Governing in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Northern Ireland
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Power- Sharing Executives NATIONAL AND ETHNIC CONFLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY Brendan O’Leary, Series Editor Power- Sharing Executives GOVERNING IN BOSNIA, MACEDONIA, AND NORTHERN IRELAND Joanne McEvoy UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS PHILADELPHIA Copyright © 2015 University of Pennsylvania Press All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations used for purposes of review or scholarly citation, none of this book may be reproduced in any form by any means without written permission from the publisher. Published by University of Pennsylvania Press Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104- 4112 www .upenn .edu /pennpress Printed in the United States of America on acid- free paper 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data McEvoy, Joanne. Power-sharing executives : governing in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Northern Ireland / Joanne McEvoy. — 1st ed. p. cm. — (National and ethnic confl ict in the 21st century) ISBN 978-0-8122-4651-3 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Representative government and representation—Case studies. 2. Minorities—Political activity—Case studies. 3. Ethnic groups—Political activity—Case studies. 4. Ethnic confl ict—Political aspects—Case studies. 5. Cultural pluralism—Political aspects—Case studies. 6. Bosnia and Hercegovina—Politics and government. 7. Bosnia and Hercegovina—Ethnic relations. 8. Macedonia—Politics and government. 9. Macedonia—Ethnic relations. 10. Northern Ireland—Politics and government. 11. Northern Ireland—Ethnic relations. I. Title. II. Series: National and ethnic confl ict in the 21st century. JF1061.M44 2015 352.23—dc23 2014012660 For Giancarlo and Luca This page intentionally left blank CONTENTS 1. Power Sharing, Institutional Design, and External Actors 1 PART I. NORTHERN IRELAND 2. Th e Sunningdale Executive: Lessons from Failed Power Sharing 39 3. Th e Good Friday Agreement 1998: An Inclusive Co ali tion 61 4. Th e 2007– 11 Executive: A New Era in Northern Ireland Politics? 87 PART II. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 5. Power- Sharing Stalemate in Post- Dayton Bosnia 107 6. From Dayton to Brussels? 132 PART III. MACEDONIA 7. Macedonia: From In de pen dence to the Ohrid Framework Agreement 159 8. Toward a Binational Macedonia? 182 Conclusion 204 Notes 227 Index 273 A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s 2 7 9 This page intentionally left blank CHAPTER 1 Power Sharing, Institutional Design, and External Actors In December 2012, Belfast hit the world headlines again, the story far from positive. More than fourteen years aft er the Good Friday Agreement of April 1998, sectarian politics came to the fore amid loyalist riots lasting sev- eral months. Around fi fty police off ers were injured, several politicians re- ceived death threats, and property was damaged across the city. Clashes between loyalists and nationalists took place at sensitive interface areas, and a prison offi cer was murdered by dissident republicans. Th e violence was sparked by a vote by Belfast City Council to limit the fl ying of the Union fl ag at City Hall to designated days rather than every day of the year. In response to the ongoing protests, po liti cal leaders called for calm and sought to bolster the power-sharing executive. First Minister Peter Robinson (Demo cratic Unionist Party) referred to the “historic decisions” his party had made “to build a shared society in Northern Ireland.”1 Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness (Sinn Féin) urged the parties to work together against “anti- peace pro cess” elements: “We are not going to kowtow or bow the knee to their activities.”2 Th e issue of equal treatment of groups’ symbols became po liti cally con- tentious in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004 following a request from the Chair of the Presidency Sulejman Tihić for the Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of symbols on the fl ags of the two entities (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska).3 Tihić claimed that the gold lilies on the Federation’s coat of arms and fl ag repre- sented Bosniaks while the red and white squares represented Croats, thereby discriminating against Serbs.4 He also claimed that Republika Srpska’s fl ag was based on symbols solely from Serb history and that the entity’s anthem, 2 Chapter 1 “Bože Pravde,” discriminated against Bosniaks and Croats as it asked the Lord “to unite the Serb brothers, save the Serb king and the Serb lineage.” In March 2006, the Constitutional Court held that Articles 1 and 2 of the Law on the Coat of Arms and Flag of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitutional Law on the Flag, Coat of Arms, and Anthem of the Republika Srpska contravened Article II.4 of the Constitu- tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina in conjunction with the International Con- vention for Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Th e Court’s ruling upheld the notion that equal rights must be given to the three con- stituent peoples (Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats) and all other citizens in both entities. Flags and symbols have also been the source of politi cal tension in Mace- donia. Th e Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001, which ended the six- month confl ict between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, stipulated that public authorities should have the right to display emblems representing the majority community in their municipality. Many ethnic Albanians prefer to identify with the Albanian fl ag— a double- headed black ea gle on a red background— while accepting the Macedonian fl ag as the state fl ag. In June 2005, a government bill proposed that a community constituting more than half of a municipality’s population would have the right to raise its preferred fl ag alongside the Macedonian state fl ag. Although some ethnic Albanians protested that they were prevented from fl ying the Albanian fl ag in muni cipali- ties where they made up less than 50 percent, the government’s parlia- mentary majority ensured the bill was passed, and the opposition boycotted the vote in protest. Th ese three episodes demonstrate how symbols can be- come highly controversial when groups have opposing identities and nation- alist aspirations. In cases of ethno- national confl ict, the contending groups’ identities are oft en bound up in symbols representing their respective cul- tures and traditions. Marc Howard Ross explores “cultural contestation” in deeply divided places where there are “issues of identity, recognition, and inclusion and exclusion that quickly come into play when leaders and groups evoke cultural images that stir up deeply held and clashing feelings.” 5 As politics in such contexts is oft en a zero- sum game, each group feels that the public expression of the other side’s symbols is a threat to their own identity. Symbols representing historical events and other controversial issues, such as fl ags and language rights, are among the challenges faced by power- sharing executives whereby representatives of the contending groups form a cross- community co ali tion. In this book, I investigate the successes and Institutional Design and External Actors 3 challenges of power- sharing executives in three contemporary cases: North- ern Ireland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia. Ultimately, I seek to add to the debates on what helps power sharing “work.” I proceed from the idea that the institutional rules that govern new po liti cal arrangements are central to the realization of demo cratic stability in post- confl ict states.6 But deciding the most appropriate institutions is no easy task. As trust will almost certainly be lacking among the communities previously in confl ict, institutional designers face a considerable challenge in creating institutions that will encourage stability and help prevent the new system from collaps- ing into further violence. Power sharing is a form of government recommended for deeply divided territories where majoritarianism is not a fair, realistic option to promote peace. It brings together representatives of groups previously in confl ict to govern the country together. Th e country may have been devastated by war or wracked by long- running confl ict. Many people may have lost their lives; many more have lost their loved ones, their home, or their job. Th ey may have been intimidated, bereaved, or discriminated against for their identity and emotionally scarred by the damaging eff ects of confl ict. It is hardly sur- prising, then, that power sharing among communities is not easy. Even in a new po liti cal dispensation, with an end to violence and the setting up of new po liti cal structures, it would be naïve to expect that government by former foes will be plain sailing. By focusing on three power-sharing cases, I want to show what power sharing is really like and to understand what this prac- tice means for power- sharing theory. I demonstrate that power sharing is a diffi cult, challenging form of government. But I also have a normative com- mitment to power sharing. I believe it is a feasible way to govern a post-confl ict territory with two or more ethno- national groups where majoritarianism is inappropriate. I would happily sit within the camp of “cautious optimism” about the “principal viability of power-sharing institutions.”7 And I view power sharing to be potentially “democracy- enabling” and “conducive to peace- building.”8 Th ere are, of course, a number of ways power sharing can be de- signed. It is clearly not a monolith. Neither is it a panacea for resolving confl ict. Aims, Methods, and Contribution My overall aim is to understand power- sharing government in deeply di- vided places. Understanding po liti cal institutions is, of course, “a serious 4 Chapter 1 endeavor” that continues to preoccupy scholarship and has important real- world implications.9 As Elinor Ostrom writes, “Th e opportunities and con- straints individuals face in any par tic u lar situation, the information they obtain, the benefi ts they obtain or are excluded from, and how they reason about the situation are all aff ected by the rules or absence of rules that struc- ture the situation.”10 Having such an impact on the opportunities and chal- lenges faced by po liti cal actors in territories wracked by violent confl ict means that institutional rules are crucial for peace and stability.