PAKISTAN’S NATIONAL SECURITY: A CROSS- SECTORAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF SECURITIZATION PROCESSES

PhD DISSERTATION

BY SYED NAJEEB AHMAD NDU-IR/PhD-13/S-017

Supervisor

DR. SHAHEEN AKHTAR

Department of International Relations

Faculty of Contemporary Studies National Defense University Islamabad –

Pakistan

2017

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Certificate of Completion

We hereby recommend, that PhD dissertation submitted by Syed Najeeb Ahmad, titled:

“Pakistan’s National Security; A Cross-Sectoral Discourse Analysis of Securitization Processes” is comprehensive and of sufficient standard to justify its acceptance by the Department of

International Relations, Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University

Islamabad for the award of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) degree.

______

Supervisor (Dr Shaheen Akhtar)

______External Examiner

Countersigned by:

______

Controller of Examinations Head of the Department

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Declaration

I, Syed Najeeb Ahmad s/o Syed Zaki Ahmad, Registration number NDU-IR/PhD/S-

13/017 NDU, hereby declare that “Pakistan’s National Security: A Cross-Sectoral Discourse

Analysis of Securitization Processes” is my own work and that all sources that I have used or quoted, have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

______

Syed Najeeb Ahmad, PhD Scholar

Department of International Relations, Faculty of Contemporary Studies,

National Defence University, Islamabad.

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Dedication

Dedicated to national security professionals, endeavoring to understand the notion of security for multiple referents, at different levels, against diverse threats, in overlapping domains.

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Supervisor’s Declaration

This is to certify that the PhD dissertation submitted by Syed Najeeb Ahmad titled:

“Pakistan’s National Security: A Cross-Sectoral Discourse Analysis of Securitization Processes” was supervised by me and is submitted to meet the requirements for Degree of Doctorate of

Philosophy (PhD).

______

Dr Shaheen Akhtar

Department of International Relations, Faculty of Contemporary Studies,

National Defence University, Islamabad.

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Acknowledgment

I am indebted to my teachers, colleagues and students at the National Defence University

(NDU) Islamabad who helped me in this research project. The guidance by my supervisor, Dr

Shaheen Akhtar, was instrumental. The teachers in our coursework, Dr Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema,

Dr Muhammad Khan, Dr Shaheen Akhtar and Dr Nazya Fiaz helped in laying down the intellectual foundation of my dissertation. Lieutenant Colonel Dr Yasir Ahmed’s help in learning the reference management software facilitated management of citations. My year long stay at the

U.S. Army War College (US AWC), Carlisle Pennsylvania, came as a blessing that helped me complete the project. My admittance to Carlisle Scholars Program, a special seminar class in the

US AWC designed to accomplish the course requirements along with time for research and publication by the students, provided good opportunity. Dr Bill Flavin, Peace Keeping and

Stability Operations Institute, and Dr Paul Kan, Department of National Security Policy Studies,

U.S. Army War College, also guided me in my research. Dr Steven Metz, Strategic Studies

Institute, reviewed the complete dissertation giving encouraging remarks. Library staff at NDU

Islamabad and US AWC Carlisle were exceptionally helpful. Dr Rashid Ahmed’s review report was also useful. My parents’ encouragement always remained a source of comfort. My wife and children deserve a special mention for enduring my work in spare moments. My deepest gratitude and prayers for all those who knowingly or unknowingly helped me intellectually and physically in completing this work; my friends, extended family and coworkers without whose support this project would not have been possible.

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Abstract

Pakistan’s security is conceptually broadening. Securitization theory can be used to explain this phenomenon by highlighting certain critical issues whose significance led to extraordinary steps for redress in the political, military, societal, economic and environmental sectors of security. Discourses on securitized issues, if studied in a systematic and comprehensive manner, provide clues to understanding the securitization moves. The purpose oriented language of discourses is instrumental in comprehending the intertextual orientation of identities and threats in a discourse. The discourse analysis revolves around primary and secondary sources like speeches and statements of key stakeholders, parliamentary discussions, authentic books, scholarly journal articles, editorials, op-eds and field reports of reputable newspapers. The depiction of such core issues as ‘survival’ issues in domains other than traditional political-military security, as seen through their social construction, indicate a broadening in the national security construct of Pakistan. Securitization of the 18th Constitutional

Amendment 2010 in context of securing the federal structure of the state, and the 7th National

Finance Commission Award 2009 along with the Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan Package

(Initiating Balochistan Rights) 2010 in context of securing the federation against Balochistan’s alienation, are examples of increasing influence of the political sector in the security conception of Pakistan. Securitization of the Malakand stabilization 2009, Operation Zarb-e-Azb 2014, and

National Action Plan 2015, reflect the significance gained by the societal sector in Pakistan’s security conception. The vigorous debate about defense versus development, aid dependence, climate change and water stress, in the context of Pakistan’s economic and environmental security, reflects growing recognition of such issues as national security issues.

Key Words: Pakistan’s national security, social construction, discourse analysis, multi-sectoral security, broadening security conception.

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List of Tables Title Page Table 1: Criteria of selection and common types of general material 9

Table 2: Lene Hansen’s Intertextual Research Models 1 and 2 52

Table 3: Adapted Intertextual Research Model 55

Table 4: Intertextual Model - Discourse Analysis of Securitization in Political 75

Security

Table 5: Intertextual Discourse Analysis; Securitization in Societal and Military 115

Security

Table 6: Cross Sectoral Securitization Construct 197

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List of Abbreviations AHBP Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan Package ANP Awami National Party APTTA Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement ATT Afghan Transit Trade ATTA Afghanistan Transit Trade Agreement BLA Balochistan Liberation Army BNM-Mengal Baloch National Movement BNP(A) Balochistan National Party (Awami) BRP Baloch Republican Party BSO Baloch Students Organization CCI Council of Common Interest CENTO Central Treaty Organization CPEC China Pakistan Economic Corridor COAS Chief of Army Staff COPRI Copenhagen Policy Research Institute CSS Critical Security Studies FATA Federally Administered Tribal Agencies FDI Foreign Direct Investment GATT General Agreement on Trade and Tariff GDS Gas Development Surcharge GHGs Green House Gases GHQ General Headquarters GNP Gross National Product GST General Sales Tax HDI Human Development Indices HKH Hindukush-Karakoram-Himalayan HN Haqqani Network HRCP Human Rights Commission of Pakistan IDPs Internally Displaced Persons IPC Inter Provincial Coordination

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IPCC Inter Governmental Panel on Climate Change IPD Inverse Population Density IPE International Political Economy IPRI Islamabad Policy Research Institute IRS Indus River System ISI Inter Services Intelligence ISPR Inter Services Public Relations JI Jamaat-e-Islami JuD Jamaat-ud-Dawa JUI(F) Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan (Fazal-ur-Rahman) JUI-S Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (Sami ul Haq) JWP Jamhoori Watan Party KANUPP Karachi Nuclear Power Plant KP Khyber Pakhtunkhwa LeJ Lashkar-e-Jhangvi LeT Lashkar-e-Tayyeba LIEO Liberal International Economic Order LOC Line of Control MAP Military Assistance Program MDGs Millennium Development Goals MMA Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal MPC Multi-Party Conference MQM Muttahida Qaumi Movement MRD Movement for Restoration of Democracy MWM Majlis-i-Wahdat-i-Muslimeen NACTA National Counter Terrorism Authority NAP National Action Plan NEPRA National Electric Power Regulatory Authority NESPAK National Engineering Services Pakistan NFC National Finance Commission NP National Party

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NPP National People’s Party NSC National Security Council NSS National Security Strategy NWFP North West Frontier Province OGDC Oil and Gas Development Corporation OGRA Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority PAEC Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission PAF Pakistan Air Force PAT Pakistan Awami Tehreek PATA Provincially Administered Tribal Areas PEMRA Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority PESA Pakistan Ex-Servicemen Association PIA Pakistan International Airlines PIDE Pakistan Institute of Development Economics PILDAT Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency PINSTECH Pakistan Institute for Nuclear Science and Technology PKMAP Pakhtun Khawa Milli Awami Party PM Prime Minister PML (N) Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) PML(F) Pakistan Muslim League (Functional) PML(Q) Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam) PPP Pakistan Peoples Party PPP-S Pakistan Peoples Party (Sherpao) PSDP Public Sector Developmental Program PSEs Public Sector Enterprises PSM Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation PTI Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons SEATO South East Asia Treaty Organization SECP Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan TNSM Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi

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TSS Traditional Security Studies TTP Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan UNDP United Nations Development Program UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change VNSAs Violent Non State Actors WAPDA Water and Power Development Authority WGI Worldwide Governance Indicators WTO World Trade Organization

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CONTENTS

PAGE Acknowledgment v Abstract vi List of Tables vii List of viii Abbreviations Introduction 1 Chapter 1 Literature Review 12 Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework 36 Chapter 3 Conception of Pakistan’s Security in Historical Perspective 57 A) Pakistan Movement B) Strengthening of Pakistan Army C) Nuclear Program D) Afghan Jihad Chapter 4 Securitization of Political Security Issues 74 A) 18th Constitutional Amendment 2010 B) 7th National Finance Commission Award 2009 C) Initiating Baloch Rights (Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e- Balochistan Package – AHBP) 2010 Chapter 5 Securitization of Societal and Military Security Issues 111 A) Malakand Stabilization 2009 B) Operation Zarb-e-Azb 2014 C) National Action Plan 2015 Chapter 6 Securitization of Economic & Environmental Security 153 Issues A) Defense versus Development and Aid Dependence B) Negative Impact of Globalization C) Illegal Trade D) Climate Change and Water Stress Chapter 7 Changing Dynamics of Pakistan’s Security: Cross Sectoral 188 Synthesis Conclusion 199 Bibliography 206

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INTRODUCTION

Extreme violence leading to worst of massacres in human history during the miserable migrations that came at the heels of Indo-Pak partition 1947 laid the foundations of an insecure Pakistan fearful of “strangulation” at the hands of India. Describing the assessment of Pakistan’s leadership at that momentous time, Chaudhri M. Ali quotes the laments of the first Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan: “Today we in Pakistan are surrounded on all sides by forces which are out to destroy us.” General Lord Ismay, Viceroy Mountbatten’s Chief of Staff paid a visit to Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the first Governor General on 11 September 1947 to reassure him of the Government of India’s good intentions. Ismay recorded his meeting with Pakistan’s founding father:

“He looked very dignified and very sad, and he spoke as a man without hope. There is nothing for it but to fight it out. We went to his study and he let himself go: How could anyone believe that the Government of India were doing their utmost to restore law and order and to protect minorities? On the contrary, the events of the past three weeks went to prove that they were determined to strangle Pakistan at birth.”1

Quaid’s words clearly indict the Government of India, by virtue of their inaction, for being complicit in facilitating killing of the people struggling to migrate to the newly founded state of Pakistan. In Quaid’s assessment, India was inclined to undermine Pakistan’s survival. He saw tacit approval of the incumbent Indian Government behind the organized violence against minorities. Such circumstances, where ‘fighting it out’ was the only recourse left in the mind of the leader of the newly founded Pakistan, led to a natural focus on military security to protect the state against the animosity of a belligerent and larger neighbor. As the survival was considered to be at stake, evident from the sentiments of Pakistan’s leadership, the ‘traditional’ security element of military shot to prominence right at the birth of Pakistan.

However, after almost seven decades spanning a mix of development and deprivation, Pakistan has come to recognize the importance of ‘non-traditional’ elements of national security including political stability, economic development, societal protection and environmental

1 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, University of Punjab, Lahore, 1973), 259. 14

sustenance, which resonate in people’s ideas as being equally important for survival. It has been widely acknowledged in the country that the broadened concept of national security encompasses security of the state and its people from a myriad of survival challenges across the traditional and non-traditional domains.

The non-traditional elements of national security including a stabilized political system, a safe society, a thriving economy, and a sustainable ecology can only mature in a peaceful internal security environment. In this context, the primary security challenge in Pakistan emerged as the preservation of life against increasing chances of hurtful terrorist disruption. In most cases, it was a random threat undermining the basic security of society in general as the citizens endeavored for a livelihood in their daily lives. It was needed to be tackled as the first and foremost policy priority. A priority, which would achieve high moral ground and wide acceptability, according to a ‘Primacy of Life’ rationale argued by Etzioni meant for providing basic security: “conditions under which most people, most of the time, are able to go about their lives, venture onto the street, work, study, and participate in public life (politics included), without acute fear of being killed or injured – without being terrorized.”2 This priority, which we would term securitization, would be seen in Chapter 5 where the government’s counterterrorism and counter violent extremism measures to secure the identity of Pakistan would be discussed in detail.

The notion of national security encompassing state survival in an anarchic world through balance of power or cooperation is the popular manner of defining the measures adopted by a state for security of her identity. However, a material assessment of policy factors like military strength, security alliances, political and economic stability, natural and human resources, sustainable environment, cooperative mechanisms, etc., cannot be the sole means of assessing the direction that a state pursues for its security in different domains. Understanding of these factors as aggregated constructions of human ideas is equally, if not more, important in ascertaining the policies that states adopt to secure themselves. The process in which these ideas are constructed, modified, influenced, and contested through the medium of language gives birth to discourses. With careful analysis of texts, a specific and purpose oriented discourse can be

2 Amitai Etzioni, Security First (New Haven: Yale University, 2007), 2. 15

gleaned which is influential in understanding state policies. National security policy is of foundational value in the functioning of a state and its nuances can be seen from the dynamics of security discourses at play in and around any country.

In momentous times, crisis-like circumstances of national significance are often prioritized as ‘security’ issues constructing legitimacy for emergency measures. The vibrancy of such circumstances stirs the discourse as well. Barry Buzan et al. (1998) term this phenomenon securitization which is manifested in discourses. The phenomenon can be better understood by disaggregating the ‘whole’ of national security into sectors, i.e., military, political, societal, economic and environmental. The identity under threat and the measures for its security, both need to be distinctly recognized by a wider audience for a successful case of securitization.3 Thus politics of identity plays a significant role in securitization.

According to Connolly, “Identity is relational and collective (emphasis original), … always connected to a series of differences that help it to be what it is.” 4 In this pursuit of highlighting differences, yet subduing them at times to complete the identity, a social paradox is created, which can be negotiated by balancing pluralism with exclusivity. In Pakistan’s security milieu, reinforcing its exclusive identity against external and internal threats, while retaining its pluralistic nature, was essential for the securitization moves. Despite the political and ethnic diversity in Pakistan, the government succeeded in coalescing the sub-identities into a cohesive national identity while pursuing its security agenda as discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5 regarding securitization of political sector issues and securitization of societal sector issues, respectively. An idea of this sectoral categorization would help to develop the concept further.

According to Buzan et al. (1998), the military sector deals with the interplay of offensive and defensive capabilities of the state and states’ perception of opposing intentions. Political security is about the organizational stability of the states, its system of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security is concerned with access to resources, finances and markets necessary to maintain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal

3 Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security; A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 8, 23. 4 William E. Connolly, Identity, Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, Expanded ed (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), xiv–xv. 16

security strives for sustainability of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and values. Environmental security is concerned about the local and planetary biosphere as the essential medium for supporting life and every other enterprise associated with it. The ‘whole’ of national security remains an unalienable entity and is disaggregated into ‘sectors’ only to facilitate analysis. Apart from this analytic disaggregation, the quintessential referent of security, i.e. the state, is also dissociated in the multi-sectoral approach allowing for more central referent objects of national security, besides the state, in different sectors. Buzan asserts that separate analysis of each sector “confines the scope of inquiry to more manageable proportions by reducing the number of variables at play.” However, the sectoral disaggregation would only be useful if it ends with a synthesis to see the cross sectoral impact of issues under securitization.

Discourse analysis of securitization moves by disaggregation and synthesis during this research’s period, i.e., the Zardari led Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) and the 2013 Nawaz led Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) – PML(N) – governments, will help to determine the constructivist perspective of Pakistan’s national security. The considerable number of securitization moves during the tenure of these Governments is the common strand that signifies the period of research. Some significant examples merit to be mentioned.

Active engagement in the fight against terrorism has seen numerous securitizing moves in the military sector. While in the political realm of national security discourse, 18th Constitutional Amendment 2010, 7th National Finance Commission (NFC) Award 2010 and Aghaz-e-Haqooq- e-Balochistan Package (AHBP) – Initiating Balochistan Rights – 2011, were securitized. Securitizing moves to counter rampant radicalization leading to terrorism remained prominent in the societal sector discourses. In the economic sector, impact of insecurity on the economy of the country, negative impact of globalization, and illegal trade issues shot to prominence time and again. Lastly, the environmental sector witnessed a strong desire to securitize against looming threats of water stress and climate change. A systematic and organized study of few of the most prominent of these securitizing moves will be undertaken by way of discourse analysis in a post structuralism theoretical framework to help understand the trend of Pakistan’s security priorities.

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Thesis Statement

Post-cold war security agenda has seen a substantial increase in scope by way of newer dimensions of security like political, economic, societal, and environmental gaining strategic space in national security alongside the traditional military security, thus making national security multi-sectoral. Securitization process, as conceptualized by Buzan et al. (1998) in a multi-sectoral framework, entails putting acute focus on an issue of ‘national’ significance by painting its criticality as a ‘security’ concern, demanding extraordinary measures for that purposefully hypothesized ‘national security’ issue. Securitization can be gleaned in the sociopolitical milieu by means of discourse analysis.

Pakistan’s national security discourse has mostly been dominated by traditional perspective of military security, mostly securitized in terms of balance of power and terror. Various issues in different sectors of national security vie and maneuver for prioritized securitization. There have been increasingly strident attempts at securitizing political instability, violent extremism and societal radicalization. At times, economic revival and environmental issues like water scarcity have also been signified using the security label. However, the major issues in the vital national security sectors of political, military, societal, economics and environment of Pakistan lacked discourse analysis from the securitization point of view. A critical analysis of the key discourses in Pakistan to highlight the securitized issues during the Zardari led PPP and the Nawaz led 2013 PML(N) governments would be indicative of the effort that went into raising the political level of certain issues to the extraordinary, broadening the scope of Pakistan’s security in the process.

Objective of the Study

The study will be aimed at discovering recent occurrences of securitization in the national security debates of Pakistan by way of discourse analysis. It will analyze the interconnected discourses during the Zardari led PPP Government and the Nawaz led PML(N) Government in five sectors of national security, namely, political, military, economic, societal and environmental to identify representation of critical issues as existential ‘national security’ issues of Pakistan with the securitizing actor eliciting their public recognition as such and

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seeking immediate and extraordinary measures for redress. Understanding the way securitization of some vital national issues broadened the notion of Pakistan’s security will be the objective of this study.

Hypothesis

The process of securitization of critical issues in the political, military, societal, economic and environmental sectors suggests broadening of the concept of national security of Pakistan.

Research Questions:

 Did securitization occur during the research period?  How securitization process in the political sector can be identified in passage of 18th Constitutional Amendment 2010, 7th NFC Award and AHBP by way of comprehensive discourse analysis?  How securitization processes in the societal and military sectors can be identified in the domestic campaign against terrorism, as analyzed by way of comprehensive discourse analysis?  How securitization processes were undertaken in critical economic and environmental security issues as analyzed by way of comprehensive discourse analysis?  What does cross-sectoral synthesis offer in understanding the changing dynamics of Pakistan’s national security?

Significance of the Study

Securitization Theory played up time and again in Pakistan’s national security history, but mostly in the domain of military sector. Development of nuclear weapons, support to Mujahedeen against Soviet Union in Afghanistan, maintenance of conventional forces parity against India, and the missile program are some of the examples of successful securitization by the State with the aim to promulgate ‘extraordinary’ measures to handle the ‘existential’ security issues at hand. These measures included prioritized resource allocation, controversial foreign policy decisions, and ignoring systemic institutional imbalances, to name a few.

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Some examples of securitization moves in Pakistan from the period of this study include Malakand / Swat counterterrorism operations 2009, AHBP 2010, 18th Constitutional Amendment 2010, 7th NFC Award 2010, Operation Zarb-e-Azb 2014, National Action Plan 2015, and the planned construction of Diamer-Bhasha Dam. Securitization was required to bring urgency in these predicaments, where immediate and extraordinary measures were required to deal with the risks identified in different sectors as national security threats. Seeking support of sufficient internal and external audiences was always a challenge for the securitizing actor. Such securitizing moves for providing security not only to the state but also, in many cases, to other referents like institutions, constitution, people, provinces, national prestige and environment helped to expand Pakistan’s national security agenda.

Discourse analysis will help to identify the dynamics which impact upon a particular debate on a national security issue when it is securitized. All the identified instances of securitization in the period under research would be critical security issues of Pakistan. An in- depth understanding of the way discourses matured around those debates would help in improving the understanding of policy makers and analysts about securitization of vital issues in Pakistan. Security analysts interested in Pakistan would benefit by learning about the social construction of vital security issues in different sectors of the country’s national security. Moreover, this study would help to enhance the significance of multi-sectoral approach to national security in Pakistan.

Research Methodology

Adopting the case study research model, instances of securitization in Pakistan’s security calculus will be analyzed during the period of research. An intertextual discourse analysis method will be adopted to view different discourses in relation to the official discourse, in order to identify the social construction of security perspectives.

Apart from the official discourse, the most important discourses to consider will be those critical of the official discourse. It will help to identify the changes brought about in the official discourses or responses given in those discourses under the influence of divergent views. Critical aspects of the subject will be included in the discourse by virtue of including media criticism on

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the matter, as those are likely to have been ignored in the official discourses. Prominent academic point of view will also be included as it has an influence on discourse, especially if it is being published in mainstream media. Important state institutions which wield influence in Pakistan’s policy discourses, like the Armed Forces, would also come into focus as those are important voices in foreign policy and security debates.

The poststructuralist discourse analysis would be designed around the identity (self) of Pakistan as personified by the Government of Pakistan. The focus of discourse analysis would be on official discourse discussed by heads of government, cabinet members, senior civil servants, military chiefs, wider security policy debate, political opposition, and the media. The object of discourse analysis would be official texts, supportive texts, critical texts, political texts, speeches, parliamentary debates, statements, and media texts including field reporting and editorials. The goal of discourse analysis would be identification of substantial political issues in different sectors of national security and the discourses linked to them, with a view to ascertain the presence of the process of securitization as attempted by the agents of discourse. Texts will be selected based upon clear articulation of identities and policies. Data will be based on the selected texts, its validity will be achieved by its textual relevance to the issue, i.e., linguistic references validating the claim to securitization. Opposing viewpoints in the discourse would also be included in the data to establish intertextual context of the discourse analysis; not as contradictory but as contributory source of data.

An important consideration or limitation in this research methodology is about which types of text should form the basis of the study. According to Lene Hansen:

“It should be stressed that poststructuralist discourse analysis gives epistemological and methodological priority to the study of primary texts; … this does not, however, imply that what are normally referred to as secondary sources – discussions of primary texts and broader presentations of a foreign policy issue – have no place within poststructuralist discourse analysis.”5

In following the same standard, this study has given preference to presidential and prime ministerial statements, speeches, interviews, parliamentary debates, reportages and editorials as primary texts for discourse analysis. At the same time, those secondary materials which

5 Lene Hansen, Security as Practice (New York: Routledge, 2006), 74. 21

constituted key texts of the official discourses, and formed part of the academic discourse, have also been taken into account. The criterion provided by Lene Hansen in her work Security as Practice on selection and common types of general material for discourse analysis proved useful in choosing the texts:

Table 1: Criteria of selection and common types of general material

Criterion Type of text Clear Widely read and Formal authority articulations attended to Presidential / Prime Yes Yes Yes Ministerial address Parliamentary debates Yes Variable Yes Legislation No Variable Yes communiques Field reporting No Variable No Editorials Yes Variable Yes (in media discourse)

Opinions Yes Variable No

Source: Lene Hansen, Security as Practice, p. 77.

The second important consideration or limitation is the question of how much data should be included in the discourse analysis. All the relevant primary and secondary materials impacting a particular security discourse should ideally be analyzed, which most likely is not feasible. Hansen suggests that in order to “make claims to having identified and analyzed the dominant discourses within a particular intertextual model, one might couple the selection of texts to a timeline that identifies periods of higher levels of political and media activity.” 6 In keeping with this view, the general material for discourse analysis was selected from within the periods where political and media activity around a particular issue being securitized was high. This approach resulted in encapsulating the important features of the official, oppositional, media, and the academic discourses relating to the security issue in focus, increasing the wider validity of the data.

6 Hansen, 77. 22

These qualitative and quantitative criteria of choosing the data were perhaps most feasible, as an unbridled quest for compiling more and more texts about a particular security issue would have led to contradictions. It was possible on the basis of these criteria to select the texts in the data for their relevance to the particular security issue being assessed for securitization.

Organization of the Study

The study is organized in seven chapters preceded by an introduction. Chapter 1 comprises review of literature relevant to Pakistan’s security in the military, political, societal, economic and environmental sectors with a view to signify its characteristics and highlight voids that this study intends to cover. Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical framework, which is Securitization Theory within multi-sectoral security concept of Barry Buzan et al. (1998) analyzed in a Poststructuralist paradigm using discourse analysis. The period of research will be the Zardari led Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) and Nawaz led 2013 Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N) governments. Chapter 3 deals with securitization moves on critical security issues during the genesis of Pakistan and later during the course of her history before President Zardari, i.e., before the period of this research. Chapter 4 deals with securitization of political security issues in Pakistan including 18th Constitutional Amendment 2010, 7th National Finance Commission Award 2010, and Initiating Balochistan Rights Package – Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e- Balochistan Package (AHBP) 2010. Chapter 5 deals with securitization of military and societal security issues in Pakistan, e.g., Malakand stability effort 2009, Operation Zarb-e-Azb 2014, and National Action Plan 2015. Chapter 6 deals with significant economic and environmental security issues in Pakistan during the period of research, e.g., defense versus development debate, aid-dependence, negative impact of globalization, illegal trade, effects of climate change, and the ever-increasing water stress. The study will conclude with Chapter 7 where a cross sectoral synthesis of the identified securitization processes in different sectors of Pakistan’s security during the period of research will be undertaken.

The first step in identifying the scope and significance of this research would be to scan the literature and find gaps where this study could contribute. Chapter 1 would endeavor to

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undertake a survey of relevant written material with a view to identify the discussion about national security priorities of Pakistan.

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CHAPTER 1

LITERATURE REVIEW

Existing body of literature on Pakistan’s security can be categorized in five domains of multi-sectoral framework, i.e., political, military, societal, economic and environmental sectors, although with frequent overlapping accounts because of their obvious interconnectedness. The political, military and societal sectors have seen more scholarship from security point of view than the economic and environmental sectors. Overall, there is no dearth of literature on Pakistan’s security. Generally it is characterized by the predominant perception of existential threat from India but over the period of years internal instability in the country has come to fore as the biggest challenge to security along with the recognition of equally grave threats in the political, economic and environmental domains of national security. The premium that Pakistan’s geopolitical importance puts on her stability figures out prominently in the literature about Pakistan’s security both in its positive and negative connotations.

Shuja Nawaz,1 Maleeha Lodhi,2 Brian Cloughley,3 Pakistan Ex-servicemen Association (PESA),4 Ahmad Faruqui,5 Manzar Zaidi,6 Lawrence Ziring,7 Farooq Hasnat,8 Anatol Lieven,9

1 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords (Oxford: OUP, 2008). 2 Maleeha Lodhi, “Beyond the Crisis State,” in Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State, ed. Maleeha Lodhi, (Karachi: OUP, 2011). 3 Brian Cloughley, History of the Pakistan Army, 3rd Edition (Oxford: OUP, 2006). 4 Pakistan Ex Servicemen Association, “A Suggested National Security Policy of ‘Peace at Home and Peace Abroad’ for Pakistan,” Criterion 6, no. 3 (August 15, 2012), http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/a-suggested- national-security-policy-of-“peace-at-home-and-peace-abroad”-for-pakistan/. 5 Ahmad Faruqui, Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2003). 6 Manzar Zaidi, Insights on Insecurity in Pakistan (Islamabad: Narratives, 2012). 7 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan at the Crosscurrent of History (New Delhi: Manas, 2005). 8 Syed Farooq Hasnat, Global Security Watch - Pakistan (California: Praeger, 2011). 9 Anatol Lieven, Pakistan A Hard Country (London: Allen Lane, 2011). 25

Stephen Cohen 10,11 Adhikari and Bhaduria,12 Bruce Riedel,13 T. V. Paul,14 and Daniel S. Markey15 cover the political and military domains of Pakistan’s security to a large extent.

Shuja Nawaz in his book Crossed Swords, which is a major work about the history of Pakistan’s military security, asserted that Pakistan’s tilt towards the U.S. was a natural reaction of a beleaguered weaker state seeking to obviate her security dilemma through external balancing.16 It came about quite regularly and in cycles. The first of these balancing acts came on 19 May 1954 when the U.S. Charge d’ Affaires in Pakistan, John K. Emmerson and the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Zafarulla Khan signed the Mutual Defence Agreement between the Governments of U.S. and Pakistan in Karachi, slated to provide $ 171 million to raise 5 ½ Army divisions in the next three years.

In that time period, the U.S. not only mulled over the adverse reaction and disadvantage of very slow disbursement of such assistance but also over the wisdom of accepting Pakistan as a military ally. While chairing a meeting of National Security Council in January 1957, President Eisenhower lamented that “this was perhaps the worst kind of a plan and decision we could have made. It was a terrible error but we now seem hopelessly involved in it.” Soon after the military takeover of 7 October 1958 in Pakistan, the U.S. was reassessing her aid program to establish whether the main U.S. objective was military or strategic and what were the repercussions of augmenting Pakistan’s defense capability in return for getting assurance of anti-communism potential and airfield support for the U.S. strategic air command? Relationship with the U.S. saw more straining during the 60s as it shifted attention towards India as a potentially better partner, being a huge democracy, a counterweight to China, and a budding market for U.S. goods and services. Pakistan raised her reservations but the U.S. and U.K.’s $ 120 million assistance to India continued as a result of the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) report of December

10 Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005). 11 Stephen P. Cohen, Shooting for a Century (India: Harper Collins, 2013). 12 Chawla Shalini, “Understanding Pakistan’s Strategy,” in India’s National Security in the 21st Century, eds. Shekhar Adhikari and Sanjeey Bhadauria, (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2014). 13 Bruce Riedel, Avoiding Armageddon (India: Harper Collins, 2013). 14 T.V. Paul, The Warrior State (New York: OUP, 2014). 15 Daniel S. Markey, No Exit from Pakistan (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 16 Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 92–188. 26

1962, while at the same time the U.S. proposed a military assistance program (MAP) of $ 143 million for Pakistan by mid-July 1963.

After the 1965 War, in the wake of deteriorating relations with the U.S., Pakistan’s reliance on China grew significantly in terms of economic and military assistance. About forty F- 6 fighter aircraft, one hundred T-59 tanks, considerable quantity of small arms, vehicles, and ancillary items – enough to equip three infantry divisions – were supplied.17 Despite reasonable military balance, as events were to prove later, internal dysfunction, political apathy, economic insecurity, and Indian covert abetment led to dismemberment of the country in 1971, which further accentuated the military sector of Pakistan’s national security. The 80s saw renewed world attention due to the Soviet war in Afghanistan and hence more military and economic assistance, which dried up in the 90s, only to be resuscitated in the 2000s due to the U.S. led ‘War on Terror.’ A common feature of these cyclical periods of moving back and forth on the international security agenda was more and more focus on the traditional concept of state security revolving around the military capabilities. This work is focused on traditional military security because it is essentially a historical account of Pakistan Army carried out by a keen observer of the Army, Shuja Nawaz, whose brother Asif Nawaz served as the 10th Chief of the Army Staff from August 1991 - January 1993. It is not a comprehensive account of Pakistan’s security, hence does not take into consideration the other security threats to Pakistan which grew over the years in the political, societal, economic, and environmental domains.

Maleeha Lodhi in an essay titled “Beyond the Crisis State” in a book edited by her, Pakistan, Beyond the Crisis State, argued that the issues of security, economy and governance have impacted each other in a complex manner that makes it difficult to ascertain their cause and effect relationship in the case of Pakistan. While pondering whether the issue of security has been the cause of political disarray, squandered resources and economic mismanagement, she was of the opinion that these issues are compounded and the crisis set by them is systemic, which can only be resolved by tackling them together. In her view, the ‘enduring quest for security’ has dominated the evolution of Pakistan’s domestic political developments and its foreign policy. Indian hostility and domination, accentuated by contentious borders inherited from a colonial

17 Cloughley, History of the Pakistan Army, 121. 27

split, bred a sense of insecurity in successive leadership in Pakistan. Kashmir dispute remained the principal contentious issue of existential proportion between the two belligerents, being termed as ‘jugular vein’ and ‘an indispensable part’ by the founding fathers of Pakistan and India respectively. It caused the wars of 1948 and 1965, besides causing other midscale escalations like the Kargil engagement in 1999 and the military standoff in 2001, with a perpetual ‘no war no peace’ confrontation between the arch rivals along the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan regions.

The western front of Pakistan has also never been peaceful due to either the irredentist claims of Kabul or the proxy cum anti-occupation wars going on in the volatile regions of Afghanistan. Perpetual fear of India overrunning Pakistan in a deep military encirclement from the east resulted in seeking alliances in Afghanistan, in order to secure the western front and avoid a two front war. In the same vein, Pakistan was forced to form alliance with the U.S. and the West in order to bolster her security against Indian bellicosity. Such enduring fears, which were alarming for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, led to the military centric security approach. The frontline status that marred Pakistan’s geopolitics during the anti- Soviet and anti-Taliban wars came as a devastating corollary to the Western geopolitical alignment and played havoc with the polity and society of a striving and progressive nation. It spawned extremism, created systemic aid dependence and resulted in prominent fissures in the society.18 Of these three trends, perhaps the most serious was the crisis of confidence in self-help that was evident from the arduousness with which foreign financial, technological and economic assistance was sought as the panacea of most ills. Maleeha Lodhi’s chapter in this book is a brief yet fulfilling account of Pakistan’s security history. However, it does not see threats to the internal federal political structure, the severity of environmental stress, and the grave societal insecurity in some parts of the country as existential threats.

Intellectually, Pakistan has made some progress in steering its national security discourse towards a comprehensive framework. As an example, a nongovernmental panel of Pakistan Ex- servicemen Association (PESA) suggested the National Security Strategy (NSS) for Pakistan: Peace at Home and Peace Abroad, in August 2012. After criticizing the earlier manner of

18 Lodhi, “Beyond the Crisis State,” 47. 28

defining national security in Pakistan as “the integrity of the national territory and its institutions” as given by Morgenthau in Politics among Nations, authors of PESA’s NSS argued that secure nations have tended to accept Arnold Wolfers “absence of threats to acquired values” as a more wholesome classification of national security. This definition, the authors argued, “emphasizes values that enable us to overcome risk from poverty, hunger, and from poor and unequal educational and job opportunities.” It emphasized freedom from risk of internal and external threats to values and highlighted the dangers emanating from absence of a well-defined ‘common identity or purpose’ for Pakistan.

The PESA’s NSS identified six Vital National Interests for Pakistan: national integration and harmony, defense and security, economic well-being, favorable regional and global order, people’s security versus state security, and promotion of our national values. The proposed NSS by PESA also suggested four Important National Interests. First, equitable distribution of wealth among sections of society. Second, grooming of a thinking, tolerant nation with strong / correct (sic) beliefs. Third, developing culture of dynamism, patience and tolerance. Fourth, protecting national environment and helping protect regional and global environments.19 The articulation of national interests indicate PESA’s awareness of the widening debate about national security, as embodied in the constitutive theory of Barry Buzan et al. (1998), i.e., multi-sector approach (military, environment, economic, societal and political) in order to make the national security conception comprehensive.

Analysis of PESA’s NSS vital national interests in the backdrop of Buzan’s model of national security reveals that ‘national integration and harmony’ embody security in political and societal sectors; ‘defense and security’ embrace the military and societal dimensions; ‘economic well-being’ takes care of the environment, economic, and societal sectors; ‘favored regional and global order’ will look after the political facet; ‘peoples’ security versus state security’ clearly enunciates the priority accorded to societal security; lastly, ‘promotion of national values’ also reinforces societal security.

19 Pakistan Ex Servicemen Association, “A Suggested National Security Policy of ‘Peace at Home and Peace Abroad’ for Pakistan.” 29

The suggested NSS, which is an indicator of Pakistan’s national security discourse, indicates a shift in the traditional, military-centric formulation of national security policies, coming rather interestingly from a forum of ex militarists. The attempt to securitize pertinent issues in military, political, societal, economic, and environmental sectors is apparent in this document. But an important requirement for securitization to take effect is the acceptance of the security narrative by a large audience which, in this case, is yet to be seen.

Advocacy of widening the national security formulation can be found in the academic work of Ahmad Faruqui, Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan, which is highly critical of the military-centric view of Pakistan’s security, terming it as ‘strategic myopia.’ Faruqui believes Pakistan’s national security policy is premised upon three assumptions: pessimism about Indian intentions, optimism about Allied cooperation and optimism about its military capabilities.20 He explains the foundational reasons of the fear of India beginning with the denial of a fair share to Pakistan’s fledgling military and economy from the divisible pool of British Indian resources. It led various governments to seek assistance from the U.S. through political and military alliances like Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), enabling inflow of significant military aid and training. The very identities of both countries, one an Islamic State and the other a predominant Hindu one, marred by mutual distrust and the conflict over the core issue of Kashmir, are a constant challenge to each other. Pakistan’s common perception about India is that of a hegemonic power bent upon undermining Pakistan’s interest at every level, not reconciled to the partition and on the lookout to dismember Pakistan further in a manner similar to 1971. In Faruqui’s view this leads to an attitude of ‘constant belligerence’ by Pakistan to preserve its separate identity and existence.

Such perpetual animosity has imbibed ‘paranoia’ in the strategic thinking of Pakistan leading to large defense spending. According to Fauqui, Pakistan’s misplaced optimism about defense patronage of partners like the U.S. and China and support of allies like Iran, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Kingdoms, and Turkey against India has been an obviously wrong assumption in 1965 and 1971 wars. He argues that his third premise in Pakistan’s National Security, i.e., optimism about its military capabilities, stems from the rich Islamic heritage nurturing a false

20 Faruqui, Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan, 41. 30

belief of super-human strengths and the formidability of martial races in the military, which have a historical legacy of courage stemming from the days of British Indian Army. After a highly critical appraisal of the way national security has been prioritized narrow mindedly by successive governments in Pakistan, Faruqui suggests ‘an integrated approach to national security’ comprising of five dimensions, namely, military, political leadership, social cohesion, economic vitality and foreign policy. He terms military as the hard asset of national security and the others as soft assets and recommends a rebalancing of assets to reduce military expenditure without reducing its potency by reducing the active forces by half and reinstituting equal number of reserves, on the lines of Israeli Defense Forces.

Interestingly, Faruqui does not believe in the stability of deterrence value of nuclear weapons, rather criticizes them for being enormously expensive, resulting in increased spending on conventional weapons, moving rivals closer to Armageddon and inviting international opprobrium and economic sanctions. Recommendations of the author to rebalance Pakistan’s national security include: national security council empowered to dismiss an elected government on the basis of established incompetence replacing it with temporary military rule and reelection; instituting Chief of Defense Forces; transparent analysis of military’s expenditures; defense dominated strategy leading to smaller force structure with a slackened arms race; and accountability of all military failures through a judicial commission.21 While broaching the concept of multi-sectoral security this work does not explore the ‘security’ perspective of sectors other than military and hence stops short of identifying the securitization moves in the past to seek extraordinary measures for certain critical threats to national security in those sectors.

Manzar Zaidi, in his scientifically researched book, Insights on Insecurity in Pakistan has delved into the reasons of extremism leading to radicalization and violence in Pakistan. He has used field surveys to ‘document increased incidence of the radicalized ideas amongst the impoverished in Pakistan,’ without claiming to establish a veritable link between poverty and terrorism in this country.22 Rather, it only ascertains the contexts in which the less privileged classes tend to support radical ideas, not necessarily indicating their inclination towards militancy or terrorism. For example, 49% of the segment of the sample in the survey

21 Faruqui, 113, 131. 22 Zaidi, Insights on Insecurity in Pakistan, 103. 31

representing the poor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Province rejected the use of violence by religious groups in Pakistan. 64% of the same segment was not in favor of Taliban takeover in Pakistan, 56% did not support future attacks against the U.S. but 77% recorded intense grievances against the U.S. The study does not establishes a firm linkage between poverty and radicalization in Pakistan but does help to affirm that it cannot be brushed aside as an insignificant variable of radicalization in the society. The author suggests international donor attention to this strategic concern regarding Pakistan’s poverty fault lines in order to prevent them from being ‘ruptured by radicalization and extremism,’ however he does not raises concern to the level of securitization of poverty.

Lawrence Ziring, an important voice on Pakistan’s security history, in his recent book Pakistan at the Crosscurrent of History, opined that the U.S. has the greatest foreign influence on Pakistan’s governance. Pakistan’s political turbulence in the wake of repeated military rules has been the result of convoluted U.S. interests in the country and the region. He is of the opinion that Pakistan’s failure to establish true democracy is actually attributable to Americans, “who could have done more to promote democracy in Pakistan.”23 He argues, Washington has been supporting one military ruler after another, General Musharraf being the last in this series of politically expedient embraces, however, in the ultimate analysis, a foreign power cannot be blamed for a country’s woes forever. The complexities of Pakistani identity, reluctance to come to grips with the conflicting ethos, and concocted approach to democracy highlights the complexity of identifying securitization moves in the discourses resonating political security of Pakistan.

Syed Farooq Hasnat in his work Global Security Watch – Pakistan questions whether Pakistan’s domestic political structure weakened due to repeated military interventions by power-seeking generals or was it the politicians’ ineptitude, venality, and utter disregard for the population that provided unwarranted political space to the Army for intervention with the tacit support of civil bureaucracy? This argument is an underlying tension that defines the weakness in the political system of the country.24

23 Ziring, Pakistan at the Crosscurrent of History, 294. 24 Hasnat, Global Security Watch - Pakistan, 54. 32

Over the years, political insecurity led to societal insecurity in Pakistan, as extremism, sectarianism, militancy and terrorism grew unabated in the country alongside poverty and institutional decay. Balochistan’s tumultuous situation is another source of domestic insecurity in Pakistan, mired by a history of revolts and insurgencies. Hasnat believes the ongoing militancy is largely the result of Musharraf era policies of highhandedly dealing with Bugti’s dissent, leading to his death in July 2006. Subsequent political governments backed down from militarily confronting the terrorists’ activities in the Province, which led to their regaining influence through waves of terror, mostly on ethnic and sectarian lines, as the political governments remained aloof. The security apparatus, meanwhile, has been blamed for kidnapping of Baloch dissidents and at times indulging in extra-judicial killings. According to Hasnat, the gravity of unrest was evident to Zardari Government, which initiated political cum economic reconciliation in the form of wide ranging debate on the broader issue of the Baloch’s deep rooted grievances and legislated a landmark bill termed Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan (Initiating Balochistan Rights) giving unprecedented political and financial incentives to address the Baloch complaints.25 It was a typical securitization move that fulfilled all the prerequisites of this security phenomenon, which would be examined in greater detail in the chapter on Political Security in this research. Hasnat’s work is a comprehensive account of the diverse threats to Pakistan’s security in societal, political and military domains, however, it falls short of categorizing the economic woes of the country or its environmental pressures as national security threats.

Anatol Lieven in Pakistan a Hard Country concludes about the country’s future as a state that is ‘tough’ and will survive the present travails, “barring catastrophic decisions of Washington, New Delhi - and, of course Islamabad.” Rational actor theory precludes such disastrous scenarios and thinking more realistically, Lieven rightly proclaims that in the long term the gravest existential threat to Pakistan is not insurgency but ecological change. Droughts will have to be faced in water scarce parts of the country and floods will have to be “controlled and harnessed with given determination, organization and money.”26 It entails a strategic understanding of a multi-sectoral, comprehensive framework of national security to meet these

25 Hasnat, 107. 26 Lieven, Pakistan A Hard Country, 477. 33

diverse and non-traditional challenges and securitization of the right threats by the policy makers to gain urgent and extraordinary remedy.

Stephen P. Cohen, a prominent commentator on Subcontinent’s security, in one of his famous works, The Idea of Pakistan, is of the opinion that an elite-driven ‘oligarchic system’ will continue in Pakistan because the cost of revamp would be very high and unacceptable to those in power; a ‘permanent establishment.’ In his opinion, even this permanent establishment is threatened from within and without. Unmanaged population growth, poor literacy, no land reforms, no regional economic unions, poor economy, inadequate educational system, and unbridled urbanization will overstretch Pakistan’s domestic institutions. Without massive investment, these institutions are likely to give way and the country will keep falling behind in the comity of ‘modern’ states. Pakistan’s geostrategic relevance is temporary and subject to oft repeated criticism about double standards and rent seeking. Even the aid is unlikely to rebuild the key administrative and political institutions. The pervasive maladministration, corruption, and massive tax evasion will cripple Pakistan, “unless the entire administration, not just a few high profile officers, embraces fiscal and administrative discipline.”27

However, there is a need to see how far the non-military issues were securitized as ‘crippling’ national security threats to Pakistan. In the political domain, Cohen argued that the way out of the perpetual civil-military friction in Pakistan is a gradual shifting of power and authority from the military to the civil “spanning the tenures of more than one prime minister and more than one army chief.”28 Analysis of discourses in the political domain, and the way securitization figured out in those during the period of research, would help to identify the ‘threat’ perspective in the ‘political’ sector of Pakistan’s national security.

In his latest quest for seeking answers to the future of Indo-Pak relationship conundrum, Cohen in his recent book Shooting for a Century prophesizes the ‘eternal rivalry’ as genealogical, mutating and pervasive. Kashmir, the ‘root-cause’ of rivalry is itself becoming ‘as much a symptom as a cause.’ It was essentially an issue of injustice to people but has become more of an irredentist dispute. The relationship between these two countries is intractable, with

27 Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, 273. 28 Cohen, 160. 34

the rivalry “firmly wedged in the internal politics of both countries.” The intractability is structurally complex. Cohen questions whether it is due to “territory (for example Kashmir), authority over people (over Kashmiris, and also over Indian Muslims), ideology, or a simple struggle for power between two powerful states?” In his opinion, “some elements on both sides argue that they will never have a normal relationship.” It is going to be a war-like relationship, unless one of the two belligerents “gives in completely – whether on the territorial issue, the people issue, or the ideological issue – or all three.”29 In such hostile projections, securitization of military issues have been coming naturally to Pakistan, but there is a need to find out the way in which discourses securitized the military threats emanating from India in order to understand their sedimentation from a post-structuralism lens.

Shalini asserts that in the Indian national security calculus, along with a widening in the security agenda, Pakistan remains a constant threat with a three-dimensional approach towards India comprising conventional, sub-conventional and nuclear levels.30 In the conventional domain, Pakistan is believed to rely heavily on the strategy of offensive action seeking high-tech weaponry to support this strategy. It is believed that the military build-up is facilitated by Pakistan’s alliance with the U.S., relationship with China, and financial autonomy of the military within Pakistan. The sub-conventional domain revolves around Pakistan military’s persistent strategy of covert war over the last six decades. The author argues that creating terror in the hearts of enemy is a cardinal military strategy precept of Pakistan and one of the most effective means of doing so is through covert warfare, which includes “tactics like guerrilla warfare, inciting insurgencies, destruction of buildings, etc., now including use of terror in the name of religion.” In the author’s view, the third dimension of Pakistan’s strategy towards India is nuclear weapons capability used to deter Indian conventional forces and use the space thus created for furthering the sub-conventional strategy for achieving the objectives of destabilizing Kashmir and ‘sponsoring terrorism.’

Shalini professes that a ‘nuclear umbrella’ has made Pakistan more assertive in pursuing terrorism, as reflected in their clandestine activities spread all over India, especially Kashmir. The conventional wisdom about the inadmissibility of “limited war” as an option to settle a

29 Cohen, Shooting for a Century, 146. 30 Chawla Shalini, “Understanding Pakistan’s Strategy,” 157–175. 35

conflict between two nuclear powers notwithstanding, the author concedes frankly that India routinely advocates the possibility of engaging Pakistan in a conventional war in spite of the nuclear weapons. Quite expectedly, the result of such provocation is fear in Pakistan’s policy makers’ minds resulting in the build-up of military capability. In conclusion, the author asks Indian strategists if they have a plan to create the required effects to answer Pakistan’s strategy of waging secret wars against India. Securitization of Pakistan’s military capability as stimulated by such estimation of its policy by the Indian strategists would be explored in detail as part of the discourse analysis of the historical context of Pakistan’s security conceptions.

Bruce Riedel in his book about the South Asian security volatility, Avoiding Armageddon, concludes that the U.S. faces a tough foreign policy challenge in South Asia in dealing with the two powers, India and Pakistan, rising in their own rights. Both states are entangled in self-styled war of survival and a balance of power struggle, where the U.S. has often been forced under grim circumstances to keep temperatures below war thresholds, which are ominously intertwined with the possibility of a nuclear Armageddon. As the U.S. cozies up with India, there is an increasing demand from pro-India and anti-Pakistan lobbies of “de- hyphenating” the relationship with India and Pakistan, which Riedel endorses as “an inevitability of geography.”31

Most interestingly, the author, who is an avid regional analyst and a prominent policy advisor on South Asia to various U.S. Presidents, alludes to an active role by the U.S. in resolution of Kashmir issue, if enduring peace is to be nurtured in this volatile region.32 Notwithstanding U.S.’s historical aversion to conflict resolution and preference to conflict management, the author believes the current high in Indo-US relationship should be exploited to use “quite American diplomacy to help advance the Kashmir issue to a better, more stable solution,” with the next U.S. President building on this strategic partnership to “quietly but forcefully encourage New Delhi to be more flexible on Kashmir.” Riedel identifies Kashmir issue as a source of extra-regional terrorism and a cause of war in South Asia in the past that remains so for the future as well, endangering global security. He propagates its recognition by policymakers as a grave security challenge to the U.S. interests, recommending extraordinary

31 Riedel, Avoiding Armageddon, xii. 32 Riedel, 198. 36

measures including changing existing U.S. policy of supporting status quo to one of active participation, to seek a pragmatic solution; a clear case of securitization in the making, albeit from the U.S. perspective.

T.V. Paul in his recent work The Warrior State describes Pakistan’s recurrently aggressive foreign policy behavior as a result of the unduly high geostrategic priority misconceived by successive rulers and often uncannily aggravated by the diplomatic support accorded by the U.S. and China. National security priorities of Pakistan, driven by elite’s misperception, have been exaggeratedly military centric due to a ‘hyper-realpolitik’ worldview that is focused upon a perpetual strategic competition with India. He accuses Pakistan of squandering the financial support given by its allies in building military structures rather than spending on social and economic development. The author opines that the self-motivation of geostrategic prominence has led to narrowly defined national priorities and goals revolving around a zero-sum game with India and Afghanistan, in fact becoming a geostrategic ‘curse,’ prohibiting Pakistan from broadening her skewed security objectives.

The author blames Pakistan of resorting to an asymmetric war in order to offset the overwhelming structural advantage that India enjoys in relation to Pakistan. He terms Indian policies like ‘Cold Start’ and the earlier military intervention in East Pakistan as reactive and often ‘poorly crafted’ fueling Pakistan’s insecurities and further augmenting anti-India mindset. Irredentism is termed as the source of conflict in the region where Pakistan’s military has to assume center stage in political decision-making in Pakistan to challenge a status quo power like India. The author describes Pakistan’s policies to ‘control’ Afghanistan by supporting and encouraging a Taliban takeover, and the tendency of the military and the Inter-Services- Intelligence (ISI) to scuttle any peace initiatives of the civilian leadership, as factors undermining chance for a peaceful settlement with India. The growing Sino-Indian rivalry accentuates Pakistan’s role as an ally of China and further exacerbates Indo-Pak tensions leading to continued ‘war-making efforts by Pakistan.’33 Notwithstanding the fact that such ‘efforts’ are not undertaken in a strategic vacuum, this rather biased account provides a widely propagated perspective on securitization of Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives and their political dynamics,

33 Paul, The Warrior State, 125,193. 37

which enriches the discussion and elaborates Pakistan’s security discourse by adding opposing views.

Daniel S. Markey from The Council on Foreign Relations, a popular U.S. think tank, has authored a journalistic analysis of Pakistan’s security and U.S. options, No Exit from Pakistan. After briefly generalizing few perspectives about Pakistan, he has argued about the long term U.S. interests in the region and the need of U.S. to remain engaged comprehensively with Pakistan.34

The first perspective, sarcastically termed ‘Basket Case’, focuses on the poor economic development indicators of the country, its weak infrastructure and rudderless political stewardship.

The second perspective, ‘Garrison State’, highlights the predominant role of the military in statecraft owing to their overly ‘Realpolitik’ mindset towards India, of guarding against capabilities and not intentions while trying to match their military expansion, despite Indian assurances of her intentions ‘as defensive and directed toward China more than Pakistan.’ While the author has compared the number of military personnel on both sides, there is no mention of the massive armored offensive formations and supporting mobilization infrastructure that has remained very specific to Pakistan and cannot be switched against China due to incompatible geography. This perspective also criticizes Pakistan for imitating Cold War era U.S. strategy of increasing the credibility of NATO’s nuclear deterrence by reducing the warhead size to suit tactical formations in order to dissuade massive Soviet armored assault against Germany. Pakistan military’s entrepreneurial ventures that motivate the ‘Garrison State’ also come under acute criticism by the author during the description of this perspective.

The third lens which the author uses to describe today’s Pakistan is termed ‘Terrorist Incubator.’ Apart from social cum religious endeavors like madrassahs and Al-Huda female Islamic education network, this perspective brands the growing rhetoric of ‘Defense of Pakistan Council,’ exhorting the masses for defending Islam and Pakistan against the U.S. and India, as a grave threat to Pakistan’s domestic fabric. However, we believe that the societal space perceived

34 Markey, No Exit from Pakistan, 41–62. 38

for extremist organizations like Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT) and Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) by the author is exaggerated.

The fourth one is a positive perspective termed ‘Youthful Idealist.’ It is based upon the potential of the numerous energetic, entrepreneurial, educated and motivated youth that can turn the predicament around in Pakistan, given that they achieve the critical mass under a favorable political environment of reform, like the one promised by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) leader Imran Khan.

Each one of these four perspectives, i.e., ‘Basket Case’, ‘Garrison State’, ‘Terrorist Incubator’ and ‘Youthful Idealist’ is the author’s construction of Pakistan’s security threats in economic, military, societal and political sectors respectively. A study of the securitization moves of the State, or absence thereof, against significant threats to Pakistan’s security in those sectors will be pursued in this research to assess the wider social construction of Pakistan’s security conception.

Pamela Constable,35 Syed Saleem Shahzad,36 and N. Elahi37 focus on internal security issues of Pakistan. Their works dilate in depth on radicalization, religious extremism and terrorism as violent threats to the political and societal security.

Pamela Constable in her work Playing with Fire terms radicalization ‘a war for Pakistan’s soul.’ Indeed, the rising radicalism in Pakistan is a grave security challenge. The societal tussle taking place between the obscurantist forces, which wish to take the country back to the puritan rule of Islam, and the modernist forces, which desire to make Pakistan a progressive and burgeoning country, much on the lines of Turkey, is called a ‘contest between Sufism and Salafism’ by the author. The tensions in seemingly different but often overlapping identities has been resulting in confusion and frustration visible in the Pakistani society where “its elite families send their children to study in the West but summon them home to marry an appropriate compatriot and fellow Muslim.”38 Constable’s is a first-hand account of the diverse

35 Pamela Constable, Playing with Fire (New York: Random House, 2011). 36 Syed Saleem Shahzad, Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban (London: Palgrave, 2011). 37 N. Elahi, “The Existential Threat,” in Pakistan’s Quagmire: Security, Strategy, and the Future of the Islamic- Nuclear Nation, ed. Usama Butt and N. Elahi (London: Contiuum, 2010), 123–56. 38 Constable, Playing with Fire, 149. 39

facets of Pakistan’s society but remains rather sarcastic, devoid of academic rigor and often one- sided. Such accounts reveal that analysis of the discourses that dominate the security debates of a society with complex identities and interests like Pakistan, in order to identify discernible securitization moves, would be a significant challenge for this research.

The ever growing nexus between various militant organizations in Pakistan and Afghanistan including Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Lashkar-e- Jhangvi (LeJ), Jundullah, Haqqani Network, Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda has been boldly recorded, at times based on primary sources, by Syed Saleem Shahzad in Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The book provides an insight into the conveniently networked modus operandi of the apparently disparate terrorist groups operating in the region. The author gives an alarming account of the sound ideological basis, firm political organization, farsighted strategy and ruthless tactics, which are the hallmark of these transnational organizations spawning terrorism with a grand design in mind. Both Al-Qaeda and Taliban act as the supreme coordinators of the various terrorist factions and use their influence to iron out mutual differences for a bigger objective like defeating NATO in Afghanistan, inflicting harm upon Pakistan Armed Forces, igniting Indo-Pak tensions, and setting up an Islamic Emirate.39

The proliferating challenge of terrorism has obviously figured out prominently in the threat discourse of Pakistan and has often seen a consequent securitization move. Such moves had resulted in political legislation (protection of Pakistan Bill 2014 and National Action Plan 2015) as well as military action (Operation Zarb-e-Azb 2014-17), both of which reflect a growing recognition of the requirement for extraordinary measures needed to control this menacing threat. The fallout of terrorism in the shape of indiscriminate loss of life and property of common citizens is dangerous not only to societal security but to the military and political security of the country as well because of the massive damage inflicted on Armed Forces and the challenge posed to the writ of the State, which is supposed to have ‘monopoly over violence.’ It is often termed as ‘The Existential Threat’ and four factors have been listed as significant in promoting terrorism in the country; sectarian / jihadi organizations, inhospitable territories of FATA, widespread madrassahs and the U.S. mistrust of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) role in

39 Shahzad, Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, 30. 40

Afghanistan; though Al-Qaeda, Taliban, and TTP remain the core concerns.40 Shahzad’s account is not an academic masterpiece but a frank and firsthand narration of his perspective on the indispensable nexus of the various shades of militant organizations thriving in FATA in his times. He gathered that perspective from interviews with some prominent terrorists, and also some disgruntled deserter military officers from Pakistan. This work adds to the discourse on Pakistan’s counterterrorism challenges, wherein lies its value in this review of literature.

Daniel Kaufmann, et al.’s World Governance Indicators,41 Ashraf Hayat,42 Noah Feldman,43 and Lamb and Hameed44 discuss the impact of poor governance as non-violent threat to the political and societal security of Pakistan.

Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), a World Bank funded project compiles aggregate and individual governance indicators covering six aspects of governance; Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence; Government Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; Control of Corruption.45 It defines governance as consisting of the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised” including, the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies,” besides the independence and authority of institutions governing the economic and social interaction between the state and the citizens. WGI statistical report indicates bottom-one-fifth-in-the-world performance of Pakistan in all the six categories of governance mentioned above, compared to over 200 countries over the period 1996-2013 given in percentile (1 percentile means 99% countries are above). Pakistan’s best being Regulatory Quality at 24.9 percentile and the worst being Political Stability and Absence of Violence at 0.1 percentile and an average of 18.6 percentile in all six categories.46

40 Elahi, “The Existential Threat.” 41 David Kaufman, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, “Worldwide Governance Indicators” (The World Bank Group, 2014), http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#countryReports. 42 Ashraf Hayat, “Strategy Not Tactics: Better Governance for Social Stability in Pakistan” (Institute for Policy Reforms, 2014), http://ipr.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Strategy-not-Tactics-Final.pdf. 43 Feldman Noah, “The Fall and The Rise of Islamic State” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2008). 44 Robert D. Lamb and Sadika Hameed, Subnational Governance, Service Delivery, and Militancy in Pakistan (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012). 45 Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, “Worldwide Governance Indicators.” 46 Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi. 41

Ashraf Hayat believes that the most important reason to study governance in Pakistan is that it likely contributes to instability in the country.47 The breakdown of law and order and lack of services indicate that political institutions are frail, state is ineffective, there is no agreement about the strategic direction the country must take and above all there are no leaders. The key governance issues in Pakistan are institutional imbalance, institutional incompetency, elitist political economy, centralized power of civil servants, absence of devolution, lack of capacity of judiciary and civil service, corruption, and lastly patriarchic / tribal politics and weak civil society.”48

It has been often emphasized that a tendency towards being an Islamic state in the Muslim World today is essentially based on a call for better governance to include mixing Islamic jurisprudence and democracy, mixing the religious and worldly precepts of statecraft, promising a reform agenda for economic revival and effective governance, and adoption of Sharia as law:

“Political actors in the contemporary Muslim world, from ordinary voters to elites, take Islam seriously as a basis for government only to the extent that they believe it can make a practical difference in places where both state and society itself have fallen on hard times.”49

Governance gone astray leads to disenchantment, frustration and alternative ideologies. The rise of Mangal Bagh’s Lashkar-e-Islam in Federally Administered Tribal Agency’s (FATA) Khyber Agency in 2008 riding the tide of popular demand for speedy justice and protection and help for the distressed exemplifies how gaps in governance threaten the writ of state with popular support. Similarly, Haqqani network was helping to negotiate sectarian conflict between warring Bangash and Turis in Kurram Agency of FATA, where violence has claimed more than 3000 lives in Parachinar area since 2007, with the aim of securing strategic space in the Agency. Most of the governance issues reside at the sub-national level, i.e., devolution of power from provinces to districts.50 The Provincial governments are reluctant to share administrative powers with the districts, not keen to evolve a pro-disenfranchised political dispensation.

47 Hayat, “Strategy Not Tactics: Better Governance for Social Stability in Pakistan,” 1. 48 Hayat, 8–29. 49 Noah, “The Fall and The Rise of Islamic State,” 3. 50 Lamb and Hameed, Subnational Governance, Service Delivery, and Militancy in Pakistan, 45–50. 42

The gravity of Pakistan’s governance shortcomings have too often been called as ‘failed’ or ‘bad’, which merits an inquiry for ascertaining whether those failings are of such nature that could invoke securitization? The need is to assess the impact of severity of governance problems in Pakistan’s security discourses. It should however be appreciated that there is no well-defined parameter beyond which the suboptimal governance can be termed as absolutely dysfunctional, worthy of invoking some extraordinary measure of redress immediately, if national security is to be guarded.

Akhtar Ali,51 Hossain, Kathuria and Islam,52 and Shahid Javed Burki53 analyze the impact of poor development and marginal economic opportunities resulting due to weak governance on societal and economic security.

Akhtar Ali is of the view that Swat is an apt example where the Taliban managed to get a foothold in a settled area by 2009 with the unwitting approval of the general population in the hope that a better social justice system would be ushered in with this new ideology.54 Similar undercurrents are simmering in Balochistan. Bad governance in the province is reflected in compromised public interest, violation of rule of law, poor state of schools and health facilities, and massive corruption in the public sector departments. The author points out a host of other indicators including corruption in examination system, bonded labor, widespread malnutrition, street children, beggary and untended old, massive corruption in judiciary, police, bureaucracy and even in procurement departments of Armed Forces. Ali’s litany of corruption also includes lack of civil liberties, illegal confinement and torture, violence against women, children, and minorities, gender discrimination, sectarian and ethnic discrimination and violence, high unemployment, poorly implemented labor laws, poor working conditions, disregard to environmental considerations by businesses, cartels, smuggling, over-pricing, and black marketing.

Ali has touched some very pertinent and sensitive chords of national security in his work without categorizing those as such. Arguably, the entire list of societal and governmental

51 Akhtar Ali, Pakistan’s Development Challenges (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 2010). 52 Moazzem Hossain, Rajat Kathuria, and Inayatul Islam, South Asian Economic Development (London: Routledge, 2010). 53 Shahid Javed Burki, Changing Perceptions, Altered Reality (Karachi: OUP, 2007). 54 Ali, Pakistan’s Development Challenges, 262. 43

malfunctions highlighted by the author cannot be treated as national security challenges per se, but many of those clearly undermine the political and societal security. Whether corruption was securitized in the period of this research or otherwise will be a good indicator of the merit this threat found in the evolving national security conception in the country.

Foundational principles of good governance, from an economic perspective, date back to Adam Smith, the pioneer political economist. World Bank defines those principles as governmental tasks which are a must for a development which is sustainable, inclusive and anti- poverty. Those tasks would comprise the establishment of a foundation of law, a distortion-proof policy environment with macro-economic stability, investment in basic social services and infrastructure, protection of the vulnerable and protection of the environment. Although prerequisites for good governance in developing countries entail a host of interconnected issues but five of those merit focus; local governance through decentralization, reallocation of non-core governmental functions to private sector with plugged loopholes of abuse, a well-paid, well- trained and competent bureaucracy working in an accountable and transparent system, regional integration of trade to reap political and economic benefits, and population control along with policies for achieving Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).55 In the vein of regional integration policy, Shahid Javed Burki, an avid writer on Pakistan’s economy, also suggests that economics could take the lead where politics has failed in resolving the intractable Indo-Pak dispute of Kashmir by way of a two-pronged developmental strategy, focusing on interregional trade and economic development, of both Indian and Pakistan controlled Kashmir, simultaneously.56

Rekha Datta,57 Monika Barthwal Datta58 and Ehsan Mehmood Khan59 have deliberated on the issues concerning ‘human security’ in Pakistan and merit discussion in the societal security domain.

55 Hossain, Kathuria, and Islam, South Asian Economic Development, 211–12. 56 Burki, Changing Perceptions, Altered Reality, 322. 57 Rekha Datta, Human Security in India and Pakistan in the Twenty First Century (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010). 58 Monika Barthwal Datta, Understanding Security Practices in South Asia (London: Routledge, 2012). 59 Ehsan Mehmood Khan, Human Security in Pakistan (Islamabad: Narratives, 2013). 44

Human Security concept introduced by U.N. in the 90s has seen some debate in the security context of India and Pakistan, although not as much as one would expect, commensurate to the dismal Human Development Indices (HDI) of both countries. The Indo-Pak security conundrum is ideally suited to study the tension between the traditional, realist concept of state security with referent as the ‘state’ and the people-centered concept of human security with referent as the ‘individual’, with the former seeking indirect security of the individual but the latter seeking direct protection and emancipation.

The seven conceptual domains of human security are economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political. The deep-rooted irredentist differences that resulted in four wars, military stand-offs and ongoing low intensity conflicts between India and Pakistan have magnified threat perceptions reciprocally, putting priority on state security over human security. Meanwhile, spawning terrorism in the region has amply manifested the emerging threat matrix, relegating state much behind Violent Non State Actors (VNSAs). Rekha Datta correctly observes that national security is challenged by groups that are disgruntled due to poor governmental institutions and processes.60 She laments the lavish defense expenditures of India and Pakistan vis-à-vis social sector spending but rightly observes that poor governance in both countries prohibits the prospects of diverting those monies fruitfully for improving human security, even if geopolitics creates the environment for doing so.61 The centrality of the role of state in providing human security by utilizing the natural advantages of true democracy, within a ‘hybrid’ approach entailing equal emphasis on state and human security by the Government is the fundamental argument of the author.62

Monika Barthwal is of the view that the ‘blind spots’ in Securitization Theory can be covered by insights from Human Security and Critical Security Studies (CSS). Human Security in CSS (Welsh School) and Securitization (Copenhagen School) are two different approaches to understand security, which are divergent in concept but can yet be considered to complement each other. At the sub-state level the security of communities and groups often fails to find an

60 Datta, Human Security in India and Pakistan in the Twenty First Century, 25. 61 Datta, 72. 62 Datta, 128,129. 45

expression where the CSS and human security approaches can help by identifying those insecurities.63

Ehsan Mehmood Khan, in his path breaking work Human Security in Pakistan, has identified such insecurities by analyzing the Human Security profile of Pakistan and upon finding it quite disheveled, recommending a complete roadmap for its improvement. In his opinion, a common Pakistani is a person who is disconnected from the state, scared of dangers to personal life emanating from terrorism and societal crime, has to arrange for his own and family’s healthcare and education, is malnourished and doesn’t have access to clean drinking water. The archetypal person lacks freedom of expression and basic political rights, is exploited in his place of work and living, does not have assured means of conveyance and transportation, has to bribe often to fulfill legitimate functions, may be subjected to bonded labor, may be subjected to domestic violence if she is a female, who routinely faces delay in justice.64 Khan’s acute observations on human insecurity in Pakistan are quite accurate. However, his work does not assess significance of these insecurities from the state actors’ perspective. State actors tend to securitize certain threats, which as per their reckoning are existential national security challenges, with a view to bend accepted norms and rules to address those threats. Human insecurities in Pakistan remaining shy of securitization reflect apathy towards recognition of humans as shared referents of security alongside state, the quintessential referent.

Bansal and Dutt65 and Kugelman and Hathaway66 discuss the environmental security issues of Pakistan wherein potential cases of securitization can be gleaned.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change published its fourth report on climate change in 2007, highlighting following challenges to South Asia:67

63 Datta, Understanding Security Practices in South Asia, 2012, 13. 64 Khan, Human Security in Pakistan, 52. 65 Sreeradha Datta, “The Impact of Climate Change in South Asia,” in South Asian Security; 21st Century Discourses, ed. Sagarika Dutt and Anol Bansal (London: Routledge, 2012). 66 Michael Kugelman and Robert M. Hathaway, eds., “Introduction,” in Running on Empty; Pakistan’s Water Crisis (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2009), 5–27, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ASIA_090422_Running%20on%20Empty_web.pdf. 67 Datta, “The Impact of Climate Change in South Asia,” 220. 46

 Any rise in average temperature would result in melting of glaciers, which would increase flooding, affecting long-term water resource availability in South Asia.  Climate change would increase pressure on natural resources and environment due to rapid urbanization, industrialization and economic development.  Crop yields are likely to decrease up to 30 percent by the middle of 21st Century.  Periodic floods and droughts would impact health of the population.  Hazards associated with rising sea levels like inundation, storm surges, soil erosion, etc.

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Asia Program’s report on Pakistan’s Water Crisis, is alarmingly explicit in its warnings. Global warming is exacerbating Pakistan’s water crisis because Indus River Basin, Pakistan’s main source of water, acquires the bulk of its water from the snows and rains in western Himalayas, which is one of the worst climate change affected areas of the World. Its rapid melting along with high intensity climate change induced rainfall is expected to aggravate river flooding. After the glaciers melt away, river flows are expected to decrease rapidly, up to 30-40 percent drop in river flows in a hundred years’ time.68

The brief survey of literature above reveals the richness of works available on security and stability perspectives of Pakistan in different domains or sectors. Although some sectors like military security or societal security tend to have more debate than others but the significance of political, economic and environmental sectors, as contributing towards strengthening Pakistan’s security, is also evident. It is worth noting that in case of a developing country like Pakistan with myriad of challenges in every domain of its functioning, national security is not being perceived as protection of sovereignty alone. Rather, as the literature review shows, along with safeguard of sovereignty, issues of societal security, political stability, economic viability and environmental sustainability have also occupied prominent space in the national security discourse.

However, a triangular gap can be gleaned from the literature review. Firstly, critical issues of security have not been discussed from securitization perspective, hence it is not clear if

68 Kugelman and Hathaway, “Introduction.” 47

the state made a deliberate move to convince a wider audience about the criticality of certain issues with a view to take some extraordinary steps for enhancing security against those critical threats. Secondly, national security of the country has not been seen sector-wise, which obscures a multidimensional view of security threats, leaving ambiguity about the significance attached to various sectors in the intellectual conception of critical security issues. Thirdly, an analytically rigorous method like comprehensive discourse analysis has not been used to analyze the securitization moves undertaken by various securitizing actors exploiting extraordinary political circumstances. Hence, it would be useful to study securitization, as gleaned from discourses, to assess broadening in Pakistan’s security conception.

After reviewing the literature about Pakistan’s security, few post-modern theories describing the non-traditional security perspectives would be scanned in Chapter 2 to explicate the context of Securitization theory and discourse analysis in this research, in order to formulate an appropriate research methodology.

48

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Historically, securitization theory was an attempt to bring diplomacy and politics back into the center stage of international affairs, which after the end of World War II had been heavily dominated by the security prism. In a reversal of Clausewitz’s logic, i.e., war is an extension of politics by violent means, politics had actually become continuation of war by other means. It was the need of ‘de-securitization’ of the continued war-like political endeavors during the Cold War that prompted analysts to look for alternate ways of understanding the politics of extraordinary circumstances. This ambition of ‘de-securitization’ of politics, to make politics as the linchpin of security and not vice versa, led to the development of securitization theory. 1

It is argued that securitization is incapable of being represented comprehensively in empirical social science, as it is less sociological and more political, with the attendant difficulties of defining the political. At the same time, sociology of securitization can also not be relegated in importance due to its contribution in social science. As a political theory, securitization often faces the controversial question of being defined by politics of emergency and exception. This discussion equates securitization to Carl Schmitt’s controversial views on politics, often termed antidemocratic. The extent to which Copenhagen School’s definition of security is derived from Schmitt’s concept of the political, as an exceptional decision defined within the friend – enemy distinction, is often argued.2 Schmitt wrote:

“The political identity of the people does not describe its own substance, but only the intensity of an association or dissociation of human beings whose motives can be religious, national (in the ethnic or cultural sense), economic, or of another kind and can affect at different times different coalitions and separations.”3 However, securitization is not only about exclusivity or Schmittian exceptionalism. Securitization, which deals with declaration of existential threat and, if successful, generating the

1 Thierry Balzacq and Stefano Guzzini, “Introduction: ‘What Kind of Theory - If Any - Is Securitization?,’” International Relations 29, no. 1 (2015): 96–136. 2 Michael C. Williams, “Securitization as Political Theory": The Politics of the Extraordinary,” International Relations, Forum, 29, no. 1 (2015): 114–20. 3 Andreas Kalyvas, Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Hannah Arendt. (Leiden: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 121, http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=352988. 49

capacity to break free of rules of normal politics, is also about a process of openness and self- determination with high democratic potential. The political theories which inform securitization are broadly categorized by Andreas Kalyvas as ‘the politics of the extraordinary’. In a democratic vision of extraordinary politics:

“There is an intensification of popular mobilization, an extensive consensus,… after appropriate public debate and decision, which describes the extraordinary reactivation of the constituent power of the people and the self-assertion of the democratic sovereign who seeks to take a new fundamental political decision concerning the constitutional essentials.”4 Before describing the extraordinary, Kalyvas links the arguments of Bruce Ackerman and Schmitt to outline the ordinary politics, characterized by pluralism and fragmentation, short of any collective objective to unify the popular sovereign around fundamental issues. It is due to this fragmentation that relations are dominated by bargaining, negotiation and compromise, largely driven by narrow, particular interests. On the contrary, democratic politics of the extraordinary refers to circumstances when the citizens overwhelmed by the issue at hand disregard normal political process, aiming to modify the fundamental political and constitutional principles; indeed the very structure of their communities.5

Securitization is based on the idea that the presence and control of certain problems as security issues is not linked to some tangible conditions. On the contrary, something acquires the status of a security issue based on an intersubjective process that involves a securitizing actor and an audience that is most affected by that issue. Intersubjectivity is a widely used concept with different meanings. Generally speaking it refers to the whole range of relations between people’s perspectives about an issue. If interactions are taken to be the foundation of social life then the understanding of social science and social behavior is based on the core concept of intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity, in simple terms, is used “to refer to agreement in the sense of having a shared definition of an object.” It is also defined as “mutual awareness of agreement or disagreement” or as displaying “implicit and often automatic behavioral orientations towards others.”6

4 Kalyvas, 164–65. 5 Kalyvas, 7. 6 Alex Gillespie and Flora Cornish, “Intersubjectivity: Towards a Dialogical Analysis,” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 40, no. 1 (2010): 19–46. 50

Based on the intersubjective understanding, security is considered to be a political force, an action, rather than a subject upon which actions are done. The most important implication of this concept is that after its establishment, securitization allows policy makers to adopt whatever means considered feasible to deal with the threat at hand. However, there are certain inconsistencies in the development of this concept.7

One of those inconsistencies deals with the intersubjective understanding of the ‘issue’ by a varied audience. The entire audience might not be at the same level of understanding in the intersubjectivity matrix, hence liable to varying degrees of commitment towards the stated securitization objectives in any particular ‘issue.’ Another inconsistency may arise out of the scope of securitization, depending upon the diverse ways in which various issues are securitized in different communities at varying times. Contextual factors affect the process of securitization in ways that would be difficult to integrate in theory, at times changing the theory beyond recognition, tilting its focus from description of the securitization act to a causal theory of securitization instead. Therefore, Buzan and Hansen emphasize that securitization is a constitutive, non-causal theory.8

A constitutive approach is adopted by this study, therefore it is important to highlight the difference between the construction of explanatory and constitutive theories. Unlike explanatory theory that explains relations between dependent and independent variables, constitutive theory theorizes the relationship between variables as mutually constituting each other and not in a causal relationship with each other.9 Securitization in multi-sectoral security as expounded by Barry Buzan, seen through discourse analysis of the period under review in Pakistan, analyzed in a constitutive manner, is the conceptual framework of this study. A broad analysis of relevant security theories is required to contextualize the conceptual framework of multi-sectoral securitization before delving into post structuralism and intertextual discourse analysis, which is how the theoretical framework will be explained in this chapter.

7 Balzacq and Guzzini, “Introduction: ‘What Kind of Theory - If Any - Is Securitization?’” 8 Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 215. 9 Michael Barnett, “Social Constructivism,” in The Globalization of World Politics, ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, Sixth Edition (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 155–68. 51

Securitization Theory within the Wider Non-Traditional Security Debate

Essentially, the notion of security is a ‘contested concept,’ there being no agreed, universal definition existing of the term. Beyond the traditional Realist paradigm, the enlarged concept of security comprises six ‘schools of thought,’ as summarized by Steve Smith in his article, “The Contested Concept of Security.” The Copenhagen School broadens the security agenda to include political, economic, societal and ecological security sectors, in addition to the traditional focus, i.e., the military sector. The Constructivist Security Studies are premised on social constructivism and explain the ‘security communities’ as reflective of certain mindsets, i.e., ‘security is what states make of it’ depending upon their security culture. Critical Security Studies (CSS), also known as Welsh School, stresses upon human emancipation, though distinct from Westernization. Feminist Security Studies challenge the view that the state can always guarantee security of its citizens, as state is not impartial in providing security to all individuals. Post-structuralism Security Studies argue that the terminologies of strategic studies focused on ‘threats, fear and security’, which, in fact, are the tools used to legitimize the process of state formation and its business.10

Influence of national security cultures upon national security governance policies is discussed by Sperling in four categories of national security governance policies; pre-conflict intervention, post-conflict intervention, protection and compellence. The study was based upon two fundamental assumptions; first, states cannot be treated as homogenous actors; second, regional and global security governance is a collective good, although not very pure. More pertinently, it discussed the key characteristics of the Westphalian and post-Westphalian states that depict their different perceptions towards national security. For example Westphalian state sees critical threat in domains of territorial integrity, autonomy from external influence and power maximization, while post-Westphalian state sees it in vulnerability of their sovereignty’s structural and voluntary erosion, as these states are oriented towards milieu goal.11 An imprint of

10 Steve Smith, “The Contested Concept of Security” (Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 2002), http://hdl.handle.net/10220/4423. 11 Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, eds., “National Security Cultures, Technologies of Public Goods Supply and Security Governance,” in National Security Cultures (London: Routledge, 2010), 8. 52

Westphalian pattern of threat identification can be discerned in Pakistan’s national security culture.

Emma Rothschild saw four important changes coming about in the concept of security, beginning with the state: 1) Descending down to the individual. 2) Ascending up to international or supranational level. 3) Broadening from a focus on the military to include the environment, society and economy. 4) Diffusing to include local governments, international agreements, NGOs, public opinion, natural disasters and financial markets as sources of responsibility.12

At the end of the Cold War, Traditional Security Studies (TSS) saw much widening of ideas and concepts in the field of security studies. Human Security (an offshoot of CSS) and Securitization Theory in multisectoral approach or the Copenhagen School emerged as two of the more important schools of thought, which competed for intellectual and political attention. Though these conceptualizations were not monolithic and contained many variant within each of them.

The Copenhagen School of thought has its roots in the research of Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and others at Copenhagen Policy Research Institute (COPRI). Europe saw much wider academic acceptance of this school than the U.S. The two unique contributions of Copenhagen School were the concepts of societal security and securitization.13 Societal security was understood in terms of a society’s resilience to retain its character in spite of adverse conditions or threats. The referent object for Societal Security was the society, while state remained the locus of security for political, military, economic and environmental security. A related concept that emerged was that of ‘identity security’ in instances where state and her societies did not align, for example, minorities or marginalized segments facing predation at the hands of other political actors within the state or even by the state itself. It also included circumstances where state mobilized society to tackle existential challenges from within and without. Copenhagen School posited itself between TSS approach of state centric security and CSS calls for ‘individual’ or ‘global’ security, by limiting ‘Societal Security’ to two referent objects, i.e., state

12 Emma Rothschild, “What Is Security? The Quest for World Order,” Dædulus: The Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 124, no. No 3 (June 1995). 13 Buzan and Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies, 212. 53

and society and disregarding the unclear individual or global level of security. Copenhagen School emphasizes on four new dimensions of national security, especially in the developing countries, besides the traditional military dimension, i.e., political, economic, societal and environmental, often interconnected in a vicious circle; economy is strained by emphasis on military security, which leads to political instability that contributes to neglect of environment protection and society, besides tending to create scapegoats in the form of external foes, leading to further militarization.14

The other important contribution of Copenhagen School is in defining the approach of Securitization Theory. Securitization studies aim to understand precisely; who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results and under what conditions. It constitutes three elements; a securitizing move (speech act), a securitizing actor (who carries out the speech act) and sufficient audience. It propounds that securitization is a move that projects an issue above the realm of traditional politics. It can be understood as politics plus, an issue painted as a critical threat, which demands extraordinary steps for redress and, most importantly, widely believed as such by an extended audience. It should not be seen as something good or bad, but as a peculiar way to attach overwhelming importance to an issue that is considered to be of extraordinary significance which in routine might not figure out as prominently as desired, in seeking the mitigating measures needed to deal with it. It entails “intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have significant political effects.”15

However, securitization theory is critiqued for being a theory that only explains how state-led policies are negotiated by state elites, and concerned with higher leadership, states, endangered elites and audiences having agenda making power. Acceptance of an issue as a security issue may occur outside the realm of public policy too, which the theory doesn’t take into account. It presupposes western democratic values, which might not hold good in many developing countries; corroded government institutions and vested political interests can use state actors to bribe or coerce audiences into accepting public policy responses deemed

14 Bjorn Moller, “The Concept of Security: The Pros and Cons of Expansion and Contraction” (Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 2000). 15 Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security; A New Framework for Analysis, 25. 54

appropriate. Securitization theory is also criticized for not having a sociological approach to understand the audience, i.e., the ambiguities surrounding the relationship between the securitizing actor and the audience of the securitizing move. It lacks clarity on who or what the role of the audience is and the role of multiple audiences in securitization process. The critique proposes a central role for the audiences in different stages of securitizing process, a deeper understanding of the sociopolitical contexts and the nature and type of policy tools and practices involved in securitization process.16

Barnett and others termed security a “speech act” that raises the profile of a problem. They contend that an important reason for assigning the “security” suffix to humans or individuals rather than states lies in the semantic value of this term, which provides greater meaning to an idea since factors at state level carrying this denotation tend to be viewed much more seriously. Securitization implied a change of status for a risk. It changed the characterization of a normal political problem with ordinary risks to a problem with existential risks which requires the most unusual counter measures. Absence of democracy may accentuate peoples’ insecurities on the pretext of national security as perceived by the security elite, and even in democracies the same pretext can be used to induce fear, like the Patriot Act in the U.S. So the fundamental question remains: Whose security and security from what? This question leads the debate for the need to change the referents of security. It is resisted by the mainstream, state centered, security community due to the salience that they accord to the ‘fundamental imperatives’ of national security.17

Human security as an academic discipline of security studies has emerged from the expanded notion of human development. In 1989 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) broadened the discussion about a nation’s development framework beyond economic growth by including human development performance. The renowned Pakistani economist, Mahbub ul Haq and Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen from India were the main proponents of this idea. From 1990 onwards the Human Development Report became a focal point for current thoughts and issues in development economics. An elaborate set of indices called Human Development Index (HDI)

16 Monika Barthwal Datta, Understanding Security Practices in South Asia (London: Routledge, 2012), 7. 17 Richard A. Matthew, ed., “Global Environmental Change and Human Security: An Introduction,” in Global Environmental Change and Human Security (London: MIT Press, 2010). 55

was introduced to quantify this newly introduced parameter. In 1994 the UNDP Report on Human Development formally introduced the concept of ‘Human Security’, which resulted in an extensive debate on the subject.

Mahbub ul Haq observed that while different developing countries work for economic wellbeing, despite nearly comparable conditions of natural resources and investments, the countries which have better human resource and enterprise do much better in terms of economic growth.18 He disapproved the development economists’ criterion of Gross National Product (GNP) as a yardstick of progress, rather suggesting five concepts for all development plans, in order to be in sync with the humans who are supposed to benefit from it, including: 1) A human accountability sheet; their quality, profile, spread and trends. 2) Benchmarked plan objectives defined in terms of basic human needs rather than in terms of production and consumption. 3) Equal emphasis on integrated production and distribution targets. 4) A decentralized human development plan evolved with community participation aimed at self-sufficiency. 5) A comprehensive set of social indicators to monitor plan progress. However, this demanded a changed national policy framework; from a greater role of market mechanism and less government intervention to more government intervention, particularly in education and health. He emphasized that population of a state should be recognized as the means as well as the ends of development.

The 1994 Human Development Report further advanced the debate on centrality of people in development of a state by dilating on the ever-increasing prospects of intra nation conflicts and daily insecurities of life. The report discussed human security’s universality and interdependence, its emphasis on prevention rather than intervention, and its people centered character.19 The report highlighted two main aspects of human security: firstly, ‘safety from chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression,’ and secondly, ‘protection from sudden and hurtful disruption.’ It identified the difference between human development and human security by describing human development as being aimed at widening the people’s choices and human security as being meant to ensure safe and free exercise of these choices with relative confidence in their endurance. It described human security as an ‘integrative concept,’ rather than the

18 Mahbub ul Haq, Reflections on Human Development (New York: OUP, 1995), 4. 19 Inge Kaul and Mahbub ul Haq, et. al., “UNDP Human Development Report 1994” (OUP, 1994), 22, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf. 56

‘defensive concept’ of ‘territorial or military security’. Armaments for security were to be relegated to achieve ‘security through sustainable human development.’ Seven main categories of human security, i.e., economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political were proposed in this report.

A general agreement at the 2000 UN Millennium Summit was achieved on two important precepts, i.e., ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’, which led to the formation of an independent Commission for Human Security, co-chaired by Amartya Sen. In its landmark report, the commission persuaded international community for a shift of focus from state to people in the understanding of security.20 In present times many states can be hostile towards their own population, whether directly or by neglect and by mismanagement or misappropriation. Hence the people deserve to be the referent of security rather than the state. It highlighted the balancing nature of human security vis-à-vis state security, human rights and human development, forging interconnectivity between individual, state and the global world through complementary policies. The commission also gave a definition of human security: “to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment.” It did not differentiate between freedom from fear and freedom from want for the individuals. The report put emphasis on ‘empowerment’ by virtue of which people can identify and implement solutions to their myriad insecurities. Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, argued that human security includes human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and personal actualization leading to poverty reduction, economic growth and conflict prevention. According to him, freedom from want, freedom from fear and a healthy environment were interrelated building blocks of human security and ultimately national security.

Whether the human security approach selects a radical departure from the traditional security paradigm or a gradual one, the main argument is about the protection and empowerment of people. In Liotta and Owen’s opinion the faith placed in the realist school of thought to provide security is misleading because the ordinary people keep suffering from disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, terrorism, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards,

20 Sadako Ogata, “Human Security Now” (Commision on Human Security, 2003), 10, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/91BAEEDBA50C6907C1256D19006A9353-chs-security- may03.pdf. 57

while all concentration remains on protecting the state from a prospective internal or external ‘enemy’. Traditional security has therefore often failed to protect the individual.21

In the developed countries, the concept of human security replacing or augmenting national security is evolving, though at a slow pace. Canada, Japan and Norway are perhaps few of its active proponents who support the notion and are expanding their national security concept ‘comprehensively.’22 However, there is an obvious East-West divide in the perception of human security. The Asian continent hosts some of the original thinkers of this concept (Mahbub ul Haq from Pakistan and Amartya Sen from India) but still most of the countries in Asia view it as a ploy for ‘human rights promotion and humanitarian intervention.’23

Discourse Analysis

Poststructuralist perspective that language produces the social world and is not just a means of understanding it, as explained by the concepts of discourse and intertextuality in world politics, would form the methodological framework of this research. This methodological framework is chosen because it provides the most direct way to study securitization:

“Securitization can be studied directly; it does not need indicators. The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations.”24

The first research question of this study, ‘did securitization occur during the research period,’ which forms the basis of the remaining research questions seeking specific instances of securitization sector-wise, can be best studied through discourse analysis. The search for an appropriate research methodology to study securitization naturally tilted towards the choice of the theorists whose theoretical framework has been adopted. In securitization discourses, issues of supreme priority are ‘dramatized’ by an agent seeking the authority to utilize extraordinary means of action. For the researchers studying the act of securitization:

21 P.H. Liotta and Taylor Owen, “Why Human Security,” The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, no. Winter / Spring (2006): 37. 22 Amitav Acharya, “Human Security,” in The Globalization of World Politics, ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, 6th Edition (New York: OUP, 2014), 448–62. 23 Amitav Acharya, “Human Security: East Versus West?” (Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2001), 5, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lang=en&id=27522. 24 Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Security; A New Framework for Analysis, 25. 58

“The task is not to assess some objective threats that “really” (emphasis original) endanger some object to be defended or secured; rather, it is to understand the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat. The process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act.”25

In post structuralism, endowment of meaning and identity to various entities and phenomenon is achieved through linguistic construction, thus according an ontological significance to language. Discourse is not just a value-neutral means to convey thoughts but it is a way of seeking to accomplish things; it is a form of action. Discourse analysis attempts to discover the purpose of a discourse, the construction of that discourse to achieve its purpose and the resources available to perform that activity. Discourse is a focus of the inquiry itself and not just a means of gaining access to the social reality that it depicts. The way a discourse is constructed reflects the disposition of the actor(s) involved in its construction. Discourse is rhetorical, in that it is inherently persuasive to establish one’s version of reality over others.26 Discourse is defined by Michel Foucault as a linguistic system that orders statements and concepts; a phenomenon that is considered much wider than idea,27 as construed in social constructivism.

Deconstruction aims to highlight the dichotomies which language employs to depict an object by comparing it to something, which it is not, like depicting women as objects of lesser political significance than men. Jacques Derrida argues that the dichotomies between the developed and the underdeveloped, the modern and the pre-modern, the civilized and the barbaric are not ‘neutral’ because one term is superior to the other. Moreover, there is a clear hierarchy between these two extremes, which is purposefully absent in the denotations of these sets of terms. Deconstruction is often described as methodology rather than theory but it is nevertheless considered essential to problematize dichotomies, see how they work and find out alternate ways of understanding world politics.28

25 Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, 26. 26 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 501. 27 Gary Gutting, “Michael Foucault” (The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2014), . 28 Barnett, “Social Constructivism,” 160. 59

Foucault described genealogy as ‘history of the present’. It evaluates a contemporary issue by analyzing the past political practices, which have formed its present shape and the alternative understandings and discourses that have been marginalized in the process. The concept of discourse and genealogy lead to Foucault’s concept of power in which he propounds that when states and institutions are believed to be having superior knowledge about a particular issue, this also is a case of power.29

Discourses are key components of the social and political world and can be analyzed in a systematic manner to find out the meanings that emerge from the way those discourses are framed. Intertextuality is described by Julia Kristeva as all texts “constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another.” Intertextuality can be clear (quotes, references) or implied (secondary sources, conceptual). Texts are located in context to other texts upon whom they rely in constructing their identity and direction. It emphasizes on analyzing official policy texts like policy statements, speeches and interviews, not in isolation but as part of wider societal discourses comprising other genres of discourse like journalistic and academic writings, oppositional rhetoric, and even popular culture. In brief, it is argued that the complete meaning emerging from a text always reflects an amalgamation of interpretations from related texts.30

Official policymakers have the authority to speak about an issue due to their designated position; however, authority is also derived from the knowledge about a particular issue. Knowledge, therefore, creates another pedestal of policy discourse where speeches by policymakers, opinion of analysts, research reports, etc, also act as sources of knowledge considered acceptable.31 It is not to suggest that discourse analysis would be organized along genre-based distinction. It would rather maintain a concept of discourses as defined by significant formulations of identity and policy. This would help to understand how discourses cut across several genres on substantial political issues, i.e., most of the foreign and security policy debates are linked to a similar issue across multiple genres.

29 Najeeb Ahmad, “Ideas & Knowledge: The New Currency of World Politics,” The Bridge, March 10, 2016, http://www.thestrategybridge.com/the-bridge/2016/3/10/ideas-and-knowledge-the-new-currency-of-world-politics. 30 Hansen, Security as Practice, 50. 31 Hansen, 7. 60

Analysis of Security Discourses

Security discourses deal with ‘identities’ whose protection is under debate, conceptualizing them as ‘discursive, political, relational and social.’ Such discourses articulate a traditionally constituted national self and a host of threatening others which are distinguished by virtue of their geography or their political alignment represented as nations, civilizations, tribes, women, civilians, terrorists, freedom fighters, or even humanity. However, it is important to remain cognizant of the fact that from a poststructuralist perspective these discourses are constructions of meaning and viewpoints, rather than formulations of some indisputable truth. Discourse analysis strives to integrate material and ideational factors describing an object within a policy discourse, without privileging one over the other. For example, the material identity of a fighter airplane constituting airframe, engines, armaments and electronics vis-à-vis its ideational identity as an object with greater capability to destroy enemy forces as compared to, say, a squadron of tanks is analyzed in a discourse seeking greater role of air power in national security. A competing discourse might question the ideational identity construction of the dominant discourse by suggesting that a fighter airplane, despite its superior agility and firepower, cannot replicate the staying power of a squadron of tanks, thus attempting to rearticulate the key representations of identity that define the policy in question.32

The aim of post structuralism is therefore to study, in an empirically rigorous and structured manner, the way in which facts are formed and how do they impact a particular foreign or security policy debate. How do these facts correlate with representations of identity and to the relevant policies? How do opposition’s discourses attempt to destabilize or modify official policy by presenting counter arguments and evidences? How the government discourse responds? How do other perspectives presented by media and other government agencies impact the official and opposition’s discourse?33

Security is a political move that entails actions beyond routine norms of politics. War can be its extreme form while just setting aside ‘normal’ rules of business to deal with an emergency situation could be a milder form. The criterion of ‘normal’ would tend to vary with political

32 Hansen, 2–6, 20. 33 Hansen, 28–29. 61

circumstances prevalent in a particular state or society. Security is a notion, which frames an issue in a very important manner, signifying it as something beyond the mundane or above the day-to-day politics. Extreme form of politicization is therefore seen as securitization.34

Securitization and Discourse Analysis

Securitization can be best understood by study of discourse and its political dynamics. If the securitizing actor manages to circumvent normal procedures in order to deal with a threat posited as existential, a securitizing move is said to be taking place. For this move to be successful, a sufficient audience has to accept its rationale and consequent measures. In case of absence of signs of acceptance, only a securitizing move is there without the object actually being securitized. A comprehensive multi-sectoral framework for analysis of state security given by Barry Buzan et al. (1998) rejects the traditionalist’s case of restricting security to military security only. It strives to widen the security agenda by examining the distinctive character and dynamics of security in five sectors, i.e., military, political, economic, environmental and societal.

It needs to be emphasized here that the sectoral analysis of the wider complex of a country’s national security is only meant to facilitate the analytical process. Sectors should not be treated as closed systems because their cross linkages are important. The ‘whole’ (of national security) is divided into its ‘parts’ (sectors) by Buzan et al., to understand its various perspectives, whose individual analysis could only be meaningful when synthesized. The authors emphasize that sectors are not ontologically separate realms but just an analytical device; different lenses to see different views of the same issues. Similarly, the security actors like the state approach security as aggregate security and not as five separate fields or sectors. In fact, the sectors interconnect with each other through the security label, the defining textual criterion that needs to be identified as a rhetoric in the discourse.35

Poststructuralist approaches of discourse and intertextuality are important in understanding securitization theory. The notion of discourse according to Foucault, as

34 Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Security; A New Framework for Analysis, 23. 35 Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Security; A New Framework for Analysis, 168–70. 62

highlighted earlier, is use of language in a manner that makes statements and concepts meaningfully ordered. Politically, language holds the key to explain policies to the audiences at home and abroad. Selection of terms to denote events and attitudes has political implications. For example killing of Hazara origin Pakistanis in Quetta can be termed as targeted killing or ethnic killing, both having different connotations. While social constructivists differentiated between ‘social facts’ and ‘brute facts’, Post Structuralism contested that even brute facts are socially constructed. For example a brute fact like heart attack can be attributed to lifestyle, genes or divine punishment and constructed in a ‘lifestyle discourse,’ ‘genetic discourse,’ or a ‘religious discourse,’ respectively.

Discourse analysis is applied on the assumption that language constitutes and produces the social world rather than a method of understanding it. Gill (2000) explains that enquiry focuses on the discourse itself, not treating it as merely a means to discover some hidden social reality. It reflects choices made in “constituting a particular view of social reality,” reflecting the disposition of the actor by way of the language he or she chooses in the discourse. And lastly, owing to its rhetorical orientation, analyst needs to be cognizant about actor’s tendency of establishing his or her version of the world through the discourse vis-à-vis competing versions. Three basic discourse-analytic questions emerge in such analysis:

 What is being done by this discourse?  How is this discourse going to achieve it?  In order to achieve it, what resources are going to be needed? 36

Securitization in its social and political contexts is a discursive event, moving towards an intersubjective understanding of the issue by the wider audience, whose dynamics is reflected in discourses and can be gleaned by way of discourse analysis. Grant et al. (2004) consider that analysis of discursive events usually takes place according to a three dimensional framework:

 The text dimension to examine the content and meaning of the text.  The discursive practice dimension to examine the form of discursive interaction.

36 Bryman, Social Research Methods, 500. 63

 The social practice dimension to consider the social context of the discursive event. 37

Intertextuality, developed by theorist Julia Kristeva, argued that social world could be understood as comprised of texts. Texts form ‘inter text,’ i.e., they are all connected to one another by those that preceded them or the ones that would follow, like statements of governments or organizations. These relations are made in more abstract ways as well, in terms of contexts and circumstances. According to Lene Hansen:

“The basic discourses of a debate structure the political and substantial positions and divisions, whereas intertextual models identify the locations of different discourses in relation to official discourse and other sites of opinion and debate.”38

Hansen proposes four intertextual research models: Model 1 focuses on official policy discourse as pursued by governmental functionaries, Model 2 broadens the scope to include oppositional, media and corporate actors, Model 3, which is further divided into Models 3A and 3B, articulates influence of popular culture, marginal political discourses, social movements, proscribed organizations, and academics on the policy discourse. Keeping in view the key questions of this research, Models 1 and 2 are considered suitable because those are sufficiently wide to include the essential elements of government, opposition, media and corporate institutions, which are likely to directly influence the discourses in political, military, societal, economic and environmental sectors of Pakistan’s security. The essentials of these models are:

37 Bryman, Social Research Methods, 509. 38 Hansen, Security as Practice, 50–58. 64

Security Discourses Intertextual Schematic

Table 2: Lene Hansen’s Intertextual Research Models 1 and 2

Model 1 Model 2 Analytical Official discourse; heads of Wider security policy debate, political Focus government /states, cabinet opposition, the media, corporate members, senior civil servants, institutions, Non State Actors military chiefs Object of Official texts, direct and secondary Political texts, speeches, statements; Media Analysis intertextual links, supportive texts, texts, editorials, field reporting, academic critical texts debates; corporate institutions public campaigns; Goal of The stabilization of official The position of official discourse, the likely Analysis discourse through intertextual transformation of official discourse, the links, response of official discourse internal stability of media discourses to critical discourses

Source: Lene Hansen, Security as Practice, p. 57.

Operationalizing Securitization and Discourse Analysis

The hypothesis of this research states: “the process of securitization of critical issues in the political, military, societal, economic and environmental sectors suggests broadening of the concept of national security of Pakistan.” To prove this hypothesis, the first question is whether securitization occurred during the period of research, while the subsequent questions revolve around specific security incidences which need to be assessed for presence or absence of securitization. The increased incidences of securitization beyond the traditional external military- political threats would indicate a widening in the concept of Pakistan’s national security.

In order to operationalize these questions, one needs to analyze relevant security discourses sector-wise. Discourse analysis would be used to assess the nature and extent of securitization moves, in disaggregated analytic convenience of “security sectors,” before aggregating the sectoral findings to reach a holistic conclusion. Increased securitization in sectors other than traditional military-political sector (focused on external threats to security), e.g., the internal political and societal sectors, or the economic and environmental sectors, would

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indicate broadening in the national security concept of the country. Although, the strength of empirical evidence in the form of texts substantiating a securitization move might vary in the different instances of securitization assessed in this research. This varying strength would be reflected in findings of the cross-sectoral analysis, indicated as strength of the securitization claim about a particular security issue.

This study would rely on identifying incidences of securitization in the political history of Pakistan during various periods of interest to this research. It is therefore pertinent to understand how such incidents can be gleaned and what is the structure of securitization in the conceptual domain? Buzan et al (1998) emphasize upon the discursive understanding of a grave threat, important enough to have extensive political repercussions, as the conceptual framework to identify securitization. This would provide the definition and criteria of identifying an incidence of securitization. It can, therefore, be studied directly without the need of any other indicators. The study of discourses within the informational wrangling of consequence in a political competition is the study of securitization. For this reason, Buzan contends:

“If by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules, he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitization.”39

Owing to the central position of discourse as a source of knowledge and power in Post Structuralism, its analysis would form the methodological framework of this study within the conceptual framework of securitization. Discourses provide the vehicle for the exercise of this power, based on superior knowledge.40 In this study too, instances of securitization would be identified based on such claims of knowledge by different actors vying to push their viewpoint across. The method to identify such jockeying would be discourse analysis of competing actors through texts selected from a period of hype regarding the issue under scrutiny. In Post Structuralism, which relies on the social construction of reality as deciphered from discourses, instances of power can be seen when actors manage to assert themselves by virtue of knowledge, in order to dominate a particular issue. Lene Hansen explains by way of an example:

39 Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Security; A New Framework for Analysis, 25. 40 Ahmad, “Ideas & Knowledge.” 66

“Take the way Western scholars have ‘gained knowledge’ (emphasis original) about non-Western peoples by describing them as inferior, backward, underdeveloped, and sometimes threatening. This takes for granted that a foreign identity exists and that it can be studied. More broadly, to speak from a position of knowledge is to exercise authority over a given issue.”41

After ascertaining securitization as the theoretical framework and its discourse analysis as the research methodology, it is appropriate to discuss the methods and the data needed to operationalize the said methodology. It is important to keep in mind that the basic discourses in a debate form the substantial positions, while the intertextual models described above identify the position of different discourses with respect to the official discourse, besides other sources of opinion and discussion. Utilizing these models, some of the prominent securitization moves in the political, military, societal, economic and social sectors of Pakistan would be analyzed by way of discourse analysis.

The model utilized for the discourse analysis in subsequent chapters is a combination of the above quoted Models 1 and 2:

41 John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, eds., The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 4th ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 171. 67

Table 3: Adapted Intertextual Research Model

Analytic Analytic Activity Course Analytical Official discourse; heads of government /states, cabinet members, senior civil Focus servants, military chiefs, wider security policy debate, political opposition, the media, corporate institutions, Non State Actors Object of Official texts, direct and secondary intertextual links, supportive texts, critical Analysis texts, political texts, speeches, statements, print media texts, editorials, field reporting, academic debates, corporate institutions public campaigns Goal of The stabilization of official discourse through intertextual links, response of Analysis official discourse to critical discourses, the hegemony of official discourse

Source: Lene Hansen, Security as Practice, p. 57 (adapted by the researcher).

All the securitization moves would be analyzed utilizing the Security Discourse Intertextual Schematic in respective chapters dealing with concerned issues sector-wise. The ‘object of analyses’ as described in the schematic above, would be primary sources of evidence for the competing discourses in an issue. Each security issue that has been purportedly securitized would be analyzed through the relevant texts that explain the positions taken by the parties in that issue. Broadening of the concept of Pakistan’s security during the period of research would be ascertained by way of increased incidence of securitization in non-traditional sectors of security, i.e., Political, Societal, Economic and Environmental, assessed by identification of the securitization moves as discerned by scrutiny of relevant discourses.

In order to make the discourse analysis accurate, the relevant discourses would be selected from the period of heightened political activity about the securitization issue under focus. The model above is suitable for discourse analysis of sociopolitical events in Pakistan because of the rich repertoire of texts available for providing the object of analysis; official texts, direct and secondary intertextual links, supportive texts, critical texts, political texts, speeches, statements, print media texts, editorials, field reporting, academic debates, etc. The literature review indicates a vibrant officialdom, civil society, print media, and academia in

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Pakistan, which would provide ample data for the intertextual discourse analysis leading to a reliable understanding of the scaled incidence of securitization in different sectors of Pakistan’s security.

After having a brief look at the various post-modern theories on national security of states and establishing the relevance of securitization theory analyzed through discourse analysis, it would be pertinent to look at the history of national security of Pakistan from securitization perspective. How the national security of the country evolved over the years and which critical issues were securitized? In the next chapter we would identify some key security issues faced by Pakistan since her birth and explain their sociopolitical dynamics using securitization theory.

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CHAPTER 3

CONCEPTION OF PAKISTAN’S SECURITY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Securitization remained evident in the evolution of Pakistan’s security. The proponents of independence from British and Hindus for the Muslims living in contiguous majority areas in pre-partition India, time and again invoked securitization to secure the political and societal identity of Muslims against the Hindu hegemony. It was the same identity which the Two Nation Theory propounded by Jinnah professed for Pakistan’s nationhood. Successful securitization was seen when existential threat to that identity was often cited to elicit support for extraordinary political measures like independence, with due recognition of the issue as a dire security threat to the identity of Muslim masses by a wide audience.

In continuation of this trend, during the later years of Pakistan’s history some significant instances of securitization occurred before the period of this research. The strengthening of Armed Forces during President Ayub’s era to safeguard territorial integrity, the development and expansion of nuclear weapons program against aggravating Indian aggression, and the support to Afghan freedom fighters against Soviet invasion threatening Pakistan are some of the glaring securitization moves, all in the domain of military sector, which were milestones in the evolution of Pakistan’s security conception. These historical episodes of strengthening Pakistan’s security will be discussed in this chapter from securitization perspective.

Security discourse analysis to see how securitization repeatedly figured out in the evolution of Pakistan’s national security concept would be useful in understanding the subsequent securitization moves during the period under research. The sector(s) in which securitization moves occurred before President Zardari’s government, compared to the sectors in which securitization moves occurred during and after that era, i.e., during the period of research, would indicate a trend as to which kind of issues were accorded extraordinary significance in the national politics of the country by way of securitization.

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As the British rule drew to an end in the Subcontinent, Pakistan was separated from India as a result of a bitter struggle to secure the political, social and economic rights of the Muslims by seeking an independent homeland for them in the areas where they enjoyed demographic dominance. However, interpretation of this popular political struggle led by Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s Muslim League on the basis of Allama Muhammad Iqbal’s ideology is not a simple affair. There are varying perspectives that characterize the struggle and its outcome. In the wake of British machinations in India at the twilight of their imperialism, securing the political, economic and societal rights of the Muslims against Hindu domination, especially in the areas where Muslims enjoyed majority population, was the primary aim of Pakistan movement led by Jinnah.

Insecurity, from British to a lesser and from Hindu political caucus to a larger extent, signified the genesis of Pakistan which was invoked to elicit favorable perspective for the freedom struggle. Securitization, therefore, remained an embedded conceptual driver in the separatist movement. Muslim political, social and economic identities were threatened by political Hinduism’s oppressive and exploitative attitude reflective in All India Congress policies. Congress’ hauteur resulting from their success in 1937 elections is evident from Nehru’s proclamation in attempting to establish Congress as the only inheritor of power after the departure of British: “There are only two forces in India today, British imperialism and Indian nationalism represented by the Congress.” Jinnah reminded him sharply that there was a third party to be reckoned with – the Muslims.1

Disillusioned with “Indian nationalism” under the increasingly opportunistic attitude of Indian National Congress, which had a visibly Hindu bias, the Muslims of Subcontinent decided to adopt a political course of action to secure their identity and rights. On 23 March 1940 in Lahore during the Annual session of Muslim League a historic independence resolution was adopted, which unequivocally declared unacceptability of the political scheme of an All India Federation being considered under the framework of Government of India Act 1935. The Lahore Resolution (later named Pakistan Resolution) stated, inter alia:

1 Jaswant Singh, Jinnah (Karachi: OUP, 2010), 199. 71

“The areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the north- western and eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign ….. Adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the Constitution for minorities …. for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights.”

Barry Buzan et al (1998) assert that the exact definition and criterion of securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat, with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects. The theorists suggest that securitization has to be studied directly by studying discourses and political objectives. If through an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing actor manages to let go of rules and procedures he would otherwise be bounded by, a case of securitization is in the offing. However, it must be understood that a discourse that portrays something as an existential threat for a referent object does not, by itself, create securitization – rather it is only a securitizing move – whereas the issue is securitized only when a wide audience accepts it as such.2

Owing to the exploitative policies of the predominantly Hindu led Congress Party’s Governments in most of the Indian provinces created after the elections of 1937, the Muslims celebrated Congress’ resignation due to political differences with the British authorities on 22 December 1939, as a Day of Deliverance and Thanksgiving in token of relief from the ‘tyranny, oppression and injustice’ of the Congress regime.3 After having a taste of the Congress’ Hindu mindset by seeing their political maneuvering and governance preferences during their direct rule from 1937 – 39 in most of the provinces, and indirect influence in the rest, the Muslims perceived the threat of Hindu domination in post British India as devastating.

Therefore, ingredients of a securitization move were evident in the language of the momentous text of Lahore Resolution; the constitutional plan being contemplated for future of India will be ‘unacceptable’ and ‘unworkable’ unless it meets the Muslim demands put forward from the political platform of Muslim League. Only an existential threat to the rights and identity of the Muslims of Subcontinent would be serious enough to support a defiant stance like the one taken in the resolution. The securitizing actor, Muslim League in this case, went on to exploit the

2 Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Security; A New Framework for Analysis, 25. 3 Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, 34. 72

urgency of this existential threat by laying the priority of an extraordinary solution, i.e., an independent homeland for the Muslims of Subcontinent; a securitizing move, which was successful by virtue of its acceptance by the wider Muslim audience convinced of its import, who later strove tirelessly to achieve the securitization objectives.

Jinnah’s Presidential address on this occasion further clarified the securitization perspective. He said, inter alia:

“It has always been taken for granted mistakenly that the Musalmans (Muslims) are a minority. … The Musalmans are not a minority. … The Musalmans are a nation by any definition. … The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different civilizations, which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. … To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a State.”4

A securitizing move is visible in the language of this text. Yoking a minority with a majority would naturally undermine the rights of the former that would lead to political and social disenchantment, likely to grow with the passage of time. Such ugly forebodings would mortally threaten the very basics of any future government that does not take into account the separate nature of the two nations living in India. The text, which is a very important primary document, invokes the looming existential threat describing it in most harsh language as the “final destruction” of any political scheme aimed at forcefully binding Muslims and Hindus together under the artificial commonality of a state. The Muslim League, in order to achieve the next step of securitization, i.e., sanctifying the then extra-constitutional and taboo demand of bisecting India into two separate states, was able to convince a very wide audience, i.e., a huge majority of the Indian Muslims, about the existential necessity of a two-state solution. Though the solution remained “truncated” in Quaid’s words, the securitization process was successfully accomplished.

4 “Address by Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah at Lahore Session of Muslim League, March, 1940” (Directorate of Films and Publishing, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1983), Paras 17, 23, 24, http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islamlinks/txt_jinnah_lahore_1940.html. 73

Allama Muhammad Iqbal, ten years earlier, had made another historic declaration on 29 December 1930 during his Presidential Address to the 25th Session of the All India Muslim League at Allahabad. It was a lengthy academic cum political discourse in which he identified the significance of communalism in Indian sociopolitical makeup and the necessity of accepting the inevitability of cultural autonomy for creating harmonious nation states. He said, inter alia:

“Communalism in its higher aspect, then, is indispensable to the formation of a harmonious whole in a country like India. .... The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India is, therefore, fully justified. … I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State. Self-government within the British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India.”5

A securitization move by way of establishing an existential threat, arguably in subtle terms, is visible in this text too. It clearly spells out the substantial ill effects of any hastily conceived political arrangement that does not take into account the aspirations of Indian Muslims. In the same spirit, Iqbal proposed a separate state for Muslims residing in North- Western India, much against the notion of ‘Unity of India,’ which the British and the Hindus both considered to be an established rule of business at that time. To suggest such radical measures of redress against the threat of disharmony in absolutely clear terms is an unambiguous articulation of the securitization move, commonly known as ‘Pakistan Movement.’

Now let’s move on to see the development of Armed Forces of Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s, another milestone in Pakistan’s security history which needs to be seen from the securitization perspective. After the independence in 1947, safeguarding the territorial integrity by way of strengthening the Armed Forces was a critical priority in the modern development of Pakistan during the rule of President Ayub from 1958 to 1969. He had actually embarked upon that journey soon after his appointment as Commander in Chief of Pakistan Army in 1951. The ill-equipped and fledgling land force, which constituted the national army as a result of the division of British Indian Army’s personnel and assets in 1947, was not in a good shape. During the formative years of this force, Ayub Khan, who was seeing rather rapid promotions during

5 Latif Ahmed Sherwani, ed., “Speeches, Writings, and Statements of Iqbal” (Iqbal Academy, Lahore, 1977), Paras 2e, 3b, http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islamlinks/txt_iqbal_1930.html#03. 74

this time (from Colonel in Punjab Boundary Commission till 29 August 1947 to General and Commander-in-Chief on 17 January 1951), assessed it as:

“Our army was badly equipped and terribly disorganized. … Our plight was indeed desperate. But from the moment Pakistan came into being I was certain of one thing: Pakistan’s survival was vitally linked with the establishment of a well-trained, well-equipped and well-led army. I was determined to create this type of military shield for my country and, with the help of dedicated men, I succeeded. Today I am convinced that without this Army Pakistan could not have weathered the storms and attacks to which it was exposed; and the army behind the people of Pakistan is still a sure guarantee that our enemies will not be able to weaken us.”6

Ayub Khan’s assessment of the security situation of Pakistan during that period is significant as it represents the perspective of an important person in the country’s military hierarchy at that time, who was to become a key strategic actor shortly where these perceptions would be instrumental. An analysis of this text, taken from President Ayub Khan’s political autobiography, reveals an interesting case of securitization in the military sector of Pakistan’s security instituted during the initial years of its birth. The existential threat to the identity of Pakistan is clearly articulated to invoke the extreme urgency of strengthening the Army by bending the rules of nation building which would have required paying attention to the economy, infrastructure and to the plight of the millions of refugees pouring into the nascent country during those initial years. By linking Pakistan’s survival to a ‘well-trained, well-equipped and well-led army,’ the securitizing actor, i.e., the government of that period, tended to convince a wider audience in favor of the securitization move at hand. The move was aimed at securing funds and equipment from within the country’s meagre financial resources and by establishing suitable cooperative foreign relationships in order to strengthen the army, which was struggling to establish solidly in defense of the motherland.

The circumstances under which the newly born Pakistan Army would receive its due share of equipment and organized forces, reconstituted out of the British Indian Army, were very unfavorable to Pakistan. The Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee was formed in April 1947 under the chairmanship of Field Martial Sir Claude Auchinleck having British service chiefs and Indian civil servants representing both the future countries of India and Pakistan. It was

6 Muhammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters (Lahore: OUP, 1967), 20. 75

mandated to fairly apportion the military stores and to ensure peaceful reconstitution of the manpower according to mutually agreed terms in an orderly manner that was naturally expected to go beyond the slated date of partition, i.e., 15 August 1947. However, by 26 September 1947 India’s rigid and mal-intentioned stance did not allow the committee to function properly, rather the propaganda of the Indian National Congress maligned the stature of the Commander-in-Chief by portraying him as favorable to Pakistan and forcing the Viceroy to seek his early resignation. On 28 September Auchinleck reported to the British Government:

“I have no hesitation whatever in affirming that the present India Cabinet are implacably determined to do all in their power to prevent the establishment of the Dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis … The Indian leaders, Cabinet Ministers, civil officials and others have persistently tried to obstruct the work of partition of the Armed Forces. I and my officers have been continuously and virulently accused of being pro-Pakistan and partial, whereas the truth is that we have merely tried to do our duty impartially and without fear, favor or affection … It is becoming increasingly impossible for myself and my officers to continue with our task. If we are removed, there is no hope at all of any just division of assets in the shape of movable stores belonging to the former Indian Army. The attitude of Pakistan, on the other hand, has been reasonable and cooperative throughout. This is natural in the circumstances, as Pakistan has practically nothing of her own and must obtain most of what she wants from the reserves of stores etc. now lying in India.”7

This episode provides an insight into the hostility being faced by Pakistan during its formative days, which helped to set off the defensive mechanism that we are now interpreting as securitization. The wider audience in Pakistan needed little convincing for believing in the dire need of a strong army because of the first hand experiences or listening to the first-hand accounts of the pogrom during the mass migration in the wake of the decision of the Indo-Pak partition. Securitizing actor’s pleas for emergent and extraordinary steps, circumventing ‘normal’ rules of business (of nation building) in those times, to build the Army to standards required to meet the emerging threat, easily found a receptive audience in the masses of Pakistan. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali quotes Ian Morrison of the London Times reporting from Jullundur on 24 August 1947:

“More horrible than anything we saw during the war, is the universal comment of experienced officers, British and Indian, on the present slaughter in East

7 Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, 191. 76

Punjab. The Sikhs are clearing East Punjab of Muslims, butchering hundreds daily, forcing thousands to flee westward, burning Muslim villages and homesteads, even in their frenzy burning their own. This violence has been organized from the highest levels of Sikh leadership, and it is being done systematically, sector by sector.”8

In popular perception another important event that reinforced the critical need of strengthening the Army during the initial few years, to the level of the issue being securitized later, was the fate of the war for liberation of Kashmir fought between Pakistan and India in 1947-48. The inadequacy of Pakistan Army’s action in 1948 disregarding orders of Pakistan’s nascent government, aimed at preventing Indians from forcing their hand in Kashmir, contributed in shaping public opinion towards the need for strengthening the Armed Forces as a vital national priority. In a more realistic assessment, as detailed analyses later revealed, the priority should rather have been towards strengthening the political and military process of war that would enable use of army in a more deliberate and meaningful manner than what was displayed during the 1948 War.9

Evidence for the success of the securitization move can be found in the sustained levels of high defense expenditures ranging between 50 to 73 percent of the total government expenditure from 1948-59 at an average of about 60 percent.10 Evidently this was a large percentage of sustained defense expenditure by a newborn country faced with a myriad of challenges in the political, social and economic domains. The prioritization seemed to be driven by existential challenges of defense and territorial integrity, established over the years by the state as the securitizing actor. Brian Cloughley records a more discreet evidence of the wider audience in Pakistan acceding to the securitization of military build-up in his work, A History of the Pakistan Army. The Government of Prime Minister Bogra attempted to reduce the size of Armed Forces by introducing legislation to that effect in 1953 ‘but reversed that policy under pressure from the country at large’ as reported in the daily Dawn of 2 September 1953.11

8 Ali, 256. 9 Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 71. 10 Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military & Politics in Pakistan, 1947-1997 (Pakistan: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2000), 57. 11 Cloughley, History of the Pakistan Army, 38. 77

Effects of this securitization of the military build-up also played up prominently in the foreign policy of Pakistan right at the beginning of its international relationships and strategic alignments. After hectic diplomacy and much efforts on the part of Pakistan’s civil and military leadership, Pakistan entered in May 1954 into a military alliance with the U.S. called ‘Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement,’ whereas India had already entered a similar agreement in 1951. Pakistan – U.S. defense agreement caused very serious consternation in Indian political leadership. Nehru declared that India will rescind their earlier reconciliatory stance on resolution of Kashmir issue entailing a fair and impartial plebiscite as agreed between him and Prime Minister Bogra and communicated by the famous communique of 20 August 1953.12

Whether Nehru would have acquiesced to such a plebiscite had Pakistan not entered the Mutual Defense Agreement is a matter of debate beyond the scope of this study. The fact that Pakistan took a firm stance on this agreement, even at the ostensible cost of a major foreign policy initiative, in order to bolster her overall security position in the international arena, is evidently a step in the securitization move undertaken with the objective of making the Armed Forces strong. Later Pakistan entered the U.S. sponsored multi-lateral military alliances South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Baghdad Pact (later Central Treaty Organization - CENTO), much to USSR’s dissatisfaction that costed in terms of their strong support to India against Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, especially in the United Nations forums. However, the uncertainty afflicting Pakistan gradually disappeared with the inflow of U.S. equipment and confidence in its use.13

The later years saw continued simmering of hostilities between India and Pakistan with no reason to believe that the basis of the securitization move regarding bolstering of the country’s defense had subsided by any measure during this period. Both India and Pakistan were receiving arms and military aid from the U.S. with the strange reassurance that it would not alter the balance of power in the Indo-Pak context and it would not be used by these countries against each other without an American reaction. India was receiving military aid from Soviet Union as well and from the United Kingdom. After the Sino-Indian border skirmishes of 1962 followed by the Chinese voluntary withdrawal, the U.S. stepped up its commitment for improving the defense

12 Khan, Friends Not Masters, 131. 13 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, The Armed Forces of Pakistan (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 60. 78

capabilities of India, much against Pakistan’s apprehensions of linking this aid to furtherance in Indian aggressive attitude and recalcitrance on the Kashmir dispute. In 1967, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto even after parting ways with President Ayub, having served him as Foreign Minister for four years, repeatedly securitized the need of strong armed forces by Pakistan in the Indo-Pak relations as founder of the new political force, the Pakistan People’s Party. He vehemently argued against the U.S. encouragement of Indo-Pak rapprochement and arms control without resolution of the outstanding disputes as it would tantamount to giving India a carte blanche in conducting the affairs in South Asia while bogging a smaller country like Pakistan down in the complexities of arms control implementation. Maintaining a strong military by Pakistan was an inescapable strategic imperative for Bhutto, which demanded extraordinary measures:

“In spite of the self-evident objections to bilateral disarmament, the Pakistan Government has taken the unusual step of announcing unilateral reduction in the expenditure on armed forces for 1967-68. … Judging from past experience, Pakistan may have to pay very dearly for this gesture. It is a tragic commentary on present official thinking that it has forgotten what price Pakistan had to pay during the September war of 1965 for having virtually frozen its defense expenditure, despite a sharp upward trend in India’s defense outlay since 1962.”14

As part of the political opposition during that time, Bhutto’s language, “having to pay very dearly” for any reduction in armed forces budget, developed the discourse leading to sustained securitization of strengthening the armed forces issue in Pakistan’s security debate. The use of these words by the ex-Foreign Minister, incumbent opposition leader and the future Prime Minister of Pakistan indicate the gravity attached to the threat from India to the survival of Pakistan perceived by the political culture of the time. Bhutto’s language in articulating the danger emanating from India was very succinct:

“Aggression has now become an instrument of India’s foreign policy, an instrument employed on no less than six occasions since her independence twenty years ago. If the military balance is to swing in India’s favor, there is no reason to suppose that she would hesitate to commit aggression for the seventh time and strike at Pakistan, her ‘enemy number one.’”15

14 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (Karachi: OUP, 1969), 98. 15 Bhutto, 100. 79

Use of phrases like ‘enemy number one’ and ‘aggression as an instrument of foreign policy’ are deliberate attempts at reinforcing the securitization discourse rather than nuancing the rhetoric. Even a cursory look at the securitization move to achieve military buildup reveals sedimentation of anti-India ideology over the years with much consistency. Bhutto retained his perceptions of the requirement to build strong Armed Forces to retain defensive capability against Indian threat during his tenure as the Prime Minister. In a letter to President Nixon dated 14 February 1973, in the context of discovery of a large cache of Russian arms from the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad, he wrote:

“Indian policies towards Pakistan remain wholly in conformity with the Russian. While India continues to arm itself to the teeth, with massive military assistance from Soviet Union, and cooperate with the Soviet Union in conduct of operations aimed at subverting Pakistan from within, it keeps pretending that Pakistan’s armed strength is a serious threat to India’s security. This explains the periodical outcries of alarm at the prospect of grant of any military aid to Pakistan from the United States.”16

The direct and indirect threat from India to Pakistan’s security and integrity were foremost in the mind of Prime Minister Bhutto when he penned those words. Nixon formally acknowledged in his official reply “that we would regard any new threat to Pakistan’s integrity as inevitably disrupting the establishment of stability in South Asia, a hope given such promise at Simla (referring to the post-1971 War Indo-Pak Simla Agreement of 1972).”17 At the same time the U.S. policy did not consider presence of any designs of the Russians or the Indians against the integrity of Pakistan, but agreed that “over the long run, if Pakistan is internally unstable and deeply divided, the Indians, Afghans and Soviets will be tempted to put pressures on Pakistan.”18

The next case of securitization in Pakistan’s security debate was the initiation of Pakistan’s nuclear program in the face of existential adversity. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto is regarded as the founding father of Pakistan’s nuclear program. As early as 1967 he had the nuclear deterrent clearly in his political agenda, which he mentioned as being absolutely imperative to avoid a total war that was the characteristic of wars of those times, in Bhutto’s reckoning. He visualized that India was determined to acquire nuclear weapons capability. In his view India would use her

16 Roedad Khan, ed., “The American Papers” (OUP, 1999), 889. 17 Khan, 895. 18 Khan, 960. 80

nuclear advantage to blackmail Pakistan, besides severely limiting Pakistan’s development in science and technology, hence the need to pursue the nuclear program. He firmly believed that Pakistan’s “security and territorial integrity are more important than economic development,” while acknowledging that the latter is necessary for defense, he insisted upon primacy of the “defense requirement of sovereignty.”19

The key strategic actors in Pakistan considered the threat to Pakistan from India as existential and pervasive, as is evident from some of the above statements. In the minds of Pakistanis, the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, especially vis-à-vis role of India, reinforced these apprehensions like never before. It led to a gradual building of national consensus, almost a national psyche, determined to get the nuclear deterrent in order to effectively ward off the Indian danger. The Indian nuclear tests of 1974 further fueled this determination. Securitizing actor’s ‘speech act’ of the time can be summarized as the slogan “never again”; Pakistan would not be subjected again to such humiliation by anyone in the world. “It evolved into the most significant symbol of national determination and a central element of Pakistan’s identity.” 20

Bhutto came to power after the debacle of East Pakistan on 20 December 1971. A testimony of his strategic priority was the summoning of a meeting on 13 January 1972 of the Pakistani scientists to consider the nuclear weapon’s development program for Pakistan, which actually took place on 20 January 1972 in Multan.21 The meeting saw enthusiastic support, with reservations at the delay in pursuing this thought, from some of the best scientific brains of the country, displaying both a national fervor and strategic insight. The scientists, like the rest of the nation, were dismayed by the country’s dismemberment and were aware of the developments in Indian nuclear program. They assured Bhutto of doing ‘fission in three years’ but sought robust patronage and planning to which the Prime Minister acquiesced wholeheartedly. Meanwhile, India, which was much ahead on the nuclear path than Pakistan at that time, conducted a ‘peaceful’ nuclear explosion in May 1974, which “introduced a qualitative change in the situation between the two countries” and Bhutto vowed “not to succumb to nuclear blackmail.” Immediately after those explosions, Pakistan sent its Foreign Minister Aziz Ahmad to U.K., U.S.

19 Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, 153. 20 Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass the Making of the Pakistani Bomb (California: Stanford University Press, 2012), 2. 21 Shahid-ur Rehman, Long Road to Chagai (Islamabad: Shahid-ur-Rehman, 1999), 16–18. 81

and France, and Foreign Secretary Agha Shahi to China, to seek the ‘nuclear umbrella’ of those countries in case of an attack by India. While acknowledging the ‘awful’ nature of Indian actions, Pakistan was advised to desist from following suit. China disclosed that their nuclear program was of ‘experimental nature.’ The outcome probably didn’t come as a surprise to Bhutto who gave a go-ahead to the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) in a Defense Committee of the Cabinet meeting on 15 June 1974 to build the device after due deliberation.22

The debate on the essentiality of nuclear weapons has grown stronger over the years in military, political, bureaucratic and almost all circles of any national significance that exist in Pakistan; national consensus thereof is ubiquitous and unquestionable. After coming to birth under tumultuous circumstances with unravelling as a clear and present danger, Pakistan tended to build external partnerships with nations and institutions to balance her opponents’ designs and to compensate for her weakness in the military strength. However, under the harsh education of strategic experiences she “found international institutions capricious and alliances unreliable.” 23 The insecurities faced during the first quarter century of her birth were sufficient instances of existential threat to identity which triggered the securitization move in terms of a national struggle for acquisition of ‘the bomb.’

Development of nuclear weapons was a long and arduous securitization move. According to Bhutto, its securitizing actor, the move began by modernizing the PAEC and initiation of Pakistan Institute for Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) along with a 5 megawatt research reactor. It was followed by sending of hundreds of young and brilliant scientists to the best universities in the U.S. and Europe for education in nuclear sciences, and agreement for the 137 megawatt Karachi nuclear power plant (KANUPP) with Canada.24 Bhutto considered this hazardous securitization move fatal for himself. Inter alia, If I’m Assassinated, is Bhutto’s vivid first-hand account of his contributions in the initial period of Pakistan’s strategic pursuit of nuclear weapons and its integration into the country’s defense and foreign policies. According to him, it was this pursuit which irked Pakistan’s enemies internationally who conspired against the

22 Rehman, 43. 23 Khan, Eating Grass the Making of the Pakistani Bomb, 24. 24 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, If I Am Assassinated (Pakistan: Sani Hussain Panhwar, 1979), 150–51, http://bhutto.org/Acrobat/If-I-am-assassinated-by-Shaheed-Bhutto.pdf. 82

nuclear program by orchestrating the coup leading to his ouster and the looming assassination. 25 However, the course of history proved that the securitization move which he initiated for acquisition of nuclear weapons to safeguard Pakistan’s identity and territorial integrity against aggressive external powers was too powerful to subside with his tragic death. In contrast, it continued fervently with attendant ups and downs during the course of its hazardous journey.

The next milestone in Pakistan’s security history is her support to the Afghan jihad against the Soviet occupation which needs to be seen from the securitization perspective. It was initiated by President General Zia-ul-Haq with Pakistan’s integrity and security, indeed her identity, as the principal referent which was threatened by the Soviet desire to reach ‘warm waters’ after consolidating their occupation of Afghanistan. The people of Pakistan were the wider audience who were convinced about the existential nature of this threat emanating from the close proximity of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The speech act revolved around jihad, a fight for the religious cum national cause of defeating an ‘infidel’ power from occupying a brotherly Muslim country and threatening own country as well. This ‘extended’ securitization helped to garner the forces of volunteer ‘mujahedeen’ or Muslim fighters from other Muslim countries to support the ranks and files of Afghan mujahedeen.

After successful invigoration of the securitization move in Pakistan, the government rallied the support of the U.S. and her western allies along with Saudi Arabia, UAE and some other Muslim countries for the Afghan mujahedeen factions fighting the Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan. The strategy was to convince the wider Pakistan’s audience about the essentiality of this proxy war and make Pakistan the pivot of Afghan Jihad. In the process, millions of Afghan refugees who fled the war zone were accepted with open arms as brothers in distress by Pakistan; about 1.5 million continue to reside as registered refugees in Pakistan,26 and a very large number as unregistered ones, having intermingled in the society. The acceptance of this securitization move in Pakistan resulted in successful prosecution of the devised strategy from 1979 till 1988, culminating in the success of the Afghan Mujahedeen and a humiliating defeat for the Soviet Union. President Zia was the principal architect of this move and strategy who

25 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, “The Pakistan Papers” (Executive Intelligence Review, 1979), 47–48, http://bhutto.org/Acrobat/The%20Pakistan%20papers.pdf. 26 UNHCR 2015 country operations profile - Pakistan (2015). 83

articulated it most effectively to constantly engage the audience both at home and abroad for eliciting their support in ‘Pakistan’s war inside Afghanistan’.

However, apart from securitization of Afghan policy, it was also meant in the long run to wield influence inside Afghanistan by way of cultivating and reaping benefits of ties in the future government. “A pro-Pakistan regime in Kabul was a politico-strategic aim to be achieved at all costs.”27 Quoting Ashok Kapur (Pakistan’s Nuclear Development: 1987), Agha summarizes the Indian viewpoint on Pakistan’s objectives in Afghanistan as threefold; to gain strategic depth, use of trained Afghan manpower against India in case of need, and control of Afghan politics to project Pakistan’s influence in the Central Asian Republics and the Middle East. Such acute interpretation caused a strategic tension between the rival neighbors and resulted in situations like the Indian attempt in 1984 at browbeating Pakistan through a massive military exercise on the border called Brasstacks and Pakistan’s response of poising its strike formations offensively, which ultimately led to a mutual retreat. The war against the Soviet Union could not be geographically limited to Afghanistan due to its unconventional character. Zia regime is rightly blamed for their short-sightedness towards the internal challenges that grew in its wake, like huge inflow of migrants, proliferation of guns and narcotics, and attendant socioeconomic insecurity.

The decision by Pakistan to take this adventurous course of resisting the Soviets in Afghanistan was taken initially without the guaranteed support of the powers that later supported this resistance. It was a bold undertaking. The mid and late seventies saw some rough patches of relationship with the U.S. which transformed immediately after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as Pakistan agreed to become a frontline state in the struggle to stop communist expansionism. In return, President Carter’s government overlooked the martial law in Pakistan and offered $ 400 million in economic and military aid in 1980, which was rejected by President Zia as “peanuts.” In 1981 the Reagan administration increased the offer nine-fold, taking it to $ 3.6 billion spread over six years. The U.S. supplied about US$2 billion worth of arms and ammunition to the Afghan Mujahedeen groups operating through Pakistan, apart from similar

27 Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, 1979-99 (London: Palgrave, 2001), 16. 84

assistance coming from Saudi Arabia, China, and Egypt.28 An important spin-off of this emergent geopolitical status of Pakistan was connected to the development of nuclear weapons program. Zia and Bhutto might have been diametrically opposed to each other but Zia continued Bhutto’s securitization of the nuclear weapons program with the same zeal. Pakistan’s nuclear program, which was under intense pressure from the U.S. in the late 70s, got a much needed breather as Pakistan was cajoled into the obligations and challenges of being the frontline state of the free world.29 Similarly, being a military man himself, Zia did not need much motivation to infuse intense energy into the other securitization move that he had inherited regarding strengthening the Armed Forces of Pakistan against the Indian threat. The U.S. military and economic assistance package became the means for that end, along with the nuclear weapons development needs.

Eight years on, the securitization move undertaken by Zia paid off successfully when last of the Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan beginning 15 August 1988 to complete by mid- February 1989 as a result of the Geneva Accord between Pakistan, Afghanistan, Soviet Union and the United States. The securitizing agent (Zia) signified the mortal danger of Soviet’s Afghan occupation as an existential threat to Pakistan, the referent, convincing the wider audience, the population, about extraordinary measures, like supporting the Afghan jihad and its attendant difficulties in blood and treasure, to achieve the end of securing Pakistan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Apart from that the other two significant securitization moves of his time, i.e., nuclear weapons development and military buildup, both were augmented incidentally which Zia perceived as vital for Pakistan’s security.

A brief survey of critical issues handled by the leadership of Pakistan during the first forty years of its turbulent history shows that securitization theory could help to explain the motivations and actions that went about in handling those issues. Whether it be Jinnah’s exposition of the pre-partition Hindu exploitation, Ayub countering the Indian military buildup, Bhutto getting the nuclear deterrent, or Zia resisting the Russian occupation of Afghanistan, their actions had some common securitization strands. The strands included dramatizing the acutely

28 Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter, eds., Pakistan Under the Military (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 18, 150. 29 Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 156. 85

critical nature of the issue, seeking redress through extraordinary measures, and ensuring widest possible public acceptance of the criticality of the issue and the extraordinary measures, both.

After seeing the critical security issues in Pakistan’s history through the securitization lens, we would apply the same perspective in Chapter 4 to identify the key ‘political sector’ issues securitized during the period of this research, i.e., the President Zardari’s 2008 and the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s 2013 PML(N) governments.

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CHAPTER 4

SECURITIZATION OF POLITICAL SECURITY ISSUES

The distribution of power in the political system of a country and fulfilment of its citizens’ aspirations, as stipulated constitutionally, is fundamentally important to national security. From the perspective of international relations, the government of a country represents and advances the country’s national interests in the world, security being foremost. The nature of the government and its distribution of power mechanisms largely remain an internal debate, unless its abrasiveness affects its representative authority in the international arena. Also, utilitarian tensions often subdue ethical considerations in geopolitics, which is, at times, helpful to undemocratic, authoritarian or oppressive governments. However, in many circumstances the stability of the state is not threatened externally but internally by the instability and imbalance of the political system.

Political security is about the organizational stability of social order. Political threats harm the organizational stability of the state. According to Buzan et al (1998):

“The idea of the state, particularly its national identity and organizing ideology, and the institutions which express it are the normal targets of political threats. Since the state is an essentially political entity, political threats may be as much feared as military ones. This is particularly so if the target is a weak state.”1

In case of Pakistan, just prior to the period of this research, the Musharraf era represented a Government which, though considered stable externally, lacked constitutional stability, political legitimacy and an ethical basis. Out of these, constitutional instability was largely inherited, while the other two were of its own making. Constitutional instability was reflected in the disturbed center-province power sharing and the presidential bias in authority vis-à-vis the prime minister. It was also reflected in the unfair inter-province financial awards and the prejudiced center versus smaller provinces relationship. Due to prolonged history of internal mistrust, the relationship of the federation with the smaller federating units was in a state of discord. Musharraf’s strengthening of the local governments without addressing the imbalance at

1 Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Security; A New Framework for Analysis, 142. 87

the provincial level failed to address the issue. The economy did show some signs of improvement but fruits of constitutionalism and devolution of power did not materialize, largely due to structural distortions. Repeated derailment of democracy and its ironic judicial validation, along with a perpetual tussle between the powerful central government and the weak provincial governments was seen by the major political parties as a grave concern for the security of the country.

In this chapter, we will examine the discourses leading to President Zardari era’s 18th Constitutional Amendment 2010, the 7th National Finance Commission (NFC) Award 2010, and the Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan Package (AHBP) – Initiating Balochistan Rights Package – 2009. A couple of rhetorical questions seem relevant before embarking upon the analysis of above mentioned discourses.

As the threat of destabilization due to the distribution of power faced by the political system were produced internally, was it a case of lesser concern to national security than if generated externally? Can these instances of heightened political activity to redress the perceived constitutional imbalances be seen to contribute towards strengthening the security of Pakistan?

The discourse analysis would adapt the model developed in Chapter 2:

Table 4: Intertextual Model - Discourse Analysis of Securitization in Political Security

Analytic Analytic Activity Course Debate on Historical discourses, PPP’s posture; President Zardari’s stance, Constitutional the ‘subject’ Committee’s chairman and members’ positions, wider constitutional and being political debate, political opposition views securitized Sources of Official texts, supportive texts, critical texts, speeches, statements, newspaper discourse opinions / editorials, scholarly articles, books, journals Goal of The stabilization of PPP Government’s discourse through intertextual links, Analysis response of official discourse to critical discourses; the likely transformation of official discourse, the internal stability of print media discourses

Source: Lene Hansen, Security as Practice, p. 57 (adapted by the researcher).

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Securitization of 18th Constitutional Amendment

During General Musharraf’s era the two main rival political parties, the PPP and PML(N), found commonality in opposition to Musharraf and astutely decided to bury the hatchet. They presented a united front to Musharraf, forcing him to end political victimization and allow normal democratic process to continue. Besides seeking to end their forced exclusion from politics, the reconciliatory effort with Musharraf that began in 2002 looked beyond the immediate goal of ending the undemocratic dispensation in the country. It aimed at addressing the lingering structural issues appearing repeatedly in Pakistan’s political and constitutional history including: the character of federalism, devolution of power, civil-military relations, balance in the Prime Minister’s and President’s powers, distribution of resources, judicial acquiescence of the military take-overs, politicians alliance with military rulers, the constitutional amendments by the military governments, and the higher judiciary appointments. Both political parties negotiated to achieve continuity in the political process and address these systemic issues. The leadership of the two largest political parties of Pakistan saw the situation confronting the country at that time as politically grim, socially undermining, economically unsuitable and harmful for the integrity of the country; all very critical security concerns indeed.

On 14 May 2006 the parleys resulted in the “Charter of Democracy” agreed upon by PPP and PML(N) described as acrimony buried by one of its architects, Mian Raza Rabbani of PPP. In his work, A Biography of Pakistani Federalism, Rabbani quotes from the Charter’s preamble to elucidate its raison d’etre:

“We, the elected leaders of Pakistan, have deliberated on the political crisis in our beloved homeland, the threats to its survival, the erosion of the federation’s unity, the military’s subordination of all state institutions, the marginalization of civil society, the mockery of the constitution and representative institutions, growing poverty, unemployment and inequality, brutalization of society, breakdown of rule of law and, the unprecedented hardships facing our people under military dictatorship, which has pushed our country to the brink of total disaster.”2

The leaders of PPP and PML(N) clearly wanted to steer the discourse in a manner to portray the criticality of the situation being faced by the country. The very “survival” is depicted

2 Mian Raza Rabbani, A Biography of Pakistani Federalism (Islamabad: Leo Books, 2012), 132. 89

under ‘threat,’ ‘federation’s unity’ under ‘erosion’ and the country at ‘the brink of disaster.’ In a securitization move, the speech act of the major political parties’ leadership (the actors) was articulated masterfully towards the people of Pakistan (the audience), predicting the specter of a survival threat for the state (the referent) due to precarious circumstances. The actors sought to convince the audience about the need for immediate and extraordinary measures to control the deteriorating situation:

“Drawing history’s lesson that military dictatorship and the nation cannot co- exist – as military involvement adversely affects the economy and the democratic institutions as well as the defense capabilities, and the integrity of the country – the nation needs a new direction different from a militaristic and regimental approach of the Bonapartist regimes, as the current one.”3

A ‘new direction’ was being suggested by the securitizing actors as the way forward; as the way to save the state from an impending disaster. Since conviction of the wider audience in gravity of the matter and its immediate redress through whatever means necessary is of significant importance, the securitization move sought to lure the passions of the public through use of terms like ‘Bonapartist regimes.’ The actors further propagated their commitment to:

“… a cooperative federation with no discrimination against the federating units, the decentralization and devolution of power, maximum provincial autonomy, the empowerment of the people at grassroots level.”4

The Charter of Democracy preceded the 18th Constitutional Amendment by four years and is considered to be its precursor. The Charter had four parts, namely, constitutional amendment, code of conduct, free and fair elections and civil-military relations, comprising thirty-six basic points.5 Out of the ten basic points in the part of Constitutional Amendments, six were incorporated four years later in the 18th Constitutional Amendment, including:6

 Restoration of 1973 Constitution as on 12 October 1999 before the military coup with the provisions of joint electorates, minorities and women reserved seats on closed party list in

3 Rabbani, 132–33. 4 Rabbani, 133. 5 “Text of the Charter of Democracy,” accessed August 29, 2015, http://beta.dawn.com/news/192460/text-of-the- charter-of-democracy. 6 Rabbani, A Biography of Pakistani Federalism, 133–34. 90

the Parliament. Repeal of the: lowering of the voting age, increase in the seats in Parliament, the Legal Framework Order 2000 and the 17th Constitutional Amendment.  Appointment of the Governors, three Service Chiefs and the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee shall be made by the Prime Minister.  A commission shall make recommendations for appointment of judges to the superior judiciary, whose composition was given in the Charter of Democracy.  Judges shall not take oath under any Provisional Constitutional Order.  The seats reserved for women in the National and Provincial assemblies shall be given to the parties on the basis of respective votes polled in the general elections.  The strength of Senate shall be increased to give representation to minorities.

The Charter of Democracy further pledged abolishment of the Concurrent List in the Constitution by virtue of which the Federal Government had jurisdiction over a number of subjects deemed appropriate to be handled at Provincial or Local Body level. It also committed to hold Local Body elections on party basis through Provincial Election Commissions in respective Provinces with constitutional protection for autonomy, and a new National Finance Commission Award. It forbade Political Parties signatory to the Charter from supporting the military in forming a Government. Rabbani was of the view that Pakistan achieved a social, political and constitutional milestone in the form of this charter. The civil-military relationship was redefined, parliament was strengthened, systems and institutions were built, federalism and provincial autonomy were restated, personal discretion was curbed and political opposition was given a meaningful role.7

The 18th Amendment was a part of the securitization move initiated by PPP and PML(N) by signing the Charter of Democracy, which was endorsed in 2007 by an All (political) Parties (of Pakistan) Conference in London. The 18th Amendment was an effort to repeal the amendments made in the 1973 Constitution by military governments of the past and restoring a parliamentary form of government rather than a quasi-presidential one, which it had become over the years. The wide acceptance of this move is evident from its endorsement not only by the two

7 Rabbani, 135. 91

major political parties of that time but also by the vast majority of political parties who were in opposition to the Musharraf regime.

The elections of 2008 brought PPP to power and in keeping with the pledge of the Charter, a twenty seven member All Parties Special Committee from both Houses of Parliament was constituted to recommend amendments to the 1973 Constitutions in the light of the Charter of Democracy. Under their elected chairman, Senator Mian Raza Rabbani, the committee issued its first report on 31 March 2010:

“President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari, in his address to both houses of the Parliament on 28 March 2009 asked the Speaker National Assembly of Pakistan to constitute a committee of both the houses of Parliament, with representatives of all political parties and independent groups in both the Houses, for the purpose of proposing amendments in the constitution in the light of the Charter of Democracy.”8

The report traced the history of enactment of the 1973 Constitution in the backdrop of the Country’s dismemberment and made a case of the grave implications on security, rather existence of the country, when aspirations of the citizens are violated by the constitution. The report opined that it was the “flawed federal structure” of Ayub’s 1962 Constitution and its violations of basic democratic principles like one-man-one-vote, adult franchise, and a centralized federation with a unicameral house, which led to “the tragic event of the separation of East Pakistan.” Although the 1973 Constitution stood the test of time but as result of military interventions, the undemocratic regimes introduced various provisions in the Constitution like 8th and 17th Amendments which altered its structure from parliamentary to quasi-presidential. These measures weakened the Parliament and caused alienation of the Provinces with the Center. The provinces were alienated due to their perceived denial of legitimate governance rights, curtailed privileges in exploiting natural resources, and huge dependence on the Center in economic matters.

Here is a classic case of implied manifestation of ‘security’ as mentioned by Buzan, where the actor is invoking the security clause while describing the predicament of the state

8 “Constitutional Committee Report 18th Amendment Bill 2010,” 3, accessed August 30, 2015, http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/report_constitutional_18th_amend_bill2010_020410_.pdf. 92

without using the word security itself. The gravity of implications that surrounded political outcome of a flawed constitution and its unwise implementation is evident in the catastrophic result of Pakistan’s disintegration in 1971. Despite analysis of this gravity, Rabbani’s report described the unfolding of those complex events without using the word ‘security’ per se. It should be noted that the security speech act does not necessarily have to be predicated on the word ‘security,’ only sensitization of danger and sounding of alarm is enough to make the wider audience aware of the existential threat. “There will be instances in which the word security appears without this logic and other cases that operate according to that logic with only a metaphorical security reference.”9 In this case, we mostly see a metaphorical reference to the word security but even a cursory intertextual analysis reveals the implied existentiality of threat to the state from the flawed constitutional structure, the Centre-Province mistrust, the quasi- Presidential form of the constitution, the tenuous civil-military relations, and the tendency of biased appointments to the superior judiciary.

The composition of the Parliamentary committee reflected the wider audience who were intended to be convinced of the dire necessity of this extraordinary requirement of amending the Constitution. It comprised of five members from the PPP (Parliamentarians) – (PPP-P), three members from PML(N), three members from Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam) – PML(Q), two members from Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), two members from Awami National Party (ANP), two members from Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan (Fazal-ur-Rahman) – JUI(F), one member from Pakistan Muslim League (Functional) – PML(F), one member from Balochistan National Party (Awami) – BNP(A), one member from Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), one member from National People’s Party (NPP), one member from National Party (NP), one member from Pakistan People’s Party (Sherpao) – (PPP-S), one member from Pakhtun Khawa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP), one member from Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP), and an independent member.

The arduous work of the committee spread over a year before it presented the 18th Constitutional Amendment to the Parliament of Pakistan for discussion, with many dissents and reiterations that went about in the process of its formulation. As an example of discourse

9 Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Security; A New Framework for Analysis, 27. 93

development, Senator S.M. Zafar of PML(Q), through a ‘note of reiteration,’ recorded his opinion about the stance of the Committee to abolish the Concurrent List from the Constitution. He argued that it is historically incorrect to assume that founders of the 1973 Constitution committed to omit the Concurrent List after ten years because all the significant federations in the world have been working under such arrangements. He gave the example of India, where the concurrent list contains forty seven subjects, and discouraged omission of that List from the Constitution as part of 18th Amendment, contesting:

“Omitting concurrent list altogether shall confront the country with innumerable problems including the overburdening of the Council of Common Interest, converting it into a Government within the Government; besides, conflict of interest between the Provinces on matters such as pollution and drugs, etc.”10

S.M. Zafar of PML(Q) also submitted another note of reiteration regarding Article 239 about creation of new provinces:

“The procedure in the constitution for creation of a new province is cumbersome. The procedure should be much simpler which may allow the parliament to change the boundaries of a province and the name in a simpler and expeditious manner. … in the interest of Pakistan and the Federation.”11

In another ‘note of reiteration’ Senator Wasim Sajjad of PML(Q) recorded his Party’s reservation on renaming of erstwhile North West Frontier Province (NWFP) to Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa, suggesting the name ‘Sarhad’ – Frontier – instead.12 MQM attached its ‘note of reiteration / dissent’ to contest the levy / consumption of sales tax by the Province, abolishment of the quota system and levy of excise duty.13

ANP reiterated deletion of Articles 246 and 247 regarding Tribal Areas and their administration, “so that the Tribal Areas could be integrated into the mainstream and opened to legislation by the Parliament and governed under regular laws of the land.” ANP suggested modification in Article 251, National Languages, to make arrangements for use of Urdu for official and other purposes and taking similar measures simultaneously for other “National

10 “Constitutional Committee Report 18th Amendment Bill 2010,” 22. 11 “Constitutional Committee Report 18th Amendment Bill 2010,” 25. 12 “Constitutional Committee Report 18th Amendment Bill 2010,” 24. 13 “Constitutional Committee Report 18th Amendment Bill 2010,” 39. 94

languages spoken in the country, within fifteen years.” Lastly ANP showed serious reservations on Article 73, Procedures with respect to Money Bill, demanding mandatory approval of the senate for Money Bills including foreign assistance, raising of debt and monetary expansion, “in a way that the interest of all the Federating Units are protected.” ANP also reiterated through a note its recommendation to delete Article 2A, The Objectives Resolution, to form part of substantive provisions, “as its insertion by a military dictator has damaged the spirit and intent of the 1973 Constitution.”14

Similarly, there were a number of other ‘notes’ by ANP, PML(F), JI, JWP, BNP (Awami), NP and PPP-S comprising almost fifty pages of the report on the working of the constitutional reforms committee, before the proposed Bill could be finally drafted. For the purpose of this research, which is not to examine various positions on the issue but to see how far different parties confirmed the threat and its remedy, the richness of this discourse proves that all the stakeholder political parties supported securitizing federalism and rights of the provinces as a means of enhancing the security of the state.

Asif Ali Zardari, the President of Pakistan and Co-Chairman of the PPP, the ruling party at the time of 18th Constitutional Amendment’s adoption, praised the efforts of the constitutional committee in drafting the new legislation and hailed it as harbinger of a new era in the constitutional and political history of the country. He termed it “an important milestone in the struggle of our people on road to democracy” and congratulated “all the political parties and their leaders for rising above party politics and agreeing to constitutional reforms based on consensus amendments,” demonstrating a national spirit by putting aside personal and partisan considerations in a historic achievement. The credit for “the first major constitutional overhaul” was given to the democratic process and the spirit of national reconciliation. The President hoped that “the doors of dictatorship have been closed forever,” subversion of constitution is a relic of the past and options of judicial acquiescence of Constitution’s subversion have been closed. Now that the rights of Provinces have been given, he emphasized the need to address on emergent

14 “Constitutional Committee Report 18th Amendment Bill 2010,” 26. 95

priority the problems of the people like load shedding, unemployment, inflation and law & order.15

What was the general impression of Pakistan’s governance in 2010? Was the viability of the State in question? How was the State doing in internal security? Reflecting on these question in June 2010, around the time when 18th Constitutional Amendment was being formulated, Christine Fair, a famous author on Pakistan’s affairs, qualitatively analyzed Pakistan’s abysmally low position on the quantitatively assessed Index of Failed States of the reputed Foreign Policy Magazine. In her view the Index depicted only one side of the coin. The statistical data reflecting upon the numerous social and political variables could not grasp the larger perspective of Pakistan. In the bigger picture, in spite of the many challenges and problems, Pakistan is far from a failed or even a failing state.16

Referring to similar ‘labelling’ in the western media of Pakistan, Anwar Shah examined 18th Amendment’s ability to reverse this course by “promoting peace, order, good government, and growth.”17 The importance of the agenda set in the 18th Amendment needed to be recognized by the political, bureaucratic, legislative and judicial arms of the state as vital for the stability of the state. In his opinion, in the absence of such consensus the provisions of greater provincial autonomy made available in the 18th Amendment might pose a risk to the economic and political federation of Pakistan. The threatening ‘risks’ refer to any failure of 18th Amendment’s ambitions, which would be seen as failure of common aspirations by the federating units, that might antagonize any of those units against the federation’s ability to keep promises. It could fuel the vicious cycle of misperceptions leading to mistrust and a not-so-structured struggle within and outside of the ‘system’ for seeking redress. Similar “centrifugal” struggles were the basis of the political and ultimately military upheaval that tore the security of the country apart in 1971. The 18th Constitutional Amendment provides enough leverage to the provinces to raise more revenues and enjoy more authority, reduces chances of military’s political intervention and

15 Asif Ali Zardari, “Text of President’s Speech (Signing of the 18th Amendment Bill),” April 19, 2010, https://lubpak.com/archives/9771. 16 C. Christine Fair, “Is Pakistan a Failed State? No.,” Foreign Policy, accessed August 30, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/06/24/is-pakistan-a-failed-state-no/. 17 Anwar Shah, “The 18th Constitutional Amendment: Glue or Solvent for Nation Building and Citizenship in Pakistan,” The Lahore Journal of Economics 17, no. September 2012 (n.d.): 387–424. 96

reduces arbitrary federal intervention as well, which should lead to reduced provincial discontent, thwart ‘centrifugal’ tendencies and overcome internal discontent. Without mentioning the word “security”, the envisaged dynamics of change brought about by gradual implementation of 18th Amendment would strengthen the federation, albeit more against internal dysfunctionality than against external intervention. But in the end, does it matter whether political security is threatened from within or without?

In states like Pakistan where the political process is not very firmly established as yet, the government’s endeavor to bring urgency in any political move by invoking the ‘security’ condition is often met with skepticism. Buzan argues:

“In weak states, basic institutions as well as ideologies are often challenged, and political violence is extensive; therefore, when the power holders try to make appeals in the name of the state, their authority to do so will be contested more systematically.”18

One of the major challenges that Pakistan faces in this context is national integration. National integration is the evenness of opportunity that different segments of society enjoy to benefit from the institutions of public good in a state, irrespective of their geographic or cultural disposition within that state. Weakness in national integration will breed mistrust amongst the integrating constituents at all levels. The more influential and advanced political sub-units would be seen distrustfully by the relatively less influential and backward ones and the federating power, the central government, would be held responsible for the mismatch and mistrust.

Referring to these problems, Gulshan Majeed quotes Rupert Emerson, “many new states in Asia and Africa are not yet nations in being but only nations in hope.”19 The challenge lies in converting primordial passions into civic sentiments, creating a national identity out of the diverse regional, tribal, sectarian and linguistic identities. Distress groups in a state, ones which are subjected to discrimination or outright violence, tend to give preference to sub-identity over the national identity. Within a nation, which is supposed to be a group of people who share values, traditions, common feelings and common objectives, such preferences are detrimental to

18 Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Security; A New Framework for Analysis, 146. 19 Gulshan Majeed, “Problems of National Integration in Pakistan,” Journal of Political Studies 21, no. 2 (2014): 67–79. 97

the extent of being ‘security’ threats, if left unaddressed. Deprivation leads to negative attitude that can be harmful for the integrity of the state. To achieve integration, efforts at the national level are required to provide equal opportunity for all in a state, without regional discrimination, of enjoying basic civic expectations of personal security, education, healthcare, livelihood and protection of religious faith. This is essential to provide satisfaction to all local sub-systems. As highlighted in Chapter 2, use of language is of particular significance to discourse analysis. Majeed wishes to establish the salience of federalism based on provincial and local autonomy, which is ‘vitally’ important to offset ‘fractures’ in the social and political structures of the country. A fractured society and polity doesn’t serve the security of a country well, hence the discourse repeatedly revolves around security without mentioning the word as such.

The struggle from ‘nation in hope’ to ‘nation in being’ entails two simultaneous processes, state building and nation building, with which some of the newly emerged states of Asia and Africa are grappling. According to Francis Fukuyama:

“State building refers to the creation of tangible institutions – armies, police, bureaucracies, ministries, and the like. It is accompanied by hiring staff, training officials, giving them offices, providing them with budgets, and passing laws and directives. Nation building, by contrast, is the creation of a sense of national identity to which individuals will be loyal, an identity that will supersede their loyalty to tribes, villages, regions, or ethnic groups.”20 National integration is a function of state building and nation building, both. In their quest for national integration, like Pakistan, federalism is a path adopted by many states to strengthen national integration in Africa. The process of federalism has met with little success in Africa. There are tendencies for a strong central state which sort of resembles Pakistani experience from 1947-1971. But as Pakistan moved towards more formal federalism in the backdrop of the 1973 Constitution, African states were experimenting with unitary model till the late 1990's onwards. One thing common between Pakistani and African experience with federalism is their struggle to deal with issue of sub national identities and separatism. But certainly Pakistani and African discourse differs due reasons of geography, colonial legacy and role of military in national polity. The African experience of achieving national integration through federalism has been turbulent:

20 Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014), 185. 98

“Given that the government systems that are presently destabilizing most Sub Saharan African States are unitary and centralized, a well-considered and appropriately nuanced federal system may be the only viable way to accommodate these divergent interests.”21

If such measures of integration can be instituted and implemented, the federal system of governance is highly suitable for a country like Pakistan, which came into being on promise of shared hopes of mutual prosperity for the federating units, largely as ‘autonomously’ determined by those units themselves. The federal structure is inclined to create integration as it is strengthened by the fragmentation of power. The threats and challenges to federalism in Pakistan emanate from inequality and insecurity. Federalism based on provincial and local autonomy is “vital to combat social and political fractures.”22 The 18th Constitutional Amendment is slated to provide that autonomy to the Provinces in true sense and is a step towards increasing the political security of Pakistan.

Historically, the need to view the Provinces of North Western India, which later formed the territory of Pakistan, through the lens of federalism was never there because the administrative perspective adopted by the British to control those areas was more of convenience and expeditionary. Hence the major political parties of those times like the Muslim League and the Congress never established roots in those provinces. Control of those areas was managed through arrangements with big landowners, moneylenders and tribal chieftains, with the use of force kept as deterrence. “Federalism was provided as one of the promises for the establishment of Pakistan,”23 the organizing principle and aspiration which has remained a pursuit of various governments with attendant controversies and heartburns. The 1956 and 1962 constitutions tried to create federalist ambience in governance of the country but could not succeed. The 1973 Constitution succeeded in formulating a federal covenant with much hopes and achievements too, but later years’ amendments mutilated its federal structure and did not allow devolution of power as envisaged in the federal spirit of the original document. This did not bode well for the governance of the country, equal opportunities for prosperity of its diverse regional populations, and development of ideas and feelings of cohesion amongst its federating units and the center.

21 Alemante G. Selassie, “Ethnic Federalism: Its Promise and Pitfalls for Africa,” Yale J. Int’l L. 28 (2003): 85. 22 Aamir Hanif Raja and Syed Shahbaz Hussain, “New Threats and Challenges to Federalism: In Pakistan (A Socio-Political Scenario),” Journal of Political Studies 22, no. 1 (2015): 103–14. 23 Raja and Hussain. 99

Over the years, it bred schisms, frictions, ill-will and mistrust, which became a subtle but cognizable ‘threat’ to the federation itself.

While critical discourses consider the constitution and its implementation inadequate for alleviating the concerns of federating units, the Federal Government has in place a bureaucratic mechanism to oversee the coordination between Provinces and the Centre, and amongst Provinces, to ensure continued confidence of the federating units in the democratic federation. The Inter Provincial Coordination (IPC) Division was created in the Cabinet Secretariat with effect from 19 March 2007. The Cabinet Division transferred the IPC related functions to the IPC Division after its creation. On 3 November 2008 it was made a ministry, the Ministry of IPC, whose functions saw a significant increase after the passage of the 18th Constitutional Amendment.

The stated mission of the IPC Ministry is to provide a forum between the provinces and the federal government for confidence building. It is meant to be a forum for discussion to debate policy issues, and to assuage the concerns of smaller provinces about dominance or exploitation by the larger provinces, or by the federal government. Another important part of this Ministry’s mission is to oversee expeditious implementation of the Constitution (18th Amendment) Act 2010 by the Commission set up for the purpose under the Constitution’s Article 270-AA.24

The IPC Wing in the Ministry of IPC functions as the secretariat for the Council of Common Interest (CCI), which was established in March 2010 when the secretarial work of CCI was shifted from the Cabinet Division to the IPC Division. Although the CCI was conceived in the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, but its role has since been expanded and its purview strengthened under the 18th Amendment. It has an iconic value in the federalist structure of the Government and provides the same opportunity to all the federating units, i.e., the provinces, in the matters of the country. CCI was created in 1973 as a result of the bitter experience of the highly centralized decision making and exclusivist tendencies of the ‘One Unit’ policy that

24 “Inter Provincial Coordination Ministry Report,” accessed August 26, 2015, http://www.ipc.gov.pk/gop/index.php?q=aHR0cDovLzE5Mi4xNjguNzAuMTM2L2lwYy91c2VyZmlsZXMxL2Zpb GUvMjA3Ml8xNV9JUEMucGRm. 100

resulted in denial of provincial rights and the dismemberment of the country in 1971.25 This segment of discourse, which relates absence of an effective inter-provincial and inter- governmental forum where provinces could settle their disputes with the federal government and with each other, is particularly insightful of the securitized nature of the political move leading towards the 18th Amendment. The year 1971 reflected a complete breakdown of Pakistan’s security and if poor inter-provinces and federation-provinces coordination were to be the root causes, the remedy sought in the shape of CCI in 1973, and it’s strengthening leading to the 18th Amendment 2010 was a justifiable securitization move.

However despite creation of the CCI in 1973, its effectiveness remained questionable. Its inefficacy is evident from the fact that the Council met only eleven times in thirty seven years of its existence where forty four items related to inter-provincial coordination were discussed, and it took the Council fourteen years to devise its own Rules of Procedure in 1991. Whereas after passage of the 18th Amendment (between July 2010 and March 2015) sixteen meetings of the Council were held. After the 18th Amendment, the Council is mandated to hold meetings at least once in ninety days with a permanent secretariat in the IPC Ministry to look after the follow up on those meetings. In addition, the Prime Minister can always hold a special meeting of the Council on the request of a province on any urgent matter. A federal minister cannot be designated as chairman of the CCI in place of the Prime Minister, who is bound to constitute the Council within the first thirty days of coming into office. The CCI has to submit an Annual Report to the parliament, three of which have been submitted so far after passage of the 18th amendment.

However, reservations expressed about the manner in which the CCI is used to conduct the business of the government are also part of the discourse. The Dawn newspaper editorial dated 17 March 2015 criticized the nine month delay (June 2014 – Mar 2015) in convening the CCI session, terming it an ‘arcane’ forum which nevertheless has a significant portfolio of agenda items. The agenda included population and housing census, permanent absorption of the Federal Government employees into the Provincial Governments transferred under the 18th

25 Ahmad Mahmood Zahid, “Institutional Analysis of Council of Common Interest” (Islamabad: Centre for Civic Education Pakistan, December 2013), i, http://www.pk.undp.org/content/dam/pakistan/docs/Democratic%20Governance/Federalism/CCI%20Manual%20(1) .pdf. 101

Amendment, amendment to the Criminal Procedure Court, and the Indus River System Act 1992, each one of which was an elaborate subject in itself worthy of a separate meeting.26 Even the decision of the CCI to hold census with the Army’s help in March 2016, as was done in 1998 census, was criticized because of the reservations expressed against it by the Balochistan Government and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). Balochistan had fears of disproportionate population representation of Pashtuns and Balochs in the Province leading to discord over distribution of resources and the MQM, championing the cause of muhajirs or Indian refugees’ descendants, was apprehensive of deliberate skewing of population distribution data in Sindh Province to benefit PPP as was done in the housing census by the PPP Government in 2010. During the CCI meeting, the Sindh Province did not agree to release water to Balochistan and Federal Capital and restoration of the executive magistracy system in the country could also not be implemented due to the matter being sub judice.27 It is apparent from the discourse development that 18th Amendment’s CCI reinvigoration was hailed as it came about but over the years the performance of this forum has seen criticism for inefficiency.

A.G. Noorani, an eminent scholar, columnist and legal expert, considered 18 th Amendment a patchwork, which “addresses provincial concerns without striking a balance with national needs.” He questioned the widely held notion that 1973 Constitution established parliamentary democracy, rather contesting that by virtue of the same constitution, the erstwhile Prime Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto established himself as a dictator in a highly centralized federation. The resignation of Mian Mahmud Ali Kasuri in protest as the Constitution Committee’s chairman and Law Minister in 1972 is cited as dissent against the 1973 Constitution within the PPP because it strengthened the Prime Minister and weakened the President, “who was shorn of his legitimate discretion on dissolution of National Assembly (Art. 58) and the power to dismiss a Prime Minister [Art. 48 (1)], who subverts the constitution.” In Noorani’s view, the 1973 Constitution undermined the cabinet system by empowering the Prime Minister to act directly [Art. 90 (2)] as the Chief Executive of the Federation [Art. 90 (1)]. He asserted that the 18th Amendment does not even attempts to restore a proper parliamentary system similar

26 “Where Is the CCI?,” DAWN, March 17, 2015, http://www.dawn.com/news/1169988/where-is-the-cci. 27 “CCI Session: Population Census next Year with Military Help,” The Express Tribune, March 19, 2015, http://tribune.com.pk/story/855591/cci-session-population-census-next-year-with-military-help/. 102

to the one established by the 1956 Constitution, which is its most glaring shortcoming.28 Failure to undo President Zia’s order no 14 of 1985, which inserted Article 2A in the 1973 Constitution making Objectives Resolution a substantive part of the Constitution (rather than an Annex), is also criticized, and so is the voice given to politicians in the Parliament on judicial appointments.

Mian Raza Rabbani, the principal architect of 18th Amendment, defended the virtues of 18th Amendment as a protector of the state and merely a constitutional amendment:

“This is post-18th Amendment federation, with all its flaws, … the ‘Charter’ of the people for devolution, provincial rights, ownership of resources, political, economic and cultural rights has found expression in the will of the Parliament – the 18th Constitutional Amendment. … it has stemmed the tide of extreme nationalist movements. … Any destabilization of the federal parliamentary structures of the 1973 constitution is a recipe where not the constitution but the federation will be under threat.”29

Rabbani invoked ‘threat’ to the political and physical security of the federation as the single most important reason for implementation of the 18th Amendment in Pakistani society and polity which is suffering from “moral, social, political and economic crises.” Rabbani appreciated the role of Baloch nationalist parties, which supported the 18th Amendment and became its signatories in contrast to distancing policy adopted by those parties in the past towards conciliatory governmental overtures. The Baloch political nationalists also signaled to their contemporary Baloch militant nationalists waging an armed struggle against Pakistan in Balochistan Province the possibility of achieving the provincial rights through peaceful political process. However, in a repeated invocation of the ‘security’ consequences of failure to implement the 18th Amendment, Rabbani opined:

“If the 18th Constitutional Amendment is not implemented now we would provide an opportunity and justification to those involved in the armed struggle to say that they adopted the path of political dialogue and constitution but when time came to reap the fruits … Islamabad once again washed its hands off. In such a situation they would say that they have no other choice but to pick the

28 A.G. Noorani, “The Eighteenth Amendment,” Criterion 6, no. 1 (May 2012): 125–38. 29 Mian Raza Rabbani, “Open Letter,” Pakistan Perspectives 19, no. 1 (June 2014): 5–8. 103

weapons for their rights. God forbid! If any such situation develops it would be very dangerous for Islamabad and the federation.”30

This is an indicative move of securitizing 18th Amendment as guarantor of State’s identity and sovereignty in the political domain against an internal threat of insurgents taking up arms to claim political rights. Use of the phrase ‘very dangerous for Islamabad and the federation’ is genealogically referring to the past incidences of provincial alienation in the case of East Pakistan where the armed struggle for independence was also predicated on ‘no other choice but to pick the weapons for their rights.’ The external secessionist support rendered to Mujib-ur-Rahman and Mukti Bahini by India is also referred intertextually when Rabbani refers to “the existence of foreign funded nationalist insurgencies in various provinces”, describing the post-18th Amendment federation.31

The two prominent political movements that were launched during the military regimes of Zia and Musharraf, i.e., Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) and ‘Charter of Democracy’ respectively, both demanded further decentralization of powers in the federation. Expansion of the provincial autonomy was an equally fervent demand along with the restoration of democracy. Upon restoration of a representative democratic dispensation in 2008 this demand was fulfilled in the form of the 18th Amendment, “which can be regarded as a paradigm shift in the constitutional federalism of Pakistan” despite “powerful circles both in political and extra- political domains that are highly critical of the 18th Amendment and regard it as anathema of national interests.”32 The challenges at the center and provincial level for the implementation of 18th Amendment are numerous. Prominent being the political will to embrace the amendment wholeheartedly, the creation of social ownership amongst the Provinces of the limitless potential offered in the 18th Amendment, and lastly building the capacity of the provincial administrative machinery to absorb the devolved functions for the good of the public. Another significant challenge is the future of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which should also reap

30 Mian Raza Rabbani, “The 18th Constitutional Amendment: A Paradigm Shift,” Pakistan Perspectives 16, no. 1 (June 2011): 5–11. 31 Rabbani, “Open Letter.” 32 Syed Jaffar Ahmed, “Historical Evolution of Federalism in Pakistan: From Bewilderment to Setting up of a Path,” Pakistan Perspectives 18, no. 2 (December 2013): 11–29. 104

the benefit of constitutionalism’s progress in the country, as a separate province or as an integral part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province.

The nature of the federal structure and the implications it entails for state cohesion is one of the fundamental concerns of Pakistan’s federalism. Pakistani federating states have the geographical contiguity, shared history and common security concerns but lack the equality of relationship, maturity in political dealings and a robust legal structure that is quintessential in a federation. The political sector of national security is threatened internally by these weaknesses gnawing at the bonds of relationships that keep the federation together. The democratic dispensation working in a federal structure needs to enjoy full confidence of the provinces as well as the pillars of the state in order to generate the potential needed to pursue the objectives of security and economy. The breakdowns in normal political functioning and frequent discords amongst center and provinces prevented Pakistan from achieving these objectives. The 18th Amendment helped in limiting the powers of the state pillars within the parliamentary bounds of 1973 constitution as well as assuaging the concerns of provinces, afraid of a unitary system of governance being followed in the country rather than a federal one. Iram Khalid rightly argues:

“This amendment has strengthened the political system as well. Abolition of the Article 58(2) b has regenerated the spirit of democracy. Now the sword of Damocles is removed from the Assembly and it has sufficient guarantee to work with its full potential with complete tenure.”33

Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT) in its Executive Summary of the Mid Term Assessment of the Quality of Democracy Report, 25 March 2008 – 24 September 2010, succinctly captured the essence of the argument about securitization of 18th Amendment. It hailed the passage of 18th Amendment as a potential game changer in the development of democracy in Pakistan, appreciated the fast pace of development towards democracy seen during the first two and half years of the PPP Government and concluded by saying, “A democratic Pakistan alone is a secure Pakistan.”34 Political security of

33 Iram Khalid, “Politics of Federalism in Pakistan: Problems and Prospects,” South Asian Studies 28, no. 1 (2013): 199. 34 “PILDAT Mid Term Democracy Assessment Executive Summary September 2010” (Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, 2010), 18, http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/Democracy&LegStr/PILDATMidTermDemocracyAssessmentExecu tiveSummarySeptember2010.pdf. 105

a country is not against external challenges of subversion of legitimacy or international denial of recognition alone, as proposed by Buzan’s political security agenda,35 perhaps articulated with Western liberal democratic states in mind. The security of the political system of the state in terms of its viability and effectiveness as a political glue, especially in relatively nascent democracies like Pakistan, forms an equally important part of the national security agenda. Identification of such threat and emphasis on security against that threat, is visible in the PILDAT Report. It didn’t end with expressing joy over strengthening of the constitutional framework alone by the passage of 18th Amendment but went on to warn that “it is the next phase (implementation) that becomes the far more formidable challenge.”

The PILDAT report offered an interesting comparison of two opposing indicators of the state of democracy in Pakistan during the period under its review, i.e., 25 March 2008 – 24 September 2010. On the one hand was the statistical 45% overall performance score calculated on the basis of a comprehensive matrix meant to assess people’s perception about functioning of democracy in the country. It reflected people’s disillusionment with the two and a half years of elected governments at the federal and provincial levels due to their sub-optimal performance. The Report did not underestimate the socio-economic challenges, terming them “the most potent threats to fragile democracy,” which included low ranking in Human Development Index (HDI), missing out on most of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and neglect of health, education, and basic services for the majority of the people. Terrorism, corruption, failure to institute a credible accountability mechanism, weak intra-political parties democracy, weak parliamentary oversight of the executive, perception of inadequate ‘democracy dividend,’ and role of media were identified as the major areas of concern for democracy in Pakistan during the period of the report, which were important intertextual links in the discourse.

On the other hand the report appreciated the elected legislatures on having transformed the distorted constitution of 1973, which had seen numerous self-serving amendments over the years. In the brief period of two and a half years, the federal legislature had achieved a constitutional milestone by granting meaningful Provincial autonomy, restoring federalism in its true sense, and by reaching consensus on equitable sharing of revenues through the NFC award.

35 Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Security; A New Framework for Analysis, 150. 106

As noted in the report, “the elected governments demonstrated the capacity to transcend narrow interests for the larger cause of national cohesion.” Acceptance of the securitization move by a wide audience was seen in across-the-board support for these far reaching democratic changes. The democratic change in the form of the 18th Constitutional Amendment was an extraordinary step urgently required to meet the grave challenge to federalism and hence to the fabric of the state. The mutilated constitution of 1973, as it existed then, was not functioning to serve parliamentary democracy in the federation, where provinces’ faith in the centre was diminishing. Strengthening national cohesion as referred to in this report also indicates the underlying fears of systemic inconsistence that were the reasons invoked by the government to seek an expeditious restructuring of the constitution. The report rightly highlighted that democracy by itself is not the panacea of all ills, it is the way democracy is used that will determine the future of the country:

“If, however, democracy continues to be used to perpetuate corruption and nepotism, prolong malpractices and poor governance, it is not democracy which will face old or new threats. The very existence of Pakistan will be put at grave risk (emphasis added). Mere continuation of past trends and repeated resort to partisan tactics will nullify the spirit and substance of the historic constitutional transformation and the admirable consensus on the distribution of finances.”36

The PPP’s effort to stabilize the discourse relating to the urgent need of 18th Constitutional Amendment continued zealously. Defending the 18th Amendment, the PPP stalwart Raza Rabbani articulated the viewpoint of his party by saying that it is time to abandon the misperceived notion that only a strong center is the assurance of a strong Pakistan. It should be realized that only by strengthening the provinces a strong federation can be ensured. Distress will inevitably be caused in this transition. It will demand a change in national mindset, besides the change in systems, structures and procedures. However if these conditions are met, the result, according to Rabbani, would be a ‘legislative revolution’:

“The 18th Amendment has shaped and tailored the concept of federalism to suit our own conditions and requirement. Let us work to realize a Pakistani federalism, with the conviction that it will lead to a renaissance and a blossoming of our great nation.”37

36 “PILDAT Mid Term Democracy Assessment Executive Summary September 2010.” 37 Rabbani, A Biography of Pakistani Federalism, 13. 107

After seeing the securitization of 18th Constitutional Amendment, it would be pertinent to further the case of identifying securitizing moves in the political sector of Pakistan’s security during the period of research by analyzing the discourses of 7th National Finance Commission (NFC) Award 2009 and Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan Package (AHBP) 2010 in context of the Balochistan’s imbroglio.

AHBP and 7th NFC in context of the Balochistan Imbroglio

Being cognizant of the dismal state of Balochistan, Quaid-e-Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, during his famous address at Sibi Durbar on 14 February 1948 said:

“Government of British India had kept Baluchistan divided in several parts, each with a different name and status, yet all bound together in shackles of backwardness. The administration handed over to us was on the one hand, quite impervious to the desires and wishes of the people for moral and material progress, and on the other, impatient of criticism and oblivious to the necessity of political reforms of any sort. Consequently, the people of the Province remained in a static position educationally, socially, economically and politically.”38 Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan that enjoys great importance due to its strategic geography, rich mineral deposits and natural resources. However, the province lacks in human resource development index, industrial growth and economic prosperity. The social and economic challenges being faced by the province are numerous, some of which date back to the pre-independence era. The province lacks in human, industrial and capital resources. It is also deficient in socio-political development and economic prosperity as compared to the other provinces of Pakistan. The reasons include neglect by successive federal governments in resource allocation, the Sardari – tribal chieftain – system averse to development, armed insurrection by a small segment of dissidents, resultant military actions, and poor governance. Successive federal government’s conflictual relationship with Balochistan led to four sub- nationalistic insurrection episodes of varying intensities in 1948, 1958, 1962, and most intensely from 1973-77.39

38 “New Era of Progress for Baluchistan (14th Feb 1948) |Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah,” accessed September 23, 2015, http://m-a-jinnah.blogspot.com/2010/04/new-era-of-progress-for-baluchistan.html. 39 Syed Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan, Its Strategic Importance (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1992). 108

Resurgence of Violence 2005-2006 In 2005 violence erupted in the wake of the federal government’s endeavor to develop Balochistan by undertaking a series of mega projects like Gwadar Deep Sea Port, large dams and a network of national highways, which were seen by the dissidents as efforts to marginalize locals and benefit economic migrants. Three reasons were highlighted by a 2006 Carnegie Study, which explained the crisis of Baloch insecurities.40 The first reason, expropriation, was linked to the inadequate compensation given to Baloch people for the vital energy resource of natural gas being extracted from the Province since 1953. While the province of Punjab was supplied natural gas in 1964, the capital city of Balochistan, Quetta had to wait till 1986 for that facility, which was most direly needed there for domestic consumption due to extreme winters. Out of the twenty six districts comprising Balochistan, only four were supplied with line gas. More importantly, the federal government charged a much lower price for Balochistan’s gas than it did for gas produced in other provinces, with Balochistan receiving no more than 12.4 percent of the royalties due for supplying gas at that time. Geological survey reports suggested presence of large quantities of natural gas and oil in the province but the dissident elements in Balochistan’s population were determined to prevent exploration, demanding an agreement for an equitable sharing of those resources. The second reason, marginalization, was mainly linked to fears of being overwhelmed by a large population influx as a result of the economic prospects of Gwadar in the future. The grievance revolved around neglect of local population’s social and economic uplift in conceiving the mega projects. The skilled workforce for those projects was largely projected to be brought in from other parts of the country and local population was not planned to be trained and inducted in various capacities. The land in Gwadar around the port was acquired prospectively by influential organizations and sold at a huge profit to people from all across the country, which again, in the view of Baloch dissidents, would lead to marginalization due to economic migration from Punjab and Sindh provinces. The third reason, dispossession, arose from the fear of military garrisons planned to be constructed in Sui, the gas producing area and the district of the warring Bugti tribesmen; in the port city of Gwadar due to its security; and in Kohlu, the central city in the troubled district of

40 Frederic Grare, “Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baloch Nationalism” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2006), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP65.Grare.FINAL.pdf. 109

the aggressive Marri tribesmen. The Baloch already feeling ‘colonized by the Punjabis’ felt dispossessed by these projects. According to Grere, “behind these three problems, which the Baloch consider a casus belli, looms the demand for autonomy, if not for total independence. … Baloch are demanding that the Province’s resources be used only for the benefit of the Baloch people.” Nawab Khair Buksh Marri, an important figure in Baloch dissident politics in 2009, clearly rejected chances of reconciliation and openly demanded independence for the Province. During an interview, in reply to a question about political negotiation, he concluded that “the doors of negotiation are closed.” In outlining his main political grievance against Pakistan he stated, “our freedom has been snatched.” On chances of compromise, he was categorically clear: “We cannot live with the Punjabis. There is no room for compromise in my book. We have to get rid of them.”41 As is evident from this text, the threat to the political sector of Pakistan’s security was very clear. The security situation in Balochistan leading to the AHBP and 7th NFC Award was marred by political uncertainty, societal fear and pervasive bitterness. Uncertainty about the future of the province in the wake of stumbling political initiatives, fear of sporadic militancy and bitterness about lack of trust in the state. A handful of disenchanted youth and recalcitrant militant tribesmen led by young iconic figures were challenging the status quo in an armed rebellion. They were disgruntled by a history of below par political dispensation and were anticipating prosperity for the Baloch in ‘liberation.’ The state and its unfavorable policies towards Balochistan were blamed on domineering Punjab, exploitative federal governments, and Pakistan Army. Such views were widely shared amongst the Baloch ultra-nationalists, whose objective was independence, in contrast to Baloch mainstream nationalist political parties who rallied for more provincial rights and resources. The militant aspect of the Baloch ultra nationalist movements was condoned with the caveat that Baloch militancy is only a reaction to state’s continued irresponsible attitude towards Baloch grievances.42 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), a private organization, conducted a fact finding mission in October 2009 to assess Balochistan’s situation. Its findings were generally

41 Amir Zia, “Interview: Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri | News & Politics | Newsline,” accessed September 25, 2015, http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2009/09/interview-nawab-khair-bakhsh-marri/. 42 “Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan,” Collection of documents and articles on Balochistan (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, February 10, 2010), http://balochistan.edu.pk/AHB/AHb.pdf. 110

corroborated by the wide-ranging commentaries on the subject appearing in print and electronic media. Broadly, there were two streams of political dissension which can be termed as moderates and extremists. Both asserted a distinct Baloch identity as ideological basis of their demands. The moderates wanted maximum autonomy, as enshrined in the Pakistan Resolution of 1940, through a political struggle, while dissidents wanted separation from Pakistan through militancy. Moderates’ grievances were lack of representation, absent autonomy, no control over resources, unrestrained behavior by the army and intelligence agencies, domination by Punjab, etc. Dissidents' contentions included themes like forcible annexation of Balochistan at the time of Indo-Pak partition, the anathema of living with Punjab, the welcoming of external actor’s help to achieve separation, raising of human rights violations of the Province at the UN and seeking external help to liberate the province.43 The dissident militant organizations were conducting a much more organized psychological war to gain higher moral ground aimed at soliciting external support. Internet was being used effectively. On the internal front, the dissidents cited ‘the long deprivation and sidelining of Balochistan in exploitation of their provincial wealth’ as the root cause of their armed insurrection. They described violent resistance as their statecraft to lend support to the freedom struggle. The prominent amongst the leadership of those organizations included Brahmdagh Bugti, grandson of the late Baloch leader Akbar Bugti and Dr Allah Nazar Baloch, a leader from the middle class. They blatantly justified their acts of target killing of ‘settlers’ – an euphemism for the non-Baloch living in Balochistan – and other sabotage activities as being fully in accordance with international norms of freedom movements.44 Baloch Students Organization (BSO) a widely represented Baloch youth organization was totally supportive of militants’ ideals of separation from Pakistan to form an independent State of Balochistan, basing their argument on historical interpretation of the ostensibly forced annexation of Balochistan with Pakistan at the time of the independence.45 Violence by militants did not find condemnation from the nationalistic parties of Balochistan. Fear of reprisals by the terrorist organization, Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), was one reason that prevented

43 “Pushed to the Wall,” Report of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan fact-finding mission to Balochistan (Lahore: HRCP, October 2009), http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/wp-content/pdf/ff/14.pdf. 44 Dr Allah Nazar Baloch interview Part 1, June 2010 (Undisclosed, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LUbm9ozXGH0. 45 Naseem Zehra, Baloch Independence Movement 1 - YouTube (Quetta, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z0cjJGI__gU. 111

rejection of such overtly condemnable acts like ‘ethnic purging’ or killing of outside settlers living in Balochistan by the common people. Even after the fully acknowledged acts of terrorism like killing of sixteen Punjabi settlers in cold blood in two different incidents on 14 August 2010, i.e., the independence day of Pakistan, outright denunciation of this incident in Balochistan remained absent.46 The perception of violence being perpetrated against Baloch sub-nationalists by the state was to some extent the reason behind public apathy or even sympathy towards BLA militancy. Repeated military operations, allegations of highhandedness by the Frontier Corps, and a long list of missing persons were perceived by the alienated segment of Baloch population as the government policy to crush a legitimate movement for political rights.47 The Pakhtuns constituted around 30 percent of the population against the 50 percent Baloch. However, the Pakhtuns contested that they are numerically more and deliberately under- reported by the Baloch dominated provincial administration.48 In departure from the past, the Pakhtun often blamed the Baloch nationalists for target killing of their kinsmen,49 whereas traditionally Pakhtun grievances had been those of economic and political discrimination by the Baloch.50 Bomb blasts, blowing up of railway lines, gas installations and electric pylons, un-aimed rocket attacks, ambushing military convoys, abduction for ransom, and target killings of law enforcement agencies personnel, political opponents and ‘settlers’ were some of the manifestations of militancy. The militants had a well-organized intelligence network in a society which was indifferent or fearful of their violence and the militants had an appeal in the hard core nationalist elements of the population, which allowed them to commit their acts with impunity. Hard core militancy in Balochistan in 2009-10 was related to Marri and Bugti tribes, supported by the Mengal tribe and hence restricted mainly to Dera Bugti, Kohlu and Sibi districts with some presence in Khuzdar district and an ominous imprint in the Provincial Capital, i.e., Quetta City. However, the events of militancy in Balochistan also pointed towards growing influence of Baloch militancy encroaching the Makran Division as well, comprising the

46 “Baloch Killings,” Dawn, August 16, 2010, http://www.dawn.com/2010/08/16/loch-killings/. 47 “Pushed to the Wall,” 13–19. 48 “Population Association of Pakistan-Statistics,” accessed September 25, 2015, http://www.pap.org.pk/statistics/population.htm. 49 “Now Pakhtuns’ Targeted Killings in Balochistan – by Jan Assakzai,” LUBP, accessed September 25, 2015, https://lubpak.com/archives/16368. 50 “Pushed to the Wall,” 20–22. 112

strategically important Gwadar, Turbat and Panjgur districts, being the backyard of Gwadar Port.51 Counterinsurgency operations in 2005-2007 were very successful in eliminating organized Ferrari camps – militant hideouts in treacherous mountains – in militancy-affected areas and reducing the scale and intensity of terrorist activities. However, after the February 2008 general elections in Pakistan followed by a political decision to formally end the military operation, the militant arms of the Baloch nationalist movements regained coherence and sharply escalated violence amidst allegations of continued military and intelligence operations in the Province. The areas of militant influence generally remained the same with more target killings in Quetta, Khuzdar, Gwadar, Turbat and Panjgur. Significant Perceptions The significant perception responsible for the poor internal security situation in Balochistan in 2010, having a serious repercussion on the overall national security paradigm of the Country, can be discussed in socioeconomic, political and military categories.

In the socioeconomic, trust deficit between the Baloch population and the State was gradually increasing ever since the partition of Pakistan due to deprivation in the federal fiscal space, lack of representation in federal institutions, and poor infrastructure development in the Province.52 Inadequate compensation of the natural gas being extracted for the past fifty years or so and similar accusations in other mineral exploration / extraction projects was being emphasized. It was also propagated that implementation of Gwadar Port was being pushed without consultation with the Province. The resultant fears of demographic imbalance, lack of guarantees for job opportunities to locals, real estate exploitation, inadequate compensation to local fishermen and their dislocation were considered to be ignored. High influx of Afghan refugees in the Province, resultant economic competition, and demographic shift in favor of Pakhtuns were the other themes of discontent. Political perceptions, driven by the politically charged ‘missing persons’ narrative, were shaped by alleged abduction / killing of persons affiliated with dissenting political / militant

51 “Balochistan Assessment - 2010,” accessed October 18, 2015, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Balochistan/2010.html. 52 Shahid Javed Burki, “Economics and Extremism,” DAWN, January 5, 2010. 113

organization.53 Abduction of Baloch National Movement (BNM - Mengal) President Ghulam Mohammad Baloch, Lala Munir, also of the same party, and Sher Mohammad Baloch of the Baloch Republican Party (BRP) from Turbat and recovery of their dead bodies after a week on 9 April 2010 fueled passions. BNP – Mengal Party Secretary General, Habib Jalib’s death54 in a case of target killing in Quetta on 14 July 2010 and of Liaqat Ali Mengal,55 former district president of BNP – Mengal on 20 July 2010, were the causes of bitter criticism of the government. In such circumstances, even if the Baloch Nationalist Parties were ostensibly against the violent militant tactics of organizations like BLA, they were more than willing to let them build pressure on the state for subsequent exploitation. Allegation of widespread corruption in the elected provincial government of Balochistan and lack of trust in its capacity to negotiate political disputes with the federal government was also a part of the political narrative. In that situation, the sizable Pakhtun population, which had its grievances but being business oriented were viewing disruption as detrimental to livelihood, was reluctant to step in as a political force against militancy.

Military operations in Balochistan from 2004 – 2007 resulted in displacement of Baloch populations from Dera Bugti district due to the use of force to quell the miscreants in Dera Bugti, Kohlu and Sibi districts. Widespread acts of sabotage including bomb blasts, targeting of national strategic installations like natural gas infrastructure, laying of mines, indiscriminate killing / kidnapping of Punjabi settlers and targeting of security personnel had become the norm. Proposal for construction of new military cantonments in Gwadar, Dera Bugti and Kohlu, was viewed as an infringement on Baloch sovereignty.56 Political decision of the new Government in 2008 to stop military operation in Balochistan, release of all political prisoners and bring to an end all actions against armed militants was the culmination of this period of counterinsurgency operation allowing another round of resurgence in the dissident insurgent’s potential.

53 Shahid R. Siddiqi, “Why Insurgency in Balochistan Cannot Succeed,” Pakistan Herald, March 30, 2010, http://www.pakistanherald.com/articles/why-insurgency-in-balochistan-cannot-succeed-2271. 54 “Balochistan Protests Habib Jalib’s Killing,” The Express Tribune, accessed October 18, 2015, http://tribune.com.pk/story/28015/balochistan-protests-habib-jalibs-killing/. 55 “Another BNP-M Leader Shot Dead,” The Express Tribune, accessed October 18, 2015, http://tribune.com.pk/story/29245/another-bnp-m-leader-shot-dead/. 56 Robert G. Wirsing, “Baloch Nationalism and the Geopolitics of Energy Resources: The Changing Context of Separatism in Pakistan” (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, April 2008), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/. 114

The National Security Situation

Continued law and order breakdown in significant parts of Balochistan kept on undermining energy security of the country. The sociopolitical insecurity in the Province was directly impinging upon national stability and conveyed a negative image of the country abroad, further damaging prospects of international economic cooperation. Rise of sub-nationalism, especially in militant form, was a very undesirable trend undermining national integration. Exploitation of acute internal dissent by inimical external forces, posed danger to ideological integrity of the country, undermining national goals of shared prosperity.

In 2010 Pakistan’s security forces were already overstretched in maintaining traditional deterrence against India with simultaneous employment against militants in the FATA. Opening of new theaters of conflict was an option Pakistan could ill afford. Frontier Corps Balochistan, which is part of the second line forces responsible for border security, was not geared up to take on the amorphous threat posed by the Baloch militants. Both, the Army and the Frontier Corps faced image and credibility problems in Balochistan as far as garnering the support of local population against the miscreants is concerned. Overwhelming support of local population in favor of counterinsurgency effort and peoples’ widespread disenchantment with miscreants was absent. Quick success of Pakistan Army in Malakand stabilization in 2009-10 on the one hand and limited gains of protracted operations in FATA on the other, were cases in point that highlighted significance of public support in counterinsurgency. Unless the environment is ‘shaped’ and a moral high ground is achieved by the state, repeated involvement of military in Balochistan was projected to have negative ramifications.

As already highlighted, the role of Police and Levies (locally hired militia with questionable effectiveness) was very restricted in curbing the militancy due to their limited capacity and mandate. Frontier Corps was the predominant arm of the state looking after the law and order and anti-smuggling duties in the province for which they had established a wide network of check posts. Baloch representation in this paramilitary force traditionally remained negligible. Frontier Corps was seen as a perpetual Damocles’ sword hanging over the Baloch heads and therefore resented.57

57 “Pushed to the Wall”, 5. 115

During the British era, the military had traditionally remained present in Quetta, as a frontier staging post, prominently during the First (1839-1842) and Second (1878-1880) Anglo- Afghan Wars. Due to its pacts with the local Sardars, the British had ensured security for its Army in Baloch areas. Establishment of the Command and Staff College at Quetta in 1905 is testimony to the political stability envisaged by the British in Balochistan. After the partition of Subcontinent, and with the experience of recurring armed insurrections in Balochistan, cantonments were added in Zhob, Khuzdar and Sibi in the 70s to be able to administer and operate in the insurgency prone areas in a more organized manner. All the while, Pakistan Army remained conscious of improving its image in the province and remained engaged in supporting the local population in the shape of medical care, children’s and vocational education, and disaster relief, besides bringing economic activity with its presence in remote areas.

Death of the 79 years old Nawab Akbar Bugti on 26 August 2006 in the middle of the latest round of unrest in 2005-2006 was a watershed event. An astute politician and President of his Jamhoori Watan Party (Democratic National Party) he had remained chief minister and governor of Balochistan. Despite all the controversies of his politics and highhandedness, as a traditional Sardar he became a symbol of defiance amongst the Baloch during the last two years of his life. His death sparked lot of violence and increased bitterness among a cross section of the Baloch population.

Musharraf’s efforts to improve Pakistan’s energy and economic security by bringing peace and development to Balochistan were a well-intentioned policy. The change of focus from military security to energy and economic security occurred due to a renewed confidence of the state in the nation’s military strength to deal with perceived security threats of the times. The realization of the need to shift the focus was not a matter of Musharraf’s personality but a reflection of the broader national consensus to strive for energy security to reinvigorate the economy. The restlessness in Balochistan was hampering the energy and economic security, both. However, the use of military instrument for subduing the resistance in Balochistan did not bear much fruit. Rather, it alienated the military even more amongst the Baloch, already deeply antagonistic about their perception of Pakistan Army as being biased and anti-Baloch. Army’s efforts to construct cantonments in Kohlu, Dera Bugti and Gwadar were seen as further measures for military domination of Baloch areas and were resisted politically and militarily. A move by

116

Musharraf’s government to administer law and order in all districts of Balochistan by Police,58 rather than the locally recruited Levies, was also perceived as a move to undermine the traditional status quo, which supported the ‘Sardars’ and therefore resisted by the Baloch and Pakhtun alike.59

Government’s Securitization Initiatives - 7th National Finance Commission (NFC) Award and Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan Package (AHBP)

The Government of Pakistan, having realized the gravity of Baloch grievances and ramifications of failure to redress, embarked upon serious deliberation to address the issue and presented AHBP on 25 November 2009. In the Musharraf era, a committee under Senator Mushahid Hussain had prepared a comprehensive set of recommendations in June 2005 but it could not see implementation due to various reasons. However, the AHBP initiative was much more deliberate and coincidentally carried the vital constitutional support of the 7th National Finance Commission Award promulgated on 10 May 2010 and the 18th Constitutional Amendment promulgated on 20 April 2010. The long outstanding issues of equitable resource distribution among the provinces from the federal divisible pool and political autonomy were magnanimously addressed in the 7th NFC and 18th Amendment, respectively.

7th NFC Award

The salient of 7th NFC Award vis-à-vis Balochistan, effective from 1 July 2010, included:60

 For the first time in the history of Pakistan, multiple criteria for resource distribution had been adopted which included population, Human Development Index (HDI), Inverse Population Density (IPD), and revenue generation/collection. Sole criterion of population had been discontinued which was the hallmark of previous NFC Awards.  Share of Balochistan from the divisible pool was increased from 5.11% to 9.09%.  Balochistan was allocated Rs. 83 billion in FY 2010/11 which would not be

58 Afzal A. Shigri, “Back to Dark Ages,” accessed October 18, 2015, http://forumpolicereforms.blogspot.com/2010_05_01_archive.html. 59 Abdul Qadir, “The Case of Levies Force in Balochistan | The Baloch Hal,” archive.is, accessed October 18, 2015, http://archive.is/DfTju. 60 “Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan,” 55. 117

reduced in case of shortfall of revenue collection by the Federal Government. At that time Balochistan was getting only Rs. 44 billion.  Balochistan was to receive Rs. 120 billion over a period of twelve years on account of Gas Development Surcharge (GDS) arrears. An additional amount of Rs 10 billion was also to be released by the Federal Government on account of ‘equalization of well head’ price with retrospective effect from the year 2002.  A sum of Rs 3 billion would additionally be available from the next financial year as a result of ‘equalization of well head’ price throughout the country.  General Sales Tax (GST) on services had been shifted to the provinces which would be an additional source of revenue for Balochistan. AHBP

Buttressed by the 7th NFC and the 18th Constitutional Amendment, the AHBP, described by President Zardari as a ‘grand leap forward’ and by Prime Minister Gilani as a ‘hand of reconciliation and dialogue with our estranged brothers from Balochistan,’ addressed all the contentious issues raised by a cross section of dissenting voices while staying within the constitutional framework. The package had sixty one policy proposals distributed in four sections, i.e., constitutional, political, administrative and economic, meant ‘to heal the wounds of the Baloch.’ The Prime Minister assured that “the government was determined to going deep into the causes of death of prominent politician Nawab Muhammad Akbar Bugti, Balach Marri, Ghulam Muhammad, Lala Munir and Munir Ahmad.” He also said conversion of ‘B’ areas of the province (policed by levies) into ‘A’ areas (policed by police) is being considered and steps are being taken to bring Frontier Constabulary under the control of the provincial chief minster.61

The edited report compiled by Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) on AHBP facilitates objective discourse analysis of this constitutional package. The discourse was replete with dissension, separatism, revolt, rebellion, and mistrust expressed by elected representatives on the floor of the legislature. Dr Abdul Malik, ex Chief Minister of Balochistan,62 who was then a senator, made an emotional speech during the debate on AHBP - of which he was one of the architects – stating that those who said there was no war in Balochistan were deceiving

61 “Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan,” 65. 62 “Dr Malik Baloch — a Profile,” accessed October 18, 2015, http://www.dawn.com/news/1015653. 118

themselves. He said “the war is certainly being led by Barahamdagh Bugti and being patronized by Khair Baksh Marri.” Complaining about the attitude of Punjab, he warned that it must change towards the people of Balochistan, Sindh and NWFP, “otherwise it would be difficult to move together.”63 The report summarized the constitutional package, comprised of four subjects. The constitutional matters section addressed the provincial autonomy through predicting passage of the 18th Amendment and abolishment of the Concurrent List. The political matters section addressed release of political workers, political dialogue, return of exiles, implementation of provincial assemblies’ resolutions from 2002 onwards and local governments. The administrative matters section covered reviewing the role of federal agencies, stopping the construction of new cantonments, missing persons’ investigations, judicial inquiry into the murder of political workers and target killings, fact finding mission into Nawab Akbar Bugti’s death, reactivation of levies, FC’s role under the Chief Minister including powers conferred under the customs act, and judicial inquiry into the land allotment in Gwadar. The economic matters sections addressed rationalization of the royalty formula, the mega projects, the development of Sui, employment opportunities, Gas Development Surcharge, the ownership in oil and gas companies, the Saindak Project, uniform price of gas throughout the country, incentives for Kohlu, profit sharing in existing mineral development agreements, and water management.

Extensive concerns were visible soon after the implementation of the 7th NFC, the AHBP and the 18th Amendment. Senator Raza Rabbani, the principal architect of AHBP, who was Advisor to the Prime Minister on Inter Provincial Coordination and Chairman of the Implementation Commission of 18th Amendment, had the prime responsibility of monitoring implementation under the oversight of the Parliamentary Committee on National Security, which was chaired by the senator himself.64 The discourses of 2010-11 were rife with criticism about the likely benefit of this securitization move pursued so vigorously by the government. About economic matters, Wasim Sajjad, the famous lawyer and politician, argued: “provincial autonomy is all about control over resources and more finances and revenues for provinces, the Concurrent List has little to do with any of that.”65 The World Bank’s 6th NFC

63 “Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan,” 69. 64 Ahmed Hassan, “Slow Progress on Balochistan Package Irks Senate Body,” DAWN, August 24, 2010. 65 Cyril Almeida, “Are You Current with the Concurrent List !,” DAWN, April 8, 2010. 119

Award studies highlighted that 93% of the combined revenues of the federal, provincial and district governments are collected by the federal government whose own expenditure accounts for 72% of the whole. The provincial and district governments spend 28% of the combined expenditures but raise only 7% of the combined revenues.66 In India, the states finance more than 60% of their expenditures from their own revenue collection. Due to its large natural resources and weakest financial standing amongst the provinces, Balochistan considered the federal grants, gas surcharges and finance awards as ‘charity.’ Since Balochistan had abundance of resources like gas and minerals, therefore it desired direct management of its wealth for optimizing its advantage for the province.

Politically, the overtures in AHBP included release of political workers, return of exiles and political dialogue but contained exception to any concession for those “involved in heinous crimes or terrorism”; a condition perceived by the dissidents as liable to exploitation. As state held the final authority of judging a person for these exceptions, the perception of amnesty was diluted. Since nationalist political parties boycotted national / provincial elections 2008, the Provincial Assembly was devoid of opposition and there were no local bodies at that time as well.67 All political bargaining would have to be done outside the parliament, due to which guarantee of enforcement would remain questionable.

In administrative perception, since reviewing the role of federal agencies like the Army and Intelligence organizations in the province to ‘pursuit of fighting terrorism only’ will be done by the ‘state,’ it’s time and magnitude will remain doubtful. Regarding the fact finding commission to determine the circumstances leading to the death of Nawab Akbar Bugti, the Baloch MNAs en bloc, including the moderates, during the debate in National Assembly on the AHBP, demanded “criminal proceedings against the former President, General Pervaiz Musharraf.”68 Regarding the most contentious administrative matter, there was a gross difference

66 “Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan,” 73. 67 Bari Baloch, “Balochistan Local Government Bill 2010 Approved,” The Nation, May 11, 2010. 68 “Government Invites Self-Exiled Baloch Leaders for Talks,” News International, December 10, 2009. 120

of opinion on the numbers of ‘missing persons.’69 The Establishment Division showed it as 105, while Baloch antagonists claimed 1100 documented cases.70

The significance of political sector of security is evident from the discourse analysis carried out above. Securitization moves were made by the government to address the ‘extraordinary issues’ portrayed as threats to Pakistan’s identity in the political domain. Extraordinary measures like the 18th Constitutional Amendment, the 7th NFC Award and the AHBP were undertaken for redress. The discourse indicates a sense of urgency on the part of government to address the serious insecurities threatening the identity of the state. The use of language is very instructive as the government was talking about ‘reconciliation,’ ‘healing the wounds’ and ‘giant leap,’ opposition’s narrative was using phrases like ‘threat to federalism,’ ‘war, ‘secession’ and ‘negotiations.’ The criticality of the situation obviously prodded the government towards integrating dexterity with haste in their dealing with those extraordinary issues. Though not out rightly military in nature, the issues triggered a response with urgency and emphasis usually associated with lurking external military threat to the country’s sovereignty. The issues were securitized as threats to the state by the PPP government on the state’s behalf, without getting misconstrued in the wider discourse as a threat to the government (and not to the state), which is in contrast to Buzan’s assertion about internal threats facing weak states:

“In case of a state, the government will usually be the securitizing actor. A government will often be tempted to use security arguments (in relation to the state) when its concern is actually that the government itself is threatened. This can be the case in relation to external threats as well as internal threats. Internal threats will be typical of weak states (Buzan 1991:99-103), which are marked by a lack of firmly established stateness (Ayub 1994:4).”71 Buzan goes on to argue about the contested authority of the government in weak states which results in systematic contestation when the power wielders in the government appeal to the wider audience in a securitization move made in the name of the state. Government actions would be viewed by many as being taken in its own interest, rather than in the interest of the

69 Hassan, “Slow Progress on Balochistan Package Irks Senate Body.” 70 “Baloch Observe International Day of the Disappeared as 1,100 Still ‘Missing,’” Baluch Sarmachar (blog), September 1, 2010, https://baluchsarmachar.wordpress.com/2010/09/01/baloch-observe-international-day-of-the- disappeared-as-1100-still-missing/. 71 Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Security; A New Framework for Analysis, 1998, 146. 121

state. In our view, here Buzan implies an identity crisis in weak states between the country and its government. In this backdrop, when we take a relook at the three securitized political issues discussed in this chapter, we fail to find any dissenting camp in the discourse accusing the government of parochialism, self-interest or self-preservation in securitizing the 18th Constitutional Amendment, the 7th NFC Award, or the AHBP. We take it as a proof of the strength of Pakistan’s identity, especially when it comes to critical issues being securitized, even in the political security domain. Buzan’s generalization about the dichotomous construction of the governments true identity in ‘weak states’ thus did not hold good for the PPP government while securitizing the three critical issues in 2009-11 in Pakistan.

After having seen the examples of securitization in the political sector, we will step into the societal and military domains of Pakistan’s security to analyze some prominent securitization moves in those sectors by way of discourse analysis. Theoretically these are two separate sectors of national security as expounded by Buzan but during the period and context of this research, securitization occurred in societal sector to provide security to the people from terrorism. Instruments of national power (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence and Legal) were mobilized with a war-like urgency against the strategic threat of terrorism to the society with the military instrument in lead role; hence the overlapping of security discourses in the societal and military sectors. Internal threat of terrorism leading to societal insecurity repeatedly figured out in the discourse as the most important national security challenge being faced by Pakistan.

The critical challenge of terrorism demanded an immediate and extraordinary response. It resulted in the military employing unusual 'ways and means' to achieve the 'end' of societal security, which in fact would provide the evidence of securitization. The diverse identities which came under threat would be examined. In three national strategic efforts, i.e., the Malakand operations 2009, the Zarb-e-Azb operations 2014 - 2017 and the National Action Plan 2015, the instruments of national power, including the military, were employed in an emergent and expeditious manner, where many norms and rules were modified for security reasons. Those actions merit to be classified as securitization moves in the societal and military sectors combined. In the end, broadening of Pakistan's security conception would be argued, based on

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the evidence gleaned from discourse analysis about the importance accorded to the societal sector of security during those significant national strategic efforts.

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CHAPTER 5

SECURITIZATION OF SOCIETAL AND MILITARY SECURITY ISSUES

Security matters in a country are defined by the overarching concept of national security, yet the primary concern often remains security of the state and the government, with little attention paid to the security of the ‘nation’. The natural outcome of this focus is more attention towards the political and military sectors of security, whereas if one thinks about the security of a nation the security of its society should figure out as the core concern. The significance of society in the national security matrix demands consideration of societal sector of security as an independent segment of security analysis for any country. According to Barry Buzan, “societal security concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom.”1

Societies can be understood through the ideas and practices, which identify the affiliates of a community. Primarily, the conception of a society is about its identity; the self-reflected perception of groups and persons, identifying themselves as members of a community. When communities feel threatened by a potential or existing danger to the extent of their survival, dynamics of societal insecurity are manifested. Identity has a predominant role in defining societal security, to the extent that societal security is often termed as ‘identity security’.2

The security of the identity is often understood in terms of the security of a certain ‘we’ or ‘us’ against an existential threat generated by a certain ‘they’ or ‘them.’ This understanding is mostly intersubjective. Intersubjectivity, as explained in Chapter 2, is defined, inter alia, as “implicit and often automatic behavioral orientations towards others.” 3 The ‘we’ and ‘they’ identities are socially constructed and are often competitive among other competing definitions of the same identities. Most security conflicts are dependent on the winning of one or the other definition of opposing identities. Societies’ reaction to threats could either constitute actions

1 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), 19. 2 Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security; A New Framework for Analysis, 120. 3 Balzacq and Guzzini, “Introduction: ‘What Kind of Theory - If Any - Is Securitization?’” 124

undertaken by the community itself or to push the problem to the political and the military sector, elevating the threat to state’s agenda.

The interdependency of societal, political and military sectors of security would depend upon the intersubjective understanding of the threat by the society; whether it decides to act itself, or it engages the political and military sectors as well besides commissioning own actions. Buzan et al. highlight two misunderstandings about the term societal as used in societal security. First, societal security differs from social security because the latter is about financial support of vulnerable individuals, whereas the former is about the identity of collectives. Second, the term society as related to societal, where society is often used to denote the state population that may represent a group without a specific identity. Buzan et al. prefer to use societal for more discreetly identifiable communities because the large aggregations, i.e., nations, are actually not societies for themselves but are societies only according to the state. While discussing the issue of identity in societal security as related to western and non-western countries, Buzan appears to prefer associating the label of nation only to western countries’ societal identities but not to other regions because in his view:

“The organizing concept in the social sector is identity. Social insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a devolvement or potentiality as a threat to their survival as a community. Despite the impression one might get from the present and, especially, previous presentations, the definition is not in terms of nations… The concept could also be understood as ‘identity security.’”4 On the other hand, differing from the disinclination of Buzan et al. (1998) to relate to nation as the preferred collective that represents a society from security of identity point of view, Kelstrup rather suggests that the most commonly used example of threatened societal identity is nation. In his view, the concept of societal insecurity should cast a broader net to include threat to collective identities, and also include situations where many or all individuals in a society are threatened without a greater threat to the collective identity. Thus, according to Kelstrup, ‘societal insecurity’ comprises “threats towards individuals or threat towards the ‘social order’ (or both).”5 Kelstrup argues that an entity, namely a reference object of security, can be considered insecure when it is threatened in a fundamental manner regarding its survival of

4 Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Security; A New Framework for Analysis, 120-139. 5 Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung, Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research (London; New York: Routledge, 2004), 108, http://www.crcnetbase.com/isbn/9780415324106. 125

identity, basic structures or core functions. As a condition of the system, security can be said to exist when there is an absence of threats or when the entity is able to neutralize the threats in a way that its survival is preserved. Security is a relevant notion, always evaluated in relation to a threat. Characteristically, threat and security are ‘social facts’, (in contrast to ‘brute facts’) which are constructed by the observers as well as the agent themselves. Kelstrup defines ‘social insecurity,’ “as encompassing situations in which societal entities, collectives or individuals, are (and/or feels) threatened.”

The contrasting views presented by Buzan and Kelstrup on feasibility of attributing societal identity to a nation for the analysis of societal security issues would be seen at the end of this chapter based upon the discourse analysis of the securitized issues in the societal domain, predicated on the Pakistani (national) identity.

In apparent contrast to societal security, military security is often focused on the referent object of state, usually to secure the identity, integrity or sovereignty of the state against an external or internal threat. However, this norm is deviated when the state is not firmly rooted to exercise the inherent and inalienable monopoly over violence within its jurisdiction. Such situations lead to lawless conditions within the state boundaries that threaten societal, and at times political, security of the society (s) and / or the polity. Such internal threats usually lead the state to make a securitization move to secure the state and the society. According to Mohammed Ayoob (1995) Third World states’ security calculus is dominated by the internal dimension of security. The internal insecurities are the determinants of national security predicament of the Third World states. Most of these insecurities result from the state building process which these countries are going through in their evolutionary process of meaningfully maturing their statehood. These processes often involve political dissension and violent clashes which require use of force to maintain security.6

In such situations, the ruling elite turn to the military to maintain civil peace, territorial integrity and often protect the machinery of government in the face of challenges from its citizens. The common forms of these challenges are from militants, separatists, terrorists, revolutionaries, and criminal gangs organized into movements threatening existing social and political order. In Buzan et al.’s construct of multi-sectoral security, such threats coalesce into

6 Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 42. 126

the societal, military and, at times, the political sector, frequently warranting a securitization move by the government to protect the identity of the state and the society from an existential domestic threat, by advocating extraordinary measures. Rising intra-societal violence juxtaposes the military sector of security between international and domestic contexts. When societal and military sectors of security combine domestically, “the securitization itself has the society at large as its referent object (or its law abiding part) and state agents or politicians as the major actors, deviating from standard security only by being directed inward.” 7 Whereas standard (traditional) security is security in the military sector, which is directed outward against potential external aggressors.

During the period of this research there were some overlapping critical issues in the domains of societal and military security where securitization processes were undertaken in Pakistan. Securitization of radicalization and terrorism will be analyzed in this chapter by way of discourse analysis to examine broadening of Pakistan’s national security conception beyond the traditional paradigm. The discourses of three prominent securitization moves from the period of research will be analyzed.

Firstly, the government’s effort to eliminate the threat to Pakistani identity posed by Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) – Movement for Enforcement of Islamic Law – and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – Movement of Pakistani Taliban, from Malakand, Swat and adjoining areas in 2009, followed by the revival of political and administrative process to stabilize the region. Secondly, Operation Zarb-e-Azb, the counterterrorism military action by the government against TTP launched by Pakistan Army and Pakistan Air Force (PAF) on 15 June 2014 in FATA. Thirdly, the National Action Plan (NAP) formulated by the Government of Pakistan after a deliberate political process in the wake of the terrible Peshawar school attack by TTP on 16 December 2014, which shook the nation into demanding measures on war footing to protect the Pakistani identity.

The discourse analysis would adapt the course and activity as developed in Chapter 2:

7 Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Security; A New Framework for Analysis, 54. 127

Table 5: Intertextual Discourse Analysis; Securitization in Societal and Military Security

Analytic Analytic Activity Course Debate on Federal and Provincial government’s posture; Civil Society’s stance, foreign the ‘subject’ governments’ positions, military’s position, wider constitutional and political being debate, political opposition’s views securitized Sources of Official texts, supportive texts, critical texts, speeches, statements, newspaper discourse opinions / editorials, scholarly articles, books, journals Goal of The stabilization of Government’s discourse through intertextual links, response Analysis of official discourse to critical discourses, the internal stability of print media discourses

Source: Lene Hansen, Security as Practice, p. 57.

Securitization of Malakand Operations 2009

Swat was experiencing growing extremism in the 90s under the influence of an extremist political organization, Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) which was gnawing at Pakistan’s identity. The radical militant organization, the Tehreek-e-Taliban-Pakistan (TTP) exploited the opportunity by establishing its hold in the area and expanded its penetration of the society to strategic dimensions by 2008. Malakand, Buner, Swat, Shangla, Upper Dir, Lower Dir and Chitral are the seven districts comprising the administrative division of Malakand, comprising nearly 40% area of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. These districts have a combined population of around 6 million and are spread over 29,800 square kilometers. Afghanistan’s Nuristan and Badakhshan Province fall to the north and northwest of Malakand Division. Bajaur and Mohmand Agencies of FATA lie in its southwest. In the east, Malakand borders Gilgit Baltistan Province of Pakistan, while in the south it borders the thickly populated Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province’s districts of Charsadda, Peshawar, Mardan and Swabi. Malakand Division districts generally comprise Pashtun tribes. Chitral, an exception, hosts Dardic languages speaking Khowar, Kalash and other tribes; mainly Yousafzai, with some nomadic Gujjar shepherd tribes as well. In Upper Swat and adjacent Upper Dir, Torwali and

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Gauri, the two other linguistic minorities of Dardic origin, live as the original inhabitants of Swat and Dir.8

The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) government in the center and the Awami National Party (ANP) government in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, elected in 2008 with a liberal mandate, desired resolution of the extremism and militancy challenge in Swat through negotiations with the extremist political and radicalized militant factions. After a lengthy negotiation process, the provincial and federal governments reached a political agreement in April 2009 which bound the TNSM to denounce TTP militancy, accept the political governments’ constitutional mandate, and not obstruct female education and employment. In return, the government was required to implement a Nizam-e-Adl (System of Justice) legislation. The new legislation would institute legacy religious courts expected to provide speedy justice to the local population. In the course of events, Sufi Muhammad, the leader of TNSM failed to implement this accord as he lacked control over his own cadres who were, by then, not ready to let go of their much touted empowerment gained through the TTP. They had acquired this power by terrorizing their wealthy landlords. Also, Sufi Muhammad reneged on his promise to accept the State of Pakistan’s legal and constitutional identity, rejecting democracy and Pakistan’s constitution as un-Islamic and hence unacceptable as basis of any accord. Since the basic assumptions of the Government were flouted openly by the militants’ extremist leader, the whole process crumbled and the Government’s flexibility came to be seen as an ominous weakness.9

Instead of reconciling, when the militants actually retrenched and expanded their armed incursion from Swat and Malakand to the neighboring district of Buner, the federal and provincial governments, hopeful of the success of the peace accord till then, scrambled to recover the lost ground. The militants were operating under the umbrella of the TTP, which had been formed in December 2007 in the wake of a watershed event. It was a month-long counter- terrorism operation in Islamabad by the Pakistan Army in July 2007 against hardened local and foreign terrorists barricaded in a controversial Islamabad mosque called ‘Lal Masjid’ or the Red Mosque located in the heart of the capital city. The Swat Valley was the first, and the last, settled

8 Zubair Torwali, “Malakand Division: Conflict, Floods and Response | Criterion Quarterly,” accessed December 8, 2015, http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/malakand-division-conflict-floods-and-response/. 9 Rohan Gunaratna and Khuram Iqbal, Pakistan; Terrorism Ground Zero (London: Reaktion Books, 2011), 76–77. 129

region outside of FATA to fall into the hands of TTP, forcing the federal government to take quick and stern action. Prime Minister Gilani, in the beginning of May 2009, announced that military is being sent into Swat to “eliminate” Taliban after their violation of the Peace Agreement. He said that the government, would not bow in front of the terrorists who have waged war against all segments of the society, being completely averse to our values and norms. Resultantly, the military aggressively engaged the Taliban, believed to be having around 7000 active fighters in Swat at the time. Artillery, aviation, and air support augmented the ground forces maneuver to defeat the terrorists and reclaim territorial control.10

Public opinion, the ‘wider audience’ in the Buzan’s securitization construct, was the principal factor behind this decisive step taken by the government. Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal’s Islamist government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa during the Musharraf era misrepresented the threat of TTP and TNSM in Swat during their five year tenure from 2002 till 2007. When the PPP led government resolved to operate against the militants in Swat in May 2009 decisively, the entire Pakistani population supported the initiative. A key element that turned the people massively against Swat militants was the infamous video of a girl’s public flogging in Swat, reflecting the perverse values with which the terrorists identified, causing widespread outrage across the country against TTP.11 Prime Minister Gilani called the military operation launched in Swat as “a fight for the survival of the country.”12 In fact, it was a matter of survival of the identity of the country. All the elements of ‘securitization’ were constructed to gain legitimacy for an extraordinary move by the government, i.e., use of force against own citizens, albeit, in direly exceptional circumstances demanding equally exceptional means of redressal.

A massive depopulation effort, meant to clear the area-of-intended-operation of the civilian population, preceded the planned operation. It provided freedom of action to the military to operate against the militants without any fear of collateral damage. The military operation was named Operation Rah-e-Raast – The Right Path. Before it began, a massive migration took place

10 “Pakistani Army to ‘Eliminate’ the Taliban in Swat: Prime Minister Gilani,” The Long War Journal (blog), accessed December 8, 2015, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/05/pakistan_army_to_eli.php. 11 Marvin G. Weinbaum, “Hard Choices in Countering Insurgency and Terrorism along Pakistan’s North-West Frontier,” Journal of International Affairs 63, no. Fall 2009 (n.d.): 73–88. 12 Susanne Koelbl, Sohail Nasir, and Shazada Zulfiqar, “Pakistan’s Anti-Taliban Offensive: The Fight for the Swat Valley,” Spiegel Online, May 20, 2009, sec. International, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/pakistan-s-anti- taliban-offensive-the-fight-for-the-swat-valley-a-625961.html. 130

whose management was just as demanding for the government as the kinetic operation itself. More than two million persons from Swat and adjoining areas were registered as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). A large number were provided temporary shelter in camps. All the IDPs were provided financial sustenance. Once the active phase of the operation was over, they were relocated to their homes, after a harsh dislocation spanning more than three months. Since Rwanda 1994, it was the largest displacement of human population. A sweltering summer for the displaced people of the cooler Swat region, who took shelter with their friends, rented property temporarily and, in many cases, resided in IDP camps before they could be relocated to their native homes. Many of their homes required reconstruction on self-help with some government assistance.13 As the war progressed, discourse development was like a war of words. Taliban spokesman, Muslim Khan, invoked their superior moral ground and threatened the Malakand Commissioner Fazal Karim Khattak of dire consequences if he does not discontinue the operation against the militants. The commissioner in turn asked Muslim Khan to surrender to security forces or face the court of law.14

The groundswell of public opinion, which led to the swift employment of a mix of military and non-military means to control the spiraling situation in Swat, could not keep momentum to push towards engaging the sprouting sanctuaries elsewhere in Pakistan. At the national level, the counterterrorism effort could not be expanded beyond Swat at that time due to multifarious reasons. Significantly, the ruling political parties in the Center and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province lacked political will to utilize the antagonistic public sentiment against terrorism. As part of the larger counter-terrorism plan, another large scale military action did take place in South Waziristan area of FATA after the Swat operation, called Operation Rah-e-Nijat – The Path of Riddance, but its gains could not be consolidated at the provincial or national level. The terrorists’ networks could not be pursued in the North Waziristan and Khyber Agencies of FATA, and in the mega city of Karachi; places which turned into sanctuaries for the militants escaping from the areas under military operations. The ‘balloon effect,’ i.e., the spilling over of terrorists from one preserve to the other upon application of pressure, could not be controlled. The institutional tensions between the political forces, the executive, the military, and the

13 Zubair Torwali, “Malakand Division.” 14 “Taliban_spokesman_threatens_Malakand_Commiss.PDF,” Asian News International, August 19, 2009. 131

judiciary prevented consensus formulation of a comprehensive antiterrorism plan at the national level. The role of external actors like the U.S., India and Afghanistan was important in shaping the narrative. Their intentions of truly helping Pakistan fight its war of survival against terrorism was under public scrutiny. The terrorists found sympathetic ground in the antagonized public opinion resulting from the infamous U.S.’s mantra of ‘do more’ for Pakistan. It became an anathema that fueled anti-Americanism in Pakistan and complicated the situation. Moreover, fear of the kind of post-Red Mosque 2007 terrorism blowback was another cause of public apprehension which slowed the required surge in public support to the national effort against terrorism. The U.S. occupation forces in Afghanistan were portrayed as the root-cause of all problems and the religious political parties leveraged this theme to disable a unified national stance against the Pakistani Taliban’s terrorism.15

However, as the stories of terrorists’ atrocities and ambitions trickled in from Swat in May 2009, the State rode the wave of public outcry against the Pakistani Taliban and decided to take strong handed action against their rapidly expanding influence. A number of soldiers, policemen, politicians and civilians gave the ultimate sacrifice and within three months of intense door to door fighting, Swat and adjoining areas were cleared of the immediate militant threat. In spite, Mullah Fazlullah, the notorious Taliban leader in Swat remained alive and escaped to Afghanistan, getting promoted in the hierarchy to the leadership of TTP. He continued to plan and execute terror attacks in Pakistan, as was claimed for the shocking attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar in December 2014.

Undesirably, the local political government and civil administration could not build sufficient capacity to gradually takeover the responsibilities of governance in the wake of Operation Rah-e-Rast, preventing return of the much needed stability to the Swat area. The civilian government’s law enforcement capacity in intelligence, policing, criminal investigation, legal prosecution, judiciary and prisons was highly insufficient, as was the situation elsewhere in the country.16 The existing structure of law enforcement capacity was for a different kind of stability, prevalent in Swat region earlier in its heydays as a popular tourist resort with minimal crime, but no way near to sufficing the needs of fighting an organized terror network with a

15 Moeed Yususf, ed., Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Challenge (Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace, 2014), 37. 16 Yususf, 105. 132

political ideology like the TTP. Extensive challenges lay ahead in the realms of law enforcement agencies’ financial management, organizational structure and organizational culture. The mainstay of local economy was tourism, which depended upon recasting a stable image of the beautiful Malakand area and reconstruction of the destroyed infrastructure; efforts that needed substantial financial input. The administrative structure was in need of a revamp. The police were not trained or equipped to conduct the proactive role they would be required to undertake in conjunction with their intelligence and criminal prosecution complements in order to stabilize the area in the post-operation phase. In order to achieve speedy stabilization, the organizational culture of law enforcement and judicial agencies needed to modify with the same resolve that the government had associated with the military operation.

The discourse analysis here also needs to take into account the discussion around structural orientation of the Pakistan Army and the financial support being provided by the U.S. for capacity building of the Army. While the Army was employed to quell terrorism in Swat, the U.S. was providing around $ 2 billion to Pakistan per annum to augment the Army’s counterterrorism capability and reimburse the cost of war, since the initiation of the Bush Administration’s ‘Global War on Terror.’ However, the structural and doctrinal orientation of Pakistan Army mostly remained conventional due to the omnipresent challenge from archrival India, which the U.S. would keenly observe as detrimental to the larger fight against terror. This reflected a lasting tension in the perspectives of Pakistan and the U.S. in the antiterrorism campaign. The outcome of the financial assistance program was being questioned in the U.S. Pakistan’s willingness to counter the menace of terrorism decisively was being challenged in the western discourse. For example, different reasons were cited for this failure by the South Asian experts Fair and Jones while writing about Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts in the fall of 2009.17 Pakistan Army’s capacity to clear and hold areas while winning and sustaining the support of the locals in many diverse terrorism ridden areas of the country at the same time was questioned. Pakistan’s security agencies were blamed for partisanship in dealing with shades of terrorist organizations according to their aims and objectives; ignoring the ones going against the Indian and the U.S. interests and only attacking those hurting Pakistan. Domestic political narrative’s strength to reinforce the public support required for going after the terrorists by the

17 C. Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones, “Pakistan’s War Within,” Survival 51, no. 6 (December 2009): 161–88. 133

Armed Forces and the Law Enforcement Agencies was inadequate. The public opinion remained divided whether this is Pakistan’s war or a proxy war of the U.S. Most importantly, the government’s inability to integrate instruments of national power in the political, economic and social domains, in order to weave a whole of the government strategy, was identified by Fair and Jones as a fundamental vacuum which was later exploited by the terrorists.

In three months, from May to July 2009, control of almost 6,400 square kilometers of area was regained from the direct control of the TTP at a cost of about 400 lives of military and 3500 militants killed. The seriousness of Operation Rah-e-Rast was duly acknowledged, alongside criticism about the overall strategy of the state to fight terrorism:

“Rah-e-Rast was conducted more seriously than other operations, with the capture of a number of high-level militants. Commitment and morale were running high. The average officer-to-soldier ratio in combat fatalities during conventional operations is around 1:17 in most armies, while in Swat operations it has been 1:5 to 1:6.”18

However, the military operation in Malakand was a classic example of the tensions inherent in any securitization move. Theoretically, state, the securitizing actor, portrayed a vital issue as an instance of direct threat to the national identity, convinced a wider audience about the extraordinary circumstances, and sought consent for the extraordinary measure of employment of armed forces. The depiction of threat and urgency gained the much needed public support and reinforced the military resolve but at the same time it led to certain constraints, which weakened the post-war stabilization of the area.

The less time available for evacuation of the population and the requirement of secrecy, which exasperated the evacuees, constrained the military operation. Many citizens of Swat were in the lurch as the fighting began. For those lurching natives, the long term result of their terrible migration to safety, and the war damage to infrastructure and property, was unclear. After the main counter-terrorism operation was over in about three months, leadership of the militants fled away to the neighboring Afghanistan. Many of the foot soldiers melted away in the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) and the urban centers countrywide. The much publicized

18 Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, “Pakistan’s Anti Taliban Counter Insurgency,” The RUSI Journal 155, no. 1 (February 2010): 10–19. 134

shooting incident of the Nobel laureate Malala Yousafzai on 9 October 2012 along with two of her friends in Mingora, Swat, and some other sporadic terrorism incidents around the same time period, reflected the challenges of stabilizing Swat due to the presence of disguised Taliban and their well-wishers amongst the population.

Some of the Taliban fleeing the military crackdown in Swat, penetrated the adjoining picturesque and historic district of Chitral, which had traditionally remained peaceful. As a result, it witnessed an upsurge in infiltration of Islamist hardliners into the society, establishing new madrassahs and imposing their presence upon the amenable locals. A great challenge for the stability of the Swat area was the trial and conviction of a large number of detainees of the military operation because the witnesses were scared, the form of evidence required was insubstantial, and the criminal laws were unsuited to the war situation. Redemption was sought in promulgating new, compatible laws that were in turn criticized for highhandedness, and in contravention to the Constitution. The arming of peace committees, the pro-government groups, was another controversial move during the stabilization phase, as the mechanism to control the activities and intentions of those groups could not be made perfect.19

The post war stabilization phase of the securitization move in Malakand remained beset by another controversial discourse revolving around how much longer the military should stay in Malakand, and whether it’s the military’s disinclination or the civil administration’s ineptitude that would delay drawdown. The high social and economic cost of this conflict left deep scars on the fabric of Swat’s society. It had a severe impact on the stabilization effort in the post war period.20 Tourism infrastructure was badly affected, schools were damaged in large numbers and personal losses in blood and treasure were enormous, which in turn lowered the morale of the society as it geared to rehabilitate itself. The dominant discourse of Taliban, which promoted rebellion against a bourgeois led exploitative system to gain rightfully deserved share of society’s wealth and achieve due social status, was still an alternative narrative that needed to be countered. The tussle between the waning radical, socialistic, Taliban ideology and the regaining

19 “Pakistan: Countering Militancy in PATA,” Asia Report (Islamabad / Brussels: International Crisis Group, Brussels, January 15, 2013), 11–21, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/242-pakistan- countering-militancy-in-pata.pdf. 20 “Pakistan: Countering Militancy in Provincially Administered Tribal Areas,” 24. 135

traditional, pluralistic, capitalistic ideology was an important feature that affected the stabilization phase of the securitization move in Malakand.

During the post-war phase, not only in Swat but elsewhere in FATA as well, opinions were abound in favor of reinvigorating those societies as a means to counter the return of militants; use the Army to create conducive environment to facilitate development. The disorderliness of the ‘house’ due to political disenfranchisement, lack of social facilities, corruption, gun culture, joblessness, and unconstitutional rule needed to be put in order. Use of “force may be necessary to prevent terrorist attacks or apprehend them wherever possible, but the use of force will be effective only if it is used as part of a strategy which also deals with the underlying causes.”21 This reflected an important facet of the contending discourse about the stabilization dynamic in Malakand, South Waziristan, Khyber and Bajaur Agencies, being discussed by the intelligentsia and the civil society. The underlying causes were the lack of trust between the state and the people, reflected in the absence of a dependable political, social, and judicial system. The breeding grounds of terrorism, i.e., political resentment given the logic of religion, needed to be addressed as part of the overall strategy without which the military effort would remain an inefficient and counterproductive activity.

Despite its numerous challenges, the stabilization effort in Malakand remained very successful. It is evident from the negligible terrorism incidents reported in that area compared to the other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province and FATA in the year 2015.22 Tourism is thriving again, with scores of domestic tourists visiting Swat, Kalam, the ski resort of Malam Jabba, and surrounding areas. Numerous tourist festivals are routinely organized, with the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa investing heavily in reviving the tourism industry of Malakand, utilizing the minimal but continuing presence of Army in Swat area.23

The years elapsed since the successful termination of military operations in October 2009, witnessed drawdown of active military presence from almost three divisions to only one

21 Zahid Anwar, “The Rise and Fall of Insurgency in North West Pakistan,” Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan 48, no. 1 (2011), http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/history/PDF-FILES/zahid.pdf. 22 “South Asian Terrorism Portal: Pakistan” (Institute for Conflict Management, December 6, 2015), http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/majorincidents.htm. 23 Zulfiqar Ali, “Army given Rs30m to Promote Tourism in Malakand, KP Assembly Told,” DAWN, accessed December 13, 2015, http://www.dawn.com/news/1212116. 136

division size force, which is also projected to scale down in due course. The multifarious stabilization challenges were met with perseverance by the civil and military organizations jointly. Three successive provincial governments in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province actively supported the stabilization process, including the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) Government. All three governments remained extraordinarily committed to the success of the stabilization process, without any civil-military discord. This resulted in steady progress. Post operation challenges of the return of the IDPs, creation of security environment, and reconstruction of the physical and psychological foundations, along with the restoration of socio-civic services, were amicably met. Rehabilitation of the masses was achieved with much difficulty. In a continuing effort, the education system is under revival, some of the important absconding terrorists are being pursued, and the civil administration is being endowed with enhanced capacity of local police to maintain law and order.

After the initial intense counter-terrorism operations, which lasted about six months, military’s role was modified to fight serious crime as well for which they were given a robust mandate. Close military-police cooperation was developed, however the military involvement was reduced over the years. Disarmament of militants, demobilization of military and reintegration of de-radicalized militants into the society were monumental tasks. Those were achieved with an approach that saw amicable integration of the local population, the civil government, and the Army. The counterterrorism in Malakand followed by the stabilization achieved thereafter, in brief, is one of the world’s best antiterrorism success stories of contemporary times. The huge swath of land and minds grabbed by the terrorists in Swat were reclaimed by use of force and persuasion, at a high moral pitch, with minimum collateral damage, and with skillful rehabilitation of the displaced people; a classic manifestation of whole of the nation approach.24

The events leading to the rise of Taliban’s influence in Swat, securitization of the issue, reestablishment of the writ of the state, defeat of terrorism, high spirit of the affected population, and restoration of people’s confidence in the government offer many lessons for policy makers. The lessons will be discussed in five frameworks; national level decision making, unity of effort

24 Kanwar Khan, Interview with a senior military official having extended first-hand experience of Malakand stabilization effort, November 25, 2015. 137

& unity of command, intelligence and understanding the operational environment, character of contemporary conflict, and security force assistance.25

National Level Decision Making

In spite of the historically tumultuous civil-military relations, tactful creation of political space by the country’s leadership, provided the key to the successful securitization of Malakand stabilization effort. Self-serving agendas were ignored, political divisions were bridged, dogmatic baggage was set aside, and an amicable civil-military equation was evolved. During the rising terrorism in the Swat area, Pakistan was slowly returning on the track of unrestrained democracy with a new federal government of Pakistan People’s Party. The PPP was a liberal, left of center popular political party, which had come to power in February 2008 riding a sympathy wave due to the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the party’s leader and two-time Prime Minister of Pakistan, by a Taliban gunman in a political rally just before the elections. Historically, the PPP and the military had been in difficult civil-military relations ever since the inception of the PPP in the late 1960s, exacerbated by the circumstances of Benazir’s death when President General Musharraf was at the helm of affairs. However, in the planning and execution of the Malakand stabilization effort, Asif Ali Zardari, Benazir’s husband, who took over the reins of PPP after his wife’s death, and General Kayani, the then Chief of Army Staff, nurtured good civil-military relationship that significantly helped to steer the securitization move in the national decision making. The political circumstances were also favored by the presence of Awami National Party (ANP) Government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. It was a leftist political party, gaining power after decisively defeating the religious Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) in the Province on the manifesto of ‘peaceful’ reversal of the rising Islamist radicalism.

After the political forces failed to ‘peacefully’ restore the sanctity of Pakistani identity through negotiation and pacts, and realized the threat of the TTP in the Malakand areas in March 2009, the decision to use the military offensively in Malakand was taken unanimously. Thereafter, the ‘extraordinary’ step of the securitization move, i.e., tasking the armed forces to tackle the deteriorating situation on war footing, was taken by the government. The Army was

25 Richard D. Hooker and Joseph J. Collins, eds., Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 2015), 6. 138

given the mandate of restoring the writ of the state by eliminating Taliban from Malakand area, evacuating the local population to avoid collateral damage, and creating conditions for peaceful rehabilitation of the population in a secure environment. The Army translated this mandate into a workable action plan and enjoyed full confidence of the governments at the central and provincial levels during its implementation.26

A synchronized civil-military relationship before, during, and after the use of dominant military force in counterterrorism is the key to success in such interventions. It hinges upon political authority’s confidence in military’s ability, military’s subservience to political authority, military’s liberty of action within given constraints, civil-military combined assessment of the operational environment, and people’s confidence in the harmony of civil-military actions.

Unity of Effort & Command

The whole-of-the-nation approach crafted by the government and implemented by the civil administration, military, political parties and the population, created the ‘unity of effort.’ Later, the deference shown to the political leadership by the military before, during and after the operations, and in return the confidence reposed by the political leadership in the concept of operations, preserved the ‘unity of command.’ The critical requirement of securitization, i.e., acceptance of the move by a wider audience, was fulfilled by the national sentiment created in favor of the military action.

A deliberate effort was undertaken by the Provincial and Federal Governments to mobilize nation-wide opinion and gain confidence of Swat’s population, direly needed for subsequent success of the military action. Armed Forces public relations department, Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) synchronized well to augment the national effort. The Federal Government released the required funds in time to support the IDPs. The Prime Minister urgently created the IDPs management organization, Special Support Group, under the Army’s command with assistance from the Federal and Provincial Governments.27 It planned and

26 Khan, Interview with a senior military official having extended first-hand experience of Malakand stabilization effort. 27 Nadeem Ahmed, “COIN in Peace-Building-Case Study of the 2009 Malakand Operation,” Prism 2, no. 4 (September 2011), http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA549886. 139

managed the colossal task of registering IDPs, disbursing one-time monetary grants, setting up IDP relief camps, and instituting an electronically disbursable periodic stipend for the IDPs. The group always remaining wary of three undercurrents; fake registrations, misconstrued public perception of the IDP management, and terrorists mixing in the IDP crowds. During the stabilization phase, development of infrastructure was jointly undertaken in harmony by the Provincial / District administration and the Army. Developmental projects undertaken by foreign development assistance provided by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and friendly countries were well-coordinated between the provincial government, the federal government, and the local command HQ present in the area. A large number of international humanitarian initiatives for the IDPs were successfully implemented.28 A culture of trust between national institutions like the country’s parliament, the chief executive, the cabinet, the major political parties, the civil bureaucracy, and the military was the key to winning the nation’s confidence, leading to a successful whole-of-the-nation approach.

Intelligence and Understanding the Operational Environment

The significance of Taliban’s actions and the hazard it posed at the local level was understood well but their subsequent strategy of melting away to other refuges and living to fight another day could not be appreciated fully. In Swat and adjoining areas the need of eliminating the Taliban’s impact and restoring people’s confidence in the writ of the government was accurately determined. But later on, the hard earned public goodwill could not be utilized to keep up the counterterrorism momentum at the national level in pursuit of the terrorists fleeing to the troubled agencies of FATA and marrying up with their comrades in those areas. The Taliban threat metamorphosed as a result of Malakand operation and ‘ballooned’ into North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Khyber and Orakzai agencies of FATA. This new threat could not be dealt with the same decisiveness due to the extensive security assistance efforts in the Malakand area to build civilian capacity to prevent Taliban resurgence. While at the same time, Operation Rah- e-Nijaat was being consolidated in South Waziristan Agency, necessitating sustained efforts. The militants took advantage of the over stretched stabilization phase in Malakand and South

28 Aadil Mansoor, “Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas Programme,” September 2009, http://www.pk.undp.org/content/pakistan/en/home/operations/projects/crisis_prevention_and_recovery/refugee- affected-and-hosting-areas-programme.html. 140

Waziristan to reinforce their existing fronts in North Waziristan and Khyber agencies of FATA. Areas which were later to be cleared in 2014-15 during another landmark operation called Zarb- e-Azb. Countering the ballooning terrorism in the kinetic and post kinetic phases is therefore a strategic imperative which needs to be built in to the strategy.

Correctly foreseeing the nebulous terrorism threats pervading wide, loosely governed spaces is only possible through a nationally coordinated intelligence struggle. A strategic intelligence perspective on terrorism should entail predictions about local population’s sentiments, national pulse, intra-terrorist linkages, trans-national support, corruption and mismanagement in public affairs, and terrorists’ financial mechanisms.

Character of Contemporary Conflict and Security Force Assistance

Political grievances gave rise to social conflict that fueled economic tensions due to poor governance in Malakand area. War amongst the people was the dominant characteristic of Malakand conflict. In order to maintain the legitimacy of the government’s response, the efforts of security force assistance, intelligence collection, and targeted military operations during the stabilization effort were conducted in a very measured way. The requirement of ‘eliminating’ threat and the possibility of terrorists escaping the operations had to be weighed against the repercussions of collateral damage. ‘Securitization’ had to be tempered, lest it created a backlash.

Clausewitz’ remark about the first and foremost job of a military commander being understanding the kind of war he is embarking upon is quintessentially applicable to the challenges of irregular warfare. The Malakand operations offer good understanding of the nature of threat posed by the Taliban in the informational, military, diplomatic, and economic domains and how those threats in each domain were countered. Engaging with neighboring stakeholders like the U.S. led international force in Afghanistan to isolate the threat externally, was a major line of diplomatic effort, along with seeking developmental assistance from international agencies and friendly countries to support the stabilization phase. Dominating the narrative to convince the external and internal audience about the righteousness of the desired end state, and the ways and means employed to achieve those ends, was a peculiarity of the information domain. The use of military line of effort was tuned to the requirement of selective and

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intelligence based use of force to minimize collateral damage, always keeping wider public sentiment in mind.

The revival of civil administration, police, judiciary, and intelligence at the local level need to be planned and resourced much before any counterterrorism operation actually begins. The needs of security force assistance tend to expand and extend, and should be thought of in the planning phase. In areas with deeper and longer history of loose governance, a much extensive long-term post-securitization security assistance would often be a more serious imperative than the demands of the securitization phase.

Securitization of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, June 2014

The increased terrorist activities in the loosely governed areas of FATA became the bane of security in Pakistan ever since the military’s entry in the area after 9/11. The historically innocuous writ of the state in those areas became conspicuous and manifestly detrimental. The waning writ of the state is only another expression for societal insecurity. The state in a secure society is considered to be having the monopoly over use of violence, unlike an insecure society that is marred by its wanton use. The national political leadership prosecuted a survival case for societal security in Pakistan, against a threat to the national identity, territorial integrity, and safety of the citizens by using the agency of Armed Forces, usually reserved for military security against external aggression. The national identity was threatened by the militants’ propagation of their self-serving ‘Islamic’ ideology. The territorial integrity was threatened by control of large swathes of land by the militants, while the security of military and law enforcement personnel along with common citizens was threatened by indiscriminate terrorism. The political sector of national security played a lead role in securitizing the threats in the societal and military sectors to expand the notion of security as per dictates of the situation.

The political and security conditions which led to the initiation of major counterterrorism operations in FATA in June 2014, called Operation Zarb-e-Azb, were to a large extent similar to those prevalent at the time of the Malakand operations. The Nawaz led PML(N) Government came to power in 2013 at the federal level and the Khattak led PTI Government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, with the promise to find a negotiated solution to the ongoing militancy.

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A deliberate peace process with the TTP was undertaken by the government in a bid to end the challenge posed by the militants to the identity of Pakistan. Despite much political effort spanning over a year no headway was made in the negotiations, while terrorism continued unabated. On the night of 8 June 2014, the terrorists launched a deadly attack on the largest airport of Pakistan, Jinnah International Airport Karachi, in which 28 people including the ten attackers were killed. The attack was claimed by the TTP who rejected all negotiation efforts and threatened with more terrorism to revenge the killing of their associates by the government forces and the U.S. drones in the Tribal Areas. The brazen attack perceivably destroyed any prospect of continuing the much trumpeted peace talks.29

The PML(N) had come to power on the slogan of ‘Strong Economy – Strong Pakistan.’ The PML(N) Manifesto 2013 charted a course to achieve the same slogan with mention of terrorism and militancy at its end, suggesting an indirect approach to tackle those issues by improving governance and socioeconomic opportunities for the people of FATA. The manifesto rejected militancy and terrorism being against the identity of Pakistan; “neither the laws of the country nor the religious beliefs or the cultural traditions of its citizens sanction use of violence against fellow humans.” Discussing the remedy, the manifesto claimed that militancy and terrorism cannot be countered by use of force alone, rather a comprehensive plan is needed with economic, social, administrative and political steps to eradicate this menace from the tribal areas. The steps identified in the manifesto included integration of FATA into political mainstream, establishment of schools and technical training centers, free health benefits, crash program to establish small and medium industrial units, public education program and education reforms. Security sector’s modernization was also promised “to establish democratic and parliamentary oversight on intelligence services and to achieve better surveillance, improved coordination and enhanced capacity for counterinsurgency forces at different levels.”30 However, the necessity of the use of force at any point in time to improve the security situation of the country was not mentioned in the manifesto.

29 “TTP Claims Attack on Karachi Airport,” accessed January 13, 2016, http://www.dawn.com/news/1111397. 30 “PML(N) Manifesto 2013” (Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), 2013), 85–86, http://www.pmo.gov.pk/documents/manifesto.pdf. 143

After spending about a year in power, with no headway visible in negotiations, the PML(N) Government moved to securitize the terrorism issue, on the same pattern as the PPP Government did in 2009 in Malakand, using the public outrage on the Jinnah International Airport attack as the trigger. The security of the society was casted as being faced with mortal danger from widespread terrorism. Public approval for the use of military to counter the terrorists was sought by making the wider audience accept the emergency-like situation demanding equally emergent steps, like the internal use of force.

The text of the 16 June 2014 speech of PM Nawaz Sharif in the National Assembly of Pakistan on the eve of Operation Zarb-e-Azb is indicative of the dire threat conceived by the political leadership.31 There was an urgent need to present that threat to the elected representatives in particular and the complete nation in general to seek their support in launching the security forces against the forces of terrorism. At the beginning, the PM mentioned his earlier speech in the Parliament on 29 January 2014 in which he had announced his Government’s sincere intention of negotiations to restore peace, which was endorsed by the Parliament. However, he lamented that the path of terrorism adopted by the militants had left no room for negotiations and the time for a decisive action has come. He highlighted this prolonged war spread over the last 10-12 years had targeted Pakistan’s armed forces, security agencies and law enforcement agencies, making the places of worship, educational institutions, airports, military installations, markets, and even homes, vulnerable to terrorism. The PM mentioned about the deep wound of 103 billion US dollars which the national economy had suffered as a result of terrorism, besides ruining the prestige and reputation of the country. He sought complete unison of opinion from all segments of society, media and political parties against terrorists and urged them to stand solidly behind the government and the armed forces of Pakistan. Recognizing the significance of the religious narrative, he also appealed to the religious scholars to guide their fellow countrymen in the light of true Islamic teachings. His speech ended with the hope for success of this operation and projection of peace and stability for the country in future.

31 Nawaz Sharif, “PM Nawaz Sharif Speech in National Assembly of Pakistan - 16 June 2014” (Session of National Assembly of Pakistan, Islamabad, June 16, 2014), http://pmo.gov.pk/documents/addresses/pm_speech_%20at_%20NA_%20June_%2016_2014.pdf. 144

Operation Zarb-e-Azb was launched with full force on 15 June 2014 and its accomplishments were widely reported during the course of its prosecution. Details of the number of terrorists killed or captured, airstrikes carried out, caches of arms recovered, and IDPs registered was shared with the media by the military in routine. On-line discourse, like public comments on news items, reflected the wide ranging support rendered to the armed forces in their difficult endeavor. “This is a war. Bring back the passion of ’65 (reference to the 1965 Indo-Pak war) and support our forces.” “Message to Imran Khan and PTI folks: do not try to divide the nation, stand behind our armed forces in this war … our own war.” “Good move from the Government. This should have started long ago. Anyway, better late than never. Keep it going till they (terrorists) are totally eliminated.”32

The opposing views of the PTI leader Imran Khan on the launching of Operation Zarb-e- Azb, whose party governed the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, added to the discourse. In a news item appearing in the daily Dawn on 12 Jun 2014, he was critical of the government’s contemplation to begin military operation in FATA, seeking explanation about the outcome of dialogue and suggesting separation of those militants who seek dialogue from those who continued to seek terrorism in order to take action against the latter.33 He criticized the action of the U.S. Congress linking their aid to the military operations, terming it as an effort by the U.S. to ‘purchase’ Pakistan’s favor in carrying out the military operation in FATA. He termed the government’s decision to go for decisive military action against terrorists as ‘suicidal,’ pitching his party’s position diametrically opposite to the rest of the political parties who actually deemed inaction on the part of the Government as suicidal.

Maulana Samiul Haq of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI-S), a member of the negotiation committee established by PM Nawaz Sharif to negotiate with the terrorists, also spoke against the military operations, saying, “dialogue is the only solution to bring back peace in the

32 “Zarb-e-Azb Operation: 120 Suspected Militants Killed in N Waziristan,” accessed January 11, 2016, http://www.dawn.com/news/1112909. 33 “Imran Fears North Waziristan Operation Will Be ‘suicidal’’,’” accessed January 13, 2016, http://www.dawn.com/news/1112282. 145

country.”34 A known Taliban supporter, his views came as no surprise but did not carry much support, indicating the hegemony which the government’s discourse was enjoying.

Meanwhile, the government kept on reinforcing its support for the crucial political move implemented through securitization of Operation Zarb-e-Azb. Substantial political capital was at stake for PML(N). On 30 September 2015, during his address to the UN General Assembly’s session commemorating 70th Anniversary of the UN, PM Nawaz Sharif termed Operation Zarb- e-Azb as “the largest anti-terrorism campaign against terrorists anywhere, involving over 180,000 of our security forces.” He pledged to fight terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, irrespective of its sponsors.35 The political discourse of the government acknowledged the critical role of the armed forces in strengthening the country’s national security against the existential threat of terrorism and praised the excellent civil-military unity of effort in making Operation Zarb-e-Azb a success:

“The success of the operation Zarb-e-Azb is a testimony that the armed forces of the country are fully capable of meeting any challenge to the national security. The exemplary unity demonstrated by the political and military leadership in curbing terrorism is yet another splendid chapter of our national history.”36

The PM’s acknowledgement of counterterrorism being a national security challenge met amicably by the armed forces in concert with the political direction, testifies the expansion of the notion of security in the societal sector and its interdependence on the military sector. The PM especially praised the ‘national unanimity’ supporting the military operations as a show of the nation’s resolve in the face of threat to national integrity. Vociferous political ownership of this securitization move helped to reinforce the government’s discourse, claiming inescapable necessity of the use of force and its continuation till achievement of the desired objectives.

The international perspective on this vital political decision was generally positive, though often critical of the delay in this decision. On 28 June 2014, The Economist reported that

34 “Sami Urges Govt to Pursue Talks with Taliban Again,” accessed January 13, 2016, http://www.dawn.com/news/1112286. 35 Nawaz Sharif, “Prime Minister’s Office, Islamabad, Pakistan” (17th Session of UN General Assembly, UN, September 30, 2015), http://www.pmo.gov.pk/pm_speech_details.php?speech_id=62. 36 Nawaz Sharif, “Prime Minister’s Message on the Defence Day of Pakistan,” September 6, 2015, http://www.pmo.gov.pk/messageDetail.php?message_id=58. 146

as the U.S. drawdowns from Afghanistan, “America is finally getting its wish, with the launch on June 15th of Operation Zarb-e-Azb.” The delay in this decision was attributed to the PM, who was said to be fearful of brutal terrorist reprisals in cities and hence relied fruitlessly on striking a peace deal with the TTP. The Army had been preparing for this offensive with airstrikes against the militant hideouts but the massive outflow of IDPs, almost 450,000 from North Waziristan, was a challenge that demanded immense resources. NATO’s unpreparedness to block the retreat of militants into Afghanistan was also blamed on Pakistan’s delayed decision-making. The report remained skeptical about “how far North Waziristan (Agency) will be really cleaned up even now;”37 a fear which would soon be allayed as all the important terrorist structures in the Agency were completely destroyed in the swift military operation with full media visibility of the destruction. On the issue of IDPs, very elaborate efforts in registering the IDPs, establishing relief camps, providing sustenance through cash and in-kind grants and their organized repatriation, would later allay the skepticism to a large extent about handling of the IDPs in North Waziristan.

Three months later, in another comment by The Economist on 26 September 2015, it was acknowledged that “key towns in the former Taliban sanctuary of North Waziristan were retaken by the state” and militants were being hunted down in other parts of the country, especially Karachi. The report took a slant at General Raheel Sharif’s popularity in the wake of successful prosecution of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, noting it as unprecedented and cause of concern for the civilian leadership.38 As events were to prove later, such apprehensions were baseless and highly speculative, however they remained a part of the evolving discourse on the issue of countering the spread of terrorism. In the official discourse, however, the civilian and military leadership remained well coordinated as was reflected in a Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Chief Minister’s office handout, which praised sacrifices of Pakistan Army, while the Corps Commander in Peshawar in turn reassured army’s commitment to fulfill security expectations of the people.39

The debate around intra-governmental coordination for initiating Operation Zarb-e-Azb impacted the discourse about the intent of the government to securitize this issue. A perception

37 Anonymous, “Better Late than Never?; Pakistan at War,” The Economist, June 28, 2014. 38 Anonymous, “Hail to the Chief; Pakistan’s Army,” The Economist, September 26, 2015. 39 “Corps Commander Peshawar Meets CM,” Insaf.pk, accessed January 11, 2016, http://www.insaf.pk/news/national-news/item/1789116-corps-commander-peshawar-meets-cm. 147

developed regarding absence of consensus amongst the political actors for launching the military operation. Hence, apart from reasons of military secrecy, lack of agreement between the central and provincial governments, prevented timely adoption of a clear securitization strategy. The PM’s speech in the National Assembly on the next day of the launch of Operation Zarb-e-Azb mitigated the impression of discord but, as is evident from the statements of PTI leadership just prior to the launch, Islamabad and Peshawar were not sensing the heat of urgency in the same manner. The issue of unbridled terrorism emanating from North Waziristan in particular, which the PM wanted to securitize to seek immediate redressal, was not an issue meriting securitization in the eyes of the PTI Government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Nevertheless, it was encouraging that “majority of the people supported the operation including those political elements who were otherwise in favor of dialogue as a priority; at least they did not speak and remained silent.” 40

A significant divergence, which hampered the securitization of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, was the political agitation going on during August and September 2014 by the PTI and Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) against the Government of PM Nawaz Sharif on allegations of electoral rigging in the 2013 general elections. Media, which plays an important role in building the much needed national consensus in politically significant moves like launching a decisive military counterterrorism offensive, remained absorbed in the coverage of the fanfare surrounding the agitation sit-ins of the PTI leader, Imran Khan and PAT leader, Tahir-ul-Qadri.

The standoff in Islamabad between the protesting mobs of PTI and PAT, demanding the PM’s resignation over alleged systematic rigging in 2013 elections, and the ruling PML(N) Government, was a period of intense political activity from 14 August to 17 December 2014. The securitization of Operation Zarb-e-Azb’s was also affected by this upheaval as the Army, which was keenly pursuing the counterterrorism operations at this time, was roped in the discourse on allegations of bipartisanship in the ongoing political mudslinging. Some members of the ruling PML(N) were fearful of Army’s political support to the protestors; a charge forcefully denied.41 Successful securitization is contingent upon minimum opposition to the securitizing move being pursued by the state, which, in the case of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, saw a

40 Khalid Rahman, “FATA: Beyond Military Operation,” Policy Perspectives, Pluto Journals, 12, no. 1 (2015): 93– 107. 41 “Corps Commanders Satisfied with NWA Operation,” accessed January 15, 2016, http://www.dawn.com/news/1124646. 148

major hurdle when the role of Army came under scrutiny by the state functionaries themselves. Acceptance of the wider audience in the extraordinary steps being taken to redress the critical security threat, is a prerequisite of securitization, which was put in doubt by the securitizing actor’s (the government) criticism of the key securitizing agent (the army).

The impression of civil-military misperceptions about the securitization of Operation Zarb-e-Azb was quelled in a significant manner by the unprecedented visit of PM Nawaz Sharif to North Waziristan on 9 October 2014 along with the Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and some federal ministers, accompanied by General Raheel Sharif, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS). This was the first ever visit by an elected PM to North Waziristan. The visit “sent a strong message after much speculation of friction between the military and the civilian government on the conduct of operation and a sign of bondage with the people of FATA.”42 This strong message was essential to support the government’s securitizing move, which could have been squandered within the first six months of its sound footings laid in June 2014. Any signs of serious internal friction between the various government agencies and functionaries is part of the normal bureaucratic functioning but the same is not true when a securitizing move is at play. It is essential in securitization that the wider audience view unity of effort against the perceived threat amongst the key actors. Any visible signs of lack of trust amongst the state organs involved in implementing the strategy devised against the imminent danger is likely to demean the securitizing move.

After six months of launching the military operation, the PM declared in a high level civil-military meeting reviewing the progress of Zarb-e-Azb, “peace has been restored as a result of this operation and it will contribute towards ensuring peace in the entire region.” 43 The PM praised the sacrifices rendered for the stability of Pakistan by the tribesmen who had to evacuate their homes to allow military operation to proceed unhindered, pledging to reconstruct the damaged property and infrastructure for the displaced persons. Within six months the results of this securitizing move were apparent, as the scope of military operations was expanded to

42 Rahman, “FATA: Beyond Military Operation.” 43 “Zarb-e-Azb Inflicted Fatal Blow on Terrorists: PM,” The Express Tribune, accessed January 15, 2016, http://tribune.com.pk/story/804568/zarb-e-azb-inflicted-fatal-blow-on-terrorists-pm/. 149

Khyber Agency of FATA to target militant sanctuaries there, after successful clearance of North Waziristan.

Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT) bimonthly report on civil-military relations in Pakistan noted some hairsplitting discourse developments, chiding the government regarding initiation of Operation Zarb-e-Azb. Firstly, it took the government a full year in office and four and a half month of dialogue with the terrorists to reach the conclusion about the inescapability of using military force to quash the spawning terrorist networks with the resolve of continuing till the elimination of terrorism from the country. Secondly, the announcement about launching of the armed forces was first made at the beginning of the operation by the military’s media wing, the Inter Service Public Relations (ISPR), stating: “on the direction of the government, the armed forces of Pakistan have launched a comprehensive operation (Zarb-e-Azb) against the foreign and local terrorists hiding in North Waziristan.” The federal government’s public relations caught up later when at a review meeting on 17 July 2014 in the Army’s General Headquarters (GHQ) the PM announced the complete nation’s backing for the armed forces fighting this battle for peace and stability in the country, emphasizing that the operation is meant to establish writ of the state.44

The PILDAT report highlighted certain tasks that the Government ought to address in the long term and in the short to medium term. In the long term, the most important task would be to develop a counter narrative against the militant’s concocted ideology and then make that counter narrative popular amongst the people. Secondly, Pak-Afghan border would need to be secured against infiltration and unauthorized movement. Lastly, FATA would have to be integrated into the country’s political system at par with other administrative constituencies. In the short to medium term, first and foremost task would be to take care of the large number of IDPs. Secondly, IDPs safe return and their (economic) rehabilitation after the military operation would be important to establish the writ of state in the affected areas. Lastly, a civil setup would have to

44 “Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan Monitor June 2014 to July 2014” (Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, July 2014), http://www.pildat.org/publications/publication/CMR/MonitorOnCivil- MilitaryRelationsinPakistan_June012014_July312014.pdf. 150

be developed to govern the terrorism affected FATA effectively, after achievement of the military objectives.

The ‘speech act’, as explained by Buzan, et al., in Security; A New Framework for Analysis, is a cardinal of the securitization move, where the existential threat is designated and special measures are sought with acceptance of a significant audience. It identifies the threat succinctly, with which the securitization move is associated by all and sundry, without necessarily using the term security. Institutionalization of security, according to Buzan, is dependent on the question that who can ‘do’ or ‘speak’ security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effects?45

In the securitization of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, the PM did not remain restricted to ‘writ of the state’ as his speech act in this move. Rather, he also identified with the IDPs very frequently and often reiterated that “the government would spend maximum funds for the IDPs, even if the amount is in billions or trillions,” directing to facilitate the IDPs in every respect.46 This was a clear example of multi-sectoral securitization within the overall move for a single objective, i.e., eliminating the menace of terrorism from the country. The political leadership of the country institutionalized security by successfully constructing the narrative or the speech act on an issue of vital national importance, under do-or-die conditions of national security, and achieved remarkable results.

It is noteworthy that societal security objectives were not being viewed purely in military terms. Rather the discourse was evolving around a comprehensive security solution to the problem, considering the administrative and economic nuances of security as well. Within the overarching concept of national security, the notion of societal security was being viewed through the lens of internal sovereignty (military), administrative security (political) and security of rehabilitation (economic).

An important function of national security is unchallenged writ over sovereign territories, which in this case was challenged by Violent Non State Actors (VNSAs). Although this

45 Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Security; A New Framework for Analysis, 27. 46 “Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan Monitor June 2014 to July 2014.” 151

challenge was not from an external aggressor, yet it invoked the military sector of national security because of the nature and magnitude of threat. As the foremost impact of this threat was on the physical security of the society as well as the security of the identity with which the society associates, the societal sector of national security was also invoked. The root cause of this threat lay in disenfranchisement of people and dysfunctional nature of the archaic political system in vogue in FATA. Since the security circumstances at hand were quite grim, the requirement of a holistic view of the issue led to the call for viewing the situation as a national security threat in the political sector. In this manner, the military, societal and political sectors of national security became securitized in this multi-sectoral securitization move called Zarb-e-Azb. The momentum of actions leading from this move were much swifter in societal and military sectors as compared to the political sector. The primary reason for this disparity was the nature of challenge, perceived to be much more direct in relation to the security of the society and the sovereignty of the territory than the challenge emanating from the dysfunction of the existing political system.

The editorial of DAWN appearing on 10 September 2015 titled Mainstreaming FATA, lucidly captured the main points of the discourse about the political security debate surrounding the Tribal Area’s constitutional status. The directly elected members of the National Assembly from FATA demanded that their political anomaly be ended by merging their areas with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province on the same lines as Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). Their suggestion carried much more significance than such calls by tribal maliks (leaders) and jirgas (committees). It is widely believed that “the region needs fundamental reforms that go far beyond anything proposed over the last decade.”47 The region has been a hotbed of religious extremism and its militant fallout due to the unequal status of the citizens of FATA. Its porous proximity to Afghanistan induces a tendency in successive governments of Pakistan to let it remain the buffer zone which was the intent of the British when FATA’s unequal administrative status was structured as such. However, now the discourse in Pakistan is vibrant about redeeming this political aberration, but so far it has not seen any direct securitization move aimed to give it a ‘normal’ political status on emergent basis.

47 Editorial, “Mainstreaming Fata,” September 10, 2015, http://www.dawn.com/news/1205923. 152

The strategies to deal with Taliban resurgence, being pursued by Afghanistan, Pakistan and the U.S., in the backdrop of the U.S. withdrawal in 2014, also impacted the discourse regarding Operation Zarb-e-Azb. The initial wake of Zarb-e-Azb developed much bonhomie amongst the three principal stakeholders. The U.S. appreciated Pakistan’s counterterrorism resolve and realized the necessity of negotiation with Taliban; Afghanistan, with a change in government, reached out to Pakistan in a fresh start; Pakistan appreciated the role of Afghan Government in reaching an ‘Afghan owned and Afghan led’ solution. According to Pakistan’s eminent diplomat, Maleeha Lodhi, a shift in Pakistan’s approach towards Afghanistan, dispelling impressions of an interventionist policy, accompanied Operation Zarb-e-Azb. Pakistan’s inclination towards a ‘Pashtun solution’ to the Afghanistan’s problem had changed for better towards an ‘Afghan solution’ to the Afghanistan problem. The military and the civil government were both displaying this policy shift by helping the Afghan Government’s High Peace Council to negotiate with the top Taliban commanders released in Pakistan. However, the post U.S. drawdown projection was dismal as commanders and warlords were “mustering arms and men and it could be only a matter of time that the country becomes embroiled in another civil war. More instability in Afghanistan inevitably means more instability in Pakistan.”48

The improved relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan continued its momentum due to the pragmatic approach of the new President of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani and the reconstituted resolve of PM Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan. The mutual support of both countries to each other in jointly fighting terrorism was considered the most important requirement for a better future. In January 2015, Wall Street Journal noted:49

Mr. Ghani's willingness to engage with Islamabad, and Pakistan's willingness to reciprocate, suggests a common understanding that the two countries need better cooperation if they are to defeat a determined and resilient enemy without NATO spearheading the effort.

48 Neha Ansari, “An Unstable Afghanistan: The Potential Impact of NATO’s Departure on Pakistan,” Journal of European Studies 31, no. 2 (December 2015): 114–33. 49 Con Coughlin, “A Tentative Alliance to Fight the Taliban; Islamabad and Kabul Are Realizing That Ultimate Responsibility for Defeating the Menace Rests with Them.,” Wall Street Journal (Online), January 1, 2015, sec. Opinion. 153

This tentative engagement was in fact quite fragile. Most of the terror attacks in Afghanistan or Pakistan were linked to terrorists operating on both sides and in the absence of conclusive investigation blames were thrown around randomly. Retaining political sensibility, whenever the blame-game kicked on, was hard on both sides. However, the criticality of the threat posed by the terrorists to their respective national security was evident, which helped to keep Pak – Afghan engagement afloat despite numerous hiccups.

Securitization of National Action Plan – December 2014

On 16 December 2014 terrorists from the TTP attacked Army Public School, Peshawar in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, killing more than 140 children and staff in the most barbaric manner. Operation Zarb-e-Azb was already six months into effect and this act of terrorism was claimed as revenge for the military operation. The attack shook the nation. Widespread social and political condemnation led to a unanimous call for stern action to root out the menace of terrorism using all possible means and methods. The vulnerability of the country to the vagaries of terrorism was never felt before to such a painful extent. The entire nation seemed ready to unitedly endorse the most extraordinary measures to deal with the full scope of terrorism laid bare by this atrocity. It was under such unusual circumstances that the political leadership securitized the nation-wide counterterrorism effort under the rubric of National Action Plan (NAP).

The debate around NAP began somberly on the very next day of the attack, i.e., 17 December 2014, during a meeting of the leaders of the parliamentary parties at the Governor’s House in Peshawar, the capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. The political leadership of the country ‘joined hands’ in solidarity and appointed a committee to work out an action plan for countering terrorism. The PM’s ‘speech act’ at the joint press conference was resolute. He announced that the plan would be submitted by the committee within a week and it will be discussed with all stake holders, including the army, before its implementation. The meeting also marked a thaw in the political standoff between PTI leader Imran Khan and PM Nawaz Sharif, who were in a logjam over persistent protests by PTI against electoral rigging in the 2013 parliamentary elections, going on for over four months. The PM declared that the government will not make any distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban, referring to an oft repeated

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accusation about partisanship in dealing with various shades of terrorists. He pledged to continue this ‘war’ with utmost resolve till elimination of the last terrorist. In an assertion of political supremacy, the PM stated that the political leadership will ‘own’ the war against terrorists and the NAP will be implemented in letter and spirit.50 The first step of this securitization move was prompt and effective, which helped to further galvanize public opinion against the pervasive radical Islamist terrorism ravaging the country.

In an emotional address in Urdu to the nation on 25 December 2014, the PM shared the grief of the bereaved families. He praised the courage of the students and their loved ones in bearing with this national tragedy and vowed to take revenge. Apprising about the marathon meeting held to prepare the outline of NAP, he shared its twenty salient decisions:51

1) Invoking a new ‘post-Peshawar identity’ of Pakistan, characterized by elimination of physical and ideological space for terrorism, extremism, sectarianism, and intolerance, the PM announced lifting of a self-declared moratorium on capital punishment.

2) Special military trial courts for speedy trial of terrorists.

3) Banning of all sorts of militant organizations and any armed groups.

4) National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) will be made potent and active.

5) Strong handed action against hate literature, newspapers and magazines.

6) The funding sources of terrorism will be strangulated.

7) Banned organizations will not be allowed to operate under pseudonyms.

8) Decision taken to constitute a special antiterrorism force.

9) Prevention of religious extremism and protection of minorities will be ensured.

10) Registration and regulation of religious seminaries is being organized.

11) Ban in print and electronic media on promotion of terrorists’ agenda.

50 Zulfiqar Ali, “Distinction between Good, Bad Taliban No More: PM,” December 18, 2014, http://www.dawn.com/news/1151550. 51 “PM Nawaz Sharif’s Address to the Nation on 25-12-2014,” December 25, 2014, http://www.pmo.gov.pk/pm_speeches.php. 155

12) IDPs return will be prioritized. Administrative and developmental reforms will be expedited in FATA.

13) Communication network of terrorists will be eliminated.

14) Measures being taken to curb terrorists’ activities on internet and social media.

15) Extremism will be tackled in every part of the country, including areas in Punjab.

16) The ongoing operation in Karachi will be taken to its logical conclusion.

17) In the greater interest of political reconciliation, the Government of Balochistan is being given complete mandate by all stakeholders.

18) Strict action is being taken against elements spreading sectarianism.

19) Along with the initial phase of Afghan Refugees registration, a comprehensive policy is being prepared for them.

20) In order to improve Provincial intelligence agencies’ access to terrorists’ communication networks and strengthen the counterterrorism agencies, the process of basic reforms in the criminal justice system is being expedited.

The ‘post-Peshawar’ identity of Pakistan was significantly poised in this twenty point description of the contours of NAP. The national response in this emergency was predicated on the identity debate by the PM himself and a comprehensive plan was formulated to secure that identity against the powers of religious extremism, militancy and intolerance. Delineating the societal identity whose security was sought through the NAP, the PM said: “A line has been drawn. On one side are the coward terrorists and on the other side stands the whole nation.” 52

On 2 January 2015, just a week after the PM’s address to the nation with the outline of NAP, a Multi-Party Conference (MPC), representing all the major political forces of the country, was held in Islamabad which unanimously consented to the proposed NAP. A clear case of securitization was underway with full public and legislative support, although laced with noticeable dissenting voices over some of the proposed constitutional amendments like establishment of military courts. The principal securitizing actor, i.e. the government, termed the

52 “Fight against Terrorism: Defining Moment,” The Express Tribune, December 25, 2014, http://tribune.com.pk/story/811947/fight-against-terrorism-defining-moment/. 156

MPC’s progress as ‘historic,’ with the Information Minister, Pervaiz Rashid declaring: “This day would be remembered in the country’s history.” He used the term ‘murderers’ to describe the Peshawar school attackers, possibly to stir a much stronger public response. ‘Terrorists’ are construed as violent actors with an agenda broader than the act of violence committed, whereas ‘murderers’ depict the perpetrators of a focused act of violence aimed only at the life of the victim. The language of this discourse became increasingly evocative and pointed, identifying the threat in very unambiguous manner, leaving no room for any nuanced interpretation of the enemy. The ‘us’ versus ‘them’ differentiation, revolving around the identity of a broader nation, which is arguably a difficult identification, was helped by some articulate annunciations by the government. Leader of the main opposition party, the PPP, and the former President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari, played a ‘leading role’ in the consensus that was reached over the NAP as acknowledged by the Information Minister, further strengthening the government’s discourse in this securitization move of historic significance. The Chief of Army Staff, who was also present at the MPC as part of the government’s security team, clarified that the Pakistan Army does not desire the special military courts “but they were needed due to extraordinary times.”53

The National Assembly debate that took place before acceptance of the 21st Constitutional Amendment encompassing the contours of NAP, which took place on 5 January 2015, is an important source to evaluate the government and the opposition’s construction of the discourse. It is translated from Urdu and examined in subsequent paragraphs.54

The Federal Interior Minister, Chaudhri Nisar Ali Khan, opened the parliamentary debate proclaiming the novelty of the discussion about undemocratic practices like the establishment of military courts in a vibrant democratic dispensation. He accepted that this constitutional amendment is seemingly at odds with democratic governance and till few years ago any discussion about amending the constitution to establish military courts would have been unthinkable. He elaborated on the ‘extraordinary’ circumstances with which Pakistan was faced which were not normal by any account as every segment of the country including the population, the institutions, the leadership, the opposition, and indeed each and every child is confronted

53 Dawn.com, “MPC Ends with National Consensus on NAP,” January 2, 2015, http://www.dawn.com/news/1154662. 54 “Pakistan National Assembly Debate on 21st Constitutional Amendment” (National Assembly of Pakistan, January 5, 2015), http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1421119900_258.pdf. 157

with a war-like situation. He termed the situation as a very complex phenomenon due to the complete disregard of the norms of war by the militants, who were targeting women, children and innocent people with impunity; the number of terrorism attacks with more than fifty fatalities were more than sixty in number only in the past twelve years. In total, more than forty thousand innocent people had lost their lives. He dilated at length about the other terrorism incidents with more number of causalities in different parts of the country including Peshawar, Karachi, Lahore, Quetta, and Islamabad. The barbarism perpetrated on the Hazara community and the attack on churches was also highlighted as indicative of an enemy with not even the remotest sense of civility. On the contrary, the Pakistan Army confronting that enemy has to abide by the constitution, Geneva Convention and our religious ideals, making it an uneven fight. He lambasted the atrocities committed by the militants in the name of Islam, like killing of innocent civilians in terrorist attacks and the kidnapping of children, elderly, and foreigners for ransom.

Nisar reiterated that the circumstances faced by the country are not normal, the country is facing a war situation, which warrants setting up of military courts. However, the Interior Minister made it clear that these courts are not meant to quickly hang a large number of suspected prisoners, which, he elaborated, has never been done by the Army despite a sizable number of suspected terrorists in custody at some designated internment centers. He cited Miranshah as an example of restraint, which was not ‘flattened to the ground’ despite recovery of huge caches of explosives from a large number of houses, in the initial weeks of Operation Zarb- e-Azb. Nisar went on to a great length to justify not only the requirement of military courts due to the inappropriateness of civil judicial system in the face of militant threats but also the fairness of military’s judicial process. He emphasized that military courts are only a small segment of the larger plan, which beckons the three important stakeholders, i.e., the federal government, the provincial governments and the Pakistan Army to work in unison for the desired ends.

Dr. Farooq Sattar, the parliamentary leader of Muttahida Qaumai Movement (MQM), an important political party in Karachi and Hyderabad, participated in the same parliamentary debate with appreciation for all the political forces which enabled the consensus on NAP. He delineated the Constitution of Pakistan as the identity around which the friend and the enemy should be decided and castigated the religious political parties for not playing their role in reducing intolerance and extremism by helping in the madrassah reforms. He reminded the house about his party’s unremitting opposition to ‘Talibanization’ of Pakistan since long and expressed 158

satisfaction about the realization in the political representatives across the board that this is Pakistan’s war. He lamented the delayed realization of this fact even when Pakistan had continuously been facing one terror act after another of alarming proportions, each one being an ‘extraordinary’ moment of its own significance, worthy of same reaction as displayed after the Peshawar attack. In the light of Sattar’s comments, it is worth noting how certain circumstances trigger spontaneous sentiment across the body politic of a society, prompting the securitizing actor to leverage the situation for justifying the extraordinary measures of securitization.

Maulana Fazl-ur-Rahman, leader of Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan – Fazlur Rahman Group (JUI-F), expressed his dissatisfaction over spoiling the image of madrassahs in the country-wide discussion about terrorism, while sharing his thoughts during the debate on 21st Constitutional Amendment in the parliament. He stated that the representative organizations of the madrassahs have always been cooperating with successive governments in sharing the details of their syllabi and were willing to organize their education system under special education boards. However, targeting the madrassahs in the narrative being built for the acceptance of 21st Constitutional Amendment was unfair and speculative because, in his opinion, no proven case of any madrassah students’ involvement in acts of terrorism has come to fore as yet. He also criticized the ambivalence displayed by the incumbent governments since 2001 in deciding about which side, the Taliban or the U.S., they wish to support. According to his views, the governments kept on supporting the U.S. war in Afghanistan as their own, whereas the people of Pakistan did not share the same conception, which created a clash of identities. He related the PML(N) Government’s ‘speech act’ in garnering support after the Peshawar attack, i.e., ‘either with us in fighting the war against terrorism or against us’ to the U.S. President George W. Bush’s 2001 similar ‘speech act’ in his campaign against terrorism after 9/11. Fazl-ur-Rahman termed it a case of confused identity; whether the government wants to follow the war led by the U.S. or fight its own war with its own identity.

Mahmood Khan Achakzai, leader of Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party from Balochistan, spoke about the extreme distress, under which his party was supporting this amendment to empower military courts in a democratic set up. The sunset clause, limiting the duration of these courts for two years, was the only consolation for him in this unfortunate step being taken due to the situational constraints. He raised concern about criminalizing of Pashtun identity, alleging arrest and blacklisting of thousands of Pashtuns ever since the beginning of Operation Zarb-e- 159

Azb, which would create a wedge between Pakistan Army and Pashtuns. Similarly, he warned against criminalizing the identity of the ‘mullah’ and the ‘madrassah student’, which would cause internal division in the society.

Sahibzada Tariqullah of Jamat-e-Islami (JI), member national assembly from Upper Dir, raised his objection about the use of Islamic identity to characterize the country’s terrorism issues, as drafted in the 21st Constitutional Amendment. He stated that this country was created in the name of Islam and stating that the terrorists are using the name of a religion or a sect to perpetrate their heinous acts would create anxiety amongst the common people. His party was of the view that the use of the word ‘religion’ in this amendment would create a negative identity of Islam in Pakistan and therefore this word should not be used in any way to identify the terrorists.

The two bills, 21st Amendment and Pakistan Army (Amendment), were adopted by the Parliament and the Senate on 6 January 2015 unopposed, with members from JUI(F) and JI abstaining. The objects and reasons given for the amendments in the bill were:

“An extraordinary situation and circumstances exist which demand special measures for speedy trial of offences relating to terrorism, waging of war or insurrection against Pakistan and prevention of acts threatening the security of Pakistan. There exists grave and unprecedented threat to the territorial integrity of Pakistan by miscreants, terrorists and foreign funded elements.”55 Chaudhri Nisar Ali Khan explained the motivations and the outline of the NAP during his visit to a Washington D.C. think tank on 18 February 2015.56 He described the ‘shock’ of the Peshawar attack as the trigger that sprung the government to move forward on a fast track, whereas historically there has been a divide between the civil and military on how the fight against terrorism should move forward. He credited the Sharif government for coordinating with the military, which was doing the counterterrorism operations, and engaging with the provincial governments, which were doing the policing. Dilating on the accusation of selective engagement by successive governments of certain militant groups like Lashkar-i-Taiba (LeT), and Haqqani Network (HN), he suggested to focus rather on the current intent and actions, which are categorically bipartisan and have been understood as such by the international community.

55 “Constitution (Twenty First Amendment) Act, 2015” (2015), http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1420547178_142.pdf. 56 “Nisar Ali Khan, Interior Minister of Pakistan, Outlines New Anti-Terror Plan,” United States Institute of Peace, accessed February 3, 2016, http://www.usip.org/publications/2015/02/20/pakistan-s-interior-minister-outlines-new- anti-terror-plan. 160

However, he acknowledged the bad state of affairs and warned against expectations of quick solutions while remaining optimistic about the government’s resolve.

The discourse about the securitization of NAP was also being shaped by scholarly debate on its pros and cons. In an insightful analysis, in April 2015, about three months after the inception of the NAP, Sheharyar Khan argued against the hasty adoption of the plan.57 He termed NAP an emotional reaction which does not substitute Pakistan’s need for a deliberate antiterrorism policy thus falling short of being a durable and meaningful solution to Pakistan’s complex terrorism issues. He also argued against giving extraordinary judicial powers to the military, which is likely to undermine civilian authority and democracy, besides diverting the army from core fighting functions to administrative tasks. He criticized and suggested caution in some of the actions being taken under NAP including the death penalty, refugees, madrassahs and lack of civil administration’s capacity, where his views are worth mentioning. Khan argued that the reinstatement of death penalty is a controversial step as it might increase terrorists’ retaliation, besides attracting opposition of human rights groups, European Union and the UN. Any perception of forceful eviction of Afghan Refugees in pursuance of the NAP would be detrimental to the soft image of Pakistan, towards which the hospitality extended to these refugees has contributed significantly. The issue of funding of madrassahs involves actors in foreign countries like Saudi Arabia, thus needing a careful handling. Lack of effective civil administration’s capacity in areas cleared by the military like North Waziristan and Khyber Agencies, will not allow the counterterrorism efforts of the military to be consequential. An interesting aspect of Khan’s analysis is his acceptance of the logic of the securitization move at work (in implementing the NAP) but he questions its utility due to the haste and shortsightedness of the process; a dichotomy which often characterizes such moves.

The International Crisis Group’s July 2015 report, Revisiting Counter-terrorism Strategies in Pakistan, was especially critical of the hasty approach taken in the NAP by the civil government, apparently for public consumption, foregoing its democratic and constitutional

57 M. Sheharyar Khan, “Review of National Action Plan: Challenges and Opportunities,” Pakistan Institute for Parliamentary Services Research Digest, April 2015, http://www.pips.gov.pk/downloadable_files/research_digest/2015/research_digest_apr_2015.pdf. 161

authority for the military.58 The report considered NAP to be a wish list rather than a strategy, not addressing the root causes of terrorism which reside in structural and governance reforms. The report portrayed the lifting of moratorium on death penalty and the establishment of military courts as “demands of the military,” which were implemented by the Sharif government. Here, social construction of the various facets of the securitization of NAP discourse can be seen in the way this report presents the military’s role in coercive perspective rather than consensual. The report suggested “little evidence of progress on many NAP targets.” Movement of banned groups, going after the Haqqani Network (HN) and the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT), and curbing the ‘charity fronts’ of proscribed outfits, being few of the shortcomings. Reforming and strengthening the criminal justice system, revoking the ‘concessions’ given to the military and revamping the counterterrorism strategy to be intelligence driven and civilian law enforcement (police) led, were the major recommendations of the report. The report neither took into account the urgency of the situation, as perceived by the government, nor recognized the lack of capacity of law enforcement agencies in Pakistan, falling short of appreciating the ‘securitization’ perspective of the situation, giving recommendations more suited for ‘normal’ circumstances.

In July 2015, the Supreme Court registered a scathing criticism of NAP terming it ‘a big joke’.59 Justice Jawwad S. Khawaja disparaged the progress shown by the government in the six months since the formulation of NAP, especially in reinvigoration of the National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA) and controlling the foreign funding of NGOs. As a part of the same bench, Justice Azmat Saeed and Justice Maqbool Baqir also urged the government to show seriousness towards implementation of the NAP.

Terrorism incidents on Shia Muharram processions in October 2015 evoked strong criticism of the NAP by the leading Shia political organization Majlis-i-Wahdat-i-Muslimeen (MWM).60 The MWM secretary general Allama Raja Nasir Abbas deplored government’s inaction to prevent attacks on Shia congregations, stating NAP cannot be trusted anymore.

58 “Revisiting Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Pakistan - Opportunities and Pitfalls” (International Crisis Group, Brussels, July 22, 2015), http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/271-revisiting-counter- terrorism-strategies-in-pakistan-opportunities-and-pitfalls.pdf. 59 Abdul Shakoor Khan, “NAP Is a Big Joke, Devised to Deceive Masses, Says Justice Khawaja,” Dawn, July 3, 2015, http://www.dawn.com/news/1192080. 60 “No Trust in NAP after Muharram Attacks: MWM,” Dawn, October 28, 2015, http://www.dawn.com/news/1215773. 162

Pakistan Army, one of the major stakeholders in NAP’s implementation, conveyed its dissatisfaction with the progress on NAP after its review in a high powered meeting on 11 November 2015, underlining the need for “matching and complementing governance initiatives.”61 The government reacted promptly by emphasizing the need of mutual reinforcement of various stakeholders in effective implementation of the NAP, “while remaining within the ambit of the constitution.”62 Dawn’s editorial commented on the same day that fighting the militants on the ground is far simpler than disrupting their support and financial mechanism, laying the blame on civil-military fault lines and “the fact that the wheels of the state – it’s very writ in fact – rarely touches the ground.”63 Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, the young chairman of the main opposition party, the PPP, also made NAP the focus of his political diatribe against the ruling party PML(N) on 28 December 2015. He alleged that NAP, which was agreed upon by all major political parties has been ‘disfigured’ and ‘being used for political victimization.’ He termed it to have become a ‘PML(N) Plan’, instead of a national action plan.64

Sensing the weakening of government’s discourse with regard to the NAP’s implementation progress, the Interior Minister bounced back with detailed statistics showing tangible progress in 15 out of the 20 points on the NAP’s agenda. He took an adroit approach by warning the opponents not to use the NAP for political point scoring, exhorting them to rise above politics in support of a national cause, as sensitive as the NAP.65 This was an interesting analogy for an issue already residing in the supra-political level. Hazards of a securitization move lay in weakening of the unremitting political support across the divide which, after almost a year since the passage of NAP, was visibly under strain from different quarters.

However, leaving the domestic squabbling aside, one year on, The Guardian noted that as a result of the actions taken by Pakistan in response to the Peshawar school attack, ‘the country is completely changed.’ The news report succinctly reflected the wider national sentiment in the emotional comments of a father, whose son had died in the Peshawar attack and who is also the

61 “Gen Raheel Stresses Need for Govt Cooperation to Counter Terrorism,” Dawn, November 10, 2015, http://www.dawn.com/news/1218775. 62 “Government to Continue Pursuing National Action Plan: Spokesperson,” The Express Tribune, November 11, 2015, http://tribune.com.pk/story/989493/government-to-continue-pursuing-national-action-plan-spokesperson/. 63 “NAP’s Patchy Progress,” Dawn, November 11, 2015, http://www.dawn.com/news/1218834. 64 “NAP Being Used for Victimisation: Bilawal,” Dawn, December 28, 2015, http://www.dawn.com/news/1229134. 65 “Terrorist Networks Broken, Facilitators yet to Be Eliminated, Says Nisar,” Dawn, December 30, 2015, http://www.dawn.com/news/1229679. 163

chairman of a group of affected parents: “There are no more bomb blasts, all the terrorists have left Pakistan now, and the country is changed completely because of the sacrifice of our children.”66

It was in the wake of another terrible attack on Bacha Khan University in Charsadda, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on 20 January 2016 that NAP once again sprang to the center of Pakistan’s counterterrorism discussion. The discourse about the effectiveness of its implementation drew extensive comments from the government, the opposition, and the civil society. The government kept up its position of reinforcing the discourse about implementation of the NAP at every level. During a meeting with the UK’s Director of National Security, one week after the dastardly attack on Bacha Khan University where four militants killed more than twenty students and staff during a daylight raid on the campus with scant security, the Chief Minister of Punjab and a key PML(N) leader reiterated satisfaction over the implementation of NAP.67

The discourse analysis of the NAP reveals that the momentum which was built around the development of consensus for adoption of the plan could not be sustained towards its implementation. Securitization of a critical political issue like the NAP behooves astuteness that was displayed by the government but over the course of its implementation the ‘momentum of urgency’ could not be carried through. The NAP can only bear the results of securitization, if it matures enough to sustain itself as a securitized issue in the military and societal security sectors of Pakistan’s national security.

Having seen the three prominent securitization moves, constructed upon the Pakistani national identity, it seems that Buzan’s reluctance to afford the ‘national’ identity to non-western states’ societal security securitization projects as discussed in the beginning of this chapter is not completely valid for Malakand Stabilization 2009, Operation Zarb-e-Azb 2014 and National Action Plan 2015. The social construction of these moves, as highlighted in the texts of the discourses, the discursive dynamics of the discourses, and the sociopolitical contexts of the discourses endorse the firm rooting of all three securitizing moves in the Pakistani identity.

66 Jon Boone, “Peshawar School Attack: One Year on ‘the Country Is Changed Completely,’” The Guardian, December 15, 2015, sec. World news, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/16/peshawar-school-attack-one- year-on-the-country-is-changed-completely. 67 “Fighting Terrorism : ‘National Action Plan Being Implemented Effectively,’” The Express Tribune, January 28, 2016, http://tribune.com.pk/story/1035373/fighting-terrorism-national-action-plan-being-implemented-effectively/. 164

Here, we move on to the next chapter of the study where few cases of potential securitization moves in the economic and environmental sectors of Pakistan’s security will be explored.

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CHAPTER 6

SECURITIZATION OF ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY ISSUES

Economic Security

In the multi-sectoral conception of national security, the economic sector is perhaps the most nebulous towards securitization. “Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power.” 1 However, the concept of security may be misused in the name of regional development, generating employment opportunities, or pork barrel politics, but there may not be an attempt to securitize because the full sequence from existential threat to extraordinary measures would be seldom present. Military security can be comparatively easily understood in terms of amity and enmity, whereas economic security is much more blurred, with the states vying for joint gains in an interdependent economic system. While securitized issues in other sectors like the political, military, societal and environmental are often anchored in the economic sector, economic issues themselves are seldom securitized within the economic sector due to four main reasons.2

First, from amongst the three levels at which economic security may be considered, i.e., global, state and individual, the state is likely to be the most effective level for securitization in the economic sector. Although as a securitizing actor, the state has its limitations within the International Political Economy (IPE) on raising alarm over its economic issues beyond the ‘normal’ politics. However, at the individual level of analysis in poor countries, food security or human security being existential threats can be securitized but there will be few actors motivated enough to securitize those issues effectively.

Second, the Liberal International Economic Order (LIEO) is based on free flow of goods and services across the globe within the scope of World Trade Organization (WTO) and is inherently competitive in trade, finance and production, which is going to produce winners and losers. In liberal democracy, it is normal for the loser states to resolve their technical problems,

1 Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era, 19–20. 2 Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Security; A New Framework for Analysis, 97–110. 166

or at best, politicize those technical problems to seek quicker results, but securitization of those issues, which disturbs international trade and commerce, is not expected. Although, LIEO accepts economic insecurity in few places as the price of overall economic efficiency,3 however making an issue ‘securitized’ in the economic sector is problematic.

Third, the increased integration and liberalization of world economy often creates complex management problems in free flow of goods and services, trade barriers, unequal trade relations and manipulation in supply of sensitive commodities, which often leads to international friction, best resolved by ‘normal’ politics and not securitization. Any state’s economy can be described as either good or bad but not in terms of existence of that state or its national economy, hence such issues remain within the realm of ‘normal’ politics. In order to mitigate threats to economic security at systems level, the increasingly internationalized world economy has produced security guarantors like the the IMF, World Bank, WTO, and monetary cum political unions like the EU, besides the independent and well linked central banks of the states.

Fourth, international concerns about stability of the LIEO and domestic concerns about income inequality are frequent but those often spillover in the political, military and societal sectors, rather than remaining confined to the economic sector alone. Economic policy failures may result in runaway inflation, widespread poverty, state institutions’ insolvency, military insufficiency, infrastructure deficiency and high unemployment, but results of such failures will undermine security in the political, military, societal and environmental sectors. The economic security agenda cannot remain isolated from the other sectors.

The economic security agenda (or threats) at the state level, as adapted from Buzan et al. (1998), taking into account the spillover possibilities into the other sectors of security, would largely comprise:4

 Fear of inability to develop and sustain defense capability for maintaining the external and internal security, which is dependent upon a sound national economy; likely spillover into the political and military security sectors.

3 John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, eds., The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 4th ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), eBook, 472-473. 4 Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Security; A New Framework for Analysis, 98, 116. 167

 Fear of economic dependencies in terms of external supplies of finance, investment and commodities, which can be exploited politically; likely spillover into the political security sector.

 Fear of inequalities in globalization due to its inherent competition, which can polarize both, the state and society; likely spillover into the political, societal and environmental security sectors.

 Fears of unbridled trading that may result in illegal trade; likely spillover into the societal security sector.

In the above framework, the first part of this chapter would explore the discussion about Pakistan’s economic security and its fallout in other sectors as gleaned from discourse analysis of some prominent topics in the national economic debate.

Fear of (under)Development and Sustenance of Defense

Only a strong economy can provide for a strong defense, enhancing a country’s power, defined in one manner as the ability to influence the behavior of others according to one’s aims and objectives. A strong economy would ensure strong defense and not vice versa. Economic backwardness generates violence, social conflicts, and political turmoil, weakening national security, whereas a strong economy ensures political and social stability, in turn making the economy more strong.

A similar linkage is posited between Pakistan’s national economy and its national security by the eminent Pakistani economist, Dr Ashfaque Hasan Khan in a presentation on “Pakistan’s Economy and National Security” at Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) on 17 March 2015.5 He argued that the slow economic growth and the large fiscal deficit leading to rising public debt and balance of payment difficulties has led to the loss of financial and economic sovereignty for Pakistan due to bailouts and grants. Khan emphasized strong linkages between the economy and national security, highlighting a chain of causation running from the economy to defense to national security, due to which a weak economy means unsustainable defense and unpredictable national security. He cited the global food and fuel

5 Ashfaque H Khan, “Pakistan’s Economy and National Security” (Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, March 17, 2015), http://www.pide.org.pk/pdf/Economic%20Performance%20and%20National%20Security.pdf. 168

crisis of 2007-2008, the global economic recession of 2009-2010, the intensification of ‘war on terror’ and fiscal indiscipline as the prominent reasons of Pakistan’s difficult situation, which resulted in:

 Weakened economic institutions like Ministry of Finance, State Bank of Pakistan, Planning Commission and all the Regulatory Bodies, namely, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA), National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) and Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA).

 Slow economic growth to an average of 3.0% per annum over the last six years from an average of almost 7.0% per annum during the previous five years (2002- 07).

 Less investment, down to 50 years low at 12.5% of GDP.

 Low domestic saving rate at 5.8% of GDP.

 Slow large scale manufacturing growth, averaged at 0.7% per annum, slowed to 2.6% in July – December 2014 compared to 6.5% in the same period in 2013.

 High budget deficit, averaged at 7% of GDP, which reached as high as 8.8% in 2012-13.

 High public debt, tripled in six years from Rs. 5 trillion in 2007 to Rs. 15 trillion in 2013.

 Addition of over $25 billion external debt in 6 years.

 Reduced foreign investment from $8.5 billion in 2007 to $1.6 billion in 2013.

 Persistent double digit inflation for more than 50 months in a row.

 Lost value of Pakistani Rupee by 42% since 2007.

 High levels of poverty and unemployment.

 Annual support of Rs 400 billion for the ailing Public Sector Enterprises (PSEs) like Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), Oil and Gas

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Development Corporation (OGDC), Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIA), Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation (PSM), and other smaller entities.

 Subsidy of Rs 2000 billion given to the Power sector in last five years.

 Massive shortfall in revenue even after additional tax measures.

 Slow industrial growth at 2.6%.

 Reduced level of exports, by 4.5% during July – January 2014-15, and down by 13% in February 2015.

This snapshot of Pakistan’s economic predicament, and its emphasized linkage to national security, gives an idea of how the development and sustenance of defense is dependent upon a sound economy. While the national economy is least likely to be securitized in the economic sector, its ‘spillover’ effect, i.e., the development and sustenance of defense, is a most likely issue for securitization in the military sector. Consequently the effects of securitization in the military sector spill over into the economic sector, especially its developmental concerns. Pakistan’s often slashed allocations of the Public Sector Developmental Program (PSDP) under budgetary pressure is a pertinent example. This has been seen historically in Pakistan with every government pledging to fulfill the defense needs of the country during annual budget at the cost of ‘other’ expenditures like the developmental or the social sector spending allocations.

There is usually a strong link between the economic and national security policies in developing countries. National security is often a critical component of a developing country’s economic planning. The national security concerns influence social sector economic development because allocations made from scarce resources to meet the national security threats affects the timings, scope and trajectory of those developmental projects. National security also plays a significant role in determining the geographical location and ownership of those capital intensive projects that are important to the military, along with the choice of technology employed in those projects.6

6 Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, eds., “Economic Development and National Security,” in National Security in the Third World (Cambridge: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 1988), 136–51. 170

However, the relationship between defense and economic development is not always negative. An eminent economist argued the positive contribution of defense programs for three major reasons:7

First, and most important, military training has provided the recruits with ‘tools’ that ultimately make them more productive workers when they enter the civilian labor force. Second, military infrastructure outlays, like airports and roads, often served civil functions as well. Finally, Third World militaries often provided many civic functions in the areas of education and healthcare… The end result is that military spending has not necessarily detracted from economic growth in civilian sectors.

In case of Pakistan, the heavy defense industry grew along with the growth of the military, in order to support the diverse armament requirements of the armed forces and to meet other strategic defense needs. Pakistan Ordnance Factories, Heavy Industries Taxila, National Defense Complex, Air Weapons Complex, Khan Research Laboratories, Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science & Technology, Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, and Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works are some examples of heavy industrial growth in different fields of defense manufacturing, which also contributed to the overall ‘civilian’ economic development.

The relationship between defense, economy and national security of Pakistan is a product of the external threat from India, allocation of sufficient funds for defense and economic performance to meet the defense needs. Anwar and Rafique (2012) conducted structured interviews of fifty defense and economic experts in the public sector and academia to explore the verbal discourse around defense spending, economic growth and orientation of Pakistan’s national security. The response to three of those questions is relevant to this study.8

First: Is Pakistan’s defense spending a major hurdle for its economic growth? Out of the respondents, 58% did not agree with this notion, arguing that defense spending is necessary in view of the threats faced, to maintain the balance of power in the region and to restore peace internally to enhance economic growth. 42% of the respondents favored the proposition, arguing

7 Azar and Moon. 8 Muhammad Azfar Anwar and Zain Rafique, “Defense Spending and National Security of Pakistan: A Policy Perspective,” Democracy and Security 8, no. 4 (October 2012): 374–399, doi:10.1080/17419166.2012.739551. 171

that if Pakistan wants to increase the pace of its economic growth, it should invest more in social sector because the major cause of local conflicts is economic.

Second: On what basis should Pakistan develop its national security policy? 54% of the respondents advocated ‘internal security and regional trade & cooperation’ as the preferred basis of developing the national security policy; stabilizing internal security situation to boost investment and developing relationship with India through trade and regional cooperation. 31% preferred ‘internal security and domestic economic performance’, while 15% preferred ‘external security and domestic economic performance’. The predominant view supported pivoting the national security around improving domestic security environment and engagement with India but still 46% of the respondents considered improvement in domestic economic performance as the basis of formulating the national security policy.

Third: What should be the preferred element of security to develop Pakistan’s national security policy? Majority supported economic security (41%), followed by social security (22%), military security (19%), environmental security (11%) and cyber security (7%). These views were summarized by the authors in the recommendation that:

“Policymakers should not develop national security policies with the perceived threats but through the common concern of citizens who seek security from war, religious extremism, economic disparities, and social injustice.” Defense expenditure is an opportunity cost (the loss of potential gain from other alternatives when one alternative is chosen) in the balancing act of Pakistan’s economic policy; a vital one, due to the national security implications of sustaining the required defense capability. The Government of Pakistan from 1980-2012 spent on an average 0.75% on health, 0.54% on education, 4.30% on development and 4.88% on defense (Economic Survey of Pakistan 2012, 2013). Haseeb et al. used a time series statistical model using data from 1980 – 2012 to find out if there is a long term relationship between defense expenditure, development expenditure, inflation, and savings on economic growth.9 The results showed two variables out of four to be significant, i.e., defense expenditure and savings. Pakistan’s defense expenditure is negatively related, while savings is positively related with GDP growth. For every 1 percent increase in

9 Muhammad Haseeb et al., “The Macroeconomic Impact of Defense Expenditure on Economic Growth of Pakistan: An Econometric Approach,” Asian Social Science 10, no. 4 (January 26, 2014), https://doi.org/10.5539/ass.v10n4p203. 172

defense expenditure, the decrease in GDP growth is 0.57 percent, whereas for every 1 percent increase in savings, the increase in GDP growth is 0.73 percent. The study also concluded that the negative impact of defense spending on economic growth cannot be used as macroeconomic stabilizer.

Military Keynesianism (pejorative - politicians’ supporting increased military spending to increase growth, as proposed by Keynes, but neglecting the rest of the principles of Keynesian economics) has its roots in research, both in favor and against it. The favorable opinion views military expenditures as guarantee of peace, security and welfare, and harbinger of increased purchasing power, improvements in human and physical capital and technological benefits, all of which contribute towards economic growth. The unfavorable opinion regards defense expenditure as a wasteful endeavor, giving back to the economy much less than what it takes, reducing savings and lessening opportunity for private investment. However, researchers have also found that defense expenditure has neither positive nor negative effect on growth. Hussain et al.’s study on relationship between defense expenditure, inflation, foreign direct investment (FDI), public spending on education, and GDP per capita with respect to poverty in Pakistan concluded: 1) Defense expenditure is not pro-poor, both in short and long term. 2) Inflation adds to poverty in both short and long term but its results are less significant in the short term. 3) Public expenditure on education alleviates poverty in both, short and long term. 4) GDP per capita has significant and positive impact on poverty in the long run but negative impact in the short term. 5) Population growth rate has negative and significant impact on poverty, both in short and long term. 6) FDI has positive and significant impact on poverty in the long run, but not in the short term. 7) GDP’s impact is negative and significant, both in short and long terms. The study acknowledged that “the prevalent geostrategic situation in the region may not favor to reduce the defense expenditure drastically, but its prudent allocation and utilization can be argued”.10

The discourse reveals ‘spilling over’ of the economic security agenda into the other sectors of security. The strengthening of defense by means of making the economy strong enough to bear the share of defense needs is advocated, while at the same time large allocations

10 Fiaz Hussain, Shahzad Hussain, and Naila Erum, “Are Defense Expenditures Pro Poor or Anti Poor in Pakistan? An Empirical Investigation,” Pakistan Development Review 54, no. 4, Part II (Winter 2015). 173

to the defense sector by the economy is derided as the source of economic insecurity for the poor. There appears a socially constructed tension in the two opposing identities, i.e., ‘defense’ and ‘development’, the former is also termed ‘security of state’ and the later, ‘security of people’. While arguments may fluctuate in favor and against the defense expenditure in Pakistan but the need for the economy to improve, in order to improve the overall allocations to social sector, is a constant theme in the discourse. However, despite the criticism, no securitization move is discerned in the economic development and sustenance of defense capability debate. Remaining shy of attempting securitization, actors in the civil society and academia remain vigilant on the detriments of a poorly performing economy on the country’s ability to provide sufficiently for the defense needs. The spectre of a gaping hole in the national security due to poor macroeconomic indicators often reverberates the economic security discourse.

In an op-ed in The News on 20 December 2015, Raashid Wali Janjua recalled an article by Bret Stephens in the Wall Street Journal of 16 December 2008, “Let’s buy Pakistan Nukes,” which suggested a Shylock-like arrangement to make Pakistan surrender its nuclear weapons in exchange for a ‘dole’ of $100 billion and an assumed US nuclear security umbrella. Janjua feared Galtung’s structural imperialism might work against Pakistan through the economic sector. He highlighted that the addition to Pakistan’s external debt from 2000-07 was only $3.7 billion, whereas from 2008-15 it was a startling $24.859 billion. Similarly, the addition to domestic debt from 2000-07 was Rs 1.796 trillion, whereas from 2008-15 it was Rs 13.0 trillion. At the end of the year 2015, the external debt stood at an alarming $65.183 billion, which, predicted at an annual growth rate of five percent, would be $81.9 billion by 2018-19. At that juncture, Janjua fears, the high debt servicing figure might become unsustainable and a default scenario would haunt the national security.11 Continuing the same storyline, Ashfaque H. Khan reinforced the alarming proportion which the external debt is likely to assume in future, posing not only “direct consequences for national security, but also a threat to the macroeconomic stability and hence to growth, employment generation and poverty.12

11 Rashid Wali Janjua, “Pakistan’s Greek Moment,” The News, December 20, 2015, http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/83125-Pakistans-Greek-moment. 12 Ashfaque H Khan, “Rising Debt: A Threat to National Security,” Blue Chip Quarterly, January 21, 2016, http://www.bluechipmag.com/index.php/governance-234/213-rising-debt-a-threat-to-national-security. 174

Fear of Economic Dependencies

The legacy of Pakistan’s democratic and constitutional anticolonial struggle naturally tilted its foreign policy after independence towards western liberalism against the expanding post World War II influence of communism. The two champions of the ‘free world’, the U.S. and the U.K., became a favorable choice for the country’s leadership to seek a developmental partnership for the nascent nation confronted with numerous economic challenges. As early as 7 September 1947, Jinnah clearly annunciated: “Pakistan is a democracy and communism does not flourish in the soil of Islam. It is clear therefore that our interests lie more with the two great democratic countries, namely, the U.K. and the U.S.A., rather than with Russia.” On 11 September 1947 during another cabinet meeting Jinnah posited a resurging “Great Game” in the Cold War where Russia was backing Afghanistan in her anti-Pakistan stance of stoking communal claims in the North West Frontier Province. He added, “It is significant to note that Russia alone of all the great countries has not sent a congratulatory message on the birth of Pakistan.”13 The tilt was visibly on the resonance of common political ideologies but economic assistance was an important underlying assumption for the cash strapped Pakistan, struggling with an unfair distribution of assets at the time of its birth. Soon thereafter, Mir Laik Ali, a close associate of the Finance Minister, Ghulam Mohammed, was dispatched to Washington to obtain a sizable loan in order to meet the defense and economic development needs of Pakistan for the next five years. The request resulted in a US $ 10 million relief grant from the War Assets Administration, which was received with dejection by Pakistan as it had much higher expectations. The Foreign Minister, Zafrulla Khan declared that the “well known friendship of Pakistan towards the U.S. and Pakistan’s obvious antipathy to the Russian ideology would seem to justify serious consideration by the U.S. Government of the defense requirements of Pakistan.” 14 Later on, as the Korean War broke out, the U.S. tried to convince Pakistan into providing troops for the U.N forces to be deployed in Korea but the offer was turned down by Pakistan due to the Indian threat, linking it to security guarantees from the U.S. against India, which was not accepted by the U.S.15

13 Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947 - 2000 (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2001), 20. 14 Kux, 21. 15 Kux, 38. 175

Pakistan’s relentless pursuit of seeking military help from the U.S. was marked by a series of ups and downs in the diplomatic parleys between the two countries in the early 50s. Within one year of President Eisenhower’s incumbency, and with the support from a favorably inclined Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, Pakistan’s desperate attempts at seeking U.S. economic assistance for security came to fruition when a military assistance deal was concluded with the U.S. in February 1954. Pakistan’s persuasive argumentation and reasoning to seek economic cum military assistance was a case of securitizing an economic need in politico- military terms. During a meeting with Dulles in May 1953, the Commander in Chief of Pakistan Army, General Muhammad Ayub Khan asserted the threat of Soviet Union descending through the Central Asian passes to reach the ‘warm waters’ of Arabian Sea, eliciting arming of Pakistan Army as the only way to stop the Soviet invasion. Ayub declared that Pakistan “under the present Government is extremely anxious to cooperate with the United States.” The U.S. was perceived as the sole provider of both the funds and the arms that were essentially needed to secure the country. In the larger strategy, the support to Pakistan was meant to form a ‘northern tier’ of defense, along with Turkey, to protect the Middle East against the threat from Soviet Union. New Delhi vociferously protested the military support to Pakistan but was placated by the U.S. assurance that the military assistance provided to Pakistan would not be used for aggression against India.16

The long sought acquiescence of the U.S. to provide arms to Pakistan and help build its armed forces was considered a critical economic breakthrough achieved by the foreign policy. Pakistan’s economic encumbrances in the initial years had prevented it from allocating sufficient resources for building defense capabilities to match the visualized threat from a hostile India. As the thread of Pakistan’s support in defense against the communist threat was weaved through the discourse over the years, economic and military assistance to Pakistan was its natural corollary that remains discernable in the texts.

There appears an interesting pattern in the disbursement portfolios offered to Pakistan; most of the grants offered in between 1950-55, while loans constituted a bigger share of aid from 1955-60. In the next five years, “large loans with high interest rates and increasingly harsh

16 Kux, 55–63. 176

conditions completely mortgaged the country.”17 The geopolitical requirements of Western governments dictated the pattern and characteristic of lending, which shifted from grants to loans and then culminated in complete shut off following the 1965 Indo-Pak war. The pattern continued in future as well, with aid remaining substantial when Pakistan was perceived as a ‘frontline state’ and reduced considerably otherwise. Aasim Akhtar argues that while military and economic aid has always been used to advance the political objectives of the donor, its form – military or economic – makes little difference as aid would always reflect ‘imperialism’s territorial logic of power,’ contending that “the direct result of this has been the consolidation of oligarchic domination within Pakistan.”18

Owing to the existential threat being faced by the fledgling country, the ‘oligarchic’ political leadership was not overly concerned about the threat to economic security which the external financial inflow in the shape of loans and grants would create in the long term. A debilitating economic dependence was accepted, which was to threaten the security in the economic sector in future as seen in the discourse analysis in the earlier part of this chapter related to the sustainability of defense. Over the years, this dependence was accepted as the opportunity cost of dealing with more urgent and stark challenges in the political and military sectors of security. Here we see manifestation of Buzan et al.’s assertion about the economic sector of security being too intertwined with other sectors of security, thereby spilling over its agenda into the political and military sectors, without ever creating a securitizing situation on economic reasoning or speech act.

In the five decades of foreign economic assistance from 1950 – 2001, Pakistan received US $ 73.1 billion from bilateral and multilateral sources, almost 30 percent of which came from the U.S.19 As the U.S. aid began in the 50s and 60s, it was well balanced between socioeconomic development programs and military assistance, as was seen in the massive infrastructure projects like the construction of Tarbela Dam and the effective reconstitution of the armed forces. However, after the Soviet invasion of 1979 the relationship of aid vis-à-vis expectations of both

17 Anita M. Weiss and Saba Gul Khattak, eds., “Dependency Is Dead: Long Live Dependency,” in Development Challenges Confronting Pakistan (Sterling, Virginia: American Institute of Pakistan Studies, 2013), 47. 18 Weiss and Khattak, 47. 19 S. Akbar Zaidi, “Who Benefits From US Aid to Pakistan?,” Policy Outlook (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 21, 2011), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Pakistan_Aid_Full_Text.pdf. 177

the U.S. and Pakistan from each other became more complicated, which turned worse in the aftermath of 9/11 and is still continuing to affect the relationship. In the complex political maneuvering of both the U.S. and Pakistan, spanning over the past three and half decades, Pakistan’s fear of economic dependencies repeatedly spilled over in the political sector of security because of what David Harvey (2003) calls the imperialistic agenda in U.S. economic and military assistance.

According to Harvey, the U.S. provided economic and military protection for propertied classes or political / military elites wherever they happened to be. In return these propertied classes and elites typically centered on pro-American politics. This implied military, political, and economic containment of the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. …While it was accepted that frontal confrontation with the Soviet empire was impossible, every opportunity was seized to undermine it – a policy that led into some disasters as the U.S. supported the rise of the Mujahedeen and Islamic fundamentalism in order to embarrass the Soviets in Afghanistan, only to have to suppress the Mujahedeen’s influence later in a war against terrorism based in Islamic fundamentalism.20

The massive decline in U.S. aid post-Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, which affected Pakistan diplomatically and put pressure on the political circumstances internally, is an example of the fear of economic dependence that often manifests in the other sectors of security. The situation arose with the Pressler Amendment in 1989 that required the U.S. President to certify that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons. President George H.W. Bush’s refusal to do so led to the U.S. developmental assistance falling “from US $ 452 million in 1989 to 1 percent of that in 1998 on account of the sanctions imposed by the United States.”21

Another example is the debate surrounding the Kerry-Lugar-Berman aid program, which committed US $ 7.5 billion to Pakistan in 2009 over a five year period but demanded accountability of the Pakistani military and constrained the uses of the U.S. funds. In the shadow of the ‘war on terror,’ the intense party politics in Pakistan was significantly affected by the issues of accommodating international aid. When the U.S Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton arrived in Pakistan in October 2009 at the heels of the Presidential signing of the Kerry-Lugar-

20 David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 52. 21 Zaidi, “Who Benefits From US Aid to Pakistan?” 178

Berman Bill, pledging US$ 7.5 billion in non-military democratic developmental assistance over a 5 year period, she was expecting an acknowledgment of close bilateral cooperation in jointly fighting terrorism. Instead:

“Clinton found … a seething military establishment distressed by U.S aid conditionality … a hostile political environment sharply divided along specific partisan (PPP vs. PML-N) lines, an educated middle class profoundly suspicious of American activities … and an impoverished majority still groaning under the weight of entrenched “traditional” elites.”22 Immediately thereafter in the aftermath of the devastating floods of 2010 in Pakistan the U.S. figured out as the largest donor providing more than US $ 400 million in humanitarian assistance. It significantly raised the image of the U.S. in Pakistan; perhaps one of the few positive manifestations of economic dependence. Though, an improvement in the positive manifestations of aid is always an underlying desire. At the U.S. - Pakistan Strategic Dialogue meeting held in Washington D.C in October 2010, the U.S. Administration announced a five year US $ 2 billion military assistance package from 2012 – 16, besides transferring US $ 600 million in December 2010 as part of regular compensations for the war expenditures. Rakisits considered that:

“While this will certainly help combat extremism, … it will go some way to compensate for what Secretary of State Hillary Clinton refers to as the ‘trust deficit’ between the two countries accumulated over many years of disappointment in the bilateral relationship.” 23

The massive financial inflows from the U.S. as compensation for ‘war on terror’ expenditures comprising the Coalition Support Fund, the counterinsurgency fund and the counterterrorism capacity building fund,24 also increased economic dependence. The fear of this economic dependence for Pakistan is visible in the U.S. demands for specific counterterrorism results in return for the aid provided, with accusations varying from non-compliance to

22 Matthew J. Nelson, “Pakistan in 2009: Tackling the Taliban?,” Asian Survey 50, no. 1 (February 2010): 112–26, https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2010.50.1.112. 23 Claude Georges Pierre Rakisits, “Pakistan’s Twin Interrelated Challenges: Economic Development and Security,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 66, no. 2 (April 2012): 139–54, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2011.646482. 24 Susan B. Epstein and K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance,” CRS Report for Congress (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2013), http://search.proquest.com/openview/a36e42bdac237a443d2fe0b5ceef0cee/1?pq-origsite=gscholar. 179

corruption and duplicity. Thus, matters of the economic sector of national security, which is essentially the requirement of external finances to fulfill the revenue shortfalls and meet the expenditure, induced insecurity in the political and military sectors of Pakistan’s national security.

Fear of Inequalities in Globalization

Globalization has economic, sociopolitical, cultural and environmental facets to it, manifesting a complex political interplay at the world stage with ramifications for ‘national security’ of bigger and smaller international players alike. In the context of globalization, the role played by economic security in the geopolitical arena, also referred to as ‘geo-economics,’ assumes greater significance. In international relations, geo-economics often manifests prominently as the central theme governing relationships between states and regions.

As the developing world begins to compete for resources with the developed world, the divide is no longer between the East and West but between the North and South. This divide, whether termed digital, cultural or economic, is bound to sharpen with greater pressure on developing countries in the form of restrictions and conditionality. The developed world is seen to institute more and more protective measures especially in the areas of knowledge and technology in order to retain supremacy.25

As part of the framework identified for economic security in the beginning of the first part of this chapter, the fear of inequalities in globalization are being discussed here, but these economic security fears are likely to spill over into the political, societal and environmental sectors of national security in their broader contexts. Here we propose some significant apprehensions in the context of globalization worth considering for their impact on national security: global egalitarianism, profits’ equity, national interests, global vulnerabilities, protectionism, and cultural erosion.

First, let’s consider the desire of global egalitarianism that is expected to emanate from globalization by the less developed countries, which often remains unfulfilled. The scale of equal opportunities remains tilted in favor of developed countries rather than being equal for the developed and developing ‘partners’ in globalization. The rising tide of global economic uplift

25 Sujeet Samaddar, Defence, Development and National Security (New Delhi: Gyan, 2005), 50. 180

resulting from globalization of economy is expected to ‘lift all boats’ but this seldom happens equally. Raw materials, semi-skilled force and poor governance of developing countries would always weigh-in lightly against high processing capability and capacity, highly skilled work force and good governance of the developed states. This perception of inequality would induce fear in the political sector of a developing or under developed state’s security conception.

Next, is the equity in profits, which is more likely to be perceived as unjust by the developing countries in their uneven business partnerships with the developed countries. This fear is likely to trigger a response in the economic sector of security to ‘secure’ legitimate equity in profits by way of regulation, which at times may not conform to global commitments like the World Trade Organization (WTO), hence resulting in a tension.

Next consider the security of global interests, for example, freedom of navigation in high seas, supply of oil at a desired price, business opportunities in distant continents, and non- militarization of space. Great powers interests are likely to collide in the pursuit of such interests, which might appear global in nature but are often a source of friction, for example, the colliding U.S. – China interests in the South China Sea over freedom of navigation and in continental Africa and South America over expanding business opportunities. At times, globalization tends to pit bigger and smaller states’ interests against each other, which induces fear in the smaller states leading to protectionism. For example, in the globalized oil market the falling oil prices harm the interests of most of the oil producing countries but advances the interests of the consumer countries, which produces a tension that could lead to fear on both sides, if the interests are harmed beyond a certain threshold.

Next comes the fear of global vulnerabilities like climate change, outbreak of disease, mass migration and food insecurity, which is differently perceived and responded by different countries based on their national priorities. In the backdrop of the much trumpeted virtues of globalization, such vulnerabilities lead to extreme fears by the affected or likely to be affected states that manifests in the political and societal sectors of security. As Europe braces to slow down war-led migration, and shut it down completely in some cases, the societal and political sectors of the refugees countries’ national security would tend to become fearful of such policies, deeming those to be inhuman and unjust in a so-called ‘globalized’ world.

181

Next, consider the protection of domestic competencies in the face of global competitiveness. For example, the jobs of assembly and manufacturing of low end products would not remain competitive in the U.S. when compared to the advantages offered in those processes in China due to a cheap labor force. Conversely, the U.S. would not like to share the technology of high end manufacturing with China, exploiting its research and development expertise to retain competitiveness in superior know-how. Hypothetically, this situation would create fear of inequality in the U.S. labor market of Chinese exploitation of cheap work force and in the Chinese industry of the U.S. protecting its advanced engineering designs.

Lastly, consider the fear of cultural erosion of native cultures as conceived by domestic constituencies in developed and developing countries alike. The developing and developed countries, both loathe to see their centuries old traditions in dress, food, music, clothing and societal norms of behavior erode against the cultural advancement of alien customs. For example, the perceived fear of ‘Islamophobia’ in the West and ‘Macdonald culture’ in the East undermine the political and societal sectors of security as a result of globalization, which is being pursued to strengthen the economic security.

Globalization was a boon for the trade and investment of developing countries. Their imports and exports grew to 70% of their GDP in 2013 from 44% in 1985, the inflow of FDI grew to 31% of their GDP in 2013 from 14% in 1985, while the outflow of FDI grew from 3% to 19%. More significantly, globalization presented developing countries with the opportunity of diversifying away from resource and labor-intensive production, enabling increased participation in more dynamic industries which contributed into the higher value sectors of world economy. For example, developing countries acquired more than 70% of the trade in parts and components, which comprised higher than 50% of the growth in manufactured exports of the world. In the services sector, the share of developing countries rose from 20% in 1985 to 30% in 2013.26

On the whole the economic growth of developing countries has been much faster in the world economy, amongst whom the major exporters of manufactured goods grew fastest. The opportunities of globalization were most successfully seized by the East Asian economies. Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and China relied on technology transfers by Transnational Corporations to catch up with the advanced world. At the same time these countries fast became

26 Khalil Hamdani, “Globalization: The Challenge for Pakistan,” The Lahore Journal of Economics 20 (2015): 225. 182

global players through their outward FDI. Japanese automobile industry became competitive in the U.S. and European markets by relocating simpler tasks to low-cost manufacturers in Southeast Asia. Korean and Taiwanese electronic firms upgraded to higher value designing and marketing, while relocating manufacturing to other East Asian countries, including China. Overall, the ‘Asian Tigers’, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand and China emerged as the most significant beneficiaries due to their innovativeness in exploiting the opportunities and mitigating the challenges of globalization.27

Pakistan faced many challenges in the realm of globalization since it began to take shape in the 80s, while benefiting from many opportunities at the same time. Sizable outflow of workers and the significant amount of remittances repatriated is perhaps the greatest opportunity exploited so far. The low income groups benefited from the remittances at the micro level, whereas at the macro level it helped in stimulating domestic demand in the expanding middle class and easing the external constraints on foreign exchange. The remittances receipt increased to 7% of GDP in 2013 from 1% of GDP in 2000, with the growth in remittances outpacing the growth in trade.28

As far as challenges are concerned, the two major ones remained the lack of foreign investment and value added exports. Pakistan’s major Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been in the extractive sector, which does not have many complementary benefits in other sectors of the economy. The FDI in banking and telecommunication sectors was useful but involved repatriation of profits and dividends. Pakistan could not enter the dynamic segments of world trade as it imports technology-intensive goods but could not export technology-intensive products. The major manufactured exports of Pakistan are textiles and garments, which compete in a world market with many competitors and often under unfavorable terms of trade.29

The opportunity versus challenge discourse surrounding the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) best captures the fears of inequalities of globalization found in the economic sector of national security. The advantages and disadvantages of CPEC have been extensively argued. The indication of fear is clearly visible in the discourse.

27 Hamdani. 28 Hamdani. 29 Khalil Hamdani, “The Challenge of the South,” UNDP-HDRO Occasional Papers, no. 2013/02 (2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2344466. 183

On the one hand, Ahsan Iqbal, the Federal Minister for Planning, Development and Reform argued that the amount of $46 billion is an investment, the terms of which are transparent, with no change in the originally conceived route, having equitable distribution of industrial clusters in the provinces, and encouraging business to business mode of working. Rejecting the accusations of bias, he contended that “not even a comma of the initial agreement reached at the first All Parties Conference has been changed till date, and numerous presentations have been given to the standing committees, parliamentarians and political leaders.” The minister posited that Pakistan’s profile improved enormously in terms of investment destination because of CPEC coupled with improved economic indicators and law & order situation across the country and the world now recognizes Pakistan as the next emerging success story. According to Ahsan Iqbal the target (of improving the economy in synergy with the CPEC) is ambitious but achievable if the government, the private sector, and the academia synergize their efforts to achieve up to eight percent growth rate annually in next ten years.30

On the other hand, the intelligentsia in Pakistan, for example the former foreign minister Hina Rabbani Khar, argued in favor of CPEC but sounded an alarm about its over-projection at the same time. Commenting upon the CPEC, the ex-minister wrote in a World Economic Forum report:

“No other country contributes as much to Pakistan’s economic potential as China. The Chinese-financed projects are likely to have a transformational value for Pakistan’s deep energy needs and to convert Pakistan as a potential highway for trade.”31 Just after a month, Hina Khar moderated her views on CPEC at a panel discussion, ‘Contemporary Great Games’ held in Lahore, arguing that “we have overblown the whole thing (CPEC). It is not safe to put all your eggs in one basket. We should look to increasing our own exports and expanding our own industries.”32 The element of ‘fear’ is discernible in this discourse of the ex-minister as she propagates development of Pakistan’s own potential for

30 “Pak-China Economic Corridor,” Ministry of Planning Development & Reform (blog), accessed March 7, 2016, http://www.pc.gov.pk/?cat=4. 31 “Geo-Economics with Chinese Characteristics: How China’s Economic Might Is Reshaping World Politics,” Global Agenda Council on Geo-Economics 2014-2016 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, January 2016), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Geoeconomics_with_Chinese_Characteristics.pdf. 32 “Contemporary Great Games in Era of Turmoil,” The Nation, February 21, 2016, http://nation.com.pk/national/21-Feb-2016/contemporary-great-games-in-era-of-turmoil. 184

manufacturing rather than only serving as a conduit for export of Chinese goods; owning advanced industrial processes rather than being a rentier of infrastructure.

Another aspect of fear in this large globalization project is reflected in the apprehensions about traffic and pollution for the residents living in one of the most scenic places on earth. Capturing the criticism well at the level of the common man and the expert both, The Washington Post quoted Sahib Noor, a farmer in Karimabad, a scenic town in the picturesque Hunza Valley: “And if we don’t get anything out of it (CPEC), our kids will just be collecting the garbage and rubbish from the trucks.” At the expert level, Sakib Sherani a prominent economist and an ex- economic advisor to the Government of Pakistan commented that a long highway connecting two strategically important points thousands of miles apart will not be an economic corridor, but the benefits will be huge only if that corridor also links Pakistani businessmen and traders to markets in China.33

Fear of Illegal Trade

The porous nature of Pakistan’s western borders is well known due to its rugged terrain, poor border control, lawlessness, and economic backwardness, all of which contribute towards a culture of smuggling profitable goods like electronics, cars, spare parts, guns, etc. The same factors, along with the huge poppy cultivation and heroin production facilities in Afghanistan, are responsible for drug trafficking which is an even more grave fear for the society than smuggled goods. The country’s society and economy has seen much harm in terms of drug addiction, gun culture, lost revenue and undermined local businesses as a result of the illegal trade to and from Afghanistan. Apart from the economic sector, the discourse about illegal trade manifests these fears both in the societal and the political sectors of national security. For the purpose of this study, the focus remains on the social construction behind the fear of illegal trade as visible in the discourse.

The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan Justice Jawad S. Khawaja termed the illegal trade on the Torkham and Chaman borders as “more dangerous than a hydrogen bomb” as reported in The News on 2 September 2015. The Border Commission constituted by the Supreme

33 Tim Craig and Simon Denyer, “From the Mountains to the Sea: A Chinese Vision, a Pakistani Corridor,” The Washington Post, October 23, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/from-the-mountains-to- the-sea-a-chinese-vision-a-pakistani-corridor/2015/10/23/4e1b6d30-2a42-11e5-a5ea-cf74396e59ec_story.html. 185

Court to monitor illegal immigration situation at the check posts at Torkham and Chaman reported about the gravity of illegal trade in the apex court, saying that “the volume of illegal trade at the Pak-Afghan border at Torkham was Rupees 100 to 150 million per day while goods worth millions of dollars are seized from the border every month but no government department keeps any record of it.”34

Pakistan has been facilitating Afghan trade since its birth in 1947 under the United Nations Conventions and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT). In 1965 both countries entered into a formal agreement called the Afghanistan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA). In 2010 the ATTA was revised and updated to Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA), apparently to provide better regulation and trade facilitation to both countries. Illegal trade was the main concern which the new agreement sought to address by introducing strict control mechanisms for transportation of cargo to Afghanistan through Pakistan and prevent the smuggling of Afghan imports into Pakistan.

Sometimes the importers from Afghanistan have imported a product much more than their actual domestic need…., the surplus quantities used to be pushed back to Pakistan as smuggling..., examples are the import of black tea and electronics goods. Electrical goods, particularly the household equipment have been imported by Afghanistan under the said facility much more than their actual demand, only to send it back to Pakistan through informal routes of trade.35

The serious concern about illegal trade was visible in the APTTA which vowed to check unauthorized trade regularly, not to be allowed under any circumstances without any exception. This led to the diversion of some of the illegal trade into legal channels resulting into additional revenue to the Government of Pakistan. The misuse of transit trade increased resentment in the manufacturers in Pakistan, badly affecting their businesses and incurring huge losses. It also affected the domestic and foreign investment process in Pakistan as genuine entrepreneurs could

34 “Illegal Trade on Pak-Afghan Border More Dangerous than Hydrogen Bomb: CJ,” The News, September 2, 2015, http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/14391-illegal-trade-on-pak-afghan-border-more-dangerous-than-hydrogen-bomb- cj. 35 “Pak-Afghan Trade” (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, December 2011), http://www.pildat.org/publications/publication/FP/Pak-AfghanTrade-DiscussionPaperDec2011.pdf. 186

not compete with the low prices of the products illegally flooded in the market through abuse of the Afghan Transit Trade (ATT).

It is estimated by Pakistan’s custom officials that 80-85% of ATT goods are smuggled back into Pakistan, crowding the documented businesses out of commercial hubs like Lahore, Karachi, Rawalpindi, Peshawar and Quetta. It is estimated that about US$5 billion worth of smuggled goods enter the country annually via the ATT, representing a revenue loss of US$ 2.5 billion. ATT is responsible for three-fourths of the value of smuggled items available in Pakistan. About 18% of Pakistan’s economy comprises manufacturing and wholesale/retail sectors, the two key sectors which are impacted the most by ATT. On the one hand manufacturing sector suffers as locally made products cannot compete with illegally imported foreign goods, while on the other informal markets thrive with retailers and wholesalers selling cheap, duty-free products without having to pay any General Sales Tax (GST). Such large scale illegal activities give rise to organized crime and other corruption related activities which undermine the foundation of the state.36

The fear of illegal trade is nested in the huge risks that it entails for the national security, not only in the economic sector but more so in the societal, political and even the military sector. Parallel structures of governance emerge in the state which increase rent-seeking activities. Sociopolitical development is stifled and prevention of internal conflict becomes impossible due to diminished rule of law which affects security in the societal and political sectors. The unchecked financial returns from crime also fuels violent non-state actors engaged in anti-state activities within and outside the country, involving the military sector of security. Risks of this kind tend to increase state expenditure on law enforcement, security and criminal justice system, and diminishes the possibility of providing infrastructure and services like border control and customs facilities to the citizenry. The fears associated with illegal trade are further augmented due to the state’s limitations in implementing the rule of law due to resource constraints.

36 “Examining the Dimensions, Scale and Dynamics of the Illegal Economy: A Study of Pakistan in the Region” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: Country Office Pakistan and Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Pakistan, December 2011), https://www.sdpi.org/publications/files/Examining%20the%20dimentions%20scale%20and%20dynamics%20of%2 0illegal%20economy.pdf. 187

The discourse is replete with examples of fears emanating out of the illegal Pak-Afghan trade in the economic sector. The annual loss to national economy from the unimplemented APTTA is estimated to be around US$ 3 billion, whereas the current official trade between the two neighbors is estimated at US$ 2.5 billion. The tire industry in Pakistan is one of the most affected industries, along with tea, cigarettes and electronics, which express grave concerns over the government’s inability to check the illegal trade, saying “our frustration with this government is growing… we thought it would take measures to curb smuggling and under invoicing that is killing local industries, especially the tire industry.” The linkage between illegal trade, organized crime and drug trafficking was repeatedly emphasized by the private industry in Pakistan:

“It is an irrefutable fact that smuggling and illegal trade, especially of drugs, is directly or indirectly linked with different forms of terrorism in this volatile region… successive governments have deliberately overlooked this issue.”37

Drug trafficking is perhaps the most serious form of illegal trade, mostly originating in Afghanistan and finding its way in and through Pakistan, which affects the societal, political and military sectors of Pakistan’s security. The persistence of drug problem in the society erodes societal values and ethics, harming the core identity of the society. Politically, it is a constant source of tension between the two governments, who blame each other for faulty policies and resolve to tackle the issue, undermining the fragile mutual trust. Militarily, the drug economy helps to fund terrorist cartels for protection of their business, hence increasing the difficulty for the military to deal with the broader issue of internal security. Pakistan’s national security is directly affected by narcotics trafficking, which originates mostly in Afghanistan and seems entrenched:

“The drug economy has infiltrated every section of Afghan society including its government, people, war lords, local militia and Taliban… In 2009, the Afghan Taliban earned $15 million from opium trade, drug traffickers $2.2 billion and Afghan farmers $444 million… with a nexus between drug traffickers and warlords.”38

37 Farhan Zaheer, “Pak-Afghan Border: Unrestricted Smuggling Hampers Economic Growth,” The Express Tribune, February 22, 2015, http://tribune.com.pk/story/842536/pak-afghan-border-unrestricted-smuggling-hampers- economic-growth/. 38 Tehseena Usman and Minhas Majeed Khan, “Drug Trafficking from Afghanistan to Pakistan and Its Implications,” Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan 50, no. 2 (2013), 188

Drug trafficking is indeed a complex problem which, though being considered in the economic sector of security, has serious ramifications in the military sector. It is a source of the threats which pose existential challenge for the state, yet seems too morphed to be tackled directly by the military instrument of state power in Pakistan. The narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan into Pakistan is waning the writ of the state and strengthening the bond among drug traffickers, criminal groups, insurgents and Taliban. This is a major challenge “because the nexus of the drug trade that supports the conflict is not countered in either Afghanistan or Pakistan.” 39

The spawning trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) has much serious repercussions in the societal and military sectors of Pakistan’s national security than the economic sector. The proliferation began in the early 80s during the Afghan ‘Jihad’ and was subsequently sustained by the continuing Afghan conflict. The large, illegal, small arms manufacturing capability and capacity in Darra Adamkhel in the tribal areas of Pakistan further fuels the dangerous weapons trade in the country. Weapons stolen from NATO cargo containers or snatched from Afghan National Security Forces by the Taliban also find their way into the illegal market.40 In the absence of any record keeping, the unhindered proliferation of locally manufactured and smuggled weapons is the natural outcome which threatens societal security. Apart from the detriment to societal security, the internal instability created by the easy availability of weapons for terrorist activities affects Pakistan’s security in the military sector more directly.

The analysis of diverse discourses related to the economic sector of Pakistan’s security reveals an absence of any serious securitization move, as witnessed in the political, societal and military sectors of security earlier in this study. However, the discourse analysis in the economic sector is rife with examples of economic issues being painted in terms of security, whether it be in the realm of development, dependence, globalization or illegal trade. Hence we discern an inclination in the society of socially constructing a security image of economic issues reflecting social awareness of the ramifications of those issues in political, societal and military sectors of security. If securitization is an indication of heightened realization of an issue’s security impact,

http://results.pu.edu.pk/images/journal/history/PDF-FILES/ARTICLE%202%20TEHSIN%2025- 43_v50_no2_2013.pdf. 39 Usman and Khan. 40 Muhammad Munir, “The Role of Light Weapons in Creating Internal Instability: Case Study of Pakistan,” Journal of Political Studies 18, no. 2 (2011): 243. 189

the portrayal of relatively lesser significant issues in terms of ‘security’ is an indication of their significance in the security understanding of a society.

As environmental issues affect a country’s economic sector much more profoundly than its military, political or societal sectors of national security, it is appropriate to deal with the environmental security in the same chapter as economic security. Therefore, we now turn our attention to the discourse surrounding environmental security issues affecting Pakistan.

Environmental Security

Like the economic issues, environmental issues too can damage the physical base of the state, perhaps to a sufficient extent to threaten its idea and institutions.41 The elevation of environmental concerns to the level where those become national security issues of a country is a relatively recent conception, compared to the issues of political, military, societal and economic sectors. It involved creation of a unique but interconnected identity of the country’s ecosystem. The threats to that identity usually arose from imbalance in the local, regional and international environment and therefore needed a more integrated response in some cases while a more indigenous one in others. For example, no single country can reduce global warming resulting from the excessive emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs). There is a natural tendency in some of the fastest developing countries like China, India and Brazil to follow the footsteps of the developed ones in emitting more greenhouse gases. Therefore, mitigation of this dangerous trajectory demands an integrated solution agreed upon by all countries within a given timeframe. On the other hand, a country’s integral environmental vectors like deforestation, population control, sustainable extraction, water availability, pollutant emission, waste management, resource scarcity and infrastructure development can be controlled internally by way of suitable national policies. The regional level also becomes prominent in environmental issues, more seriously in case of water distribution among upper and lower riparian like the Nile or Indus, but also in other cases like trans-frontier pollution in the U.S. and Canada or pollution of shared rivers like the Rhine.

The concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere, carbon-dioxide in particular, is causing the global warming. According to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

41 Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era, 131. 190

Change (UNFCCC), global climate change is the most difficult and dangerous environmental problem which the humans have ever created. The ecological threats pertinent to a particular state, which require a globally coordinated response like emissions control to prevent global warming and the rise in ocean levels, can hardly be addressed in the national security framework. However, if the ecological threats emanate mostly from internal mismanagement of a country’s environment, those can be framed as national security issues owing to their adverse impact on the economy and human life; indeed the very ‘idea and institutions’ of the state.

The 2007 Climate Change Synthesis Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines climate change and global warming as:

“Change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g. using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. It refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity.”42 In Pakistan, climate change was recognized as a threat earlier on, as is evident by the statement of Federal Minister, Makhdoom Syed Faisal Saleh Hayat, in the Musharraf era, who sounded an alarm by saying: “Agricultural productivity in Pakistan was affected by the changes in land and water regimes, where dry land areas in arid and semi-arid regions were most vulnerable, and affected agricultural productivity, putting the country’s food security at risk.” 43 An indication of securitization is visible in the Minister’s statement, dated from his tenure as Federal Minister for Environment from 2002 – 2004. However more seriousness towards the climate change issues was witnessed during the subsequent governments of PPP and PML(N).

Pakistan’s concerted response to this emerging threat to its ‘idea and institutions’ was initiated by President Zardari’s PPP Government in 2008 with the commissioning of a high powered Task Force for Climate Change Response, which culminated in formulation of the National Climate Change Policy 2012. In another landmark response, the Government set up a separate Ministry of Climate Change in the same year. The National Climate Change Policy outlined Pakistan’s nine major vulnerabilities to climate change.

42 “Climate Change 2007 Synthesis Report” (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2015), 30, http://khartoumspace.uofk.edu/handle/123456789/17900. 43 Datta, “The Impact of Climate Change in South Asia,” 228. 191

First, considerable increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, and erratic monsoon rains, causing frequent and intense floods and droughts. Second, projected recession of Hindukush – Karakoram - Himalayan (HKH) glaciers threatening reduced water inflows into the Indus River System (IRS). Third, increased siltation of major dams caused by more frequent and intense floods. Fourth, increased temperature resulting in enhanced heat and water stressed conditions leading to reduced agricultural productivity. Fifth, decrease in already scanty forest cover from rapid change in climatic conditions to allow natural migration of adversely affected plant species. Sixth, increased intrusion of saline water into Indus delta due to sea-level rise. Seventh, threat to coastal areas due to projected sea level rise and increase in cyclonic activity due to higher sea surface temperatures. Eighth, increased stress between upper riparian and lower riparian regions in relation to sharing of water resources. Ninth, increased health risks and climate change induced migration.

The National Climate Change Policy termed the above vulnerabilities as ‘threats,’ which can “lead to major survival concerns for Pakistan, particularly in relation to the country’s water security, food security and energy security.”44 A securitization attempt on part of the state is clearly visible in this succinct articulation of ‘threat’ to the ‘survival’ of the country, hence meriting analysis to see the development of this discourse in the environmental sector of Pakistan’s national security.

The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, addressed the inaugural session of the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP-21) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Paris on 30 November 2015. He stated his government’s resolve towards tackling climate change as a ‘threat’ by stating, inter alia:

“We are meeting at a defining juncture; a crossroads that offers both a historic opportunity to act against the threat of Climate Change, and a strong global will to take that course. This is all the more important for countries like Pakistan, whose contribution to global warming is minimal, yet it remains most vulnerable

44 “National Climate Change Policy” (Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Climate Change, Islamabad, September 2012), 2, http://www.mocc.gov.pk/gop/index.php?q=aHR0cDovLzE5Mi4xNjguNzAuMTM2L21vY2xjL3VzZXJmaWxlczEv ZmlsZS9Nb2NsYy9Qb2xpY3kvTmF0aW9uYWwlMjBDbGltYXRlJTIwQ2hhbmdlJTIwUG9saWN5JTIwb2YlMjB QYWtpc3RhbiUyMCgyKS5wZGY%3D. 192

to its adverse effects. For the effective implementation of our national programs, finance, technology transfer, and capacity building remain key enablers.”45 The use of terms like ‘threat,’ ‘defining juncture’ and ‘most vulnerable’ in relation to the climate change issue by the Prime Minister at an important international forum reflect a deliberate inclination to raise the level of this issue above the normal politics. The request for ‘finance, technology transfer, and capacity building’ in a globally transparent manner represent the extraordinary measures which the State of Pakistan wanted to seek to implement its climate change policy at home, aimed to secure the survival of the country. Lastly, a mention of ‘strong political ownership’ and ‘broad social acceptability’ reflects the communication of both, the political resolve about this national security issue and the conviction of wider audience, i.e., the population of Pakistan, in its criticality.

The Minister for Climate Change addressed the High Level Segment of COP-21 on 8 December 2015, carrying forward the securitization of the issue of climate change, reinforcing the Prime Minister’s narrative:

“Climate change is indeed the defining issue of our time. Left unaddressed, it could seriously undermine the development gains achieved over the past decades, pushing people back to poverty and misery…. Pakistan’s per capita emission of greenhouse gases is one of the lowest in the world. Yet it is placed in the extremely vulnerable category by a host of climate change indices. … Availability of adequate finance is at the core of the battle to confront the adverse impacts of climate change. In Pakistan alone, we require up to US$14 billion annually to adapt to climate change impacts.” The language used by the Minister echoed the alarming tone of the Prime Minister’s earlier speech, with equal emphasis on need for urgency and extraordinary measures. Invoking the fear of people’s ‘poverty and misery,’ he highlighted the ‘highly vulnerable’ category in which Pakistan is placed with respect to the climate change indices. The Minister was more categorical in defining the extraordinary measures needed to mitigate this threat in terms of ‘US$ 14 billion annually’ for adapting to climate change impacts.

45 “Statement by the Prime Minister of Pakistan at the Inaugural Session of COP-21, France” (Ministry of Climate Change, November 30, 2015), http://www.mocc.gov.pk/gop/index.php?q=aHR0cDovLzE5Mi4xNjguNzAuMTM2L21vY2xjL2ZybURldGFpbHM uYXNweD9vcHQ9bmV3cyZpZD0xMDk%3D. 193

In a show of ambivalence, the Climate Change Ministry, which was formed in April 2012, was demoted to Climate Change Division in July 2013 by the newly formed PML(N) Government, and again raised to the level of ministry in January 2015 by the same government. Based on the National Climate Change Policy, the Framework for Implementation of Climate Change Policy was formulated by the Climate Change Division in November 2013. Using the IPCC’s highly sophisticated simulation protocols, the Framework document scientifically projected a grim picture of Pakistan’s future climate. The likelihood of fewer cold days / nights, warmer and more frequent hot days / nights over most land areas is assessed to be “virtually certain.” Increase in frequency of warm spells / heat waves over most areas is assessed as “very likely.” Increased frequency of heavy precipitation events over most areas is also predicted to be “very likely.” Increase in drought and increased incidence of extreme high sea level is projected as “likely.”46 The depiction of ‘threat’ throughout this policy framework is extraordinary, suggestive of the requirement of urgent mitigating steps.

The social perception of Pakistan Government’s seriousness towards environmental issues was mixed. For example, in an investigative news report in Dawn on 6 February 2015, the Climate Change Ministry was termed ‘cosmetic’ due to the ambiguity surrounding its downgrading to a division headed by a bureaucrat and subsequent reinstatement to a Ministry headed by a politician, within less than three years. Some segments of the society praised this step ahead of the important Paris summit on climate change in November 2015, along with the current PML(N) Government’s other environment-supportive initiatives like mass transit projects, hydropower dams, and setting up of solar parks. Whereas others like Naseer Memon, head of Strengthening Participatory Organization and author of several books on climate change, were critical: “creating ministries and departments can only make a difference when something is on the priority agenda; environment and climate change are not even at the bottom of priorities.” Abid Qayyum Suleri, head of the think tank, Sustainable Development Policy Institute was also skeptical: “ministries often come about (in Pakistan) not so much because they are needed but to accommodate large cabinets and a burgeoning bureaucracy,” but hopeful at the

46 “Framework for Implementation of Climate Change Policy (2014 - 2030)” (Government of Pakistan, Climate Change Division, November 2013), 6, http://www.pk.undp.org/content/dam/pakistan/docs/Environment%20&%20Climate%20Change/Framework%20for %20Implementation%20of%20CC%20Policy.pdf. 194

same time: “the minister will lend some political patronage to the ministry and help it get the issues of climate change voiced in the cabinet.”47

Meanwhile, the government kept on strengthening its discourse by emphasizing on the cross-sectoral dangers posed by climate change risks, like water scarcity, food shortage and energy crisis. On 7 July 2015, Pakistan Today quoted the then Federal Secretary for Climate Change, Arif Ahmad Khan briefing the National Assembly’s standing committee on climate change: “it will not only have an impact on human health but will also affect the country politically and economically.”48 The emphasis on spillover effects of environmental sector of security into the political and economic sectors is noteworthy from the point of view of this study. The government’s narrative was apparently aimed at channeling the attention of lawmakers towards considerations more familiar to them, i.e., political and economic, rather than the scientific ones usually associated with the contentious issues of climate change.

In the international arena, the discourse tended to reinforce the threat of climate change to Pakistan but discredited the seriousness shown by the government towards its mitigation. The Royal Institute of International Affairs report, Attitudes to Water in South Asia, summed up the climate change related threat to Pakistan as the “brink of an environmental disaster” due to the shifting of the country’s seasonal monsoons towards Afghanistan, away from traditional catchment areas. The expectancy of unusual rainfall patterns, cloudbursts and flashfloods was predicted to have exponentially increased, while the Government’s response capability has significantly reduced due to silting of the major reservoirs, i.e., Mangla, Tarbela and Warsak dams, over the years. The report lamented lack of urgency on part of the Government in sectoral reforms and policy planning to mitigate risks in the Indus Basin, despite suffering US$ 16 billion losses since 2010 due to flooding. The downsizing of the Ministry of Climate Change and reducing its budget were cited as indicators of the Government’s non-seriousness.49

47 Zofeen T. Ebrahim, “Pakistan’s New Climate Change Ministry Merely ‘cosmetic,’” Dawn, February 6, 2015, http://www.dawn.com/news/1161895. 48 “Pakistan Headed for Water, Food and Energy Disaster, NA Committee Told,” Pakistan Today, July 7, 2015, http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2015/07/07/national/pakistan-headed-for-water-food-and-energy-disaster-na- committee-told/. 49 Gareth Price et al., Attitudes to Water in South Asia (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2014). 195

The cleanliness of scarce water resources was also an important part of the environmental security discourse. Gregory Pappas, a public health expert working in Pakistan, warned about the pressures on the water of Indus River. Indus is the major water source for the country, especially the fifty percent population living in rural areas who use the water from the river for domestic purposes, despite it being unfit for drinking. Control of river flow path is an issue, which affects huge swathes of territory and people, as was witnessed in the 2010 super floods affecting more than 20 million people. The causes of pollution of the Indus River, which are a serious concern of public health, include, return flow from agriculture, untreated or incompletely treated sewage from cities, industrial waste, organic matter, inorganic wastes, and sudden increase in water surface temperatures caused by thermal power plants along the Indus. As much of the population living along the Indus depends on the river for drinking water, and even boiling does not remove the polluting chemicals, polluted water is a serious public health issue. Pappas rightly posited that “health has emerged as a global security issue, and the water needs of human population have become part of that issue.”50

The agrarian base of Pakistan’s economy makes it more susceptible to the vagaries of climate change, especially the projected increase in temperature. Zia Mustafa, senior engineer in National Engineering Services Pakistan’s (NESPAK) Environmental and Public Health Engineering Division, considers that Pakistan’s food security has been put at risk and a reduction in annual crop yields brought about by water logging, desertification, pest attacks, and natural disasters is discernible. It is projected for Pakistan that with only one degree centigrade rise in temperature, wheat yield is estimated to decline by 6-9%, and an even lesser rise will severely impact cash crops like mango and cotton. Furthermore, the rise in temperature would affect the water flows in Indus Basin System resulting from melting of snows and glaciers; more water available in earlier periods but less later on, spelling disaster in the long-term availability of water. The dependency of Pakistan’s industrial sector on agricultural raw materials will also doom the supply chain of the industries like cotton, yarn, textile, sugar, flour, and rice. The energy security of Pakistan is also linked to climate change as erratic river flows would disrupt hydroelectric power. The rising cost of environmentally sustainable power generation would

50 Gregory Pappas, “Pakistan and Water: New Pressures on Global Security and Human Health,” American Journal of Public Health 101, no. 5 (2011): 786–788. 196

restrict increase in capacity to the desired level and reduce per capita energy consumption, thereby curtailing economic development.51

Water scarcity refers to the lack of volumetric abundance of water supply calculated as a ratio of the human water consumption to the available water supply in a given area. It is a physical, objective reality, measurable consistently across regions over time. Water stress refers to the lack of ability to meet human and ecological demands for water. In comparison to scarcity, water stress is a broader concept which considers several physical aspects related to water resources, including water scarcity, but also water quality, environmental flows, and the accessibility of water. Water scarcity contributes to water stress; an area could be water stressed but not water scarce due to plentiful supplies of contaminated water.52 UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) defines ‘absolute’ water scarcity as availability of less than 500 cubic meters of water per year per capita and ‘stress’ as availability of between 500 to 1000 cubic meters of water per year per capita. Water scarcity is a relative concept relevant to: 1) Lack of availability of fresh water of acceptable quality with respect to aggregate demand. 2) Lack of access to reliable water supply services. 3) Lack of adequate infrastructure, irrespective of the presence of water resources.53

Experts predict Pakistan to decline from being water stressed to water scarce by 2030 due to overuse and misuse leading to reduced water availability, increased water pollution, and an increased threat to environmental security. It is believed that the stressful conditions in water availability:

“Will pose the greatest future threat to the viability of Pakistan’s economy and undermine human and socioeconomic security.... If the current path of water management continues, Pakistan may see the angry protests and isolated acts of violence turn into a larger, more organized form of conflict.”54

51 Zia Mustafa, “Climate Change and Its Impact with Special Focus in Pakistan,” in Pakistan Engineering Congress, Symposium, vol. 33, 2011, 290, http://pecongress.org.pk/images/upload/books/8- Climate%20Change%20and%20its%20Impact%20with%20Special%20Focus%20in%20Pakistan.pdf. 52 Peter Schulte, “Defining Water Scarcity, Water Stress, and Water Risk: It’s Not Just Semantics - Pacific Institute,” Global Water Think Tank, Pacific Institute INSIGHTS, February 4, 2014, http://pacinst.org/water- definitions/. 53 “FAOWater - Water Scarcity,” accessed March 14, 2016, http://www.fao.org/nr/water/topics_scarcity.html. 54 Daanish Mustafa et al., Understanding Pakistan’s Water-Security Nexus, 2013, http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo57884. 197

The incidence of environmental hazards like floods and droughts, when mismanaged by the government, also tend to threaten political security due to questions on ‘legitimacy and accountability’ of the elected government. The public resentment towards President Zardari’s visit to France in the initial days of the devastating 2010 floods in Pakistan harmed the image of the PPP Government. Further damage was done by reports about the mismanagement of protective embankments and untimely utilization of donor funds. PPP relies heavily on their vote bank in Southern Punjab and Sind, which were most badly affected by this mismanagement. A CNN commentator summarized; “Overall, it’s hard to imagine that President Zardari and the PPP can survive the political impact of the floods. Yet Pakistan is a place that always stretches the imagination.”55

Climate change and economic growth of an agricultural country like Pakistan are intricately interdependent. Any stress on the environment due to climate change, for example rise in temperature, uneven rainfalls, unpredictable water flows and water scarcity will seriously affect the economic growth. By taking the single most important variable representing climate change, i.e., temperature, a quantitative study evaluated temperature variation, GDP, investment, labor, openness (exports plus imports as percentage of GDP), agriculture, manufacturing and services, from 1973 – 2011. It concluded about the linkage between climate change and economic growth of Pakistan:

“The results show that temperature has negative significant relationship with GDP as well as with the productivity in agriculture, manufacturing and services sectors…. If climate change is not controlled, it will hurt economic growth to a great extent.”56 The debate about requirement of constructing new dams has been vibrant in the climate change discourse in Pakistan. The capstone policy document of the PML(N) Government, Pakistan Vision 2025, notes:

“At present, out of the total installed generating capacity, about two thirds is thermal, making electricity expensive. Rebalancing the generation mix therefore provides an important channel to reduce our cost per unit. In this regard, major programs are being launched – notably: building of the 9500 MW Bhasha and

55 “Forget Politics, Pakistan Is Drowning,” News Report, CNN Opinion, August 19, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/08/19/pakistan.floods.mosharraf.zaidi/. 56 N. Akram and A. Hamid, “Climate Change: A Threat to the Economic Growth of Pakistan,” Progress in Development Studies 15, no. 1 (January 1, 2015): 73–86, https://doi.org/10.1177/1464993414546976. 198

Dasu Dams, Gaddani Energy Park 6600 MW and major increase in power generation from alternative energy sources. China – Pakistan Economic Corridor energy projects will serve as a backbone of the energy strategy to overcome power crisis in Pakistan.”57 The Vision notes top five goals for Pakistan’s water security. First, Water storage capacity to be increased from currently 30 days to 45 days by 2018, and 90 days by 2025. Second, minimize wastage, promote conservation and rationalize pricing. Third, integrate national and provincial priorities in relation to social and economic considerations for effective allocation. Fourth, achieve effective management of all sources of water and their sectoral and regional allocation by establishing an institutional mechanism, e.g. a National Water Commission. Fifth, ensure supply of a minimum benchmark of suitable water per capita in Pakistan. Diamer-Bhasha and Dasu Dams are recommended by name for construction in the Pakistan Vision document, whose design and development is already in implementation stages.

Opposition to the construction of large dams on political, ecological and humanitarian basis has always been significant in the discourse about construction of big dams in Pakistan. The pending development of Kalabagh dam is a well-known example from the past, while the contentions of the last ten years around finalization of Diamer-Bhasha and Dassu hydroelectric projects is a more recent example of such controversies.

Majed Akhtar opposes the strategic approach of constructing big dams in Pakistan to alleviate water and electricity shortage, basing his arguments on geographical, geopolitical and political reasons. Large dams are not easy to ‘insert’ into the geography, policy or polity of a country, as they are prone to trigger political contests. The author invokes disputatious nature of the territory of Kashmir (India considers the Gilgit Baltistan Province and Azad Kashmir as part of the overall disputed territory), where Pakistan desires to build Diamer-Bhasha and Dasu dams, to highlight the ‘geopolitical’ aspect of big dams’ geography. He also highlights the history of contentious political disputes in deciding the distribution of water among the Provinces of Pakistan as a disincentive to opt for the construction of large water reservoirs. As an example of the contentious nature of Indus basin river systems, the author quotes Pakistan’s going for international arbitration against India in the implementation of Indus Water Treaty 1960 over

57 “Pakistan 2025: One Nation - One Vision” (Planning Commission Pakistan, 2013), 61, http://www.pc.gov.pk/wp- content/uploads/2015/05/Pakistan-Vision-2025.pdf. 199

Indian construction of Baglihar and Kishenganga projects on Chenab and Jhelum Rivers respectively. He characterizes this litigation as a ‘trend of internationalizing dam development in Kashmir,’ which, in his view, could make Diamer-Bhasha and Dasu Dams a geopolitical issue in future. The author also advocates the interests of the dislocated population, about 25,000 in the case of Diamer-Bhasha Dam, which he fears would be undermined, forming his assessment on the perceivably unfair compensation afforded to the displaced persons from the sites of Tarbela Dam in the 60s and Attabad Lake in 2010 (a natural lake formed in Gilgit Baltistan Province on Hunza River after a massive landslide). Akhtar cautions about the ‘nationalist developmental hysteria’, which is gripping the ‘political elites’ and the ‘politically mobilized public,’ advocating consideration for his counterpoints.58

The 4500MW hydroelectric plant in the Gilgit Baltistan Province of Pakistan, Diamer- Bhasha Dam, is ready for construction at an estimated cost of US$ 14 billion, the largest infrastructure project since the 1974 Tarbela Dam. The Federal Minister for Planning, Development and Reform, Ahsan Iqbal, unequivocally spelled out the urgency of this project: “the country is expected to face acute water shortage in the next decade, and in order to prevent food shortage, this project will be developed at any cost.”59 Majed Akhtar might call it “developmental hysteria” but the definitive stance and the emergency-like projection, discernible in the minister’s tone, is prescient of the social construction of Pakistan’s Vision. It gains more value when coming from the focal person responsible to the country’s leadership for all major developmental activities and representing their ambitions. Arguably, these developments do not equate to the water, energy and food issues being securitized per se, but the urgency, determination and innovative approaches taken for redress in the environmental sector’s issues, especially in the period of current PML(N) Government, do reflect a tendency of securitization.

58 Majed Akhter, “Dams as a Climate Change Adaptation Strategy: Geopolitical Implications for Pakistan,” Strategic Analysis 39, no. 6 (November 2, 2015): 744–48, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2015.1090680. 59 “Diamer-Bhasha Dam Construction to Start next Year,” Pakistan Today, December 29, 2015, http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2015/12/29/business/diamer-bhasha-dam-construction-to-start-next-year/. 200

CHAPTER 7

CHANGING DYNAMICS OF PAKISTAN’S SECURITY:

CROSS SECTORAL SYNTHESIS

The purpose of disaggregating the ‘whole’ of Pakistan’s evolving national security concept into sectors was analytic convenience but to reach a meaningful conclusion, aggregation of sectoral analysis is essential. Discourse analysis was the method adopted to reach a constructivist understanding of Pakistan’s national security. Now, by assigning values to each sector of security based on the discourse attention in the securitization move, we will seek to identify a trend in the emerging social construction of Pakistan’s security. This chapter would attempt to synthesize the findings of the sectoral discourse analysis, highlighting the cross sectoral focus areas for each of the securitizing moves analyzed during this research.

Synthesis is defined as “the combining of often varied and diverse ideas, forces, or factors into one coherent or consistent complex.”1 In this chapter, an attempt would be made to bring coherence and consistency into the diverse ideas, which were found to have shaped the conception of Pakistan’s security during the research period, in order to see their combined effect. These were the ideas serious enough to be projected as national security concerns and were securitized, which, for ease of analysis, were studied under different sectors comprising Pakistan’s security complex. Those securitization moves sought extraordinary responses of varying intensity, including: constitutional and financial rebalancing for enhancing political security; utilizing peoples’ antiterrorism opinion to mobilize the civil administration and armed forces for ensuring societal security against internal military threats. Though remaining shy of securitization, the environmental sector witnessed raising of the alarm level to bring focus of policymakers on few vital issues and the economic sector observed articulation of the dismal economic performance as a cross sectoral threat to national security.

The relative weight of each sector comprising a security complex can be identified by the degree of securitization seen in that sector along with the relative importance of the type of

1 “Merriam Webster,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (USA: Merriam Webster Inc, 2002), 2321. 201

issues securitized. However, this formulation is not free from dichotomies. Some sectors like the economic tend to be less securitized, lest it invokes apprehensions about a country’s economic health, but it does not reduce the ‘security’ significance of economic issues in the composite understanding of the security complex. Such anomalies would require a judgement call by the analyst, as he or she embarks upon analyzing security discourses, to balance between objectivity of the ‘degree of securitization’ and the subjectivity of the ‘importance of the type of issues securitized.’ The traditional security analyst would tend to give more significance to the political and military point of views in comparison to the societal, economic, or environmental viewpoints when deciding upon the relative importance of issues comprising a national security complex. 2

Sectoral concerns tend to feed multiple sectors. For example, issues which apparently seem military might actually be stemming from other sectors, as Thucydides claimed ‘fear, honor and interest’ to be the motivating factors behind most wars. At times those concerns would reinforce each other in one sector and modify in another. However, security actors tend to have a holistic conception of security issues across the sectoral divide, with the label of security acting as the integrating force behind that conception. In fact, many of the ‘existential-threat’ narratives which drive securitization often involve different sectors, which subsumes sectoral divisions in the process. The sectoral division further diminishes during the seeking of extraordinary means for redress.

First, let’s take a look at the historically significant securitization moves prior to the period of this research as analyzed in Chapter 3 and see how those synthesized in the overall national security complex of their times. Those moves were: the independence movement for Pakistan, the strengthening of Pakistan Army, the nuclear weapons program, and the ‘Afghan Jihad’ of the 80s.

Pakistan Independence Movement can be best viewed from a political security lens but its repercussions in the societal and economic sectors for the security of an embryonic nation state, i.e., Pakistan, were discernible in the discourse. The brief discourse analysis of Pakistan Movement carried out in Chapter 3 suggests predominant securitization on political grounds but with expressed intent of securing the sociocultural heritage as well, disregarding chiding for

2 Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Security; A New Framework for Analysis, 165. 202

communal thinking. The ‘Two Nation Theory’ argued statehood for Pakistan in the Muslim majority areas of British India on the basis of distinct cultural identity of Hindus and Muslims, the two major political forces in India at that time, apart from the British. Muslims feared an unjust deal in the offing, if the Hindu dominated political, economic and social caucus were to gain supremacy after the British’s retreat. In the face of a domineering Hindu majority population, the future societal and economic security of the minority Muslim population in India was a serious apprehension for the Indian Muslims. An independent Muslim state formed in two separate zones in the east and west of India comprising contiguous Muslim majority areas was projected to alleviate those apprehensions. As a securitizing move, Pakistan Movement saw ‘very high’ degree of securitization in the political sector and ‘high’ degree of securitization in the societal sector.

Military security might not have been on the minds of the founding fathers of Pakistan during the independence struggle but it soon became the primary concern right at its birth. Ayub Khan, who rose to the position of Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army in 1951 and to the position of President of the country from 1958 – 1969, was the principal actor leading the securitization move to strengthen the Armed Forces. The move was primarily in the military sector with obvious spillover into the political sector, mainly aimed at securing U.S. assistance for building the military to guard against external aggression. The existence of Pakistan as a democratic political entity was perceived to be under threat from India and arguably communism, which was securitized to seek a larger share of the national financial resources and U.S. materiel and financial assistance for military buildup. It was a very successful episode of securitization spread over two decades, which later became a political norm, firmly establishing the need of a strong military to deter aggression and defend Pakistan. As a securitizing move, military buildup saw ‘very high’ degree of securitization in the military sector (in context of external threat) and ‘low’ degree of securitization in the political sector.

The development of nuclear technology for defense of Pakistan was again a case of securitization in the military sector of security with political implications. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, then Prime Minister and the founding father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, shared a widely held belief in the country at the time of its dismemberment at the hands of India in 1971:

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“security and territorial integrity are more important than economic development.” 3 It gives a fair idea of the primacy of military sector in the overall national security complex as well as the predominance of threat perception in the formative years of the country. Although the non- securitized spinoff of nuclear technology turned out to be the nuclear power generation and the nuclear medicine capabilities which continues to help the societal, economic and to some extent environmental sectors of security but have not been analyzed in this research as such. Over the years, the securitization of nuclear weapons program also transited into becoming a political norm due to its unquestionable security context. As a securitizing move, the struggle for development of nuclear weapons witnessed ‘very high’ degree of securitization in the military sector (in context of external threat) and ‘low’ degree of securitization in the political sector.

The next historical securitization move is the ‘Afghan Jihad’ of the 80s, characterized by its principal securitizing actor President General Zia-ul-Haq as ‘Pakistan’s war inside Afghanistan.’ It was a move aimed to augment the military security using proxy war as a means but had serious repercussions for the political, societal, economic and environmental sectors of Pakistan’s national security, which could not be conceived at that time and proved disastrous later on. The securitizing move focused on safeguarding the frontiers of the country against perceived Soviet aggression but failed to conceive the fallout of those ten years of ‘sponsored jihad’ in the political, economic, societal and environmental sectors of Pakistan’s security today. The move was aimed at translating the coalition’s political support into building the military capacity and capability of Afghan Mujahedeen while providing logistic conduit, staging base and intelligence advisory along the way. As a securitizing move, Afghan Jihad witnessed ‘very high’ degree of securitization in the military sector (in context of external threat) and ‘low’ degree of securitization in the political sector.

The major securitization moves analyzed under the political sector involved strengthening of the federation by adopting the 18th Constitutional Amendment, instituting the 7th National Finance Commission (NFC) Award and the Initiation of Baloch Rights reforms (Aghaz- e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan Package – AHBP). All the three moves were viewed from the lens of

3 Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, 153. 204

political security but their securitization narratives had strands from the other sectors of security as well.

Primarily, the 18th Constitutional Amendment was meant to strengthen the federal political structure of Pakistan in the political domain and to discourage any military coups in future by making their illegitimacy stark and unpardonable. By analyzing the Amendment’s securitization process in Chapter 4, we concluded the reasons behind it to be worthy of classification as national security issues. Politically, the Amendment sought federation’s unity, allaying of federating units’ concerns, subordination of military, and decentralization of power. However, failure to do so, it was argued, would lead to many other devastating societal, economic, and even military consequences, apart from grave political repercussions threatening the existence of the state.

The discontentment of the smaller provinces, namely, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, was projected to be serious enough cause for societal unrest in future if the trajectory of their perceived exploitation by the Center and the larger provinces, namely, Punjab and Sindh, continues. The internal unrest, which the 18th Amendment sought to harmonize, was considered a threat to the internal security of the country and hence a parameter affecting the military security in the context of internal threat. One of the reasons of Provinces’ alienation was their perception about restricted privileges in exploitation of natural resources and needless dependence upon the Center in economic matters. 18th Amendment was slated to provide, inter alia, the much desired economic and cultural rights to the provinces, whose absence was being seen as a threat not to the constitution but to the federation itself.

The various lenses of security cast their own image when the 18th Amendment is viewed through them and none could claim absolute significance. As analysts we used the political lens to describe its securitization but, as stated earlier, the securitizing actor needs to remain cognizant of the whole gamut of security. In this case, the economic, social, and military reasons of securitizing the 18th Amendment were equally important to ensure its successful securitization. As a securitizing move, 18th Constitutional Amendment witnessed ‘very high’ degree of securitization in the political sector, ‘high’ degree of securitization in the societal and economic sectors, and ‘low’ degree of securitization in the military sector (in the context of internal threat).

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However, the 18th Amendment has only provided a direction and a mechanism to thwart the perceived threats, which is hampered in its implementation due to numerous challenges. Here, caution against backfire is appropriate; the same perceptions which led to the adoption of this landmark amendment could turn against it, and everything which it claimed to stand for, if its implementation is procrastinated due to capability and capacity issues.

The circumstances leading to AHBP – Initiation of Baloch Rights – justified the evident securitization of this serious issue, which clearly spilled over from the political to the military, economic, and societal sectors of security. Continued perception of alienation, although to varied degrees of severity in various segments of population, had reduced political trust in the federation. The mistrust was threatening to become viral in the Balochistan Province. Economic exploitation was at the heart of misperception against the Center, with a litany of historical expediencies fueling public passions, which forced the Government’s hand into including a number of economic incentives in the AHBP. Societal insecurity had reached alarming proportions with rampant grey zones of conflict, with the state not only losing grip over control of violence but rather getting accused for it.

In the zones of violence in Balochistan, insecurity of the persecuted citizens and the security forces clearly made it appear as a serious case of societal insecurity, ripe for a securitization move like AHBP or a military crackdown. Military, which had been used previously to mixed effects in the Province, also remained prominent on the security calculus owing to their role in meeting any spiraling situation. However, political and economic security sectors’ implications outweighed the societal and military security sectors’ imperatives, leading the securitizing actor to take the risk of securitizing a grave national security issue predominantly through indirect political and economic approaches. Out of the military and societal sectors, the latter’s security received more attention in AHBP by creating incentives like employment, education and career development opportunities, expected to mitigate the risk of radicalization of the youth in the province. As a securitizing move, AHBP witnessed ‘very high’ degree of securitization in the political and economic sectors, and ‘high’ degree of securitization in the societal sector.

7th NFC award, as it affected Balochistan, was primarily a socioeconomic step taken in good political stride to address the long outstanding societal and economic security issues of

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Balochistan. Although analyzed through the political lens of security, being part of the securitization move linked to a political crisis, the effects of 7th NFC Award to Balochistan were meant to assuage core economic issues of the province based on societal demographics. For the first time in Pakistan’s history, the sole criterion of population was discontinued and multiple criterion for resource distribution were adopted including human development index, inverse population density and revenue generation / collection capacity. Balochistan imbroglio, as in 2010, was a national security issue where the securitizing actor used the political security narrative to implement economic measures of 7th NFC award. It was a clear example of the real- world overlapping amongst the sectors of security, which facilitate analysis but warrant synthesis for understanding the actual scope of impact of issues on the national security canvass. As a securitizing move, the 7th NFC award witnessed ‘very high’ degree of securitization in the political and economic sectors, and ‘high’ degree of securitization in the societal sector.

The major securitization moves analyzed under the military and societal sectors in Chapter 5 involved protection of the society by undertaking the Malakand stabilization operations 2009, the counter terrorism Operation Zarb-e-Azb, and the wide ranging anti- extremism National Action Plan 2015. All the three moves were viewed from the lens of military and societal security but had repercussions in the political, economic and environmental sectors of security as well.

Malakand stabilization effort which began with an intense military operation in May 2009 to provide security to the society gradually transited into creating a sustainable political order in the area. An order which could reinvigorate an economic and environmental revival, the two inseparable domains of security in the region due to the central role of tourism in the local economy of the area. Politically, the stabilization of Malakand was a milestone, hailed nationally and internationally as a securitization move of substance. The political sector also witnessed passing attention of the securitizing actor in terms of portraying Taliban advance as threat to the political stability of the country. However, discourse analysis revealed the focus sectors of the securitizing actors to be military and societal. Taliban’s omnipresence and omnipotence in the area was portrayed to be the military threat, requiring immediate kinetic action followed by stabilizing military presence to provide immediate security and long term confidence to the society. As a securitizing move, Malakand stabilization saw ‘very high’ securitization in military

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sector (in the context of internal threat) and the societal sector, whereas the political sector witnessed ‘low’ securitization.

Operation Zarb-e-Azb, the landmark counter terrorism effort is another case of securitization best described using the military and societal lenses of security. Although the violation of writ of the state is often mentioned in the discourse but not as the basis of securitization, which is mostly predicated on the pervasive military threat posed by the terrorists to the indefensible society. The securitizing actor’s focus sectors in this move remained the military and societal as was evident from the vibrant discourse outlining this securitization move. In terms of the overall positive impact, among all the securitizing moves analyzed in this research, securitization of Operation Zarb-e-Azb was the most significant. From the analyst’s perspective it showcased the speech act of securitization most effectively, from the securitizing actor’s perspective it received a most receptive wider audience, and from the audience’s perspective it provided the long desired security. As a securitizing move, Zarb-e-Azb saw ‘very high’ securitization both in the military sector (in the context of internal threat) and the societal sector.

The comprehensive antiterrorism and anti-extremism NAP, though analyzed from societal and military security lens of security, is perhaps much more wide ranging in import. The securitizing actor attempted to address the security challenge by emphasizing societal insecurity as the sufficient and necessary cause of insecurity in the political, military and economic sectors. The manifestation of this securitization move was seen in the societal and political sectors through the measures of lifting of moratorium on death penalty and establishment of the military courts. In the military and economic sectors, it was manifested in the continuation of Operation Zarb-e-Azb. The irony of US$ 103 billion worth of economic loss due to terrorism was leveraged by the securitizing actor to seek acceptance of this securitization move by the wider audience. As a securitizing move, NAP witnessed ‘very high’ securitization in both the political and societal sectors, ‘high’ securitization in the military sector (in the context of internal threat) and ‘low’ securitization in the economic sector.

The security perspective of the economy and environment of Pakistan cannot be measured on a securitization matrix per se because those issues were not desired to be securitized by any major securitizing actor. The narrative about their criticality to national security is

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compelling, to say the least, but not perceived momentous enough politically by the securitizing actor to cross the securitization threshold.

The discourse about Pakistan’s economic security illuminated critical linkages between the national economy and the national security, linking Pakistan’s sovereignty to slow economic growth, large fiscal deficit, rising public debt, and balance of payment difficulties. A weak economy simply means weak national defense, resource-starved government, tension-ridden society and unsustainable environment; indeed a disastrous recipe for every sector of national security. However, as highlighted earlier, securitizing economic weakness of one’s country is like committing political suicide in today’s International Political Economy. The lone voices suggesting emergency economic measures in Pakistan therefore fail to impress the securitizing actor into action, despite very forceful securitizing logic and persuasive sound bites for any speech act.

Nevertheless, the healthy discourse on the country’s economic woes, especially about the fears of defense versus development, economic dependencies, inequalities of globalization, and illegal trade is reflective of the significant awareness about the role of economy in national security. The drive and momentum behind many economic projects like the China Pakistan Economic Corridor clearly indicates a security-like urgency even without its explicit use.

In the environmental sector’s discourse analysis, the rhetoric debating creation of a separate Ministry of Climate Change is indicative of public attention accorded to the environmental issues. Although the discourse revealed explicit and implied references about the ‘existential threat’ and ‘virtual certainty’ of climate change to Pakistan’s ‘survival’ but the state response was ‘cosmetic’ at best and non-existent at worst. Like the economic sector, the silver lining of the environmental sector analysis remains in heightened mindfulness about the cross sectoral security implications of the environmental issues. Irrespective of environmental issues failure to get securitized, the discourse analysis highlights some critical issues like water stress, rise in average temperature, unusual rains and flooding, etc, which beg urgent inclusion in the security agenda of an agricultural country like Pakistan. Environmental issues need to be synthesized with a premium in every discussion about Pakistan’s national security because of their overarching impact.

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In our quest to find out if securitization of critical issues in the different sectors would lead to the broadening of the concept of national security of Pakistan, we summarize the above synthesis of the substantial securitizing moves. The assessment of each sector of security based on the discourse attention given in the securitization moves to those sectors, leads to a consolidated matrix:

Table 6: Cross Sectoral Securitization Construct

Securitization Political Military Military Societal Economic Environmental moves / Focus Sector (External) (Internal) Sector Sector Sector sectors Sector Sector Independence **** * * *** ** * Movement Military ** **** * * * * buildup Nuclear ** **** * * * * Program ‘Afghan Jihad’ ** **** * * * * 18th **** * ** *** *** * Amendment AHBP **** * * *** **** * 7th NFC Award **** * * *** **** * Malakand ** * **** **** * * Stabilization Zarb-e-Azb * * **** **** * * NAP **** * *** **** ** *

Level of securitization: **** = very high; *** = high; ** = low; * = none

In the traditional military-centric security construct, the referent object of security is the state whose identity and sovereignty has to be defended mostly against external, and exceptionally against internal threats. The stability of political structures and governance processes, and the security of the society with its pluralistic existence, are taken for granted. The economy is considered an essential security-enabler and not the core. On the significance of environmental threats, the jury is still out and it is also not considered as a core national security issue.

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This study highlights Pakistan’s national security conception gradually expanding from traditional to a more multi-sectoral outlook. The multi-sectoral framework of security has the ‘military sector’ firmly as one of its constituents but its weight in any given period varies according to the national security priorities. However, given the inertia of external threat from India, the priority of the military sector remains high enough to be prominent but not spectacular enough to be securitized. Although this may not be true about the internal conception of military security which witnessed repeated securitizations but for protection of the people. Overall, the securitization trend clearly indicates the primacy of sociopolitical priorities in Pakistan’s national security conceptual development during the research period. The above matrix indicates a securitization pattern of political and societal focus in the independence movement to a prolonged external military focus till the 90s, followed by a political and societal focus against internal threat from the late 2000s, till now.

In case of Pakistan’s emerging security concept, the referent object broadened from state- centrism with an external focus to sociopolitical centrism with an internal focus. The federal political structure, smaller provinces’ rights and a terrorized society became the referent objects of security, as witnessed in various securitization moves. In further broadening of the referent objects of security, although not to the level of securitization, the threats to the economy and the climate figured out to be strong contestants. Securitization processes are indicators of a country’s national security focus. Securitization for strengthening Pakistan’s federal political structure, providing political and economic security to smaller provinces, securing the population against terrorism and extremism, and a desire in the society to have some critical economic and environmental issues securitized, clearly indicate a trend in broadening of Pakistan’s national security conception.

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CONCLUSION

The military-centrism of Pakistan’s national security conception is often criticized, perhaps based more on historical tradition than on evolving trends. This study attempted to present a counterview by using securitization theory to understand the emerging social construction of Pakistan’s security conception. Notwithstanding the theoretical and methodological limitations, the study revealed a broadening in the national security conception of Pakistan by virtue of the trend of securitization seen in the sociopolitical dimension. The nebulous nature of national security makes it a complex phenomenon to study. The ontological and epistemological options were narrowed by relying upon the multi-sectoral framework of security manifesting instances of securitization, which could be deemed to reflect Pakistan’s security conception.

The results might be skewed due to a bias on part of the securitizing actors’ tilt towards a particular issue, or leaning towards a side within that issue, or manipulating the speech act to garner the audience in a particular direction. Similarly, the audience may not be as well-informed to understand the full import of an issue, or not as empowered to make their ideas count, thus undermining the value of securitization theory. These could be valid criticisms, however the discourse analysis indicated a fairly informed intersubjective understanding of the issues being discussed. The discursive process by which the discourse developed, helped to highlight biases and put those under public scrutiny. Moreover, the discourse analysis only aimed to identify the elements of securitization, i.e., a securitizing actor, a critical threat, a speech act, the wider audience and an extraordinary step, without being judgmental about hidden motives. The identification of those elements led to the findings about securitization and its implications in different dimensions of national security.

The review of literature on Pakistan’s security reflected a widely shared interest in the subject, viewed mostly in terms of global and regional tensions emanating from concerns on militant extremism and irredentist frictions. Less attention has been paid to the unprecedented significance accorded to the national security value of effective political organization in the country, protection of society against extremist tendencies, economic viability to maintain the security architecture, and environmental sustainability of the country’s fabric. Analytic disaggregation of security into its constituent dimensions, i.e., military, political, economic, 212

societal, and environmental according to Buzan et al. (1998), to study critical issues through study of the discourses surrounding those issues, has alluded to the scholarship on Pakistan’s national security. The relevance of securitization in trending the trajectory of national security priorities in Pakistan’s strategic culture was prominent in its absence. The absence of discourse analysis of those securitization moves, especially in the political and societal dimensions of national security, was also prominent.

A three dimensional gap obscured the constructivist projection of Pakistan’s national security, i.e., securitization perspective of critical issues, multi-sectoral categorization of national security, and discourse analysis of the securitization moves in poststructuralist framework. This is the void which this study has strived to bridge by showing how ‘politics of the extraordinary’1 worked its way into ‘securitization’2 of certain critical issues, gleaned from the development of intertextual discourses,3 reflecting the influence which policy took from the ideas of wider audience.

The evolving security conception of Pakistan could be studied in different ways. However, securitization theory and discourse analysis provided a better epistemological method to understand the ontology of Pakistan’s security. According to Poststructuralism, security policy is influenced by people’s ideas, which could be studied analytically by comprehensive analysis of discourses surrounding that policy. On the other hand, Securitization as a sociopolitical theory propounds how discourses could be used to study the extraordinary significance afforded to certain critical issues painted in terms of ‘security’ to elicit support of the overwhelming majority for taking extraordinary measures like changing the constitution. Intersubjective understanding of the critical issue is mandatory, entailing widely shared perception of identity and threat. Once the understanding is commonly established, security becomes a political force which can be used by the policymakers to deal with the threat and secure the identity by adopting whatever ways and means considered necessary, irrespective of the normality of those ways and means.

The constitutive nature of securitization theory in contrast to a causal nature played an important part in its application to understand the dynamics of Pakistan’s security. The variables

1 Kalyvas, Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Hannah Arendt. 2 Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Security; A New Framework for Analysis. 3 Hansen, Security as Practice. 213

in the securitization process like the threat, the identity, the audience, and the extraordinary steps, occurring within the different sectors of security like military, political, societal, economic, and environmental explained the wider phenomenon of national security by composition rather than cause and effect. Securitization theory was applied during the period of research to see if and when securitization occurred, in which sectors, on what issues, and what was the sectoral trend of the securitizing moves, in order to understand the direction which Pakistan’s security conception is taking. A method to analyze the intertextual discourse was developed with analytical focus on the official discourse charted by heads and important functionaries of governments. The object of analysis was the official texts, intertextual links, critical texts by political opposition, and texts representing corporate interests; the goal was to ascertain the hegemony of official discourse in response to the critical discourses in accomplishing the securitizing move.

Historically, securitization remained a discernible political force in the development of Pakistan’s security conception; the independence movement being the first and foremost example. In Pakistan Movement, Azadi (independence) was the speech act of Jinnah, the securitizing actor, meant to secure the political identity of Indian Muslims against the threat of Hindu chauvinism. It found intersubjective acquiescence amongst the wider audience of Indian Muslims, who gave full support for the extraordinary step of separation from India. Highest priority was attached to the political sector of security by the embryonic state of Pakistan in undivided British India as is visible from this securitization move.

However, over the years of independent living, the threat metamorphosed from the political to the military sector necessitating another securitization move which came about soon after independence in 1947. Field Marshal Ayub Khan, the President of Pakistan and the securitizing actor in the mid-1950s, securitized the necessity of strong armed forces to defend the territorial integrity of nascent Pakistan against Indian aggression, which resonated well with the public and resulted in the extraordinary step of huge prioritization of the military sector vis-à-vis the political and economic sectors, in a fledgling state fighting poverty and under-development.

The military sector witnessed further augmentation through a significant securitizing move led by Prime Minister Bhutto in 1973 aiming to develop the nuclear deterrent to thwart any future move by India like the one leading to the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. The speech

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act, never again, saw widest acceptance by the audience leading to the extraordinary step of building nuclear weapons. The unprecedented hegemony of official discourse in this case is a continuing facet of the country’s security conception even today, reflecting acceptance of the enduring nature of nuclear deterrent as the ultimate guarantor of security.

The next securitization move in the country’s security history also took place in the military sector with General Zia-ul-Haq as the President declaring Afghan Jihad in the 1980s as the only way to repel Russian aggression in the region. The speech act resonated well at home and abroad resulting in an acquiescing domestic and international audience supporting the extraordinary step of sabotaging the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Foreign aid funded the jihadists pouring in from few Muslim countries including Pakistan to augment the rank and files of Afghan Mujahedeen. After gaining independence, Pakistan’s security conception witnessed repeated securitization moves in the external military sector due to existential threats from India which led to a military outlook of the country’s national security construct.

The debate of identity and threat evolved from the territorial identity of Pakistan threatened by India, to the identity of Pakistan’s federalism threatened by the military’s political misadventures and resentment of smaller provinces. Zardari led PPP Government concluded that the ineffective and inefficient political organization of the constitution as manifested during the years of its existence till then (1973-2010) reflected a grave security threat to the country, an existential one as per their reckoning, which needed a securitized response. As a result, 18th Constitutional Amendment was the extraordinary step taken with widest possible political consensus which showed significant augmentation of Pakistan’s security conception in the political sector.

The resentment of Balochistan against injustice in allocation of financial, governmental, natural and economic resources by the federal government was a similar threat securitized by the Zardari Government. It was also accepted widely across the political divide and resulted in the unprecedented increase in the financial share of Balochistan in the 7th NFC Award from 5.11 percent to 9.09 percent, apart from allocation of many other subsidies and payments. Similarly AHBP was another securitized move in the same era which brought an acute focus on the grievances of Balochistan province and resulted in extraordinary legislative steps, going beyond

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the constitutional bounds in some cases, meant to secure the Federation politically by placating the estranged elements in Balochistan and strengthening the political process.

A clear trend of increased attention to the political and economic sectors of security can be gleaned from these securitization moves. Meanwhile, the security conception in the external military sector maintained an equitable equilibrium within given economic constraints, which reflected a satisficing appraisal of the security balance in the military domain by the state. If successful securitization moves echo the widely accepted national priorities of security, 18th Constitutional Amendment, 7th NFC Award and AHBP manifested a change in the security culture; conceptually elevating from military centrism to political centrism.

Societal sector and the internal military sector were two sectors in which some of the most remarkable securitization moves took place to counter unparalleled threats brutalizing the core identity of Pakistani society. The Malakand stabilization effort 2009 was one of those moves where once again unstinted domestic and foreign acquiescence led the government to orchestrate the extraordinary step of quelling a politico-religious rebellion in the picturesque Swat region with negligible collateral damage and with full local cooperation.

Major Findings of the Study

 During the period of this study, i.e., Zardari led PPP and Nawaz (2013) led PML- N governments, 18th Constitutional Amendment emerged as the most significant political step, which was securitization in the political, societal, and economic sectors. Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan Package (AHBP) and 7th National Finance Commission (NFC) Award were the next political strides that reflected significant levels of securitization in the political and economic sectors and to a lesser level in the societal sector.  The discourse analysis revealed very high level of securitization in the internal military sector and the societal sector of security indicating a continuing shift in the sectoral focus away from external military, albeit in this case to societal and internal military sectors. The ongoing Operation Zarb-e-Azb (and its offshoot Operation Radd-ul-Fassad) is another example of a widely accepted securitization move where the discourse analysis revealed a bias of securitization towards the

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societal and internal military sectors. In case of the parallel securitizing move in the same context, i.e., National Action Plan 2015, along with societal sector, the political sector’s securitization also dominated the discourse.  The discourse around economic and environmental sectors of Pakistan’s security is vigorously growing but has not yet reached the threshold where a securitizing actor could attempt to securitize an economic or environmental issue as a national crisis. However, the increasing security perception of both, the economic and the environmental constraints, is an important finding of this study.  In a constructivist analysis, the national security conception of Pakistan was found to be getting broader as security of the political structures and the societies were acutely prioritized. This new knowledge was made possible by sectoral identification of the securitization moves carried out during the research period by way of intertextual discourse analysis. It reflected the national security priorities of two successive democratic governments; Zardari from 2008 to 2013, and Sharif from 2013 to 2017 (period of research). A similar appraisal of securitization perspective of critical issues in the country’s national security history provided a backdrop for comparing the securitized issues during the research period.  The trend of the issues securitized during the period of this research indicated a shift in the socially constructed perspective of national security from military centric to political and societal centric. Moreover, a high propensity was also found in the discourses about economic and environmental issues, seen to be vying for national security priority.

More importantly, there are questions which remain to be explored by future researchers of Pakistan’s national security. How can the broadened concept of Pakistan’s security conception be translated into a more secure Pakistan? How far are the identified securitization moves from achieving their objectives? How can the economic security of Pakistan be brought to the center of security discourse without undermining confidence in the state? How can urgency of meaningful action be brought in Pakistan’s environmental security threats?

However, the widening of Pakistan’s security construct is by itself a prodigiously modern development in the broader conceptual scheme of national priorities. Developed nation-states

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proportionately invest into strengthening political, societal, economic and environmental dimensions of security over the course of national development, along with building the military dimension. It is a modern trend for a developing country like Pakistan to give acute priority to the political and societal dimensions of security. This trend reflects confidence in the mundane, and maturity to march ahead in the broader framework of security. A confidence reflective of the national desire to move in step with the modern world’s comprehensive security conception.

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