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Anglo-American Discourse About the USSR, 1984-1986

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Anglo-American Discourse About the USSR, 1984-1986 Anglo-American Discourse About the USSR, 1984-1986. Melody Catherine Watson School of Humanities Department of History The University of Adelaide Submitted for the postgraduate qualification of Doctor of Philosophy (History) November 2017 2 Contents Abstract ................................................................................................................................................... 4 Declaration .............................................................................................................................................. 6 Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................. 7 List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................ 8 Notes........................................................................................................................................................ 9 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 10 Foundations ................................................................................................................................... 11 Approach ....................................................................................................................................... 12 Thesis Structure ............................................................................................................................. 13 Chapter One: Methodology ................................................................................................................... 15 Discourse and Identity ................................................................................................................... 15 Narrating the late Cold War .......................................................................................................... 20 Russia and the Soviet Union .......................................................................................................... 21 The Role of Gorbachev .................................................................................................................. 24 The United Kingdom and the United States .................................................................................. 26 Mainstream discourses .................................................................................................................. 26 Methodology ................................................................................................................................. 32 Chapter One: Common Threads in Anglo-American Discourse About the USSR, January 1984– February 1985. ....................................................................................................................................... 39 Historical Overview ........................................................................................................................ 40 Timeline of Significant Events, 1982-1985 .................................................................................... 43 Common Threads .......................................................................................................................... 43 Media Commentators — Ian Davidson and William Safire ........................................................... 47 Political Discourse — Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher ...................................................... 57 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 72 Chapter Two: Discursive Tensions in Anglo-American Discourse About the USSR, January 1984– February 1985. ....................................................................................................................................... 74 Discursive Tensions ........................................................................................................................ 75 Key Debates ................................................................................................................................... 77 Cold War ........................................................................................................................................ 79 Reagan and Thatcher ..................................................................................................................... 82 Davidson and Safire ....................................................................................................................... 95 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 108 3 Chapter Three: Political Discourses from Chernenko to Geneva, March 1985–April 1986................. 111 Gorbachev and Geneva ................................................................................................................ 112 Nuclear Strategy and Foreign Policy ............................................................................................ 114 Defence, Strength and Deterrence .............................................................................................. 117 The Strategic Defense Initiative ................................................................................................... 124 Ronald Reagan on Peace .............................................................................................................. 131 Margaret Thatcher on Peace ....................................................................................................... 142 Geneva, Before and After ............................................................................................................ 146 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 153 Chapter Four: Understanding Gorbachev: Newspaper Discourses of Anxiety, Optimism and Masculinity, March 1985-April 1986 .................................................................................................... 156 Gorbachev and Geneva ................................................................................................................ 157 Gender and Metaphor ................................................................................................................. 158 Walker on Gorbachev as Protagonist ........................................................................................... 163 Davidson on Gorbachev as Foil .................................................................................................... 172 Safire on Gorbachev as Antagonist .............................................................................................. 177 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 184 Chapter Five: Glasnost and the Chernobyl Disaster ............................................................................ 187 The Disaster .................................................................................................................................. 188 Chernobyl as a Critical Discourse Moment .................................................................................. 189 Methodology ................................................................................................................................ 191 Initial Responses, 28-30 April ....................................................................................................... 192 Chernobyl and Soviet Secrecy, 28 April-6 May ............................................................................ 196 Chernobyl and Glasnost, 2 May-Onwards ................................................................................... 204 Walker on Chernobyl ................................................................................................................... 211 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 217 Chapter Six: Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 220 Patterns and Concepts ................................................................................................................. 220 The Consequences of Discursive Change ..................................................................................... 228 Appendix 1: Past, Present, and Future in Reagan’s Major Speeches, January 1984-March 1985 ...... 233 Appendix 2: Number and Distribution of Articles Referencing Chernobyl, 29 April 1986-16 May 1986. .............................................................................................................................................................. 235 Appendix 3: Sources provided in initial articles about the Chernobyl disaster, 29 April 1986. ........... 236 Bibliography ......................................................................................................................................... 239 4 Abstract This thesis examines mainstream discourses about the Soviet Union in the United States and United Kingdom from 1984 to 1986. For more than 50 years, the Soviet Union presented
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