Mind on the Edge of Humanity
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Word Count: 7,842 Making Friends, Making Tools and Making Symbols By Matt J. Rossano What kind of mind immediately preceded the human mind? In decades past, it was assumed that the step from the nonhuman mind to the human mind was a qualitative one. The defining characteristics of the human mind such as language, episodic memory, recursion, mentalizing (theory of mind) were, by their very nature, dichotomous (Chomsky 1966: 78; Povinelli 2000; Suddendorf and Corballis 1997). In other words, these mental traits were either present or absent with no intermediate states possible. Recent research, however, has questioned this assumption (e.g. Clayton, Bussey, and Dickson 2003; Slocombe and Zuberbuhler 2006; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, and Moll 2005). Symbolic thinking has typically been grouped into this same category as another uniquely human and strictly dichotomous mental attribute. Studies with nonhuman primates, however, suggest that a rudimentary symbolic faculty may be present in them as well (Pollick and de Waal 2007; Slocombe and Zuberbuhler 2006). It seems reasonable to assume that our hominin ancestors built upon this rudimentary capacity, incrementally approaching the full-blown symbolism of Homo sapiens. The current paper argues that symbolic thinking can be broken down into a series of progressive stages using the framework proposed by philosopher Charles Peirce. Evidence for the presence of these stages is observable in the archeological record. It is further proposed that the cognitive requirements for increasingly sophisticated tool-manufacture 1 and social cooperation were the key selective forces behind the evolution of symbolic thinking. <A>Incrementally Approaching Symbolism In their book In Search of the Neanderthals, Stringer and Gamble (1993:203) express a strictly dichotomous view of symbolism: “… arranging behaviour according to symbolic codes is an all or nothing situation. The onset of symbolic behaviour can be compared to the flick of a switch…” Symbolism is either there or not, no in-between. This attitude stands in contrast to those expressed recently by two other archeologists. Bar-Yosef (2000:14) has characterized Late Mousterian hominins as possessing a ‘low level of symbolic behavior,’ while Wadley (2001:208) has suggested that Paleolithic image-making varies in its ‘symbolic complexity.’ The conflict between Stringer and Gamble’s view on the one hand, and Bar-Yosef and Wadley’s on the other, may be more apparent than real. It all turns critically on how one defines ‘symbolism.’ One of the most thorough examinations of semiotics (the study of signs and symbols) comes from American philosopher C. S. Peirce (Peirce 1932[1960]; or see Hawkes 1932 for a good discussion). Peirce defined three levels of reference: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. Iconic referents are ones that bear a perceptual or physical resemblance to the things they signify, such as using a round pebble to represent a soccer ball. Indexical referents are ones that indicate (as the name implies) the presence of what they signify based on a temporal or spatial association. For example, a weather vane indicates the wind (when the wind blows, the vane moves), tears indicate sadness, smoke indicates fire, etc. While both iconic and indexical referents can be thought of as ‘symbolic’ in the 2 sense that one thing is standing for another, Peirce reserves the term ‘symbol’ for only those occasions where the relationship between the signifier and the signified is purely arbitrary. For example, the ‘$’ is truly symbolic because its relationship to money is based solely on convention. The $ does not resemble real currency (and therefore is not connected iconicly to its referent) and only rarely occurs in temporal or spatial proximity to currency (and therefore is not connected indexically to its referent). While these levels of reference are distinguishable, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. A sign can sometimes overlap levels of reference. A smiley face looks like a smiling face, but can also indicate happiness or the intention of conveying a joke (as is the case with electronic messages). The purely arbitrary nature of symbolic associations make them especially taxing to acquire. Deacon (1997:75-92) provides a detailed discussion of the hierarchical relationships among the different levels of reference. He shows how indexical referents are ‘built up’ from iconic ones and symbolic referents are ‘built up’ from indexical ones with each level placing increasing cognitive demands on the organism. Acquired symbolic reference is acutely memory-intensive: To learn the first symbolic relationship requires holding a lot of associations in mind at once while at the same time mentally sampling the potential combinatorial patterns hidden in their higher-order relationships. Even with a very small set of symbols the number of possible combinations is immense, and so sorting out which combinations work and which don’t requires sampling 3 and remembering a large number of possibilities (Deacon 1997:93). Neuroscience studies confirm the notion that extensive ‘brain power’ is required for symbolic function. A broad network of neocortical structures is necessary for the acquisition of the purely arbitrary associations required when learning symbols (Asaad, Rainer, and Miller 1998; Chee, Sriram, Soon, and Lee 2000; Dimitrov et al. 1999; Eacott and Gaffan 1992; Murray, Bussey and Wise 2000; Savage et al. 2000). These structures include the inferior temporal cortex, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and the uncinate fascicles connecting the two. Therefore, while we would expect icons and indices to precede symbols, we would not necessarily expect the move from one to the other to be inevitable, especially when going from indices to symbols. Thus, if by ‘symbolism’ we mean strictly Peircian symbols (arbitrary referents based on cultural convention) then Stringer and Gamble may indeed be correct – this is something that either exists or doesn’t. Peircian symbols, however, do not emerge ex nihlio. Iconic and indexical referents provide the basis for their construction. Bar-Yosef’s ‘low level’ of symbolism and Wadley’s varying degrees of ‘symbolic complexity’ may reflect the presence of iconic and indexical reference systems in the archeological record. All of this raises the possibility that the human mind, with its full-blown capacity for (Peircian) symbolism, was preceded by hominin minds capable of lesser forms of referential thinking (iconic and indexical). There is reason to suspect that this might be the case. Studies of both ape language learning and language development in humans show that they progress from an initial indexical phase to one 4 of symbolic understanding (see discussion in Deacon 1997:85-92,135-142). Thus, we might expect that the emergence of fully symbolic artifacts in the archeological record would be preceded by iconic and indexical ones, providing evidence for the existence of these pre- symbolic hominin minds. <B>Iconic Artifacts Evidence of red ochre and other mineral pigments dates as far back as 300,000 years before present (ybp) in the hominin archeological record (Barham 2002; Clark and Brown 2001; de Lumley 1969; Roebroeks 1986). Barham (2000; 2002), for example, has unearthed over 300 pieces of variously colored mineral pigments dated anywhere from 270,000 – 170,000 ybp from the Twin Rivers site in Zambia. The pigments appear to have been intentionally transported to the site from remote locations and show evidence deliberate modification. Though red ochre and other mineral pigments can have utilitarian uses (Bahn and Vertut 1988; Keeley 1978; 1980), evidence from many of these finds suggests ritual rather than practical use (Knight, Power, and Watts 1995; Watts 2002). Barham (2002:187) notes that the wide variety of different pigments found at the Twin Rivers site argues against purely practical use. If mineral pigments had ritual meaning, then what was the most likely form that meaning took? Our hominin ancestors’ earliest use of pigments, according to Kuhn and Stiner (2007:46), was probably to enhance or alter physical appearance making the wearer more dramatic, impressive or intimidating – as is not uncommon in contemporary traditional societies. Using archeological and anthropological data, Knight, Power, and Watts (1995) have proposed a somewhat different function 5 for early pigments, especially red ochre. In their view, red ochre would have signified menstrual blood and the fertility associated with it. Common to both Kuhn and Stiner’s view and that of Knight et al., is that the pigment’s meaning would have been closely tied to perceptual appearance – either the appearance of the pigment itself (as blood) or the appearance of what it enhances (facial expressions, bodily contours, etc.). All of this suggests that where ritual use of mineral pigments appears likely from the archeological record, its reference value was iconic in nature. In other words, it stood for things by virtue of perceptual cuing. Given that iconic referents are the most basic, it is also not surprising that this is the first form of reference emerging in the archeological record. Mineral pigment use may not be the only example of early iconicity in the archeological record. Though fraught with speculation and controversy, two of the earliest examples of what some researchers have called ‘art’ may also represent iconic referents. A three-million-year-old jasper cobble roughly resembling a human face was uncovered from a site near Makapansgat, South Africa. The nearest source for this item was ten kilometers from the recovery site, leaving open the possibility that it was intentionally transported presumably by a hominin who was intrigue by its anthropomorphic quality (Bednarik 1993; Dart 1974). A similar type artifact was found at Berekhat Ram in the Golan Heights. This was a 233,000 year old human-figure-shaped stone that showed evidence of intentional modification – possibly to enhance its anthropomorphic shape (d'Errico and Nowell 2000; Marshak 1997). The singularity of these finds 6 warrants caution in their interpretation; however, if there is any meaning to them at all it would likely be iconic.