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Russia's Foreign Policy Change and Continuity in National Identity

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Russia's Foreign Policy Change and Continuity in National Identity Russia’s Foreign Policy Russia’s Foreign Policy Change and Continuity in National Identity Second Edition Andrei P. Tsygankov ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC. Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK Published by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 http://www.rowmanlittlefield.com Estover Road, Plymouth PL6 7PY, United Kingdom Copyright © 2010 by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Tsygankov, Andrei P., 1964- Russia's foreign policy : change and continuity in national identity / Andrei P. Tsygankov. -- 2nd ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7425-6752-8 (cloth : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-0-7425-6753-5 (paper : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-0-7425-6754-2 (electronic) 1. Russia (Federation)--Foreign relations. 2. Soviet Union--Foreign relations. 3. Great powers. 4. Russia (Federation)--Foreign relations--Western countries. 5. Western countries--Foreign relations--Russia (Federation) 6. Nationalism--Russia (Federation) 7. Social change--Russia (Federation) I. Title. DK510.764.T785 2010 327.47--dc22 2009049396 ™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992. Printed in the United States of America It is the eternal dispute between those who imagine the world to suit their policy, and those who arrange their policy to suit the realities of the world. —Albert Sorel (Carr 1964, 11) Contents Note on the Transliteration ix List of Tables xi Chronology of Key Foreign Policy Events, 1985–2009 xiii Preface xxiii 1 Understanding Change and Continuity in Russia’s Foreign Policy 1 2 The Cold War Crisis and the Soviet New Thinking 31 3 The Post–Cold War Euphoria and Russia’s Liberal Westernism 55 4 The New Security Challenges and Great Power Balancing 93 5 The World after September 11 and Great Power Pragmatism 129 6 The U.S. Regime Change Strategy and a New Face of Great Power Pragmatism 171 7 The Post-Western World and Russia’s Search for a New Direction 201 8 Conclusions and Lessons 221 Essential Reading 245 Index 249 About the Author 265 vii Note on the Transliteration In transliterating names from the Russian, I have used “y” to denote “й,” “ ’ ” to denote “ь” and “ъ,” “yu” to denote “ю,” “ya” to denote “я,” “i” to denote “й” and “ий,” “iyi” to denote double “и,” “e” to denote “э,” “kh” to denote “х,” “zh” to denote “ж,” “ts” to denote “ц,” “ch” to denote “ч,” “sh” to denote “ш,” and “sch” to denote “щ.” I have also used “Ye” to distinguish the sound of “E” (such as “Yevropa”) in the beginning of a word from that in the middle of a word (such as “vneshnei”). Everywhere, I did not distinguish between “e” and “ë.” Original spelling is retained in quotations. ix Tables 1.1 Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity 9 1.2 International Relations Theories and Their Perspectives on Foreign Policy 15 1.3 Constructivist Explanation of Foreign Policy: A Causal Process 17 1.4 Explaining Russia’s Foreign Policy after Communism 21 2.1 GNP for USSR and USA, 1960–1985 35 2.2 New Thinking: View of National Interest 37 2.3 New Thinking (NT): Contending Views 40 2.4 Gorbachev’s Legacy in Security Policy 42 2.5 Growth Rates for the Soviet Economy, 1985–1991 43 2.6 The Rise of Ethnonationalism in the Union Republics, 1989–1991 47 2.7 Limits on Arms Accepted or Proposed by Gorbachev, 1983–1991 50 2.8 The Record of New Thinking 51 3.1 Westernist Course: View of National Interest 58 3.2 The Spectrum of Russia’s Post-Soviet Foreign Policy Thinking 62 3.3 Westernism (Wsm): Contending Views 65 3.4 External Aid and Investment: Russia and Other Recipients, 1990–1995 71 3.5 Post-Soviet Economic Decline: Russia Relative to Other Ex-Republics 83 3.6 Russia and the Ex-Republics: Economic, Military, and Cultural Dependencies 84 3.7 The Record of Westernist Course 86 4.1 Great Power Balancing: View of National Interest 97 xi xii Tables 4.2 Great Power Balancing (GPB): Contending Views 101 4.3 Russia’s Power Resources Relative to Other Powerful States 102 4.4 Russia’s Government Revenue and Expenditure, 1992–1998 105 4.5 Russia and China: Demographic and Economic Disparities in the Far East, 1997 111 4.6 Russia’s Power Capabilities Relative to Former Soviet States 113 4.7 The Record of Great Power Balancing 122 5.1 Russia’s Economic Recovery, 1998–2001 130 5.2 Russia’s Increased Military Budget, 1999–2002 133 5.3 Defensive Pragmatism: View of National Interest 134 5.4 Defensive Pragmatism (DP): Contending Views 138 5.5 Russia’s Foreign Policy Discourse after September 11 139 5.6 Favorable View of the United States 145 5.7 The Record of Defensive Pragmatism 162 6.1 Russia’s Basic Economic Indicators, 1999-2007 174 6.2 Assertive Pragmatism: View of National Interest 178 6.3 Assertive Pragmatism (AP): Contending Views 181 6.4 Russia’s Foreign Policy Discourse 182 6.5 The Record of Assertive Pragmatism 195 7.1 Russia’s New Debate on Foreign Policy 208 7.2 GDP Based on PPP, Share of the World 211 8.1 Russia’s Five Visions of the World and National Interest 226 Chronology of Key Foreign Policy Events, 1985–2009 1985 March U.S.-Soviet arms negotiations in Geneva April Gorbachev announces a unilateral moratorium on deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles and proposes a moratorium on all nuclear weapons tests Eduard Shevardnadze succeeds Andrei Gromyko as Soviet for- eign minister July Soviet Union imposes five-month moratorium on nuclear weap- ons tests, making its extension contingent upon a similar U.S. response September Moscow proposes at Geneva negotiations that United States and USSR reduce long- and medium-range nuclear weapons by 50 percent 1986 January Gorbachev proposes a ban on all nuclear weapons by the year 2000 June Warsaw Pact meeting in Budapest proposes mutual Warsaw Pact– NATO troops reduction of 100,000 to 150,000 men and the re- duction of military capabilities to those “necessary for defense” July Gorbachev announces in Vladivostok a five-point plan for coop- eration in the Asia-Pacific region and advocates closer ties with China xiii xiv Chronology October Reagan and Gorbachev meet in Reykjavik, Iceland 1987 May General Dmitri Yazov is named the new Soviet defense minister December Gorbachev and Reagan sign in Washington the INF treaty elimi- nating all 2,611 Soviet and U.S. intermediate-range nuclear forces 1988 January Gorbachev announces the need for “innovative policies” in East- ern Europe May U.S.-Soviet summit in Moscow December Gorbachev announces before the United Nations General Assem- bly a unilateral reduction of Soviet forces by some 500,000 sol- diers, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery pieces, and 800 combat air- craft 1989 April Soviet crackdown on Georgian nationalists in Tbilisi; twenty demonstrators killed and two hundred wounded Unilateral withdrawal of Soviet forces begins from Hungary May Gorbachev before Council of Europe promises not to interfere militarily in political events in Eastern Europe October Shevardnadze proclaims before the Supreme Soviet that the So- viet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979 “violated the norms of proper behavior” and that the Krasnoyarsk radar installation is illegal under the 1972 ABM treaty December “Big Four” (United States, France, Great Britain, and USSR) meet to discuss the status of Berlin 1990 January Soviet troops are deployed to Azerbaijan in the wake of massive anti-Armenian demonstrations February “Two Plus Four” talks on German reunification announced March In response to Lithuania’s declaration of independence, Soviet paratroopers seize the headquarters of the Lithuanian Commu- nist Party Chronology xv May U.S.-Soviet summit in Washington July Gorbachev and Kohl announce agreement to allow reunified Ger- many to belong to NATO November NATO and Warsaw Pact states sign the CFE treaty and the Char- ter of Paris at the CSCE Summit Gorbachev proposes a new Union treaty December Shevardnadze resigns as Soviet foreign minister 1991 January Soviet troops crack down on pro-independence forces in Lithua- nia and Latvia; nineteen protesters killed March In the Soviet referendum voters choose to preserve the union; Baltics, Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova boycott the vote July Warsaw Pact is disbanded in Prague Bush and Gorbachev reach an agreement in Moscow on the Stra- tegic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Ten Soviet republics reach an agreement on a new Union treaty to be signed on August 20 August Coup against Gorbachev December Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus establish the CIS in Minsk Gorbachev resigns as president of the USSR 1992 February Foreign Ministry conference “The Transformed Russia in the New World” March Kozyrev briefly travels to China April Bush, supported by Kohl, announces $24 billion package for Russia Yeltsin orders withdrawal of troops from Nagorno-Karabakh and asks for the deployment of NATO troops Russia places the Fourteenth Army in Moldova under its control May Russia supports the United Nations’ sanctions against Yugoslavia Russia signs the CIS Collective Security treaty Russia joins the IMF and World Bank June Russia and United States agree on terms of START II July Yeltsin at G-7 summit Yeltsin and Moldova’s president Snegur sign peace agreement over Transdniestr conflict December Yeltsin visits China xvi Chronology Kozyrev acknowledges the need to be more active on the eastern front 1993 January Yeltsin attends the Civic Union’s congress Bush and Yeltsin sign START II April New Foreign Policy Concept signed into law May Russia initiates the CIS Economic Union agreement at Moscow summit July The Tokyo G-7 summit declares a $43.4 billion package of assis- tance for Russia October Russia withdraws from the ruble zone U.S.
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