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Prism a Journal of the Center for Complex Operations the Center for of a Journal PRISM❖ Vol. 2, no. 4 09/2011 PRISM Vol. 2, no. 4 2, no. Vol. ❖ 09/2011 www.ndu.edu A JOURNAL OF THE CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS TITLE FEATURES 3 Transforming the Conflict in Afghanistan by Joseph A. L’Etoile 17 State-building: Job Creation, Investment Promotion, and the Provision of Basic Services by Paul Collier 31 Operationalizing Anticipatory Governance ndupress.ndu.edu by Leon Fuerth www.ndu.edu/press 47 Colombia: Updating the Mission? by Carlos Alberto Ospina Ovalle 63 Reflections on the Human Terrain System During the First 4 Years by Montgomery McFate and Steve Fondacaro 83 Patronage versus Professionalism in New Security Institutions by Kimberly Marten 99 Regional Engagement in Africa: Closing the Gap Between Strategic Ends and Ways by Laura R. Varhola and Christopher H. Varhola 111 NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat by Michael Aaronson, Sverre Diessen, Yves de Kermabon, Mary Beth Long, and Michael Miklaucic FROM THE FIELD 125 COIN in Peace-building: Case Study of the 2009 Malakand Operation by Nadeem Ahmed LESSONS LEARNED 139 The Premature Debate on CERP Effectiveness by Michael Fischerkeller INTERVIEW 151 An Interview with Richard B. Myers BOOK REVIEW 160 The Future of Power Reviewed by John W. Coffey PRISM wants your feedback. Take a short survey online at: www.ccoportal.org/prism-feedback-survey PRISMPRISM 2, no. 4 FEATURES | 1 AUTHOR Afghan and U.S. commandos reinforce Afghan government presence in remote villages along Afghanistan-Pakistan border U.S. Army (Justin P. Morelli) U.S. Army (Justin P. Transforming the Conflict in Afghanistan BY JOSEPH A. L’ETOILE any have characterized the war in Afghanistan as a violent political argument between the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (with its coalition partners) and Mthe Taliban, with the population watching and waiting to decide whom to join, and when. The main value of this analogy is not in its characterization of the war but in its explanation of why the Afghan government and the coalition are finding it so difficult to gain traction against a largely unpopular insurgency. By framing the options as a simple binary choice between the government with its hierarchical, remote, and centralized governing structure and the Taliban with its violently repres- sive but locally present shadow government, the war is represented—or misrepresented—as a matter of unattractive choices that impel the population to remain on the sidelines waiting to see who will win. Unfortunately, the political clock is running out in Afghanistan. It is imperative for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to capitalize on the progress in security made in the fall and winter of 2010 and continue to show progress during the fall of 2011. This is necessary in order to buy the time and the coalition resources required for an orderly and responsible transition to Afghan-led security by the end of 2014. Joseph A. L’Etoile is the Director of the Irregular Warfare Group at Orbis Operations LLC. 2 | FEATURES PRISM 2, no. 4 PRISM 2, no. 4 FEATURES | 3 L’ETOILE TRANSFORMING THE CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN The immediacy and severity of the security operations, returning to the very roots of the U.S. should be handed over to local elites and their top-down side. The NDS made progress most challenges in Afghanistan are driving political Special Forces ethos. Trained to work by, with, militias. This arrangement represented continu- quickly because it received robust advice and and military reconsideration of restrictions pre- and through local populations to achieve desired ity with most of Afghanistan’s past; since the support from the Central Intelligence Agency viously imposed on some population-centric ends, SOF have been assigned the mission to unification of modern Afghanistan in the 18th and was a smaller organization with a smaller counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies hereto- mobilize select Afghan populations to achieve century, the central government in Kabul has scope of mission. But its small size prevented it fore deemed too “risky.” Fears of warlordism and campaign-level effects. Through the Combined been most successful in controlling the country from exerting a decisive impact on the war. The traditional Afghan factionalism are being sub- Forces Special Operations Component through provincial elites of various sorts who ANA made slower but significant progress; how- ordinated to fears of Taliban success propelled Command–Afghanistan (CFSOCC–A) Village organized local men into militias. ever, like the NDS, it was too small for the task, by a shadow government that has operated Stability Operations (VSO) and the Afghan For the first few years, this approach and it shied away from the long-term population with more presence and immediacy within the Local Police (ALP) programs, the Afghan gov- seemed to work, as there was little insurgency security operations required in COIN, prefer- Afghan population. Consequently, bottom-up ernment and coalition are beginning to treat the to be found in most of the country. In 2005, ring to concentrate on offensive operations. The population mobilization has become a major population more as a resource and a potential however, things began to fall apart. One rea- ANP grew in size, but its abbreviated training line of operation for the coalition, embracing solution and less as a burden or security chore. son was that the international community had and poor leadership resulted in such widespread community-based constructive governance However, time is short and the security transition begun forcing the disbandment of numerous predation and incompetence that its presence that stimulates and enables resistance to the challenges are profound. militias and had created a national police force was often beneficial to the insurgents. Many Taliban’s malicious policies and practices. This article briefly examines coalition to replace them. Some of the militiamen were ANP members served outside their home areas, The coalition and Afghan government experiences with local defense and popula- moved into the national police, but others were a decided disadvantage given the provincialism of have neither the time nor resources to secure tion-mobilization initiatives in Afghanistan to left jobless, and many of them proved willing to rural Afghans, the need for counterinsurgents to the most relevant and threatened segments of emphasize the political and sociological chal- join the insurgents in return for pay. Although know the human terrain, and the value of having lenges involved. From that perspective, recent some militia commanders became police chiefs, friends and relatives as intelligence sources. Not VSO/ALP initiatives are placed in context. others were removed from power because they until 2008 did the international community really the international community and the That context in turn highlights significant had preyed on the population enough to drive begin addressing the problems in the ANP, and it Afghans it backed concluded that local challenges, both materiel and nonmateriel, it into the insurgency’s arms. But the new police is still in need of much improvement. Although governance and security should be handed that require immediate attention to enable chiefs were often just as predatory and less increased partnering with ISAF and purges of over to local elites and their militias and reenforce population mobilization efforts. competent. The U.S. penchants for lavishing malign actors have cut down on predation, the Next, broad solutions to those challenges are development funds and insisting on intrusive ANP remains deficient in the intelligence and suggested, with an emphasis on those that offer power-sharing mechanisms, such as imposing operations capabilities required to combat the the population by using only their respective the greatest potential for near-term success as term limits and leadership rotations among insurgents. More importantly, the ANP is not resources. This has led to a shifting in the ISAF well as sustainability through 2014 and beyond. local elites, also contributed to instability and connected to an effective judicial system. This is campaign plan from operations almost exclu- violence. When the insurgents ramped up their especially problematic since the most significant sively designed to protect the population to opera- Background offensive activities in 2005, they fully exploited governance void the insurgency fills is the need tions designed to enable the population to protect Although VSO is sometimes interpreted those weaknesses. for judicial and dispute-resolution procedures. itself. These most recent efforts toward popula- as the first sustained effort at bottom-up COIN The government of Hamid Karzai and its From 2001 to 2005, the international tion mobilization represent a revisiting of previ- since the fall of the Taliban, the operations North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) security forces in Afghanistan concentrated ous practices that kept the population out of the actually represent the second swing of the Allies responded to the deterioration in secu- on counterterrorism missions. Operating from conflict,1 but at this point in the campaign, it pendulum toward bottom-up solutions, follow- rity by increasing the size of Alliance forces and bases that were often distant from the popula- is both logical and moral to mobilize the local ing a swing to top-down solutions that lasted attempting to strengthen the top-down Afghan tion, they sought to capture
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