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JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1986 VOL XXXV

Problems of Communism (ISSN 0032-941 x) is a Moscow's Afghan War bimonthly publication providing analyses and significant information about the contemporary affairs of the by la/may Khalilzad Soviet Union, China, and comparable states and political mqvements. Views of contributors, as well as 21 China's Economic Experiment: From Mao to Market geographic boundaries and names, do not necessarily by Jan S. Pryby/a reflect the policies of the United States Government. 39 Gorbachev and Eastern Europe by Vladimir V. Kusin On a/I editoriai matters, communications should be addressed to: The Editors, Problems of Communism, US Information Agency, United States of America, BOOKS 301 4th Street SW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA. Telephone (202) 485-2230. 54 Politics of Soviet Law by Robert Sharlet

On subscriptions, communications should be addressed 61 Last Stages of Leninism to: The Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402, USA, by Melvin Croan preferably using the subscription form provided at the back of this issue. Outside the United States, please 67 Limits of Critical Marxism address inquiries to the Public Affairs Section, Embassy by Vladimir Tismaneanu of the United States of America. 77 Soviet Designs on Africa by Barry M. Schutz Copyright: Reproduction or republication of texts from Problems of Communism is permissible, and no claim of copyright is asserted. However, the Editors request that they be advised of reprint usage and that source 84 Correspondence credit be given both to the authors of individual articles and to Problems of Communism. Should textual items in the journal ever be subject to a claim of copyright, such claim will be clearly stated. Graphics and pictures Cover: An Afghan resistance fighter takes aim with an anti-tank that carry a credit line are not necessarily owned by weapon. Photo by Pascal Pugin, lmapress via Pictorial Parade. Problems of Communism, and users bear responsibility for obtaining appropriate permissions.

EDITOR An annual index for Problems of Communism appears Paul A. Smith, Jr. in the November-December issue (No. 6) of each year except in the case of the first three volumes, which are MANAGING EDITOR SENIOR TEXT EDITOR covered in a combined index in the November­ Wayne Hall Sophia Sluzar December issue (No. 6) of Vol. Ill. Material from the journal is also indexed in ABC POL SCI, Bibliographie ASSOCIATE EDITOR CONTRIBUTING EDITOR Internationale des Sciences Socia/es (all sections), Richard Snyder Maria Pryshlak Current Contents, Economic Abstracts, Historical Abstracts, Index to US Government Periodicals, DESIGNER International Political Science Abstracts, Public Affairs Gary Soderstrom Information Service, Social Sciences Citation Index, Social Sciences Index, Strategic Studies Reference PRODUCTION COORDINATOR EDITORIAL ASSISTANT Guide, and United States Political Science Documents. Sarah E. Mewborn Kim Taylor lN THIS ISSUE OF

Artict~s

Moscow'sAfghan War ZaJmay Khalilzad

In the seventh year of its war ln Atghanjstan, the USSR is appty'ing increasrngly sophisticated military tactics 10 subdue the country. Moscow is parring its military efforts with a domestic pacification program and an international .campaign to gain legltlmacy for a pro-Soviet communist govern~nt in Kabul. For tf'ieir part,. the Afghan M1>jahedln·are contesting Kabul's legitimacy in internat!Qnal forun1$ and holding their. ownagainst Sov~t forces inAfghanistan.

China'sEco~mii; Experiment:Ff()nt M~ ·to Market Jan ~- Prybyla ,, ," ' .·..... t <:; ~oltow_rri9 a four,year period of adjustment that saw marked improvement· in. the quantitative • \ • ~rforrnance of Chma·s industry and agriculture, Chinese readers in 1981 embarked on a new :• !::;{.\.'. • c®rse of ~omlc reform to help cure the economy's qualitative ills. 1n1t1ally,experiments with · J(~~ mar.~ets arij:l privatization of labor and property were begun in the countryside .. In 1985'.these experiments were extended to the urban industrlat economy. Beijing still taces the problem of .. reclonplllng t~acincompaflbility between the market mechanism and ~ntral plan institutions. ,,, ,','' ,' ' ' '

.·•.!QQrb~r:tw~ and Ea$tJm Europe ~la.diirilt l(usin ''/' ,''v; "' I

. Mos<:o.wsllea/ings with Eastern Europe since Mikhail Gorbachev'$ accession have been senerany ctlara<:teriiej:l by continulry. Polic1es of bloc integration and mmtary cooperation have been pµrsµ~ with li;tle.slgliilicant change beyond a modest increase in Soviet vigor. Gorpachev's steps topate have ottered little prospect .of improving economic performance. the Achilles· heel of the region,.. •

Essay-reviews

Politics of Soviet Law Robert Sharret

Although "socialist legality" is no longer 99 percent political. the Communist Party of the Soviet Union continues to interfere in the.everyday admilJistratiooof }ustlce-a point w.elt illustrated by recent emlgre Soviet jurists. The interplay between politics and law in. the USSR raises the question as to what, if any, positive role Soyletjurists can play in shaping the system's future.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)·

·, I .

0 \. C, / ,;, ,,., i ;~U- .. Zalmay Khalilzad

,.I n December 27, 1985, Moscow's war in Afghan­ are trying to strengthen a recently formed alliance istan entered its seventh year. It has yet to among seven major factions, bring about greater co­ progress according to Soviet expectations. The ordination of military operations in Afghanistan, and Soviet-installed regime of Babrak Karmal remains in­ adopt new political strategies in international forums. effective. The factionalism in the People's Democratic The war in Afghanistan is thus as much a test of will Party of Af~hanistan (POPA) remains fierce. But most and resolve as it is a clash of opposing forces. important, despite a commitment of some 120,000 The war has been immensely costly for the Afghan Soviet troops, the Soviet and Karmal forces have people. Some 4 million, or nearly one in every four of been unable to rout the anti-Soviet, anticommunist the pre-invasion population, have become refugees in forces, the Mujahedin. And so the war goes on. I ran or Pakistan. According to The New York Times But this is not the story of a stalemate. Rather, it is some 500,000 Afghans have lost their lives since the a tale of changing Soviet tactics against continued Soviet invasion.1 It is also estimated that up to four partisan resistance, and of increasing competition million Afghans have become displaced within their between them for the support of the Afghan people at own country since they have been moving to the cities home and for public sentiment abroad. For its part, or to the mountains from the countryside to escape Moscow is escalating its military efforts and applying from the fighting.2 In some parts of Afghanistan political pressure in the hope of undermining the famine and malnutrition are common.3 Afghans' will to resist. The greater military effort is Yet, the Soviet Union has also had to pay a higher accompanied by a large-scale program of "Sovietiza­ price for its involvement than Soviet leaders had prob­ tion" designed to transform Afghan society along ably anticipated. Although exact figures are difficult to socialist lines. Moscow is also renewing its efforts to come by, the estimates are that between 10,000 and lessen support for the Mujahedin in states friendly to 40,000 Soviet soldier's already have lost their lives in them, especially Pakistan and Iran. It has allowed the Afghanistan.4 Hundreds of planes, helicopters, tanks, Kabul regime to engage in UN-sponsored indirect and armored vehicles have been destroyed.5 Large talks with Pakistan, in the hope that diplomacy will facilities for accommodating Soviet forces in Afghan­ supplement its military efforts against the Mujahedin. istan had to be constructed and some of them have The leaders of the Afghan resistance, for their part, had to be rebuilt or repaired after being attacked by the resistance groups. The direct costs of the six years of war have been estimated at 18 to 36 billion

Za/may Kha/ilzad is Associate Professor in the De­ partment of Political Science, and a member of the ' The New York Times, Dec. 10, 1985. Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia Univer­ 'See Statement of G. Hekmatyar to the UN. New York, October 1985. sity (New York). He is author of Security of Southwest ' For a discussion of humanitarian needs, see the statement by Gerald B. Helmand and Richard Schiller submitted to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Asia (1984), and coauthor of "The Government of Europe, US Congress, Dec. 4, 1985. God": Iran's Islamic Republic (1984). The author • Estimates of the number of Soviet fatalities vary a great deal. The Mujahedin wishes to thank professors Zbigniew Brzezinski and estimate Soviet losses at 50,000 dead by the end of 1985. The US government Robert Jervis for comments on an earlier draft, and estimates that some 10,000 Soviets have died in Afghanistan over the past six years. See The Washington Post, Dec. 2, 1985. the Ford Foundation for a grant to study security 'According to US government estimates, the Soviets have lost 700 aircraft in issues in the Asian rim/and. Afghanistan. Ibid.

1 Moscow's Afghan War

US dollars, not an insignificant amount for an econ­ earnest on December 24, 1979 when Soviet airborne omy that already suffers from serious shortcomings. 6 troops began to land at Kabul. Within three days, The Soviets also have had to assume some of the bur­ some 5,000 troops had been airlifted to the Afghan den of the Afghan economy which has been severely capital. With these forces the Soviets overthrew the disrupted by the war. Moscow even has had to pay communist government headed by Hafizullah Amin, some of Afghanistan's foreign debt. disarmed Afghan soldiers in Kabul, and seized impor­ Afghanistan continues to be a political vulnerability tant facilities, such as the radio station.8 As the air­ for the Kremlin. To the Soviets' dismay, they are wide­ borne troops were taking over the Afghan capital, two ly seen as being colonialists. The UN General Assem­ Soviet motorized rifle divisions crossed the Amu bly has called for the departure of "foreign troops" Darya (Oxus River) from Central Asia. More forces from Afghanistan since 1980 with larger majorities followed. By early January 1980, the number of Soviet each year. The image of the Red Army has been tar­ soldiers had reached 85,000. nished by reports of the Soviet soldiers' drug abuse The Soviets divided the country into seven military and defections. Soviet human rights abuses, detailed regions. The 201st Motorized Rifle Division, located at for example in the 1985 UN-sponsored report by Felix Konduz and Fayzabad, had primary responsibility for Ermacora,7 the activities around the world of groups the security of the northeast. The 16th Motorized Rifle supportive of the Mujahedin, and the continuing effec­ Division, based in Mazar-e-Sharif, was responsible for tiveness of the principal resistance groups in Afghan­ the security of Balkh province and surrounding areas. istan continue to embarrass Moscow. The 275th Division, operating out of Jalalabad, was In spite of thes~ costs, neither side appears willing assigned the East-Central region. The 105th Airborne to give up the fight or to accept a "political settlement" Division and the 360th Motorized Rifle Division were that does not meet its chief goals. The basic Soviet made responsible for the security of Kabul and the goal is to assure the continued existence of a friendly surrounding areas. The 54th Division and the 68th communist regime in Afghanistan. The Mujahedin re­ Division were responsible for Herat and western fuse to accept such a regime. Thus, both sides are Afghanistan. The 357th Motorized Rifle Division was preparing for a protracted struggle, and each is hop­ stationed in Qandahar in the southeast. The Soviets ing that time will be on its side. also have air assault brigades in various locations. This article will review the Soviet conduct of the Some 30,000 soldiers based in Soviet Central Asia are war, as well as Moscow's pacification strategy. It will held in reserve along the Afghan border for possible also look at the resistance forces and their efforts to use in Afghanistan, especially northern Afghanistan. 9 oppose the Soviet Union both militarily and politically. The number of Soviet troops stationed in Afghan­ To gain a better understanding of Soviet involvement istan was increased by about 10,000 soldiers annually in Afghanistan, it is instructive to look at Soviet in 1981, 1982, and 1984. There are indications that in military tactics as they have evolved since the inva­ 1985 the increase was between 5,000 and 10,000. sion. Thus, the total number of Soviet troops committed to Afghanistan is approximately 155,000-125,000 in­ side Afghanistan and some 30,000 on the Afghan Soviet Military Tactics border.10

The Soviets have yet to devise a military strategy • As a KGB defector reported, the Soviets deployed in the vicinity of Kabul moved to eliminate Amin with speed and efficiency: which would let them exercise real control over "Along the road, the column was stopped at an Afghan checkpoint. Afghan troops Afghanistan in short order. Their inability to do so has gathered around to find out what was happening. Suddenly the flaps of the front made them change their military tactics repeatedly vehicle went up and the Afghans were machine-gunned to the ground. The column rolled on. When it reached the palace, the special troops attacked from three sides, and increase the number of their troops. while Colonel Bayerenov led the attack on the palace. The attack got off to a good The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan began in start. It would have been even better had the leading armored vehicle not got caught up in the palace gates. Moscow wanted no Afghans left to tell the tale of what had happened in the palace. No prisoners were to be taken. Anybody leaving the building 'For economic costs of the war, see Joseph J. Collins, "The Soviet Afghan War," in was to be shot on sight. Amin was found drinking in a bar on the top floor of the Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman, Eds., The Lessons of Recent Wars in the palace. He was shot without question." Time (New York), Nov. 22, 1982. Third World, Vol. 1, Lexington, MA, DC Heath, 1985, p. 197; also Nake Kamrany and • The New York Times, Oct. 9, 1980; David Isby, "Afghanistan, 1982: The War Leon Poullada, The Potential of Afghanistan's Society and Institutions to Resist Soviet Continues," International Defense Review (Geneva ), No. 11, 1982, and The Penetration and Domination, Los Angeles, Modelling Research Group, 1985. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1984-1985, London, authors assert the economic costs could be US$12 billion annually. IISS, 1985. 'The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, Situation of Human Rights "US Government sources estimate that the total number of Soviet troops in in Afghanistan (New York), A140-843, Nov. 5, 1985. Afghanistan was 120,000 in the fall of 1985. The Washington Post, Dec. 2, 1985.

2 + Airµort City @• National Capital International Boundary Province Boundary Road Rail Line w Moscow's Afghan War

The Soviets have also upgraded their weapons. The Soviets left the responsibility for pursuing the MiG-21 aircraft have been replaced by MiG-23 Mujahedin in the outlying areas largely to the Afghan fighters and MiG-27 strike planes. Two squadrons of regular forces under the control of the Karma! govern­ the sophisticated Su-25's fighters have been ment. These forces, however, were much weakened deployed in Afghanistan. The Soviets have also after the Soviet invasion by the defections of between dramatically increased the number of Mi-24 heli­ 30,000 and 40,000 soldiers to the Mujahedin.14 copter gunships and have introduced a large number Moscow also began to rely more on small and mobile of heavy-lift helicopters. The Soviet ground troops are forces conducting search-and-destroy operations. Ac­ also using much more sophisticated equipment.11 cording to many reports, including a number of Soviet military tactics have changed over the documents released by the US government, the years, indicating a trial-and-error search for ap­ Soviets also began to use chemical weapons on a proaches that might work. During 1980, believing that significant scale against the Mujahedin.15 the Mujahedin could easily be defeated, the Soviets Soviet operations in 1981 reflected the new ap­ employed large formations in an offensive strategy proach. The biggest operations were carried out in against the resistance forces, pursuing them to their Panjshir, because of concern over the security of strongholds. Intense fighting took place in the eastern Salang road, and in the Paghman area which is 16 . and northeastern parts of the country, especially in miles northwest of Kabul. Between June and Sep­ Konar and Badakhshan provinces. But the Mujahedin tember both regions were subjected to major attacks - not surprisingly-used different tactics than by the Soviets. The Soviets responded to an uprising Moscow expected them to use. Rather than standing in the city of Qandahar with artillery bombardments. in place and fighting a conventional war, they adopted The disappointing results of the 1981 operations hit-and-run tactics. 12 prompted the Soviets to send a high-level delegation Lack of success led Moscow to change its ap­ headed by First Deputy Defense Minister (now proach. Rather than pursuing the resistance and Defense Minister) Sergey Sokolov to Afghanistan at seeking quick victory, the Soviet forces went on the the end of the year. Apparently, Sokolov concluded defensive. They sought to maintain control over the that the number of Soviet forces was inadequate even cities and towns, key communication points, military for a defensive strategy and recommended that more facilities, and main transportation arteries, thus leav­ forces be sent to Afghanistan. While their forces ing the countryside to the resistance. The shift, which focused on holding the cities and keeping the lines of occurred late in 1980, was influenced by two other communication open, the Soviets encouraged Karma! factors. First, major uprisings occurred in several to go on the offensive against the Mujahedin in the Afghan cities including Kabul, Herat, Jalalabad, rural areas. Karma! exhorted his forces to take "the Sorubi, and Aybak.13 Second, the resistance groups revolutionary struggle" to the provinces, districts, and were complicating Soviet logistical problems and the villages. normal economic functioning of the country by attack­ Soviet efforts in 1982 again failed to bring major ing the country's lines of communication. The Soviets victories. Soviet forces bombed the Shomali region were, as they continue to be, particularly concerned near Kabul because the Mujahedin had attacked the with threats against the Salang Tunnel on the road Bag ram Air Base from that area. Moscow also applied linking Kabul to the Soviet border in the north. The substantial force against Herat in July after part of Panjshir partisans, led by Ahmed Shah Massud, who that city fell to the Mujahedin. The Soviets also carried is by now the best-known of the Mujahedin com­ out two offensives in the Panjshir valley to reduce the manders, were a continuous threat to the Salang pressure against the Salang road (May and August). Pass. The May offensive was one of the biggest military op­ erations since the invasion, involving some 12,000 to 15,000 soldiers. The Panjshir offensive was followed by a similar move once again against Paghman in "Joseph J. Collins, "The Soviet-Afghan War," loc. cit., passim. June-July.16 By the end of July, the Kabul regime had_ " For a discussion of Soviet military efforts during 1980, see Zalmay Khalilzad, "Soviet Occupied Afghanistan," Problems of Communism (Washington, DC), November-December 1980; James Hansen, "Afghanistan: the Soviet Experience," National Defense (Arlington, VA), Vol. 66, 1982, pp. 20-22; Nearby Observer, "The " Ibid., p. 206. Afghan-Soviet War: Stalemate or Evolution?" Middle East Journal (Washington, DC), "US Department of State, Special Report (Washington, DC), Nos. 98 and 104, 1982 Spring 1982. "Edward Girardet, "How Stubborn Tribesmen Nibble Russians to Death," U.S. "Henry Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, Durham, NC, Duke University News and World Report (Washington, DC), July 12, 1982; and US Department of State, Press. 1983, p. 208. "Afghanistan: Three Years of Occupation," spec/a/ Report, No. 106, December 1982.

4 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986

Vying tor the Panjshir Valley: at left, a Soviet camp on the perimeter of the strategically important valley in August 1983; at right, resistance leader Ahmad Shah Massud (center), the "Lion of the Panjshir," leads a patrol .

-Nagakura)GAMMA-LIAISON .. " declared the area free of Mujahedin. However , in in Panjshir, the Soviets sought to divide the resistance October ·and November the Soviets carried out yet an­ parties by offering Massud a ceasefire to which he other offensive against the area . In both Paghman and agreed . The ceasefire lasted until spring 1984, and Panjshir , the Soviet dilemma in 1982 was that when caused some resentment against Massud both within they moved into the area the Mujahedin retreated his own group as well as among other resistance from the valley to the mountains and then carried out leaders . However, in several other areas the Soviets attacks against the Soviets and the Karma! troops at faced increased military pressure . During the sum­ times of their choosing . In order to flush out the Mu­ mer, Kabul itself, its Bala Hissar barracks , and the jahedin from caves where they had hidden, the Soviet military headquarters and embassy came un­ Soviets continued to use chemical weapons- inca­ der attack on a number of occasions . For several pacitants, lethal chemicals, and perhaps even myco­ months, the Soviets lost control in parts of Herat, toxin biological weapons. According to US govern­ Mazar-e-Sharif, and Qandahar. To deal with these Mu­ ment estimates, some 3,000 deaths resulted from )ahedin attacks , the Soviets bombed the western sub­ Soviet use of these agents in 1981 and 1982.17 urbs of He rat in April , causing heavy casualties. 19 i It was probably not until 1983 that the Soviet Soviet frustrations led to more modifications in tac­ leaders realized that, short of a massive increase in tics in 1984, including increased attacks on civilians, the number of their forces, a quick military victory in a greater reliance on Soviet troops, and the establish­ Afghanistan was unlikely. Yet, the Soviets did not aug­ ment of security outposts manned by Soviet troops. ment their forces in 1983. Moscow might have begun The Soviets apparently made a conscious decision to considering at that point the possibility that the go after civilian targets directly in areas of strong negotiations on a settlement , initiated in 1982 under resistance . Crops were burned, animals killed, and UN sponsorship, might bring about international ac­ houses destroyed. At times, hundreds of civilians ceptance of the Soviet-installed regime. Moscow may were killed . This led to the depopulation of some also have been reacting to growing international resistance strongholds-for example, Paghman, and criticism of its conduct of the war, especially the use parts of Panjshir, Logar, and Paktia . In some areas , of chemical agents (which became considerably less the resistance units now have to bring along their own Jrequent du ring 1983).18 food supplies since the local population is no longe r" ·• From a military viewpoin t, 1983 was a mixed year there to provide it. The object of this policy was to for the Soviets . Having failed to defeat the Mujahedin complicate the logistics of the resistance as well as to

"US Department of State, Special Report, Nos. 98 and 104, 1982: also The Christian "Louis Dupree, "Afghanistan in 1983: And Still No Solution, " Asian Survey Science Monitor (Boston), Sept. 16. 1982. (Berkeley, CA), February 1984; Sayed B. Majrooh , "Afghan istan 1983," Afghan "William Branigan, " Afghanistan : Inside a Soviet War Zone," The Washington Post, Information Center, Monthly Bulletin (Peshawar), No. 32-33 , November-December six-part series, October 1983. 1983; U.S. News and Wocld Report, Aug. 1, 1983. p. 22.

5 Moscow's Afghan War

undermine support for the resistance among the non­ terized as an incremental escalation aimed at break­ combatant population. Moscow might also have in­ ing the stalemate in the war. In 1985, the Soviets ac­ tended to increase the number of refugees in Iran and celerated this trend. They carried out several major Pakistan in the hope of turning around the positive at­ offensives against resistance strongholds- Herat titude toward the Mujahedin in both countries. 20 was attacked twice, in April and October, Konar in The Soviets also began to employ a mix of large June, Panjshir in July, and Paktia in September.23 conventional forces and small special forces units in Soviet military actions in 1985 also had two addi­ their operations. The special forces increasingly tional goals. First, the Soviets strengthened their engaged in guerrilla-type operations against the Mu­ efforts to cut off or limit the supply routes of the jahedin. Another innovation was the use of helicopter Mujahedin. Increased Soviet military activity near the units for night-time attacks. The use of Soviet forces in Iranian and Pakistani borders was intended in part to challenging resistance control in the countryside in­ serve this purpose. Lacking the manpower in Afghan­ creased, thus modifying an earlier tendency to leave istan to seal off the more than 1,500 miles of Pakistani that job to Karmal's forces. A large Soviet force was border and the more than 400 mile-long border shared sent to Paktia province during April and May to relieve by Afghanistan with Iran, the Soviets have also relied the besieged Khost military outpost, but failed to on land mines and occasional special forces opera­ achieve this objective. tions in the border areas. They are supplementing To make Kabul secure, most villages located within these efforts by seeking support among the Pashtun a five-mile radius (extended to 10 miles in 1985) were tribesmen in the Pakistani border area in the hope that destroyed. Moscow also increased the number of mili­ these tribesmen would prevent the Mujahedin from tary posts around the ring. This made large-scale infil­ crossing into Afghanistan. 24 According to the Mu­ tration of the city difficult. As a result, the resistance jahedin, however, Soviet efforts to close the supply had to acquire rockets with a greater range so as to routes have made access more difficult but by no hit the Afghan capital. Moscow also increased the means impossible. number of fixed military posts along important high­ By bringing the war closer to the Pakistani and ways, for example, on the roads between Kabul and Iranian borders, the Soviets are pursuing their second Konduz, and Kabul and Jalalabad. goal, namely, to induce Pakistan and Iran to cease The Soviets used a large number of their own supporting the Mujahedin.25 In late 1985 the Soviets forces to attack Panjshir in April. Heavy bombers carried out two major military offensives close to Paki­ based in the Soviet Union were used for high-altitude stani territory in Konar and Paktia. As noted, they are saturation bombing. The Soviets built five garrisons also seeking friends among the tribes living along the running the length of the Panjshir river valley.21 Most Afghan border. Air and ground incursions into Iranian of the 40,000 civilians still there left the area and have and Pakistani territory have increased. During 1985, not returned. However, the areas in the mountains re­ there were over 200 such incursions against Pakistan. mained in Massud's hands. Soviet efforts to kill or cap­ The Soviet press has been carrying increasingly stri­ ture him also failed. This time, the operation against dent criticisms of Iran's and Pakistan's support for the Panjshir was a bigger success than on previous occa­ Mujahedin. sions as it decreased the pressure on the Salang Pass and significantly increased Massud's difficulties. However, Soviet forces in the area were subjected to The Sovietization Program sustained attacks and also suffered many casualties. The Panjshir operation was followed by similar at­ The Soviets are pairing greater military efforts with tacks in Herat, Takhar, and Qandahar provinces. a substantial political and economic program to mold Again hundreds of civilians were killed because of in­ discriminate bombing of residential areas in the cities "John Keegan, "The Ordeal of Afghanistan," The Atlantic Monthly (Boston), of Herat and Qandahar. The resistance in turn in­ November 1985. Kamrany and Poullada, op. cit., p. 121. creased its pressure against Soviet strongholds in­ " "Panjshir-the Seventh Offensive," Central Asian Survey (Oxford), Incidental cluding the military base Khair Khana (near Kabul), Papers Series, No. 1, 1985. "US Department of State, "Afghanistan: Five Years of Occupation," Special Report, and shelled the city of Kabul itself, causing frequent No. 120, December 1984. and serious disruptions in the supply of electricity and " For reports on these attacks see the fortnightly bulletin, Afghan Realities, 22 published by the Afghan Information and Documentation Center, Peshawar, Pakistan. other services. Also see Monthly Bulletin and the reports in Afghanistan Forum (Washington, DC). The attacks in 1984 began a new phase in Soviet "Author's interviews in Pakistan and New York, fall of 1985. military policy in Afghanistan which can be charac- " The Muslim (Islamabad), Oct. 11, 1985. 6 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986

Afghan society in the Soviet image.26 This has pro­ Struggles between adherents of the two factions of duced a crippling dilemma. While the Sovietization the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) program seeks to convert Afghans into loyal sup­ -the Parcham and Khalq- have particularly affected porters of the communist regime, the massive use of the armed forces. Although both factions were pro­ force only increases the Afghans' hostility toward the Soviet, a split occurred in 1967 because of dif­ Soviets and the communist regime that they support. ferences over organizational tactics (Khalqis wanted Yet, to transform Afghanistan into a pacified Soviet a Leninist-type party based on the working class, satellite, the Soviets must first subdue the Afghan while Parchamis preferred a broad national demo­ resistance militarily. Soviet cooptation efforts are cratic front) and personal rivalries that were com­ unlikely to work as long as Moscow conducts what pounded by social and ethnic differences (Khalqis are amounts to a genocidal war against the Afghans. mainly rural Pashtuns while the Parchamis are mostly Nevertheless, in the long term, Moscow's program urbanized and Dari-speaking). might have some effect, especially if the war goes Prior to the Soviet takeover, Khalqi officers badly for the Mujahedin. dominated the armed forces. However, since 1979 Moscow's program has many elements, including the number of Parchamis, whose leader Karmal was the expansion of existing Afghan coercive institutions installed in power, has been increasing so fast in the and the creation of new ones under Soviet control. armed forces that they might be now predominant. Moscow has sought to increase the size and compe­ This is clearly resented by the Khalqis. Khalqi officers tence of Kabul's armed forces in hopes of turning the have been reluctant to follow the orders of Parchami war into a purely Afghan struggle and so gradually officers. At times actual battles between the factions ending direct Soviet participation. (Here the Soviets have taken place. For example, in June of 1983 fight­ have failed as Soviet direct involvement in the fighting ing in the 25th Division between the two groups raged against the Mujahedin has increased.) To augment for three days. Parchamis often accuse Khalqi offi­ the regime's forces, draft laws have been changed cers of cooperating with the Mujahedin.29 For the several times. Each change extended the length of present, the Soviets appear to have little confidence service and lowered the draft age. At times, con­ in these Afghan forces and frequently behave as scripts were made to remain in service even though though they were expendable. Casualties among they had completed their term. The regime also Kabul regime soldiers have been very high, perhaps resorted to press gangs and street roundups of young three to five times higher than for Soviet soldiers.30 men for military service. But these measures­ The state secret police, KHAD, has grown consid­ accompanied as they are by attacks against civilians erably since the invasion. This KGB-run organization and the misuse of Afghan soldiers and officers-have is spreading its influence over the state and party resulted in widespread defections and evasion of apparatuses. Its status was enhanced officially in military service. Prior to the Soviet invasion the 1986 when it became the Ministry of Internal Security. Afghan armed forces had numbered close to 100,000; It carries out surveillance over the government and at present they number between 40,000 and 50,000 the military, employing a mixture of brutal tactics and men, many of whom are of questionable loyalty and economic rewards to undermine popular support for some of whom directly or indirectly aid the Mujahedin. the Mujahedin. It also seeks to infiltrate the resistance Afghan pilots have been known to drop their bombs in and probably has been responsible for the assassina­ the desert rather than on the target area. On several tions of several of its commanders. There are reports occasions Afghan regular forces have sabotaged that KHAD may have more than 20,000 operatives Soviet-controlled military facilities. One dramatic among whom are a number of common thugs. The example of this occurred in May 1985 when some 20 Soviets run a large training program for KHAD person­ aircraft were destroyed by Afghan officers at the Shin­ nel.31 Although KHAD appears to be considerably dand military base. In another instance, officers with more effective than the armed forces, it is embroiled ties to the resistance flew two Mi-24 helicopters to Pakistan.27 In November 1985,- four army generals were arrested and reportedly executed for collaborat­ "See Special Report, No. 135,December 1985,p. 7. 28 ing with the Mujahedin. "Monthly Bulletin, April 1983.On the historical reasons for Parchami-Khalqi rivalry, see Anthony Arnold, Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1983. "See Khalilzad, "The Soviet Dilemma in Afghanistan," Current History " The Washington Times, Jan. 13,1986. (Philadelphia), October 1985,p. 334. "Henry Bradsher, "Afghanistan," The Washington Quarterly (Washington, DC), "Afghan Realities, July 16,1985 provides details on these acts. Summer 1984,p. 51.

7 Moscow's Afghan War

in conflicts with other institutions, notably the a serious obstacle to Soviet military efforts because military.32 the Mujahedin are frequently informed of Soviet mili­ The Soviets have also had some successes with tary plans when Afghan military forces are also the militias whose formation they have promoted. The involved in an operation. purpose of the militias is to decrease the military Dealing with factionalism has absorbed a lot of en­ burden on the Soviet and Afghan armed forces and to ergy on the part of the Soviets. A series of changes in win over critical local leaders. Local leaders are en­ party and state. office-holders have been announced couraged to form militias to keep the Mujahedin out of in 1985 by Kabul, in a probably futile effort to stop the their areas. In return, they are allowed to keep their factionalism. 34 The Parchami Najibullah, former head weapons and receive financial support and weapons of KHAD, has been named secretary of the POPA from Kabul. The formation of militias has been fost­ Central Committee. He holds substantial responsibil­ ered especially in the border areas to limit the infiltra­ ities for several areas. It is possible that he is being tion and resupply of Mujahedin from neighboring positioned to replace Karmal - if and when the states. However, militias in urban institutions, in fac­ Soviets decide to do so. Najibullah's secretaryship is tories and schools for example, have been created as another indication of the growing influence of KHAD. well. The militias have at times been a significant The promotion of Ghulam Faruq Yaqubi, Najibullah's problem for the resistance, even though some local successor at KHAD, to full membership on the Central leaders have sided with the Mujahedin after getting Committee points in the same direction. money and weapons from Kabul. Two Parchamis, Dastiqir Panjsheri and former Another form of the Sovietization effort has been Defense Minister Abdul Qader, have been dropped the expansion of the Afghan Communist party, the from the Politburo. Suleiman Laeq, also a Parchami, POPA. Since the original communist coup of 1978, who is minister of tribes and nationalities, became a when party membership stood at 5,000, the POPA has candidate member of the Politburo. Ismail Danesh, expanded to more than 140,000 members according minister of mines and industries, who belongs to the to Soviet and Kabul sources.33 Actual membership is Khalq faction, was dropped from the Politburo and probably half that number. Nevertheless, the party sent into honorable political exile as Afghanistan's and its affiliated organizations have become a means ambassador to Libya. Another Khalqi, Defense Min­ for expanding the base of support for the regime. ister Lt-General Nazar Mohammad, has been pro­ Under Soviet prodding, the Kabul regime has pres­ moted to candidate member of the Politburo. A Khalqi sured government personnel, especially Afghan mili­ from the security apparatus to be promoted to full tary officers, to join the party. A refusal to do so can member of the Central Committee is Saifullah, com­ bring loss of position and benefits. Many of those who mander of the Kabul police. have joined the party have done so for practical The Kabul regime has tried to build a facade of reasons-to obtain government jobs and contracts, legitimacy for itself in 1985 through a series of public admission to university, scholarships to study abroad, initiatives. On April 12, Kabul announced it would call or merely to avoid problems with the occupying a Loyah Jirga, the traditional grand assembly of power. Afghan tribal leaders. Historically, such assemblages These members would no doubt abandon the POPA were used by Afghan kings and by the republican gov­ in large numbers if the collapse of the pro-Soviet ernment to gain acquiescence in a transfer of power regime became imminent or if the Soviet forces were or approval of a major new policy. In the 1980 Funda­ about to leave. However, should the Soviets win the mental Principles of the Democratic Republic of war or be perceived as doing so, the party would find Afghanistan, which serves as an interim constitution, many more recruits. Yet, the influx of new party mem­ the Loyah Jirga is defined as the "highest organ of bers has done little to dilute the factional conflicts. state power." Yet, neither the Karma! regime nor the The Khalqis, who lost much of their power to the Par­ Amin government had convoked a Loyah Jirga, chamis after the Soviet invasion, appear unreconciled although regional jirgas were held. Reports of the to the present arrangements. Their hostility has been event suggest that a high percentage of the 2,000 par­ ticipants were regime functionaries, from the military

"Edward Girardet, "Russia's War in Afghanistan," Central Asian Survey, July 1983, pp. 94-95. 33 See report on Babrak Karma l's speech to the High Jirgah of Frontier Tribes, "On the personnel changes in late 1985, see Special Report, No. 135, Sept. 14, 1985, in Afghanistan Forum, November 1985, p. 5. December 1985. 8 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986 or KHAD, or members of the POPA or its front 10,000. Most are expected to spend as many as 10 organizations. 35 years in the USSR. The emphasis on children and or­ In August, local council elections were announced phans is a newly visible element in Moscow's Soviet­ -the day before they were to begin. In Kabul, the ization program. 39 Afghan resistance commanders "election" process was simple: a smattering of district have reported capturing "child soldiers" between residents were assembled at a meeting. hall. Candi­ ages 8 and 15 who, they claim, have been trained in dates were introduced only moments before the vote. the Soviet Union to perform espionage work and carry Voting meant raising hands under the watchful eyes out assassinations. of KHAD agents; secret ballots were not used. The Yet the Soviet experience with Afghan students so regime announced that 450,000 residents had par­ far has "not been entirely positive. The ongoing war ticipated, about 90 percent of eligible voters. 36 obviously generates hostility toward Moscow even In September, a High Tribal Jirga was convened for among them. Moreover, some face discrimination the Pathan and Baluch tribes whose territories span when in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, even if only the borders with Pakistan and, in the case of the half of the students currently in the Soviet Union and Baluch, also with Iran. This time, a somewhat higher Eastern Europe return to work in collusion with the proportion of the roughly 3,700 delegates actually Soviets, it undoubtedly could have a substantial im­ were tribal representatives.37 Delegates reportedly pact on the future of Afghanistan. Moscow probably received cash payments supplemented by arms for believes that Afghanistan will not be pacified until its attending. The weapons were said to be for use in Sovietization program succeeds in transforming tradi­ defending the frontier but were presumably also for tional Afghan social patterns. No doubt, the Soviet in­ use in tribal lands across the border, which would vestment in Afghanistan's young is intended to bring complicate the situation there for Pakistan. about such a transformation. A number of POPA-dominated institutions have In Afghanistan itself, although a large number of the been established under the communist government. country's educational institutions have been disrupted They are intended not only to make Afghanistan struc­ or destroyed (50 percent according to Kabul govern­ turally similar to the USSR but also to facilitate the ment figures), those that remain under regime control political indoctrination and mobilization of the popula­ are being restructured along Soviet lines. Russian is tion. This is especially true of institutions such as the being made a required subject beginning with the Democratic Youth Organization, similar to the Soviet fourth grade, while English, French, and German Komsomol, and its affiliate, the Pioneer organization, classes are being phased out. 40 Many of the ad­ for children between ages 10 and 15. The Kabul re­ ministrators and teachers in Afghan schools come gime and the Soviets are sparing no efforts to influ­ from the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. All cultural ence Afghan youths. Since the Soviet invasion, 25,000 and educational cooperation agreements with West­ to 40,000 Afghans have been sent to the Soviet Union ern nations have been terminated. The curriculum to be educated. There are presently more students in now includes courses on "sociology," which in fact the Soviet Union from Afghanistan than from any teach communist ideology. The version of Afghan­ other country, with the possible exception of Vietnam. istan's history now being taught has been tailored to The adults who are educated in the Soviet Union are inculcate pro-Soviet and pro-regime attitudes. rewarded upon their return, generally with govern­ Sovietization extends also to the economic sphere. ment positions. 38 The Soviet Union has not only increased its economic Increasingly, the Afghan students being selected ties with Afghanistan since the invasion but has en­ for training in the Soviet Union are orphaned and quite couraged the Kabul regime to sever its ties to the young. They currently number between 5,000 and West. Some 70 percent of Afghan trade is now with Soviet-bloc countries. 41 The Soviets have encouraged the exploitation of Afghan natural resources. They "Ibid. "Ibid. have tripled their gas imports from Afghanistan, but "Ibid. pay less than the international price. Payments for " Der Spiegel (Hamburg), Nov. 4, 1985. "Ibid. gas are deducted from the growing "Afghan debt" to "The Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 30, 1985, pp. 7-8, and Jan. 6, 1986, the Soviet Union. Afghan officials cannot tell how pp. 11-12; and Professor Batinshah Safi, "Russification of Education in Afghanistan," much gas is being exported to the USSR, since the Peshawar, Afghanistan Education Committee, mimeo., nd. "IMF Directions of Trade 1985, Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund, 1985. meters are situated inside the Soviet Union and the "Edward Girardet, Afghanistan: The Soviet War, New York, St. Martin's Press, Afghans do not have access to them. 42 Infrastructural 1985, p. 155. ties to the Soviet Union have been multiplied. Moscow

9 Moscow's Afghan War

At left, Borak Abdulkadir, a graduate of Moscow's Highway Construction College, uses Russian to conduct a class in 1985 at the Polytechnical College in Kabul (built with Soviet technical assistance); at right, a school run by Afghan resistance forces in Konar province .

~ TASS from SOVFOTO; Afghanistan Education Committee.

has even replaced the Afghan airline's planes ac- each group has different additional goals. None wants quired in the West with planes made in the Soviet the pre-invasion situation restored. All reject the com­ Union. As in the political and military sphere, the munist regime that ruled for some 18 months before Soviets are basically drafting the economic plans and . the Soviet invasion. Some want to bring about basic programs to be followed by the Kabul regime.43 changes in the institutions under which they have It is clearly Moscow's expectation that a combina- lived, if need be by force. Others essentially want to tion of escalating military pressure and the ambitious restore the institutions overthrown by the commu ­ Sovietization program will wear down the Afghan nists. Thus, the war by the resistance against Soviet resistance over time. Although the results so far are occupation is crossed by internal conflicts . mixed, it is still too early to expect the Soviets to Those who want basic changes can be broadly de- , decide on the failure or success of their current scribed as Islamic "fundamentalists," even though strategy. According to Deputy Foreign Minister there are significant differences within this category. 45 Mikhail Kapitsa, Moscow expects its problem in As a rule, they advocate the establishment of a "new" Afghanistan to "be over" in five years.44 It is possible political system, namely an Islamic Republic, which that if the Soviets fail to put down the resistance by has not existed in Afghanistan before, and which does 1990, they might conclude that their strategy has not not exist in any Sunni Muslim country . The largest worked . Soviet failure or success will be determined Afghan "fundamentalist" groups are Burhanuddin not only by the programs and actions of the Soviets Rabbani's Jamiat-i-lslami; Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's and the Kabul regime but also by the performance of Hezb-e-lslami; Yunus Khalis's Hezb-e-lslami Afghan­ the Mujahedin and the policies of states concerned istan; and Abdul Rasool Sayyaf's Islamic Alliance for with the conflict in Afghanistan. Let us first review the the Liberation of Afghanistan . efforts of the resistance movement. Sayyaf is an eloquent orator in Arabic and· won a prize for service to Islam in Saudi Arabia in 1984. He was born in about 1940, and received a bachelor's The Resistance degree in religious studies from Kabul University and a master's degree from AI-Azhar in Cairo, where he The groups involved in the Afghan resistance are probably joined the Muslim Brotherhood . He returned , numerous , and their orientations and aspirations vary. to Afghanistan in the late 1960's, and .•joined They differ in ideology, in base of support , and in rela­ Hekmatyar's and Rabbani's Jawanani-Musulman, the tive capability . All want the Soviet forces to leave, but Muslim Youth Organization, then active at Kabul Uni­ versity . In 1972, the leaders of this organization formed a political party, the Jamiat-i-lslami. Rabbani 43 Ibid. was elected president , Sayyaf, vice-prnsident, and " The Muslim, Oct. 11, 1985, p. 1. "Khalilzad , " Soviet Occupied Afghanistan, " lac. cit., p. 38. Hekmatyar became a member of the party's Council.

10 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986

Sayyaf was jailed by President Mohammad Daud in The "traditionalists" represent the old elite. Gailani, 1975 but was released in 1980 by Babrak Karmal's for example, was a friend and adviser of former King regime. Upon his release he went to Peshawar and Mohammad Zahir Khan. They desire a role for the joined the Mujahedin forces. He has often acted as former King (who is in Italy) and probably would be spokesman for the fundamentalist parties. In domes­ satisfied with a government headed by him. They have tic politics he favors a strict application of the Islamic openly called for support from the West. At the do­ law, the Sharia. In foreign policy, he advocates mestic level, they have declared themselves in favor equidistance from the Soviet Union and the United of a multi-party system but opposed to permitting the States.46 Presently, he has close ties with Saudi communists to form a legal party. On the whole, the Arabia. traditionalists have not been as well organized as the Hekmatyar and Rabbani have also been influenced fundamentalists. Allegations about the misuse of by Muslim Brotherhood beliefs. Hekmatyar, whose funds have been directed more frequently against group is strong among the Pashtuns, was thought to these groups than against the fundamentalists. be the best-organized political leader. In 1982, every­ While the Pakistan-based groups are the largest one agreed that his group was the largest. Today resistance organizations, there are other important there is no such consensus. Hekmatyar's forces have groups. These include the Shiites in Central Afghan­ been involved in most of the fights among the partisan istan, who can be subdivided into those supported by groups. This factor perhaps has contributed to de­ Iran (NASR and Sepah) and those independent of Iran creased support.47 Hezb-e-lslami has its origins in the (Shura-ye Ettefaq, Harakat-i-lslami, and Mustazafin).50 late 1960's, when Hekmatyar and Rabbani were There are also a number of groups independent of among the organizers of the Muslim Youth Organiza­ both the Shiite organizations and the Pakistan-based tion before becoming involved in the Jamiat. At that Sunni groups. In the Nooristan region of eastern time, Hekmatyar was studying engineering at Kabul Afghanistan, for example, there are the Free University. In the mid-1970's, he fled to Pakistan, Resistance Front and the Free Government group. where he broke with Jamiat and established his own Although these groups have had substantial suc­ group. Allegedly, he received Pakistani support to cess individually in opposing the Soviets, a lack of uni­ work against President Daud. Like Sayyaf, Hekmatyar ty has prevented them from realizing fully their polit­ favors strict application of Islamic laws and has close ical and military potential. In fact, they have spent a ties with the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East. significant part of their resources fighting each other. On international politics, his public position is that This has enabled the Soviets to avoid paying a higher "both America and Russia are enemies of lslam." 46 price for their occupation and has prevented the Mu­ Rabbani and Khalis comprise the moderate wing of jahedin from receiving greater international recogni­ the Afghan fundamentalist group. Khalis broke away tion and support. Lack of unity has prevented the Mu­ from Hekmatyar in 1979. He is the oldest (born in jahedin from challenging the legitimacy of the Karma! 1919) of the Peshawar-based leaders. Both Khalis and regime in many international forums and drawing Rabbani have moderated their views on domestic and greater attention to Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan. foreign policy issues over time. They appear inclined If it holds and consolidates, the alliance of the prin­ to allow some political diversity in Afghanistan. At the cipal resistance groups formed in May 1985 in international level, they were originally equally critical Peshawar has the potential to change this situation of the United States and the Soviet Union. Since 1983, dramatically. The alliance, called the Islamic Unity of however, they have been expressing more favorable Afghan Mujahedin,51 has a supreme Council com­ views about the United States.49 Rabbani's base of posed of the leaders of the seven constituent groups. support is largely among non-Pashtuns. Another set of parties active against the Soviet forces and currently based in Pakistan can be classi­ "Nawa-i-Waqt (Lahore) July 25, 1980. "Le Monde (Paris), Nov. 15-17, 1983, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service fied as "traditionalist." They, too, declare that they (hereafter JPRS), Near East/South Asia (Washington, DC), Jan. 11, 1984, p. 100. want an Islamic government in Afghanistan. However, "Al·Hawadith (London), April 18, 1980, in JPRS, Near East/North Africa, they would be satisfied if pre-1978 Afghan political June 13, 1980. p. 15. .. Jere Van Dyk. In Afghanistan: An American Odyssey, New York, Coward-Mccann, institutions are restored. One such "traditionalist" Inc .• 1983: Van Dyk quotes Rabbani as saying that Russia is "the first enemy; the West party is Mahez-e Milli-ye lslami, headed by Ahmad is the second," p. 63. Gailani; a second is Jabh-e Najat-e Milli, led by "On the Shiites, see Oliver Roy, "Rise of Khomeynism among Shiite Minority," Le Monde Diplomatique, April 1983, quoted in JPRS, Near East/South Asia, June 8, 1983, Siabghatullah Mojadeddi; a third is Mohammad Nabi's pp. 56-60. Haraket-e-lnqelab-ye-lslami. " Monthly Buffetin, May 1985. 11 Moscow's Afghan War

The position of spokesman for the alliance rotates of the individual parties. Commanders in the field felt among the seven leaders at three month intervals. no need to follow the orders of party leaders, since The first spokesman was Khalis, followed by they could always go to other parties if they were Hekmatyar.52 Currently, Gailani is spokesman. The unhappy with their own leader. To change the relative alliance has a 49-member shora (assembly) com­ power in favor of his group, an individual leader often posed of seven delegates from each group, a joint sought to subvert the other parties and to "buy" the military committee, and six nonmilitary bodies (com­ others' commanders. In order not to lose comman­ mittees on cultural, political, refugee, education, infor­ ders to rivals, leaders tended to tolerate incom­ mation, and health affairs). A principal purpose of the petence and even corruption. In turn, commanders alliance is to increase the political profile of the faced similar problems in relation to their fighters. The resistance. Perhaps the Mujahedin have finally recog­ lack of cooperation among the parties, and actual nized that a united front is a necessary precondition fighting among them, had lead to a considerable loss for their greater international presence. of popularity for the seven leaders among the Afghan In October 1985, the alliance sent a delegation of population. representatives from all seven groups headed by its Even with the current alliance, many sources of spokesman-Gulbuddin Hekmatyar-to New York for conflict remain among the Mujahedin. Thus, a major the 40th anniversary of the United Nations. The dele­ task of the new joint military committee of the alliance gation requested that the resistance forces rather is the prevention or at least the containment of these than the Karmal government be given Afghanistan's conflicts. Its additional purposes are to: (1) coordinate seat at the UN.53 The Mujahedin also intend to seek to a military strategy and a weapons distribution system represent Afghanistan in the Organization of the congruent with the strategy; (2) develop a program to Islamic Conference (OIC}, where Afghanistan has re­ protect supply routes; (3) improve the capacity to pre­ mained unrepresented ever since the Karmal govern­ vent infiltration by Kabul's agents; (4) establish joint ment was in effect expelled.54 In January 1986, the training for Mujahedin and improve the quality of train­ alliance's spokesman Gailani headed a delegation to ing; (5) develop common strategies to counter major an OIC foreign ministers' meeting. The delegation was Soviet military moves. given high visibility at the meeting, but the issue of for­ A number of resistance organizations and com­ mal membership for the Mujahedin was deferred until mands inside Afghanistan are already well organized the scheduled January 1987 meeting of OIC heads of and cooperate with one another despite political dif­ state. OIC membership could be the first hurdle in the ferences. Among the internal regional commands, the challenge of the Karmal government's right to repre­ most effective appear to be those led by young and sent Afghanistan in other organizations, including the educated commanders, such as Panjshir's Massud, UN. Herat's Ismail Khan, Jalaluddin in Paktia, and Abdul The alliance is also intended to foster military coor­ Haq in Kabul.55 If the alliance functions effectively and dination among the resistance groups. Relations broadens to encompass military coordination, the among the partisan groups have at times been char­ less well-organized groups might emulate the meth­ acterized by conflict, including actual fighting, during ods of these younger commanders and become more which hundreds of partisans have lost their lives. effective in their own areas. Although influenced by ideological differences, the In order to prevent the Soviets and the Karmal discord has been fundamentally the result of the com­ regime from succeeding in emptying the Afghan coun­ petition for domination and power among the seven tryside, the Mujahedin-besides increasing their leaders in Peshawar. Lack of a coalition had capabilities in important regions- need also to prevented the emergence of a single overall military develop basic social institutions. In many parts of command and joint planning in the war against the Afghanistan, the Mujahedin are the only authority. Yet Soviets. It had often led to misunderstandings and the resistance is not in a position to provide the fights for the spoils of victory, as well as premature population of those areas with emergency relief serv­ claims of victory. ices. Assisting the local population in developing Lack of alliance among the seven major parties had social programs could intensify ties between the local also hindered the organizational development of eaci, population and the resistance organizations. It might

"Afghan Realities, Oct. 16, 1985. "The Wall Street Journal (New York), Nov. 1, 1985. " The Washington Post, a six-part series in October 1983; Monthly Bulletin, "Afghan Realities, Oct. 16, 1985, p. 2. June 1983, pp. 6-8. 12 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986

even enable some refugees to return home. Should negotiations on Afghanistan, it is the Karma! govern­ the Mujahedin develop a joint social service program ment that is party to the indirect talks with Pakistan. in liberated areas, it would further strengthen the The mass media in many countries use Soviet termi­ alliance and undermine the prospects for Moscow's nology in discussing Afghan developments. Thus, the Sovietization program. resistance is almost invariably referred to as "the rebels," implying that the Mujahedin are fighting against the legitima te government. The International Dimension Recently, however, support in some key countries for the resistance in Afghanistan has increased. This Soviet attempts to eradicate the resistance in includes greater support in the United States Con­ Afghanistan have been coupled with efforts to bring gress, which recently authorized overt humanitarian about the abandonment of the Mujahedin by their assistance for the first time.57 Since Amer ican support friends in the international commun ity. The Soviets for the Mujahedin's military operations remains covert have striven to isolate the issue of Afghanistan and for the most part, one cannot be certain about the thus to prevent events there from affecting the Soviet overall magnitude of US assistance to the Mujahedin . Union's relations with other countries. Moreover, The Soviets themselves have claimed that Washing­ Moscow is using various propaganda tools to try to ton has spent US$300 million in support of the Afghan convince the world that the Karma! government is partisans during the first four years of the Soviet­ "legitimate" and that the war in Afghanistan was Afghan war and intended to spend $130 million in precipitated by and goes on because of "foreign 1984.58 The Washington Post reported that for the interference ," meaning support for the Afghan 1985 fiscal year Congress allocated $250 million for resistance .56 the Afghan program .59 Soviet efforts have been partially successful. But the countries that have the most influence on Although the sanctions imposed on the Soviet Union developments in Afghanistan are its immediate neigh­ after the invasion were in force longer than was the bors. Fully aware of this, the Soviet Union has case with sanctions for any other post-World War II increased pressure on both Iran and Pakistan in the transgression, most of them have long since been hopes of changing their policies with regard to the war lifted . Few significant international agreements with the Soviet Union have been delayed over Afghanistan . The Soviet-imposed regime of Babrak Karma! occu ­ "International Herald Tribune. (Paris). Dec. 4. 1984. p. 1. "Policy Forum (Washington. DCi, Vol. 2, No. 18, October 1985. pies Afghanistan's seat in all international forums ex­ "Bradsher, "Afghanis1an ," loc . cit., p. 46. cept for the Islamic Conference . In the UN-sponsored " The Washington Post, Jan. 13, 1985.

Leaders of Afghanistan resistance parties at a 1985 meeting in Peshawar, Pakistan: from left to right, Abddur Rasou/ Sayyaf (partly hidden), Burhanudin Rabbani, unidentified (hidden, at rear), Sebghatullah Mojad~ddi, Gulbuddin Hekmatyw , Nabi Muhammadi, Yunus Kha/is, and Ahmad Gailani. -Photo furnished by Hezb-e lslami.

13 Moscow's Afghan War

in Afghanistan. Pakistan has experienced a marked Iranian-backed resistance groups. The Mujahedin are deterioration in its relations with Moscow. President looking for partners among the Shiite resistance. Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq was given a stern lecture by The People's Republic of China is another neighbor­ the new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev about Paki­ ing state affecting the war in Afghanistan. Although it stan's Afghanistan policies when the two met at Kon­ is improving its relations with Moscow, Beijing has not stantin Chernenko's funeral. To increase the pressure given up supplying arms to the Afghan resistance. on Islamabad, Moscow has also sought-unsuccess­ Also, although the Chinese during 1985 had softened fully-to prevent an improvement in Inda-Pakistan their position with regard to the need to resolve the relations by making repeated suggestions that Islama­ Afghan conflict as one of the three preconditions for bad masterminded the Sikh opposition to New Delhi; any improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, the most re­ sought a nuclear capability against India; was becom­ cent Chinese statements seem to imply that meeting ing an American military base, and thus was tipping all three preconditions is again their requirement of the regional balance of power against lndia.60 the Soviets.63 Up to now, these pressures on Islamabad have Islamic states, whether neighbors or not, have failed to bring about any fundamental change in Paki­ generally been supportive of the Mujahedin. The role stani policy, although there are voices in Pakistan of Saudi Arabia has been especially substantial. One calling for a change. Moscow is counting on resistance group, Sayyaf's Islamic Alliance, has close Pakistan's domestic divisions to influence the govern­ ideological and financial ties to the Saudis. Both the ment to come to terms with the situation in Afghan­ government and semi-private groups in Saudi Arabia, istan. As noted earlier, it is also active among the such as the Mecca-based World Muslim League, pro­ tribesmen in Pakistan's North-West Frontier and vide significant financial support to the Mujahedin. Baluchistan provinces. However, two Saudi allies, Oman and the United Arab For Iran, the war in Afghanistan has been a signifi­ Emirates, recently established diplomatic relations cant factor in negatively affecting relations with the with Moscow. Pressure on the Saudis to follow suit is Soviet Union. Iranian support for the Afghan resist­ increasing. It is conceivable that Riyadh could make ance has focused largely on the Shiites, who con­ Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan a condition for the stitute some 20 percent of the Afghan population. The establishment of these ties with Moscow. Soviets and the Kabul regime have at times shown But Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are also crucial for their displeasure at Iranian support by carrying out helping the Mujahedin gain greater international legiti­ cross-border military operations. Such operations macy. For example, if the new alliance of the Afghan against Iran first took place in 1982. Rather than in­ Mujahedin consolidates, Saudi Arabia might support timidating Iran, they heightened the Iranian percep­ the demand by the Afghan fighters for membership in tion of the Soviet threat and led to increased support the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Should for the Afghan Mujahedin.61 the Mujahedin receive such formal support from the Recently, the Soviets have sensed an opportunity Muslim world, they could then press for greater atten­ to improve relations with Iran. Tehran's international tion to the Afghan cause at the UN. For example, no isolation and need for arms for the Iran-Iraq war has UN Security Council meetings have been called to led Moscow to expect less hostility from Iran. Yet, so deal with military offensives against the Mujahedin far Iran has not changed its policies in return for a even when these involved major attacks on civilian significant betterment of relations with the USSR. The targets. The Mujahedin could encourage sympathetic future of Iran's Afghanistan policy remains uncertain, UN members to call for such meetings in the future. but it need not necessarily change to Moscow's ad­ Other UN organs, such as its public affairs program vantage. As one indicator of the uncertainty, Hekma­ and the 4th Committee (which deals with colonial tyar recently closed his offices in lran.62 However, issues) might also begin to give greater attention to Rabbani continues to have a mission in Iran, and his Afghan-related matters. The alliance also enables group has a working relationship with some of the sympathetic countries to deal at a high political level

"'Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Soviet Union (Washington, DC-hereafter FBIS-SOV), Feb. 22, 1984. 63 For a recent statement, see Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian's report before the "Zalmay Khalilzad, "Islamic Iran: Soviet Dilemma," Problems of Communism, National People's Congress Standing Committee, Jan. 16, 1986, trans. in Foreign January-February 1984, pp. 1-20. Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China (Washington, DC), Jan. 17, 1985, " Interviews by author, autumn 1985. pp. Kl1-15.

14 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986

with the Mujahedin without fear of favoring one resist­ on the fourth instrument-which is to set out the inter­ ance group over another. Ultimately, an effective relationship between the first three documents as well alliance could give the Mujahedin a voice in negotia­ as deal with the withdrawal of foreign troops- is yet tions dealing with Afghanistan. to be reached. This document is expected to have specific dates as to when the withdrawal will begin and when it will be completed. The Kabul regime has UN Proximity Talks refused to provide these dates so far.67It reportedly has made the provision of these dates conditional on Presently, the formal negotiations on Afghanistan Pakistani acceptance of face-to-face negotiations in are the "proximity" (indirect) talks between the Kabul future talks. To Kabul, direct talks would mean that government and Pakistan. These talks, which have Pakistan, and therefore other states, accepts the Kar­ been held periodically since 1982, are sponsored by ma! regime as the legitimate government of Afghan­ the United Nations. The talks have gone through istan. To date, Pakistan has not agreed.66 several phases, during which conflicting proposals The insistence by Kabul on direct talks raises ques­ were made both on the format and substance of a set­ tions regarding Moscow's real attitude toward a tlement. In December 1985, reports were issued that "political settlement" in Afghanistan. That attitude the two sides had agreed that a settlement should could be one of several: consist of four instruments. 64 Reportedly, Kabul and Islamabad have already reached agreement on three • Moscow might see the UN-talks as simply a means of the four documents comprising the settlement. The of lowering the political costs of its involvement while first document deals with what is called "non­ it continues to try to defeat the resistance militarily. interference and non-intervention," and is to be Thus, to keep the talks going, Kabul will continue at ratified by Islamabad and Kabul. This instrument will Moscow's behest to make demands that are unac­ require the end of outside assistance to the Mu­ ceptable to the other side. jahedin, especially by Pakistan. Presumably, Kabul will undertake not to interfere in Pakistani affairs, by • Moscow might be ambivalent about the negotia­ ceasing to support Pashtun and Baluch separatists tions. As it continues to intensify its military efforts, and tribal opponents of Islamabad, and thus implicitly Moscow might view the talks as conceivably giving recognize the disputed border between the two coun­ some legitimacy to the Kabul regime. If direct talks tries-the Durand line. come about, Moscow might believe that a Soviet­ The second document deals with international oriented regime could survive without the presence of guarantees of the settlement. The two sides have Soviet troops. agreed that Washington and Moscow should be the guarantors of an Afghan settlement. The United • Moscow might be uncertain whether the Kabul States has announced its willingness "to play an regime would survive even if the Mujahedin stopped appropriate guarantor's role in the context of a receiving outside assistance. Nevertheless, Moscow comprehensive and balanced settlement," and has might feel that recognition by Pakistan would improve informed the UN that it finds this document accept­ the chances of the Kabul government because such able.65The American declaration reversed an earlier recognition could lead to tensions between Pakistan posture by which Washington would not support any and the Mujahedin as well as induce some Mujahedin one component of the settlement until the entire commanders to join the government. agreement was completed. The third document focuses on the return of Afghan • Moscow might be calculating that if the Kabul refugees to Afghanistan. According to the Pakistanis, regime becomes "legitimated," it could call in Soviet before the refugees return to Afghanistan they will be troops to help against persisting Mujahedin opposi­ consulted regarding the "conditions" acceptable for tion. Moscow could do so at a considerably smaller their return. which will be "voluntary." 66 An agreement political cost because the Mujahedin would be much

"Unpublished paper by Abdul Waheed, Pakistan Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, "Afghanistan-A Forgotten War," presented at a conference on "Ibid. Afghanistan sponsored by the Hanns-Seidel.Stiftung. Munich, Dec. 16-17. 1985; and "The New York Times, Jan. 1, 1986; and The Christian Science Monitor, The New York Times, Jan. 1, 1986. Jan. 2, 1986. " Waheed, loc. cit. " The New York Times, Jan. 1, 1986. 15 Moscow's Afghan War

less formidable without Pakistani support and the · something unacceptable to them. 71 The danger of a world outcry would be considerably smaller since the split between Pakistan and the resistance on the number of Soviet troops needed would not have to be terms of a political settlement is serious. Islamabad as large as it is now. might implicitly (or explicitly) agree to accept a communist-dominated government in Afghanistan It is highly probable that Moscow believes that and stop supporting the Mujahedin in exchange for a Pakistan's acceptance of the Kabul regime would promise of Soviet withdrawal and the willingness of significantly increase its chances of survival. the Kabul government to take back the Afghan refu­ Therefore, in order induce Pakistan to talk directly gees. The Mujahedin are likely to reject such a for­ with the Kabul regime, the Soviets have been bringing mula since the removal of the communist-dominated about changes- largely cosmetic- in the Kabul gov­ government is one of their principal demands. To ernment. Their purpose is to convince the Afghan achieve it, at least some of the Mujahedin are likely to population, Pakistan, and world opinion generally that continue their resistance even without Pakistani sup­ the Kabul government is broadening the bases of its port. Yet without Islamabad's support, the Mujahedin support. The Soviets have urged the Kabul govern­ would be dramatically less effective, and thus make it ment to "create an atmosphere of positive dialogue possible for Moscow and its local surrogates to over­ between the public and political forces, including come an increasingly weak opposition. Moreover, if those who so far stick to positions hostile to the continued opposition became threatening, Moscow revolution." 69 might "delay" the withdrawal of some of its troops or Karmal has implemented these desiderata by ap­ even bring in more troops at the "invitation" of a pointing a few Afghans who do not have formal POPA "legitimate" government. Such a move might be affiliation to prestigious positions in the government. perceived by many as entirely proper. For example, two persons without party affiliation Second, Iran is not a party to the UN talks and were appointed to ministerial positions: Abdul Basir might oppose an agreement concluded by Pakistan. Ranjbir was named head of the central bank, and Iran has refused to participate because the Mujahedin Mohammad Daoud Kauian was appointed head of the are not represented. Pakistan and UN negotiator Bakhtar News Agency. There are rumors that more Diego Cordovez have kept the Iranians "informed," noncommunists will be appointed. In January 1986, but Tehran's attitude to the negotiations is not known. the Revolutionary Council was broadened to include Should Tehran oppose the agreement, it might con­ some non-party members. 70 tinue support for the Mujahedin resistance, which in However, both the Soviets and Karmal's govern­ turn might move closer to Iran. Even if Iran were not to ment continue to maintain that the 1978 coup, which supply major weapons to the Mujahedin, the Soviet brought the communists to power, is irreversible. Union might take a negative Iranian official position to They have not demonstrated any serious desire to be a reason for delaying or stopping its troop with­ negotiate directly with the partisans or to agree to a drawal. Given Iran's unpopularity in the international mechanism through which the Afghan people could community, the Soviets' move would probably elicit express their preferences regarding the kind of only a muted world reaction. government they might want. Even though a few non­ But the basic problem with the talks is that communists have honorific positions, Moscow and Moscow's fundamental position on Afghanistan re­ Kabul appear determined to keep control over the mains unchanged. It does not accept the Afghan ministries of defense and interior, KHAD, and similar­ population's right to self-determination. So far at least, ly crucial institutions. the talks serve Moscow to reduce its costs of estab­ Even if Kabul were to provide the dates for a Soviet lishing a communist-dominated, pro-Soviet govern­ troop withdrawal without direct talks with Pakistan, ment in Kabul. Should Moscow accept the Afghans' there remain potentially serious problems with the right to self-government, it could easily find a "face­ present negotiations. First, since they do not directly saving" way out of Afghanistan. Its refusal to do so is include the Mujahedin, the partisans have opposed undoubtedly conditioned by what Moscow perceives these talks for fear that Islamabad might agree to to be its strategic stakes in Afghanistan.

"Pravda (Moscow), Nov. 10, 1985, trans. in FBIS-SOV, Nov. 18, 1985, p. D/1. " The Soviets, also, are not represented at the talks. They have at times sent an " Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: South Asia (Washington, DC), official to Geneva to give on-the-spot instructions to the Kabul delegation, and the Jan. 22, 1986, p. C/1. Mujahedin, on occasion, have been briefed by Pakistan.

16 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986

American military base.72 Given the Soviet perspec­ Soviet Stakes in Afghanistan tive on world politics, this notion probably finds some credence in Moscow. Apparently, the Soviet leadership remains con­ Soviet domestic factional politics reinforce external vinced that a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and considerations for not withdrawing from Afghanistan. the establishment of a noncommunist regime there The reluctance of any single leader during a succes­ would damage Soviet prestige and have adverse sion period to consider withdrawal from Afghanistan repercussions elsewhere. It also must expect that a reflects a desire to avoid personal responsibility for a victory in Afghanistan would bring very significant setback there. Being associated with failure could en­ advantages to the Soviet Union. Although Moscow's courage challenges by rivals. Soviet activities in perception of damage to its i.nterests from a failure in Afghanistan since Gorbach~v·s coming to power are Afghanistan is probably exaggerated, it nevertheless characterized by continued application of force. plays a role in Soviet persistence. Accepting defeat in Another factor deterring Moscow from leaving a country where, because of territorial contiguity and Afghanistan is the Soviet expectation of significant past and present investments, substantial interests gains from a victory there. Soviet credibility would be are involved, could undermine the legitimacy of Soviet strengthened by a demonstration that it supports its domination elsewhere and lead to the questioning of friends and stands firm in the face of pressure. Not Soviet capability and resolve. Undoubtedly Moscow only would the Soviets add a country the size of has its own domino theory, making a retreat very dif­ France to their satellite empire, they could also use ficult. Western support of the resistance might be Afghanistan as a base for subverting neighboring taken by Moscow as an indication that Western countries, such as Iran or Pakistan. A Soviet victory powers would insist on gaining influence on security would also have important geostrategic implications issues in Afghanistan if the communist regime fell. for the Persian Gulf by improving Moscow's ability to The Soviets have repeatedly made the argument project power there. that- had they not invaded Afghanistan -the United The question of potential Soviet gains from secure States would have turned Afghanistan into an access to Afghan military facilities has been a con­ troversial one. Immediately after the Soviet occupa­ tion many analysts, including several senior officials "For Soviet and Kabul regime statements, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White Book: Pakistan Subversive Activities Against the Afghan Revolution, Moscow, Novosti in the Carter administration, argued that the Soviets Press Agency, 1980. had made significant gains in their ability to massively

Table 1: Potential Soviet Force Projection Great Circle Distancesfrom Soviet and Afghan Bases to Key PersianGulf Cities

(In kilometers)

From USSR From Afghanistan Gulf city lzyl Atrek Nabit Dag Yerevan Kalai Mora Oandahar Shindand Farahb Heral Bandar Abbas 1,181 1,374 1,807 1,113 1,004 881 794 965 Chah Bahar 1,491 2,178 2,232 1,165 841 900 798 1,002 Muscat 1,720 2,306 2,359 1,498 1,204 1,237 1,137 1,335

EstimatedCombat Radii for Selected Soviet-blocAlrcrafr: (In kilometers)

MiG-21 ...... 635 MiG-23 ...... 1,150 MiG25(AandE) ...... 1,260 MiG27(DandJ) ...... 795 Su-15 ...... 862 Su-17 ...... 530 Su-24 ...... 1,061 Yak-28 ...... 925

a Possible Soviet airfield inside the Soviet Union. b A helicopter airfield here could be expanded to accommodate other aircraft. c Estimates of combat radii vary. The highest and lowest estimates have been averaged here.

SOURCES: Albert Wohlstetter, et al., Interest and Power in the Persian Gulf, Los Angeles, CA, Pan Heuristics, 1980; and US Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1985. 17 Moscow's Afghan War

Wreckage of a Soviet convoy destroyed on the highway from Gardez to Kabul in 1983.

-Kouwenberg & Versteeg/SYGMA.

threaten Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf. Some Given thefr perceptions of gains and losses from argued that this consideration was probably a major victory or failure in Afghanistan, it is not clear•. .whether motivating factor for the Soviet action . Over time, this the Soviets will leave this unfortunate country under interpretation has been replaced by another extreme any circumstances. The first precondition for Soviet analysis that attributes no significant effect on Soviet departure would be a much stronger Afghan resist­ ability for power projection to the Gulf.73 ance capable of dramatically increasing the costs of The perception that Afghanistan was a first step in Soviet occupation . Only if Soviet leaders are per­ a general Soviet expansion in the region was clearly suaded that time is not on their side in the long run, exaggerated . However, so is the belief that the oc­ might they begin to consider seriously a settlement cupation of Afghanistan does not change the Soviet that would allow self-determination to the Afghans. capability to project power. It is unlikely that the inva­ sion was primarily motivated by the Soviet Union's desire to better its power projection capabilities, but it Soviet Options is equally unlikely that Moscow was unaware of this possibility. The confusion in the West about the The Soviets could respond to more effective resist­ regional implications of relative Soviet capability is ance efforts either by continuing the present level of largely due to the fact that the Soviet presence in involvement, escalating, or deciding on some form of Afghanistan has different implications for different disengagement. In the short run, they are likely to parts of the Gulf. The invasion has not changed Soviet continue the 1984-85 strategy, although there is a power projection capability as far as the upper Gulf chance of escalation . (Iraq, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia) Escalation would certainly make life more difficult is concerned . Bases in the Soviet Transcaucasus for the Afghan resistance. However, a substantial in­ region are closer to this area than are existing or crease in the number of Soviet troops (perhaps potential bases in Afghanistan . However, bases in another 100,000) would also greatly increase the Afghanistan have improved Moscow's ability for pro­ costs of occupation . Furthermore, almost doubling jecting power to the lower Gulf and the Arabian Sea, the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan would including the Strait of Hormuz, parts of I ran and draw more attention to the situation as a whole and Oman, and the whole of Pakistan. (See the data in could negatively affect Soviet ties with key countries , -•~ Table I on page 17.) including the United States, at a time when Moscow is seeking expanded economic ties and new arms con­ trol negotiations. An escalation of the war, including the use of more " For a detailed discussion of potential Soviet gains from bases in Afghanistan. see brutal tactics, would also be likely to lead to intensi­ Zalmay Khalilzad, " The United States and the War in Afghanistan," in Leo Rose and Noor Hussein, Eds., United States Pakistan Relations, Berkeley, CA, University of fied military activities by the resistance against Soviet California Press, 1985 strongholds. International friends of the Mujahedin

18 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986

might respond by increasing their support, as they Third, major military incursions into Pakistan are a have done in the past. Clearly the Soviets would be possibility, including, perhaps, the takeover of Paki­ able to hurt the Afghans more than vice versa, but the stani territory for a period of time. The Soviets might result could be greater Afghan hatred for the Soviets. justify such action as being directed against Afghan If the alliance among the Mujahedin holds, the refugee camps in Pakistan. For Moscow to carry out Afghans might also be able to exact a much higher such operations agai'nst Pakistan, however, major political price for the Soviet occupation than has been logistical preparations and the formation of supply the case in the past. lines would be necessary. These would be visible and In another possible scenario of escalation, the could be vulnerable to attack. In sum, a substantial in­ Soviet Union might increase pressure on Iran, but vestment of resources would be required for Moscow especially on Pakistan, to abandon the Afghan to mount a significant territorial incursion into resistance. As already mentioned, Soviet relations Pakistan. Should this occur, Pakistan, which has a with Pakistan remain tense and Soviet propaganda 500,000 man army and some very modern equipment, against Pakistan is increasingly hostile. Greater including F-16's, would be likely to resist-as did the Soviet pressure on Pakistan could take several forms. Iranians in 1982. First, Moscow might increase its efforts to destabilize A Soviet attempt to hold Pakistani territory would Pakistan politically. 74 Such efforts have not had much probably lead to a major crisis in American-Soviet success so far however, and an active Soviet policy of relations. The Reagan administration takes pride in destabilization runs the risk of undermining the very having restored a strategic relationship with Islama­ tribes and parties in Pakistan that are more receptive bad. Thus a Soviet attack against Pakistan would be to Moscow than the current regime. The Soviet inva­ viewed as a major challenge by the United States and sion of Afghanistan actually strengthened President could lead to a major confrontation. International cen­ Zia's position. Evidence of significant efforts at sure would also increase dramatically. A Soviet attack destabilization might be seen by many Pakistanis as would damage Moscow's tenuously better ties with an indication of a Soviet plan to use Afghanistan as a China, which has a long-standing security relationship base for expanding in the region. Nevertheless, Mos­ with Pakistan. Clearly then, this is a very risky option cow is likely to pursue the destabilization option for the Soviet Union. before fundamentally changing its policies on Afghanistan. Second, Soviet escalation might take the form of Prospects direct military pressure through air strikes against ma­ jor Pakistani targets. Successful attacks could in­ In the aftermath of the Geneva summit between crease opposition pressure on President Zia to come President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, to terms with the Soviets. However, it could also in­ there has been much speculation that peace might be crease pressure on the government to respond de­ at hand in Afghanistan. Unfortunately this does not ap­ cisively. The Pakistani air force recently brought down pear likely. Moscow still insists that Afghanistan an intruding aircraft.75 should be dominated by pro-Soviet communists. The Soviet military pressure could also force Pakistan Mujahedin still reject this Soviet goal. Even an agree­ to seek closer security relations with the United ment between Pakistan and the Kabul government States, something Moscow does not want. It could need not spell an end to the war. dispose Washington, at the very least, to increase its It is possible that when Moscow realizes that military supplies for Islamabad. Already, in response neither escalation against the Mujahedin and neigh­ to a Soviet cross-border attack against purely Paki­ boring countries nor the current negotiations will stani targets in 1985, the Reagan administration expe­ result in a communist-dominated Afghanistan, it might dited the shipment of sensitive air defense equipment begin to consider other alternatives. It is not self­ to Pakistan.76 Washington has also indicated to the evident that the Soviets would never accept anything Soviets that direct military pressure on Pakistan can short of total military victory. In the past, the Soviets have significant repercussions on the state of Soviet­ have changed their minds, and they may do so again. American relations. Several compromises appear feasible. Some ob­ servers have suggested that the post-World War II settlements on Finland and Austria provide useful ex­ "This section draws on my "The Soviet Dilemma in Afghanistan," loc. cit. "The Washington Times, Jan. 16, 1986. amples of what might be achieved. However, given ,. The New York Times, May 12, 1985. the many unique features of the Afghan case, if the 19 Moscow's Afghan War

Soviets ever do accept a political settlement and bloody conflict. Until recently, even some responsible withdraw, a new and different precedent will thereby governments, including India's, had voiced such opin­ be set. ions. Recent Indian press reports, however, show that Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew New Delhi now accepts that Washington is seriously Brzezinski has proposed a formula of compromise­ interested in a political settlement.78 namely, the external neutralization of Afghanistan In bilateral talks on Afghanistan in 1982 and 1985, combined with a Soviet military withdrawal, the and on other occasions, the United States has indi­ introduction of Islamic peace-keeping forces for an in­ cated to the Soviet Union that Washington will not terim period, and self-determination for the Afghans.77 create obstacles to a Soviet withdrawal and a political An arrangement that guarantees Afghanistan's neu­ settlement in Afghanistan. Yet Moscow has ex­ trality would ensure that Afghanistan would not pressed distrust of American assurances, probably become a security threat to the Soviet Union. The not least because its countercharges against the neutralization formula deals with Soviet fears of United States served its own propaganda purposes. It American strategic designs on Afghanistan. Moscow is important that available channels be used to signal could even claim victory, were such an agreement periodically to Moscow that the United States is ready reached, by asserting that it has achieved one goal for and willing to play a constructive role-should Mos­ which it invaded Afghanistan in the first place. A set­ cow decide to consider seriously a settlement that in­ tlement of this type might be achieved through current cludes self-determination for the Afghan people. or modified UN-sponsored negotiations that allowed Ultimately, however, two factors will have crucial the Mujahedin to have some representation. influence on the Soviet decision. One is the military The Soviets and their friends-and even some inde­ strength and the popular support of the Mujahedin in pendent analysts- have occasionally charged that Afghanistan. The other is the level of international Washington prefers the continuation of the war to a support (especially Pakistani) extended to the Mu­ political settlement. Such charges are based on the jahedin. The latter is partly contingent upon the recognition that Soviet involvement in Afghanistan of­ maintenance and strengthening of the alliance among fers propaganda advantages to the United States and the resistance groups. Only when Moscow is con­ keeps the Soviet Union entangled in a protracted and vinced that it cannot get its way by military force, will it pursue solutions that encompass self-determina­ tion. Moscow has yet to reach that point. "The New York Times, Oct. 6, 1985. "See, e.g., the articles by A.G. Noorani, "India's Policy on Afghanistan," Indian Express (New Delhi), June 14 and 15, 1985.

20 China'sEconomic Experiment: FromMao to Market

Jan S. Prybyla

fter a brief, turbulent period of a market-plan By 1976, the Chinese economy was in a bad state. economy with mixed private/socialized prop­ While the poor quality of the country's economic per­ Aerty in the early 1950's (the political equivalent formance was not new and had many dimensions, it of which was Mao's "New Democracy''),1 the Chinese was summed up in low and, for some time declining, adopted Stalin's model of a centrally planned com­ factor productivity. 2 Indeed, the 10 years of profound mand economy with comprehensive state/collective political upheaval during the Cultural Revolu_tion property. The installation of this model was completed merely added to the already long-term negative trend in 1956, toward the end of China's First Five-Year Plan of productivity, which had averaged -1.5 percent an­ (1953-57). Almost as soon as it was in place, how­ nually since 1957.3 The growth in the net domestic ever, the model was found to be ill-suited to China's product that had been obtained since the introduction conditions. The Stalinist emphasis on capital-inten­ of the planned economy in the mid-1950's (4.4 percent sive heavy industrialization at the expense of agricul­ annually)4 was due primarily to the addition of factors, ture produced many problems: sluggish agricultural especially labor, rather than to improvement in the output and labor productivity; sectoral disproportions; efficiency of factor use. In fact, great damage was in­ consumer-goods shortages and low consumption lev­ flicted on land (through ecological abuse), labor els; bottlenecks in the supply of key inputs; retarded (through educational obscurantism), and capital services; urban unemployment (25 percent of the ur­ (through technological retardation), particularly in ban labor force, or 8 million people, in 1957); and rigid, periods of leftward adjustment, such as the Great overcentralized bureaucratic structures and pro­ Leap Forward (1958-60) and the Cultural Revolution cedures. As a result, between 1957 and 1976 the (1966-76).5 The result was poverty verging on destitu­ model was subjected to "right" (1957, 1961-65) and tion in large areas of China's countryside. "left" (1958-60, 1966-76) adjustments that caused violent swings in the economy, as well as in the political and social lives of the Chinese people. ' Mao"s New Democracy was an attempt to combine communist dictatorial political forms with emasculated and restricted manifestations of political pluralism in a united front of communists and noncommunist "patriotic personnages." New Democracy was envisaged by Mao as a transitional phenomenon, the main function of which was to prepare the ground for proletarian dictatorship by the communist party. Like the transitional arrangements in the economy before 1953, it was a mix of incompatible Jan S. Pryby/a is Professor of Economics at The elements. See Mao Tse-tung, "On New Democracy" (January 1940), in Selected Pennsylvania State University (University Park). He is Works of Mao Tse-tung, Bejing, Foreign Languages Press, 1965, Vol. II, PP. 339-84. author of The Chinese Economy: Problems and Poli­ 'Total factor productivity is defined as the output per unit of labor and capital combined. For a discussion of factor productivity, see K. C. Yeh, "Macroeconomic cies (1978, 1981), Issues in Socialist Economic Changes in the Chinese Economy During the Readjustment," The China Quarterly Modernization (1970), and Market and Plan Under (London), December 1984, pp. 705-13. Socialism: The Bird in the Cage (forthcoming). He is a • See Table 6 "Annual Rates of Growth of Domestic Product, Factor Inputs and Productivity, Selected Periods," in ibid., p. 711. contributing editor of Current History, and a member 'Ibid. of the editorial advisory board of Occasional Pa­ • The following is just one of many examples of ecological abuse. In Inner Mongolia pers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, (Nei Monggol), the plowing up of grasslands during the Cultural Revolution's "take grain as the key link" campaign turned 967,000 acres of good pastureland into desert published by the School of Law, University of Mary­ and resulted in 1.9 million acres' being invaded by sand. Between 1966 and 1978, the land (Baltimore). (continued on p. 22) 21 China's Economic Experiment: From Mao to Market

The search for the causes of China's economic ance, processing, and coordination of information problems proceeded in two stages. The first, from about cost and utility, motivation, and distribution of 1976 through 1980, was characterized by political property rights. Reform alters in a qualitative way the housecleaning, ideological reinterpretations, and locus of decision-making in the system and the cri­ piecemeal economic adjustments. The formal begin­ teria for making the decisions. Thus, it marks the ning of the end of the first stage came in December system's transformation into something qualitatively 1978 with the holding of the landmark 3rd Plenum of different. For reform of a centrally planned economy the Party's 11th Central Committee at which Deng to deserve its name, the market and private property Xiaoping consolidated his hold on the party leader­ must become the dominant determinants of produc­ ship. The consensus that emerged from the Plenum tion, investment, and the distribution of income was that China's economic problems lay in the party shares in the system.6 and government's erroneous "style of work," which, it was said, had produced leftist distortions of the system of central administrative command planning. Policies of Adjustment Thus, it followed that if this work style were rec­ tified-through replacement of personnel plus some Between 1976 and 1980, four major adjustment "education"-things would fall into place. In other policies were implemented. First, the administrative words, what was needed was a simple adjustment. structure of the plan, flattened by the leftist hur­ With time, the simplicity of the remedies and their lack ricanes of the Cultural Revolution, was rebuilt and of effectiveness became apparent. The second stage righted. Among other things, administration of the began in 1981 and is still going on. The consensus, ap­ economy was simplified and decision-making was de­ parently fragile, now seems to be that China's eco­ volved to local authorities and industrial managers.7 nomic troubles are rooted in the system of central Second, the system's goal priorities were reordered planning and that what is needed is reform. primarily to benefit agriculture and consumer-goods An important conceptual distinction between "ad­ industries, as well as to create a more open economy justment" and "reform" must be made at this time. Ad­ (in particular vis-a-vis the West). Third, emphasis was justment means policy changes within the framework put on the importation of modern engineering tech­ of the given system. Adjustment-type changes do not nology from capitalist countries, in order to help alter in any fundamental respect the basic operational modernize the technologically retarded Chinese principles and institutional structure of the system. plants and equipment. Fourth, and potentially most The opposite is true of reform. Reform changes the significant, selected elements of capitalist social principles governing the system and the system's in­ techniques8 were imported and used as supplements stitutional arrangements for. the generation, convey- to the command plan ("using capitalism to build socialism"). The fourth adjustment policy raises the interesting question of whether social techniques are systemical- number of livestock in this autonomous region declined by half. Renmin Ribao (Beijing), Jan. 23, 1979; and Nei Monggol Regional Radio Station (Hohhot), Jan. 26, 1979, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China (Washington, DC­ hereafter FBIS-CHI), .Feb. 2, 1979. For an overview of the ecological disaster in China • The transformation thesis explicitly rejects the convergence notion of market wrought by leftward adjustments, see Vaclav Smil, The Bad Earth: Environmental socialism in which market and plan harmoniously fuse in roughly equal proportions. the Degradation in China, Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1984. one aiding and rounding off the other. I find the convergence notion to be theoretically The educational damage inflicted by the Cultural Revolution was both quantitative unsound and operationally unattainable. and qualitative. "Educational work suffered great setbacks during the 'cultural 'See Robert Michael Field, "Changes in Chinese Industry Since 1978," The China revolution' in the years 1966-76, and has not to this day fully recovered from the evil Quarterly, December 1984, p. 742. consequences" (Beijing Review, Jan. 1, 1981, p. 8). According to Hu Yaobang, general • As explained more fully in the text below, by resort to capitalist social techniques is secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 160 million meant the use of prices (including wages and interest rates), profits that depend on youths who were between the ages of 8 and 18 in 1966 (at the outset of the Cultural prices, and taxes to motivate workers and managers and to influence the spending Revolution) received substandard, indeed "poisonous," education during the years of patterns of consumers and investors, and the use of exchange rates in transactions turmoil. Another 210 million teenagers in primary and secondary schools around 1980 with foreign countries. It also means that broad property rights with regard to assets were being given deficient education as a result of the destruction wrought by the are vested in the actual users of those assets. In a capitalist (market) economy, these Cultural Revolution. Ibid., Apr. 14, 1980, p. 15. In 1978, in a population exceeding techniques arise from competitive, lateral, buying and selling transactions concluded 960 million, China had a total of 4.3 million scientific and technical personnel in by freely choosing economic units. In a command economy, only the form of these engineering, scientific research, agriculture, public health, and teaching. The only techniques is used, without the substance. Thus, prices in a command economy setting relatively reliable ones were those whose skills were acquired before 1966. State are not the mathematical expression of costs and utilities in the system and do not Statistical Bureau, Statistical Yearbook of China 1983, Hong Kong, Economic even remotely indicate allocative rationality. Rather, they are accounting devices Information and Agency, 1983, pp. 103, 525. For an update on the educational denoting-very roughly and imperfectly-production costs plus an arbitrary margin of situation, see Marianne Bastid, "Chinese Educational Policies in the 1980s and profit. Property rights in assets vested in enterprise managers are subject to Economic Development," The China Quarterly, June 1984, pp. 189-219. administrative restricti9ns regarding their value, size, use, and so on.

22 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986

ly and culturally neutral. Is it possible to graft markets means using prices (including wages and interest and de facto private property rights onto the central rates), profits that depend on prices, and taxes k> administrative command plan so as to improve the motivate workers and managers and to influence the plan's efficiency, without reforming the planned sys­ spending patterns of consumers. The economic tem as a whole? Indeed, can capitalist social tech­ agents adapt to those inducements at will; within the niques be used to build a more efficient state social­ parameters set up by the levers, the agents have free ism? Or, is it necessary to truncate such techniques, choice. But to do the job of raising the efficiency of emasculate them, and restrict them in order to pre­ resource use, prices must be market prices, and vent them from fundamentally changing the state markets must be workably (not necessarily perfectly, socialist system? More broadly, does the importation in a textbook sense) competitive. If prices are ad­ of capitalist social techniques produce behavioral rip­ ministerep by government and/or party authorities­ ples that transcend the economy and· cause "spiritual whether central or local-and thus do not originate in pollution," for example, or "unhealthy tendencies"? 9 reasonably competitive buyer-seller transactions, The answer, of course, is that social techniques then they are merely administrative levers mas­ ., cannot be completely separated from the system querading as economic levers: arbitrary prices arbi­ from which they have evolved. Nor, in my opinion, can trarily imposed.11 Administrative levers, whether in the they be used disjointedly. They must be applied as a form of physical commands or administered prices, system, their organic interconnections unbroken. cannot convey the multidimensional opportunity-cost Capitalist social techniques, it can be argued, are the information needed for efficiency of operations. In products G>fa pluralistic culture and as such need a fact, they produce troublesome motivational effects. pluralistic, competitive, free-wheeling, free-choice en­ The use of capitalist social techniques during the vironment to do their job of efficient resource alloca­ period of adjustment in China had two major charac­ tion. If such an environment is denied them, or if their teristics: the various measures adopted were not essential interconnections are broken, they either organically linked into a logical, internally consistent atrophy or work in a perverse way. Indeed, ever since system; and many of the measures were confined to Nikita Khrushchev came to power in 1957, the Soviet certain geographical areas or to selected experi­ and East European economies have borrowed capital­ mental enterprises. 12 In other words, the capitalist ist social techniques, only to devitalize them and hem social techniques were fenced off from one another them in by the bureaucratic plan. Consequently, the and thus did not constitute an organic entity. efficiency results have been very small, nonexistent, Nonetheless, the adjustments were quite compre­ or even negative.10 hensive and affected urban as well as rural policies. In China, like elsewhere in the world of the plan, the State agricultural procurement prices (and above­ use of capitalist social techniques during the period of quota prices) were raised, as were industrial tariff adjustment was intended to maximize reliance on wages and salaries.1.3 Later, the salaries of teachers "economic levers" rather than on "administrative and other "intellectuals" were also raised. Overtime levers." Unlike administrative levers, which are and piecework pay ,and bonuses to enterprise man­ arbitrarily imposed from above, economic levers are agers, workers, and employees were reintroduced for indirect, general inducements to economic agents the first time since the mid-1960's, and strict adminis­ expressed in financial terms. Economic leverage trative restrictions on labor mobility were relaxed

'The ethical principles of a socialist economy are listed by the Hungarian economist ""The Retreat from Marx," The Economist (London), Oct. 27, 1984, p. 18. In China, Janos Kornai as: (1) socialist wage setting (to each according to his work and equal "the assigned profit margin for making hot rolled steel is now ten times as high as tor pay tor equal work); (2) solidarity (help the weak to rise rather than punish them cold rolled steel. So the hot sort is naturally in surplus while the cold has to be through capitalist-like competition); (3) security (full employment guaranteed by imported at great cost. Yet rolled steel is one of the products [that] will stay subject to society); and (4) priority of general interest over partial (individual) interest. See Janos administrative decree" (ibid.). • Kornai, "The Dilemmas of a Socialist Economy: The Hungarian Experience," "For example, it has been reported that since August 1984, 1.000 customs and Cambridge Journal of Economics (Cambridge, UK), June 1980, p. 149. Kornai rightly security officials have manned around the clock the perimeter of the Shenzhen Special concludes that conflicts are inevitable between these four ethical principles and the Economic Zone (near Hong Kong). South China POSt (Hong Kong), May 29, 1985. five conditions tor economic efficiency, which are: (1) an incentive system to stimulate­ "Tariff or basic wages and salaries are laid down-on the Soviet model-by the better performance from all individuals participating in production; (2) careful • central authorities in schedules that are mandatory on state-sector enterprises. There calculation of costs and benefits and termination of nonefficient production activities; are several such schedules. Industrial workers in China are generally subject to an (3) fast and flexible adjustment to the current situation and external conditions; eight-grade schedule, the skill and basic wage rate being spelled out for each job (4) entrepreneurship; and (5) personal responsibility. grade. State employees are under a different schedule containing roughly 3~.la:rt ..._.·R, ·.· -o/.~,_ "On the Soviet and East European borrowing of capitalist social techniques and its grades. There are separate schedules for _engineeringand technical pers n · ;'4\:; -~.)- efficiency results, see Jan S. Prybyla, Market and Plan Under Socialism: The Bird in the teachers, etc. See Jan S. Prybyla, The Chmese Economy: Problems and ,.;,,,ii, \ Cage, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1986. 2nd ed., Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1981, pp. 150-6 . D::··, · · .-.:•· O 23 ~ l~CKU,,1 I f83l-/ .,/· China's Economic Experiment: From Mao to Market

profits taxation, partial profit retention by enterprises, and enterprise incentive funds were initiated in selected places and firms . Special Economic Zones equipped with various legal forms of joint-venture or capitalist coproduction were also begun, and similar arrangements were made in the case of individual projects outside the zones. In the countryside, rural fairs (where near-market prices prevail) and house­ hold subsidiary plots were resurrected and expanded somewhat, and a production responsibility system subject to contract between the rural collectivity (pro­ duction team) and small groups of households was initiated in 1979.

Results of Adjustment

Althoug h the use of selected capitali st tec hniques Manufacture of "Camel" brand cigarettes at the has generally proven unsuccessful in the long run, Xiamen Cigarette Factory in Fujian Province in 1981. such adjustments of the plan are not invariably a -EASTFOTO . waste of time . They can, and sometimes do, improve certain dimensions of the planned economy's per­ through a de facto termination of the rustication formance . They did that i China. Indeed, by 1980, (xiafang) program , the gradual removal of rightist quantitative performance of industry and agriculture labels, and the encouragement of unemployable had shown marked improvement from the levels of youths "awaiting work" to find work for themselves in 1975.15 However, the economy's qualitative ills re· the newly revived urban private sector or in coopera­ mained by and large unaffected . In fact , the ad hoc tive industry and services .14 use of emasculated and disjointed capitalist soc ial There were important structural changes in indus" techniques side by side with administrative orders of try as well . Instead of the state appropriating 100 per­ all kinds made the qualitative deficiences if not worse , cent of state enterprise profits , experiments with at least more visible and less tolerable . Thus, hitherto suppressed inflation came more into the open; hidden unemployment came out of hiding; subsidies contin -·· ued to rise at fast rates; budgetary deficits appeared, " The xiafang movemen t. which peaked in the late 1960's and early 1970's , involved the compulsory transfer of educated urban youths (mainly middle-school graduat es) to as did balance of payments disequilibria ; investment the count ryside . Between 1968 and 1978, about 20 million urban youths were so (especially outside the state budget) continued on its relocated . The policy of rustication was quietly phased out in 1978-79. following the runaway course despite the central authorities' efforts National Conference on Rusticated Youth Settling in the Countrys ide held in Beiji ng, Oct. 31-Dec. 10, 1978. Although most of the " sent down" youths returned to their to curb it; the production process was disrupted by home towns aft\lr this time, many apparently still remain strand ed in the countryside , persistent energy and transportation bottlenecks ; a caught in inextricable red tape. See Charles Hoffmann , " Urban Unemployment in significant port ion of state firms operated in the red; ' China," Asian Thought and Society (Oneonta . NY), March 1984, pp. 32-37 . Rightist labels were attached to many people, mainly intellectua ls, during the quality of output was deficient ; and factor produc tivity Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957 that followe d the aborted Hundred Flowe rs Campaign. showed little or no gain. Additionally, social indis­ The consequences for an individual of being branded a rightist were terrifying. See, for cipline was on the rise, some people demanded more example, Ruth Earnshaw Lo and Katherine Kindermann . In the Eye of the Typhoon, New York , Harcourt Brace Jovanovich , 1980. Removal of rightist labels was ordered in freedom of cultural expression and political democ­ 1975, but the order was countermanded by the left faction within the leaders hip. The racy, and many people, especially the young, began removal proc ess was resumed shortly after the arres t of the so-called Gang of Four in to question the relevance of Marxism-Leninism.16 in··· ,.late 1976. See '"Last Rightists have Their Designation Removed," Beijing Review, .¥Nov. 24, 1978, p. 3. Urban unemployment, according to Hoffmann, loc. cit . (note 14, Table 2, p. 33), probably peaked at 13 percent of the urban labor force in 1979. The precise youth " For example, gross agricultu ral output rose from 128.5 billion renminbi in 1976 to component of the 15 million urban unemployed in that year cannot be known with 164.6 renminbi in 1980. Over the same period. gross industrial output rose from certainty, but it could be as high as three-fif ths. According to Li Xiannian (report to a 321.9 billion renminbi to 499.2 billion . See Statistical Yearbook of China 1983, op. cit. , working conference of the Party·s Central Committee, Apr. 25, 197~). the urban pp. 149 and 215. ~ unemployment at that time stood at 20 million . Ming Pao (Hong Kong), June 14. 1979, 11 For a discussion of this view among youth , see Stanley Rosen, " Prosperity, p. 4. See also, John Philip Emerson, " Urban School-leavers and Unemployment in Privatization. and China's Youth."' Problems of Communism (Washington . DC), China," The China Quarterly, March 1983, _pp. 1-16 . March-April 1985, pp. 1-28. 24 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986 these respects, China by 1980 had begun to encoun­ present in a somewhat different form in China during ter many of the same problems advanced socialist 1961-65) 19 whereby the rural collective's operational economies had experienced during their numerous unit, the production team (of some 30 to 40 house­ experiments with adjustment of their highly central­ holds), signs contracts with its smaller component ized plans. units for the delivery of given quantities and assort· ments of output at stated prices. These smaller units may be groups (zu) of up to half a dozen households or Beyond Adjustment, Toward Reform individual peasant families (hu). The production responsibility contract (zeren zhi) may be either an The year 1981 marks a turning point in China's post­ output contract (baochan zhi) or a net-output delivery Mao economic history, although the turning had been contract (baogan zhi). some two years in coming. The period 1981-85 can Under the terms of the output contract, the non­ be divided into two subperiods. From 1981 until the collective producing unit (the group or household) end of 1984, the agricultural economy underwent im­ delivers the contracted-for output to the collective portant changes in market relations and privatization and receives workpoints for it. The value of a work· of labor and property that skirted, and perhaps even point is determined by the collective effort of all crossed, systemic frontiers. While this was going on, production-team households in the context of the the nonagricultural, or urban, economy (industry, state's pricing policy, and the income distribution commerce, services, transport, communications) was function rests, as before, with the production team primarily still functioning under a policy adjustment, (the collective). Under the net-output delivery con­ with experiments of a reformist temper being tried tract, no workpoints are involved. The contracted-for only in a selected but growing number of enterprises output is delivered to the collective and paid for at and geographical locations. Beginning in 1985, how­ prices specified in the contract. The balance remain­ ever, while the reform-like changes in agriculture: ing after the delivery obligation is fulfilled, the were consolidated, the movement toward reform in agricultural tax is paid, arid a number of collective the nonagricultural sector was stepped up, though not deductions are made remains the property of the without stops and retreats. In 1985, therefore, experi­ household and can be consumed by the family, sold ments with free markets and privatization of labor and on the free market, or sold to the state at "negotiated" property began to be extended throughout the other (near-market) prices. From the standpoint of the non­ sectors of the economy. collective contracting unit, the evolution since 1979 The decision taken by the party Central Committee has been from group to household. From the stand­ in October 1984 to move beyond adjustment in the ur­ point of the nature of the contract, the movement has ban sector is official recognition of the need to bring been from output contract to net-output delivery con­ the two major sectors of the economy into institu­ tract. In other words, between 1979 and 1981, the pro­ tional harmony. 17 It also is an implicit admission that gression was clearly in the direction of free market qualitative improvement of economic performance and the privatization of labor and use of land.20 must be sought through the use of market and privati­ The details and precise modalities of operation of zation measures of reform, rather than through a the baogan daohu have been publicized and widely return to the Stalinist plan in either its original (First Five-year Plan) version or in its modified 1961-65 form. A return to the no-market, no-plan solution of ""Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Reform of the Economic Structure, Adopted by the 12th Central Committee of the CPC at Its Third Maoism is not even under consideration. Plenary Session on October 21, 1984," Beijing Review, Oct. 29, 1984, pp. i-xvi. See also FBIS-CHI, Oct. 22, 1984, pp. K/1-17. For a discussion, see The New York Times, Oct. 21, 1984. Agriculture "A literal translation of Baogan daohu is "full responsibility to household." "Two major differences between baogan daohu (1985) and the household contract system of 1961-65 should be noted. First, the 1961-65 system was less prevalent than The keystone of the institutional changes in the present one. Second, in a significant proportion of cases, the 1961-65 system agriculture, the element of change that constitutes a involved payment in workpoints to the household by the contracting team or brigade (baochan daohu). whereas no workpoints are involved in the present system (baogan transition from adjustment-like tinkering with the parts daohu). In other words, the present arrangement represents a more widespread and to a reform-like replacement of the economic mecha­ profound decollectivization than did its 1961-65 predecessor (denounced during the nism, is the contractual system of net-output delivery Cultural Revolution as an evil creature of Liu Shaoqi). 18 "Yak-Yeow Kueh, "China's New Agricultural Policy Program: Major Consequences, by households, or baogan daohu. It is the culmina­ 1979-1983."" Journal of Comparative Economics (New Haven, CN), December 1984. tion of an evolutionary process initiated in 1979 (but pp. 354-61, esp. Table 1, p. 356, and Table 2, p. 357. 25 China's Economic Experiment: From Mao to Market

discussed and analyzed.21 Our interest here is in the There can be no doubt that in agriculture there has systemic implications of this arrangement, that is, in taken place (since 1981) a considerable marketization its reform potential. of information and coordination through reasonably The arrangement amounts to family tenant farming, competitive market prices and direct lateral buyer­ the landlord being the state (via the collectivity). seller transactions, and an equally impressive de fac­ Although no actual rent payment is involved, there is a to privatization of property rights (involving greater quasi-rent element implicit in the net-output delivery flexibility of cropping patterns, work schedules, spe­ obligation at state-set prices, which in the past were cialization, and marketing), both of which have af­ typically below-sometimes appreciably below­ fected motivation in a positive way. equivalent market prices. Legally, tha land remains the property of the collective, and it cannot be bought or sold by the noncollective units. Such units, how­ Results in Agriculture ever, can obtain extensive (and exclusive) rights of use to the land, typically for a 15-yearperiod (longer in Proponents of going beyond adjustment naturally the case of pastures and woodlands). Draft animals, attribute the favorable situation in agriculture over the farm machinery, and means of transportation can be last several years to the contractual household net­ owned privately by the families. Limited numbers of output delivery arrangement (baogan daohu). The re­ helpers (three) can be hired, but this restriction seems sults in agriculture are impressive (despite recent not to be closely enforced. The contract can be trans­ estimates of a fairly sizable reduction in grain output ferred to another family with the collecti\te's permis­ tor 1985).23 Production of grain, cotton, and other sion, and compensation must be paid to the transferor commodities has risen spectacularly, albeit from low by the transferee for any capital improvements made levels.24 Yields have increased, and labor productivity to the land. Consolidation of land parcels is also possi­ has risen to the point where from 15 to 30 percent of ble, again with the collective's consent. Under the the labor force has been released from land-related contract, households may specialize in particular work. Per capita rural incomes have risen sharply.25 tasks, regardless of whether such tasks are agricul­ tural or not (for example, transportation, machinery

repair, merchandisi,ng). "Du Runsheng,"Second Stage Rural"Reform," Beijing Review, June 24, 1985, From the standpoint of the system, the importance pp. 15-17, 22: Zhao Ziyang, "Why Relax Agricultural Price Controls," ibid., Feb. 18, 1985, pp. 16-18, 29. "Starting this year [1985], Chinese farmers will no longer of baogan daohu resides in the de facto (not de jure) be obliged to sell a portion of their harvest to the state. Instead, they will depend privatization of landed property (both de facto and de primarily on contracts and the market demand to determine which crops they will jure in the case of draft animals, machines, carts, grow .... Through contracts with farmers, the government will purchase large amounts of grain and cotton at preferential prices and leave the rest of the crop to be regulated trucks, and so on); the devolution of extensive (though by the market. When the market price goes IOw, the state wilt purchase the grain or far from unlimited) decision-making power, including cotton from the farmers at a protective pric~ higher than market price. On the other decisions about income distribution and the voluntary hand, when the market price goes high, the state may sell its reserves in big quantities to bring the price back down. By buying and selling the government can control the establishment of cooperatives, to the level of a private wide fluctuations in the market." See also "Market .to Replace the Quota System," production unit (the family); and the significant resort ibid., Jan. 14, 1985, p. 8. As part of the "second stage" (1985) agricultural changes, to market prices and near-market prices (negotiated and reflecting the growing monetization and commercialization-specialization of the prices) by both parties to the contract in deciding on rural economy, the agricultural tax, formerfy paid in grain, will henceforth be settled in cash in the "reverse ratio" of 3:7, i.e., 30 percent of the tax grain will be valued at the the volume, assortment, and disposition of output. former state monopoly (quota) price, and 70 percent at the former (higher) above quota The last is to become even more important with the price. Xinhua (Beijing), May 24, 1985, in FBIS-CHI, May 29, 1985, pp. Kl4-6. proposed phasing out of the state's monopoly of pur­ "Estimates of grain production in 1985 put grain output at about 27 million tons below the 1984 record of 407 million tons. See John F. Burns, "Facing a Decline in Its chases of key farm products (for example, grain, oil­ Grain Fields, China Retreats on Policy," The New York Times, Jan. 1, 1986. seeds, cotton) and the concurrent removal of state­ " For example, grain production in China increased from 284.5 million metric tons in 1975 to 407.1 million metric tons in 1984. Statistical Yearbook of China 1983, op. cit., set procurement prices and the contractual delivery p. 158: and State Statistical Bureau, "Communique on Fulfillment of China's 1984 quota. This decision has been taken in consequence Economic and Social Development Plan," Beijing Review, Mar. 25, 1985, p. ii. of the upsurge in farm production and the resultant " According to Fei Xiaotong, "more than one-third of the total rural labor force in southern Jlangsu [Province] has given up farming" ("Surplus Rural Labor Put to Work," decline, in some cases, of market prices below state Beijing Review, May 27, 1985, p. 20). According to a New York Times report, "apart 22 procurement prices. from peasants who have switched to growing cotton and other crops [rather than grain], about 50 million have cut back or abandoned farming to go into the fastest growing sector of the economy, rural industry." Such a comparatively low figure would "A useful source is Frederick W. Crook, "The Baogan Daohu Incentive System: constitute roughly 15 percent of the total agricultural labor force. See John F. Burns, Translation and Analysis of a Model Contract," The China Quarterly, June 1985, "China Grain Crop Dips: Setback Seen for Policy," The New York Times, Dec. 23, pp. 291-303. (continued on p. 27)

26 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986

Jia Chunyan, a peasant of the once highly publicized model brigade of Dazhai, keeps her surplus from the 1984 corn crop in her living room together with her bicycle and TV. -Sven -Erik Sjoberg, Pressens Bild from Photoreporters,

and household expenditure patterns have shown qual­ industries (cooperative as well as private) have mush­ itative improvement. The marketed portion of agricul­ roomed, absorbing some of the farm labor that has tural output has been expanded, and town and village been displaced . · There have also been a few troublesome results

1985. The Beijing China Daily (New York ed.) of Oct. 9. 1985. p. 4, puts the number of connected, it would seem, with baogan daohu (see " surplus laborers" in China's countryside at 120 million , which is expected to reach discussion below). Nonetheless, there is no doubt some 230 million by the turn of the century. Six1y million surplus farm workers were that , so far at least, the positive developments in employed in rural industrie s in 1985. There are indications that the rural industries are agriculture outweigh the negative ones. Most impor­ being developed too fast. There is also talk of "wasted funds, raw materials, and energy [which] greatly dampen the enthusiasm of the masses." Commenta tor 's article , tant , the problem of the deficient quality of economic Renmin Ribao, June 3, 1985, trans . in FBIS-CHI, June 7, 1985, p. K/9. See also Robert performance in the agricultural sector has been ad­ Delfs. "The Rural Uprising, " Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), July 11, 1985, dressed with remarkable success . pp. 56-57. Per capita income in 1984, acco rding to a sample survey of peasant households, Two questions arise in this connection . The first , came to 355 yuan, an increase of 160 percent over 1978, or 100 percen t when price concerns the source of the agricultural success story. increases are taken into acco unt. Bei;ing Review, Apr. 22, 1985, p. 16. A note of Is it the partial decollectivizat ion and movement away caution . Knotty statistical problems are involved in the sample surveys of peasant incomes . These inclu de the questionable reliability of the price deflater in the from central command planning represented by the countryside; the representativeness of the samples drawn on an unspecified but baogan daohu ? Or is it the contribution of other, less­ nonrandom basis; the question of collect ively supplied consumption goods (not taken reformist, more-technical factors ? The latter include a into account by the income data): and the propensity of local officials to " overfulfill" the statistica l plan, i.e., the tende ncy to inflate statistics so as to show that what the succession of good weather years; increased use of leadership wants (that the peasants should grow rich) is, in fact, happening chemical ferti lizers; reversion to traditional cropping instantaneously. On the technical problems involved in rural income sampling, see patterns (that is, the abandonment of the Maoist pol­ Nicholas R. Lardy, " Consumption and Living Standards in China , 1978-83 ," The China Quarterly, Dec. 1984, pp. 851-52 . icy of commune and provincial self-sufficiency and of

27 China's Economic Experiment: From Mao to Market

the policy of "grain first") and a consequent rise in herent in private property use, such understanding interprovincial trade in farm produce; and the hike in seems to have eluded the officials put in charge of procurement prices, which falls under the rubric of markets and property supervision. The attitude of adjustment. It should be noted, however, that it is not these officials toward fluctuating prices (especially easy to draw a line between institutional changes and upward fluctuation, which is seen as "profiteering") technical ones. For example, the increased use of and market equilibrium prices in the context of com­ chemical fertilizers by household producers is due in modity shortages ranges from unsympathetic to hos­ large part to an improvement in the system's motiva­ tile. In this view, what is not controlled is seen as tional structure; it is simply now worth the peasants' "arbitrary" and "blind."28 Such attitudes have had real while to use more chemicals whereas it was not under consequences. The sharp rises in the retail prices of the old workpoints system. deregulated farm goods on China's city markets in This leads to the second question: Is baogan daohu 1985, for example, led to a flurry of administrative a reform or an adjustment? The answer is that it is an price controls, rollbacks, and subsidies.27 Even more almost-reform. The degree of individual choice in­ dangerous, the theoretical grasp of how a market­ volved is far from minor. That choice i$ exercised to a price system operates is still quite elementary on the large extent on the basis of market-price information; part of many financial cadres. 28 it is coordinated in large part by the market; and it is But it is not just a question of deficiency in theo­ motivated by the lure of market gain. Property rights retical comprehension of how market prices allocate to assets-including land-are clearly and signifi­ resources. In practice, even for those who understand cantly privatized. basic market principles, it is not easy to distinguish But the liberation of individual choice under the between price changes that are a result of granting regime of baogan daohu is not nearly complete. greater freedom to buyers and sellers to bargain com­ Limitations on that choice are pervasive and signifi­ petitively and arrive at equilibrium prices in the cant as regards both state intervention in the market market and price changes that stem from "wrong" process and state restrictions on private rights of use sources such as speculation, cost-push, or demand of assets. The coexistence of market prices, "prefer­ inflation. Given the magnitude of this practical difficul­ ential" (quota and above-quota) prices, and negotiated ty, the financial bureaucrats will most likely do what prices- a multi-tier price system- encourages mar­ comes most naturally: they will administratively con­ ket manipulations and distortions, of which quality of trol prices. produce is the first victim. But there is a more funda­ Reform of the plan requires the mobility of factors mental problem. Even though the Chinese peasant of production. This is still not the case in China under understands instinctively and fairly accurately the baogan daohu. Even though factor mobility has in­ principles of the market "!lechanism and the rights in- creased compared with the post-1957 past, land and labor remain largely tied, and capital equipment (as well as crucial current inputs) must be purchased from the state monopolist. Although peasants are now "See, e.g., Chen Yun's speech to the National Party Conference (Sept. 23, 1985), in permitted to leave the land in response to market sig­ Beijing Review, Sept. 30, 1985, p. 19; and Tian Jiyun, vice-premier of the State Council, nals, they are not permitted to leave the countryside "Price System Due for Reform," ibid., Jan. 28, 1985, p. 19. "In early May 1985, the prices of 1,800 food items were partially deregulated in Beijing. Although the average price increase was said to have been 50 percent, beef prices went up 130 percent, and many vegetable prices doubled. concerned about "Following are two examples of the cadres' deficient theoretical grasp of how a possible adverse reactions by urban workers to the price hikes, the government market price system operates. In Urumqi, a meeting of cadres concluded that awarded every Beijing resident a subsidy equivalent (at present) to US$2.19 a month. "commodity price departments must straighten out prices so as to conform to the law The total cost of this subsidy (about US$140 million a year) is roughly equal to the of prices. Prices which should be changed must be resolutely changed. Those which subsidy formerly paid by the government on food purchased from peasants and resold should be controlled must be strictly controlled. Prices which are not allowed to be to urban consumers at lower prices. In December 1985, Deputy Prime Minister Li Peng raised, resolutely must not be allowed to be raised" (Xinjiang Regional Radio [Urumqi], announced that this subsidy would be raised in order to "stabilize" the situation in May 30, 1985, trans. in FBIS-CH!, June 4, 1985, p. T/1). Consider also the statements Beijing, and that there would be no major price changes in 1986. The New York Times, of a Renmin Ribao commentator: "At present a small number of state commercial Dec. 23, and May 10, 1985; Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong), May 31, 1985, in FBtS-CH!, units in some cities and rural areas still show no interest in market conditions. Some of May 31, 1985, p. W/1. A contingent of 11,000 government price inspectors was them are merely hankering after profits. When ore products are supplied, they force deployed in Beijing to prevent price· gouging (some would say, to prevent prices from down the prices at the expense of the producers; and when products are in short finding their market equilibrium level). In 1984, a decision was made to partially supply or in great demand, they raise prices willfully at the expense of the consumers. deregulate the prices of certain raw materials and energy. This resulled in a sharp ... The authorities concerned should strengthen effective management and increase in factory production costs. The factories affected by the rise were not, supervision over the market and should strictly ban willful! price hikes in violation of however, permitted to pass on their increased costs in the form of increased prices of state regulations" ("State Commerce Should Learn to Participate in Market their products. Very few went out of business. The great majority were kept afloat by Regulation," Renmin Ribao, May 28, 1985, trans. in FBIS-CH!, May 28, 1985, new government subsidies. The Wall Street Journal (New York), Apr. 1, 1985. pp. K/15-16). Commentator would have flunked Economics 101.

28 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986

Movement from adjustment toward reform in indus­ try, however, is likely to prove more difficult than it did in agriculture . For one thing, whereas agriculture was a collective-sector economy, the industrial economy is primarily a state-sector economy. The state sector is characterized by a comparatively greater rigidity of administrative (ministerial-type) structures. Unlike the collective sector, it is the preserve of the bureaucrats who inhabit it in great numbers and benefit greatly from the privileges flowing from its administration . There is bound to be resistance to the expanded use of the market mechanism because it takes the bread out of the bureaucrats' mouths. Ironically, there is also likely to be considerable opposition to privatiza­ tion of property rights from those who would seem to , benefit most from such privatization - the enterprise managers, since most of them are neither profession­ ally nor intellectually equipped to make the kind of property-related decisions and take the entrepreneur­ Privately raised pigs are carted to market by peasants ial risks required by market rules. Like their cousins in near Chengdu in Sichuan Province, the countryside (the commune, brigade, and team of­ -LallonUSYGMA . ficials), but on a more grandiose scale, these urban bureaucrats and enterp ~ e managers are prone to (though many do).29 Thus, baogan daohu, despite its react to the step-by-step relaxation of direct adminis · thrust toward free markets and privatization of prop­ trative controls in a highly "feudalistic" and corrupt erty use and labor, is still only a half-reform, perhaps a way that distorts and ultimately undermines the intent little better than half. However, even the reformist half of the reform . Indeed, according to numerous reports has so far operated in the broader context of the ad­ in the Chinese press, a number of urban officials have ministrative command plan that still dominates the taken advantage of commodity shortages, privileged nonagricultural sectors of the economy. administrative position and access to information , and the incompatible mix of administrative com­ mands and emerging markets to line their own Industry: Some Problems pockets. 30 This has happened in China on a very impressive Beginning in 1985, and lasting until 1990, this ad­ scale. Instead of market competition and useful out­ ministrative command dominance over the nonagri­ put and innovation, what emerges is the old-fashioned cultural economy (over "industry," or the "urban" sec­ bureaucratic squeeze, mutual back-scratching, para­ tor for short) is to be relaxed and reduced in scope. sitic payoffs, and bribes . One of the earliest reactions The aim is to create a "planned commodity economy" to the October 1984 decision and the consequent in the urban sector, a code name for marketization and privatization. Reform-minded changes in industry are thus designed to bring the urban economy in

harmony with the already accomplished reformist ,o "When Party and government organs and cadres use their influence to set up changes in agriculture. enterprises . . all the profits are syphoned off into the pockets of individuals or small groups .. .. These malpractices mar the reputation of the reform . . . They contaminate the organism of the Party. The new malp,actices are all associated with money. Some cadres and Party members are .. . blinded by lust for gain . ... They ,• "On the unauthorized and uncontrolled movement of rural labor to the cities . see have become slaves to money " (Zhibu Shenghuo [Beijing], No. 5, 1985, trans . in Inside Christine Wong, "'The Second Phase of Economic Reform in China." Current History China Mainland [Taipei], August 1985. pp. 15-17). See also Bei;ing Review, Apr . 1. (Philadelphia). September 1985. p. 262. In the Chinese conception of the market. labor 1985, p. 7. To date the biggest scandal , on Hainan Island, involved 690 parties who and natural resources (e.g., land)·are not "commodities," hence they are not sul;>jectto pccketed 2.1 million yuan (US$720,000). Between January and March 1985, 872 market transactions that are concerned only with commodities . Capital goods produced more-or-less phoney companies were set up by 88 government departments and others by state firms are presently in a theoretical twilight zone. Some, like trucks and (even schools and kindergartens) . Contraband vehicles and 16 other luxury...ioods tractors, have been reclassified from noncommodities to commodities . See Robert C. imported from Hong Kong and other capitalist places were resold at hefty profits on Hsu, "Conceptions of the Market in Post-Mao China: An Interpretive Essay," Modern the domest ic market . See The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly (Hong Kong), China (Beverly Hills), October 1985, pp. 438-40 . Aug. 19, 1985. p. 6.

29 China's Economic Experiment: From Mao to Market

relaxation of central controls was the emergence of economy through administrative commands and high­ countless so-called briefcase companies set up by in­ ly centralized property rights has proved increasingly dividual officials, groups of officials, and work units to counterproductive. The only apparent alternative, take advantage of the fluid situation and to do busi­ therefore, is decentralization with the help of markets ness in the cracks between plan and market. It is im­ and privatized rights of property. The big question portant to point out that these "unhealthy tendencies," thus is how to combine efficient central control with as they are officially called, are not manifestations of such decentra.lization - in short, how to create a competitive market ethics that demand adherence to decentralized monopoly. contractual law freely arrived at. Such tendencies are It cannot be done, but most state socialist regimes rather the expression of bureaucratic privilege let in the last 30 years have given this impossibility their loose in a setting characterized by supply shortages, best shot. What is involved in this quest 1sthe recon­ demand inflation, and a combination of highly im­ ciliation of private and social interests. The market perfect markets and administrative commands-the accomplishes such reconciliation by enabling the "commoditization" of long-standing malpractices. dominant influence of consumer demand to deter­ Instead of a market economy, what mushrooms in mine the volume and assortment of output and the such a situation is "feudal socialism," that is, basic configuration of income shares. This the bureaucratic baronies operating in markets of various philosophy of decentralized monopoly cannot allow. shades not only of impropriety and illegality, but of Reform of the plan, therefore, is caught from the start textbook market imperfection. 31 in a Catch-22 economic philosophy conundrum. Be The second reason why the movement toward re­ this as it may, the Chinese leadership's decision to form in the urban sector will be more difficult than initiate changes in the urban economic structure reform in agriculture is an extension of the first. In clearly tries to address this problem by concentrating agriculture, the devolution of decision-making powers on two fundamental issues: macro-control and micro­ has been to the level of the private firm (the family). In autonomy. the urban sector, this devolution will be made to the level of the lowest bureaucratic unit: the state enter­ prise, with all that this implies in bureaucratic bad Macro-Control habits and modes of behavior just discussed. Then there is the practical matter of experience. Macro-control concerns the relationship between Agriculture in China has during most periods operated the state (at whatever level) and firms or enterprises. partially in a framework of market prices (in village Under the Stalinist model, practically all enterprises fairs) and de facto private property (household sub­ are socialized- nationalized or collectivized- and sidiary plots). The private (family) property mentality are directly controlled by the administrative command promoted briefly by the agrarian reforms of the late plan, which is also highly centralized. Under modified 1940's and early 1950's has never been quite ex­ versions of this model, the role of administrative com­ tinguished. Such has not been the experience of in­ mands expressed in physical-technical norms (for dustry. Except for black-market prices, industry after example, output targets set in tons) is somewhat re­ the mid-1950's operated exclusively in a setting of duced, and the role of indicators expressed in finan­ state-set prices. All institutional manifestations of cial terms (for example, output performance judged private property were eventually obliterated, first by by profit and profitability rates, or by sales volume) is the Great Leap Forward and then, more thoroughly, increased. At the same time, the financial indicators by the Cultural Revolution. are less directive and more indicative than the phys­ An important philosophical principle that has to be ical-technical norms. There is thus a double transition: kept in mind when discussing adjustment and reform from physical to "value"32 instruments of control, and of the plan is that those in charge of the plan, the top from mandatory to more "guidance" planning (plus leaders of the communist party, do not intend to relin­ some free production and exchange on the quish control over the economy, but to make that con­ periphery). However, the financial indicators ("eco­ trol more efficient. Their goal in doing so is to facilitate nomic levers") continue for the most part to be based maintaining political control. Direct control of the

" Barry Kramer, "Oriental Tradition-Chinese Officials Still Give Preference to Kin, 32 As noted earlier, "value" instruments of control in a centrally planned economy Despite Peking Policies: Favoritism Stirs Resentment But Curb Isn't Enforced; A Job for are norms expressed in financial terms (e.g., profit, sales targ~,s), the "values" being a Son of Deng," The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 29. 1985. based on allocatively irrational, planner-determined prices.

30 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986 on state-set, cost-plus, allocatively irrational industrial ply network, that is, outside the centralized system of prices. This double switch, therefore, does not ad­ producer-goods rationing. A primary mechanism for vance the cause of economic efficiency by much, if at accomplishing this task is the holding of producer­ all, as can be demonstrated by examining the 30-year­ goods fairs, which have been reported from various old Soviet and East European experience with eco­ places, most notably Shanghai. At these fairs, capital nomic levers. From the standpoint o~ efficient re­ goods can be purchased and sold at prices negotiated source use (which is the crux of .the planned by the buyer and seller within certain limits. This is a economy's problem), economic levers are only as "Hungarian" development. good as the price system from which they stem. The In Hungary, under the New Economic Mechanism, Chinese are beginning to understand this, but their the Soviet-type material-technical supply system has understanding is as yet imperfect. been replaced by multiple-channel wholesale trade in In China, changes in the macro-control mechanism the means of production. Increasing guidance plan­ involve not only the double transition from physical to ning, that is, the use of financially expressed incen­ "value" instruments of control and from mandatory to tives and disincentives, appears to involve primarily guidance planning (which is in essence an adjust­ augmenting the economic role of lower level author­ ment), but also, since 1984, proposals for and some ities (provinces, municipalities, economic zones) attempts at altering the industrial-price system vis-a.­ compared with that of central authorities. Goods of vis the market mechanism. In the remainder of this minor or purely local importance are to be subject to section, I shall examine the key components of the the interplay of supply and demand forces in the mar­ Chinese planners' efforts to carry out this transition. ket. The markets, however, are not to be completel yr free, but subject to various forms of supervision by Planning. The idea is not to abolish mandatory plan­ local authorities. ning but to reduce it, while at the same time increas­ There are two major problems with this arrange­ ing guidance planning. Reduction of mandatory plan­ ment as it has been adopted in China. First, manda­ ning in the Chinese case involves cutting from 120 to tory planning, although reduced in terms of the 30 the number of products regulated by the plan, and number of commodities regulated, continues to apply streamlining the number of administrative echelons to strategic products (for example, raw materials, involved in economic decision-making.33 A potentially steel) that enter into the manufacture of most other important development is the distribution of some pro­ products. So long as mandatory planning is not com­ ducer goods outside the state material-technical sup· pletely abolished, it will, by its presence, however small, significantly limit and inhibit any and all reform­ ist movements outside the area in which its writ runs. Second, there is reason to believe that shifting the re­ sponsibility for guidance planning from central to lower level bureaucrats will result in merely making guidance planning mandatory at the lower levels. There is evidence that mandating guidance at lower levels has, in fact, already happened.34 The short-term result of this propensity to dictate guidance has been

"Beijing Review, Oct. 29, 1984, p. 7, puts the reduction at from 120 to 60. Some aggregation in the remaining balances of items that were listed separately before may be involved. "Abram Bergson, "A Visit to China's Economic Reforms," Comparative Economic Studies (Temple, AZ), Summer 1985, p. 76. A secretary of the Ungui County (Guanxi Province) Party Committee told bankers who were reluctant to lend money for building some questionabletown and townshipenterpr ises: "We are not in charge of personnel administration, but your 'party tickets' are in our hands .... You don't have to follow the leadership of the county government. ... You refuse to give help. In the future don't call on us when you have problems. " The bankers got. the message and gave the Rural Chinese wait at the Beijing railroad station on loan. Renmin Ribao, June 5, 1985, trans.in FBIS-CHI, June 7, 1985, p. Kl8. In the first their way home with two of the "three bigs" - a televi· six months of 1985, the Agricultural Bank lent 2 billion yuan to rural industries run by local authorities under guidance planning, a figure originally targeted for the whole sion set and a washing machine. year. Vigor Fung, " China Seeks to Slow Economy Without Reversing Reforms," The -UPIIBETTMANN. , Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, Aug. 19, 1985, p. 21.

31 China's Economic Experiment: From Mao to Market

an overheated economy with runaway investment and over time, this pragmatic, step-by-step handling of a further lowering of the quality of output. The situa­ change may itself undo the intent of reform. At the tion is also unsatisfactory with respect to the local back of the policymakers' minds seems to be lodged authorities' attitude toward the "free" market sphere. the idea that a comprehensive freeing of industrial Indeed, according to reports in the Chinese press, it prices should await a significant increase in the sup­ seems that local authorities have been wont either to ply of goods, that is, the advent of a buyers' market (as turn the market into an underground operation bene­ has happened with grain and some other farm prod­ fiting relatives and associates in the bureaucratic ucts). However, the arrival of such a happy state may power edifice or to restrict it in various ways.35 be obstructed by the present continued irrationalities of the shackled industrial price system. Price System. A largely unnoticed and unsung epic So far, relative prices of some products have been feat of bureaucratic futility occurred in the Soviet readjusted and others will be readjusted later. Still, a Union in 1967 when several million industrial whole­ lot of prices (e.g., for coal, steel, short-distance sale prices were recalculated by hand and published railway rates, housing rents, and public uti(ities) are in massive volumes as part of the USSR's proposed "too low," while other prices are "too high." These transition from mandatory-physical to guidance­ readjustments of relative prices have several impor­ "value" planning.36 Although the new prices were up­ tant constraints imposed on them. One is that the dated and a little better calculated (in an accounting prices of products produced and distributed by the sense), they took little if any account of use values mandatory state plan should be left basically un­ (demand). Thus, they were instantly obsolete. Like the changed. What is meant by "basically" is not alto­ old prices, they gave the wrong signals, and the waste gether clear, but it would appear that the prices of went on. such products when "marketed by enterprises Chinese policymakers today, unlike their Soviet through their own channels according to specific reg­ counterparts in 1967, are aware of the need not mere­ ulations" are to be determined by market forces. 37 ly to readjust the industrial price system, but to reform An initial result has been the emergence of a dual it, that is, to make such a price system a mathemat­ price system for a number of key commodities (for ex­ ical expression of competitive business transactions ample, coal, steel), which does nothing to make the in a market in which the parties involved maintain price system allocatively more rational. The existence wide rights of choice. Without such reform, guidance of the dual price system compromises economic cal­ planning, even if carried out in the spirit of guidance culation in monetary terms. Another constraint on rather than mandate, is a trivial pursuit from the point price reform is the regime's commitment not to affect of view of allocative optimality. Intellectual under­ urban living standards adversely, not even temporari­ standing extends to the formidable difficulties-eco­ ly. Thus, relative price adjustments and price deregu­ nomic, political, psychological- inherent in freeing in­ lation (as with some farm products) have been typi­ dustrial prices. Caution and gradualness characterize cally accompanied by cash subsidies to urban wage­ the leadership's approach to the task of price reform earners or by the introduction of new price controls. ("We must grope for stones while crossing the river"). And so the present situation is marked by the not Unfortunately, by stretching out the price distortions very compatible and distorting coexistence of state­ set cost-plus prices, floating prices, white-market prices, and black-market prices. These various prices " Since deregulation, some local governments have refused to decontrol and have are supposed to be restricted to their respective used their power to monopolize the timber trade and exploit forest farmers. Renmin spheres of mandatory planning (state prices), guid­ Ribao, May 28, 1985, trans. in FB/S-CHI, June 3, 1985, pp. K/15-16. Local leaders have reportedly been restricting the marketizing changes promoted by the center by, ance planning (floating prices), and market sector for example, limiting the availability of open spaces and enclosed areas where market (market prices), but they are not. They overlap and transactions are authorized, collecting unwarranted fees and fines ("squeeze"), conflict. Not only is there a badly insulated three- (or suspending or confiscating business licenses, and capriciously occupying private business premises. Shandong Provincial Radio Service (Jonan), June 9, 1985, trans. in four-) tier price system, but there is a multi-currency FBIS-CHI, June 11, 1985, pp. 0/1-2. On the frequent verticality ("commandism") of system as well: one for local people and one for for­ what are supposed to be lateral, mutually arrived-at baogan daohu contracts, and the eigners (foreign-exchange certificates or foreign - great number of levies and surtaxes imposed locally by cadres hostile to the baogan daohu system, see Ts'ai Ming-ch'in, "The Burden on the Peasantry: An Analysis of nonsocialist-currencies). Here, too, there are leak- Mainland China's Rural Economy," Issues & Studies (Taipei), April 1984, pp. 30-47. "Gertrude E. Schroeder, "The 1966-67 Soviet Industrial Price Reform: A Study in Complications," Soviet Studies (Glasgow), April 1969, pp. 462-77; and Jan S. Prybyla, "Soviet Economic Reforms in Industry," Weftwirtschaftliches Archiv (Kiel), Vol. 107, ""Tian Jiyun On Commodity Prices," Banyue Tan (Beijing), No. 9, May 10, 1985, No. 2, 1971, pp. 272-316. trans. in FBIS-CHI, June 5, 1985, p. K/12. 32 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986 ages from one sphere to the other. Chinese renminbis to wage differentials; otherwise the changes are mingle with foreign-exchange certificates, Hong Kong meaningless. The latter appears to be the case at this dollars, and US dollars, and there is a rampant black juncture, for the central authorities have made it market in foreign currencies. patently clear that they will not abandon their control The debate continues. A question that has not been over wages altogether. (Even the "liberal" Hungarians unequivocally answered is whether those who advo­ have not done this.) The central government's interest cate fundamental changes in the industrial price sys­ in retaining a measure of wage control no doubt tem realize that price flexibility is not a one-time stems from its concern with the possibility of runaway operation, that prices must be continuously flexible, consumption funds and inflation, as well as a concern that they must move spontaneously over time. But, as about the skewing of the pattern of income distribu­ noted above, economic spontaneity is equated with tion.44Despite talk about the need, from an efficiency arbitrariness and blindness, and political pluralism is standpoint, to increase income differentials, in China seen as unhealthy bourgeois factionalism. such differentials cannot exceed certain rather nar­ At present, worker mobility in industry, particularly rowly defined limits without giving rise to serious in the state sector, is insignificant. With the exception political difficulties. Redistributive mechanisms (such of private-sector employment (which has risen sub­ as progressive income taxes linked to transfer pay­ stantially since 1978 but still constitutes a very small ments) are not yet in place, so wage control has to be percentage-2.5 percent in 1984-of total urban em­ more direct. In other words, part of the problem with ployment) and freer movement of labor among jobs in the price of labor, as with other prices, is the transi­ the cooperative sector, urban workers continue to be tional incompatibility of the plan-market institutional assigned to their danwei (work units) by labor bu­ arrangements of motivation, that is, the coexistence reaus, and both inter- and intra-enterprise labor mobil­ of administrative controls over labor mobility with not ity is subject to mandatory administrative planning. fully marketized incentive levers, with the two sets of Although there have been some successful experi­ instruments frequently working at crosspurposes. ments in loosening up the mobility of scarce skilled Because the 1985 floating of wages by enterprises labor,38 in general such efforts have met with theo­ was to proceed from the payroll base figures for 1984, retical incomprehension and bureaucratic opposition: enterprises hurried to raise wages (especially through there is need, it is said, to distinguish between "ra­ the less easily controllable bonu,ses) before January tional flow and anarchic free flow [that is, market allo­ 1, 1985.45 In December 1984, wages jumped an un­ cation] of talented people."39 There have been numer­ precedented 46 percent, most of the increase having ous official announcements heralding future change: been paid for by borrowing from state banks. That the Soviet-type eight-grade tariff wage system will month, bank loans rose 48.4 percent, and government soon be abolished in enterprises; 40 enterprises will expenditures on payrolls went 70 percent over the have more control over wage determination; 41 wage budget. To foot the bill, the treasury printed 8 billion rates will be determined more by individual workers' extra yuan in 1984.46 productivity-related criteria than by seniority;42 and Interest rates, one of the economic levers on which total payrolls will be allowed to fluctuate according to the government has increasingly relied to guide the individual enterprise performance. 43 nonmandatory spheres of the economy, are not mar­ But such practices require the freeing of industrial ket-determined and have not proved effective so far in labor so that it can move spontaneously in response allocating capital funds rationally or in cooling down the overheated economy. Differentiated and floating

"For a discussion of some of the experiments, including the use of job markets for nation-wide placement, see Asiaweek (Hong Kong), Sept. 6, 1985, pp. 37-43. "Hunan Provincial Radio Service (Changsha), May 18, 1985, trans. in FBIS-CHI, May 21, 1985, p. P/3. "Zhao Ziyang, "Report on the Work of the Government," loc. cit. On the problem of "New Year's speech by Zhao Ziyang, premier of the State Council, to the National runaway consumption and investment in late 1984 to mid-1985, see An Zhiwen, Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in Beijing, Jan. 1, "A Year in which Marked Progress Was Made in the Reform of the Economic Structure 1985, in Beijing Review, Jan. 7, 1985, p. 15. of the Cities," Renmin Ribao, May 13, 1985, trans. in FBIS-CHI, May 22, 1985, "Zhao Ziyang, "Report on the Work of the Government," delivered at the 2nd pp. K/6-11, esp. p. K/10. Western economists estimate the 1985 inflation rate in the Session of the 6th National People's Congress on May 15, 1984, in Beijing Review, urban areas of China at 10 to 15 percent, with the Shanghai rate put at 17 percent. June 11, 1984, p. iv. Leonard Silk, "China Hits Its Stride," The New York Times, Oct. 27, 1985. ""Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Reform of "Wong, loc. cit., p. 279. the Economic Structure," Adopted by the 12th Central Committee of the Communist .. Hong Kong Evening Standard, June 4, 1985, p. 8. In 1984, gross wages in Beijing Party of China at its Third Plenary Session on Oct. 20, 1984, in Beijing Review, rose 500 yuan. Of this, more than 80 million yuan was paid out in in-kind and money Oct. 29, 1984, p. xii. bonuses, including bonuses for worn-out shoes. Ming Pao (Hong Kong), May 17, 1985, "See notes 40 and 41. p. 5, in FBIS-CHI, May 22, 1985, p. W/3.

33 China's Economic Experiment: From Mao to Market

interest rates are being tried, but any resemblance to value of gross industrial output (a count that includes market rates is coincidental. enterprises in rural towns and townships). It is ex­ pected that by 1987 most of that output value will be produced under the leasing cooperative arrangement. Micro-Autonomy It remains to be seen how this will work out in prac­ tice. As has been noted, the movement involves the Micro-autonomy means three things: experimenta­ de facto privatization of industrial property rights tion with mixed public-private forms of property en­ primarily to groups. The question is whether these franchisement at the enterprise level; resort to partial groups will be bona fide cooperatives or nee-Stalinist or total foreign ownership of firms; and enlargement collectives-which are simply a lowlier species of of the decision-making powers of state enterprises state enterprises. Much will depend on the taxing and with regard to some or all of the following: production, rent-collecting attitudes and policies of local supply, marketing, pricing, labor, and investment. To authorities and on whether there will be enough cap­ constitute meaningful reform (that is, to raise the ital and current inputs outside the plan for the "auton­ quality of economic performance), micro-autonomy omous" firms to do something with their newly ac­ must occur within a setting of marketized macro­ quired money. Will the leased firms compete with control. Otherwise micro-autonomy becomes merely state firms for scarce materials, maybe even for cus­ an exercise in administrative decentralization-a tom? If so, what will be the state's reaction? Will the tinkering with the bureaucratic apparatus. This has new arrangement further encourage an already active been the fate of micro-autonomy in the Soviet Union underground economy and contribute to the well­ and most East European state socialist countries. established propensity of officials to be corrupted? In addition to the establishment of various forms of Mixed Property Forms. The coexistence of public contracting and leasing arrangements, the legal pri­ and private forms of enfranchisement at the enter­ vate sector in urban areas has been significantly ex­ prise level is not new in the People's Republic of panded. This trend, however, must be kept in per­ China. Mixed public-private enterprises existed in spective. Although the number of people employed in China before the mid-1950's, some of them even sur­ this sector (mostly in services, retail trade, and cater­ viving until the Cultural Revolution in 1966. What is ing) has increased more than 15-fold since 1978, such new is the direction and magnitude of change outlined workers still constitute only a very small proportion of in recent proposals. For example, under the proposed total urban employment (2.5 percent at the end of industrial changes, in the years 1985-87, all enter­ 1984, compared with 3.2 percent in 1957 at the end of prises with fixed assets of less than 1.5 million yuan the Stalinist First Five-Year Plan).48 Even if one as­ and annual profits of under 200,000 yuan are to be sumes considerable undercounting of this essentially contracted out or leased to individuals or groups amorphous backpack sector, legal private activities in (cooperatives) for periods of up to five years. As in urban areas are quite marginal and are likely to re­ Hungary, such enterprises tend to be concentrated in main that way. the service trades, catering, maintenance, repair, construction, and local transportation. The arrange­ Foreign Ownership. There has been foreign equity ment is broadly similar to the baogan daohu system in, participation in socialist development of communist agriculture, where, as will be recalled, legal social states in the past-in the pre-Stalin Soviet Union dur­ ownership is combined with broad privatization of the ing the 1920's, and since then in some other countries rights of use. The leased enterprises are required to (for example, Hungary); the practice has the doctrinal pay rent and taxes to the state. They are granted rela­ sanction of no less an authority than Lenin himself. In tively broad rights of business decision-making, in­ China, since 1978 various forms of foreign participa­ cluding decisions about the distribution of the firms' tion have been encouraged. Two remarks have to be net income. As an added benefit, public firms operat­ made in this regard. First, foreign industrial participa- ing under the leasing arrangement will be allowed to avoid restrictions on the hiring of labor applicable to private-sector enterprises. 47 "Wong, loc. cit., p. 262, and Christine Wong, "Ownership and Control in Chinese It appears that most enterprises so far denational­ Industry: The Maoist Legacy and Prospects for the 1980s," in US Congress, Joint ized have been turned over to cooperative groups. Economic Committee, China in the 1980s, Washington, DC, US Government Printing The kind of small enterprises involved in this change Office, 1985. "Statistical Yearbook of China 1983, op. cit., p. 120; and Beijing Review, Mar. 25, currently account for a little more than half the total 1985, p. Viii. I•

34 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986 tion-whatever the precise form, and there are vantaged in many respects, have typically enjoyed many-has as a rule been isolat€d from the rest of greater independence from planning indices and the economy either through special regulations or ministerial intervention than state firms have. Such an outright zoning. Second, the high hopes that such an increase in state enterprise "autonomy" is the micro arrangement would attract advanced technology and end of the macro use of economic levers. generate hard-currency exports (especially with At the heart of the enterprise autonomy scheme is respect to the Special Economic Zones) have not yet the question of profit retention. 49 In the past, state been realized. Actual (as distinct from contemplated) enterprises remitted almost all their profits to the foreign investment in joint ventures of all kinds has state treasury. The state then allocated nonreturnable been relatively modest, made largely by "Hong Kong grants for the enterprises' capital needs out of the compatriots" for tourism-related projects, industrial state budget, and sent detailed instructions for the assembly work (e.g., assembly of television sets), and use of these funds. Under the new policy, however, in­ real-estate speculation (and perhaps for political in­ stead of remitting all profits, enterprises will pay a tax surance as well). on profits. This and other taxes will be used by the state as an economic lever to induce the desired State Enterprises. The enlargement of the hitherto enterprise behavior with respect to the after-tax prof­ minimal decision-making prerogatives of state-owned its retained by the enterprises . The self-interest of the enterprises is also a form, albeit more limited, of denationalization and privatization of collective prop­ "Barry Naughton, " False Starts and Second Wind: Financial Reform in China's erty rights (including, prominently, greater rights by an Industrial System," in Elizabeth J. Perry and Christine Wong, Eds., The Politi;a, enterprise to its profits). Collective firms, while disad- Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China, Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 1985.

A peasant entrepreneur in Xiwei manufactures ceramic mosaics. ...-Lalfont/SYGMA. I 35 China's Economic Experiment: From Mao to Market enterprise, it is now believed, can be reconciled with curb the "blind" and "wanton" disbursement of the country's "social" interest (as perceived by the premiums. The use of taxes, including the most impor­ state) through the state's taxation policy. But such a tant, the eight-grade progressive income tax,54shows view may be overly optimistic. The Soviet experience that Chinese planners have a far better theoretical with profit retention shows that this assumption is cor­ grasp of the issues involved in using economic levers rect only if the price system within which profit arises with noneconomic prices than the Soviets have ever and taxes are deployed is market rational.50 Without a been able to manage. revolutionary marketization, that is, a freeing and de­ But there still are many unresolved questions. The bureaucratization of the industrial price system, the most important of these is who will do the determining partial privatization of property rights in the form of of what is "reasonable" profit and what is not, and profits to the level of the state firm remains an adjust­ what criteria will be used to make that determination. ment that will, in my opinion, keep generating alloca­ When prices are allocatively distorted, it is not easy, tively wrong signals. Indeed, Soviet experimentation even with the purest of intentions, to pinpoint what with tax-for-profit formulas (and the associated "enter­ part of profits or profitability rates is due to erroneous prise funds")51has now been going on for 30 years, economic calculation and what is due to other fac­ and there are no indications that it has been at all tors. In such conditions, there is bound to be con­ helpful. In fact, there has probably even been some siderable administrative fiat in the decision to tax, net regression. which may compound rather than lessen the problem. Knowing this, the Chinese have introduced an array The Hungarians are familiar with this dilemma. of corrective taxes to compensate for profit distor­ In addition to the right to a portion of profit and tions due to the continued presence of an irrational greater latitude in the use of retained profit, enter­ price system. Among these taxes is a product tax, prises are to gain new rights with respect to their which is applied uniformly throughout the country but labor force. This includes, notably, the right to hire differentiated among products. The purpose of the tax and to dismiss workers for cause, and the right to is to confiscate that part of (windfall) profits on certain determine wages in relation to performance.55These goods that arises from "wrong" pricing, as, for exam­ rights, too, especially the latter, will almost certainly ple, the profits on some consumer durables and ciga­ be circumscribed by the state's taxing policy and rettes.52 There is also a resource tax designed to bureaucratic suasion. Other important rights granted eliminate rent differentials among extractive indus­ to enterprises include the right to enter into lateral tries and mining, and an adjustment tax whose pur­ transactions with other firms, not as a general rule, pose is to remove differences among enterprises in but supplementary to the (guidance) plan, and on a the same industrial branch, whenever such differ­ larger scale and with less administrative fuss than ences arise from "undeserved" causes.53Moreover, to was possible under the mandatory plan; the right to in­ remind enterprise managements that capital is not crease the scope of production outside the plan and free and to correct for profit distortions due to capital of "self-disposal" goods; and the right to purchase cer­ intensity, a capital charge is now levied on fixed and tain producer goods and materials on a more or less working capital. And a bonus tax is in force to help open market.56 It is interesting but not surprising to note that the in­

"AlecNove, The Soviet Economic System, 2nded., Boston and London, George troduction of the tax-for-profits scheme has right away Allen& Unwin, 1980; Marshall I. Goldman, USSR in Crisis: The Failure of an Economic System, NewYork, W.W. Norton, 1983; and Prybyla, Market and Plan Under Socialism. "Thisis a graduated progressive taxthat had long been imposed oncollective " SeeWilliam G.Rosenberg, "Observations onthe Soviet Incentive System," The enterprisesandis now extended tostate enterprises. ACES Bulletin (Bloomington,IN),Fall.Winter 1977, pp. 27-43; and Prybyla, "Soviet "Seenotes 40 and 41. Under the former system, enterprise managers-who were EconomicReforms inIndustry." After-tax profits ot Soviet state enterprises are appointedbysuperior administrative-party authorities-had verylimited rights with allocated,inaccordance withcentrally determined formulas, among three major respecttothe hiring and dismissal ofworkers intheir enterprises. Inconformity with enterprisefunds (also known as"economic stimulation funds"): thematerial incentive thesocialist ethical principle ofjob security (see note 9above), itbecame almost fund;fund for social-cultural measures; andproduction development fund.Monies from impossibletofire incompetent (muchless, superfluous) state-sector workers. The thesefun(ls may be disbursed byenterprises (withthe approval oftheir supervisory phenomenongoesby the name ofthe unbreakable "ironrice bowl." In Kaifeng, Henan ministries)forvarious enterprise-related purposes. Province,forexample, of400 large factories, 110were at one point operating below "Onthe various types ofnew taxes, see Wong, "The Second Phase ofEconomic capacityorhad ceased operations altogether, whilekeeping everyone onthe payroll. ReforminChina"; and Naughton, loc.cit. On broader issues involved inthe change, Beijing Review, May25, 1979, p.8. seeNina P. Haipern, "China's Industrial Economic Reforms: TheQuestion of "Thesevarious rights are listed inBeijing Review, June18, 1984, pp. 10-11, ina Strategy,"Asia~ Survey (Berkel.,y),October 1985, pp. 998-1012. reporton the May 10, 1984, "State Council Provisional Regulations onGreater " Whatis"undeserved" issometimes difficult todefine inthe much-plan, some· Decision-MakingPowersof State-Owned Industrial Enterprises." Forsome recently marketcontext. Forexample, many local firms have jumped inon the booming market airedinnovative proposalsonmicro-autonomy, seeMary Lee, "Prescription forHealth: inherbal medicines andcigarettes. allegedly reaping windfall profits from these ReformHighlights Management Problems inChina," Far Eastern Economic Review, addictions,whilesupplying inferior products. Sept.12, 1985. p.103. 36 Problems of CommunismJan-Feh.1986 given rise to complaints in the Chinese press about troduction of markets and privatized property rights large-scale tax avoidance and evasion.57 might bring with it bouts of open unemployment, open inflation, booms and recessions, balance of payments disequilibria, and wide differentials in the distribution Prospects of income and wealth. This has happened in China. These problems are also present in the system of cen­ Instead of speculating on the future course of eco­ tral administrative command planning, but most of the nomic changes in China, I shall list some dangers that time they manifest themselves there in a suppressed lurk along the reformist path. I assume that the cur­ or disguised form. Their openness in a market setting rent leadership, or an important and influential part of provides opponents of reform with excellent issues it, is committed to the improvement of the qualitative around which to mobilize resistance to the marketiza­ performance of the economy. I further assume that tion and privatization process. This has been the case such improvement requires reform of the economic in Hungary. system rather than adjustment. In the Chinese con­ The incompatibility of market and plan institutions text, as noted throughout this essay, this means that during the "transitional" period has been discussed markets and privatized property rights would have to here and elsewhere.58 The effects of the cure of a little become dominant in the system. This would require bit of market and more than a bit of planning, with the marketization of the plan's institutions of informa­ partly privatized and mostly socialized property rights, tion, coordination, and motivation (in short, the have in general proved worse than the disease. A establishment of competitive market relations among good instance of this unhappy mix in China is the at­ buyers and sellers), and the de facto privatization of tempted extension of urban micro-autonomy in a sys­ property rights in the means of production, exchange, tem still dominated by an irrational industrial price and distribution. system. This institutional working-at-odds has been in­ There are, I think, three interacting and interrelated strumental in subverting the reformist movement groups of dangers in the way of the reformist move­ (never very strong) in the USSR and most East Euro­ ment in China. The components of these three groups pean countries. have been active elsewhere in the world of the plan. Operating within the market environment brings They have succeeded in all instances in bringing the rewards to many. However, it is not an easy or restful reform movement to a halt either early on (as in the task; nor is it one with which all are familiar or toward Soviet Union) or a bit later (Hungary). The three which everyone is temperamentally and professional­ groups are economic, political, and ideological. ly predisposed. Moreover, the market is governed by The economic dangers come from three sources. stringent rules of the game. Observance of contract First, from the nature of the market mechanism itself; terms and abstinence from all action in restraint of second, from the basic incompatibility of market and trade, for example, are among the rules of market administrative command institutions where these conduct, and a predisposition for risk-taking (not coexist because the reform is introduced incremen­ gambling) is among the chief qualities of the market tally rather than all at once; and third, from the entrepreneur. But the qualities required of govern­ behavior of those unacquainted with the operational ment bureaucrats and state enterprise managers in a rules and ethical requisites of the market and privat­ plan setting are quite different from those of the ized property rights. market entrepreneur. Where the entrepreneur is bold The market mechanism is very good at equilibrat­ and adventuresome, the bureaucrat is obedient and ing supply and demand in individual product markets staid. Where the former seeks to maximize gain, the (and, incidentally, at resolving conflicts at a fairly latter tries to minimize loss. "low" systemic level), but it is less good in achieving Thrust into a market environment, bureaucrats tend equilibrium on the macro level. This means that the in- to behave not like capitalists, but like black mar­ keteers, lining their pockets, stealing, and generally

"In Hebei Province, between 1980 and 1984, some enterprises paid only 30 percent of the taxes due by them. Officials at various levels have been accused of "lowering "E.g., Gertrude Schroeder, "The Soviet Economy on a Treadmill of 'Reforms,' " in tax rates at random, widening the range of tax exemptions, even regarding taxation as US Congress Joint Economic Committee, Soviet Economy in a Time of Change, an obstacle to reform." Renmin Ribao, May 24, 1985, trans. in FBIS-CHI, May 28, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1979, pp. 312-40; idem, "Soviet 1985, p. Kl10; Xinhua (Beijing), May 27, 1985, trans. in FBIS-CHI, May 31, 1985, p. K/2. Economic 'Reform': More Steps on the Treadmill,'' in US Congress Joint Economic See also, Marlowe Hood, "China Learns a Capitalist Lesson: Tax Evasion Goes With Committee, Soviet Economy in the 1980's: Problems and Prospects, Washington, DC, the Game,'' The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 16, 1985. US Government Printing Office, 1982, Part I, pp. 65-88.

37 China's Economic Experiment: From Mao to Market

acting not according to the rules of the market, but ac­ receive these economic guarantees but at a sacrifice: cording to the street-smart, corrupt codes of the they lack locational mobility, experience chronic underground economy. Their behavior is partly con­ shortages of desired goods and services, put up with nected with the high degree of imperfection found in low quality of products and other consumer frustra­ markets created by something that is neither adjust­ tions, and accept a slow increase in their standard of ment nor reform. Mostly, however, it is due to the in­ living. Economic reform, with its competition, high­ compatibility of (even modest) pluralism in the eco­ risk quotient, and short response time to rapidly nomic marketplace and continued monopoly of politi­ changing market conditions, breaks that contract. cal power. Some firms have to close, some people have to be It should be added that bureaucrats and managers dismissed from their jobs, rents rise, and so on. are not the only ones who experience difficulty The second issue connected with Marxism and af­ operating in a market environment. There are other fected by economic reform is that of social classes. groups as well; the nonentrepreneurial peasants, for Marketization and de facto privatization of the eco­ example. The market, after all, is not responsive to nomic system benefit not one class but many, and nonpecuniary considerations. Those unable to oper­ these are not the ones chosen as "progressive" by ate in it according to the rules, or those excluded from Marx's Laws of History. Although in the long run, it, may add up to a sizable political constituency. reform benefits the urban proletariat- in fact, trans­ The political danger stems not only from this ill-fit of forms it into a middle class-the short- and medium­ market and centralized planning, but also from other term benefits, and some of the longer term ones as sources. The market is a labor-saving device in the well, accrue primarily to the entrepreneurial and in­ sense that it generates, transmits, and analyzes infor­ dependent segments of urban and rural society: the mation about what needs to be done in the system; "rich" peasant, the shopkeeper, the enterprising coordinates the disparate pieces of information; and businessman, the broker, and the venture capitalist. provides the requisite motivation to get the job done. Reform changes not only the output structure of the The market does all this at a comparatively low trans­ economy but its class structure as well, and in the action cost; there is no need for bureaucrats to do this process redefines class in a non-Marxist sense. work deliberately and manually. In other words, the If Marxism is associated with the socialist ethical market threatens the bureaucrats in their capacity as code, Leninism is identified-much more accu­ "producers" - planners, supervisors, enforcers, rately-with party control over all spheres of life. Mar­ double-checkers, and so on. The market also endan­ ketization and privatization reforms diffuse economic gers the consumer privileges of the bureaucratic elite. power among many centers; production, exchange, Under the regime of the market, what matters is and distribution relations tend to function best when money, not political privilege. Reform thus threatens horizontally integrated rather than vertically, and tend the bureaucracy on both counts. to diversify and be made more indicative and indi­ Ideological dangers to reform come from two doc­ rect-all of which goes against the Leninist impera­ trinal sources: Marxism and Leninism. From the tive of absolute power absolutely concentrated. On standpoint of Marxism, there are two issues con­ this Leninist issue of control, economics, politics, and nected with economic reform. Clinging to Marxism ideology converge. Marketization and privatization, are socialist ethical codes (developed mostly after the opponents of reform argue, cause not only macro­ Stalin's death) that include the right to employment economic woes and aberrant behavior ("spiritual pol­ (regarded as more important than the right of free lution"). They threaten the planning, supervisory, and speech), interpreted in the state sector as the right to managerial elites both as "producers" and con­ a lifetime job (in China, the right has traditionally ex­ sumers; they are ethically repugnant on a Marxist in­ tended even to children of many state-sector employ­ terpretation; and, above all, they are a menace to uni­ ees). Other rights associated with the Marxist ethos fied monopolistic control by the Leninist party. are access to basic necessities of life at low (subsi­ These are serious counts that have to be carefully dized) prices, "equality," stability, and others.59 considered in arriving at a perception of the odds for The quest for market efficiency inevitably comes in and against the reformist movement in China. conflict with these ethical desiderata and suscitates resistance in the adversely affected quarters. The codes are part of an implicit social contract between " See footnote 9. the monoparty state and the citizenry. The citizens

38 Gorbachev andEastern Europe

Vladimir V. Kusin

hen Mikhail Gorbachev became Soviet party ment to increasing the bloc's "defensive capacity." 2 leader in March 1985, most Western observ­ Yet, in his March 13 funeral oration for Konstantin Wers anticipated that he would provide a more Chernenko delivered from atop the Lenin mausoleum, imaginative and dynamic guidance for Eastern Gorbachev revived some of the old stereotypes: Europe than his immediate predecessors had exer­ cised. At the same time, observers were divided as to Faithful to the principles of socialist internationalism, whether this imagination and dynamism would trans­ our party will continue to do everything for broader late into greater uniformity in Eastern Europe or interaction between the fraternal countries and for the whether Gorbachev would allow the individual states enhancement of their position in international affairs. 3 greater latitude. The official proclamation of Gor­ bachev's accession was cast in a continuity mold, On the same day, the new Soviet leader met briefly promising that Moscow would go on "doing everything with bloc leaders in Moscow for the Chernenko funer­ possible and necessary to strengthen the socialist al. According to private East European sources, a community." 1 By contrast, Gorbachev's maiden cool and detached Gorbachev simply told his lesser speech as leader (at a Central Committee meeting) comrades to get on with the business at hand with and a Pravda editorial two days later contained turns greater application and consistency. Henceforth, he of phrase that raised the expectations of those desir­ indicated, the emphasis would be on economic effi­ ing reformist change. Instead of advocating "strength­ ciency and tighter coordination of the bloc's external ening the might of the socialist community," the Gen· actions. All should strive for a lessening of tensions eral Secretary pledged "fraternal friendship" with it. vis-a-vis the West, but only on the basis of bloc unity Missing also were such ritual catchwords as "socialist directed by Moscow. A Warsaw Pact summit would be internationalism," "cohesion," and even "Marxism­ held in due time to extend the treaty. Hungary's Janos Leninism," not to mention the once obligatory commit- Kadar reportedly sought to pose as the bloc's elder statesman paternally accepting Gorbachev into the family, but the General Secretary remained aloof, 'TASS in English, Mar. 11, 1985, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Daily gently referring the Hungarian to his proper station by Report: Soviet Union (Washington, DC-hereafter, FBIS·SOV}, Mar. 11, 1985, pp. R/2-4. indicating that he would not attend the Hungarian party congress, then only two weeks away.4

Vladimir V. Kusin is Deputy Director of Research and 'For Gorbachijv's March 11 speech, see Pravda (Moscow), Mar. 12, 1985; for the Analysis, Radio Free Europe (Munich). Formerly asso­ editorial, ibid., Mar. 13, 1985. 3 TASS in English, Mar. 13, 1985, in FBIS-SOV, Mar. 13, 1985, pp. R/2-3. ciated with the universities of Lancaster, Glasgow, • The communique from this encounter appeared in Pravda, Mar. 14, 1985. Western and Hokkaido, he is the author of The Intellectual observers generally interpreted this meeting as an "informal" one. See, e.g., Le Monde Origins of the Prague Spring (1971), Political Grouping (Paris), Mar. 14, 1985. The only specific point apparently mentioned was the possibility (later dropped) that in the Czechoslovak Reform Movement (1972), and the 27th CPSU Congress might be brought forward in time-a sign that Gorbach~v From Dubcek to Charter 77 (1978), and numerous may have overestimated his own capacity to break the back of opposition to him within articles on Eastern Europe. (continued on p. 40) 39 Gorbachev and Eastern Europe

Although the Budapest event might have offered an conciliation with his discontented populace. On the opportunity for a more extensive summit, time was other hand, the Romanians might be brought to heel. too short. Moreover, Gorbachev had to be doubly The Bulgarians might be chastised for economic fail­ careful with regard to Hungary. As the new leader of ures and for botching up their involvement in the an empire in trouble, it would be imprudent to be seen papal assassination attempt and for the handling of either endorsing or condemning the somewhat unor­ their Turkish minority. The Czechoslovaks, too, might thodox ways of comrades in one of the constituent be unceremoniously impelled to mend their efficiency countries so early in his tenure. Even if he himself had record and to start a reform. Leadership changes in wanted to give his blessing to market-based reform­ Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, some be­ ism, which-despite considerable conjecture-is by lieved, might be speeded up. In general, languishing no means certain, his own party's Politburo, given its in economic and political doldrums would no longer composition at Gorbachev's accession, would most be allowed. likely not have allowed him to do so. Also, once he What really came to pass did not quite match ex­ took a stand, lesser bloc leaders would have felt pectations, but neither did it depart drastically from obliged either to follow suit or raise objections. The the predictions. Let us review the record nearly a year caucus could have degenerated into a squabble. later, looking first at issues of bloc-wide significance Rather than show himself too friendly with Kadar, Gor­ and then at the specifics of Moscow's bilateral deal­ bachev needed to demonstrate that East Europeans ings with the East European states. were a priority with the new Soviet chief, but only as a collective entity. By and large, the Western press saw Gorbachev's Renewing the Pact accession as a blessing for the Soviet Union's Euro­ pean allies. The Los Angeles Times ran the headline There was never any doubt that the Warsaw Pact "Gorbachev May Be Eastern Europe's Best Hope for would be renewed after its first 30 years, but the Evolution."5 The London Times correspondent in War­ precise form of renewal and the nature of Pact obliga­ saw, in a piece entitled "Time Ripe for a Strong Hand," tions did evoke some debate among the member reported that "in Poland one senses the desire for the states. It is known that Romania-and possibly emergence of a strong, reform-orientated, non-inter­ others-wanted the Pact extended by only five or 10 ventionist leader in the Kremlin." 6 The Washington years rather than by 20 years with an automatic Post stressed the economic angle: "Soviet Allies Opti­ 10-year further extension. Ceau~escu later said that mistic on Modernization.''7 The International Herald he had favored setting a shorter treaty duration as an Tribune proclaimed that "East Europe Sees Gorba­ act of goodwill toward the West, "to give a new chev as Sign Uncertainty Is Over,"8 and an overview perspective to the peoples, to the struggle for the in Le Soir bore the title "In the East, a Breath of Fresh abolition of military blocs and for peace." In the end, Air." 9 he signed the 20-plus-10 extension "to consolidate Many observers further believed that some bloc collaboration and friendship with the socialist coun­ countries might fare better under Gorbachev than tries," but the Romanian leader added that he hoped would others. The Hungarians might have their depar­ the treaty would not have to run its full course and that ture from orthodoxy sanctioned. The East Germans it would be terminated earlier, "concomitantly with might recover the leeway in dealing with Bonn they NAT0." 10 Judging from the perfunctory nature of the had lost in the late summer of 1984. Poland's April 26 renewal ceremonies in Warsaw and other in­ Wojciech Jaruzelski might be given a go-ahead for direct evidence,11 the issue had been resolved earlier in the month. the Soviet party. Gorbach~v reportedly asked East European party leaders how preparations were going for their party congresses and whether the gatherings might be held earlier (this only related to the Bulgarian, Czechoslovakian, East German. and "See excerpts from his speech before the Romanian State Council, as reported by Polish comrades, since the Hungarian congress was imminent and the Romanian Agerpres in English at 1732 GMT, May 22, 1985, in Foreign Broadcast Information congress had been held in November 1984). Service, Daily Report: Eastern Europe (Washington, DC-hereafter, FBIS-EEU), 'Robert Gillette, Mar. 12, 1985. Attribution of headlines to correspondents can, of May 23. 1985,p.p. H/1-2. course, be misleading, but in the cases cited, the home-base editors did read their man Actually, the Romanian proposal was probably not a major bone of contention. The in the field fairly accurately. Washington Post of Apr. 2, 1985, quotes an unnamed Western diplomat in Bucharest to • Roger Boyse, Mar. 12, 1985. the effect that the Romanians had "glamorized and promoted their own part in the 'Bradley Graham, Mar. 13, 1985. renewal ... to reinforce their image with the West as the Warsaw Pact's difficult 'Henry Tanner, Mar. 13, 1985. member." The diplomat thought that "there never was any real intention [by Ceau$escu] 'Pol Mathil, Mar. 14, 1985. not to renew or not to go along with Soviet terms."

40 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986

At the October 1985 meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders in Sofia: from left to right, Gustav Husak, Janos Kadar. Erich Honecker , Mikhail Gorbachev , and ho$t Todor Zhivkov . ' -INTERFOTO MTI from EASTFOTO.

Defense funding has been another sore point. A Warsaw Pact countries should now unilaterally commentator speaking on Budapest Radio on the day reduce their defense budgets by 10 to 15 percent an­ of the Pact's renewal argued against relying on linear nually "to make the NATO governments as well as growth in armaments as the linchpin of military mod­ others follow suit." 14 ernization . He called for more "rational " ways of im­ East Germany also had some reservations about its proving combat capabilities .12 Three weeks later, two Pact obligations, if we are to judge from an unusual Hungarian military leaders went on record in separate sentence in a communique issued in mid-May, at the releases with an assurance that their country would end of CPSU Politburo member Viktor Grishin's visit to meet its obligations under the Pact, but only "in pro­ East Berlin. It read: "In the future, too, the GDR will do portion to the capabilities of our national economy justice to its responsibility within the defense alliance and our realistic possibilities ." One of them added that of the Warsaw Treaty as a cornerstone of peace and "the principle of a proportionate distribution of the socialism in Europe." 15 burden" had been expressly laid down during the re­ It would be wrong to see the pre-renewal tussle as newal negotiations .13 In May, Ceau$escu declared simply a one-way street, with the allies hurling amend­ publicly that Romania had not been increasing its mili­ ment requests at the USSR. On its part, the Soviet tary appropriations for the past two years and that the Union may have wished to make the Pact more politi­ cal and more specific where the original text had been quite general. 16 In the end, nothing was changed in

11 In addition to signing the renewal document and an accompanying communique, the document, not even its preamble, with its open the Pact leaders laid wreaths at three places and held a joint dinner before conclu ding references to the situat ion as perceived by the Pact's the one-day affair . British newpaperman Ian Mather. interviewing Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry official Richard Dvorak in mid-April, was told regarding renewal of the Pact Jhat there had been "some reservations, particula rly from Romania. but they are now ··settled." See The Observer (London), Apr. 14, 1985. "S ee Agerpres, May 17, 1985, for Ceau~escu's interview on Spanish television; and " Colonel Peter Deak. Radio Budapest, 6:30 p.m., Apr. 26, 1985, trans. by Radio FBIS-EEU, May 30, 1985, pp. H/1-5, for a translation of the text of his address to the Free Europe monitoring service (Munich). Socialist Democracy and Unity Front on May 23, as published in Scinteia (Bucharest), 13 Deputy Prime Minister and then Defense Minister General liljos Czinege, and May 24, 1985. Secretary of State in the Ministry of Defense General Lajos Morocz, in two separate "ADN International Service in German, 1149 GMT, May 14, 1985. trans . in releases by MTI (Hungarian Telegraph Agency, Budapest), in English, May 14, 1985. FBIS-EEU, May 15, 1985, p. E/1. See also Vladimir Socor, "Warsaw Pact Summit Renews the Warsaw Treaty,'' Radio "This possibility is discussed in an excellent article by Regensburg Universi1y Free Europe (hereafter, RFE), Background Report (Munich), No. 53, June 19, 1985. Professor Jens Hacker in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Dec. 7, 1984.

41 Gorbachev and Eastern Europe

creators in the mid-1950's. The absence of amend­ the Nuclear Threat and a Turn for the Better in Euro­ ments, in the direction of either reduced or increased pean and World Affairs" signed at the WTO summit in central control in the Pact, may be seen as a com­ Sofia on October 23, 1985. The document endorses promise, the simplest option. various Soviet proposals purportedly aimed at pre­ This compromise probably reflected the reality venting an arms race in space, terminating the arms that, as a military organization, the Warsaw Pact per race on earth, and freezing Soviet and US military se does not play a major role in East-West strategic forces at current levels.20 relations. The Czech ex-communist exile Zdenek Mlynar" had even suggested that the Soviet Union could perfectly well allow the Pact to expire in 1985, Economic Linkages in the Bloc which would be applauded by members of peace movements and various statesmen in the West to As in the case of the WTO, so with the Council for Moscow's advantage. With or without the Pact, he Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) the USSR under argued, Eastern Europe would still remain a military Gorbachev seems to be pursuing long-standing poli­ bloc under Soviet command. 11 But, as Mlynar" cies, but with increased vigor. In a speech delivered in predicted, there was no dissolution. This is because Dnipropetrovsk on June 26, at a time when the prime the Pact's function as a legally defined political bond ministers of the member states were assembled in between the East European regimes and the USSR re­ Warsaw at the 40th session of the CEMA Council, Gor­ tains a definite value. By having to sign the joint bachev stated: political platforms promulgated periodically through the Pact's Political Consultative Committee, the Soviet The matter at issue is that of deepening the economic Union's "allies" commit themselves to postures from cooperation and economic integration of the member which later deviation can be easily censured. 18 countries of the GEMA. Well-adjusted specialization The reality of Soviet domination in Pact affairs was and production cooperation, active interaction in ad­ highlighted at a December 4 meeting of bloc defense vancing science and technology make both our com­ ministers in East Berlin, where Soviet Defense Minis­ munity as a whole and each of its members more ter Sergey Sokolov vowed that the Warsaw Treaty robust and still stronger in defense, and nullify the Organization (WTO) would match any US arms build­ policy of economic pressure that is actively pursued up. The fact that East Germany had the previous week by the West toward the socialist countries. 21 pledged to increase its 1986 defense budget by 7.7 percent suggested that it was the WTO's East Euro­ These goals, confirmed by the CEMA Council at the pean members who would bear the brunt of expanded conclusion of its June 25-27 session,22 have five inter­ military outlays. 19 linking components: close coordination of national The Pact summits are useful to Moscow not only for five-year plans so as to dovetail production programs; enforcing defense policies; they also can serve as conclusion of special long-term cooperative agree­ platforms from which to launch political offensives. ments, such as in extracting and transporting Soviet An example is the declaration "For the Elimination of natural gas or conserving on energy consumption; elaboration of a joint plan of action for scientific and technical work; a continued high concentration of trading within the bloc, with special emphasis on the delivery of quality goods and consumer durables from " Interview in Die We/twoche (Zurich), Apr. 11, 1985. " The Political Consultative Committee (PCC) was defined in the original (and Eastern Europe to the USSR; and limitation on trade renewed) treaty as consisting of "members of government or some other specially and other economic links with the West. Although appointed representatives." By 1960, 1he practice of holding PCC meetings as summits Hungary's economic experiment is apparently going for party chiefs had become established. As of the end of 1985, there have been 23 to be allowed to proceed, the requirement to partake PCC meetings, including the constituent session. Seven were held under Nikita Khrushchev, 11 under Leonid Brezhnev, one under Yuriy Andropov, and four so far fully of CEMA's non-market-based integration limits under Gorbachev. the possibility for that country or other East European " The Washington Times, Dec. 5, 1985. For the East German announcement, see states to move further away from centrally deter­ Neues Deutsch/and (East Berlin), Nov. 30, 1985. Poland astonishingly reported spending 31.7 percent more on defense in 1985 than in 1984. See Zo/nierz Wo/nosci mined economic parameters. (Warsaw), Nov. 27, 1985. The June CEMA session also made a public gesture " Pravda, Oct. 24, 1985, trans. in Current Digest of the Soviet Press toward greater cooperation with the European Com­ (Columbus, OH-hereafter, CDSP), Nov. 20, 1985, pp. 4-5. "Pravda, June 27, 1985. munities. However, Western officials generally con­ " See the communique in Pravda, June 29, 1985. cluded that the effort contained a high degree of 42 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986

propaganda and that bloc-to-bloc dealings would rein­ CEMA seems to be the same as his approach to the force Moscow's central power over decisions on East­ domestic Soviet economy: tighten discipline now and West trade that ought to remain the preserve of indi­ perhaps institute reform later. One wonders whether vidual East European countries. 23 the sheer weight of the predicament and the resist­ The prime ministers of the CEMA states (which in­ ance of established institutions and processes will not clude, in addition to the USSR and its East European force him to keep postponing reform in both settings. allies, Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam) convened in Moscow in December to launch a 15-year cooperative program to upgrade their respective economies tech­ Internationalism vs. Nationalism nologically. Five key areas were targeted for joint ef­ forts: electronics, production automation, atomic Although Moscow doubtless would prefer unques­ energy, new industrial materials, and biotechnology tioning, unvarying obedience on the part of its East (especially as applied to agriculture). 24 European partners, reality-as the discussion of WTO Under Gorbachev, the Soviet party is evidently and CEMA developments has already suggested- is seeking to increase the role of the bloc's communist something different. The response of alliance part­ parties in overseeing fulfillment of CEMA commit­ ners to Moscow's lead has varied considerably, and ments by their respective states. On May 20-21 in the Soviet Union itself has shown some flexibility in Moscow, secretaries of the respective national par­ dealing with its allies. ties in charge of economic matters held the first of A June 15, 1985, Pravda item entitled "Inter­ what are slated to be annual meetings.25 In the words nationalism in Practice" sternly asserted that the of Czechoslovak delegate Milos Jakes, national interests of CEMA member countries must be "correctly conjoined" with the international interests the main purpose was ... to make use of GEMA expe­ of the bloc as a whole. Communists, it was main­ rience in party work in order tq mobilize the toiling tained, must "always and in everything" remain loyal masses tor the fulfillment of all GEMA-set objectives. 26 to Marxism-Len_inismand proletarian internationalism. This was followed by an equally stern and far more The key question is: Can CEMA integration work specific article in the June 21 Pravda over the better under Gorbachev than it did under his prede­ pseudonymous byline of 0. Vladimirov.28 Vladimirov cessors? It is now nearly 15 years since CEMA, condemned a number of sins, without attributing them meeting in Bucharest in July 1971, adopted a "com­ to any one country: overestimation of the role of prehensive" program for bloc economic integration, private property in a socialist economy; undue em­ and the organization still remains largely a vehicle phasis both on national attributes and on the imitation whereby Soviet raw materials are exchanged for East of foreign models; disrespect for the basic common European manufactures and investments. The price principles of socialism; "revisionism" regarding the structure within the trading bloc is in a shambles,21 national issue, and exacerbation of minority prob­ and growth rates of the member states' economies lems; spreading of "national communism"; unprinci­ are generally declining. The Gorbachev approach to pled compromises with antisocialist forces; the claim that small countries can mediate between the great

" On relations between GEMA and the Communities and on other GEMA issues of powers; Russophobia and anti-Sovietism; advocacy of the 1980's, see Vladimir Sobell, RFE, Background Report, Nos. 8, 63, and 67, of Feb. 4, "a new unity" instead of proletarian internationalism; July 2, and July 17, 1985. and "various revisionist, nationalist, and clerical "The bloc also formed a six-nation organization, lnterrobot, to coordinate production of industrial robots. See account in The Washington Post, Dec. 19, 1985. concepts." Many of the issues on this bill of par­ " Pravda, May 22, 1985. ticulars had been overworked already and awakened "Rude Pravo (Prague), May 22, 1985. The new measure was also discussed in an little new attention. 29 However, some of the issues article "Internationalism in Practice" appearing in Pravda, June 15, 1985, obviously designed as a guideline for the upcoming GEMA summit. served as the focus for a lively new debate engaging " Neue Zurcher Zeitung, of June 29, 1985, reported that Soviet Premier Nikolay both Soviet and East European authors. Would or Tikhonov abruptly closed a price debate at the Warsaw GEMA meeting when some East Europeans began to talk about the unevenness of the price levels in raw materials, machinery, and food. "The June 21 article appeared to have lifted certain passages from an article in the The Soviets even launched a counter-offensive on the price issue. In September in April 1984 issue of Voprosy /storii KPSS, by O. V. Borisov (the pseudonym for Oleg an article specially written for the Czechoslovak party daily, then USSR Gosplan Rakhmanin, first deputy head of the Central Committee's Department for Liaison with Chairman Nikolay Baybakov stated: "The price level is of considerable importance for Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries and a noted China specialist). the intensification of trade in engineering goods. In our opinion, there is a certain "The June 22 editions of Rude Pravo and Rabotnichesko Delo (Sofia) reprinted the discrepancy between the quality of various items delivered to the USSR and their full text of the Vladimirov article. The Poles carried a bland summary, and the prices." See Rude Pravo, Sept. 6, 1985. Romanians, Hungarians, and East Germans barely mentioned it.

43 Gorbachev and Eastern Europe

would not Moscow allow room for East European gov­ The more relaxed Soviet posture was also evident ernments to undertake foreign political action that at the October Pact summit in Sofia. The final com­ they deemed to be consonant with their own national munique appealed not to "socialist internationalism," economic and political interests? How much input but to "common fundamental interests and goals ... would they be allowed to have into Soviet strategic in­ [and a] Marxist-Leninist world outlook." Cooperation teraction with the West? Would Soviet coordination be and integration were to be pursued "on the basis of a loose and cooperative or tight and disciplinarian? harmonious combining of national and international Barely had the Vladimirov article seen the light of interests."35 Although one would have to judge that day, when the CPSU journal Kommunist published an Hungary, East Germany, and Romania had scored a article by Oleg Bogomolov, director of the Institute of point, Czechoslovakia's Hlivka still averred that the Economics of the World Socialist System, arguing Sofia document "reaffirmed the loyalty of the fraternal that national interests among socialist countries need parties and countries to revolutionary principles, to not be identical, and that to ignore such interests proletarian and socialist internationalism .... "36 would do more harm than good. The same issue also The draft of the revised Soviet Communist Party included a spirited defense of Hungary's reforms, writ­ Program, published on October 26 in Pravda and ten by Karoly Nemeth, Janos Kadar's deputy.30 Ro­ lzvestiya, 37 came out strongly for economic integra­ mania's Nicolae Ceau~escu quickly sprang to the tion-not only as a source of renewed growth, but defense of national interests, as did the Romanian also as a means of shielding the community against press.31 By contrast, Czechoslovakia's Ivan Hlivka "hostile actions of imperialism" as well as the staunchly opposed "any kind of relaxation" in efforts "economic crises and negative processes inherent in to increase bloc unity, and stressed the view that capitalism." On the role of small states in world Soviet foreign policy was conducted "not from posi­ politics, the document was less adamant: tions of toothless pacifism, barren objectivism, and unprincipled compromise with the class enemy, but All states, large and small, regardless of their from clear-cut class positions."32 capabilities, geographic situation, and social systems, In August, a well-known Soviet political commenta­ can and must participate in the search for solutions to tor, Nikolay Shishlin, tried to square the circle, argu­ acute problems, the resolution of conflicts, the reduc­ ing that while each socialist country "has its own tion of tensions, and the curbing of the arms race. specific national interests [which] do not disappear overnight merely with the establishment of socialism Despite such language, Michal Stefanak, head of the ... it is equally obvious that the fundamental interests International Affairs Department of the Czechoslovak of the socialist states coincide; they are identical." 33 In Communist Party's Central Committee, interpreted an interview with Radio Budapest that was broadcast Soviet foreign policy, as shown in the Program, to be on August 31, lzvestiya commentator Aleksandr Bovin "profoundly internationalist and class-based."38 praised small and medium-sized states for their ability In Hungary, various officials weighed in with state­ to "find zones of agreement" and "play a balancing ments that collectively amounted to a comprehensive role" in international affairs. 34 While Bovin's com­ policy pronouncement defending their country's in­ ments were pstensibly about small non-socialist coun­ dependent course, albeit within the parameters of tries, the Hungarian radio audience could hardly have continued membership in the Soviet bloc. Party secre­ missed the difference between his views and those of tary Matyas SzOros suggested that "there are no per­ Vladimirov, who had stated: manently valid solutions that yield successful results regardless of the specific conditions," and he entered What kind of mediation by this or that socialist country a plea for "proper adaptation" of the basic principles can help solve conflicts between the USSR and the of communism to specific national circumstances, an USA, when the foreign policy of the USSR and the appeal that he related not only to Hungary's foreign Marxist-Leninist core of world socialism [i.e., the bloc] is identical on all basic international issues? " Rude Pravo. July 9, 1985. "Novoye vremya (Moscow), Aug. 23, 1985. The next day, the Hungarian party " Kommunist (Moscow), No. 10, signed to press on July 3, 1985. Nemeth had been newspaper Nepszabadsag excerpted the Shishlin article at length. designated Kadar's "deputy" at the March congress of the Hungarian party. See "Radio Budapest, Aug. 31, 1985, 4 p.m., trans. by RFE monitoring service. Nepszabadsag (Budapest), Mar. 29, 1985. "Pravda, Oct. 24, 1985. "For Ceau~escu's speeches, see Scinteia, July 12, 1985; and Agerpres, "Pravda (Bratislava), Oct. 29, 1985. July 24, 1985; for articles, see Era Socialista (Bucharest), Nos. 13, 18, and 19, July 10, "For a translation, see CDSP, Nov. 27, 1985, Special Supplement. Sept. 25, and Oct. 10, 1985. "Rude Pravo, Nov. 12, 1985. 44 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986 policies, but to its domestic policies as well. 39 First Politburo member Werner Jarowinsky defend the ef­ Secretary Kadar, writing on· the eve of the Reagan­ forts of East Germany and West Germany to help con­ Gorbach~v summit, saw the upcoming meeting of the solidate the Geneva results by using their specific superpowers as vindicating the comportment of weight in the two alignments. The meeting also Hungary and East Germany in 1984.4° Ferenc Havasi, removed from the Politburo Konrad Naumann, a hard­ a member of Hungary's Politburo and the party liner known for his reservations concerning inner­ secretary in charge of economic affairs, soon German rapprochement. 46 And even Czechoslovakia thereafter defended the "modernization" (i.e., the con­ seemed to want to be part of the new trend: Gustav tinuation and extension) of the country's economic Husak hastened to East Germany to sign a communi­ reforms, 41 and Nemeth opened a national conference que with Erich Honecker that stated: on inner-party democracy with the argument that "history cannot serve as a collection of examples that Both parties ... noted the willingness of their govern­ appear to jL,1stifythe circumstances of today, nor can ments to keep identifying new forms of cooperation one build the future from the past alone." 42 with the countries of Western Europe, based on equal­ At the Kremlin's November 7 reception commem­ ity and mutual advantage, as stipulated in the Helsinki orating the Bolshevik revolution, Gorbach~v noted the Final Act. ... 47 "exceptional importance" of the October meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders in Sofia and acknowledged that Time will tell, of course, whether all these state­ the Soviets have "immense respect" for the ex­ ments will actually afford the East Europeans much perience of their partners and "value the fraternal aid room for maneuver. In this context, it is useful to go and friendly advice of comrades in the struggle [for over the salient events of the year in bilateral relations socialist transformation]." He added that the USSR between Moscow and the East European states. was "always ready to share [its] knowledge and ex­ perience with them." 43 As if to highlight this cooperative spirit, Gorbach~v stopped off in Prague Hungary: Circumscribed Acceptance on November 21 on his way home from the Geneva summit meeting in order to brief Pact leaders (a move Why Grigory Romanov, a reputed hard-liner and that may also have been designed to diminish the Gorbach~v·s rival (already destined for ouster?), was possibility of a backlash at home from some of his chosen to deliver the CPSU's message at the 13th Na­ more diehard Kremlin colleagues). In the face of the tional Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' "complicated" contemporary international situation, Party (HSWP) at the end of March, we do not know. It the allies pledged "unity and togetherness" and could have been an indirect warning to the Hungari­ "class-based solidarity." 44 ans that they should not take Gorbach~v·s approval Hungary and East Germany were swift to pick up tor granted, or it may have been a ploy to humble the ball in the aftermath of Geneva. Gyula Horn, a Romanov by making him deliver a more moderate and secretary in the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, balanced message than he might have been inclined observed that the two East European states had been to make. In any case, Romanov's speech clearly con­ correct in pressing for damage limitation and a veyed the wish of Gorbach~v and the CPSU not to resumption of detente. 45 In Germany, the Socialist commit Moscow either to full support or to straight re­ Unity Party's Central Committee convened to hear jection of Hungary's reformist course. Romanov said that "there is no way of reliably safeguarding the na­ tional interests of each socialist state except by "Nepszabadsag, Nov., 2, 1985. A translation appears in FBIS-EEU, Nov. 27, 1985, strengthening our community as a whole and by aug­ pp. F/6-11. Neues Deutsch/and was quick to reprint salient passages of the SziirOs article in its Nov. 6, 1985, issue. Steven Koppany analyzes the SziirOs article in Radio menting our traditions of proletarian and socialist Free Europe, Hungarian Situation Report (Munich), No. 13, Dec. 6, 1985. internationalism." On the other hand, he defined the "See New Hungarian Quarterly (Budapest), No. 45, Winter 1984; in Hungarian, bloc as a community in which ''there is no place for Magyarorszag (Budapest), Nov. 3, 1985. "Nepszabadsag, Nov. 7, 1985, trans. in FB/S-EEU, Nov. 29, 1985, pp. F/3-9. relations of domination and subordination, the foisting "Radio Budapest, Nov. 21 and 22, 1985, 12 noon and 10 p.m., respectively (trans. of some people's will on others, or for mechanical by RFE monitoring service). See also Nepszabadsag, Nov. 22, 1985. "Pravda, Nov. 8, 1985. "Pravda, Nov. 22, 1985. The CPSU Politburo's statement on the Geneva summit alluded to the Prague pourparler's commitment to "joint peaceful positions" but also * Neues Deutsch/and, Nov. 23, 1985. For a translation of a broadcast of spoke of unity based on "class solidarity." Ibid., Nov. 26, 1985. The Prague stopover Jarowinsky's speech by ADN's International Service in German at 1626 GMT, Nov. 22, marked an unprecedented fourth Warsaw Pact summit for the year. 1985, see FBIS-EEU, Nov. 26, 1985, pp. E/1-7. "Budapest Television, Nov. 21, 1985, trans. by RFE monitoring service. "Rude Pravo, Nov. 27, 1985.

45 Gorbachev and Eastern Europe

standardization." In other words, reformist particu­ Hungarian specialists met Petr Fedoseyev, Dzherman larism in Hungary could go on, provided due respect Gvishiani, Abel Aganbegyan, and Oleg Bogomolov. was paid to bloc-wide tenets as set by Moscow: Upon their return to Hungary, Huszar acknowledged Romanov noted "the high level of trust and mutual that some questions concerning "commodity and understanding" between the CPSU and the HSWP price relations" were not viewed "in quite the same leaderships, and spoke approvingly of the exchange way" by the two sides, but on balance he assessed the of experience in "improving the methods of manage­ conference as a positive development "based on ment in the national economy and in developing complete mutual confidence." 52 democracy." 48 As noted above, in July the Soviet party journal Romanov also highlighted the need to consolidate Kommunist published an article by HSWP Politburo "our states' economic independence from the West": member Karoly Nemeth that reiterated in unusually candid fashion the Hungarian leadership's intention to Of course we are in favor of developing business rela­ go ahead with innovation, including expansion of tions with the capitalist countries alongside the con­ worker influence on management and "an increase in solidation of socialist economic integration. However, inner-party democracy." The HSWP's policy, he wrote, we build these relations in such a way as to prevent "is in need of constant renewal. ... The party is guided the imperialist forces from exploiting economic levers by principles, but not by dogma ... , and the anwers as a means of political pressure and interference in that were being given decades ago, or even 10 or 20 the affairs of the sovereign socialist states. years ago ... no longer meet the needs of today.53 Bogomolov's article in the same issue of Kommunist The CPSU Politburo report reviewing Romanov's implicity provided a theoretical justification for visit said that the HSWP congress had demonstrated Nemeth's defense of his country's unorthodox "a further consolidation of socialism's positions in approaches.54 Hungary" and had contributed to "enhanced cohesion In a September interview, CPSU Central Committee of the countries of the socialist community." 49 It was member and Director of Moscow's Institute for the not clear in Budapest how such a somber assessment Study of the USA and Canada Georgiy Arbatov de­ gibed with the reaffirmation of reformist lines at the scribed Moscow's view of the Hungarian experience congress itself.50 with market forces: Things looked up when Prime Minister Gy6rgy Lazar was dispatched to Moscow to open a Hungarian It is accepted as being successful, although it has exhibition on April 1. GorbacMv apparently avoided some complications, which the Hungarians speak the usual internationalist and integrationist exhorta­ about. At the same time, nobody can automatically tions and wished the Hungarians success in fulfilling take a model from another country and implement it. I their congress decisions.51 He must have known that think the Hungarian comrades-and I talk with them the main resolution of the congress postulated further about it-would be the first to be appalled if we just reforms. took their model and implemented it in our country. 55 Moscow continued to signal positive attitudes, if not explicit approbation toward Hungarian reforms. At Kadar went to Moscow in September for talks with a Soviet-Hungarian symposium on reform concepts Gorbachev. The resulting communique emphasized held in Moscow at the end of May and the beginning of "common experiences and the general laws of the June, Istvan Huszar, Bela Csik6s-Nagy, and other building of socialism," but also acknowledged "na­ tional characteristics." It did not, however, mention Hungary's reforms or the Soviet attitude toward them.

"The full text appeared in Pravda, Mar. 27, 1985. In an atmosphere of reported "complete unanimity of "Ibid., Apr. 5, 1985. views," Gorbachev accepted an invitation to visit " HSWP Central Committee member and Nepszabadsag commentator Peter Renyi, 56 when asked by the Second German TV Channel whether the pace of reforms would be Hungary. maintained, said, "I believe so. Insofar as one can measure reforms on a speedometer, I would even venture to say that they will now move faster." ZDF, 9:45 p.m., "MTI, May 28, 1985; also Nepszabadsag, June 1, 1985. Mar. 29, 1985, trans. by RFE monitoring service. 53 Loe. cit. " See the communique in Pravda, Apr. 2, 1985. Kadar doubtless would have liked to "The HSWP held a national conference on "inner-party democracy" on November have gone himself, but did not-whether for health reasons (exhaustion after the 21-23, 1985, at which both the themes discussed and the conclusions drawn were HSWP congress) or because Gorbachev did not yet consider it opportune. As it was, evocative of the Prague Spring of 1968. HSWP Deputy General Secretary Karoly Lazar's reception by the Soviet General Secretary contrasted with the failure of Nemeth delivered the main address. See Nepszabadsag, Nov. 22 and 23, 1985. Romanian and Bulgarian counterparts-also in Moscow at about the same time-to be "The Los Angeles Times, Sept. 27, 1985. granted audiences with the new CPSU chief. " Nepszabadsag, Sept. 26, 1985. 46 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986

This limited evidence suggests that Gorbachev's Moscow for the Chernenko funeral, Honecker met acceptance of Hungary's reformist course is quali­ with Kohl for more than two hours in a guest house in fied. First, although the reforms are being accepted, Lenin Hills. In a joint statement, the two declared their the Soviet leaders avoid giving them full and un­ hope for a new era in East-West relations and pledged equivocal public endorsement. Second, the Hungar­ to develop "normal and good relations" between their ians are being reminded that they must observe "the countries. 61 general laws of socialism," both by keeping domestic Honecker's pace was too fast for Gorbachev. Less developments under party control and by exercising than 10 days later, Andrey Gromyko summoned East caution in their dealings with the West. Third, although German Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer to Moscow a limited application of some Hungarian experiences and enforced the adoption of a tough and unbending has been hinted at, a replication of Hungarian reforms joint communique that indicated Moscow would de­ in the USSR is being ruled out, and the reformist termine the rules of the game. 62 The Soviets clearly course is not being prescribed for other East Euro­ wanted to be seen as determining when and how con­ pean allies individually or collectively. Fourth, the frontation was to be shifted to accommodation and Hungarians are required to continue their participa­ not as being compelled to act under pressure from an tion in economic integration and to support the foreign eager client. policy initiatives of the bloc, particularly those affect­ The Bonn government was perceived in Moscow as ing Soviet strategic interests. The limits have thus the most likely supporter (next to Britain) of US Presi­ been established quite clearly. 57 dent Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the prime target of the latest Soviet peace of­ fensive. Driving a wedge between SDI supporters and Handling Honecker the opponents would be more valuable than continued efforts at decoupling Bonn from Washington, at least In 1984, Moscow and East Berlin fell out over the in the short run. Honecker's "commonality of inter­ kind of East-West policy to be pursued by Moscow's ests" with West Germany would stand in the way. It allies in the wake of the deployment of intermediate­ would be inappropriate for East Berlin to behave as if range nuclear forces (INF) in Western Europe and the SDI were not an issue, or as if it concerned only the USSR's confrontational posture in response. More US-Soviet "grand" relationship and not ties between particularly, how close inner-German relations should the lesser powers. be within the global East-West climate became a bone Finally, Moscow had decided that the "correct" of contention. Moscow eventually prevailed on ideological way of celebrating the forthcoming anni­ Honecker to cancel an announced visit to West Ger­ versary of the end of World War 11was to keep West many.58Would Gorbachev now loosen the grip? Germany dangling on the "revanchist" hook. Unseem­ The East Germans were openly hopeful that Gor­ ly haste. in restoring friendliness between Kohl and bachev would "restore energetic leadership ... and Honecker would run counter to this carefully orches­ end the confusion that overshadowed relations be­ trated anniversary program. It is possible, too, that the tween Moscow and its key ally [read East Berlin] last Soviets had already anticipated an upsurge in the year." 59On the day of Chernenko's death, Honecker political fortunes of West Germany's Social Demo­ praised West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's State crats (the SPD) and wanted to steer Honecker clear of of the Nation speech, an address that Moscow had excessively close relations with the governing coali­ criticized not long before. 60 Shortly after arriving in tion of Christian Democrats, Christian Socialists, and Free Democrats. Whatever the reasons, the Soviets offered the East " The resuits of Kadar's talks with GorbacMv were similar to those he had held with German leader an alternative strategy (or so it seems Andropov during his previous visit to Moscow in July 1983. Indeed, the in hindsight). He was apparently asked to redirect his Gorbachev-Kadar communique specifically referred to this earlier visit and to satisfactory implementation by both sides of agreements reached then. on the earlier· Westpolitik toward countries other than West Ger­ meeting, see Alfred Reisch, "Kadar Policies Get Seal of Approval from the Soviet many and to downplay relations with Bonn to sub- Leadership?" RFE, Background Report, No. 195, Aug. 11, 1983. "For analysis of the 1984 tribulations, see Ronald D. Asmus, East Berlin and Moscow: the Documentation of a Dispute, Munich, Radio Free Europe, Occasional Paper Number One, 1985. "Neues Deutsch/and and Frankfurter Al/gemeine Zeitung of Mar. 11, 1985; cf. TASS "From a Reuter despatch from East Berlin, Mar. 12, 1985, reporting comments of of Feb. 28, 1985. East German officials to Western diplomats. West German Economics Minister Martin "ADN International Service in German, 2058 GMT, Mar. 12, 1985, trans. in Bangemann reportedly had a talk with Honecker in which the East German leader FB/S-EEU. Mar. 13, 1985, p. E/1. "seemed to be encouraged by GorbacMv's appointment." "For the text of the communique, see lzvestiya (Moscow), Mar. 21, 1985. 47 Gorbachev and Eastern Europe

governmental and trade levels while in the meantiriie As regards the rights and responsibilities of the Soviet cultivating the SPD. Only after the Soviets decided to Union wjthin the Four-Power agreements on Germany change their own stand vis-a-vis the West in general and Berlin, West German and West Berlin negotiators and, perhaps, Bonn in particular, would Honecker be have precisely in recent months frequently learned allowed to deal with Kohl again. He would then, in from their GDR interlocutors that this or that is at the fact, be able to do so from a position of strength, hav­ moment "impracticable" because "our friends" - that ing in the interim proven himself to be an important is, the Soviets- have said so. 67 European statesman.63 Honecker appears to have accepted this scenario Nonetheless, East Germany was champing at the without demur. Yet the communique signed after a bit. Beginning late in the summer of 1985, East Berlin May meeting with Gorbachev in Moscow showed started a series of leaks that when combined con­ some signs of unresolved issues. Despite a stated veyed a common theme. Honecker, it was implied, mood of "cordiality and complete unanimity," there wanted to go to Bonn at long last, but had to wait for was no declaration that relations between the two Soviet approval, which Gorbachev had promised to countries were satisfactory, and "mutual resolve was give only after the summit meeting with Reagan in expressed to further perfect relations along party, Geneva.68 More important still, the East Germans state, and public lines."64 Viktor Grishin's subsequent once again joined forces with the Hungarians, this mid-May visit to East Berlin yielded yet additional evi­ time to postulate three tenets that they believed to be dence that Honecker was being reminded to behave instrumental for their own conduct of policy toward as told. In the words of the communique, the West, as well as their demeanor inside the bloc. First, both apparently asked Gorbachev to show flex­ Erich Honecker pointed to the complete agreement in ibility and readiness to compromise when dealing with views about current issues of world politics, the strug­ the United States.69 Second, they successfully in­ gle tor the preservation of peace, and further duced Moscow to accept the notion that small and· strengthening of the unity and united nature of the medium-sized states on both sides of the ideological socialist community, which had been emphasized so divide have a role of their own to play in influencing strongly during his meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev. 65 the behavior of the superpowers. And third, they argued in favor of an undogmatic interpretation of in­ The document also included the already-cited GDR ternationalism that would allow for the acceptance of pledge to honor Warsaw Pact obligations "in the national peculiarities and interests. future, too." Yet, one must be careful in assessing prospects for A curious incident in mid-April may explain this last East German freedom of action. On the one hand, the development. In two consecutive issues-April 15 Honecker regime has undoubtedly come of age and, and 16- the otherwise protocol-conscious East Ger­ as an economically important partner of the USSR, man party newspaper Neues Deutsch/and referred to the GDR rightly claims more room for itself than its the Soviet troops stationed in East Germany as role as a mere Soviet military instrument allowed it to "Group of Soviet Forces in the German Democratic have in the past. On the other hand, however innova­ Republic," and not (as was official and customary) as tive and versatile Gorbachev may turn out to be, he is "Group of Soviet Forces in Germany," a formula not likely to surrender suzerainty where it matters designating Soviet rights in a// Germany, East and most. Dovetailing of interests rather than accenting of West. The then commander of these troops, Soviet differences will constitute the center of gravity of Army General Mikhail Zaytsev, went out of his way to future Soviet-East German relations. Moreover, correct the mistake, using the old designation no Honecker has not been a reformer at home. East Ger­ fewer than four times in a speech delivered on April man policies of economic intensification have already 16; Neues Deutsch/and dutifully reprinted the met with Soviet approbation and possibly even emula- general's speech the next day with the correct for­ mula, and has not erred since.66 A West German jour­ "See fn. 15. "See Tagesspiege/ (West Berlin), Apr. 17, 1985, for a more detailed account nalist noted in this context: "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Apr. 18, 1985. " Honecker conveyed this message himself in an interview in Saarbrucker Zeitung, Nov. 13, 1985. For a good summary of East German positions at that pre-summit "This interpretation is offered in Barbara V. Flow, "Honecker Woos NATO Countries" juncture, see "Honecker's Policy of Wait and See," Neue Zurcher Zeitung, Nov. 13, and "Mixed Signals in Inter-German Relations," RFE, Background Report, Nos. 42 and 1985. 76, May 9, and Aug. 8, 1985. "See Louis Wiznitzer's article filed from Paris to The Christian Science Monitor "Pravda, May 6, 1985. (Boston), Nov. 6, 1985, which references unnamed East European sources. 48 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986

tion . Hence, Soviet chastisement for GDR foreign pol­ icy transgressions is likely to be carefully balanced with good marks for East Berlin's useful domestic economic policies .

Poland the Insoluble

The plan for Poland which has been crystallizing over the past year appears essentially identical to the concept of "normalization" formulated in basic con­ tours four years ago, under Brezhnev. It seems to have the following features:

• General Wojciech Jaruzelski will stay at the ·helm as the best strong man available . • His priority task will now be to revivify the Polish United Workers' Party so that it, rather than the army and the government, once again becomes the undis­ puted ruler of the country .70 • The polish government will concentrate on Toasts are exchanged at the April 26, 1985, banquet straightening out the economy, at first not along the in Warsaw marking renewal of the'·Warsaw Pact: at lines of the reformist concept of 1981 (which con­ left, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev; at center, East tained a number of "Hungarian" features) but rather in Germany's Erich Honecker / at right, Poland's Woj­ the Gorbachev manner.71 ciech Jaruzelski. • Soviet-Polish relations will form the core of -REUTERS/BETTMANN. Poland's economic recovery program .72 A renewed at­ tempt to spur modernizat ion through capitalist assist­ monies. The talks produced a communique that spoke ance, such as the one undertaken by Gierek with of "a spirit of unity and cordial friendship, " but it Brezhnev's blessing in the early 1970's, will not be lacked the usual references to confidence , mutual tolerated. Neither will Poland become too friendly with understanding, and identity of views. Gorbachev was the West in the political and cultural fields, lest this af­ said to have confirmed the Soviet Union's constant , , ford the West an opportunity to link up with the opposi­ tion inside the country.

• The state will maintain a non-confrontational but "The Central Commitlee of the PUWP met on May 12-13 to discuss "the distant relationship with the Church; the two are not to effectiveness of pany work and ways of improving its quality." The leadership said it be seen as acting in unison on any of the essential was "increasing the scope of participation of party bodies and party members in the process of policy- and decision-making ." Trybuna Ludu {Warsaw), May 12-15, 1985, problems facing Poland. carried reports on the session. When personnel changes were made in the wake of the • The state will alternate between toughness Sejm elections of October 13, Jaruzelski gave up the premiership for the more toward dissenters and apparent accommodation de­ ceremonial chairmanship of the Council of State, while retaining his position as party leader. Polish official sources and Western observers alike interpreted this as an signed to condition the public to accept the regime's indication of a decision to focus on party matters . See Polish government spokesman monopoly in domestic politics as irreversible. Jerzy Urban's remarks to foreign press correspondents as reponed by the Associated Press and Deutsche Press Agentur on Nov. 12, 1985, as well as Jaruzelski 's speech at • The regime will not enter into dialogue with a PUWP ideological conference on Nov. 27, 1985 (Trybuna Ludu, Nov. 29, 1985); also underground Solidarity, but will not be averse to The Washington Times, Nov. 12, 1985; and Der Spiegel (Hamburg), Nov. 13, 1985. simulated consultations with the new official trade 11 This emphasis is clear from the proceedings of the PUWP's economic conference unions and possibly even the self-management in Poznan on May 31-June 1, and from the speech of the new Prime Minister Zbigniew Messner to the Sejm on November 12. On the Poznan meeting, see FBIS-EEU, June 3, organs in factories. The objective will be to weaken 1985, pp. G/1-17; on Messner's speech, see Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish, 1445 residual sympathy among industrial workers for the GMT, Nov. 12, 1985, trans . in FBIS-EEU, Nov. 18, 1985, pp. G/3-28 . 72 defeated union and to persuade the public of the futil ­ The states signed two economic agreements on October 7: one on cooperation in the period 1986-90, including provisions for Soviet l.(Seof Polish industrial capacity ; the ity of reliance on clandestine organizations for mat­ other on the rescheduling until after 1990 of Poland's debt to the USSR-amounting to ters affecting everyday life. more than 5 billion rubles-and toleration of Poland's negative balance of payme_[lts In April , Gorbachev remained for a day in Poland for with the Soviet Union until the end of. 1987. See Trybuna Ludu, Oct . 8, 1985; and Roman Stefanowsk i's article in RFE, Polish Situation Repoa (Munich), No. 17, Oct. 26, bilateral talks after the Warsaw Pact renewal cere- 1985. 49 Gorbachev and Eastern Europe

projects on Soviet territory .75 Simultaneously, the importance of Romanian economic connections with the West has diminished perceptibly. The bulk of export earnings has been earmarked for rapid pay­ off of earlier loans and related interest expenses, thereby further reducing the room for purchases of modern equipment, spare parts, and raw materials on Western markets. Bucharest's economic crisis and the resulting accommodation with the USSR has tend­ ed to devalue Ceau$escu's international standing. At the same time, Romania continues to be a nuisance within the bloc . Gorbachev could not possi­ bly have welcomed Ceau$escu's May call for reduc­ tions in WTO defense outlays.76 Moreover, in a reprise of the political alignments of 1984 (which had seen Honecker, Kadar, and Ceau$escu striking a some­ what independent posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union), Honecker received Ceau$escu in East Berlin in late Easr Germany's Erich Honecker, left, and Romania's May. Although the resulting communique adhered Nicolae Ceau~escu raise their hands in a gesture of friendship at the conclusion of the Romanian leader's more closely to the measured position of the GDR May 29, 1985, visit to the German Democratic than to the tenets usually verbalized by the Roma­ Republic. nians, it made no mention of "socialist international ­ -ADN Zentralbild from EASTFOTO. ism."77 On the day of Ceau$escu's arrival , the East Germans praised him for relying on "principles of in­ unwavering solidarity with the Polish party and the dependence and national sovereignty," and Romania Polish people and to have expressed Moscow's inter­ was said to "occupy a respected place in the family of est in fully overcoming the crisis, achieving stabiliza­ the fraternal socialist countries ."78 tion, and strengthening the positions of socialism . Nicolae Ceau$escu's persistent pursuit of the Jaruzelski was not mentioned by name, an unmistak­ theme of independence, however futile the end result able sign that Moscow was not putting all its eggs into may turn out to be in Romania's own case, cannot be his basket.73 totally written off. Twenty years of rhetoric and shadow-boxing with the Soviets over this issue have given it a life of its own. Not even Gorbachev can ig­ Waiting Out Ceau~escu nore the impact it has had on attitudes in the ~mpire over which he now presides. Moreover, all was not Gorbachev has not acted overtly with respect to empty talk and sham argumentation. Romania engi­ Romania; he has not even met individually with the ail­ neered the departure of Soviet troops from its land ing Ceau$escu.74 In the meantime, economic neces­ and refused to allow their return. It rejected Khrush­ sity and Soviet pressures have forced Romania to in­ chev's concept of hierarchic economic integration in crease its trade and other cooperative undertakings the bloc at a time when all the others were willing to with GEMA countries, and even agree to participate in accept it. Without Romania, the economic landscape of the empire could have changed then, making sub­ sequent economic reforms more difficult. Ceau$escu "Trybuna Ludu. Apr. 28, 1985. u Most recently, Ceau~escu's appearance during his mid-December visit to repudiated the invasion of reformist Czechoslovakia Yugoslavia was said to be worn and haggard. See Oie Presse (Vienna). Dec. 19.1985; ano the ensuing Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sover- and Chicago Tribune. Dec. 24. 1985. " Radio Moscow broadcasts in Romanian assert that the USSR is stepping up oil i;Jeliveries to Romania to keep her refining capacities functioning . Statistical services in both countries show an increase in deliveries in 1984 and the lirst half ol 1985. but these unreliable sources do not make it clear how much of the increased Romanian oil 7a See tn. 14. For a round-up of recent developments in the Romanian-Soviet dispute. bill reflects expanded physical deliveries and how much it reflects rising prices. or how see Anneli Maier's article in RFE. Romanian Situation Report. No. 12. Aug. 13.1985. much is paid for in hard currency or ""hard-currency goods."" Programs planned for the "See Scinteia. May 31. 1985; a translation of the communique as released by AON 1986-90 period apparently entail fairly substantial Romanian participation in gas International Service in German. 1701 GMT. May 30, t985 , can be found in FBIS-EEU, extraction on Soviet teritory and in the builidng of pipelines, alongside other CEMA May 31, 1985, pp. E/6-11 . states. See Paul Gafton's articles in RFE, Romanian Situation Report (Munich). Nos. 7 "Neues Deutsch/and, May 28, 1985; and AON International Service in German, May and 8, Apr. 9 and May 14, 1985. 28. 1985, trans. in FB/S-EEU, May 29, 1985, p. Ell . 50 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986

eignty, giving heart to others. He denied full cooper­ 1984, had essentialy been completed by February ation to Warsaw Pact military programs, including 1985, just before Gorbachev's succession. There is maneuvers on his territory and-possibly, although no evidence of any Soviet opposition to this cam­ we do not know it for certain-training exercises out­ paign, or to Bulgaria's long-term goal of "one Slavic side the European theater. 79 Romania opposed the nation." A Turkish reporter accompanying the speaker Soviet policies that culminated in the rifts with China, of the Ankara parliament, Necmettin Karaduman, on a the Eurocommunists, and Israel. It created, albeit six-day visit to Moscow in late May 1985 said that clumsily, a body politic and body theoretic that con­ Karaduman asked Vasiliy Kuznetsov, first deputy tinue to balk Soviet desires for the homogeneity of the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, to intercede bloc and unbridled Muscovite hegemony over it. with Sofia. Kuznetsov purportedly refused "to inter­ vene in another country's internal affairs." 84 If Gor­ bachev criticized Zhivkov regarding the actions vis-a.­ The Bulgarian Connection vis Bulgaria's Turks, one can only surmise that it was not the act itself but rather the handling of the cam­ Bulgaria's Todor Zhivkov, like Czechoslovakia's paign that provoked Soviet dissatisfaction. Gustav Husak, had the distinction of having two indi­ Bulgaria's economic performance is probably the vidual meetings with Gorbachev in 1985: one during a most important issue in what observers see as Gor­ visit to Moscow on June 5-7, the other when the bachev·s·stern behavior toward this Balkan ally. Four Soviet leader stayed behind in Sofia on October 24- factors seem salient. The first is Bulgaria's wasteful 25, after the Warsaw Pact summit. The first visit pro­ domestic energy sector and dependence on Soviet duced the usual citations of brotherly cohesion and coal and oil deliveries. (An acute shortage of power consensual opinion, as well as a fourth Order of Lenin made the winters of 1984 and 1985 critical periods, for Zhivkov.80 After the second meeting, however, with extensive power cuts and equipment break­ Gorbachev told workers in a Sofia factory (which ex­ downs that rivaled those of neighboring Romania.) ports most of its machine tools output to the USSR): More broadly, Moscow apparently did not like the way "We briefed each other ... in a comradely fashion, not Bulgaria approached coordination of the two coun­ evading a few prickly issues."81 tries' five-year plans, for 1986-90. 85 Observers had noted a few "prickly issues" even in Second, the USSR has long criticized the poor qual­ pre-Gorbachev times, relating in particular to the ity of deliveries from Bulgaria, especially of engi­ Bulgarian nationalism of Zhivkov's late daughter, neering goods.86 When visiting the USSR in August Lyudmila.82 But other matters were probably on Gor­ bachev's mind when he took Zhivkov to task: the botching of Bulgaria's terrorist and underworld con­ ,. For a history of Romania's comportment in the Warsaw Pact, see Robert L. nections, with special reference to the papal assassi­ Hutchings, Soviet-East European Relations: Consolidation and Conflict, 1968-1980, nation plot; the unnecessary haste and brutality of the Madison, University of Wisconsin Press. 1983; and David Holloway and Jane Sharp, campaign to Bulgarize ethnic Turks; and Bulgaria's Eds.• The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition, London, Macmillan, 1984. A recent journalistic summary appeared in Der Tagesspiegel (West Berlin), Dec. 21, 1985. lackadaisical economic behavior. All three issues 00 The occasion for the award remains a mystery. The citation refers to a "jubilee," antedate Gorbachev's accession, but he chose to but there was no obvious birthday or other anniversary being celebrated. See TASS in administer the censure. English, 1033 GMT, June 7, 1985, trans. in FBIS-EEU, June 7, 1985, pp. F13-4. "Pravda, Oct. 25, 1985. The Russian words for "prickly issues" were "ostryye ugly." The extent of Bulgarian involvement in the attempt­ "On Lyudmila Zhivkova's "mystical reworking of Marxism-Leninism, her ed murder of the Pope and the connection of the endorsement of traditional nationalism, her vigorous assertion of claims on Macedonia, then KGB chairman and Gorbachev's mentor Yuriy her lavish celebration of Bulgaria's non-Slavic Thracian past, and her sponsorship of independent cultural and peace initiatives," see Stephen Ashley in RFE, Bulgarian Andropov with the event is not yet clear. What is cer­ Situation Report (Munich), No. 12, Nov. 7, 1985. tain is a rather intimate and unsavory association of "Reports on Bulgarian involvements in the "sensitive issues" relating to drugs, arms, the Bulgarian secret services with syndicated crime and other murky affairs have been plentiful. See, e.g., a report by the US Drug Enforcement Agency as released by USIA, July 26, 1984; The New York Times, in the European underworld, especially its drug and Feb. 6, 1985; and Liberation (Paris), Oct. 16, 1985. arms smuggling branch, in which Turkish nationals "Hurriyet (Ankara), May 31, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, play a significant role.83 Even if the hand that guided Daily Report: Western Europe (Washington, DC), June 4, 1985, p. Tl1. Mehmet Ali Agca in St. Peter's Square was not "See Rada Nikolaev' articles in RFE, Bulgarian Situation Report, Nos. 1o and 12, Sept. 2 and Nov. 7, 1985. The first of these discusses Bulgaria's energy crisis; the Bulgarian, the drawn-out tumult and revelations to second, a number of personnel changes, which included the dismissal of Stanish which the act led, would justify displeasure. Bonev, chairman of Bulgaria's State Planning Commission, on October 18-an event Sofia's campaign to coerce ethnic Turks into adopt­ that occurred one week before, and appeared connected with, GorbacMv's visit. "See, e.g., an interview with the Soviet Ambassador to Sofia, Leonid Grekov, in ing Bulgarian names, which began in the autumn of Pogled (Sofia), No. 26, July, 1985.

51 Gorbachev and Eastern Europe

1985, Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo member of late-an explosion on a train, a parcel bomb, de­ Stanko Todorov said: struction of ski lifts, and fires on Sofia streetcars. But one thing is certain, the oft-ignored Balkan state has We assured our Soviet comrades that Bulgarian work­ emerged from the doldrums with a bang, and will ers were making great efforts to improve the quality doubtless engage a goodly measure of the new Soviet and reliability of the products we export to the USSR.87 leader's attention.

Third, the Soviets appeared displeased over lag­ ging productivity levels, lax discipline, and excessive Czechoslovakia's Non-Reform worker preoccupation with private pastimes and pri­ vate enterprise. Soviet Ambassador Leonid Grekov A Czechoslovak newspaper greeted Gorbachev's said: ascent with the headline "Continuation of the Great Work" and pointedly emphasized the legacy of the The attachment of (Bulgarian) workers to the land is hapless Konstantin Chernenko,92 an indication of not a simple problem. Many of your workers have Prague's unfailing loyalty to hard-line orthodoxy. houses in the countryside, gardens, vineyards, or they Presumably, Czechoslovakia will continue-as it did breed livestock. When they return to their jobs, it is during the Andropov period-to emulate Soviet cam­ only natural that they rest after having attended to paigns to intensify and modernize production, uproot these activities. 88 corruption, and tighten work discipline. At the same time, it will also likely pursue an "active foreign policy" The Bulgarians responded by tightening control over of endless exchanges of official and semi-official cadre work and by launching a campaign against cor­ visits with other nations as a means of softening its ruption, incompetence, and indiscipline.89 image as an oppressive regime; and to the same end, Fourth, there must have been some displeasure it may continue to treat dissidents with some modera­ over the "embourgeoisement" and generally lax ideo­ tion and afford some leeway to religious believers logical manners of Bulgarian youth. A rather harsh (even while blocking vitally required agreements with decree was issued in October 1985 to tighten super­ the Vatican). vision and indoctrination of the 16-to-19 age group.90 But the current Czechoslovak leadership has no Economic decline would have become the concern stomach for reforms, even economic ones, at this of Bulgarians even without Soviet criticism. It appears time. Party leader Gustav Husak told a June session that neither the "new economic approach," first for­ of the Czechoslovak party Central Committee: mulated in 1977, nor the "new economic mechanism," first introduced in 1982 and then amended in 1984, We will not take the road of any of the market-oriented has brought the expected results. Reform Bulgarian concepts that would weaken the system of socialist style, hailed (together with the East German experi­ collective property and the party's leading role in the ence) as potentially capable of steering a communist economy. We have had bad experience with that kind economy between the Scylla of the command system of thing. 93 and the Charybdis of marketization, seems to be foundering. Bulgarian economists have already begun Resources for the next five-year plan are being allo­ to argue the case for a reform that would rest on cated on the assumption that the command system market principles, as practiced in Hungary.91 remains essentially unchanged. The country's propor­ It is difficult to link Gorbachev's ascent to power tion of trade with the USSR is nearing 50 percent, and with a wave of terrorist acts that has plagued Bulgaria more than 80 per cent of overall trade turnover is with the socialist world.94 In its orthodoxy, Czechoslovakia sometimes even outdoes Big Brother. Barely a week before the May 07 Rabotnichesko Delo, Aug. 20, 1985. "Interview in Pogled, loc. cit. " See two lengthy lead articles in Rabotnichesko Delo, Sept 9 and 15, 1985, and a series of critical articles in Trud (Sofia) running from August through November 1985. "Pravda (Bratislava), Mar. 13, 1985. "On the decree and reasons for it, see interviews with the chief secretary in the " Rude Pravo, June 19, 1985. Ministry of Education, in vechernji Noviny (Sofia), Oct. 30, 1985, and with Minister of " According to the semi-annual (1985) plan fulfillment report, 46.2 % of all Education Aleksandar Fol, in Rabotnichesko Delo, Nov. 1, 1985. Czechoslovak foreign trade was with the USSR and 80.3 % with "socialist countries." "For example, economist Ivan Angelov argued in Trud of Sept. 20, 1985, that Rude Pravo, July 26, 1985. For the increasingly awesome Czechoslovak economic Bulgaria·s New Economic Mechanism had failed and that full reliance on the market entanglement with the Soviet Union, see also Hospoda/ske Noviny (Prague), May 31, was preferable. 1985. 52 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986

meeting of Gorbachev and Husak in Moscow, the have to cope with in their own way. He did not relax Soviet leader had told visiting Italian Communist offi­ the Soviet grip on the area to the point where disinte­ cial Gianni Cervetti that the idea of holding a world gration might, or almost certainly would, ensue. He communist conference was simply not topical. 95 Yet has eschewed endorsing market-based reform for in­ in mid-June, Husak said he was convinced that "the dividual countries or as an underpinning of CEMA. He unity and togetherness of the movement would be en­ prodded all of the client states into domestic action hanced" if such a meeting took place.96 designed to increase efficiency, discipline, and thrift, Writing in Rude Pa!J.voof July 9, 1985, Ivan Hlivka and he asked them to cut corruption and abuse of called for full recognition of the primacy of Soviet ex­ power. He affirmed Soviet primacy in coordinating the perience for bloc members, for total coordination of way the East-West relationship was to be shaped and economic and political measures, for intensification ton ducted. of the influence of communist party organizations on Nevertheless, Gorbachev has fine-tuned rather intrabloc processes, and for rejection of those hoping than bulldozed. No East European leader has been to rely on the West in their modernization drives. toppled, and no established governmental mode has Another Czechoslovak official interpreted the new been changed. The Hungarians continue their re­ version of the Soviet party program as demanding forms, and so far the Czechoslovaks go ahead with "improvement of political coordination in the Warsaw their non-reforms. He has conceded that national Pact" and as postulating faithfulness to Marxism­ peculiarities and interests do not have to be trampled Leninism by the ruling parties as the most important underfoot but could be amicably dovetailed in order to factor in a successful march forward.97 produce internationalist ideological satisfaction. He Husak presents Gorbachev with a choice between has given his client states the right to deal with the what the former likes to call a politically stable and West as long as they eschew countering Soviet strate­ loyal Czechoslovakia under the present leadership gic objectives, comply with CEMA's integration plans, and the dark threatening future that reformism would and avoid becoming dependent on Western economic bring if it were allowed once again to raise its ugly mercies. head. Even if Gorbachev were aware that Husak is ex­ In other words, in not acting rashly either in tighten­ aggerating both the virtues of his own government ing or in relaxing Soviet control over the area, Gor­ and the perils inherent in reform, he could not remain bachev has acted optimally. By the same token, indifferent to the argument. Gorbachev has no short­ neither the centrifugalists nor the centripetalists can age of problems and potential crises around him, and be fully content with what has come to pass. a placid, if inefficient, Czechoslovakia is better than In at least one respect Gorbachev has so far failed another Prague Spring. Things may start happening to provide an adequate answer to the East European when Czechoslovak economic inadequacy becomes challenge. He has not charted a credible path toward more pronounced, but not a shadow of disagreement making the region economically healthy. The East was allowed to seep into the communique issued Germans and the Hungarians may yet achieve their after Gorbachev stopped over in Prague on his way own economic revitalization, but for the other coun­ from the summit in Geneva in November and held bi­ tries, the post-industrial era of hi-tech modernization lateral talks with Husak before briefing the Warsaw keeps receding into the more distant future. From any Pact leaders collectively. 98 perspective, Marxist or not, this shakiness of the eco­ nomic base should be cause for considerable concern. Conclusion " L'Unita (Rome), May 22, 1985. "Rude Prll.vo, June 19, 1985. On the world communist conference the In all, Mikhail Gorbachev has set the signposts for Czechoslovaks had to backpedal. Vasil Bilak told the CC meeting on Nov 28. 1985 in Eastern Europe in a way that combines firmness with one terse sentence: "Today we see that conditions for it are not yet ripe." Rude Pravo, Nov. 30. 1985. a good amount of understanding. He seems to have 07 See Michal StefaMk in ibid., Nov. 12, 1985. recognized that there are limits that he himself cannot " Ibid., Nov. 22, 1985. overstep, as well as problems that his lesser allies

53 IB@@Ik~ Politicsof SovietLaw

Robert Sharlet

OUMPIAD S. IOFFE. Soviet Law OVER HALF A CENTURY ago, Party of the Soviet Union, as the and Soviet Reality. Dordrecht, Yevgeniy Pashukanis, the preemi­ political sovereign, continues to in­ Martinus Nijhoff, 1985. nent Soviet legal philosopher of his terfere in the ordinary administra­ day, declared that "for us revolu­ tion of justice in myriad subtle FRIDRIKH NEZNANSKY. The tionary legality is a problem that is ways. However, the increasing Prosecution of Economic Crimes 99 percent political." 1 Since that availability in the West of authorita­ in the USSR, 1954-1984. Falls time, and especially since Stalin's tive accounts by emigre Soviet Church, VA, Delphic Associates, death in 1953, substantial changes jurists is now beginning to shed 1985. have occurred in the way the Sovi­ some light on these heretofore hid­ et leadership governs Soviet soci­ den aspects of the Soviet legal sys­ LOUISE I. SHELLEY. Lawyers in ety. Overt and systematic terror tem. The most recently published Soviet Work Life. New Brunswick, as a principal means of control accounts, among them Olimpiad NJ, Rutgers University Press, passed from the scene some dec­ loffe's 3 Soviet Law and Soviet 1984. ades ago as the party-state shifted Reality, Fridrikh Neznansky's4 The JOHN N. HAZARD. Managing its emphasis from prerogative or Prosecution of Economic Crimes in Change in the USSR: The administrative methods of govern­ the USSR, 1954-1984, and those 5 Politico-Legal Role of the Soviet ance to normative or legal ones. included in Louise Shelley's study Jurist. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge After Stalin, reliance on legal proc­ esses has been the general rule­ University Press, 1983. ' Yevgeniy 8. Pashukanis, "The Soviet State and the except for "political cases" which Revolution in Law," trans. by Hugh W. Babb, in John N. JOHN N. HAZARD, WILLIAM E. continue to be dealt with adminis­ Hazard, Ed., Soviet Legal Philosophy, Cambridge, MA, BUTLER and PETER B. MAGGS. tratively, albeit under a cloak of Harvard University Press, 1951, p. 280. 'See Peter Reddaway, Ed., Uncensored Russia: The Soviet Legal System: The legality. The treatment of "political Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union, New York, Law in the 1980's. New York, cases," relatively small in number American Heritage Press, 1972; and Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Oceana, 1984. but significant for their calculated Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, violation of Soviet-style due proc­ Reiig/Ous, and Human Rights, Middletown, CT, Wesleyan University Press, 1985. ess, is by now well-documented in 3 Before emigrating from the USSR, Olimpiad loffe Robert Sharlet !s Professor of Western literature. 2 was chairman of the Department of Civil Law of Leningrad University Law School. He also played a Political Science, Union College Less well known, however, is the major role in the post-Stalin drafting and recodification (Schenectady, NY). His books on day-to-day admixture of politics of Soviet civil law. Soviet law and politics include The and law in the legislative and policy • During his long career in the USSR Procuracy, Fridrikh Neznansky worked as a senior criminal New Soviet Constitution of 1977 implementation process and in the investigator and served as a prosecutor in hundreds of (1980) and Pashukanis: Selected more mundane spheres of civil law cases handled by the Moscow City Procuracy. After Writings on Marxism and Law and criminal procedure. Although leaving the Procuracy, he worked for several years as a defense attorney until his emigration in the late 1970's. (1980) - co-edited with Piers "socialist legality" is no longer 99 • Louise Shelley is an American criminologist Beirne & trans. by Peter 8. Maggs. percent political, the Communist (continued on p. 55)

54 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986

Lawyers in Soviet Work Life, reveal vetoed a constitutional clause that planning law in order to overcome much about the preemptive role of would have created a tier of tribu­ unexpected difficulties. In neither politics in the ordinary legal proc­ nals to exercise judicial review case does the party bother to use ess in the USSR. These insider ac­ over administrative decisions.7 the established legislative process counts are beginning to enrich the To be sure, not all legislative ini­ to carry out such changes in an analyses of Western scholars. tiative inevitably comes from the orderly way. In effect, "the annual top. Nonetheless, a legislative pro­ planning laws remain intact, while FEW WESTERN SPECIALISTS on posal "remains a mere idea until it the real plans are changed again Soviet law and politics have has been taken over by the appro­ and again in a tightly closed ad­ doubted that the party controls the priate party agency" (loffe, p. 36). ministrative sphere without any formal legislative process, but they Only after such an agency ap­ needless publicity" (loffe, p. 218). were not familiar with the exact proves a legislative draft is it possi­ Typical of this approach to plan­ modus operandi of this control. ble to proceed to formal enact­ ning law is the example of Aleksey Emigre scholarship is now helping ment. Kosygin, who when informed in the to fill this gap. It reveals that the Even in the implementation of late 1970's that oil output had Politburo, acting on the advice of new legislation, or of laws already declined because of, among other the Central Committee Secretariat, on the books, a state agency may things, new, general restructuring determines the long-term law­ turn to its party supervisor for legislation that stripped the in­ making agenda and assigns the guidance. For example, when a dustry's enterprises of their status various legislative drafting tasks to technical dispute arose within an as juridical persons, exclaimed: appropriate state institutions and important state commission during "Well, then, to hell with the restruc­ organizations. The substance of the mid-1970's, the chairman de­ turing. Consider them juridical per­ every new law is predetermined in ferred taking a decision on the sons !"9 In brief, Soviet politics of advance by the party leadership by matter-even though the majority law are characterized by "strict means of "political directives" that on the commission supported legality" in the texts and "striking are binding on the drafting and en­ him- by saying: "Let's hold off on arbitrariness" in practice (loffe, p. actment agencies.6 Of course, for the decision and find out what our 182). a legal act as complex as the new [party] curator thinks."8 Converse­ USSRConstitution of 1977, a mere ly, in 1978, when scholars of the In­ THE PARTY MAINTAINS its control political directive was not suffi­ stitute of State and Law of the over the administration of criminal cient; the Administrative Organs Academy of Sciences initiated a and civil justice, and the policy­ Department of the party Secretar­ purely theoretical discussion of implementation process in gen­ iat closely supervised the Constitu­ legislation to implement Article 58 eral, by means of a steady flow of tional Commission and its drafting of the new Constitution, which pre­ directives to the operational agen­ committees in order to ensure an sumably guarantees a citizen the cies involved. These party direc­ outcome consistent with the will of right to judicial redress for unlaw­ tives, described variously as "in­ the party as ultimate legislator. ful violation of his rights by an offi­ structive law" (Neznansky, p. 30) or This department of the Secretariat cial, they were told to cease and "secret instructions," (loffe, pp. 38, paid special attention to novel or desist. To date, Article 58 remains 57, 164), constitute a considerable unusual proposals that arose in a dead letter (loffe, pp. 37, 52). body of classified, unpublished response to the leadership's politi­ Party leaders not only control rules. Formal legal norms- consti­ cal directives on the Constitution. the flow and implementation of leg­ tutional, code, and statutory law- Thus, for example, the head of the islation, they also frequently adopt Administrative Organs Department a cavalier attitude toward their own laws. The Politburo, which 'See Konstantin M. Simis, "The Making of the New Soviet Constitution: Conflict over Administrative has historically defined itself Justice," In Robert Sharlet, Ed., "Studies in Soviet Legal specializing in Soviet law. Her study is based on in-depth as a meta-juridical institution Policymaking and Implementation," a special issue of interviews with 25 former Soviet jurists now living in the above and outside the law it Soviet Union, (Tempe, AZ) Vol. 6, No. 2, 1979, West, the majority of whom had served as legal advisors pp. 203--07. Simis, a former Soviet jurist, was involved in to economic enterprises, local governments, and social creates, routinely bypasses budget the drafting of the 1977 Constitution before his organizations, or worked as state arbitrators. Some of law, for example, in order to pro­ emigration from the USSR. her respondents were also defense attorneys. cure funding for unforeseen ex­ • Olimpiad S. loffe, "Law and Economy in the USSR," ' See Olimpiad S. loffe and Peter B. Maggs, Soviet Harvard Law Review (Cambridge, MA) May 1982, Law in Theory and Practice, New York, Oceana, 1983, igencies, and it regularly orders or p. 1605. pp. 99-101. permits ad hoc amendments to • ,otfe, "Law and Economy ... ," pp. 1623-24. 55 Books

are constantly subject to interpre­ ty intervention. In the early 1960's, condone the arrest of the ring­ tation through the prism of party in­ for example, Ivan Satin, a local par­ leader, and the Administrative structions. In effect, "instructive ty official, was caught operating a Organs Department instructed the law is a hidden reef that underlies large-scale fruit and vegetable Procuracy to terminate criminal the Soviet system of justice" (and scam in the Moscow region. His il­ proceedings against all those in­ administration), which an official legal organization included several volved for "lack of evidence." In the can ignore only at his own peril dozen well-placed individuals in end, the chief investigator in the (Neznansky, p. 32). the political, legal, and economic case was dismissed on the In the sphere of criminal justice, apparatus. The scam involved di­ grounds that he had brought instructive law affords party offi­ verting produce from state ware­ charges against the notables pre­ cials and appointees- in a word, houses for under-the-counter sale maturely (Neznansky, pp. 107-11).13 the ruling class-"the protection of in retail outlets. The annual take Another example of party inter­ the law denied to the ordinary citi­ was over 500,000 rubles. Although ference in a criminal case involved zen" (Neznansky, p. 39).10 In prac­ the Procuracy had a solid case, the the editor of the magazine Ogonek, tice, a protected individual sus­ party would not permit the arrest of A. Sofronov, who was reported by pected of a crime cannot be ar­ several ringleaders, including the his employees for embezzling rested without party sanction, and first secretary of a district party large sums of money in the mid- often investigations are impeded, committee and the chairman of the 1970's. The evidence was irrefut­ criminal proceedings terminated, executive committee of the local able, but because Sofronov was in­ or punishment limited to discipli­ soviet. Satin himself received only volved in disseminating the party's nary action by the party. The high­ a light sentence, while 30 of his ideological line, Mikhail Suslov in­ er the rank of the individual, the lower ranking accomplices were tervened on his behalf, and the less likely it is that he will face any sentenced to terms of 10 to 15 "case took another course." In the formal juridical action, and the years (Neznansky, pp. 104-07).12 subsequent covef-up, not only did more likely it becomes that he will In another case, in the mid- the editor avoid punishment, but be dealt with on a purely intra-party 1960's, the jilted mistress of a those who had turned him in were basis. A recent example was the senior gas-industry official anony­ brought to trial (loffe, p. 199). case of Nikolay A. Shchijlokov, mously denounced her former Party instructions also orches­ long-time USSR Minister of Inter­ lover for running an extensive ex­ trate all political cases. As one nal Affairs under Brezhnev. Report­ tortion and kickback racket among regional party official noted can­ edly involved in a bribery scandal, his employees. The operation in­ didly to a roomful of judges: "Yes, Shchijlokov was dismissed from cluded discreet payoffs in the form you judges are independent and office shortly after Andropov's rise of valuable presents to two minis­ subordinate only to law. But you to power and the initiation of an ters and, through them, to Chair­ are dependent on me, are you anti-corruption campaign. The er­ man of the USSR Council of Minis­ not?" (loffe, p. 220). Further indica­ rant minister was subsequently ters Kosygin, who was, apparently tion of party involvement in politi­ subjected to party sanctions, but unaware of the scheme. cal trials can be found in the samiz­ no legal action was initiated Generally, Soviet criminal inves­ dat literature that reaches the against him (loffe, p. 199).11 tigators approach a case involving West. It is replete with accounts of Lesser party officials and highly placed individuals with con­ political cases decided according nomenk/atura appointees accused siderable trepidation (Neznansky, to party directives, which emanate of economic crimes also frequent­ p. 99). In this particular instance, more often than not from an anony­ ly escape prison as a result of par- the Moscow City procurator warned mous apparatchik. 14 Investigator his subordinate that the ministers Neznansky cites a more unusual would probably invoke their party " See also loffe, Soviet Law and Soviet Reality, p. 143, especially the "Romanov case," in which party connections. It did not matter that permission to arrest a prominent person suspected ot a an airtight case could be made. "For a similar case, the so-called Uzbek fur case, crime was denied. The Central Committee refused to see loffe, Soviet Law and Soviet Reality, pp. 105-06. " On the anti-corruption campaign, see Robert "For an analysis ot such cases, see Robert Sharie!, Sharie!, "Soviet Legal Policy under Andropov: Law and "The Communist Party and the Administration of Justice Discipline," in Joseph L. Nogee, Ed.. Soviet Politics: in the USSR," in Donald D. Barry, F.J.M. Feldbrugge, Russia After Brezhnev, New York, Praeger, 1985, "On this type ot case in general, see Gregory George Ginsburgs, and Peter B. Maggs, Eds., Soviet pp. 85-106; and on corruption in general, see Konstantin Grossman, "The 'Second Economy' ot the USSR," Law After Stalin, Vol. Ill: Soviet Institutions and the M. Simis, USSR: The Corrupt Society, New York, Simon Problems of Communism (Washington, DC). Administration of Law, Alphen aan den Rijn, The and Schuster, 1982. September-October 1977. pp. 25-40. Netherlands, Sijthoff end Noordhot, 1979, pp. 321-92.

56 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986 example-a classified case of in­ seems that it was his bad luck to in rejecting his claim against a rail ternal dissent assigned to him in have had his case adjudicated dur­ freight carrier. He later learned the late 1960's. It concerned two ing a special party-sponsored law­ that "all arbitrators are under a firm Greek Communists who had emi­ and-order campaign designed to party order not to penalize the rail­ grated to the Soviet Union several clean up Moscow before the 1980 roads" in economic disputes years earlier, but had since be­ Summer Olympic Games. Moscow (Shelley, pp. 63-64). come disillusioned and were seek­ City Party Committee First Secre­ • A regional party committee ing to leave the USSR. In the case tary and Politburo member Viktor secretly sanctioned an illegal deci­ file, Neznansky found General Sec­ Grishin had warned prosecutors sion on housing legislation by a retary Brezhnev's "personal in­ and judges that "he would person­ city soviet. A group of law pro­ structions" to press charges ally look into any cases" in which fessors asked the city prosecutor against the men for contacting the lenient sentences were handed to appeal the decision in the man­ Chinese ambassador about re-emi­ down (p. 36).16 ner provided for by Soviet law. grating to the People's Republic of As in any legal system, the vast Knowing that the party had a hand China (p. 35). majority of cases that arise in the in the matter, the wary prosecutor The party also intervenes in rou­ Soviet Union involve civil litigation declined to act (loffe, p. 42). tine criminal cases, but on a more of one kind or another. In this area, • An arbitration board imposed selective basis, and in less dra­ too, the influence of the party is a very heavy fine on an enterprise matic ways. One such instance often felt, as indicated by the for failing to fulfill its planned con­ was a 1978 case of attempted rape following: tractual obligation to a trading part­ cited by loffe. The victim, a young ner. The director of the organiza­ Leningrad woman, was rescued by • In a series of civil suits, bus tion "appealed" to the regional fellow citizens, who turned her at­ drivers in Leningrad sought com­ party committee, arguing that his tacker over to the police. The pensation from management for preoccupation with fulfilling a mili­ assailant did not deny his crime, carbon monoxide poisoning due to tary order had overridden the obli­ and it looked like an open-and-shut faulty maintenance of vehicles and gation in question. The party, in case. His father, however, was a hazardous working conditions. Be­ keeping with its standing policy of prominent law professor at Lenin­ fore the local authorities realized bailing out priority industries (such grad University-to be precise, the how many drivers had been poi­ as the railroads and the defense chairman of the Criminal Law De­ soned, the first few cases sailed sector) when management prob­ partment. The professor used his through the courts in favor of the lems arise, interceded and di­ professional connections to have plaintiffs. Faced, however, with rected the chief arbitrator to set the case terminated on a tech­ hundreds of similar compensation the case aside (Shelley, p. 72). nicality, no doubt with prior ap­ claims, the party stepped in with a • In a clearcut probate case, proval from the appropriate party secret directive forbidding any fur­ the party issued "secret instruc­ organ (p. 200).15 ther decisions against the manage­ tions" to a lower court to resolve a Party influence can serve not ment. Defense arguments there­ dispute between the heirs of a only as a mitigating factor for those after fell on deaf ears, and all famous physician in a manner that who fall under its protection, but subsequent appeals failed as party contravened the laws of inherit­ also as an aggravating circum­ instructions overrode civil equity.17 ance. On appeal, the higher courts stance for the less fortunate. Such • An enterprise counsel in implicitly deferred to the instruc­ was the experience of a Moscow Ukraine believed that the local ar­ tive law and upheld the illegal deci­ factory worker in a case described bitration board had acted illegally sion (loffe, p. 191). by Neznansky. The man committed a minor offense (petty theft), but POLITICAL LICENSE and "legal­ "Similarly, see also the "Uzbek black marketeer was given a harsh sentence out of case," pp. 88-89. In spite of blatant procedural error, all ized arbitrariness" are most blatant all proportion to the crime. It appeals failed in face of an ongoing party campaign. As in Soviet administrative law. As a senior procurator bluntly put it: "The party won't loffe points out, "most administra­ understand our overturning verdicts just because some procedural rule was broken." tive regulations are not only unpub­ 15 For a rape-murder case involving party pressure in " See Yuri Luryi, "Soviet Labor Law: New Concepts lished but even secret [i.e., classi­ the opposite direction-to get a conviction at any cost­ or Relationships?" Columbia Journal of Transnational fied]. Therefore, citizens who have see the "Case of the Two Boys," in Dina Kaminskaya, Law (New York), vol. 23, No. 2, 1985. pp. 423-24. The Final Judgment: My Life as a Soviet Defense Att-Orney, author was formerly a defense attorney at the Leningrad been ordered administratively to New York, Simon and Schuster, 1982, Part Two. bar. do or not to do something cannot 57 Books

check the legality of the orders cepted Western scholarly percep­ ist legality, consequently, extend received" (p. 205). Given the sub tion of the interrelationship be­ fully to the Communist Party.21 rosa character of administrative tween the party and law in the rules, the opportunities for covert USSR.18 It demonstrates that in its Similarly, with regard to the im­ party manipulation are legion. In penchant for intervening directly in plementation of law, the party effect, party instructive law can the legal process on behalf of its modestly acknowledges its man­ virtually reshape administrative cadres and apparatchiki or in de­ dated general supervisory role regulations at will. Two examples fense of significant regime inter­ without ever hinting at its actual ad involving university admissions ests, the party actually practices hoc interference in individual policies will suffice to illustrate this the "jurisprudence of political cases. For instance, as noted in point. expedience. "20 the mid-1970's by one party official In the mid-1960's, the Kirghiz Yet, despite this evidence of ac­ in the USSR Ministry of Justice, Party Central Committee directed tions to the contrary, the party con­ "the Party Bureau of the Ministry the republic's university to imple­ tinues to preach a doctrine of strict and the party organizations of the ment a kind of affirmative-action legality, and Soviet juridical litera­ administrations and of depart­ program to increase the enroll­ ture describes the relationship ments direct the work of commu­ ment of native women. Contrary to between the legal system and the nists, of all collaborators in further formal Soviet university procedure, party in a rather sanitized form. perfection of the organization of female Kirghiz students were to be Witness, for instance, the com­ work of the [legal] apparatus, admitted without having to take the mentary by Central Committee offi­ strengthening work discipline, im­ entrance examinations required of cial Boris Ponomar~v concerning proving auditing and verification of all other applicants, including the Constitution's assertion that the execution of policy, and raising young women of other nationalities "all party organizations operate the personal responsibility of every resident in the republic. In fact, within the framework of the USSR worker for the work assigned" (The however, examinations were a Constitution": Soviet Legal System, pp. 39-42).22 mere formality, notes loffe, since To be sure, the party usually all the vacancies had been allo­ The proposition set forth in para­ does confine itself to a supervisory cated beforehand to the children of graph 3 of Article 6 means that the role over legal institutions. To do the ruling elite "according to vari­ party organizations in the first otherwise would be impractical ous secret instructions" (pp. 42-43, place shall not replace state and would leave its "leading role" 214-15). A decade later, in the organs, and secondly shall not vio­ in the Soviet system in shambles, mid-1970's, the Leningrad regional late the Constitution and legislative since direct intervention in specific party organization issued secret in­ acts enacted in accordance with it. cases can be very time-consuming structions mandating a discrimina­ The central party organs may, of tor party officials and organiza­ tory admissions policy at Lenin­ course, find it necessary to intro­ tions already burdened with mani­ grad University, by ordering cer­ duce changes and additional provi­ fold other responsibilities. Thus, tain faculties, including law, not to sions into legislation and issue line party organizations generally admit "Jews, half-Jews, or persons corresponding statements to this seek to exercise control by setting who looked Jewish" (loffe, p. 39).18 effect addressed to deputies of the the broad policy parameters within Supreme Soviets- to communists, which legal institutions operate, THE INSIDE VIEW of the Soviet and to communists who work in the while staff party committees in legal system offered by former highest state organs, but until the those institutions strive to ensure Soviet jurists clearly illustrates the law has been altered or abrogated, general compliance. strong impact of politics on Soviet all party organizations must con­ law and supports the generally ac- form to it. The principles of social- " Hazard. Butler, and Maggs. The Soviet Legal System, p. 36; the volume provides a compilation and translation of useful selections of laws and "John Hazard probably speaks for most specialists commentaries on all aspects of the Soviet legal process. "On the method of rigging entrance exams for the on Soviet law when he writes: "Politics run like a red For some additional discussion of Art. 6, see also loffe, purpose of discriminating against Jewish applicants to thread through the institutions of Soviet law ... ," Soviet Law and Soviet Reality, p. 202. Soviet universities, see Grigori Freiman, It Seems I Am a Managing Change, p. 12. "For an analysis of supervision as opposed to Jew: A Samizdat Essay, trans. by M. B. Nathanson, ,. Robert Sharie!, "Varieties of Dissent and interference in the party relationship to the Soviet legal Carbondale, IL, Southern Illinois University Press, 1980, Regularities of Repression in the European Communist system, see R. Sharie!, "The Communist Party and the esp. Ch. 3. The author writes about his experiences as a States," in Jsne L. Curry, Ed., Dissent In Eastern Administration of Justice in the USSR," loc. cit., Soviet mathematics professor. Europe, New York, Praeger, 1983, esp. pp. 12-14. esp. pp. 338-80.

58 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986

As a result, in the great majority vantage points are diff er~mt- Haz­ this has been achieved in the sixty­ of instances involving neither a ard writing as an informed and ex­ odd years of Soviet history. Pro­ protected person nor a pressing peri!Slnced Western observer and duction has lagged; productivity political priority, Neznansky ob­ loffe as a former practitioner of has been low; conflict exists in serves, "justice for the ordinary Soviet law-their views coincide society; deviance is punished citizen in the USSR has lost much on three fundamental issues. severely; the legal system has of the arbitrariness of the Stalin era First, both are in agreement on been developed along conven­ and is most closely determined by the dominant role of the party in tional Romanist tines; administra­ the objective standards of formal the Soviet system in general, and tive regulations have multiplied, to law" (p. 39). Soviet legal literature in the legal system in particular. As be enforced with coercive meas­ .abounds in cases in which the Hazard has noted: "The conclusion ures; and laws have had to punish post-Stalin rules of due process for cannot be avoided that, if there is "parasites" tor refusing to work and both criminal and civil cases have any principle that communists hold nonconformists for departing from been maintained and/or enforced sacred and which they will defend. the principles established by the through higher court review (The at all costs, it is the Communist Communist Party in its Code of Soviet Legal System, Chs. 7 and 8). Party's monopoly rule" (Managing Morals. (Managing Change, p. 169) Moreover, in most of the dis­ Change, p. 11). Second, both agree putes that parties choose to bring that the party has come increas­ For his part, loffe has in view to state arbitration, Louise Shel­ ingly to rely on law as a means of primarily the period since Stalin, in ley's respondents report, state ar­ control and governance, steadily which he sees a series of profound bitrators carry out their duties with bringing more and more relation­ contradictions between the theory a high degree of legal professional­ ships and activities within the pur­ and the practice of Soviet law. ism (pp. 49-52, 69-71).23 However, view of the country's legal codes. while the state arbitrator's deci­ In loffe's words: "Year after year sions are usually based on objec­ legal regulations are becoming ment over the function of law and tive legal criteria, they are fre­ more and more widespread in the the role of the jurist in the Soviet quently difficult to execute due to, country" (p. 16).24 system. These differences are fur­ among other things, the rigidities Third, Hazard and loffe are in ther magnified by the fact that loffe of the centrally planned Soviet accord on the existence of signifi­ is drawing on past experience economy. Thus, in practice-as a cant gaps between reality and law while Hazard is looking to the means of coping with the struc­ in the USSR. Hazard notes a major future. tural defects in the economic sys­ disjunction in looking back over the For loffe, Soviet law is essential­ tem - enterprise di rectors often span of Soviet legal history: ly a relatively static order-mainte­ avoid the legal process by resort­ nance system aimed at maximiz­ ing to "informal rules," a "set of The communists of 1917 promised ing the party's power over society mores [or] unwritten laws" that much: abundance; social tranquili­ and protecting the "state's position have evolved in the interstices be­ .ty; a society that would require no of economic monopolist" (p. 13). tween the party's instructive law coercion; international proletarian He repeatedly uses the metaphor and the formal law of the state brotherhood; a legal system that of the mask, describing Soviet law (Neznansky, p. 37). would favor the working man and as "legislative camouflage" or "a eventually wither away, to be re­ disguising mask" that serves as a IN THE BOOKS reviewed here, placed by a non-coercive set of ad­ "practical cover for arbitrariness" some broader perspectives on the ministrative regulations and a thor­ (pp. 85, 177, 218). The pervasive interplay between politics and law oughly absorbed sense of social image is one of law as a shroud in the Soviet Union are presented obligation that would stimulate stifling political and economic ini­ by John Hazard, long the doyen of citizens to perform duties because tiative that does not conform to Soviet legal studies in the West, they understood their importance prescribed party norms. and by Olimpiad loffe, for many to community we/I-being. None of For Hazard, Soviet law is primar­ years the preeminent civil law spe­ ily a dynamic instrument in the cialist in the USSR. Although their party's hands for shaping the " See also Robert Sharie!, "Constitutional socioeconomic environment and lmplementatibn and the Juridicization ot the Soviet "See also Hazard. Butler and Maggs, The Soviet System," in Donald A. Kelley, Ed.. Soviet Politics in the moulding the Soviet citizen in the Legal System, Ch. 14. Brezhnev Era. New York. Praeger. 1980, pp. 200-234. desired image. The dominant

59 Books

theme of Hazard's past work has For Hazard, the situation in the vision of Soviet law will prevail­ been the linkage between law and contemporary USSR presents a loffe's pessimistic forecast, or social change in the USSR and in very different picture. In his view, Hazard's optimistic scenario. Over Soviet-type systems.25 As he con­ the hegemonic role of the party in 20 years ago, a prominent Soviet templates the future development the Soviet system is being eroded law professor suggested that law­ of the Soviet system, the prevailing as a consequence of the moderni­ yers could be of help in the legisla­ image is one of jurisprudence as a zation of Soviet society. The party tive process, but only if they were policy science for "managing is no longer firmly in control of the "brave enough to say 'no' when change" through "the orderly pro­ course of events as the USSR ap­ necessary." The proposal had little cedures of law" (Managing proaches the slippery downslope impact then on the party's legal Change, p. 47). to the "post-industrial era" with its policy, and it cost the professor his As one might expect, loffe's and unforeseeable problems. The Pol­ position (loffe, p. 171). Will it be Hazard's divergent conceptions of ish crisis, triggered by a failure to any different now under Gorba­ Soviet law rest on very different meet consumer needs, is recog­ chev? Will jurists play a significant perceptions of political and eco­ nized by Soviet leaders as a possi­ role in shaping the Soviet future, or nomic reality in the USSR. To loffe, ble harbinger of a general crisis of will they continue to simply carry the "appropriate criterion" for state socialism, and they are out party instructions? The safe bet economic efficiency is the degree haunted by the "spectre of unman­ would be to await the implementa­ to which the present economic ageab I e change" (Managing tion of the resolutions adopted at structure sustains the political Change, p. 1). the 27th CPSU Congress (to be dominance of the state, and not In Hazard's opinion, the road to held in February 1986) before ven­ the degree to which it ensures the salvation for the USSR lies in the turing any answers to such ques­ material well-being of society. ongoing "scientific and technologi­ tions. Yet, if past experience is any From this point of view, he argues, cal revolution," which in turn must guide, odds are that many years the partyO'leadership has made the be accompanied by managerial in­ will pass before legality overcomes economy work splendidly as the novation, beginning with "rethink­ political expediency in the Soviet source of its dictatorship." loffe ing the unthinkable" - the role and Union. concludes that, given the nature of methods "of the Communist Party the Soviet political system, there is itself." He suggests that the Soviet no hope that law could serve as a leadership may be on the threshold " See also Ch. 4 in passing. The Soviet legal press regulatory agent for reforming the of enhancing the "politico-legal" has been relatively silent since Gorbachev's accession about what future role the jurist might play. Supportive economy without weakening state role of the legally educated party of Hazard's projection is a recent lead article "Juridical power.26 member working alongside the. Science: Planning, Multi-faceted Approaches. and economist and the engineer in Integration," Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo (Moscow). managing the inevitable process of August 1985, pp. 3-12. On the parts to be played by "See John N. Hazard, Law and Social Change in the Soviet law and jurists in the scientific-technical 27 USSR. London, Stevens, 1953; and Hazard, Communists change (Managing Change, p. 43). revolution, see Robert Shariat "STA, Party Policy, and and Their Law. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. Ultimately, of course, Gorba­ Socialist Law," in Gordon B. Smith, Peter B. Maggs, and 1969. chev (himself a lawyer-politician, George Ginsburgs, Eds.. Soviet and East European Law "See loffe, "Law and Economy in the USSR," loc. and the Scientific-Technical Revolution, New York, cit., pp. 1624-25. as was Lenin) will determine which Pergamon, 1981, pp. 47-77.

60 LastStages of Leninism

Melvin Croan

ALAIN BESANCON. The Rise of Durham, NC, Duke University with the Soviet system, and as an the Gulag: Intellectual Origins of Press, 1985. amalgam of corrupt philosophy Leninism. New York, The Con­ and debased religion, now perma­ STEPHEN F. COHEN. Sovieticus: tinuum Publishing Corporation, nently wed to the colossus of American Perceptions and Soviet 1981. power it called forth. Although he Realities. New York and London, devotes many chapters in his The GUY HERMET, Ed. Totalitarismes. Norton, 1985. Rise of the Gulag to unearthing the Paris, Economica, 1984. STEPHEN F. COHEN. Rethinking Russian roots of Leninism, Besan- CARL A. LINDEN. The Soviet the Soviet Experience: Politics 9on is insistent that Leninism has Party-State: The Politics of and History Since 1917. New to be understood as a chiliastic ldeocratic Despotism. New York, York, Oxford University Press, ideology, whose origins can be Praeger Publishers, 1983. 1985. traced back to Gnosticism and Manichaeism and whose preten­ ERIK P. HOFFMANN and TIMOTHY J. COLTON. The Dilem­ sions remain truly universalistic. ROBBIN F. LAIRD. Technocratic ma of Reform in the Soviet Union. Comparing the development of ide­ Socialism: The Soviet Union in New York, Council on Foreign ology to the different stages of the the Advanced Industrial Era. Relations, 1984. growth of parasites, he treats Leninism as the outgrowth of an AN OLD SAYING has it that who­ lenge of change. Will Mikhail Gor­ inchoate French cycle and a more ever is incapable of change lacks bachev put the USSR on the road developed German cycle, the lat­ the means of self-preservation. to change? How far will it be able ter involving successive mutations This adage applies not only to in­ to move forward in the face of for­ of Hegelianism by Marx and En­ dividuals, but to countries as well. midable institutional and ideolog­ gels. Leninism for him is the final The Soviet Union today stands at a ical obstacles? mutation of all of its antecedents crossroads where the very survival The volumes under review here and constitutes a complete ideol­ of its system may be at stake be­ deal with many different aspects of ogy unto itself. The clear implica­ cause recent leaders have failed to the Soviet experience. Yet all of tion is that Leninism as an ideology deal with the most basic problem them can be read with an eye to has little in common with Russian facing the Soviet Union -the chal- the conundrum of change. Further­ national traditions. Yet, it took root more, in one way or another, each because "civil society in Russia study broaches the crucial ques­ suffered, with regard to the state, Melvin Croan is Professor of tion of the future of Marxism­ from a congenital weakness," Political Science, University of Leninism - the system's ideolog­ writes Besan9on, and because the Wisconsin (Madison) and author of ical lodestar-or, to put the accent cultural environment was not suf­ numerous works on the Soviet where it rightly belongs, the future ficiently varied, vigorous, and Union and Eastern Europe, with a of Leninism. diverse "to combat and eliminate" particular emphasis on East Ger­ this ideology, as occurred in many. He is currently working on a ALAIN BESANCON, a French spe­ France and Germany. For Besan- study of bureaucratic socialism cialist on Russian history, sees 9on, this explains why "neither in and its critics. Leninism as virtually synonymous France nor in Germany could an 61 Books

ideology have been established as ed to explain. What the critics tion." Exploring the political theory simple, as complete, as fortified overlooked was that the concept of of representation in terms of the and as organized as the Russian totalitarianism constituted less a relationship between civil society ideology" (pp. 105 and 104). tool for empirical micro-analysis and the state, Manent's rich, dia­ Besan,;:on's view of Leninism as than an expression of moral con­ lectical discussion adds true philo­ alien to Russian national traditions cern in the grand tradition of sophical depth to the subject of the is similar to that of Alexander political philosophy. state's absorption of civil society, Solzhenitsyn, whom Besan,;:onad­ This and many other important considered by most contributors to mires as an exemplar of the virtue points are cogently argued by this volume to be the hallmark of of pure truth which, he firmly be­ Pierre Hassner in his insightful totalitarianism. lieves, must eventually prevail over contribution ("Totalitarianism ideological falsehood. Viewed From the West") to the IN HIS BOOK, The Soviet Party­ According to Besan,;:on, Lenin­ volume on "totalitarianisms" (note State, Carl Linden, who previously ism presently holds sway not be­ the plural]}, edited by Guy Hermet. proposed a "conflict model" of cause it conveys conviction, but The publication of this book in Soviet politics in lieu of the total­ because it manifests power. As he Paris at a time when controversies itarian approach,3 returns to the puts it, "All the reality of ideology is about the concept of totalitarian­ fray with the concept of "ideocratic concentrated in the exercise of ism have all but subsided in the despotism." Borrowed-with due power" (p. 289). Yet, precisely Anglo-Saxon world 1 is itself note­ acknowledgement- from Nicholas because this is true of Leninism, worthy as a manifestation of the Berdayev, the term "ideocratic" is the Soviet system is incapable of dramatic shift of Left Bank intel­ meant to convey the primacy of change and, Besan,;:onconcludes, lectual attitudes away from an ideology, "a secular analogue to is doomed to immobilism and des­ earlier enchantment with Soviet­ theocracy with its close tying of tined to be swept away by an evolv­ style socialism. The greater the ideas as dogma and power" (p. xii) ing reality that Leninism cannot pity, therefore, that the chapter on In the ensuing discussion, Linden even begin to comprehend. the Soviet Union, written by Alek­ stresses the Leninist input, but he In many respects, Besan,;:on's sander Smolar, should have largely also feels that original Marxism treatment of Leninism as an ideol­ failed to answer the question, must be regarded as "an active, ogy intermeshed with power is "transformation or degeneration?" not inert, ingredient in the political bound to call to mind Hannah posed by its title. 2 However, in chemistry that produced the first Arendt's classic study, The Origins general, the volume sustains a fair­ ideocratic party state" (p. x and Ch. of Totalitarianism, a veritable tour ly high standard of analysis; in 1). This Soviet party-state, accord­ de force that related the pursuit addition to Hassner's excellent ing to Linden, claims to be mono­ and exercise of unlimited power to presentation, and two brief but lithic, but it actually suffers from considerations of intellectual his­ thoughtful epilogues authored by the factional politics that Linden tory, social decay, economic dislo­ Juan Linz and Richard Lowenthal deems to be inherent in ideocratic cation, and, above all else, abnor­ (two non-French students of the rule. mal political psychology. Arendt subject}, special mention should Soviet "crypto-politics," to use held the "essence" of totalitarian­ be made of Pierre Manent's contri­ T.H. Rigby's apt designation,4 has ism to be terror, prefigured by the bution, "Totalitarianism and the produced few real heroes, yet relentless compulsion to impose Problem of Political Representa- Linden comes close to treating the fictitious world of ideology Nikita Khrushchev as one. Despite upon a recalcitrant reality. Her the many contradictions in the work- indeed, the notion of total­ 1 For a recent discussion of these controversies, see policies of this former Soviet itarianism itself-received much Walter Laqueur. ··1s There Now, or Has There Ever leader, Linden gives him relatively Been, Such a Thing as Totalitarianism?" Commentary high marks for at least attempting criticism from various quarters. (New York). October 1985. pp. 29-35. Many political scientists, and some ' Long-time readers of this journal will recognize the to ameliorate despotism, and for historians, contended that theories title as having been borrowed from Zbigniew Brzezinski's article. "The Soviet Political System: of totalitarianism could not be Transformation or Degeneration?" Problems of ' Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet "operationalized," and that they Communism (Washington. DC), January-February 1966. Leadership. 1957-1964. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins served to obfuscate, rather than to Brzezinski's essay was reprinted along with the Press. 1966. pp. 1-9. commentaries that it engendered in Zbigniew Brzezinski, • T.H. Rigby, ··crypto-Politics." in Frederic J. Fleron, clarify the actual experiences of Ed., Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics, New York, Jr., Ed.. Communist Studies and the Social Sciences, the regimes that they were suppos- Columbia University Press, 1969. Chicago. Rand McNally, 1969, pp. 116-28.

62 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986 shifting "the party's focus from tion of official Marxism-Leninism. Introducing himself as a revi­ ideocratic to mundane economic At the same time, they emphasize sionist among Sovietologists, managerial functions" (p. xi and that the new, authoritarian order, Cohen proceeds to attack most of Ch. 5). By contrast, he judges which they designate as "techno­ the "conventional wisdom" of pre­ Leonid Brezhnev to have strength­ cratic socialism," constitutes an eminent scholars in the field. He in­ ened the coercive and repressive orientation of the top elite that has dicts the Western -and, particu­ features of the Soviet system, with yet to become "an integral part of larly, the American - scholarly per­ the objective of reimposing a pure­ bureaucratic behavior or mass po­ ception of the Soviet system. This ly despotic relationship between litical culture" (p. 198). This elite, does not mean that he holds any the rulers and the ruled. Yet, as according to the evidence so as­ brief for the Soviet system, at least Linden makes clear in his tantaliz­ siduously marshalled by Hoffmann not for the form that it has taken ing- if rather disjointed-discus­ and Laird, has always harbored since Stalin's rise to power. Yet, sion of "repressed political poten­ deep-seated reservations about while Cohen sees the evident de­ tials" (Ch. 4), he believes that the opening up decision-making proc­ fects of the system, he seems to regime's ideocratic foundations esses to anything resembling real believe that just about everything will be subject to an ever-increas­ participation by the lower eche­ objectionable about the Soviet ing challenge from below, espe­ lons. Therefore, the authors' at­ experience can be blamed on the cially from various Russian na­ tempt to sift through official pro­ West. What he fails to acknowl­ tionalist currents. "In the not dis­ nouncements so as to pinpoint edge is that absolving the Soviet tant future," Linden writes, the conservative, reformist, and cen­ regime of virtually all responsibility Soviet leadership will have to con­ trist positions within the elite for its conduct at home and abroad front a stark choice between insti­ seems contrived. Moreover, it also is, as Richard Pipes has sug­ tuting "a basic change in its man­ tends to deflect attention away gested, tantamount to holding Rus­ ner of rule" or else risking "an from one of their more basic sia itself in deep contempt. 6 upheaval" (p. 158). points, namely, that the primary What is the course Soviet his­ objective of Soviet theorizing thus tory might have taken had the HOW THE KREMLIN has sought to far has been to devise more effec­ West shown the Soviet Union a full obviate such unpalatable alter­ tive means for formulating and im­ measure of "understanding"? natives is the subject of Techno­ plementing policy from the top Cohen, who is also the author of a cratic Socialism, coauthored by down, and for fashioning more highly sympathetic biography of Erik Hoffmann and Robbin Laird. streamlined methods of political Nikolay Bukharin,7 consistently This study, the final volume in a control over society. argues the possibility of a non­ trilogy, 5 presents a comprehensive Stalinist alternative. His might­ summation of recent Soviet think­ TO TURN FROM Hoffmann and have-been scenario centers on the ing on policy-making, politics, and Laird's highly informative-but blossoming of the New Economic progress under conditions of ad­ ultimately inconclusive-study to Policy (NEP, 1921-28) which vanced industrialism. The authors Stephen Cohen's two recent books allegedly Bukharin would have argue that the concept of "devel­ is to experience initial delight that championed and nurtured until it oped" or "mature" socialism, un­ quickly turns to distress. Both had developed into something ap­ veiled under Brezhnev, together Sovieticus, a collection of topical proximating full-scale market with various corollary constructs commentaries that appeared in socialism with a human face. This involving "the scientific-technolog­ The Nation magazine, and Rethink­ historical fantasy has to be predi­ ical revolution" and "the scientific ing the Soviet Experience, a more cated either on the view that management of society," comprise substantial academic disquisition, Leninism is substantially more a distinct, Soviet ideology of ad­ are written with sustained verve. open-ended and open-minded than vanced modernization and, there­ Each is predicated upon the com­ the burden of the available fore, signify a pragmatic adapta- mendable supposition that politics and history comprise a single sub­ • Richard Pipes, ··u.s.and Them," The New Republic ject of study. Unfortunately, both (Washington, DC), Oct. 14, 1985, p. 34. For Cohen's rejoinder to Pipes, which seems to sidestep Pipes's ' The two earlier volumes were The Politics of the historical interpretations point about holding Russia "in deep contempt," see his Economic Modernization in the Soviet Union, Ithaca, NY, Cohen ventures and the political letter, "Cohen on Pipes," ibid., Feb. 3, 1986, p. 42. Cornell University Press, 1982; and The Scientific­ arguments he advances turn out to 'Stephen F. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Technological Revolution and Soviet Foreign Policy, Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888-1938. New York, Elmsford, NY, Pergamon Press. 1982. be seriously flawed. Alfred Knopf, 1973.

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evidence allows us to believe, or domestic reform than the detente leadership headed by Gorbachev else on the contention that "Bol­ he advocates. In any event, it seems bent on precisely the shevism was larger and more di­ would be fool hearty for the West to course charted by Colton. It re­ verse than Lenin and Leninism" sacrifice its own legitimate inter­ mains to be seen whether the lim­ (Rethinking the Soviet Experience, ests for a chimerical pursuit of ited initiatives undertaken thus far p. 49). domestic change in the Soviet by this leadership will lead to any But what would a non-Leninist Union over which, pace Professor wider ranging measures, and type of Bolshevism really amount Cohen, it can never hope to exert whether they will produce the de­ to, if not a blatant contradiction in decisive influence. sired results. Colton forecasts terms? And even if one were, for potentially dire consequences, argument's sake, to deem such a A MUCH MORE SOPHISTICATED shou Id resurgent conservative concoction feasible, would it have approach to the basic issues of forces obstruct change or, in his been politically viable? Further­ change in the Soviet system is pro­ words, if "bungled reforms come to more, would Bukharin necessarily vided by Timothy Colton in The naught" (p. 79). have been the right person to lead Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet the experiment? Finally, would a Union. This thought-provoking, IS THE SOVIET UNION, then, on Bukharinite Soviet Russia have in­ short book, conceived as an the verge of an existential crisis? exorably progressed toward the "essay" for a "general audience," Clearly Besanc;:on and Linden, as democratic, yet developmental, manages to review the legacy of well as other observers, feel that socialism of Cohen's imagination? the Brezhnev period, diagnose the this may well be the case. 8 Colton, These are all questions that the ailments of the Soviet system, ex­ for his part, alludes to the possibil­ author has studiously avoided amine the emergent ruling elite, ity of a "crisis of legitimacy" in the because, given the nature of the explore various options for 1990's in the event of a miscar­ case, they are unanswerable. change, and consider the relation­ riage of "moderate reform," but re­ Cohen is deliberately equivocal ship between foreign affairs and jects the thesis that the survival of with regard to the prospects for domestic policy-all in a scant 100 the Soviet system is presently at change in the contemporary Soviet pages. Though admirably concise, stake, and cautions against an un­ system. On the one hand, he envi­ Colton's study is full of insights, derestimation of the rulers' re­ sions the emergence of a "coali­ and is so tightly argued throughout, sources and an exaggeration of tion for change" composed of both that no brief summary can substi­ their problems. From his exten­ reformers and conservatives with­ tute for the actual reading of the sive, although by no means ex­ in the ruling elite. In his view, this text itself. Suffice it to note only haustive, list of Soviet ailments, coalition would draw strength from that Colton foresees the Kremlin Colton singles out economic stag­ many sources, including the offi­ opting for a course of "moderate nation as the most likely source of cial ideology's promise of a better reform," which he defines as: serious trouble in the longer term. future, and its commitment to "the On the opposite side of the ledger, very idea, desirability, and inexor­ a strategy of controlled change he notes such features as societal ability of change" (Rethinking the somewhere between radical and inertness, patriotic pride, and the Soviet Experience, p. 152). Lest minimal reform. Its focus would be like, calling special attention to the anyone suppose that such an os­ on public policy and the machinery entrenched power of the ruling tensibly significant asset could as­ needed to fulfill change, not on elite and the elaborate network of sure the triumph of reformism, basic institutions and beliefs. controls that it commands. "Al­ Cohen- consistent to the very end Hence it falls well short of radical though some controls can be modi- -protests that reform will be a lost reform. But, unlike minimal reform, cause unless the West adopts con­ the change involved will pose a

ciliatory policies toward the Soviet challenge to some established • See, for example, Ernst Kux, "Contradictions in Union. This, of course, is neither groups and thereby generate con­ Soviet Socialism," Problems of Communism, November­ self-evident nor demonstrable. In troversy and conflict. (p. 63) December 1984, pp. 1-27; and R.V. Burks, "The Coming Crisis in the Soviet Union," in Morton A. Kaplan and fact, competitive East-West rela­ Alexander Shtromas, Eds .. The Prospects for tions, including perhaps the ten­ His prediction appears to be Transformation in the Soviet Union, New York, sions and crises Cohen so decries, remarkably accurate. Having Professors World Peace Academy. forthcoming. Burks argues that "the chances of system breakdown in the could well prove to be a much come to power after these words Soviet Union within the next five to ten years are greater incentive to Soviet were written, the new Kremlin probably better than even."

64 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986 tied," he asserts, "no present or to which it has given rise. The lat­ milieu of Leninism. Contrary to foreseeable Soviet leader will ter has spawned the nomenk/a­ Besanc;on's opinion, the psych­ tamper with the basic authoritarian tura, a monstrous labyrinth of ology of Leninism is deeply em­ credo of Leninism" (p. 59).9 preferment, patronage, and priv­ bedded in the millennial Russian This is, in fact, precisely the rub. ilege. Its beneficiaries, now num­ historical experience and unfail­ Viewed in retrospect, Leninism bering close to several million per­ ingly conjures up the specter of must surely be ranked as one of sons, constitute something of a anarchy at the mere suggestion the most powerful and durable class unto themselves that mani­ of any dimunition of centralized ideological/political forces of the fests a highly developed sense of authority. 20th century. As a technique for vested interest in self-preserva­ Last but by no means least, there the seizure of power and the main­ tion.12It is one thing for Gorbach~v is the matter of the "scientific­ tenance of control in backward to replace top-ranking Brezhnev­ technological revolution." It is dif­ areas of the world, it knows no era gerontocrats, or to remove in­ ficult to agree with Hoffmann and rival. It is also unsurpassed in its competent individuals along the_ Laird that the Soviet system is suc­ proven ability to foster social line; it would be an entirely dif­ cessfully mastering its impera­ mobilization and political institu­ ferent matter for any Soviet leader tives. To be sure, the Soviet lead­ tionalization simultaneously, there­ to excise the entire bureaucratic ers would like to borrow selectively by escaping the kind of premature excrescence. After all, the nomen­ from advanced technology for their decay of power experienced by klatura is a key factor contributing own special purposes, namely, other revolutionary regimes.10 All to the regime's stability, even finding better methods of planning, told, it has proved remarkably suc­ though it is also a major compo­ administration, and political con­ cessful in carrying through its own nent of systemic stasis. trol. In other words, the Kremlin highly distinctive strategy of "polit­ Reforms that may eventually would like nothing more than to ically forced development."11 But lead to a relaxation of controls in modernize Leninism. But its aspira­ can this very same Leninism also order to introduce some measure tions in this regard seem doomed adjust to the unintended conse­ of genuine popular participation­ to disappointment. Despite the quences of what it has wrought? to say nothing of any broadly Orwellian nightmare of a technol­ Can it cope effectively with the gauged marketization of the Soviet ogized totalitarianism, the "third fundamental political challenges economy-pose a somewhat dif­ industrial revolution" may actually posed by novel developments that ferent, though related problem. As enhance the realm of freedom. fall beyond the conceptual grasp of Linden reminds us, Leninism pro­ Whichever way this may turn out, its parochial Weltanschauung?The vides no "practical wisdom" about advanced technology, particularly odds against the requisite trans­ how to delimit, devolve, or distrib­ the computer revolution and the mogrification of Leninist theory ute power. Indeed, all of its in­ concomitant information explo­ and practice appear well-nigh grained, antidemocratic reflexes, sion, threatens to burst the con­ overwhelming. rooted in Lenin's profound distrust straints of Leninism. The Soviet Consider, in the first instance, of the masses and reinforced by leaders appear only too cognizant Leninism's elitist conception of the Soviet party-state's jealous of this fact; the resultant quandary "democratic centralism" and the monopolization of the many per­ constitutes a significant factor politics of administrative command quisites of power, militate against contributing to the Soviet Union's the very possibility of such change. growing technological lag vis-a-vis As if that were not enough, there the West.

• Warning against wishful thinking in the West remains the factor of the cultural In the final analysis, the relation­ concerning Gorbachev, the astute columnist. George F. ship between Leninism and legiti­ Will, recently remarked that "any Soviet leader has been macy is what lies at the very heart thoroughly marinated in the ideology that legitimates " For an ex-insider's firsthand experience of the him." "Abolishing the 20th Century," Newsweek (New nomenklatura system, see Mikhail Voslensky, of the dilemma of change in the York), Dec. 9, 1985. p. 104. Nomenklatura: Gospodstvyyushchiy klass Sovetskogo Soviet Union. On the one hand, the "A seminal analysis of these issues was first offered Soyuza, London, Overseas Publications, 1984. The changes that seem essential for by Samuel P. Huntington. "Political Development and recent translation into English of Voslensky's informative Political Decay," World Politics (Princeton, NJ), April. and Insightful book. published by Doubleday as the survival of the Soviet system in 1965. pp. 386-430. Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class. is from the the long run remain improbable if " See Richard Lowenthal, "Development vs. Utopia in German edition and contains numerous misrenderings of crucial Leninist tenets are not Communist Policy," in Chalmers Johnson. Ed .. Change Soviet political terminology. See the discussion of in Communist Systems, Stanford. Stanford University Voslensky's book by Peter Reddaway. "'More Equal Than abandoned. On the other hand, the Press. 1970. Others." The New Republic. Dec. 2, 1985, pp. 28-31. discarding of the doctrinal founda-

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tions of Leninism would obviously Soviet scene all but played out, been exacted in its name during undermine the Soviet party-state's Leninism may well be no longer the course of the present century, claim to legitimacy. Either way, the around in the 21st century in any Leninism's impending demise, last stage of Leninism appears to presently recognizable guise. Con- whenever it occurs, should occa­ be at hand. Its historical role on the sidering the human toll that has sion no lament.

66 Limitsof CriticalMarxism

Vladimir Tismaneanu

FERENC FEHER, AGNES GEORGE KONRAD. Antipolitics. unacknowledged irrational voca­ HELLER, and GYORGY MARKUS. San Diego, New York, London, tion. In this sense at least, Dictatorship over Needs. New Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Leninism was a legitimate off. York, St. Martin's Press, 1983. 1984. spring of the original doctrine, and Antonio Gramsci was perfectly FERENC FEHER and AGNES OSKAR GRUENWALD. The right in attributing to Lenin St. HELLER. Hungary 1956 Revisited. Yugoslav Search tor Man: Marxist Paul's role in the expansion and in· The Message of a Revolution -A Humanism in Contemporary stitutionallzation of an otherwise Quarter of a Century After. Lon­ Yugoslavia. South Hadley, MA, esoteric creed. Lenin and Trotsky don, George Allen & Unwin, 1983. Bergin & Garvey, 1983. were the initiators of a new prac­ tice of philosophy, and their com­ mitment to the use of terror against · "MARXISM has been the greatest ly skeptical Western intellectuals. the "enemies of the Revolution" fantasy of our century." 1 Thus From Georg Lukacs to Lucien was a prelude to Stalin's ultimate Leszek Kolakowski characterized Goldmann, from Max Horkheimer bastardization of historical mate­ the mythical ambivalence of his­ to Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice rialism. In the words of Milovan torical materialism, its intrinsic Merleau-Ponty, historical materi· Djilas: utopian dimension and longing for alism functioned as a metaphys­ a new foundation of reality. Unlike ical source, a shield against the the dominant streak in Lenin's other theologies, Marxism was liberal temptation and an invitation character and political practice able to deter for many decades the to that mystical drama that was a ruthless will to coerce, dic­ emergence of a sense of critical Hegelians called "the advent of the tate, and subjugate. Stalin's terror questioning, and to nourish pas­ realm of freedom." The promise of and Stalin's tyranny are unmistak­ sionate, even fanatical, emotional total subjective emancipation - ably foreshadowed by Leninism. 2 attachments on the part of normal- the generous Messianic dream, rooted in German idealism and Contemporary Marxism pre­ French Jacobinism- represented sents a bewildering proliferation of Vladimir Tismaneanu, who receiv· the precondition for the conversion nee-Marxist, "critical," or even ed his Ph.D. from the University of of Marxism into an intolerant peda­ "post-critical" schools, many of Bucharest, is Hooper Fellow in In­ gogy, a dogmatic attempt to trans­ them unequivocally opposed to au· ternational Security Affairs at the cend the limits of the human condi· thoritarian regimes of the Soviet Foreign Policy Research Institute tion and to challenge the ethical type. Praxis -the process by (Philadelphia). His articles on prescriptions that had guaranteed revolutionary ideologies have ap­ the continuity of European Intellec­ peared in Orbis, Praxis Interna­ tual and political history. 'Leszek Kolakowski, ""Marxism-A Summing Up,00 tional, Survey; and Telos. He has Survey(London), Summer 1977-78, p. 165; and Although Marxism has never Sidney Hook, Mancismand Beyond,Totowa, NJ, completed a study on the Latin been a monolithic entity, expo­ Rowmanand Llttlefleld, 1983, pp. 54·72 (an excellent American radical left and is work­ nents of its diverse "orthodox" and assessment of Kolakowski·s contribution to the ing on a book on the ideological demystification of Marxism). "heretic" directions have all shared • George Urban, "A Conversationwith Mllovan crisis of Soviet-type regimes. a certain rebellious instinct, an Ojllas,00 Encounter(London), December 1979, p. 11.

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which, according to Hegelian­ veil of Marxist "false conscious­ nonetheless anchored in the same Marxist dialectics, the subject and ness." Nevertheless, these one­ intellectual matrix they wish to object of history are supposed to time "pupils" of Lukacs continue to overcome. They prove incapable become one-has regained its ab­ insist on the relevance of the Marx­ of scrutinizing the immanent pa­ stract and speculative content. ian paradigm for the comprehen­ thology of historical materialism, of This is particularly true of the East sion of authoritarian-bureaucratic questioning its humanist preten­ European critical philosophy of systems. They persevere in in­ tions, of introducing the criterion of resistance, an intellectual current vesting their emotional capital in praxis into their assessment of its that emerged as "humanist revi­ the humanist potential of the Marx­ contemporary hypostases. Yet, sionism" in the wake of Nikita ist dialectic, although they are genuine post-Marxist critical Khrushchev's secret de-Staliniza­ perfectly well aware that Stalinist philosophy-of which the Buda­ tion speech at the 20th Congress and neo-Stalinist appropriation of pest School is in some sense a har­ of the CPSU.3 Georg Lukacs and historical materialism cannot but binger- must elaborate theses Ernst Bloch were the towering frustrate and severely compromise directly refuting the frozen axioms figures who inspired the theoret­ their own endeavor. The political­ of historical materialism. In an ical awakening of East-Central philosophical discourse of their ironic twist, these disciples of Max Europe's critical Marxist intel­ book remains rooted in a certain Weber's once most promising dis­ ligentsia. For a generation of dis­ type of "existential" Marxism. In ciple- Lukacs- need to redis­ enchanted social philosophers, other words, the authors base cover the tension between reason there were new illusions, new themselves on a Fichtean revolt and unreason and embark on a metaphysical dreams, brought into against "reality" and claim, in good thoroughgoing critique of political being during the painstaking op­ Hegelian tradition, that they would ratio itself. eration of restoring intellectual attain some "truer" reality beyond sovereignty. The early Marx was the present, spurious one. NO MORALISTIC indictment of invoked as an ally against the posi­ The members of the Budapest Soviet-type regimes will succeed tivist doctrinaire late Marx; the School reject any pose of neutral­ in undermining the pyramid of young Lukacs, with his eschatolog­ ity and raise their voices on behalf privilege erected in the name of ical pathos, was rehabilitated, of the beleaguered "unhappy con­ Marxism-Leninism. Although an together with other exponents of sciousness." Early Marxian cate­ ethical-axiological scrutiny is cer­ the critical tradition (e.g., Karl gories, such as subjectivity and tainly an indispensable component Korsch, Henri Lefebvre, Walter alienation, are central to their of any critique, the latter must be Benjamin, and Theodor Adorno). political-philosophical discourse. expanded to a general sociological Abiding by a Blochian rather than interpretation of the subjective and IN THIS SETIING, the Budapest a Lukacsian tradition, this school objective background of collectiv­ School audaciously defied the rebukes what Hegel called "recon­ ist-authoritarian regimes. One can­ hypocrisy of Hungary party chief ciliation with reality" (Versohnung not sublimely ignore or discard Janos Kadar's "repressive tol­ mit der Wirklichkeit) and is deeply Hannah Arendt's and Raymond erance" and inaugurated a far­ suspicious of the propensity of the Aron's penetrating dissections of reaching demarche whose basic radical-utopian Left in the West totalitarian Leviathans. aim has been to demythologize the to dismiss the long-term implica­ The Budapest School views "dic­ ideology of "really existing social­ tions that the failure of Marxism tatorship over needs" as a consist­ ism" and to dispel illusions about in Eastern Europe has for the ent Stalinist sociopolitical system its nature. In Dictatorship over nature of revolutionary thought that is central to Eastern Europe's Needs, leading members of the itself. Soviet-type regimes. It begins with Budapest School-Ferenc Feher, The authors seem caught be­ the assumption "that the subjec­ Agnes Heller, and Gyorgy Markus tween their awareness of the eth­ tion of the 'rebellious' and 'in­ -bear witness to the possibility of ical impasse inherent in Marxism dividualistic' private person to a developing an uninhibited outlook and an unwillingness (or power­ 'superior wisdom' has to be started capable of breaking through the lessness) to go beyond Marxism at the level of his need system" itself. They continue to practice a (p. 227-28). "Dictatorship over sui generis variety of Marxism, needs" is thus a key concept • Vladimir Tismaneanu. "Critical Marxism and Eastern Europe," Praxis International (Oxford), October 1983, something that one could call "anti­ that grasps the inner logic of the pp. 248-61. totalitarian Marxism," but which is East-Central European regimes-

68 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986

the persistence of latent Stalinism jeopardized. One is tempted to over needs." But this politicai in them. It suggests the process make use here of the concept of metaphysics cannot escape re­ of dissolution of the autonomous "structural violence," the basic sponsibility for the ruin of so many subject within the overwhelming political strategy developed by a altruistic promises and the triumph framework of totalitarian controls. frightened "elite" whose incorrigi­ of the worst species of tyrants in Furthermore, this concept indi­ ble debility originates in the never­ this century. cates the disastrous politicization solved complex of legitimacy is­ To go beyond myth and utopia, it of the psyche, the cynical manipu­ sues. For communist bureaucra­ is essential to discard the obsolete lation of the subjective field, the cies there is no basis of legitimacy tenets and archaic symbols of attempt to do away with the sphere other than sheer power, no authen­ Marxism, to transcend the "pre­ of privacy as an ultimate sanctuary tic meritocratic competition, no vious philosophical conscious­ of the ego. reasonable hierarchy of values. ness." Yet, the Budapest School is Despite certain "liberalizing" This is particularly conspicuous in loath to commit intellectual par­ measures, the totalitarian order re­ the case of self-contained hyper­ ricide and remains sentimentally mains basically unchanged, char­ personalized - one might say attached to the cultural-political acterized by oppression in actu "pharaonic" - regimes, such as the horizon of historical materialism. and in potentia, exercised in vary­ late Enver Hoxha's in Albania, Kim These philosophers are obviously ing degrees according to the pre­ II-song's in North Korea, and Nico­ oriented toward a desirable, but vailing interests of the bureau­ lae Ceau~escu's in Romania. according to them nonexistent, cratic elite. On this issue, there is Yet the communist regimes are order of democracy and social jus­ no significant difference between not actually as "solid" and im­ tice. (Once again the real alterna­ the Hungarian philosophers, who mobile as they appear to be. The tives seem subordinated to ulti­ state that "East Europeans still live example of the Hungarian authors mate metaphysical archetypes.) under Stalin's shadow" (p. xi), and reviewed here refutes the image of And if, as they argue, "the world Kolakowski, for whom these regimes' total manipulation needs more, not less, socialism of and control over their societies. than it has today" (p. xiii), one the so-called de-Stalinization, Kadar's ideological watchdogs had should perhaps question Marx's forced upon Communist states by to put up with these intellectual ghost regarding the tragic fate of various economic and political troublemakers for many years political idealism and historical necessities, has not suspended the before hitting upon the optimal romanticism when converted into totalitarian principle. In Communist bureaucratic solution of banish­ revolutionary praxis. countries at the moment we are ment. (The emergence of Solidarity Unlike the historical school of not dealing with "liberalized" or in Poland is, of course, another Isaac Deutscher, the Hungarian "democratized" variants of com­ powerful argument against those critical Marxists refuse to sub­ munism but essentially with an ail­ who grant these systems an aura scribe to the Stalinist theory of "ob­ ing Stalinism. 4 of immunity and infallibility.) jective necessity." It is thus all the There is a negative principle more urgent that they unify the In evaluating Eastern Europe's working at the core of these re­ theory of "dictatorship over needs" Soviet-type regimes, the Hungar­ gimes, despite the apparently with a comprehensive interpreta­ ians see no principle of modera­ smooth functioning of their repres­ tion of Marxism as an instrument of tion, no democratic rationality, sive institutions. The logic of intellectual and political subjuga­ underlying the functioning of the domination cannot ultimately pre­ tion. social organization. On the con­ vail over the counter-logic of A particularly interesting chap­ trary, the recourse to violence is emancipation. The problem is ter in Dictatorship over Needs always possible, should the nom­ whether a culture of resistance focuses on relations between East enklatura (the self-perpetuating should include Marxism among its European societies and the West­ political elite) feel its hegemony main components or should jet­ ern Left. The Hungarian authors, tison it as a key feature of the despite their disaffection with execrated autocracy that is being Soviet-type societies, seem still • Leszek Kolakowski, '"The Euro-Communist Schism," resisted. To be sure, Marxism, as convinced that a dialogue is possi­ Encounter, August 1977, p. 14. See also idem, "A a Weltanschauung, cannot be re­ ble with certain West European General Theory of Sovietism," Encounter, May 1983, as well as his masterful Main Currents of Marxism, Volume duced to the verbal ritual practiced communist parties. It is for these 3: The Breakdown, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978. by the servants of the "dictatorship writers a matter of intellectual

69 Books

honor to persuade Western Marx­ ence of Solidarity in Poland) of the tatorship over ideas as well as over ists that "dictatorship over needs" emergence of "self-created organs needs, to inculcate in its subjects is actually the opposite of any kind of a counter power" (p. 297) seems its own image of the future, and to of humanist philosophy, including an abstract and overly optimistic tame any form of resistance. The historical materialism. They there­ appraisal of the window of toler­ bureaucratic ethos involves a re­ fore attempt to offer "an elemen­ ance currently granted by the sys­ doubtable esprit de corps, a soli­ tary model of the functioning of the tem. Is this anything more than darity developed through contin­ Soviet social systems" (p. 40). another utopian blueprint, rooted in ued paternalistic behavior and Those systems, artificial as they sublimated despair and embar­ jealously guarded monopoly of were at the outset, invented their rassed feelings of defeat? As the power.6 own mechanisms of "internaliza­ authors themselves have to admit, The dissolution of the civil soci­ tion" and succeeded in becoming a such pluralistic forms of self-orga­ ety and the maintenance of an reference point, a "second nature" nization of various social groups atomized political space, the sine for various strata of the population. can exist and survive only through qua non of the "dictatorship over The main achievement of the sys­ violence, and, unfortunately, spon­ needs," have provoked widespread tem would be, eventually, to cau­ taneous oppositional violence in a moral paralysis and intellectual terize any sense of historical trans­ police state is more often than not corruption in Soviet-type regimes. cendence, to preclude the genesis doomed to failure. Totalitarianism Mistrusted and despised P.ven by of independent nuclei of thought is totalitarianism precisely be­ many of its own promoters, Marx­ and action- i.e., to effect a com­ cause it succeeds in combatting ism-Leninism remains a guarantor, plete intellectual Gleichschaltung. and eradicating areas of sponta­ a means of ideological self-repro­ Totalitarian systems aim to destroy neity and informal centers of com­ duction of the system. What is in­ the notion of individual autonomy. munication. The matter is then how volved is a deliberate fabrication of These authors correctly excoriate to outmaneuver bureaucratic ma­ self-images, ritualistically incul­ the immoral escapism of the West­ nipulation and reinvent politics cated in the population. The ideo­ ern Left in its attempt surrepti­ beyond the frontiers dictated by logues fail to persuade the "prop­ tiously to dissociate the "innocent" the system. agandized" subjects but at least theory from the abominable praxis, "Dictatorship over needs" rep­ partially succumb to the fallacies and they remind the reader that resents a modernized version of they have themselves concocted. Stalinist totalitarianism. Yet, This is a strange interplay of illu­ these societies, however tragic although overt terrorism was re­ sion, cynicism, and self-deception, this may be, do belong to the inter­ placed after Stalin's death with a in which it is almost impossible to national history of that social and more "moderate" dictatorial for­ discern who really believes in and intellectual movement that bears mula, the system has undergone who only pretends to share the the name of socialism. (p. 43) no fundamental transformations values of the system. Duplicity is that would warrant a different the rule of the game. The authors take on the eternal assessment of its "essence." The supreme irony is that the question about the origins and Stalin's successors generally get "ideologues" still hope to revive the dynamics of social conflicts in by without using his atrocious mesmerizing function of the orig­ Eastern Europe. Students of East methods, but they have preserved inal doctrine and to that purpose European societies will certainly intact the entire infrastructure, obsessively reiterate the same benefit from the stimulating dis­ perpetuating the risk or even the hollow platitudes. A theory that cussion of bureaucratic planning likelihood of a tragic return to ter­ was once able to inspire collective as a social process, as an opera­ rorism. One shares the pessimistic dreams and exalted sacrifices is tion touched off and controlled by conclusions of Albert Camus, for reduced to a senile, unexciting, the apparatus as a "single corpor­ whom the pestilent rats, despite a unappealing, and infinitely redun­ ate entity" (p. 77). In this view, temporary retreat, never totally dant succession of outworn stereo­ planning is a euphemism em­ surrender.5 types, a debased materialism ployed to conceal the despotic A principal function of commu­ style of these economies, their nist bureaucracy is to exert die- 'See Ferenc Feher, "Paternalism as a Mode of command character. Legitimation in Soviet-type Societies," in T. H. Rigby and The Hungarian philosophers' ex­ • Rats being the metaphor for totalitarianism in Ferenc Feher, Eds., Political Legitimation in Communist pectation (inspired by the experi- Camus's novel The Plague. States, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982, pp. 64-81. 70 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986

altogether devoid of metaphysical had been waiting for them to come from time to time, and, adhering to sensitivity and humanist authen­ to offer us everything that exists, the rules of war, become as ruth­ ticity. and above all to keep it under sur­ less as its foes. The "magic" principle of par­ veillance. Modern physics talks of tiynost' (party-mindedness, or par­ "antimatter"; here is "antithought. "7 In the process the individual found tisanship) replaces the obligation himself victimized in the name of to search for truth, which, accord­ Turned into a state religion, Marx­ his ultimate freedom: ing to one of the few Gramscian ism-Leninism became, as Cor­ theses actually accepted and nelius Castoriadis and Claude For the spectators the blood was quoted by Marxist-Leninist mis­ Lefort demonstrated, the perfect tomato juice; for us the blood was sionaries, is supposed to be "revo­ language of domination.8 our own.9 lutionary." The Budapest philos­ The Hungarian philosophers il­ ophers describe this enthrallment: lumine the resulting moral derelic­ The tormenting question for the tion. In the building of the "new Budapest School - an issue that The ways of the Party are enig­ human being,'' the ethics of re­ Kolakowski and Castoriadis unam­ matic, indeed it is Kierkegaard's sponsibility-the basis of Western biguously and trenchantly solved God that is embodied in it; no one moral philosophy-was abrogated - is the relevance of the Marxian can ever be in the right against it. and replaced by a new moral code, message for contemporary subjec­ (p. 191) the ethics of heteronomy. The in­ tivity, particularly in this age of dividual was absolved of personal "postmodernity," to use Alain These authors expose the hid­ implication in his deeds, and the Touraine's apt concept. They seem den rationale for the soporific, party became the absolute arbiter unable to confront the entire wooden jargon of official sermons of good and truth. George Konrad Jacobin tradition, including the and simulated faith: the exercise of perceptively expressed the result mystique of the Enlightenment, domination by the bureaucrats. in his historical-metaphysical novel that inspired the vicious experi­ This topic merits further elabora­ The Loser: ment of "dictatorship over needs" tion, since the language of Bol­ that they so keenly criticize. These shevism has been the movement's It still didn't occur to me that my writers are further confronted with most "effective" contribution to the jokes could cost me my life. Com­ the contemporary obsolescence of desecration of humanist culture in munism for me was a metaphys­ the Left-Right paradigm and the the 20th century, and the source of ical future, a second creation, the obligation to reconsider fundamen­ its victory over competing totali­ work of man replacing God, the tal topics in the light of the real and tarian doctrines. This smothering axis of all known human values­ decisive conflict between demo­ rhetoric has imbued millions of the thing we would accomplish cratic and totalitarian principles. books, booklets, and journals, and together, correcting our errors as For those who have long been even a new species of human we went along, an open alternative subjected to the "virtuous" peda­ being, allergic to any sign of lin­ to familiar oppression. I felt that if gogy of socialism, a scholastic guistic, let alone intellectual, spon­ this experiment turned out to be a definition of the real substance of taneity. The effects of this "seman­ mistake, the human race would those regimes is actually irrele­ tic purge" were impressively have lost its reason for being. vant, particularly if the commen­ described by Ludvik Vaculik: What's more, the world of Com­ tators retain their problematic munism for me was not merely liv­ commitment to radical socialism. The languages people speak today ing proof of its dialectics, but the As a basis for a critique of the "dic­ are seen as embodying the evolu­ pledge of my own survival, a tatorship over needs," some refer­ tion of human knowledge. . . . The unified force battling fascism ence to existing, if imperfect, men I talk to, by contrast, act and which must, lest it be crushed, sus­ social-democratic experiments speak as if they had been excluded pend its inherent benevolence would be more effective than in­ from this evolution, as if nothing dulgence in hazy dialectical con­ had existed before them, as if we structs and skeptical historical • Cornelius Castoriadis, "The Hungarian Source," relativism. Te/os (St. Louis, MO), No. 29, 1979, pp. 4-6; Claude Lefort, t.lements d'une critique de la bureaucratie ' Ludvik Vaculik, "Thus Spake Schweik," The New (Elements for a Critique of Bureaucracy), Paris, • George Konrad, The Loser, New York, Harcourt York Review of Books, July 21, 1983. Gallimard, 1979. Brace Jovanovich, 1982, pp. 138, 206.

71 Books

Even the Budapest philosophers technology of power-namely, the consequences of his historical de­ discussed here seem to sense the emergence of the individual as the cision to join the masses instead of inanity of their plaintive and soli­ center of political discourse. massacring them. It is certainly tary cri de coeur. One is reminded One of the most interesting true, for example- as Feher and of Bloch's pathetic, and hardly con­ chapters in this book consists of Heller argue-that Nagy and the soling, words: "We have no con­ a rehabilitation of lmre Nagy, not revolution he served personified fidence, we have only hope." 10 only with regard to the scurrilous certain libertarian values that were slanders proffered by the scrib­ to be "adopted," or rather usurped, IT IS NATURAL that these philoso­ blers of the Kadar regime, but also by the "Eurocommunist" parties. phers are preoccupied with the with respect to those who, like But he was by all means more than Hungarian revolution of 1956 and Castoriadis, ignore the simple but a "Eurocommunist" avant la lettre, seek to retrieve the spirit of that fundamental fact that Nagy in­ more than an astute Realpolitiker, magnificent experience and to find augurated a new type of radical at least during the last days of the in it political symbols that can practice. As Feher and Heller so revolution and later on, during nourish contemporary anti-totali­ tellingly put it, Nagy "was one of his deportation to Romania and the tarian praxis. Hence Feher and the most remarkable specimens of ignominious trial staged by Kadar Heller's book Hungary 1956 Revis­ a novel type in political activity: and the Soviet KGB General Ivan ited, dedicated to the memory of the post-Machiavellian politician." Serov. the victims. This work is an inval­ (p. 126) Nagy's last words suggest more uable introduction to one of the few This phenomenon is all the more than nausea and contempt for his world-historical events to occur in remarkable because of the inexor­ former comrades, and the Hungar­ East-Central Europe in the after­ able tendency of Stalinist parties ian writers are not mistaken in their math of World War 11 and the to beget whole cohorts of super­ conviction that these words ut­ Soviet occupation of that area. The Machiavellians, from the Bolshevik tered in intimate closeness to a Hungarian revolution marked the Politburo to the inflexible cham­ posterity already awaiting him, ex­ first time that Stalinist autocracy pions of the Comintern (Georgi pressed more than a communist was challenged uncompromis­ Dimitrov, Josip Broz Tito, Palmira quere//e de famille: ingly, not only at the level of Togliatti, to name but a few). foreign policy, but at the funda­ Although I totally agree with "In this trial, in this tissue of hate mental one: the political organiza­ Feher and Heller that Nagy in­ and lies, I have to sacrifice my life tion of society. It engendered a carnated "the type of personality for my ideas. I willingly sacrifice it. new substantive principle, a new the anti-authoritarian revolution After what you have done to these order of rationality that was the op­ needed and will always need" ideas, my life has no value any posite of the mummified Stalinist (p. 128, emphasis in original), I still longer. I am certain that history will wonder how such a non-Stalinist condemn my murderers. One thing activist (and he was a true militant) alone would repulse me: to be

'"See JOrgen ROhle, "The Philosopher of Hope: Ernst could have put up for more than 30 rehabilitated by those who will Bloch," in Leopold Labedz, Ed., Revisionism: Essays on years with the Bolshevik "Inquisi­ murder me." (p. 136) the History of Marxist Ideas, New York, Praeger. 1962; tion." Was he aware, during the and Ernst Bloch, Heritage de ce temps (Heritage of Moscow show-trials of that tor­ Our Time), Paris, Payot, 1978. Feher and Heller are doubtless As for the Hungarian break with Marxism, GyOrgy tuous psychological mechanism familiar with Jorge Semprun's writ­ Markus wrote in a letter to this reviewer: "While I Gramsci so aptly called "the ings about the Spanish communist actually doubt the survival of a 'critical' Marxism as part hypocrisy of self-criticism"? During movement and Santiago Carrillo's of the counterculture in Eastern European 11 circumstances (at least in the more quasi-liberal his Moscow exile, did he experi­ dubious career in it, and it is environments and for the time being-and essentially ence- like Lukacs-the pseudo­ therefore surprising that they not for intellectual reasons), I further think that-despite moral obligation to endorse, even if its most real crisis-this heritage represents in its totality the intellectually deepest and most synthetic only by silence, the infamous sen­ attempt to deal with the crisis-phenomena of modernity tences against the Old Bolsheviks? and as such both the theory and its crisis will stay with " Jorge Semprun, The Autobiography of Federico us for a long time." Personal correspondence by Markus No one can question the sincer­ Sanchez and the Communist Underground in Spain, from The University of Sydney, Australia, March 29, ity of Nagy's commitment to the trans. by Helen Lane, New York, Karz Publishers, 1979. 1983. See also Agnes Heller and Ferenc Feher, cause of the 1956 revolution, but it For Semprun's more recent views concerning the Marxisme et democratie. Au-de/a du socialisme reel destiny of Marxism, see his introduction to Lezsek (Marxism and Democracy: Beyond Really Existing is still debatable whether he actu­ Kolakowski, L'esprit revolutionnaire (The Revolutionary Socialism), Paris, Maspero, 1981. ally anticipated many of the crucial Mind), Paris, Deno~I. 1985. 72 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986

would tend to associate Nagy's Nagy's most enthusiastic sup­ sciousness, as young Lukacs had figure with a movement personi­ porter. During his last year, he fell entitled his noted contribution on fied by the Spanish "Eurocom­ victim to paranoia and confessed the "inevitable" victory of universal munist" professional manipulator. to numerous imaginary crimes: categories over frail particularity. 15 If it is true, as they claim, that Nagy rejected Khrushchevism as "a "I confess to being a spy on the DISSIDENT East-Central European paternalistic consolidation of payroll of Josip Broz Tito and intellectuals, with their outspoken Stalin's decaying work" (p. 118), Eisenhower; I admit that I incited a discourse and refusal to acquiesce then he would certainly have re­ fascist counter-revolution against in the pragmatic imperatives of sented the chameleonic posturing my nation and against the army of superpower politics, perceive of such "Eurocommunist" lumi­ the glorious Soviet Union, the Yalta as the starting point of a naries as Carrillo, Jean Kanapa, or fatherland of all workers." (p. 165) calamitous evolution, of a pattern Giancarlo Pajetta. To accept the of cynical treatment of nations and authors' portrayal of Nagy as "the Losonczy, Nagy, Miklos Gimes, countries, and as the climax of first Eurocommunist" (ibid.) would Istvan Bibo, Lukacs, Tamas Aczel, short-sighted Realpolitik guided by diminish his historical stature and Tibor Dery, Gyula Hay, Pal Maleter ill-conceived Machiavellian as­ trivialize the meaning of his final -these people and their com­ sumptions. George Konrad's Anti­ divorce from the whole legacy of rades epitomized the regained politics voices the growing malaise Leninism. honor of Hungarian culture, its ir­ of those immediately subject to the Nevertheless, benefiting from repressible vitality. Of more global long-term effects of the "Yalta their friendship with Lukacs and significance, they strove to estab­ logic," a revolt against the ini­ the opportunity to read some of the lish a new body politic inspired by quitous international order im­ unpublished memoirs of Hungarian those values and principles to posed, in his view, by a collusion of communist leaders, Feher and which Hannah Arendt alluded in contemporary empires. Heller accomplish a praiseworthy her brilliant essay "The Revolu­ It is one of the characteristics of task of historical and political tionary Tradition and Its Lost Eastern Europe's post-World War restitution. In the process, they Treasure."14 The logic of heresy 11 culture that literature and polit­ demolish the fellow-traveler-style culminated in liberating apostasy. ical sociology are inextricably link­ literature concerning Kadar's The dialectical celebration of wick­ ed, with literature being the main "liberal" despotism, and put for­ edness, the unrestrained cult of vehicle for conveying actual or ward a new reading of Eastern sacrifice, and the self-flagellation potential dissenting views. As in Europe's communist drama in this of the intellect through the iden­ prerevolutionary Russia, so in century, with all its internecine tification of truth with party, all Soviet-type regimes in Eastern struggles, Freudian complexes, those stifling rationalizations were Europe, literature is charged with a and Macbethian plots. Witness the finally exposed by these indi­ subversive content, with that assassination in Kadar's jail of viduals. They succeeded thereby dimension of dissaffection with Geza Losonczy, whose daughter, in breaking through the enthralling reality that is not permitted expres­ according to George Konrad, is force of History and Class Con- sion in political-philosophical still imploring her father's mur­ derers to tell her where his grave 12 is. Losonczy, that irresistible in­ " In Hannah Arendt, On Revolution. New York, Viking, Press. 1971, pp. 172-73. On the same issue, see the tellectual who had been a hero of 1963. superb chapter "The Revolutionary Commitment," in the anti-fascist underground and For the historical-political background of the Melvin J. Lasky, Utopia and Revolution, Chicago, Hungarian revolution, see the indispensable study by London, The University of Chicago Press, 1976. then, together with Kadar, a victim Ferenc A. Vali, RiH and Revolt in Hungary, Cambridge, An important recent addition to the Lukacs of Rakosist terror, 13 was lmre Harvard University Press. 1961, as well as the important controversy is Hungarian philosopher and human rights volume edited by Tamas Aczel, Ten Years Alter: The activist Gaspar Miklos Tamas's "Lukacs's Ontology: A Hungarian Revolution in the Perspective of History. New Metacritical Letter," in Agnes Heller, Ed., Lukacs York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966, esp. the essays by Reappraised, New York, Columbia University Press, Raymond Aron and Michael Polanyi. 1983, pp. 154-77. Tamas provides significant criticism of "Reconfirmed in a conversation with George Konrad "Franz Borkenau insisted on Lukacs's role in the the Budapest School's tendency to idealize both in New York on January 19, 1986. crystallization of the "secret doctrine of wickedness" as Lukacs's personality and his ethical stances. "On Geza Losonczy's biography, see The Truth about an esoteric counterpart to the official theory which For the impact of the young Lukacs on contemporary the Nagy Affair: Facts, Documents, Comments (with a postulated identity between truth and the class critical Marxism, see the comprehensive study by Preface by Albert Camus), London, Secker & Warburg, consciousness of the proletariat. See Franz Borkenau, Andrew Arato and Paul Breines, The Young Lukacs and and New York, Praeger, published for the Congress for World Communism: A History of the Communist the Origins of Western Marxism, New York, The Seabury Cultural Freedom, 1959, pp_ 122-23. International, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1979. 73 Books

works. This is, of course, true only betrayed,'· he, like the Budapest find new paths toward dialogue for certain areas of the literary School, seems to view the pre­ and mutual comprehension. Spe­ field, where censorship has some­ vailing system as an autonomous cifically, he calls for the abrogation what subsided; it does not apply social formation, intrinsically of the Yalta agreements and the to pseudo-artistic celebrations of hostile to a free development of the withdrawal of all foreign military the communist status quo. This human personality. Yet he sug­ force, Soviet and American, from commitment of literature to fun­ gests that "the nations of Eastern Europe. "The key to peace," he damental human values was best Europe have chosen a road that argues, "is not disarmament but expressed by Jaroslav Seifert, the leads toward gradual and peaceful the mutual withdrawal of military Czech Nobel Prize-winning poet, recovery of independence" (p. 26). forces" (p. 30). However, it is highly when he declared in 1956: Although Konrad concedes that doubtful that any such Soviet "with­ "what Realpolitik seems to be tell­ drawal," unlikely in any event, If an ordinary person is silent about ing us, from both East and West, is would automatically result in the the truth, it may be a tactical that we can loosen our bonds only kind of East-Central European neu­ maneuver. If a writer is silent, he is to the extent that the Soviet Union trality that the Hungarian writer is lying. 16 can accept some gentle relaxation aiming at. On the contrary, the without suffering injury to its pres­ most probable consequence of In the 1970's, Konrad coau­ tige" (p. 27), his hypothesis of mar­ such an occurrence would be a thored (with Ivan Szelenyi) a highly ginal autonomy contains a good mood of perpetual anxiety on the polemical interpretation of the deal of wishful thinking. He over­ part of the Soviet leaders, mani­ status of the intelligentsia in the looks possible Soviet reactions to fested in strengthened censorship societies of "really existing social­ any of the practical initiatives he is and ruthless suppression of dis­ ism."17In certain points, that study calling for, particularly the sugges­ sent. There are no Soviet military anticipated many of the auda­ tion of a neutral Eastern Europe, forces in Romania or Yugoslavia, cious hypotheses more recently which runs diametrically counter but the "dictatorship over needs" advanced by the Hungarian author to Leninist-Stalinist expansionist keeps going there. As Irving Kristel in his unorthodox introduction to logic. It is, of course, little wonder correctly emphasized, Antipo/itics, including the "eman­ that utopian proposals appeal to cipatory" mission assigned to a East European intellectuals, who it is a fact, not to be forgotten, that transnational intellectual elite. For desire to escape the tragic quan­ the Soviet Union has never recon­ Konrad, it is the calling of the dary of having to choose between ciled itself to the dissolution of a freischwebende lntelligenz, as Karl the Scylla of resigned compliance Communist regime, anywhere, Mannheim designated the free­ with the Prince- i.e., more or less anytime. 20 floating stratum of uncommitted in­ honorable capitulation - and the tellectuals, 18 to suggest the guide­ Charybdis of quixotic rebellion. I would further argue with Kon­ lines for an alternative to the pres­ However noble Konrad's aspi­ rad's self-styled East European ent political boundaries in Europe. ration for the creation of an au­ Gaullism, evident in the suggestion Unlike the East German Rudolf tonomous and neutral Europe, that Europe become "an independ­ Bahro, Konrad nourishes no illu­ his proposal smacks of the sui­ ent agent in the debate between sions with respect to the nature of cidal self-delusive conciliatory America and the Soviet Union" (p. the system functioning in East­ tendencies found in the West, that 33). Europe cannot be a neutral Central Europe. Far from consider­ state of voluntary blindness Nor­ partner to superpower dialogue; ing it the result of a "revolution man Podhoretz described as "the Western Europe, in particular, re­ spirit of appeasement." 19 Like the mains a natural ally of the United pacifists and isolationists in the States in the struggle for the pres­

"See Michael Kaufman, "Czech Government West, Konrad seeks to escape ervation of those very values that Eulogizes Maverick Poet," The New York Times, Jan. from neo-cold war rhetoric and are imperiled by Soviet expan­ 22, 1986. sionism. " George Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, The lntef/ectuals on the Road to Class Power, New York, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1979. "Irving Kristol, "Let Europe Be Europe," The New "Mannheim elaborated the theory of the "see Norman Podhoretz, "Appeasement by Any York Times Book Review, June 10, 1984, p. 15. The epistemological privilege of the intelligentsia in his book Other Name," Commentary (New York), July 1983; also same point was poignantly made by Cornelius ldeo/Ogy and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Walter Laqueur, "The Psychology of Appeasement," Castoriadis in "Defending the West," Partisan Review Knowledge, New York, Harcourt, 1947. ibid., October 1978. (Boston), No. 3, 1984, pp. 375-79. 74 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986

Getting rid of Yalta amounts to heuristic value of memory, enjoy­ with Soviet imperialism forced Tito eliminating the causes of the cold ing the "dialogic rationality," and to permit the emergence in Yugo­ war, and Konrad cannot be so gulli­ turning down the specious deter­ slavia of avant-garde currents of ble as to think, together with the minism of Soviet ideology. Accord­ intellectual resistance doomed to American revisionist school, that ing to Konrad, a "second culture" underground existence in other the United States "provoked" the would establish the authority of in­ East European states. Yet, he did "peace-loving" Soviets into this tellectual creativity over matters of not welcome the critique of the confrontation. American forces in spirit by annulling, through cathar­ metaphysical foundations of so­ Western Europe maintain a status .tic irony and a new sense of objec­ c i a Ii sm that this openness quo directly and consistently men­ tivity, the hypnotizing impact of engendered. aced by the Soviet Union, and it is ritualized cliches. In a word, the Such a critique was mounted by na'fve to expect Soviet leaders to "power of the spirit" would under­ the philosophical school that coa­ permit a peaceful transformation mine "the power of the state." For lesced around the journal Praxis. of East-Central Europe into a Konrad, antipolitics becomes The Gruenwald book offers a plural,ist, politically neutral region. another way of rejecting the ab­ fascinating exegesis of this school Konrad knows too well that com­ surdity of contemporary "ideolog­ and suggests the reasons leading munists-committed to the princi­ ical wars" and asserting the su­ to the decision to put a brutal end ple of totalitarian conditioning and premacy of permanent transpoliti­ to humanist Marxist free research domination - cannot accept de­ cal values. in Yugoslavia. The Praxis group mocracy. Even that most intelli­ detected the aberrations of gent of Western Marxists, Antonio THE LAST of the volumes reviewed pseudo-socialist ethics, the intrin­ Gramsci, was committed to the here, Oskar Gruenwald's The sic perversions of the system, and same ideal and praxis-the seizure Yugoslav Search tor Man, belongs responded by founding a Marxist and preservation of power, even if as well to the philosophical litera­ personalism. This philosophy was he talked of hegemony rather than ture of humanist Marxism. It is an immediately denounced by ideo­ monopoly with regard to political­ honest and well-documented in­ logical orthodoxy (in both Yugo­ cultural power. The Soviets are in quiry into the tribulations of Yugo­ slavia and other communist coun­ Eastern Europe not for reasons of slav "dialectical Marxism," an at­ tries) as an assault against the very security, but primarily because tempt to dissipate illusions concer­ essence of "socialist systems." they have to safeguard a myth, to ning the Titoist social experiment. Yugoslav humanist Marxist phi­ prevent internal anarchy and the Together with Aleksa Djilas and losophers like Mihajlo Markovic, final collapse of the system. Pris­ Mihajlo Mihajlov, Gruenwald repre· Svetozar Stojanovic, Gajo Petro­ oners of such insoluble dilemmas, sents a political orientation whose vic, Rudi Supek, Ljubomir Tadic, swinging between utopia and des­ basic objective is to "democratize" and Predrag Vranicki dwelled upon pair, East European dissident intel­ the system,21 to uphold any effort the fundamental ethical issue of lectuals have acquired a sense of aimed at weakening that system's Marxist philosophy and praxis, the surreal political sociology un­ repressive institutions. tension between means and ends, known to their peers in the West, if Gruenwald characterizes the re­ the relationship between revolu­ one is to judge from the following gime created by Tito and his party tionary praxiology and teleology. quote from Konrad: "Our great as an "enlightened despotism," They were aware that something dream: what would it be like if the whose faked tolerance vanishes as was rotten in the Leninist-Stalinist, Russian politburo were like the soon as it is confronted with a real i.e., Bolshevik, approach to this English queen?" (p.75). political opposition. The impera­ topic, and attempted to develop an Antipolitics is a manifesto for tives of his struggle for survival all-embracing critique of bureau­ "the serpentine strategy of East cratic socialism. European liberation" (p. 123). For These Yugoslav Marxists, sub­ Konrad, to foster "antipolitics" is to " Pedro Ramet, "Yugoslavia and the Threat of jected to harassment by the out­ avoid millenarian temptations, to Internal and External Discontents," Orbis (Philadelphia), raged communist apparatus, grad­ Spring 1984, p. 120; and Pedro Ramet, Ed., Yugoslavia assuage visceral outbursts, and to in the 1980's, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1985. Among the ually realized the impossibility of encourage "a healthy pagan cyni­ best-known works by Yugoslav humanist Marxists are avoiding a political collision with cism toward dedicated fanatics" Svetozar Stojanovic, Between Ideals and Reality, New the exponents of the established York, Oxford University Press, 1973; and Mihailo (p. 172). Antipolitics would eventu­ Markovic, From Affluence to Praxis, Ann Arbor, power. Like the Budapest School, ally amount to rediscovering the University of Michigan Press, 1974. as well as Leszek Kolakowski and

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Karel Kosik, the Yugoslav critical IN ARRIVING at this conclusion, apocryphal legitimation of the Marxists had to give up many radi­ the Praxis group took a long step existing regimes. Its moral-political cal-humanist illusions with regard beyond the thrall of utopia and message, which seems now al­ to the "reformability" of the system revolution. Yet they suffered from most extinguished, functioned until from within. The required commit­ the same failing that plagued the the late 1970's as a ferment of ment to the existing order- by an­ efforts of the Budapest School radical opposition to the ruling tiphrasis called "socialism" -was -the ultimate inability to re­ bureaucracies, contributing to the replaced by an uninhibited exam­ nounce the central and contam­ genesis and development of the ination of the factors that had inating commitment to Marxism. dissident counterculture. This brought about the Stalinist East European critical Marxism, process was accompanied, pri­ concentration-camp universe. in its most outspoken phase, has marily in Poland, Hungary, and After a long and excruciatingly debunked the sclerotic logic and Yugoslavia, by a progressive dis­ painful journey, these critical enchantment with the merely hu­ Marxists finally succeeded in manist (ethical) critique of the abandoning the "lyrical illusion," as "Quoted in Robert Conquest, "The Role of the communist regimes. This aware­ Malraux once called Marxist moral Intellectual in International Misunderstanding," ness pointed to the necessity to Encounter, August 1978, p. 38. idealism. They discovered the truth On the issue of relations between totalitarian power turn dissidence into opposition of the observation by Albert Camus and cultural resistance, see Albert Camus, "Kadar Had and, as a logical inference, to that "none of the evils that totali­ His Own Day of Fear,'' an introduction to Tibor Meray, abandon Marxism as an inaccu­ Ce-jour ltl: Budapest (23 octobre 1956) (That Day: tarianism claims to remedy ... is Budapest, October 23, 1956), Paris, Robert Laffont, rate and even misleading historical worse than totalitarianism itself."22 1966. perspective.

76 SovietDesigns on Africa

Barry M. Schutz

R. CRAIG NATION and MARK V. tionary movements, and obtain Following the main thrust of the KAUPPI, Eds. The Soviet Impact military facilities wherever and Soviet allied interventions in Africa in Africa. Lexington, MA, whenever possible. during 1975-79, the Soviets em­ Lexington Press, 1984. Why did Soviet leaders choose barked upon an extended period of 1975 to intervene in African af­ consolidation, a process that has THOMAS H. HENRIKSEN, Ed. fairs? In addressing this question produced something of a contro­ Communist Powers and Sub­ in The Soviet Impact in Africa, versy among Western observers. Saharan Africa. Stanford, Hoover which he coedited with R. Craig Institution Press, 1981. Some have expressed fears con­ Nation, Mark Kauppi identifies sev­ cerning a further expansion of PAUL B. HENZE. Russians and eral congruent factors that influ­ Soviet influence; others have The Horn: Opportunism and the enced the Soviets' decision. In the predicted the reversal of Soviet/ Long View. Marina del Rey, CA, region, in 1974-75, there occurred communist fortunes in the region.1 European American Institute for the collapse of the Portuguese em­ Neither view, however, has been Security Research, EAi Paper pire and the overthrow of Ethiopian supported by events. There have No. 5, 1983. Emperor Haile Selassie by a rad­ been some Soviet gains, to be ical military coup that required ex­ sure, but there have been notable DAN C. HELDMAN. The USSR ternal support. On the global level, setbacks as well. In his essay, "The and Africa: Foreign Policy Under there was increasing Soviet aware­ Soviet Union and Zimbabwe: The Khrushchev. New York, Praeger Liberation Struggle and After" (in Publishers, 1981. ness of a loss of resolve by US leaders after Vietnam and Water­ Nation and Kauppi), Keith Somer­ MILENE CHARLES. The Soviet gate, as well as the concomitant ville cites Soviet miscalculation in Union and Africa: The History of implementation of Soviet bloc co­ backing the losing movement as the Involvement. Lanham, MD, operative intervention in the Third the reason for the Soviets' failure University Press of America, World on the Soviets' behalf. This to add black, revolutionary Zim- 1980. led Soviet leaders to believe that the global correlation of forces had AT THE START of the last quarter shifted in their favor and that they ' For a discussion of the debate on recent Soviet fortunes in Africa, see Steven R. David, "Third World of the 20th century, the Soviet therefore could project Soviet Interventions,'' Problems of Communism (Washington, Union jettisoned its policy of power well beyond their borders. DC), May.June 1984, pp. 65-71. limited engagement in sub-Sahar­ While the novelty of this develop­ an Africa and the Horn and be­ ment receded somewhat in the came a more active power in the time between the publication of Barry M. Schutz is Professor of region. Under the banner of coun­ Thomas Henriksen's edited collec­ Third World/African Studies at the tering imperialism, the Soviet tion, Communist Powers and Sub­ Defense Intelligence College Union intensified its efforts to Saharan Africa, in 1981 and the (Washington, DC) and Adjunct Pro­ establish close ties with African Nation and Kauppi volume in 1984, fessor, National Security Studies governments and radical political the Soviet Union maintains an ac­ Program, Georgetown University movements, undermine Western tive presence in Ethiopia and An­ (Washington, DC). He has written influence throughout the continent, gola, and, to a lessening extent, in widely on political change in furnish arms and training to revolu- Mozambique. Southern Africa and the Horn.

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babwe to its constellation of states Christian state religion and an im­ foreign policy-examined during in southern Africa after 1980. And perial dynastic rulership. More Khrushchev's tenure-with em­ in his "From Intervention to Consol­ generally, traditional tsarist inter­ phasis on the legitimizing function idation: The Soviet Union and est in Africa, according to both of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Southern Africa," also in Nation Bissell and Henze, focused on the Ironically, geostrategic con­ and Kauppi, Seth Singleton identi­ Russian desire to compete for in­ siderations, while generally men­ fies the Soviets' failure to rebuild fluence with the established colo­ tioned only in passing in Soviet and develop Mozambique's war­ nial powers (Britain, France, Italy, writings, are actually easier to ravaged economy as a major fac­ the Ottomans) and the need to se­ grasp than are the more frequent tor in the Soviets' declining influ­ cure certain geopolitical objec­ and loudly proclaimed ideological ence in that country, despite the tives in the region. But the Rus­ justifications. Indeed, Soviet views latter's continuing adherence to sians were never able to match the toward revolution and the Third Marxist-Leninist political prin­ success of the European colonial World have struggled to keep pace ciples. powers. This exclusion from the with a rapidly and pervasively By contrast, Thomas Henriksen European colonial "club" in Africa changing global environment and a and Richard Bissell's sober as­ in late 19th century, notes Bissell, sometimes fluctuating line caused sessments of the continuing Soviet seems to have whetted Soviet in­ by political leadership changes. presence in Africa, both in Henrik­ terest in Haile Selassie's Ethiopia, Milene Charles, in her The Soviet sen's volume, point to the emerg­ even to the extent that from 1953 Union and Africa: The History of ence of a qualitatively new Soviet to 1974 the Soviet Union was will­ the Involvement, assiduously fol­ threat based on the Soviets' en­ ing to provide aid to a feudal re­ lows the circuitous path of CPSU hanced ability to provide quick and gime that was closely linked to the policy toward, and the party's con­ massive military assistance over United States. comitant Africanist research con­ considerable distance, as well as The persistence of this link, of cerning, sub-Saharan Africa since on the great complementarity in course, was rooted in more than the Bolsheviks came to power. It is political and military roles of the common tradition between the essentially a tale of missed oppor­ Soviet Union, Cuba, and the East Soviet Union and Ethiopia. Russian tunity, policy failure, and poor com­ European states. The Popular geopolitical alignment with Ethi­ munication. From Lenin's advoca­ Movement for the Liberation of opia and the African Horn enabled cy of support for progressive na­ Angola (MPLA) still runs Angola Imperial Russia to gain access to tional democratic (national bour­ with Soviet and Cuban arms and the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, geois) forces in the colonized terri­ personnel, and Mengistu Haile­ and (later) the Suez Canal via the tories to Stalin's rigid "we-they" re­ Mariam still rules Ethiopia-since Mediterranean and Black Seas. jection of all but loyal Communists 1984, with the support of a Marxist­ Bissell distinguishes this "Russian" in such territories, Moscow failed Leninist vanguard party (the Ethi­ perception of the utility of involve­ to win true converts in Africa. Per­ opian Workers' Party). Thus, a ment in Africa from the "commu­ haps most poignant in this regard curious stasis of Soviet influence nist" one which accentuates the is Charles's portrait of George Pad­ and African resistance exists. spread of Marxist-Leninist ideology more, the West Indian Communist While the Soviet/Cuban juggernaut rather than the pursuit of geostra­ who toiled to extend Moscow's line of the late 1970's has been halted, tegic national interest (though the to the African colonies, only later the very presence of the two coun­ latter of course remains a Soviet to reject Moscow for Ghana's tries remains a dynamic factor in concern). Dan Heldman's analysis Kwame Nkrumah and Pan-African­ the politics of the region. of Soviet African policy during the ism in the 1950's and early 1960's. Khrushchev era (1957-64), The Moscow's research on Africa, in WHAT HAS BEEN the genesis of USSR and Africa, also distin­ the meantime, developed steadily. Soviet involvement in Africa, and guishes these historical/geopoliti­ Soviet Africanist research in the does it have antecedents in Im­ cal pressures from ideological mo­ 1920's anticipated the destructive perial Russia? Richard Bissell (in tives of Soviet policy in Africa. potential of latent anti-colonialism Henriksen) and Paul Henze (in Rus­ Although Heldman generally con­ among Third World elites. In the sians and the Horn) each elaborate curs with Bissell's interpretation, 1930's, D.A. Ol'derogge laid the pre-Bolshevik traditions of Russian he offers a more fully developed foundation for the celebrated lin­ "designs" on an Ethiopia that, theoretical perspectiv~ of the guistic capability of Soviet Afri­ like Russia, had an orthodox pragmatic foundations of Soviet canist research by establishing

78 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986

programs in Swahili, Hausa, Am­ tary support to the winning Federal essay "The Soviet Union and East­ haric, and Zulu. During the 1950's forces in Nigeria (against seces­ ern Europe: Patterns of Competi­ and the early 1960's, I. Potekhin sionist Biafra) and sided with Siad tion and Collaboration in Southern headed research efforts into Afri­ Barre, who had just come to power Africa" (in Nation and Kauppi), can ethnography, while in the late via a military coup in Somalia. these states- in particular, Ro­ 1960's and early 1970's, A. Solodo­ But the Soviets were to learn yet mania, Hungary, and Czechoslo­ vnikov developed and refined another valuable lesson in Zimbab­ vakia- are not likely to support or methods for conducting special­ we in the late 1970's. Moscow's encourage policies that would cut ized economic analyses. Finally, propensity to play zero-sum games off the Cape Route for the West, by the late 1970's, Soviet African­ with competing movements­ since they too might suffer should ists even moved into the hereto­ smugly adhering to Joshua Nkomo such policies backfire. In fact, the fore forbidden "bourgeois" fields of and his Zimbabwe African People's Bloc states depend as much as psychology and sociology. Union (ZAPU) at the expense of Western states on the shipping In spite of this continuous line of Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe route around the Cape for import­ research, the Soviets have a poor African National Union (ZANU)­ ing their own supplies, most not­ record on communicating effec­ ultimately proved detrimental to ably to bring Middle East oil to East tively with African regimes receiv­ Soviet interests there. As a result, European ports in Soviet tankers. ing their support. Among Moscow's Moscow now seems intent on Of course, such dependency on most notable failures were Ghana avoiding the same mistake in open sea lanes generates consid­ (1966), Mali (1968), the Sudan South Africa by carefully touching erable concern among Bloc states (1969), Nigeria (1972), and its all bases, keeping in contact with over what they perceive as in­ recurring unpopularity in Sekou the weaker Pan-African Congress creasing Western entrenchment in Toure's Guinea (with its most re­ and the compromising Zulu leader, southern Africa. Thus, an anti­ cent departure in 1978). It was not Gatsha Buthelezi, while directing Soviet (though pro-East European) until 1975, when, ironically, Cuba fundamental support to the more Zimbabwe, an increasingly Wes­ took the initiative in developing the popular, radical, and established tern-leaning Mozambique, and a MPLA linkage with Moscow, that African National Congress (ANC). formidable anticommunist insur­ this poor performance was finally Taking note of this recent Soviet gency in Angola tend to heighten reversed. The "Cuban connection" proclivity, Bissell urges readers to Bloc states' fears of restricted ac­ not only ensured the Soviets' con­ understand that "the lessons the cess to valuable resources in the tinuous influence and presence in Russians have learned in their region. Angola, it also provided Moscow African experiences to date are Coker also sees the East Euro­ with the essential surrogate mili­ likely to condition their intentions pean states hedging their com­ tary personnel to stymie the Soma­ in the 1980's" (p. 1). mitments in Angola and Mozambi­ li drive into the Horn in 1977. que, since the successful imple­ It was only when policymakers HOW MIGHT such lessons influ­ mentation of Soviet-style five-year incorporated findings of research ence Soviet use of other Bloc plans in the two Lusophone states with actual political experience, states to help achieve specific might actually stabilize their however, that Soviet research on goals in the region? Is there in fact economies and engender steadier Africa yielded some concrete re­ a confluence of interests among and more efficient Western invest­ sults. It helped Soviet decision­ members of the Bloc, or have ment. The potential impact of such makers correct a persistent tend­ some actions of certain Bloc mem­ investment increases in signifi­ ency of the 1950's and 1960's to bers actually worked at crosspur­ cance with the Bloc's 1984 rejec­ back the leader or movement with poses with Soviet interests? The tion of Angola's, Mozambique's, whom they were ideologically most East European states' involvement and Ethiopia's bid for membership comfortable. This propensity had in southern Africa is of course par­ in the Council of Economic Mutual inclined them to support such lost tially political for the Soviet Bloc. Assistance (CEMA),2an action that causes as those led by Patrice But it also holds considerable eco­ surely casts a pall on long-term Lumumba in the Congo (Zaire) con­ nomic self-interest in the acqui­ flict (1961-65) and by Oginga sition of many of the same mineral Odinga in Kenya in the late 1960's. resources that the West requires. 'See Coker, p. 67. Fortunately for these three Afro­ Thus, in 1969, having learned the For this reason, argues Christo­ Marxist regimes, the European Economic Community and the Lome Conference have accepted them as hard way, the Soviets threw mili- pher Coker in his challenging recipients of developmental assistance.

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prospects for economic coopera­ perceived to have preceded and Ironically, the activities of East­ tion between the CEMA states and stimulated Soviet assistance; and West "bridge" states such as the Afro-Marxist regimes. Com­ (b) it was directed against the Yugoslavia, Romania, and even bined with inefficient Bloc eco­ South African attack on Angola. North Korea help retain a Western nomic management in Africa, Cuba's involvement in the Horn, on presence in the region as much if exclusion from CEMA weakens the other hand, is objectionable in not more than they maintain and "socialist orientation," especially in African eyes because it is seen as extend Soviet influence. This is so Angola and Mozambique. The lat­ tactical, that is, as subordinate to because the absence of direct So­ ter's continuing drift to the West Soviet strategic aims in the region; viet involvement enables the newly since 1982 may be a harbinger of and as inconsistent with Cuba's independent African states to Angola's subsequent fate. professed policy of nonalignment, forge positions of nonalignment Much has been written about an inconsistency that surfaces without sacrificing their revolution­ the critical Cuban role in the Soviet primarily in Cuba's abdication of ary credentials. The existence of intervention in Africa. The Cuban material support for the Eritrean active Marxist model states with commitment to buttress the MPLA struggle. no particular subservience to in Angola in 1975 has perhaps But Cuba is not the only com­ Soviet aims has already proven to been the most important develop­ munist country whose activities be a powerful force in Zimbabwe, ment in African politics since have advanced Soviet interests in Mozambique, and Angola and may Ghana's independence in 1957. Africa. Yugoslavia in particular, exercise an even greater influence Cuba's entry into Angola with mas­ notes Henriksen, has abetted the on a South Africa ruled by blacks, sive Soviet backing altered some "spread of communism, if not the should this ever occur. basic conceptions regarding influence of the Soviet Union" (p. Soviet capability throughout the 118). Henriksen makes a good HOW DOES CHINA fit into all this? Third World, let alone that inherent case, but he infers more negative As is well known, in the mid- to Africa. Cuba's military commit­ consequences for the West than 1960's, the People's Republic of ment, its effective coordination as seems warranted. (Indeed, it can China (PRC) competed aggressive­ a vehicle for Soviet African ambi­ be argued that Yugoslavia's mod­ ly with the Soviet Union in Africa, tions, and its remarkable ability to est support for ZANU in its struggle offering emerging African states sustain its commitments have to achieve power in Zimbabwe has an especially vital alternative rev­ helped to further polarize politics in actually provided Robert Mugabe olutionary model of development. southern Africa by intensifying the with an anti-Soviet Marxist-Leninist A decade later, Chinese activism in arms buildup in South Africa and model for development.) support of the FNLA (National ultimately by driving Washington Romania, too, seems to have en­ Front for the Liberation of Angola) closer to Pretoria. As George hanced Soviet standing in southern and UNITA in Angola posed a se­ Volsky argues in his perceptive Africa. Bucharest's interest in the vere problem to both Moscow and though thinly documented essay, National Union for the Total In­ Havana which, during the transi­ "Cuba" (in Henriksen), Cuba's dependence of Angola (UNITA­ tional period in 1974-75, backed operations in Africa show how a once aligned with the MPLA but the besieged MPLA in Luanda. single leader of a small country now its main opponent) before the Both William Ratliff, in his essay working as a surrogate for one of joint Cuban-Soviet intervention in on "The People's Republic of the superpowers can decisively Angola in late September-early Oc­ China" (in Henriksen), and Colin alter trends in the international tober 19753 may yet facilitate a Legum, in his "The Soviet Union's system. continuing East Bloc role there Encounter with Africa" (in Nation However, Cuba's entry into should the MPLA and UNITA ever and Kauppi), stress the significant Africa has not been an unmixed form a coalition government.4 impact China had on the Havana- blessing for the small Caribbean power. While most African states understand and accept Cuba's in­ 'For example, in April 1975, UNITA leader Jonas joint congressional resolution proclaiming moral support Savimbi was received in Bucharest by Romanian party for Jonas Savimbi and UNITA. This statement was made volvement in Angola, they do not leader Nicolae Ceau~escu. See, e.g., John A. Marcum, in anticipation of Savimbi's late January-early February necessarily view Havana's involve­ The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla 1986 visit to Washington. The administration made it ment in the Horn in the same light. Warfare (1962-1976), Cambridge, MIT Press, 1978, clear, however, that it opposes giving military or pp. 265-66. economic aid to UNITA. See Bernard Gwertzman, Cuba's Angolan operation appears • It is interesting to note that the Reagan "Reagan To Offer Angolan Rebels Moral Backing," The somewhat heroic because (a) it is administration recently announced that it would seek a New York Times, Jan. 26, 1986.

80 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986

Moscow decision to intervene in power Competition and Regional was acceptable to EPLF members Angola.5 In fact, Soviet competition Conflicts in the Horn of Africa," yet because these countries repre­ with Beijing for primary influence another excellent contribution in sented a revolutionary alternative throughout southern Africa was Nation and Kauppi. Superpower to the US-backed Haile Selassie truly a zero-sum game. For exam­ competition may have fueled the regime. ple, the Soviet Union refused to flames of conflict, she concedes, Not all analysts, however, ac­ supply needed arms to Mugabe but the source of the hostility can cept this interpretation. Some and his ZANU movement unless be found elsewhere, most notably writers, such as Paul Henze, argue ZANU renounced its Maoist incli­ in the policies and proposals of that "Eritrea" never existed and nations. (Mugabe refused to bow to European colonial powers before was only "created" by Soviet and Soviet pressure, and he later paid and after World War II. For exam­ other outside support. The Soviets the Soviets back for their intran­ ple, Great Britain exacerbated re­ were able to orchestrate the sigence by denying the USSR any gional conflict in the Horn by pro­ emergence of Eritrea, according to role in independent Zimbabwe.) posing toward the end of the war Henze, because of a coincidence Furthermore, one can argue that the creation of a Greater Somalia of events: the development of a Mozambique's star has fallen, in that would comprise British So­ specious Eritrean nationalism Soviet eyes at least, partially maliland, former Italian Somalia, stimulated by the rush to African because of the Mozambique Liber­ the Northern Frontier District of independence in the early 1960's, ation Front's (FRELIMO) enduring Kenya, and the Ogaden and Haud, and the enjoinment of Soviet and relationship with Beijing before internationally recognized ter­ Arab interests after the 1967 Arab­ and after independence. ritories within Ethiopia. Britain also Israeli war when the Eritrean But Soviet competition with the proposed that Eritrea be divided cause became the object of Arab PRC is not nearly so intense at between the Sudan and Ethiopia interest. Marina Ottaway, among present. Seth Singleton's chapter rather than be annexed by the lat­ other specialists on the Horn, finds in Nation and Kauppi indicates that ter. These proposals infuriated no evidence to support Henze's Moscow may even see Beijing's Haile Selassie in Ethiopia, incited assertion. Furthermore, there support for liberation in southern emerging African elites in Kenya, seems little basis for Henze's Africa as a potential source of ten­ and whetted the appetite of the claim in Russians and the Horn, sion between the United States Somalis inhabiting these diverse devoid as it is of any footnotes or and China. This is so, he suggests, regions. In addition, the apparent bibliographical references, that it because traditionally the aim of irredentist impact of colonial, is an improvement on the "remark­ Soviet policy during periods of fascist Italy's policies on Somali able paucity of informed and bal­ retrenchment is "to divide China nationalism contributed greatly to anced books on developments in and the United States rather than existing Somali claims and the sub­ the Horn of Africa during the past attempt new gains at the expense sequent conflict. ten years" (p. 2).s of both" (p. 119). Eritrean expectations for a dis­ No doubt exists about long­ tinct political and cultural status standing Soviet interest in the Horn INDIGENOUS REGIONAL conflict were fed by 10 years of federation or about Moscow's historical fasci­ has also had a decisive impact on status within Imperial Ethiopia nation with Ethiopia. But irony developments in the Horn, and, ac­ (1952-1962). Haile Selassie's ter­ touches the Soviets' finally reach­ cording to some scholars, in spite mination of this arrangement ing the Horn through· a military of superpower competition in the sparked the formation of the Erit­ area. The conflicts between Ethi· rean Liberation Movement (ELM) in opia and Somalia and between 1961, a nationalist coalition that • Information and balance, ot course, are in the eye ot Eritrea and Ethiopia would exist soon fragmented into the leftwing the beholder. Informative books on the Horn during the period in question include, In my opinion, Tom Farer, even without superpower, and Eritrean People's Liberation Front War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: The Widening Storm, especially Soviet, involvement, (EPLF) and the more moderate Erit­ 2nd ed., Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for says Marina Ottaway in her "Super- rean Liberation Front (ELF). International Peace, 1979; Marina Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa, New York, Whereas from its inception, the Praeger, 1982; Marina and David Ottaway, Ethiopia: ELF attracted Arab support, the Empire in Revolution, New York, Holmes and Meier, EPLF turned to the Soviet Union 1978; Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux, The Ethiopian • See also Jiri Valenta, "The Soviet.Cuban Intervention Revolution, New York, Schocken, 1982; and Richard in Angola," Studies in Comparative Communism (Los and eventually obtained support Sherman, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution, New York, Angeles), Spring-Summer, 1978, pp. 14-15. from the Soviet bloc. Such support Praeger, 1980. 81 Books

buildup that enabled Somalia to in­ favorable disposition toward local nizers and military suppliers of the vade Ethiopia in pursuit of its goal disputes in southern Africa. Single­ black opposition which also just of "greater" Somalia. Paradox ton argues that, in essence, the happens to confirm Pretoria's enters the Horn with the Soviet Soviet Union shares a propensity worst fears and provide the latter military and political swing to toward regional polarization with with the rationale for further Mengistu's emerging revolutionary its putative nemesis, white-ruled repression. regime in Ethiopia. After Fidel South Africa. To the extent that Stalemate over independence Castro's fruitless attempt in early Moscow succeeds in associating for Namibia follows the same 1977 to reconcile Mengistu and the United States with Pretoria's script. So long as SWAPO (South Siad Barre in a Pax Sovietica of the apartheid policy in South Africa, it West African People's Organiza­ Horn (which was to include South gains the support of blacks in tion) is not in power, it needs Yemen as well}, Moscow realized South Africa as well as of the Moscow's military support and that it had been euchred by Siad Front-Line States (Angola, Bots­ Angola's territorial protection. But Barre who, in late 1977, expelled wana, Mozambique, Tanzania, once in power, SWAPO would like· his Soviet advisers and abrogated Zambia, and Zimbabwe), Nigeria, ly prefer to emulate nonaligned Somalia's treaty of friendship with and many other Third World coun­ Zimbabwe, adhering to a prag­ the Soviet Union. (Perhaps even tries. Moscow knows that South matic economic policy while inhib· more ironic, the Soviets may have Africa is more important to the iting the ANC from staging attacks had some awareness of, if not in­ United States than it is to the from its territory. Singleton astute­ fluence on, Somalia's impending Soviet Union and that the United ly observes that such an outcome attack on Ethiopia.)7 States is trapped between disap­ would greatly satisfy Washington The Soviet Union gambled, and proval of South Africa's internal but neither Moscow nor Pretoria. lost, on its commitment to Somalia, policies and Washington's satisfac­ sacrificing its investment in the tion with economic/strategic bene­ WHAT THEN IS Moscow's ultimate port of Berbera in the process. But fits accruing from its association objective in Africa? According to it did manage to recoup much of its with Pretoria. many of the contributors to the losses by establishing a firm rela­ South Africa likewise benefits books under review here, the an­ tionship with the Mengistu regime from a certain level of regional in­ swer is straightforward: political in Ethiopia. Determined to avoid a stability that keeps the Soviet and leverage throughout Africa. As repetition of their vanishing acts in Cuban pots boiling in Angola and Richard Remnek and Joachim Ghana (1966) and Egypt (1973), the Mozambique. The de-Sovietization Krause argue in their two essays Soviets are exercising every strat­ of Angola might induce Washing­ on Soviet military policy in Nation agem derived from their 30 years ton to put even greater pressure on and Kauppi, as Milene Charles in­ of trial-and-error operations in Pretoria to redistribute power in­ fers from the history of the Soviet Africa. Moscow's insistence on a side South Africa. In order to help involvement with Africa, and as vanguard party in Addis Ababa avoid such a development, Pre­ Heldman implies in his case study strikes a Leninist chord that the toria continually searches for real of Khrushchev's Africa policy, the Soviets somehow seem to have and imagined ANC training or stag­ Soviet Union seeks political advan­ forgotten in most of their African ing bases throughout the region. tage over the West through essen­ adventures heretofore. Internally, the repression of mod­ tially military means. The often erate black oppositionists (such as conflicting goals of other Bloc EVEN IF IT IS TAU E that the Steve Biko, Desmond Tutu, and actors, the alternative revolution­ Soviets have been disinclined to African trade union leaders, ary model of China, and the con­ get involved in regional conflicts in among others) polarizes black straints imposed by specific Afri· the Horn, as Ottaway suggests, opposition to white rule by creating can states in African regional con­ there is little doubt that they have a more hard-line enemies and lead­ texts limit Soviet prospects for the ing to a Moscow-dependent Afri­ achievement of this objective. can National Congress revolution­ But the Soviets have plied their ary movement as the only alterna­ interest in Africa for a very long 'At the very least, the Soviets surely played an tive to Afrikaner rule. This develop­ time and through undulating important role in the buildup of the Somali military. For ment - in full swing in late phases. They have suffered set· example, Henze notes that "without Soviet support, the Somalis could not have developed the military strength 1985-places the Soviets in the backs in Ghana, Egypt, Somalia, to threaten Ethiopia" (p. 32). dominant position as political orga- and the Sudan only to reemerge in 82 Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986

Angola and Ethiopia, among oth- leaders will pay greater attention umes by Henriksen and by Nation ers, with renewed determination to economic rather than military and Kauppi contain perspectives and new tactics for survival. They assistance, or enlist additional essential for assessing the past will no doubt continue to pursue Third World countries (for exam- Soviet role in Africa, and perhaps their interests in Africa, perhaps pie, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Nica- even for anticipating Soviet inten­ content in the ideological certainty ragua) to serve as military surro- tions and operations in the future. that, over the long run, history is on gates for pressing Soviet interests their side. Maybe in future. Soviet in Africa. Certainly, the edited vol-

83 Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome very much a Filipino, not an r------, to comment on matters East German, and served as Ex­ discussed in this journal. ecutive Secretary of the CORRECTION Letters should be addressed to Mindanao-Sulu Pastoral Secre­ The title of the novel of William Faulkner that John and Carol The Editors, Problems of tariat. Recently released from Garrard reported had been excerpted in the Soviet literary jour­ Communism, US Information detention, he continues to be nal lnostrannaya literatura (see "Soviet Book Hunger," Problems Agency, 301 4th Street, SW, active in the Church. Nowhere of Communism, September-October 1985, p. 80) should have Washington, DC 20547, USA. in the source cited by Rosen­ been The Sound and the Fury. berger (an Apr. 27, 1983, AFP transmission from Hong Kong PHILIPPINES translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily political officer, were attempt­ TO THE EDITORS: In his cor­ Report: Asia and Pacific, Apr. SOVIETS AT SEA ing to seek asylum in Sweden. respondence in the July-August 28, 1983), is Gaspar called an The vessel was intercepted by 1985 issue of Problems of Com­ East German, although his first TO THE EDITORS: In my review Soviet fighter aircraft and sur­ munism concerning David Ros­ name is given there as "Carlita." of four novels about the Soviet face vessels and returned to enberg's earlier article "Com­ Mr. Gaspar's writings are avail­ professional and military Soviet custody. The best ref­ munism in the Philippines" able in How Long?, Quezon classes ("Novel Views of the erence seems to be an article (Problems of Communism, Sep­ City, Claretians Publications, Soviet Cadres," Problems of by Lt. Gregory Young, USN in tember-October 1984), Leif Ro­ 1985. Communism, July-August the February 1985 issue of Sea senberger raises a rather cru­ The issue concerning outside 1985), I erroneously cited the Power, published by the US cial point that needs further funding of the CPP is an impor­ preface to The Hunt for Red Navy. This article is summar­ clarification. tant one and deserves careful October as a source for the ized in The New York Times of Mr. Rosenberger states that research. story of the attempted defection February 10, 1985; Facts on in 1983 "Carlos Gaspar, an East of a Soviet naval vessel to the File of April 5, 1985, also carries German, was discovered to be RICHARD J. KESSLER West (p. 74). Memory deceived the item. According to Facts on the CPP's link in a complex in­ Senior Associate me. There is no preface; the File for June 12, 1976, the ternational funding support Carnegie Endowment passage cited is from page 88 Stockholm newspaper Ex­ system" (p. 85). "Carlos" Gaspar for International Peace of the novel itself. pressen on May 4, 1976, re­ is Karl Gaspar. But, in fact, he is Washington, DC There is, however, public evi­ ported the barratry by the dence of the incident involving Storozhevoy's crew. the Soviet frigate Storozhevoy, which left the port of Riga on DONALD F.B. JAMESON November 8, 1975, manned by McLean, VA a crew who, together with the

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