DOCSLIB.ORG

Retrospectives at the Gorbachev Foundation

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Retrospectives at the Gorbachev Foundation Retrospectives at the Gorbachev Foundation Valentin Tolstykh (Chairman, Svobodnoye Siovo) One of the greatest politicians of the twentieth century, Charles de Gaulle, said after analyzing the results of May 1968 events in Paris that we live during an epoch when everybody wants changes, but usually without realizing precisely what kind. This need for changes and transformations is felt, expressed, and brought to reality by leaders: either reformists or revolutionaries. Mikhail Sergeevich, you, without a doubt, are an outstand- ing leader of the twentieth century who has changed the face and course of events in the contemporary world. Even your enemies and people hostile to you, who take advantage of every possibility to curse you, admit that. I would like to ask you a question: What do you consider yourself to be? Reformist or revolutionary? Now, ten years later, after everything that took place and happened, are you happy about everything you started in April of 1985? The term perestroika is accepted and interpreted now in a different way. And the first person who should be glad and happy with this difference of ideas and expression will be you, Mikhail Sergeevich. The best definition 1 ever heard of the meaning and essence of perestroika was the one given by an intelligent man whom 1 met by accident two years ago. In my opinion, his description was surprisingly precise and bright: "Gorbachev took the muzzle off the country, that's all about it." And 1 would like to add that he took the collar off as well. We definitely underestimate everything that happened in April 1985. It's only now that everybody became brave, courageous, and far-sighted. Look, for example, how resolute Boris Yeltsin became-look how he dismantled the Soviet Union, promised everyone as much sovereignty as one would be able to swallow; look how he attacked the Parliament with tanks, look at the kind of slaughter he made in Chechnya. And where would he be and what would he do now if Gorbachev had not started perestroika in 1985? Almost for sure, he would still be the secretary of Party Committee of Sverdlovsk oblast or if he were promoted he would have become one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In connection with this, 1 would like to ask you, Mikhail Sergeevich: now that your name is constantly pronounced and tied to the name of Yeltsin, and it is said that Yeltsin finished what Gorbachev began, to what extent is it true, if it is true at all? Mikhail S. Gorbachev The easiest question: Were the reforms necessary? Common people just say: "Mikhail Sergeevich, you initiated the reforms. We trusted you. Just perhaps, were they not necessary? We live a lot worse then before." This is a human, true-life question. I'll answer sincerely: to me, a person dedicated to active policy during forty years, the question is clear. 1 knew our system from within, and I-as a person-realized the necessity of changes long ago. The higher 1 was climbing along the nomenklatura hierarchy, the career ladder, the stronger this conviction 7 8 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA hecame. When 1 was young, I faced many problerns, but then I thought that 1 was simply unable to understand and solve many of them, that there were many people, institutions , and organizations that could solve them. Then I began to forro part of these organizations myself-first at the regional level as a member of the Central Comínittee, the first secretary of the enormous territory with everything there was in it. And 1 realized that there are limits to what 1 could do even having the power, that 1 was bound hand and foot by the system itself. 1 used to think then that the system could be improved by making the necessary changes in staff, that "I... realized the necessity of the new generation of people changes long ago. The higher I would blow away the old was climbing along nomenklatura nomenklatura. During that decade-I have noticed it hierarchy ... the stronger this myself-the flow of new people conviction became. " was very limited, everything --Mikhail Gorbachev was done under the slogan of stabilization of cadres, stabi- lization of the institutions, stabilization of the political system. But this stability gradually led to stagnation of the staff and the system itself with far-reaching consequences. The system whose backbone was a fossilized staff ceased to accept the demands of the life. I repeat that 1 was still thinking that the problem consisted mainly in the lack of staff and the need of new people. This belief stimulated my activity and made me sure that it was possible to give some oxygen to the system itself. That's how perestroika began when 1 became the head of the party and the state--and under those conditions it was the same thing. That was the beginning of my reforms. So, today 1 am convinced, sure , positive: the reforms were necessary. Their necessity was objective. We felt it very keenly since the middle of the 1970s. Other people felt it earlier. 1 mean the period of reforms ¡nade by Khrushchev and Kosygin. There were other intents, including the dissident activities. Finally, there were discussions and critical opinions in the ideological field whose outcome usually favored the system. The system defended itself by all its means and methods. But 1 would like to add that reforms were not invented by people who took power in 1985 and who suddenly became "enlightened." We were prepared by the same life and the growing understanding that the country needed reforms. The same impulses carne from outside. The Hungarian events [of 1956] took place a long time ago. Then they were considered as the intents of imperialist forces to impede the process of building socialism in Eastern Europe, to undermine the influence of the Soviet Union, to split "the new Soviet Empire." That's how we perceived and evaluated them; 1, myself, believed and considered it to be true. By the way, even now 1 would be able to produce a lot of documents from abroad proving that it was not a children's game, that this kind of policy existed and was followed by the West. Well, that "signal" could have been interpreted in that way. How can we estimate the Prague Spring, the demonstration of the Czech people in favor of socialism "with a human face"? Was it an intent to answer to the demands of a global, scientific-technological revolution? Was it not clear Perestroika: Ten Years Later 9 that the cultural level of contemporary society demanded a new understanding of the human being and society itself? Here we have to remember the beginning of the wave of reaction, the cruelest persecution and repression of different trends of thought: in general, any search at all. That was what marked the stagnation and complication of all our internal contradictions. Under the conditions of that system of power we were deaf to signals that carne from incide and outside of the country, we were not able to understand them the way we should. And what is more important, we were not able to adopt, politically and intellectually, the new concepts, new policy. This had not happened. 1 can only add that under that system the country was also losing its economic power, which it used to have due to its natural and human resources, due to the rates of growth. From the beginning of the 1970s we lost even that advantage. We realized that we were losing out from the historical point of view. And the reform- minded people said that there was only one way out-modernization, democratization. We understood that without them the country would not be able to reach new horizons. Then we still were-in our actions and thought-within the framework of the existing system. So, the understanding of the necessities of reforms was nurtured, 1 would say, suffered by the society. And reformers' task consisted not so much in inventing new models and obligating society to stick to them as in removing the restrictions and brakes, ridding society of lack of liberty, and giving it a possibility to further develop within the framework of the common civilization process. As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union and Russia were excluded from this common civilization process as the result of the Bolshevik Revolution. Thus, 1 am answering your first question and the questions of the participants of this meeting. 1 am sure that reforms were of vital necessity, as they are necessary now. Another matter is what carne out of them. But this is another "We realized that we were losing question that must also be outfrom the historical point of answered. view.... And reformers' task In connection with this, I consisted not so much in would like to discuss a popular inventing new models and thesis that has become today almost a cliché-"Gorbachev obligating society to stick to them and his mission." Yes, Gorbachev as in removing the restrictions and other thinking representatives and brakes." of the government elite of that time realized the need for reforms of the system. Yes, we thought that it would perish otherwise, and we undertook the task of saving it. Yes, we planned to give the system some oxygen via reforms, and thought that it would work due to it. Nave? But, let's remember, today's young and not-so-young clever men, what you were saying on the eve of the Nineteenth Party Conference in 1988 in the book lnogo ne dano [There Is No Other Way]: we are for "socialism with a human face, democracy, democratically renovated society." All the most zealous, the most convinced democrats, especially those who revile perestroika today and call it katastroika-are the authors of this book.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • H-Diplo Roundtable, Vol
    2018 H-Diplo Roundtable Editors: Thomas Maddux and Diane Labrosse @HDiplo Roundtable and Web Production Editor: George Fujii Introduction by Artemy M. Kalinovsky, University of Roundtable Review Amsterdam Volume XIX, No. 29 (2018) 9 April 2018 Chris Miller. The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy: Mikhail Gorbachev and the Collapse of the USSR. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016. ISBN: 978-1- 4696-3017-5 (hardcover, $29.95). URL: http://www.tiny.cc/Roundtable-XIX-29 Contents Introduction by Artemy M. Kalinovsky, University of Amsterdam ...................................................2 Review by James Cameron, Fundação Getulio Vargas .........................................................................5 Review by Yakov Feygin, The University of Pennsylvania ...................................................................8 Review by Michelle Getchell, U.S. Naval War College ......................................................................... 14 Review by Kristy Ironside, McGill University .......................................................................................... 16 Review by Vladislav Zubok, London School of Economics and Political Science .................... 20 Author’s Response by Chris Miller, Tufts University ............................................................................ 25 © 2018 The Authors. Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States License. H-Diplo Roundtable Review, Vol. XIX, No. 29 (2018) Introduction by Artemy M. Kalinovsky, University
    [Show full text]
  • Russia's Foreign Policy Change and Continuity in National Identity
    Russia’s Foreign Policy Russia’s Foreign Policy Change and Continuity in National Identity Second Edition Andrei P. Tsygankov ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC. Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK Published by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 http://www.rowmanlittlefield.com Estover Road, Plymouth PL6 7PY, United Kingdom Copyright © 2010 by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Tsygankov, Andrei P., 1964- Russia's foreign policy : change and continuity in national identity / Andrei P. Tsygankov. -- 2nd ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7425-6752-8 (cloth : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-0-7425-6753-5 (paper : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-0-7425-6754-2 (electronic) 1. Russia (Federation)--Foreign relations. 2. Soviet Union--Foreign relations. 3. Great powers. 4. Russia (Federation)--Foreign relations--Western countries. 5. Western countries--Foreign relations--Russia (Federation) 6. Nationalism--Russia (Federation) 7. Social change--Russia (Federation) I. Title. DK510.764.T785 2010 327.47--dc22 2009049396 ™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992. Printed in the United States of America It is the eternal dispute between those who imagine the world to suit their policy, and those who arrange their policy to suit the realities of the world.
    [Show full text]
  • Yeltsin's Winning Campaigns
    7 Yeltsin’s Winning Campaigns Down with Privileges and Out of the USSR, 1989–91 The heresthetical maneuver that launched Yeltsin to the apex of power in Russia is a classic representation of Riker’s argument. Yeltsin reformulated Russia’s central problem, offered a radically new solution through a unique combination of issues, and engaged in an uncompro- mising, negative campaign against his political opponents. This allowed Yeltsin to form an unusual coalition of different stripes and ideologies that resulted in his election as Russia’s ‹rst president. His rise to power, while certainly facilitated by favorable timing, should also be credited to his own political skill and strategic choices. In addition to the institutional reforms introduced at the June party conference, the summer of 1988 was marked by two other signi‹cant developments in Soviet politics. In August, Gorbachev presented a draft plan for the radical reorganization of the Secretariat, which was to be replaced by six commissions, each dealing with a speci‹c policy area. The Politburo’s adoption of this plan in September was a major politi- cal blow for Ligachev, who had used the Secretariat as his principal power base. Once viewed as the second most powerful man in the party, Ligachev now found himself chairman of the CC commission on agriculture, a position with little real in›uence.1 His ideological portfo- lio was transferred to Gorbachev’s ally, Vadim Medvedev, who 225 226 The Strategy of Campaigning belonged to the new group of soft-line reformers. His colleague Alexan- der Yakovlev assumed responsibility for foreign policy.
    [Show full text]
  • Raisa Gorbacheva, the Soviet Union’S Only First Lady
    Outraging the People by Stepping out of the Shadows Gender roles, the ‘feminine ideal’ and gender discourse in the Soviet Union and Raisa Gorbacheva, the Soviet Union’s only First Lady. Noraly Terbijhe Master Thesis MA Russian & Eurasian Studies Leiden University January 2020, Leiden Everywhere in the civilised world, the position, the rights and obligations of a wife of the head of state are more or less determined. For instance, I found out that the President’s wife in the White House has special staff to assist her in preforming her duties. She even has her own ‘territory’ and office in one wing of the White House. As it turns out, I as the First Lady had only one tradition to be proud of, the lack of any right to an official public existence.1 Raisa Maximovna Gorbacheva (1991) 1 Translated into English from Russian. From: Raisa Gorbacheva, Ya Nadeyus’ (Moscow 1991) 162. 1 Table of contents 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 3 2. Literature review ........................................................................................................................... 9 3. Gender roles and discourse in Russia and the USSR ................................................................. 17 The supportive comrade ................................................................................................................. 19 The hardworking mother ...............................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The BG News April 2, 1971
    Bowling Green State University ScholarWorks@BGSU BG News (Student Newspaper) University Publications 4-2-1971 The BG News April 2, 1971 Bowling Green State University Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/bg-news Recommended Citation Bowling Green State University, "The BG News April 2, 1971" (1971). BG News (Student Newspaper). 2578. https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/bg-news/2578 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University Publications at ScholarWorks@BGSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in BG News (Student Newspaper) by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@BGSU. Bell quits A.D. post; Young in By Harold Brown said, "Back in December it was a toss-up in my mind bet- mosphere. I expect to teach through athletics, not merely Sport Editor ween Bob Bell and Dick Young. Dick was strongly entertain," he said. recommended by a special screening committee at that Young, 39, received his B.A. from Ohio State in 19M and In an unexpected move, Bowling Green State University time and I was strongly impressed with his approach to the his M.A. in education, also from OSU. in 1959. He is has its second Athletic Director in 90 days- athletic program and his own personal characteristics of currently working on his doctoral degree here at the Richard A. Young, head Falcon baseball coach, was stability, integrity, and dedication to a balanced athletic University. appointed to fill the position vacated by the resignation of program in the University." He joined the Falcon coaching staff in 1959 as an Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • The S.A. Institute of International Affairs to Be
    THE S.A. INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS TO BE REMOVED Africa 1979: Myths, Miracles and Mirrors LI' Peter CJ. Vale After Brehznev: Who and What? Robin Knight The Arabs in Africa: Islamic Philanthropy or Petro-Colonialism? Philip Frankel A Constellation of States: Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa Deon Geldenhuys and Denis Venter Book Review Namibia Old and New: Traditional and Modem Leaders in Ovamboland by Gerhard Totemeyer VOL 3 NO 3 DEC 1979 DIE SUID-AFRIKAAJVSE INSTITIM Wi IMTERNASEOMALE AAMGELEEPJTHEDE THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INST1TUUTVAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (fountted/geslig: 1934) NATIONAL OFFICE-BEARERS/NASIONALE AMPSDRAERS CHAIRMAN/VOORSITTER Dr Leif F.geland DEPUTY CHAIRMAN/ADJUNK-VOORSITTER Gideon Rons, Sr VICE-CHAIRMEN/VISE-VOORSITTERS H.F. Oppenheimer Dr C.B. Strauss and all Chairmen of the Institute's Branches ex efficio en alle Voorsitters van die Instituut se Takke ampshalwe (Cape Town/Kaapstad, Witwatersrand, Natal, Eastern Province/Oostclike Frovinsie, Pretoria, Stelienbosch, Border/Grens, Transkei and/en SWA/Namibia) TREASUREH/TESOURIER J.C. Williams DIRECTOR/DIREKTEUR John Barratt INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BULLETIN Published by the South African Institute of Internationa] Affairs and supplied free of charge to members. Three issues per year. Subscription rate for non-members R.5,00 per annum (surface mail); R7,00 per annum (overseas airmail). Price per copy R.1,50 plus postage. Uitgegee deur die Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut van Internasionale Aangeleemhede en gratis a«n lede verskaf. Drie uitgawes per jaar. lntekengeld vir nic-lede R5.00 perjaar (landpos); R7,00 per jaar (buitelandse lugpos).
    [Show full text]
  • Embargoed Until
    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: Ashley Berke Senior Public Relations Manager 215.409.6693 [email protected] MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO RECEIVE 2008 LIBERTY MEDAL AT THE NATIONAL CONSTITUTION CENTER Award to be presented by President George H.W. Bush Philadelphia, PA – The National Constitution Center’s 2008 Liberty Medal will be awarded to former Soviet leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner Mikhail Gorbachev for his courageous role in ending the dangerous, decades-long Cold War and in giving hope and freedom to millions who lived behind the Iron Curtain. The public Liberty Medal ceremony will take place on Thursday, September 18, 2008, at the National Constitution Center on Independence Mall in Historic Philadelphia, and will set the stage for international commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 2009. “This year’s ceremony will be a memorable tribute to a revolutionary thinker with courage and conviction who believed in the power of liberty and openness,” said National Constitution Center President and CEO Joseph M. Torsella. “Mikhail Gorbachev is someone who truly changed the course of history, and we are honored to recognize him.” “During the Cold War, Gorbachev helped replace confrontation with negotiation and established a new climate between East and West,” said Torsella. “He bravely opened the doors of Soviet society to the winds of freedom and change, and he continues to be a voice for an open society today. His vision and strength were central to bringing about a peaceful end to the Cold War, and his remarkable leadership has led to profound and lasting consequences for our nations and for all people who treasure liberty.” This took both vision and courage.
    [Show full text]
  • Twenty-Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
    TMUN TWENTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION MARCH 1986 COMITTEEE DIRECTOR VICE DIRECTORS MODERATOR SIERRA CHOW NATHALIA HERRERA DAVIS HAUGEN TESSA DI VIZIO THE TWENTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS OF THE TMUN COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION A Letter from Your Director 2 Topic A: Economic Reform and Institutional Restructuring 3 Uskorenie 3 Glasnost 6 Perestroika 7 Questions to Consider 9 Topic B: National Movements and Satellite States 10 Russian Nationalism 10 Satellite States 11 Hungarian Revolution, 1956 12 Prague Spring Czechoslovakia, 1968 13 Poland Solidarity, 1980 14 The Baltics 17 Kazakhstan 19 Questions to Consider 21 Topic C: Foreign Policy Challenges 22 The Brezhnev Era 22 Gorbachev’s “New Thinking” 23 American Relations 25 Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan 26 Turning Point 28 Questions to Consider 30 Characters 31 Advice for Research and Preparation 36 General Resources 37 Topic A Key Resources 37 Topic B Key Resources 37 Topic C Key Resources 38 Bibliography 39 Topic A 39 Topic C 41 1 THE TWENTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS OF THE TMUN COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION A LETTER FROM YOUR DIRECTOR Dear Delegates, Welcome to the 27thCongress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This event represents a turning point in the Soviet Union’s history, as Mikhail Gorbachev, a champion of reform and reorientation, leads his first Congress as General Secretary. My name is Sierra Chow, and I will be your Director for the conference. I am a third-year student at the University of Toronto, enrolled in Political Science, Psychology, and Philosophy. Should you have any questions about the topics, the committee, the conference, or University of Toronto in general, please reach out to me via email and I will do my best to help.
    [Show full text]
  • Ap European History 2007 Scoring Guidelines
    AP® EUROPEAN HISTORY 2007 SCORING GUIDELINES Question 3 Considering the period 1953 to 1991, analyze the problems within the Soviet Union that contributed to the eventual collapse of the Soviet system. 8–9 Points • Thesis explicitly identifies and defines the problems within the Soviet Union in the period 1953-91 that contributed to the collapse of the Soviet system. • Essay is clearly organized, consistently followed, and effective in support of the argument regarding the problems within the Soviet Union that led to the collapse of the Soviet system. • Essay is balanced, analyzing at least TWO major problems within the Soviet Union AND how and why such problems led to the collapse of the Soviet system; essay takes into account the chronological parameters required by the question. • At least TWO major problems within the Soviet Union that led to the collapse of the Soviet system are supported with multiple pieces of relevant evidence. • May contain errors that do not detract from the argument. 6–7 Points • Thesis is explicit and responsive to the question but may not fully define the problems within the Soviet Union that contributed to the collapse of the Soviet system. • Essay is adequately organized, supportive of the argument, but may on occasion stray off task in terms of the prompts of the question (analysis, problems within the Soviet Union, linkage of such problems to the collapse of the Soviet system, coverage of the period 1953-91). • Essay analyzes at least TWO major problems within the Soviet Union AND how and why such problems led to the collapse of the Soviet system but not in equal depth; essay may concentrate on the post-1985 period but suggests at least some awareness of the broader chronology required by the question.
    [Show full text]
  • The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev 1986
    The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev 1986 Donated by A.S. Chernyaev to The National Security Archive Translated by Anna Melyakova Edited by Svetlana Savranskaya http://www.nsarchive.org Translation © The National Security Archive, 2007 The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev, 1986 http://www.nsarchive.org January 1st, 1986. At the department1 everyone wished each other to celebrate the New Year 1987 “in the same positions.” And it is true, at the last session of the CC (Central Committee) Secretariat on December 30th, five people were replaced: heads of CC departments, obkom [Oblast Committee] secretaries, heads of executive committees. The Politizdat2 director Belyaev was confirmed as editor of Soviet Culture. [Yegor] Ligachev3 addressed him as one would address a person, who is getting promoted and entrusted with a very crucial position. He said something like this: we hope that you will make the newspaper truly an organ of the Central Committee, that you won’t squander your time on petty matters, but will carry out state and party policies... In other words, culture and its most important control lever were entrusted to a Stalinist pain-in-the neck dullard. What is that supposed to mean? Menshikov’s case is also shocking to me. It is clear that he is a bastard in general. I was never favorably disposed to him; he was tacked on [to our team] without my approval. I had to treat him roughly to make sure no extraterritoriality and privileges were allowed in relation to other consultants, and even in relation to me (which could have been done through [Vadim] Zagladin,4 with whom they are dear friends).
    [Show full text]
  • BUSINESS Manchester, Conn
    20 - MANCHEffTER HERALD. Sat.. Nov. 13. 1982 BUSINESS Manchester, Conn. Cold tonight; mild Tuesday Monday, Nov.'15. 1982 — See page 2 25 Cents p in B rie f- Business advice offered HmlB I ' , . 'Old boys' help wome’P •V $•'^11 . A DAYLONG AWED workshop Nov. By Patricia McCormack fabulous, too, Mrs. Fitzpatrick said. training program, conducted in the evening every other week. 13 in Nfew York City w ill tune women into United Press International Male executives on the AWED ad­ V visory board include G.G. Micbelson, one result of this exposip-e to super ad­ opportunities in the fashion and beauty Help’s only a phone call away for a senior vice president of R.H. Macy & vice and training, Mrs. Fitzpatrick said, field'. Some 1,800 from across the country female with a grettt idea for hitting the Co.; Lawrence W- Small, executive vice is that there have been only three have paid the $50 registration feee. There w ill be 48 different workshops run f -■ road to riches via her own business but president. North American Banking bankruptcies among the AW ED alumni. stops walk by a .faculty of 220 from the ^real .jiot knowing a dime’s worth about Group, Citibank, N .A.; and Oscar Dunn, Generally, four out of five businesses fall marketing, raising money or running a former senior vice president of General in the first five years of operation, she world.” Mrs. Fitzpatrick said‘$romen accepted company. Electric and board member of J.S. said. • for the 18-month training program — a EVA, or extravehicular activity, is The help comes via the American Penney Co.
    [Show full text]
  • 1. INTRODUCTION from Bounded to Juxtapositional—New Histories of the Gulag
    1. INTRODUCTION From Bounded to Juxtapositional—New Histories of the Gulag Michael David-Fox The Gulag has long been approached as a bounded system, a network of camps isolated in the remote corners of the Soviet space. The main metaphor behind Solzhenitsyn’s epochal 1973 Arkhipelag GULAG (Gulag Archipelago) of a vast chain of islands was, in part, intended to bridge the veil of silence that surrounded the camps much like water surrounds enclaves of land. Solzhenitsyn popularized the previously little-known acronym (Glavnoe up- ravlenie ispravitel´no-trudovykh lagerei i kolonii, or the Main Administra- tion of Corrective Labor Camps and Colonies of the GPU/NKVD and later MVD), turning it into a metonym for not just the NKVD network of labor camps but, by extension, all Soviet camps—and later, in its most expansive usages, Stalinist repression writ large. This symbolic meaning attached to the term no doubt helped reify the Gulag as a discrete entity separated from the Soviet mainland. Early scholarly contributions to the history of the Gulag were not only heavily influenced by Solzhenitsyn’s metaphor but often took a systemic ap- proach by treating the network of camps and colonies as a whole. The most significant examples of this came before the “archival revolution” of the 1990s, which was marked by a statistical war over the total number of victims.1 In addition, the history of the Gulag was very much bounded chronologically, largely by the years of Stalinism, since the camps as a mass system of forced labor arose under secret police supervision in 1930, shortly after Stalin con- solidated sole power, and were radically reduced several years after his death during Khrushchev’s Thaw.2 Finally, there was little if any comparison to the history of camps or forced labor in other times and places.
    [Show full text]