GENERAL GERHARD VON SCHARNHORST : MENTOR OF CLAUSEWITZ

AND FATHER OF THE PRUSSIAN-GERMAN GENERAL STAFF

By Oberstleutnant i.G. Michael Schoy

“My career is entirely my work, since I became ten years old.”

Scharnhorst, March 1809

Introduction formers that reorganized the Prussian Army in the years between 1807 and 1813, which The character of Prussian General made possible Prussia’s liberation from Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst per- French domination and the recovery of her meates the modern German armed forces. dominant position amongst European states. The Bundeswehr, the Federal Armed Forces A cornerstone of Scharnhorst’s comprehen- of West Germany, was founded with ap- sive programme of reform was the introduc- pointment of the first soldiers in Bonn on 12 tion of a permanent general staff, deeply November 1955, Scharnhorst’s two hun- interwoven with the reorganization of the dredth birthday to the day. The highest military educational system in Prussia. decoration of the former Nationale Volk- sarmee (National People’s Army) of the Indeed, by doing so, Scharnhorst became the German Democratic Republic, introduced in father of the Prussian-German general staff, 1966, was named after Scharnhorst. The an organizational element that was devel- main auditorium at the Officer School of the oped further by his successor as Chief of the German Army in Dresden is named after Prussian General Staff, General August Scharnhorst. In 1989, the then Chief of Neithardt von Gneisenau, and reached its Army Staff, Lieutenant-General Horst temporary climax under Field Marshal Hildebrandt, donated an award according to Helmuth von Moltke. Gneisenau honoured performance, character, and manner to the Scharnhorst’s greatness with the statement: best graduate of the army’s officer courses, “People like to compare me with him, but I the so called Scharnhorstpreis, named after am a pygmy beside this giant, whose mind I the Prussian general. can only admire, never fully comprehend.”1 Why is there so much interest in re- The rise of the Prussian-German membering and honouring the contributions general staff has attracted many authors, of a long dead general of another age? Gen- publications, and studies, especially after eral Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst World War II. The German structure was was an exceptional military intellectual often copied in the military and other thinker and laid the foundations for the de- realms. But, the Prussian-German general velopment of the German armed forces as a staff was more than just an organizational truly professional institution. After the dis- instrument for effective command and con- astrous defeat of the Prussian troops by Na- trol. Rather, the system’s applied working poleon at Jena and Auerstedt in October methods inspired selection, training, and 1806 and the subsequent Peace of Tilsit in education of subsequent general staff and July 1807, Scharnhorst became the intellec- admiral staff officers for later generations. tual and political leader of a group of re- The Bundeswehr’s general staff sys- tem has roots in Scharnhorst’s work and horst: Ausgewählte Schriften (1983), and mind. But what were the characteristics of Hansjürgen Usczeck and Christa Gudzent his comprehensive programme? Are his edited under the title Gerhard von Scharn- principles still applicable today? Does his horst: Ausgewählte militärische Schriften overall concept provide a solution as to how (1986). Another major source for this work an army can face future challenges? Core was several Scharnhorst biographies, of elements of Scharnhorst’s reform of the which four deserve special mention: Rudolf Prussian Army still possess enduring rele- Stadelmann’s Scharnhorst: Schicksal und vance. Scharnhorst recognized that disci- geistige Welt (1952), Reinhard Höhn’s plined intellect was essential to the profes- Scharnhorsts Vermächtnis (1952), Siegfried sion of arms, he encouraged a responsive- Fiedler’s Scharnhorst: Geist und Tat (1958), ness to change within the Prussian officer and Klaus Hornung’s Scharnhorst: Soldat- corps, and he improved the quality of lead- Reformer-Staatsmann (1997). All contain ership on all levels of command by institut- valuable documents relating to Scharnhorst, ing a general staff system. his life, and his work. These sources are complemented by the most comprehensive Scharnhorst’s mind and work must English work, Charles Edward White’s book be analyzed from three distinct perspectives. The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and The major influences that formed Scharn- the Militärische Gesellschaft in Berlin, horst’s particular intellectual skills and apti- 1801-1805 (1989). tude groomed him to be an advocate of re- form. He lived in tumultuous times, within Scharnhorst — his origin, education and the context of the French Revolution and mind disastrous Prussian defeats at the hands of “My career is entirely my work, Napoleon, both of which gave a great impe- since I became ten years old,” Scharnhorst tus to military reform. Scharnhorst had a told his daughter on a piece of paper when profound influence on the subsequent devel- he was seriously ill in March 1809.2 In fact, opment of military education and staff sys- Scharnhorst’s brilliant career was not auto- tems in Prussia. Clausewitz and other dis- matically the logical consequence of his tinguished pupils internalized the ideas and natural abilities and traits. Throughout his principles of their mentor. The lasting life, he had to overcome numerous obstacles qualities of the Scharnhorst legacy are best and unpredictability. What qualities enabled exemplified in today’s Bundeswehr. Scharnhorst to be one of the main reformers Scharnhorst was a prolific writer of the Prussian state after its collapse in who published many articles and books dur- 1806? In answering this question, his back- ing his thirty-five years of military service. ground and those experiences and incidents Even though having left behind a substantial that predominantly influenced Scharnhorst’s body of work in his writings and papers, military and political thinking, his character Scharnhorst never developed a comprehen- and mind, are significant. sive analysis of his views. Therefore, it be- Gerhard Johann David Scharnhorst comes necessary to reconstruct his military was born on 12 November 1755, in Borde- theory from numerous letters, memoranda, nau, a small village northwest of Hanover, and other papers. The main sources for any the eldest son of Ernst Wilhelm Scharnhorst such endeavour are personal letters and pri- and Friedericke Wilhelmine Tegtmeyer. mary documents, which Ursula Gersdorff Their marriage, however, was against the edited under the title Gerhard von Scharn- will of the family Tegtmeyer who had other horst inherited the Tegtmeyer estate in Bor- plans for their youngest daughter. As the denau by judicial decision.8 He was now a son of a so called “Brinksitzer”3 who had free peasant who owned a former manor and served as “Quartiermeister”4 in a Hanove- was exempted from paying taxes. His social rian dragoon-regiment, the social status of advancement allowed him to think about an the elder Scharnhorst was much below the officer career for his son. In preparation for status of the wealthy and respected free this occupation, Scharnhorst received peasant Tegtmeyer. Only after the illegiti- mathematics lectures by a retired captain in mate birth of Scharnhorst’s elder sister Wil- nearby Schwarmstedt. After passing an ex- helmine did the parents Tegtmeyer finally amina-tion, the almost 18-year-old Scharn- consent to the marriage, which took place in horst entered the military academy of Count the church at Bordenau on 31 August 1752. Wilhelm zu Schaumburg-Lippe near Bücke- However, it took another three years before burg on 19 April 1773. reconciliation occurred. This rapproche- Count Wilhelm (1724-77) was ment only happened when the first son was known as a man whose liberal mind was born and was baptized with the name of his coupled with great culture and dignity, and grandfather, Gerhard Johann David.5 his character was in many aspects a remark- When the old Tegtmeyer died in able one.9 Born in London, he went to 1759, his son-in-law took over his own ten- school in Geneva and studied in Leyden and ancy, in Hämelsee, where Scharnhorst spent Montpellier, where he enjoyed a broad edu- most of his childhood in modest yet difficult cation in the classics.10 circumstances. Two years later, his grand- In 1748, Wilhelm became monarch. mother died and inter-family conflict broke His little principality of Schaumburg-Lippe, out again. The two unmarried sisters of the with a population of 20,000, was the fourth old Tegtmeyer accused the elder Scharn- smallest in Germany. Captivated by the horst of legacy hunting. A bitter legal dis- spirit of an enlightened absolutism, Wilhelm pute over the Tegtmeyer inheritance took introduced numerous changes and reforms more than ten years and consumed most of in his little state to raise the morale of his the earnings and savings of the young and people.11 In addition to these progressive growing family. Later, a friend of Scharn- steps, Wilhelm endeavoured to bring intel- horst at that time described the family life as lectuals and artists to Bückeburg, which determined by legal proceedings.6 In 1765, made the royal seat a centre of science and almost all buildings of the farm were de- culture.12 stroyed by fire and the Scharnhorst’s had to move to a new tenancy, in nearby Bothmer. In military affairs, Wilhelm was an It can be assumed that the constant family autodidact, and a successful and revered strife cast a shadow on Scharnhorst’s youth. one. During the Seven Years’s War (1757- In fact, he never spoke positively about this 63), he commanded the allied artillery of period of his life.7 Prussia, Hanover, England and Schaum- burg-Lippe, and was instrumental in the Under these circumstances, how victory of the coalition troops against France could Scharnhorst develop a mind, which at the battle of Minden on 1 August 1759. was the foundation of his later military and In 1762/63, he was a Field Marshal in Por- intellectual leadership? Until that time, he tugal, reorganized the Portuguese forces and had only received a fragmentary school edu- led them successfully during the defensive cation. In 1772, however, the elder Scharn- war against Spain and her ally France.13 Hanover. It had been used since Spring 1767 as an artillery and military engineering In addition to his success as a com- school and became of particular importance mander, Wilhelm was also regarded as an for Scharnhorst. At Wilhelmstein he was exceptional military theorist for his time. able to compensate for his fragmentary His war experiences and continuous reflec- school education; he extended his common tion on the character of war found expres- education and he laid the foundation for his sion in his most famous work “Mémoires thorough professional knowledge and pour servir à l’art militaire défensif”, printed skills.18 Wilhelm personally instituted the in 1776 and written, as were most of his syllabus and selected the textbooks.19 His papers, in French.14 Wilhelm believed that educational concept was based on a combi- “’[w]ar is one of the greatest calamities that nation of theoretical and practical classes afflicts mankind,’ ... ‘an evil inevitabil- with a focus on the artillery and military ity.”’15 For him, the application of the art of engineering science. The young cadets could war is the necessary means to avoid war, or improve their professional and common at least to reduce its evil. “Only the defen- knowledge in courses, such as military his- sive war is legitimate,” wrote Wilhelm, tory, campaign planning, tactics, gunnery, “waging an offensive war, however, was fortifications, military engineering, survey- below an honourable man’s dignity.”16 ing, and terrain sketching as well as mathe- Wilhelm was convinced that a strong de- matics, physics, chemistry, civil engineer- fence could reduce the likelihood of war by ing, economics, geography and languages. deterring an even stronger attacker. Accord- Key to Wilhelm’s ideas of military educa- ingly, the historian Rudolf Stadelmann tion, however, was not only a broad, general called him a “strategist of deterrence in the education, but also the critical examination Rococo period”.17 Wilhelm believed that an of the studied subject. He believed that effective deterrence was predominantly military command was not simply the appli- based on two elements — mobilization of cation of learned techniques. Wilhelm the entire resources of a nation and perfec- stated the purpose: “To understand his pro- tion of the military sciences. Consequently, fession the officer must have some idea of social reforms and military policy were its relationship to other fields of knowledge, deeply interwoven in Schaumburg-Lippe. and the ways in which they contribute to his For Wilhelm, perfection of the science of own.”20 Practical exercises offered the op- war was not contrary to the enlightened hu- portunities for students to apply and verify manitarian spirit. It is rather a precondition their knowledge. for the effective use of defensive means, and consequently, for the welfare of mankind. The main influence on Scharnhorst, He recognized that the key for success however, had been Count Wilhelm himself. would be a highly qualified and effective Acting regularly as an instructor, Wilhelm military leadership. For this purpose, he had the natural talent to inspire his pupils established the military academy at fortress with his personality and military expertise.21 Wilhelmstein. Wilhelmstein became the He cultivated Scharnhorst’s character and prepatory school for the young Scharnhorst intellect, and laid the foundation for his in the study of military art. enlightened mind. According to Rudolf Stadelmann, Wilhelm was “the first great Fortress Wilhelmstein was built be- experience in Scharnhorst’s youth”, “the tween 1765 and 1767on an artificial island most important educational power in his in the Steinhuder Meer, a lake north of life”, and “probably the only superiority he quainted with Count Wilhelm, and believed, ever accepted”.22 Scharnhorst later testified like him, that a professional education to- to Count Wilhelm’s particular character and gether with a solid common knowledge are solicitous noblesse in the first volume of his the basis for successful military leadership. periodical Neues Militärisches Journal: Therefore, in 1770, Estorff had already es- “One will rarely find combined in one per- tablished a regimental school for young of- son that much kindness of the heart and ficers, cadets, and non commissioned offi- greatness of the mind. His affability, the cers. In Northeim, Scharnhorst gave courses goodness of his heart, and his charity made on mathematics, on tactics and on engineer- him the universal father and provider of his ing, and later additionally on sketching, his- state. He had never left people living in tory, and geography.26 Soon he had estab- poverty without help; he never left widows lished a reputation as a talented military and orphans without care. … In his mili- teacher. In tribute to his success, Scharn- tary academy he was principal, instructor horst received an appointment to the newly and benefactor, as well as educator and established artillery school in Hanover. friend of his officers.”23 Finally, Scharn- At the artillery school in Hanover, horst’s great admiration and thankfulness for Scharnhorst continued to teach the same Count Wilhelm culminated in the sentence: subjects as he had at Northeim. The school “He brought happiness to many young peo- was founded and commanded by Lieutenant ple.”24 Colonel Victor Lebrecht von Trew who per- When Count Wilhelm died on 10 sonified more the strict troop officer than the September 1777, his military school was military theoretician. However, like Estorff, subsequently closed and a new chapter be- he was convinced that the improvement of gan in Scharnhorst’s life. He applied for the scientific and technical education of of- service in the Hanoverian Army and on 28 ficers was necessary.27 Soon after his arri- July 1778, he joined the 8th Dragoon Regi- val, Scharnhorst began to make numerous ment in Northeim as Fähnrich (ensign), the suggestions to Trew concerning the insti- same unit in which his father had served. tute’s syllabus, development, and examina- Scharnhorst would stay in the Hanoverian tion procedures. This tendency to present Army for the next 23 years. During this memoranda and concept papers to his supe- time, three primary fields of experience riors would become characteristic of Scharn- formed his mind and influenced his military horst’s future career. career — his occupation as a military educa- In his suggestions, Scharnhorst tor, his active writing, and the War of the stressed the importance of theoretical and First Coalition against the First French Re- applied mathematics, chemistry and physics, public (1792-97). Each, in its own way, left as well as later military history and lan- an imprint on Scharnhorst for the rest of his guages, predominantly French. In doing so, life. Scharnhorst followed the same syllabus con- Scharnhorst’s ability as a teacher cept he himself had experienced at Wilhelm- was recognized from the start. Shortly after stein. he reported for duty in Northeim, his regi- In accordance with Trew, Scharn- mental commander, Major General Em- horst insisted from the start, on expansion merich Otto August von Estorff (1722-96), from an artillery school into a military or appointed him as “second teacher” at the war academy, including all branches of the regimental school.25 Estorff was well ac- service.28 He rejected fears that a scientific these appointments.30 officer education could interfere with the Least of all, Scharnhorst planned and military practice. organized the examination procedures of the If a young man, who is destined for a academy according to clear expectations, military career, does not learn to use which he later also tried to develop in Ber- his mind right, to judge correctly and lin. All cadets should attend a three-year conclusively, the mathematics and course with quarterly intermediate examina- theory of war, then no experience will tions and a final examination by the school help him. One has to give young peo- commander and in the presence of the com- ple, destined to become officers, the manding general and other officers. To- early opportunity to think about their gether with a note signed by the examiners profession, to use other’s insights and these improvements should guarantee the experiences; to do that they need to objectivity of the examination. The candi- have the right basic notions. Without dates should receive an examination certifi- those they will not find an interest in cate, and its marking should be of impor- reading and will become gradually tance for further advancement of the offi- idle and inactive. The lessons at our cers. In doing so, the academy should not institute aim to stimulate the ambition; only acquire a better reputation, but should the students become, due to the cir- also replace the current practice of officer cumstances they live in, interested in promotions being based on connections with things they would not have otherwise objective performance criteria.31 been interested in. They judge among Scharnhorst’s occupation as a teach- themselves, dispute, ask, read up, and er had a positive side effect. It gave him the in doing so learn gradually to examine opportunity to further his education by ap- a topic thoroughly rather than only to plying the principle ‘learning by teaching’. repeat it in private lectures.29 In that time, he also invented numerous im- Scharnhorst recognized that it is im- provements in gunnery, for example the portant to educate military leaders at an micrometer telescope for ranging.32 But early age, even if they needed their knowl- most importantly, during his teaching in edge only when they have achieved higher Hanover, Scharnhorst expanded his reputa- ranks. Experience proved that there is no tion as a knowledgeable and prolific writer time or desire for a comprehensive study at on military subjects. an advanced age or higher rank: First, Scharnhorst published the If Frederick, Gustav Adolf, Condé, Militair Bibliothek of which four volumes, Caesar and Alexander would not have with 150 to 170 pages each, came out in had any theory, and would not have Hanover between 1782 and 1784. Scharn- studied war according to principles, horst intended with this journal to encourage how could they have commanded ar- officers of all branches of the services to mies at age, won battles and made participate in the spiritual and scientific life conquests, as neither the one nor the at that time and he wanted to compensate for other could have had much experi- the fact that most officers did not have a ence? If many years of service would private library. Accordingly, the Militair be sufficient to create generals one Bibliothek contained reviews of important could give old corporals or privates, military literature and papers with direct links to the officer’s profession, as well as translations of foreign military textbooks information about German and European and manuals added.37 Four volumes were armies. It had approximately 700 subscrip- published in Göttingen in 1785 before tions and was read, for example, in Berlin, Scharnhorst decided to end the Bibliothek Dresden, Hamburg, Leipzig, Copenhagen, für Officiere. Lisbon, and Vienna.33 Scharnhorst continued to publish It was the first issue of the Militair journals aimed at a military audience. He Bibliothek, where Scharnhorst revealed his achieved his greatest success with his third rationale for military education. In his arti- periodical, the Neues Militärisches Jour- cle “Introduction to literature: The benefit nal.38 Between 1788 and 1805 thirteen vol- of scientific knowledge, the prejudices umes were published, interrupted by against it and the usual studies,” Scharnhorst Scharnhorst’s participation in the War of the argued the case for training under near com- First Coalition from 1793 to 1797. The bat conditions instead of the daily monoto- character of the Neues Militärisches Journal nous duty and constant drilling: “This con- changed considerably over time. The first stant repetition of an action enervates the seven volumes (1788-93) were rooted in the spirit and exhausts its activity, engendering tradition of the Militair Bibliothek and Bib- antipathy and dissatisfaction.” Through liothek für Officiere. However, the military reading, an officer “enriches himself with pedagogic element became even more evi- the experiences and insights of others.” dent by giving information about foreign “Ignorance”, however, “disgraces the repu- armies, book reviews, articles on tactics, tation of the military”. The “Bildung” of short biographies of important military cap- officers, Scharnhorst argued, “gradually tains, and historical war anecdotes.39 The refines the military”, and consequently “will most quoted military authorities were Fre- have an influence on the society”.34 Indeed, derick the Great and Count Wilhelm zu for Scharnhorst, military education was the Schaumburg-Lippe.40 balance between practical field exercises, In comparison, the last six volumes theoretical instructions, and personal study. of the Neues Militärisches Journal (1797- He believed that “... the profession of arms 1805) were subtitled “Militärische Denk- was not just a craft or technique, which is würdigkeiten unserer Zeit, insbesondere des primarily mechanical, or an art, which re- französischen Revolutionskrieges im Jahr quires unique talent and ability. It was in- 1792 von dem Herausgeber des mili- stead an extraordinarily complex intellectual tärischen Journals” and dealt with the mili- skill requiring comprehensive study and tary, political, and social consequences of training.”35 the French Revolution. Scharnhorst’s ex- After three years, Scharnhorst unex- perience in the War of the First Coalition pectedly stopped publishing the Militair turned the focus to critical examination of Bibliothek. He changed the title, publisher, the revolutionary wars. This writing laid the and place of publication (Göttingen) and foundation for a general debate on the started a new project in 1785, the Bibliothek change of the armed forces and the art of für Officiere. Why Scharnhorst made such a war in that epoch.41 radical move is not clear.36 However, the Scharnhorst’s journals were aimed new periodical was, in terms of content, a mainly at officers interested in extending continuation of the Militair Bibliothek, with their professional knowledge. In addition to reviews of foreign military literature and the military periodicals, he published his Scharnhorst and his spouse had five chil- first book, entitled “Handbuch für Officiere dren.47 Scharnhorst’s eldest daughter, Clara in den anwendbaren Theilen der Kriegswis- Sophie Juliane, became after the death of senschaften”, which appeared between 1787 her mother, his closest confidante and ad- and 1790 in three volumes. Scharnhorst’s dressee of numerous letters, which provide motivation to write this book was rooted in much information about his way of thinking. the lack of a comprehensive textbook at the Scharnhorst had spent the first fif- artillery school in Hanover. Consequently, teen years of his military life almost exclu- the Handbuch für Officiere was a practically sively teaching at military schools and edit- orientated, elementary military compen- ing his military periodicals. During that dium, geared to young officers.42 time, he had established a good reputation as Scharnhorst continued his military an educator and military writer. However, writing. In 1792, Scharnhorst’s second and he was also branded as a military scholar “most popular” book, “Militärisches Tas- without having any practical experience. chenbuch, zum Gebrauch im Felde”, ap- Scharnhorst received the first opportunity to peared.43 His intent was once again to give prove his abilities in combat when after the practical guides to young line and staff offi- execution of King Louis XVI (1754-93) on cers. The book was divided into four sec- 21 January 1793, the First Coalition against tions. The first part addressed infantry and the revolutionary French Republic was cavalry officers by providing tactical guid- formed, under the lead of England. In ance on marches, reconnaissance, ambushes, March 1793, Hanover provided one corps to patrolling, and security operations. The join Austrian and English troops to oppose second part treated the artillery, the third France’s expansion into Flanders and Hol- fortifications, and the fourth the war with land.48 Scharnhorst, advanced to captain on and against fortresses.44 Scharnhorst used 19 October 1792, experienced combat for historical examples in all parts to illustrate the first time as an artillery battery officer in his tenets. This comprehensiveness made the wake of the siege of the fortress Valen- the Militärisches Taschenbuch, according to ciennes in May 1793. Four months later, he Carl von Clausewitz, “the best that has ever would personally distinguish himself as an been written about actual war.”45 Scharn- officer under fire. At the battle of Hond- horst’s military writing influenced several schoote in September 1793, Scharnhorst generations of young officers. took control, without orders, of several weakened Hanoverian units fleeing the bat- Besides Scharnhorst’s professional tlefield and turned the impending rout into development in Hanover, two events of a an orderly rear-guard action that helped pre- personal nature need to be mentioned during serve the entire corps.49 this time. In 1782, Scharnhorst’s father died and he inherited the family estate in Borde- The following year, Scharnhorst nau and, on 24 April 1785, he married Klara received a second opportunity to prove his Schmalz, the daughter of a Hanoverian offi- leadership qualities under fire. At that time, cial. They had met through her brother, the he served as principle staff officer of the jurist Dr. Theodor Schmalz who was a close Hanoverian Major General Rudolf von friend to Scharnhorst. Theodor Schmalz Hammerstein. Hammerstein was ordered to wrote a biography of Count Wilhelm, which occupy the town of Menin in today’s south- inspired or was the result of this acquaint- ern Belgium. Scharnhorst improvised a sys- ance.46 In their eighteen years of marriage, tem of ditches and barricades that enabled the garrison of a little more than 2,000 men At the same time, he was ashamed to to repel several French assaults following confess to his wife, finding “almost pleas- encirclement by approximately 20,000 ure” in warfare that he called a “shameful troops under General Jean-Victor Moreau. activity”.56 This inner conflict between the Moreau’s offer of honourable capitulation exercise of power and the savagery of war was rejected by Hammerstein with the bold confirmed to him the importance of his the- statement: “Nous sommes habitués à faire ory of Bildung. With regard to the plunder- notre devoir on se rendra pas.”50 To save ing of villages and his experiences during his force, Hammerstein decided to break the siege of Valeciennes, Scharnhorst wrote: through the siege. Scharnhorst took com- The man without Bildung is surely a mand of a part of the corps to make the at- cattle, a cruel beast; in general I have tempt and, on the night of 30 April 1794, found that only well-educated people succeeded against strong French opposition. sought to alleviate the horrors of war, Out of 1,800 troops taking part in the opera- and that uneducated officers were just tion, 1,500 were able to break through.51 as bestial as the rank and file.57 This operation was regarded as a moral vic- tory and Scharnhorst’s contributions were What really dismayed him, however, fully recognized.52 In his report to the was the lack of Bildung and ignorance commander of the Hanoverian troops, Gen- within the Hanoverian military leadership: eral Count von Wallmoden, Hammerstein “I can well praise myself that nobody knows gave the credit to Scharnhorst, and recom- the connection better than I do. Here are mended to ask King George III in London awful stupid and cowardly people.” And, in for “a reward for something extraordi- the same letter Scharnhorst confided to his nary.”53 Hammerstein’s report had a fa- wife: vourable result. On 27 June 1794, Scharn- I would be contented, if I only could horst was promoted to major, and subse- achieve any aim. I do recognize the quently, was transferred as second aide- inappropriateness of many orders, and general quartermaster to Wallmonden’s 54 I cannot say anything to that. There- staff. fore, my ambition does not get satis- Although Scharnhorst had proved fied, … because I do not see yet, how himself under fire, he revealed a remarkable to get a company. The silliest cattle ambivalence about his profession and the succeed here almost as well as the savagery of war in particular. “I am not most intelligent.58 made to be a soldier”, he wrote to his wife Here, Scharnhorst for the first time on 24 May 1793, and affected by the battle confessed his strong desire to command. He of Famars (23-24 May 1793). felt very qualified for this task. But at the I can face danger without difficulty, same time, he was well aware that within the but I am enraged and thrown in an in- existing caste-ridden Hanoverian Army, his supportable mood by the sight of in- chance to get such a command was low. nocent people moaning in their blood Once again, a 12 year old aristocrat at my feet, by the flames of burning from the country will be appointed to villages, which men have put to the the Regiment Diepenbroik, and Gust, torch for their own pleasure, by the who is qualified for everything, is be- other horrors of this universal devasta- 55 ing set back only because he has not a tion. title. Aristocrats are setting us back socio-political and morale factors of the war. and yet we fight for them — that is the Scharnhorst noted that France was able to way it is.59 mobilize “all available resources of the na- tion”, whereas the allied forces did not have After the campaigns of 1793-95, such support.62 He deduced that the deeper Scharnhorst returned to Hanover in the quar- reason for French success was primarily termaster staff. His thoughts at that time driven by social and political changes. The were focused on the revolution in warfare enthusiasm of the French soldiers was based that was obviously taking place in conse- on a society determined to fight for its revo- quence of the political developments in lutionary ideals. With the French nation-in- France and the success of the French nation- arms, war became the business of the people in-arms over the standing armies in Europe. again, all of whom considered themselves to Inspired by his personal war experience, be citizens. In comparison, the Allies of the Scharnhorst systematically and thoroughly First Coalition did not have common inter- analysed the basic reasons for the French ests to fight for, except the retention of their success in the Revolutionary Wars, and power and the fear of the revolution. summarized his notions in his main essay “Entwickelung der allgemeinen Ursachen Thirdly, Scharnhorst delineated the des Glücks der Franzosen in dem Revolu- superior effectiveness of French military tionskriege, und insbesondere in den education and organization. Beyond better Feldzügen von 1794”, which he and his officer’s training, he pointed out that in the friend Friedrich von der Decken published French Army, the decisive criteria to ad- in the Neues Militärisches Journal in vance in the hierarchy were qualification 1797.60 and merit. In the Allied Armies, however, an officer’s career was determined on de- In this essay, Scharnhorst described scent and social status. Due to this socio- the changes in tactics introduced by the political difference, the French did have a French. Based on patriotic volunteers and, higher qualified officer corps. In addition, later, on conscripts in apparently unlimited they made use of an effective command and quantities, the French troops applied a com- control element, the general staff. Conse- bination of free-firing skirmishers (“tirail- quently, Scharnhorst was convinced that leurs”) and dense columns of attack in coor- “after 1793, general staffs had become as dination with extensive artillery support. important for armies as governments are for The flexible and dispersed fighting order of states.”63 the tirailleurs proved to be superior to the linear tactics of the allied troops, especially Scharnhorst drew the conclusion that in intersected and covered terrain. This tac- to deal with the challenge of the French na- tical advantage was of particular importance tion-in-arms it was necessary to modernize for Scharnhorst: “And, it is an established Hanover’s military institutions. He ad- fact that the French tirailleurs had decided vanced his arguments not only in his publi- the greatest part of affairs in this war; that cations, lectures, and discussions, but also in they were superior to those of the Allied memoranda to his superiors. For him, the armies.”61 basic renewal of the officer corps, its re- cruitment and professional education, the However, Scharnhorst’s essay was better education of non-commissioned offi- more than a typical military examination of cers, the promotion to lieutenant by exami- tactical affairs. He also considered the nation, the abolition of nepotism and favour- itism, the reorganization of the army into able pension for himself and his family.69 In all-arms divisions, and the institution of a his official application to the Prussian King, permanent general staff were of overriding on 25 October 1800, he finally added a third importance.64 request — the promise of being ennobled. After Frederick Wilhelm III had met these Scharnhorst’s analysis of the chal- terms, Scharnhorst asked for his reassign- lenge posed by revolutionary France found ment from the Hanoverian Army on 30 De- little support in Hanover. The Hanoverian cember 1800. On 12 May 1801, he trans- Army was not persuaded of the need for ferred to Prussian service. fundamental reform in the military sphere. To do so would have required important Scharnhorst in Prussia political and social adjustments “no less Scharnhorst was a man of forty-six than a revolution in service.”65 There were when he arrived in Berlin in the late still doubts that King George III “would spring of 1801, in robust health, ac- have been reluctant to test the resistance of customed to work half the night, with the Hanoverian aristocracy and the estates in a mind that had reached the full pow- the defense of their long-standing privi- ers of maturity while retaining its leges.”66 early receptivity and suppleness. To Scharnhorst was well aware that due his new comrades he presented an un- to both social and professional reasons, his usual figure. He carried himself neg- further advancement in the caste-ridden ligently, his trunk and massive head Hanoverian military was restricted, and even bent slightly forward. His speech, too, more important, that it was very unlikely he lacked elegance of form; it was low- would get the command position he was keyed, deliberate, at times halting, yearning for.67 It was this turn of events that with a Hanoverian intonation that convinced Scharnhorst to reopen negotia- sounded slurred to Prussian ears. tions with the Prussian Army. Already in Even on the parade ground he dis- 1797, the Prussian King Frederick Wilhelm played none of the physical tautness III (1797-1840) had offered him a position and smartness of manner that was be- in his army. At that time, Scharnhorst de- coming fashionable among other Prus- clined the Prussian offer because Hanover sian soldiers. An artillery officer was promoted him to lieutenant colonel and pro- soon heard to say that in service mat- vided a significant salary income.68 Three ters any NCO [non-commissioned of- years later, however, his plans had become ficer] was superior to the newcomer.70 more concrete. Scharnhorst was attracted by This short and sharp portrait by Peter the Prussian Army, which was considered Paret, illustrates why “Prussia’s new acqui- the most important in Germany and pro- sition” received a cool reception in Berlin. vided opportunities he was denied in Hano- A large part of the Prussian officer corps ver. branded Scharnhorst as a military scholar, In a letter to the Prussian intermedi- an “indecisive, unpractical, unmilitary book ary, Lieutenant Colonel Karl Ludwig Lecoq, writer,” and reformer.71 Scharnhorst de- on 5 October 1800, Scharnhorst referred to cided to act cautiously in this new and po- the contacts established in 1797 and re- tentially hostile environment. He recog- quested a posting as a lieutenant colonel in nized the tensions between traditionalists the Prussian artillery, as well as a respect- and reform orientated officers in Berlin and decided, for the time being, to remain impar- Frederick Wilhelm III followed the judge- tial. “Admittedly it has its disagreeable ment of Duke Karl of Brunswick that the side, but in the long run it takes you far- proposed innovations “would be not appli- thest,” he told his wife.72 cable to the Royal Prussian Army.”77 While cautiously dealing with his Recognizing that for the time being superiors, Scharnhorst continued to strive the Prussian military was beyond compre- for military reforms. Soon after he had set- hensive reform, Scharnhorst changed strat- tled in Berlin, he advanced several proposals egy by adopting an indirect approach. Con- and memoranda to the King and senior Prus- vinced of Frederick the Great’s theorem that sian officers intended to enhance organiza- “the spirit of an army lives in the heads of tion and education in the Prussian Army in the officers” he now put his hope in Bildung order to catch up with the French. His sug- and insight to change the spirit of the Prus- gestions for reform were based on the same sian military leadership. However, this en- concept he had already advocated in Hano- deavour was challenging. How could the ver. But as in Hanover, there were strong Prussian aristocrats, who believed in their objections to his plans. inherent command abilities, become con- vinced of the value of Bildung? And, how At the beginning of the nineteenth could the prejudices against Bildung, which century, many senior officers in the Prussian since the French Revolution had become Army “had been subalterns during the wars disreputable and was seen as a “preliminary of Frederick the Great, and they combined a stage of putsch,” be removed?78 veneration for Frederican methods with a stubborn reluctance to admit that the prac- Scharnhorst clearly recognized that tice of warfare may change.”73 These offi- generals trained under Frederick the Great cers actually doubted whether the success of could not be re-educated. Every attempt to the French was significant enough to re- do so, to show them that their professional examine Frederick’s principles, or as Queen knowledge needed to be updated, would not Louise had written, the Prussian military only be hopeless but would also cause fierce (and with it the Prussian state) “had fallen opposition to his plans. For this reason, asleep on Frederick’s laurels.”74 Lieutenant Scharnhorst confronted the Prussian gener- General Ernst Friedrich von Rüchel illus- als with the moral question: “What will hap- trated this arrogant confidence with his habit pen when the men Frederick II trained dur- of saying “that the Prussian Army possessed ing the Seven Years’ War are no longer with several generals of the quality of ‘Herrn von us?” And at the same time, he provided the Bonaparte’.”75 answer: “This crisis can be met only by edu- cating our officers.”79 Scharnhorst believed Against this background, it is not that if he could convince parts of the senior surprising why these conservative, predomi- Prussian leadership of his notions, a highly nantly noble traditionalists were unrespon- educated young officer generation could be sive to innovations, especially when intro- developed. Those officers would be capable duced by a Hanoverian son of a peasant. of meeting the new challenges of war and They were well aware that each of Scharn- balancing the widespread incompetence horst’s proposals “denied the continued va- within the senior leadership itself. lidity of a particular aspect of the Frederi- cian system, and each was potentially dam- With the cabinet order of 5 Septem- aging to special interests.”76 Finally, King ber 1801, Scharnhorst would receive the opportunity to translate his theory into prac- Scharnhorst’s goal with the academy tice. At that time, there were three main was to enhance the very low educational military institutes in Berlin. The “Ecole standard throughout the Prussian officer Militaire”, also named “Académie des No- corps. “One has always recognized,” stated bles”, was founded by Frederick the Great, Scharnhorst, and educated talented noble cadets with a that most families select their most in- focus on fine arts and philosophy. On the competent sons to become officers, other hand, the predominantly bourgeois one has seen a lot of officers who cadets of the artillery corps received their were incompetent to do an officer’s scientific professional foundation at the job; one has seen officers who could “Militärkademie der Artillerie” (Military neither write nor calculate, and what is Academy of the Artillery). Between these the worst of all, one has generally rec- extremes existed a third, almost neglected ognized that most young people, as military institute, the so-called “Lehr- soon as they had become officers, Anstalt für junge Infanterie- und Kavallerie- immediately ceased their efforts, and Offiziere” (Institute for Young Infantry and instead resigned themselves to idle- Cavalry Officers), and Scharnhorst was ap- ness and often to unrestraint.85 pointed its director.80 Now, he had a key position inside the Prussian military educa- Scharnhorst believed that “ignorance tional system, and a vehicle that allowed is degrading and dishonouring the military, him to influence parts of future Prussian and often the entire state.”86 For him the officer generations. profession of arms was an “extraordinarily complex intellectual skill, requiring com- In this new area of responsibility, prehensive study and training.” Through a Scharnhorst was in his pedagogical and or- thorough scientific education, the officer ganizational element. Within the next three would develop “insight” and “understand- years, he transformed the institute from an ing” for the reforms necessary in order to insignificant military regional school into a cope with the challenges in the wake of the military academy of national importance. new war paradigm. Subsequently, the offi- Everything in the academy, “up to the re- cer would become a “thinking officer”, ports and admittance requirements” was pushing progress in the army on his own influenced by Scharnhorst’s mind.81 He initiative.87 At the end of the day, this group developed the curriculum, he selected the of educated officers would create an impor- best available instructors, he set the bench- tant “centre of power” for the Prussian mon- mark with his own lectures, and he fought archy. “Men with insight”, as Scharnhorst successfully several times for a budget in- called them, trained in military command, crease.82 In 1804, finally, the transformation were ready to “rise themselves up, if the process culminated when Scharnhorst wrote state was in difficulties”.88 From regarding a comprehensive constitution dealing with war as a science, it was only a short step to the details of the then called “Akademie für the introduction of a coherent scientific edu- junge Offiziere” (Academy for Young Offi- cation in an academy, combining all cers).83 According to Rudolf Stadelmann, branches of the service. Consequently, the this document was the crowning moment of Akademie für junge Offiziere was a decisive Scharnhorst’s twenty years of educational cornerstone in Scharnhorst’s pedagogical experience as it “could not be thought purer concept. But how did he put his theory into and brighter.”84 practice? According to its organizational struc- All lectures in the art of war will leave ture the Akademie für junge Offiziere be- those in the dark who did not serve in longed to the Prussian general-quartermaster a war, or who did not have the oppor- staff, supervised by the general-quarter- tunity in war to get the right ideas of master who also acted as the inspector.89 army operations, if they do not see The student body was fixed at twenty offi- through examples in the field how the cers from outside Berlin plus a group of paper sentences and tenets could be officers from the Berlin regiments, selected applied.94 by the inspector. There was no formal ex- A young officer’s power of judge- amination for admission. The director, how- ment had to be aroused in the field. There ever, interviewed all applicants and had the he had to learn that the knowledge of uni- right to reject those he judged unsuitable. versal rules alone was not sufficient. Rather The course of instruction extended over more important was the recognition of the three consecutive winters, from 1 September certain circumstances under which these to 21 March. Students attended classes for rules had to be applied. sixteen to twenty hours a week, supple- mented by private study, remedial instruc- If the officer does not know how and tion, practical exercises and field excur- where he could apply the universal sions.90 principles and rules, and if he did not make his eyes used to the terrain; if he The Akademie für junge Offiziere is not able to comply with the certain derived from Scharnhorst’s application of circumstances — if he here was miss- the best aspects of his previous experience. ing practice and judgement — what Scharnhorst never did develop a complete then does it help him all? Everybody educational concept.91 However, he did suc- knows the advantages of outflanking; cessfully apply the educational principles he but how many know how and where had experienced at Wilhelmstein, and prac- this can be done.95 ticed at Northeim and Hanover. His overall goal was to form young cadets and officers Demanding a close link between with an “independent intellect” and to de- lecturing the art of war in classes and gain- velop their “power of judgement” systemati- ing practical experience in the field, Scharn- cally.92 These officers would be the hinge to horst opposed the usual drill routine in the overcome the pedantic focus on drill and on Prussian barracks. His philosophy, today teaching single facts within the Prussian known as mission orientated training, is still Army. Their cultivated intellect would pro- a basic element in the training of modern vide them a critical view about all military armed forces. But how did he methodically dogma and ideologies and would examine transfer his notions into action? whether they were valid in reality. Scharnhorst recognized that educa- Although, Scharnhorst had clear tional success depends on three factors — pedagogical objectives, he was concerned the method of the lectures, the teacher’s skill how to “place theory and practice in the and ability, and the pupil’s diligence.96 proper relationship.”93 The key to success, With regard to the low standard of education he believed, would be to allow young offi- most of his students had, Scharnhorst in- cers to apply their theoretical knowledge in sisted: “the desire to learn must not be re- the field. duced by an overtaxing teaching enthusi- asm.”97 An overloading of the students had to be avoided. Therefore, it would be neces- stances. Clausewitz later described this sary to select only that subject material most quality as “coup d’oeil”, and as an essential “relevant to the education and training of the element of “military genius.”102 In Scharn- officer.”98 And, in order to prevent tiredness horst’s concept, theory had to be based on “lectures must never last more than one experience. In the absence of experience, hour.”99 however, the study of war had to be founded on history. He believed that “history was The teachers had “to focus more on the most complete intellectual representation thoroughness than on the amount of material of reality.”103 Consequently, the examina- taught,” Scharnhorst wrote. He believed tion of historical examples would help offi- that “[a] main thing in every institution is cers to train judgement. not to teach too much, but to consider that the students also should understand how to With regard to the third factor for apply skilfully what they had learned.”100 educational success, the diligence of the Therefore, teachers should not present final pupil, Scharnhorst stressed the importance results, but guide students to find their own of “ambition”. He wrote: “Most effective is solution. Forming intellect instead of sup- that man in whom the flame of ambition is porting rote learning was one of Scharn- burning most purely, and the state must be horst’s main concerns. As Clausewitz, his supported and led by his most effective ele- most famous pupil, later wrote: ments.”104 In Scharnhorst’s mind, it was essential to keep up the voluntary nature of Far from being a pedant, he [Scharn- learning and to avoid the exertion of school- horst] placed little value in the raw masterish pressure. The lectures should be substance of knowledge, and paid at- attended regularly; however, their selection tention only to the intellectual and was the responsibility of the students. The spiritual values that can develop from young officers should learn that it was it; nor was anyone more practical and knowledge that made their profession in- active. This showed unmistakably in teresting. Scharnhorst assured them that “if his judgement and selection of men they had acquired thorough knowledge, they for important assignments; native in- would be in a better position on achieving telligence, common sense, even the higher appointments than those who were crude child of nature counted more lacking this knowledge.”105 In order to cre- with him than any amount of learning ate a positive learning climate, student mis- that had not yet proved its aptitude takes in written deliverables, as well as their and usefulness.101 best performances, should be examined In Scharnhorst’s opinion, dialogue anonymously.106 Convinced of the psycho- and discourse should methodically enrich logical effect of ambition, Scharnhorst the lectures while all dogma and rigid for- stated, that “the ambition to be the first” mulas should be eschewed. This approach would automatically create outstanding per- would arouse pupils thinking with an inde- formances.107 pendent, critical, and receptive mind. Ac- All the notions that Scharnhorst had cordingly, they would develop a proud con- about enhancing the military educational sciousness of their own effort, and even system found their way in the Akademie für more important, they would be prepared to junge Offiziere. There, he was able to think and respond intelligently and resource- gather and educate those young men, who fully under complex and uncertain circum- later, among others, became the designers of the Prussian Army reform — Carl von suited to place theory and practice in Clause-witz, Karl Ludwig von Tiedemann, proper relationship.112 Ludwig Wilhelm von Boyen, and Rühle von Functioning like a club, the work of Lilienstren. The most impressive reference the Society focused on a variety of intellec- for Scharnhorst’s inspiring thoughts, how- tual activities. “There would be no meeting ever, was given by Clausewitz who called without a lecture on a military topic,” wrote his mentor “the father of my spirit.”108 Scharnhorst.113 In order to achieve this With the Akademie für junge Of- goal, he inspired the associates to write es- fiziere, Scharnhorst had created an effective says, to present them, and discuss them with institution to educate parts of the young of- the membership. This discussion would ficer generation. Over the long term, these often induce the author to examine a topic in officers could imbue the Prussian Army with more depth and subsequently, would train a new spirit and enhance its professionalism. his “power of judgement”. “The preparation But how could he convince the decision- of a short essay is often more instructive for makers then of the need for reform? How the author than the reading of a thick book,” could he permeate the middle and upper Scharnhorst pointed out.114 Moreover, essay ranks with his notions? competitions provided the necessary incen- tive. The fact that these competitions were Scharnhorst was aware that the often conducted anonymously would help to proud, aristocratic Prussian senior officers “create more space for innovative ideas.”115 with their widespread reservations about With these methodical tricks, Scharnhorst Bildung could not be brought back to school heightened the willingness for active par- that easily. They, as Clausewitz remarked, ticipation within the membership. His ob- “like most persons, could only get floated on jectives, however, were more far-reaching. the sandbank of their prejudices with invisi- ble levers.”109 The vehicle for this endeav- In the Militärische Gesellschaft, our became a volunteer society called the Scharnhorst created an intellectual climate “Militärische Gesellschaft”, and according where military affairs could be openly dis- to the historian Reinhard Höhn, “one of the cussed, “without being suspected of having genius creations of Scharnhorst’s mind.”110 a subversive tendency.”116 A prerequisite, “We have founded a military, scholarly so- he recognized, would be to obtain and main- ciety here,” Scharnhorst wrote his wife on tain objectivity. He accomplished this ob- 24 July 1801: “I was invited to be a mem- jectivity not least by winning General von ber, and at the first meeting was called its Rüchel, Inspector General of the Prussian director.”111 Guards and military institutions, and gover- nor of Potsdam, for the honorary position of The purpose of the Militärische Ge- presidency. According to the statutes, the sellschaft, according to the first article of its president was guiding “the spirit that reigns statutes, was: in the society.”117 Having a powerful tradi- …to instruct its members through the tionalist like Rüchel for president, “who exchange of ideas in all areas of the considered himself the standard-bearer of art of war, in a manner that would en- the Frederician tradition in the army,” would courage them to seek out truth, that give the Militärische Gesellschaft a certain would avoid the difficulties of private reputation and legitimacy, while Scharnhorst study with its tendency to one- himself, who as director, was the real execu- sidedness, and that would seem best tive authority, could stay and act in the background.118 ter the transformation of warfare unleashed by the French Revolution. Consequently, he Under Scharnhorst’s direction, the insisted on removing the quartermaster staff Militärische Gesellschaft provided an intel- from its subsidiary position to an institution lectual platform, where under the protection of central significance, a notion he had al- of certain traditionalists, the advocates for ready declared during his time in Hanover. innovation and reform could announce their In Scharnhorst’s mind, a general staff could notions within the framework of academic work out strategic plans and consult the customs.119 At the end of the day, this inter- higher command. Additionally, well- change would affect the mind of the mem- educat-ed general staff officers could assist bers, and subsequently, it would enhance the com-manders-in-chief and improve their army’s receptiveness to innovation. The leader-ship through qualified advice. reputation of the Society attracted officers from all ranks as well as civilians, among Actually, Colonel Christian von whom the then Minister of Finance, Massenbach and not Scharnhorst had insti- Reichsfreiherr Friedrich Karl von und zum gated the reorganization of the Prussian gen- Stein, was the most prominent. Until the eral-quartermaster staff (at that time the of- break up of the Militärische Gesellschaft in ficial Prussian terminology for general 1805, when the Prussian army mobilized for staff). In 1802, Massenbach, who was a the war against France, it had almost two Württemberger in origin and a most active hundred associates, including two princes of member of the Militärische Gesellschaft the royal house, August and Louis Ferdi- advanced two memoranda to the King, nand. On the other hand, nearly half of the pointing out the necessity of a permanent officers were captains and lieutenants, in- general staff even in peacetime as the central cluding most of Scharnhorst’s students at element for planning and consulting organi- the Akademie für junge Offiziere. The ma- zation of the highest command.121 He pro- jority of the officer membership became posed that this general staff should prepare generals. Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Karl operational plans for military eventualities Wilhelm von Grolmann, Rühle von Lilien- in three possible “theatres of operations” — stern, and Friedrich Karl Freiherr von Müf- East (Russia), South (Austria, Silesia) and fling, all from the Militärische Gesellschaft, West (France). Accordingly, the staff became Chief of the Prussian General should consist of three sections or so-called Staff.120 This fact indicates that under “brigades”. Exercise journeys should be Scharnhorst’s guidance the Militärische regularly undertaken in peacetime for the Gesellschaft became a focal point of intel- purpose of reconnoitring the terrain and lect and Bildung in the Prussian Army. He studying possible scenes of operations. Fur- now had a vehicle to influence discreetly the thermore, Massenbach insisted that the chief mind of the middle and upper officer ranks. of staff should have unhindered and uncon- Furthermore, with the Mili-tärische Gesell- trolled access to the sovereign, called “Im- schaft in combination with the Akademie für mediatvortrag”. Its implementation would junge Offiziere, Scharn-horst had formed not only mean an advance toward unified two instruments to enhance the intellectual control of strategic policy, but also a signifi- level of the Prussian officer corps. cant influence by the chief of staff on strate- gic decisions.122 Scharnhorst recognized, however, that besides intellect, a sound organization Based on Massenbach’s suggestions, would be the second essential means to mas- King Frederick Wilhelm III ordered the re- organization of the general-quartermaster corps and to newly-created division head- staff on 26 November 1803.123 Lieutenant quarters. But, a unified planning, and com- General Julius August von Grawert was mand and control element was missing. entrusted with this task and Lieutenant Gen- Even Scharnhorst who was appointed chief eral Levin von Geusau was appointed gen- of staff to the Duke of Brunswick, the com- eral-quartermaster (chief of staff). The staff mander of the Prussian main army, experi- consisted of twenty-one officers and in ac- enced limited influence on events. “What cordance with Massenbach’s plan, it was ought to be done I know only too well,” he divided into three brigades, each headed by wrote to his daughter on 7 October 1806: a general-quartermaster-lieutenant.124 “What is going to be done, only the gods Scharnhorst (now promoted to colonel) took know.”128 over the 3rd Brigade, responsible for West- One week later, on 14 October 1806, ern Germany. The 1st Brigade, headed by came the disastrous defeat of the Prussian Karl Ludwig von Phull (also a Württember- Army by Napoleon at Jena and Auerstedt. ger by origin), dealt with East Prussia, and Scharnhorst himself gave an illustrative ex- the 2nd Brigade under Massenbach covered ample for the disaster that day. When his Central and Southern Germany, including troops were forced to retreat, he gave his Silesia. horse to a brother of the King, whose own Unfortunately, the three general- horse had been killed, picked up a musket, quartermaster-lieutenants disagreed amongst and fled the battlefield wounded and on foot themselves on almost every issue of strategy with the last of the infantry.129 and tactics. As a result, each pursued their Prussia’s military catastrophe re- individual concerns within their area of re- vealed — despite Napoleon’s genius and the sponsibility.125 A single general staff acad- fact that the Prussian Army was outnum- emy to balance these differences was miss- bered — that the Frederician army’s organi- ing. Furthermore, the role of the new staff zation and tactics had become obsolete. An within the military organization remained unsuccessful end to the war threatened the unclear. “Prussia now had for the first time military and political downfall of the Prus- a regular General Staff,” Walter Görlitz has sian state, and found expression in the Peace written: of Tilsit (9 July 1807).130 The political fu- The only trouble was that nobody ture of post-war Prussia was uncertain. She knew the true use of this institution had to be prepared that Napoleon would and that among the organized disorder destroy her if he thought it politically expe- of the various military hierarchies dient. Concerned about this situation and [Quartermaster staff, Oberkriegskol- the preservation of his dynasty, Frederick legium and Adjutant-General’s de- Wilhelm III finally determined to proceed partment] the exact limits of its func- with thorough reforms. In the so-called Or- tions and authority was not clearly telsburg Publicandum of 1 December 1806 regulated.126 (only six weeks after Jena and Auerstedt) and in later memoranda, he outlined ideas With regard to these inadequacies it that basically coincided with Scharnhorst’s is not surprising that the Prussian General views.131 Staff “made its début on the stage of history with a fiasco.”127 In the war year 1806, gen- Immediately after the Peace of Tilsit, eral staff officers were distributed to various Frederick Wilhelm III promoted Scharnhorst to major general and appointed him chair- its free growth — our work cannot go man of the “Militär-Reorganisations-Kom- further than that.135 mission” (Military Reorganization Commis- Scharnhorst believed that while the sion) on 25 July 1807. Initially, Scharnhorst memory of Jena and Auerstedt was fresh, mourned, as the commission was a “very now would be the best time to achieve what heterogeneous” one.132 Gradually, however, up to then had been ignored. Within the he managed to replace the most obstruc- next two years, the plans for the reorganiza- tionist members with men he trusted. Most tion of the Prussian Army had been com- had been his students at the Akademie für pleted and essential parts of the reform pro- junge Offiziere or members of the posals were accepted and ratified by the Militärische Gesellschaft, like for example King. The reform work focused on four Boyen, Grolmann, Braun, Count Dohna, fundamental questions — the conceptual Tiedemann, and Clausewitz. Others, like framework of the army and consequently the Gneisenau, had attracted Scharnhorst’s at- issue of universal conscription in the future, tention by distinguishing themselves in com- the amendment of doctrine and equipment, bat. All had proven themselves under the renewal of the officer corps, and the fire.133 Finally, when Stein, who was reorganization of the army. The various Scharnhorst’s counterpart in the civil ad- proposals the Prussian reformers made and ministration, joined the commission the link implemented are not directly germane to between civilian and military reformers was Scharnhorst and his influence on profes- established. sional military education. However, the As the head of the Military Reor- question whether the two essential elements ganization Commission Scharnhorst, had of Scharnhorst’s reform concept, intellect become the intellectual as well as the politi- and organization, are still relevant for a cal leader of the military reformers. Their modern army requires closer examination. goal, however, was not to build a new state: Scharnhorst’s concept of a general staff “The only changes wanted were those that system — out-of-date or still modern? would generate additional power, and any- thing old but still serviceable was used.”134 For Scharnhorst, the failure of Prus- Thus, the plans of the reformers were rather sian military leadership at Jena and Au- evolutionary than revolutionary. The pre- erstedt demonstrated once more that quali- requisite for success, however, would be the fied command would be the key for military break-up of the old absolutist system, or as success. He believed that a permanent gen- Scharnhorst expressed it in a letter to eral staff would secure the quality of com- Clausewitz: mand, and at the same time guarantee its continuity. In Winter 1807/08, Scharnhorst We must kindle a sense of independ- presented his proposals for the reorganiza- ence in the nation; we must enable the tion of the general-quartermaster staff and nation to understand itself and to take the establishment of a permanent Prussian up its own affairs; only the will of the general staff to the King.136 “A well in- nation to acquire self-respect and to structed, theoretically and practically edu- compel the respects of others will suc- cated and trained general staff,” he wrote, ceed. To work toward that goal is all had become “for the army of every modern we can do. To destroy the old forms, power an unavoidable essential need.”137 remove the ties of prejudice, guide and Scharnhorst’s general staff system com- nurture our revival without inhibiting prised three principal and interrelated ele- Additionally, Scharnhorst introduced ments — the reorganization of the Prussian a “troop general staff” (Truppengeneral- command structure, identification and selec- stab), in order to enhance the quality of tion of talented young officers, as well as the leadership at the tactical level of com- training and education of these men to gen- mand.141 Scharnhorst recognized that it eral staff officers. would be a hopeless undertaking to remove all “ignorant generals, whose understanding Reorganization of the Prussian com- of strategy and tactics was not beyond the mand structure was initiated with the cabinet knowledge of a subaltern officer.”142 Their order for “Establishment of the General War authority and the tradition supporting them Department” on 25 December 1808. The were too powerful. Scharnhorst’s solution following year, on 1 March, the Ministry of was to assign highly educated general staff War was created as one of five new minis- officers to the different headquarters, guid- tries of state. The War Ministry was organ- ing the commanding generals according to ized into two principal departments — the the intentions of the supreme command, and General War Department, and the Economic advising them on all matters of the science Department, which dealt with administra- of war. With this notion, the general staff as tive and budget matters. The General War the brain of the army was born, and the role Department was divided into three “Divi- of the general staff officers was raised from sions”. The First Division, headed by Grol- a purely administrative one to an assistant mann, carried out the main functions of the commander. The troop general staff, repre- old general adjutant’s office (General- sented by the chief of staff, became a re- adjutantur) and reported to the King on per- placement for the commander’s lack of tal- sonnel matters. The Second Division, under ent. It had been developed into an effective Boyen, formed the general staff, while the planning and controlling instrument for mili- former general-quartermaster staff was abol- tary operations. ished. The Third Division, placed under Gneisenau, was the artillery and engineer Scharnhorst was aware that his con- division dealing also with procurement mat- cept required officers of superior character ters.138 and intellect. Their identification, selection, training, and education would be essential to With creation of the War Ministry, achieve his vision. His notions found their Scharnhorst disposed of the former “organ- way in the “Reglement” of 6 August 1808, ized disorder of the various military hierar- whereby the Military Reorganization Com- chies.”139 Now, Prussia had an institution mission issued the future selection criteria that centralized the activities of war. Fur- for officers. Its opening paragraph declared: thermore, a general staff would advise the King and not the general-adjutant, who A claim to the position of officer shall “used to be an infantry officer without from now on be warranted in peace- higher knowledge.”140 For Scharnhorst, the time by knowledge and education, in general staff should become the focal point time of war by exceptional bravery for collective knowledge and astuteness; in and quickness of perception. From the other words, it was meant to be a consulting whole nation, therefore, all individuals instrument substituting for the strategist’s who possess these qualities can lay ti- lack of military genius, and unifying com- tle to the highest positions of honour mand of the army in the field. in the military establishment. All so- cial preferences which as hitherto ex- isted is herewith terminated in the pass an entrance examination. The classes military establishment, and everyone, were limited to fifty officers. The educa- without regard for his background, has tional goal was to prepare selected officers the same duties and the same rights.143 from all branches for the general staff and for service as adjutants and assistants to The Reglement further stated that senior commanders. candidates for commissions no longer en- tered the army as officer-cadets but as pri- The Allgemeine Kriegsschule was vates. They had to demonstrate a minimum the final cornerstone in Scharnhorst’s en- level of academic competence before they deavour to improve Prussian military leader- were appointed to the rank of ensign and ship. He had now set the preconditions for pass a second examination for promotion to selection, training, and education of a mili- lieutenant. To give due weight not only to tary elite, and in the general staff, he had the candidate’s knowledge but also to his created the organizational instrument to character and personality, the regiments had bring this intellectual potential to bear. The to report on those candidates who were al- link between a sound military organization ready serving. This law was a revolution in and intellect was established. But is Scharn- selecting the army’s leadership. Its focus on horst’s general staff system still relevant to knowledge, examination, and education today’s Bundeswehr? broke down the aristocratic exclusivity of The Bundeswehr does not have a the Prussian officer corps. It reformed the general staff in the traditional sense, but it practice of automatic promotion according does have officers in general staff and admi- to seniority and gave scope to talent, qualifi- ral staff appointments. The command and cation, and justified ambition. Additionally, control organization of the German armed it made necessary a thorough reform of forces has been streamlined in the wake of Prussia’s military educational system. the reorganization that the Bundeswehr is According to Scharnhorst’s plans, presently undertaking. The position of the military education was more simply and Chief of Staff, Bundeswehr, (Generalinspek- rationally organized into a three-tier struc- teur der Bundeswehr) has been reinforced ture, under supervision of a single director- with additional instruments for planning and ate. On the first level were the cadet operational command and control. The schools, which prepared aspiring officers for “Op-erations Council” (Einsatzrat), for ex- the ensign examination. The second level ample, is chaired by the Chief of Staff consisted of three military schools in Berlin, Bundeswehr and supports the Commander in Breslau, and Königsberg, which prepared Chief of the Armed Forces in the planning, ensigns for their second examination. At the preparation, and command and control of apex of the educational programme, the Bundeswehr operations. Moreover, the three institutes for advanced study that ex- newly established “Joint Operations Com- isted before 1806 (see pages 24-5 of this mand” (Einsatzführungskommando) in Pots- paper) were combined into a single school dam now plans and controls all joint opera- for officers in Berlin, the “Allgemeine tions of German armed forces abroad. Kriegsschule” (General War Academy).144 Additionally, German general staff Besides training gunners and engineers, the officers are also employed at the tactical new institute educated selected officers in a level of command, the “troop general staff three-year advanced military course in the service” (Truppengeneralstabsdienst). In art of war. For selection, the students had to the German Army, for example, general eral staff or admiral staff posts, and were staff officers can be found down to the level instead predominantly employed as com- of combat manoeuvre brigade. The brigades manders of battalion size or higher units. previously required two general staff offi- General staff and admiral staff officers of cers – the G3 (planning, operation and train- the Bundeswehr are employed within the ing), and the G4 (logistics). In the wake of Ministry of Defence, NATO, UN, and all the Bundeswehr’s reorganization, however, other western alliances, as attachés or liai- the command structure of the high readiness son officers, with troop service, with agen- brigades has been significantly reinforced. cies and schools, as well as with other min- These brigades do now have two additional istries and science institutes.147 general staff officers — a chief of staff, and In the Bundeswehr, the selection a G2 (enemy estimation). In cases where process for general staff and admiral staff there is no chief of staff, the G3 performs officers is based on three notable factors. this task, acting as “primus inter pares”. The first is the examination report of a four- From the divisional level of command, gen- teen-week joint staff officer basic course eral staff officers head all staff sections (G1- (Stabsoffiziergrundlehrgang), that must be G6) in the headquarters. passed by every career officer in the rank of The general staff service of the captain as a prerequisite for promotion to Bundeswehr is regulated by the so-called staff officer. The second is the officer’s per- “Heusinger-Erlass”, dating from 8 Septem- formance according to his evaluation re- ber 1959.145 It determines that specially ports. The third is the recommendation of a earmarked general staff posts must be filled superior in the position of a division com- with general staff officers. As a rule, these mander, or comparable, as well as the rec- officers have successfully attended the two- ommendation of the head of the responsible year general staff officer course at the personnel management department. The “Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr” (Ger- final decision then rests with a “selection man Armed Forces Command and Staff Col- commission” in the Ministry of Defence that lege) in Hamburg. For a short time, up to 20 considers the character, performance, suit- percent of the general staff posts can be ap- ability, and the willingness of the candidate pointed with officers having no general staff to attend the training. Finally, approxi- education. Officers in a general staff post mately 15 percent of an officer year group, bear after their rank the designation “im or in absolute figures up to forty-five offi- Generalstabsdienst” (in the general staff cers from the army, twenty-five from the air service), or the abbreviation “i.G.”146 force, and sixteen from the navy, are se- lected to attend the general staff and admiral General staff officers are a small staff courses at the Führungsakademie in group within the Bundeswehr. In 1996, only Hamburg. Generally, the personal profile of 3.7 percent of all officer posts were general the selected officers, on average, can be staff officer posts, and this figure has not described as follows: approximately thirty- significantly changed during the last few three years old, in the rank of captain, uni- years. In an army with 21,452 officers in versity degree and experience as commander 1996, there were 1,061 posts filled by gen- at the company level.148 eral staff officers, hence 5 percent. In 1996, altogether 1,723 educated general staff and Every year in October, the two-year admiral staff officers served in the general staff and admiral staff courses start Bundeswehr; 309 of those were not on gen- at the Führungsakademie of the Bundes- wehr. The aim of the courses is: experienced general staff officer in the rank of lieutenant colonel, heads each syndicate. …to enable officers to fulfill tasks in- He is responsible for both the service spe- dependently and responsibly in a gen- cific training and the evaluation reports his eral staff or admiral staff appointment, students receive at the end of the course. in peacetime, crisis, and in the differ- Hence, the tutor occupies a key function in ent forms of conflict, within and out of preparing his students for future general their single service, in the national and staff and admiral staff appointments. A di- international realm, in particular in rector of the prevailing service heads the NATO, and at all levels of com- courses.150 He (or in future she) has for the mand.149 army and the air force the rank of colonel The main objective of the pro- and for the navy the rank of captain. The gramme is to identify and develop military latter is also a tutor. Approximately 130 commanders and assistant commanders, military and 20 civilian teachers lecture at who according to their character, education, the Führungsakademie. Together with guest and training are able to understand and ana- speakers from various realms, they provide lyse complex facts, and who are able to pre- an intellectual platform for intensive aca- pare decisions based on different problem demic exchange of ideas. analysis methods. The curriculum com- The general staff system of the Bun- prises 450 programme days and a total of deswehr reveals significant parallels with 3,600 programme hours. Approximately 46 Scharnhorst’s programme. The Bundes- percent of the programme hours are avail- wehr’s command and control structure, the able to the students for personal studies. selection process of talented officers, and The curriculum focuses on security policy their training and education at a higher mili- and strategy, operational planning and tary academy are founded on Scharnhorst’s command, armed forces operations in peace- basic principles. How did Scharnhorst per- time, and Bundes-wehr planning. More than ceive the specific role of general staff offi- half of the programme time is used for joint cers and what is their role today? What dis- education in mixed seminars and working tinguishes general staff officers from the groups. Every student has to write one main other officers in a staff? essay on a topic either provided by the Führungsakademie or proposed by the stu- In the Bundeswehr, like in other ar- dent. This essay can also be done in con- mies, a general staff officer must relieve his junction with a university as part of a mas- commander or superior in all aspects of staff ter’s thesis or dissertation. Numerous jour- work. According to German opinion, how- neys, exchange programmes with command ever, his second and at the same time main and staff colleges of other NATO states, task is to advise superiors with the right to field training exercises, and computer- be heard. A general staff officer is fully assisted single service, and finally joint ex- responsible for the accuracy of the advice he ercises, round off the programme. provides. Consequently, a German general staff officer does have a position that distin- The students are divided up in syndi- guishes him from other staff officers. When cates, which become their “military home” requested, all staff officers advise superiors. for the duration of the course. International A general staff officer, however, provides students from NATO countries enrich the advice on all official matters in his official syndicates. A tutor, who is a selected and capacity, and if required he urges his com- mander to make decisions and to take ac- sions, he will seek advice from his tion. Superiors should consult him as a mat- principal staff assistants. He should ter of course. A general staff officer is consult them. They will be loyal in obliged to express his misgivings. He is implementing his decisions. If re- significantly involved in all phases of the quired, they will urge the commander operational planning process. Together with to make decisions and take action. his superior, he analyzes the mission, esti- Principal staff assistants are responsi- mates the situation, and develops the com- ble for the accuracy of the advice they mander’s decision. Therefore, it is later provide. The duty to give advice is often not ascertainable who had provided linked with the regulation of the right what contribution. However, only the com- to brief. Before a member of the staff mander or prevailing superior is authorized briefs to a higher authority, he has to to make decisions. Once the decision is inform his superior.153 made, the general staff officer will loyally In brigade, division, or corps size implement it.151 units, only the general staff officer with the This brief task description for gen- highest position, the chief of staff, has the eral staff officers has its roots not only in the close relationship to the commander as de- Prussian general staff but has also found its scribed above. However, younger general way into the newest German Army regula- staff officers work together with their supe- tions. Army Regulation (HDv) 100/100, riors in the same way. They have the duty Command and Control of Armed Forces, for to provide advice. The Army Regulation example, states: 100/ 200 describes the tasks of the chief of staff as follows: Before making decisions, the com- mander will seek advice from his prin- The chief of staff commands the staff cipal staff assistants. He should con- and coordinates its work. He is the sult them. Principal staff assistants first adviser of the commander and is are responsible for the accuracy of the responsible for the staff’s effective- advice they provide. If required, they ness to him. He informs the staff will urge the commander to make de- about all important decisions of the cisions and take action. Their think- commander. If neither the commander ing and action must be guided by the nor his deputy can be reached the commander’s will and intentions and chief of staff will make the necessary must be determined by his decisions decisions.154 and orders. They will be loyal in im- It is the Prussian general-quarter- plementing his decisions. He will in- master staff of the early 19th century, and in volve subordinate commanders where particular Scharnhorst’s behaviour during practical and possible.152 the campaign in 1806, where these regula- In addition to that Army Regulation tions are rooted. When the remaining ele- (HDv) 100/200, Command and Control ments of Prussia’s Army started retreat after Support of Armed Forces, says in its para- the defeat at Jena and Auerstedt, Scharn- graph “Tasks for Commander and Staff”: horst joined Lieutenant General Gebhard Lebrecht von Blücher’s corps that was A distinguishing characteristic of staff tasked to be the “Arrière-Garde” (rear work is the duty to give advice to the guard).155 Blü-cher, although a thoroughly commander. Before making deci- ill-educated man was an excellent and popu- When the war began for the Prussian lar commander. He was the first Prussian Army in Spring 1813, Scharnhorst decided general recognizing the value of a scientifi- to serve as chief of staff under Blücher, who cally educated and intelligent principal staff was commanding the main Prussian Army in assistant.156 Scharnhorst, acting as chief of Silesia.160 However, Scharnhorst made this staff, or-ganized and controlled all move- decision despite his own feelings on the ments of the corps, and Blücher appreciated subject. His strongest desire was to com- his counsel. The corps fought its way to mand the Prussian Army in the field. But he Lübeck, were it finally was defeated and the also recognized that due to Blücher’s reputa- remnant dis-armed and captured. In his re- tion and political circumstances this wish port to the Prussian King, Blücher testified would not be possible. “I want nothing from that Scharn-horst’s effort was of significant the world. What I prize I will not be given importance to him. He praised Scharnhorst in any case….I would exchange my seven as a man, whose “ceaseless activity, firm decorations and my life to command the determina-tion and intelligent counsel” were army for one day,” Scharnhorst wrote in a largely responsible for “the lucky progress letter to his daughter.161 Thus, serving as of my arduous retreat”. “I do not hesitate to chief of staff for Blücher, Scharnhorst him- admit,” Blücher wrote, “that without the self obeyed the unwritten law for general active support of this man, it probably staff officers, normally to stay anonymously would have been hard for me to do half of in the background, and to advise, warn, and what the corps really has done.”157 This guide commanders when needed.162 Ac- historical example marks the beginning of cording to Walter Görlitz, Scharnhorst had the “military marriage” between a com- become a “perfect exemplar for all Chiefs of mander and his principal staff adviser. “It Staff.”163 was the first example of the co-operation Unfortunately, on 2 May 1813, between a naturally gifted commander and a Scharnhorst was wounded in the battle of scientifically trained Chief of Staff,” wrote Groß-Görschen, when a bullet struck his leg Walter Görlitz.158 Accordingly, it could be below the knee. At first the wound seemed considered, in a way, as the birth of the harmless. Scharnhorst left the army for Vi- principal staff adviser within the Prussian- enna to negotiate with the Austrians to be- German general staff system. come a member of the coalition against Later, during the Wars of Liberation France. However, the wound became in- (1813-15), the Prussian general staff proved fected, and he died in Prague on 28 June its effectiveness for the first time in combat. 1813. Therefore, Scharnhorst did not see When the Prussian Army mobilized for war the later success of his general staff system, in 1812, Scharnhorst’s life had reached its culminating on 18 June 1815, when Blücher climax. Every division, corps and army and his then chief of staff Gneisenau played commander received a small staff, responsi- a decisive role in Napoleon’s defeat at Wa- ble for operational planning and execution. terloo. All principal staff assistants were chosen by In the German understanding, the Scharnhorst, and most had either been his primary task of general staff officers is to former students or members of the Mili- provide accurate advice to commanders and tärische Gesellschaft. Additionally, a chief superiors. In this system, the role of the of staff was assigned to every corps and chief of staff is a particular one. He has a army commander as principal adviser.159 very close relationship to the commander. Scharnhorst demonstrated as Blücher’s chief larly diligent staff workers. General offi- of staff, how important an intelligent and cers, who have themselves attended the gen- scientifically educated principle staff adviser eral staff or admiral staff course, and in the could be for the overall success. Interna- Bundeswehr this number is the majority, tional and German critics, however, often seem to have less difficulty dealing with argue that the German general staff system these characteristics.164 But the remainder undermines the commander’s authority, and also learn quickly how to make effective use endangers the cohesion in the officer corps, of their principal staff assistants. with only a small group of specially edu- On the other hand, the main chal- cated officers occupying the majority of the lenge for general staff officers is to be re- senior positions. The question still remains, sponsible for the accuracy of advice they whether the Prussian-German general staff provide. The quality of their counsel corre- system is still suitable and relevant for mod- lates with the quality of a commander’s de- ern armed forces and to what degree. cision. In an increasingly complex opera- Actually, the German general staff tional environment, the education of general system is a challenge for both commanders staff officers does not end after they have and principal staff assistants. First, com- passed a command and staff college. They manders need to be aware that general staff will only mature by regularly changing ap- officers providing responsible advice do not pointments at all levels of command. Gen- restrict their authority, but would enhance eral staff officers need to have the ambition the efficiency of their leadership with their to take every opportunity for further educa- systematic staff work and counsel. General tion. The “ambition to be the first”, stated staff officers apply similar command and Scharnhorst, would automatically create control principles, often resulting in similar outstanding performances.165 But unfortu- solutions. If one is not available, another nately it is the ambition that in some cases can jump in. Staff work, based on the same results in careerism. Streamlined and adapt- principles, will establish continuity in the ed general staff officers, only focused on not armed forces, and subsequently, will relieve making a negative impression on superiors, commanders. They would then be able to however, are poor principal staff assistants. focus on their primary functions of com- They generally do not fulfill their duty to mand, training, education, and mission- give responsible advice, and if required, to orientated leadership, while at the same time urge superiors to make decisions. There- being assured that the daily work would be fore, it has to be one of the primary tasks for accomplished according to the guidelines com-manders and superiors to counteract given, and without permanent personal con- such tendencies. trol. The advice provided by similar- In this context, it must be remem- educated principal staff officers on all ques- bered that the German general staff system tions of military command and training sup- demands an independently formulated deci- ports commanders in their decision-making. sion from the commander. After consulting However, commanders working together his principal staff assistants, it is the com- with principal staff assistants also need to mander who has to make the decision. No have discipline. They have to seek advice general staff officer can relieve him of this from their general staff officers, and give responsibility. Consequently, the German them the chance to practice providing ad- general staff system does not undermine the vice, rather than abusing them as particu- commander’s authority. It rather leads to a responsible decision through high quality of the Bundeswehr. The creation of such an advice. educational elite is justified so long as it strengthens the military organization, re- The second objection, that creation mains open to talent, and rewards merit. of a specially educated elite would endanger General staff and admiral staff officers sup- the cohesion in the officer corps, also does port commanders in their decision-making not withstand closer examination. In the through high quality advice. This major Bundeswehr all career line officers must go task constitutes the particular value of the through the same selection process, and con- Prussian-German general staff system, and it sequently do have the same chance to qual- is the key to master the increasing complex- ify for the general staff and admiral staff ity of military affairs. Therefore, Scharn- education. Furthermore, there is no isolated horst’s concept of a general staff system is general staff and admiral staff officer corps not out-of-date; it is of enduring relevance in the Bundeswehr. The chance for ad- for the Bundeswehr and other modern armed vancement up to the rank of general or ad- forces. miral remains open for all officers.166 Since general staff and admiral staff officers serve Conclusion in regularly changing appointments on all Scharnhorst had a brilliant career. levels of command they remain in competi- He rose from a Hanoverian son of a peasant tion with line officers. Both objective ex- to be Chief of the Prussian General Staff and aminations and commonly accepted selec- architect of the reorganization of the Prus- tion criteria, as well as the fact that leader- sian Army in the years between 1807 and ship positions in the Bundeswehr remain 1813. The transformation of warfare un- open to talent and reward merit remain two leashed by the French Revolution was the essential preconditions for justifying an edu- major experience of Scharnhorst’s life cational elite. which he never ceased to study for the rest The example of the Bundeswehr has of his career. The campaigns of the First illustrated — and similarities too can be Coalition against Revolutionary France, in found in other western armed forces – that which he personally distinguished himself as key principles of Scharnhorst’s general staff an officer in the Hanoverian service, showed system still find application today. Scharn- him the deficiencies of traditional military horst’s objective was to design a Prussian institutions and the power of the French army wherein the best would have access to nation-in-arms. Step by step, he worked his the top positions and improve the quality of way through an understanding of the new military leadership. Although, the Bundes- conditions and gradually developed a con- wehr does not have a general staff, it does cept of comprehensive military reforms, possess organizational elements doing gen- based upon two cornerstones — intellect eral staff work for both the political leader- and sound organization. ship on the military-strategic and opera- Scharnhorst’s reform concept, both tional level of command, as well as for in part and in whole, were well thought out commanders at the tactical level of com- and eventually proved effective during the mand.167 Furthermore, the German general Wars of Liberation. If careers were to be staff system, in keeping with Scharnhorst’s open to men of talent as the Reglement of model, is based on a small group of selected 1808 stated168 and if the transformation of officers, thoroughly trained, and educated at warfare and its increasing complexity re- a military academy, the Führungsakademie quired officers with initiative, judgement, orientated society that later was copied in and flexibility, then they would surely have military and other realms. His greatness lay to be thoroughly trained and educated. in the ability to see the new dimensions of Scharnhorst reorganized Prussia’s military warfare after the French Revolution and to educational organization to become an inte- develop the educational and organizational gral part of his general staff system. His institutions to meet the challenge of the goal was to select, train, and scientifically transformation of war. Scharnhorst recog- educate the best minds in the Prussian nized that higher commander’s leadership Army, and then to promote and assign them could be improved by the assistance of spe- to key positions in the general staff. This cially trained- and scientifically-educated combination of intellect and military organi- general staff officers. His concept to amal- zation, Scharnhorst hoped, would create the gamate intellectual power with sound or- power to meet the challenge of the changing ganization resulted in the Prussian-German military environment. general staff system. Indeed, by doing so, core elements of Scharnhorst’s reform of the Today’s armed forces are facing a Prussian Army still possess enduring rele- similar challenge to which the Prussian vance. It becomes essential now to adapt Army confronted two hundred years ago. Scharnhorst’s programme to the future. The transformation of war is a continuous Future operations will most likely be within process, making military affairs more and a coalition context. Besides technological more complex. The traditional operational interoperability, it will mainly be the degree factors of space, time, and forces required of organizational, doctrinal, and cultural not only to be synchronized in a multi- interoperability, which determines the level dimensional and non-linear way, but also to of successful coalition command. Thus, be handled with increasing speed, and in leadership education needs to be further consideration of steadily increasing amounts developed from a joint approach today to a of information. Military commanders must combined approach tomorrow. In an alli- not become overwhelmed by the vast ance like NATO, for example, the creation amount of information and detail available. of a combined command and staff college To cope with this challenge, the commander would be the next decisive milestone to im- needs to take full advantage of a competent prove multinational command and control, and effective staff system, which supports and it would be in accordance with Scharn- and enhances their decision-making. Be- horst’s views on the need for developing a sides a profound professional knowledge, keen military mind and intellect. principle staff assistants require a keen awareness of the world around them and NOTES recognize how political, social, cultural, 1Meinecke, Friedrich. The Age of German Lib- economic, and ethical factors impact on eration, 1795-1815, trans by Peter Paret and Helmuth military affairs. Therefore, extensive train- Fischer (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: California ing and education are essential. Selection of UP, 1977), pp 57-8. the best minds for this educational pro- 2Stadelmann, Rudolf. Scharnhorst: Schicksal gramme and their assignment to key posi- und Geistige Welt (Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1952), tions remain paramount to the success of an 36 (trans by the author). army. 3A ‘Brinksitzer’ is a tenant farmer who had, With his notions, Scharnhorst had according to the existing caste system, a low social status. anticipated features of an achievement- 4“Quartiermeister” (quartermaster) was the tary engineering, campaign planning of offensive and high-est rank for non commissioned officers. defensive operations, economics, physics, geography, questions to a topic of choice, French and English. 5Fiedler, Siegfried. Scharnhorst: Geist und Tat And, with the exception of his translations, which (München: Schild-Verlag, 1958), pp 56-7. were marked as “pretty good”, Scharnhorst received 6Stübig, Heinz. Scharnhorst: Die Reform des in all other subjects the best mark, “good”. Subse- preußischen Heeres (Göttingen/Zürich: Muster- quently, he was honoured for this outstanding result.

Schmidt Verlag, 1988), p 10. (Ibid, pp 17-8.) 19 7Stadelmann, p 37. On the syllabus and methods of learning, see: Klein, pp 262-9. 8The decision of the “Oberappellationsgericht 20 zu Celle” as of 24 June 1771 can be found in: Georg White, p 5. Heinrich Klippel, Das Leben des Generals von 21Scharnhorst, “Von den Militär-Anstalten des Scharnhorst (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1869/71), Vol 1, p verstorbenen Grafen von Schaumburg-Lippe,” in 38. Klippel, Georg Heinrich, Das Leben des Generals 9Major sources for this paragraph are: Hans von Scharnhorst (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1869/71),

Klein, Wilhelm zu Schaumburg-Lippe: Klassiker der 1:185; quoted in: White, p 6. Abschreckungstheorie und Lehrer Scharnhorsts 22Stadelmann, p 132. (Osnabrück: Biblio, 1982); Stadelmann, pp 132-44 and Fiedler, pp 65-79. 23Scharnhorst, Gerhard. “Characterzüge und

10 Anecdoten von dem verstorbenen Grafen Wilhelm Count Wilhelm, for example, spoke five lan- von Schaumburg=Bückeburg.” Neues Militärisches guages (German, French and English as well as later Journal, Vol 1, 2nd ed (1799), p 123 (trans by the Italian and Portuguese) and masterfully played the author). This periodical was first published in 1788. piano. Until 1796 in total 7 volumes had been published. 11 Stadelmann, p 19. For example, Count 24Ibid (trans by the author). Wilhelm relinquished magnificence, reduced the state debt, established industries, built an orphanage and 25Hornung, Klaus. Scharnhorst: Soldat- reformed the school system. Furthermore, he gave Reformer-Staatsmann (Esslingen/München: Bechtle the poor, who were fit for work, the opportunity for Verlag, 1997), p 34. employment, and he compelled beggars to work in 26 his factories. He also introduced a kind of fire and Stübig, Heinz. Scharnhorst Die Reform des health insurance. preußischen Heeres (Göttingen: Muster-Schmidt Verlag, 1988), p 20. 12 Two notable intellectuals were Thomas Abt 27 and Johann Gottfried Herder. Hornung, p 34. 28 13Stadelmann, p 19. Ibid. 29 14Stadelmann, p 20 and Charles Edward White, Ibid, p 36 (trans by the author). The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Mili- 30Ibid, p 37 (trans by the author). tärische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801-1805 (West- 31 port/Connecticut/London: Praeger, 1989), pp 3-4. Ibid. 32 15White, p 3. Fiedler, p 227. Scharnhorst invented the mi- crometer telescope in 1780. 16Stadelmann, p 20 (trans by the author). 33Hornung, p 39; Stübig, p 31; White, p 9. 17Ibid. 34There is no exact equivalent of “Bildung” in 18 Comparing the results of Scharnhorst’s en- English. A common translation of Bildung is educa- trance examination in 1773, where he was examined tion. Education, however, is only one part of as below average, with the results of his final exams Bildung; culture, and self-cultivation are other parts. in 1777 illustrates how much he succeeded. On 28 Bildung in Scharnhorst’s understanding is “the per- August 1777 the following subjects were examined: fectibility of the individual’s character and intellect theoretical and applied mathematics, civil and mili- through education” (White, p xii). Consequently, Bildung is somewhere in between education and 50Fiedler, p 158. enlightenment. 51Hornung, p 48; Stübig, pp 37-9; White, p 16. 35 Scharnhorst’s article with the original title 52 “Anleitung zur Lectüre. Von dem Nutzen wissen- Fiedler, p 159. The Austrian Emperor, for schaftlicher Kenntnisse, den Vorurtheilen gegen example, praised in a personal letter to Hammerstein the battle of Menin as an “outstanding military ac- dieselben und dem gewöhnlichen Studiren” was published in Militär-Bibliothek (Hanover, 1782), Vol tion”. I, pp 5-13. It is printed in: Ursula von Gersdorff, ed, 53Hammerstein’s report is ed in: Carl von Gerhard von Scharnhorst: Ausgewählte Schriften Clausewitz, “Ueber das Leben und den Charakter

(Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1983), pp 2-7. von Scharnhorst”, Historische Politische Zeitschrift,

36According to White (12) one explanation for Berlin: 1832, p 2. stopping publishing the Militair Bibliothek is that 54Stübig, p 39. Scharnhorst was sharply criticized by the editor of 55 the rival Bellona “for his presumption in reviewing a Letter of 24 May 1773; Hansjürgen Usczeck book written by a superior officer”. For Stübig (32), and Christa Gudzent, eds, Gerhard von Scharnhorst: however, it is also possible that business reasons Ausgewählte militärische Schriften, (Berlin: Mili- were responsible for Scharnhorst’s decision. tärverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1986), p 75 (trans iaw White, p 17). 37Hornung, p 40. 56Letter of 28 August 1793; ed in: Ibid, p 86. 38Hornung, p 40; Stübig, p 32; White, p 15. 57Letter to an unknown addressee of 5 June 39 Hornung, p 40. 1793; ed in: Ibid, p 83 (trans by the author and iaw

40Stübig, p 32. White, p 17.) 58 41 Letter of 1 June 1793; ed in: Ibid, 78 (trans by Hornung, pp 40-1; Stübig, pp 32-3; White, p 15. the author). 59 42Hornung, p 38. Ibid (trans by the author). 60 43White, p 14. The Militärisches Taschenbuch This essay is ed in: Gersdorff, pp 47-110. was published in three editions and was also trans- 61Ibid, p 84. lated into English in 1811 as the Military Field 62 Pocket Book. Ibid, pp 58-9. 63 44Hornung, p 41. Ibid, p 81. 64 45von Clausewitz, Carl. On War, trans and ed by Hornung, pp 66-76. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Prince- 65Paret, Peter. Clausewitz and the State (Prince- ton UP, 1989), p 170. ton/New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1976), p 65. 46Hornung, p 44. 66Ibid. 47Their eldest son Gerhard Wilhelm (his second 67Stübig, p 45. Although, Scharnhorst belonged Christian name was reminiscent of Count Wilhelm) as general quartermaster to the Hanoverian general was born in 1786; their daughter, Clara Sophie staff this was rather counter productive for his further Juliane, was born in 1788; their second daughter, career. At that time the general quartermaster staff Sophie Ernestine, was born in 1791; their second son, was an isolated group of specialists. There was al- Friedrich Gerhard August, was born in 1795; and most no personnel exchange between the quartermas- finally their youngest daughter, Anna Sophie Emilie, ter staff and the rest of the army. Accordingly, it was was born in 1796. very unlikely for Scharnhorst to leave this staff again

48Hornung, p 47. The Hanoverian Corps was and to get a command posting. approximately 13,000 men strong. That was almost 68Stübig, p 45. As general quartermaster half of the Hanoverian Army. Scharnhorst had an annual income of 900 Reich- 49Hornung, pp 47-8; Stübig, pp 36-7; White, p staler. After the Prussian offer Hanover paid him an

16. additional allowance of 550 Reichstaler per year. 69Hornung, p 81. 86Scharnhorst wrote an article about the degrad-

70 ing ignorance of the military in the first volume of Paret, pp 65-6. the Militär Bibliothek, 1782. This statement is

71Clausewitz, “Ueber das Leben und den quoted in Stadelmann, p 150.

Charakter von Scharnhorst”, p 21. 87Höhn, pp 106-7. 72 Letter of 24 July 1801; ed in: Gersdorff, p 88Scharnhorst. “Ohne Bildung der Offiziere in 128. Scharnhorst described in this letter the conflict der Kriegskunst kann der Staat keine gute Aus- between the commander of the Prussian artillery, führung von seinen Armeen erwarten”; quoted in: General von Meerkatz, who was reform oriented, and Höhn, p 131. his regimental commander, General von Tempelhoff, a traditionalist who “preferred to be in company with 89At that time Lieutenant-General Levin von the respected aristocracy.” Geusau was Prussian’s general-quartermaster and

73 inspector of the “Akademie für junge Offiziere”. He Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian was holding numerous other responsibilities in the Army 1640-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), p Prussian Army and was relieved when Scharnhorst 26. was willing to take over responsibility for the school. 74Queen Louise of Prussia in a letter to her Geusau was supporting Scharnhorst’s plans to trans- father in 1808, quoted in: Ralph Thiele, Jena- form the school into a real academy and gave him

Auerstedt 1806: Die Schlacht und ihr Vermächtnis, almost carte blanche.

(Frankfurt/Main: Report Verlag, 1996), p 49. 90According to the Articles 1 to 10 of the “Ver- 75Görlitz, Walter. Geschichte des deutschen fassung und Lehreinrichtung der Akademie für junge Generalstabes von 1650-1945 (Augsburg: Weltbild Offiziere, und des Instituts für die Berlinische In-

Verlag, 1997), p 27. spection”, issued in 1805; ed in: Fiedler, pp 192-4. 91 76Paret, p 66. Fiedler, p 145. 92 77Fiedler, p 230. Scharnhorst. “Promemoria: Die Notwendig- keit einer Instruction für den Unterricht der Junker 78 Höhn, Reinhard. Scharnhorsts Vermächtnis und jungen Offiziere bei den Infanterie- und

(Bonn: Athenäum Verlag, 1952), p 114. Cavalerie-Regimentern betreffend”; ed in: Höhn, p 117. 79Scharnhorst to Lieutenant General von Geusau, 16 August 1802, Acta, Heeresarchiv Pots- 93This principle can also be found in the statutes dam, Nachlass Geusau, Nr. 16; quoted in: Höhn, p of the Militärische Gesellschaft (Article 1) where

130. Scharnhorst described the purpose of the society. It is ed in White, pp 191-9. 80Stadelmann, pp 65-6. According to Stadel- mann, the annual budgets were 21,000 Thaler for the 94Scharnhorst. “Plan einer Lehranstalt für die “Ecole Militaire”, 7,000 Thaler for the Junker und jungen Offiziere der Infanterie und “Militärkademie der Artillerie”, and 1,000 Thaler for Cavalerie-Regimenter, nebst einer Instruktion für die the “Lehr-Anstalt für junge Infanterie- und Lehrer derselben”; ed in: Höhn, p 117 (trans by the

Kavallerie-Offiziere”. author). 81 Ibid, p 66. 95Scharnhorst. “Über den Nutzen und die Etab- lierung einer Militärschule für die jungen Offiziere 82Ibid. überhaupt, insbesondere die von der Artillerie”; 83The title of the document is “Verfassung und quoted in: Höhn, p 118 (trans by the author). Lehreinrichtung der Akademie für junge Offiziere, 96Scharnhorst. “Plan einer Lehranstalt für die und des Instituts für die Berlinische Inspection”, Junker und jungen Offiziere der Infanterie und issued in 1805. It is ed in: Fiedler, pp 192-209. Cavalerie-Regimenter, nebst einer Instruktion für die 84Stadelmann, p 145. Lehrer derselben”; quoted in: Fiedler, p 125. 85Scharnhorst, “Über die Bildung der Offiziere 97Ibid. und Unteroffiziere”; ed in: Höhn, p 110 (trans by the 98Scharnhorst. “Promemoria: Die Notwendig- author). keit einer Instruction für den Unterricht der Junker und jungen Offiziere bei den Infanterie- und 115Ibid.

Cavalerie-Regimentern betreffend”; quoted in: Höhn, 116 p 119. Höhn, p 150. 117 99 “Statutes of the Militärische Gesellschaft in Scharnhorst. “Ohne Bildung der Offiziere in der Kriegskunst kann der Staat keine gute Aus- Berlin”, Article 3, ed in: White, p 192. führung von seinen Armeen erwarten”. Nachlass 118According to Clausewitz’s characterization of Scharnhorst No 58, Sheet 68; quoted in: Fiedler, p Rüchel in “Nachrichten über Preussen in seiner

133. grossen Katastrophie, in Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzel- 100 schriften”, Heft 10 (Berlin: Mittler & Sohn, 1888), p Scharnhorst. “Plan einer Lehranstalt für die Junker und jungen Offiziere der Infanterie und 435, quoted in: White, p 39. Cavalerie-Regimenter, nebst einer Instruktion für die 119Höhn, p 154. Lehrer derselben”; quoted in: Höhn, p 118 (trans by 120 the author). White, p 49. All members of the Militärische Gesellschaft are listed in White, pp 203-11. 101Clausewitz. “Ueber das Leben und den Char- 121 acter von Scharnhorst”, p 21 (trans by the author). Görlitz, Walter. Geschichte des deutschen Generalstabes … , p 29. 102von Clausewitz, Carl. On War, pp 100-2. 122Ibid. 103Paret, p 71. 123Wilhelm, King Frederick III. “Instruction für 104 Stadelmann, p 142 (trans by the author). den General-Quartiermeister-Stab”. Berlin, 26 No-

105Scharnhorst. “Ueber das Studium der Krieg- vember 1803. skunst”; quoted in: Höhn, p 122. 124In detail, the staff consisted of three quarter- 106Scharnhorst. “Verfassung und Lehreinrich- master-lieutenants (in the rank of major general or tung der Akademie für junge Offiziere, und des Insti- colonel), heading the brigades, six quartermasters (in the rank of major), six quartermaster-lieutenants (in tuts für die Berlinische Inspection”, Article 26; ed in: Fiedler, p 202. the rank of captain), and six adjutants. 125 107Stadelmann, p 141. Paret, p 77. The different approaches of Phull, Massenbach and Scharnhorst are described in: 108von Clausewitz, Marie “Erinnerung an den Höhn, p 153.

General Clauswitz und sein Verhältniß zu Scharn- 126 horst”, quoted in: White, p 101. Görlitz. Geschichte des deutschen Generals- tabes …, p 22. 109 Clausewitz. “Ueber das Leben und den Char- 127 acter von Scharnhorst”, p 30. Görlitz, Walter. History of the German Gen- eral Staff, 1657-1945, trans by Brian Battershaw 110Höhn, p 147. (New York: Praeger, 1959), p 25. 111Letter of 24 July 1801; ed in: Gersdorff, p 128Letter of 7 October 1806; quoted in: White, p 130. 127. 112The “Extract from the Organization and Stat- 129Scharnhorst describes his battle experience in utes of the Militärische Gesellschaft in Berlin Fol- a letter to his daughter of 16 October 1806; ed in: lowing the Revision in January 1803” is ed in: White, Gersdorff, pp 211-2. pp 191-9. The quoted article is from page 191. 130Stübig, p 64. Prussia lost approximately half 113Scharnhorst. “Bemerkungen über die Veran- of its territory and population, had to pay huge repa- lassung und den Zweck der Militärischen Gesell- rations, and was forced to support a large army of schaft und über die Mittel zur Erreichung desselben; occupation. bei Gelegenheit des Schlusses der Gesetzrevision im 131 Januar 1803”; ed in: Usczeck and Gudzent, pp 191-7. This illustrates that Frederick Wilhelm III The quoted passage is from page 194. recognized most of the severe defects of the tradi- tional administrative and military institutions as 114Ibid, p 195. clear-ly as did the reformers. However, he never developed his own concept and acted only after the defeat of the Prussian Army at Jena and Auerstedt. 147For the figures see: Christian Millotat, Das preußisch-deutsche Generalstabssystem: Wurzeln — 132Letter of 27 November 1807; ed in: Gers- Entwicklung — Fortwirken, (Zürich: vdf Hochschul- dorff, pp 255-7, the quoted passage is from page 255. verlag, 2000), pp 23-5. 133 Paret, p 141. 148For the selection process for the general staff 134Meinecke, p 46. and admiral staff training see: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, P II 1 — Az 16-30-00/22, Ver- 135 Letter of 27 November 1807; ed in: Gers- wendungsauswahl und- planung der Berufsoffiziere dorff, pp 255-7 (trans by the author). des Truppen-, Sanitäts- und militärgeographischen Dienstes; hier: Streitkräfteeinheitliche Auswahl der 136The original title of the memoranda is: “Vor- Teilnehmer am nationalen Lehrgang General- schläge zur künftigen Einrichtung des Generalquar- /Admiralstabsdienst (LGAN), (Bonn: BMVg, 5 Sep- tiermeisterstabes der preußischen Armee” (Proposals tember 1997), as well as official Briefing Führungsa- for the future establishment of the general-quarter- kademie der Bundeswehr as at December 2002. master staff of the Prussian Army). 149der Bundeswehr, Führungsakademie. 137Hornung, p 196. Lehrplan für den LGAN 1998 (Hamburg: FüAkBw, 138Scharnhorst. “Vergleichung der ehemaligen 30 June 1998); in accordance with official briefing Geschäftsführung der militärischen Oberbehörden Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr as at December mit der jetzigen”, ed in: Gersdorff, pp 297-309. 2002. 139See quote Walter Görlitz on page 35 of this 150There are always two courses at the same paper. time at the Führungsakademie, a “younger” and an “elder” one. 140Scharnhorst. “Vergleichung der ehemaligen Geschäftsführung der militärischen Oberbehörden 151Millotat, pp 33-4. mit der jetzigen”, in: Gersdorff, p 297. 152der Verteidigung, Bundesministerium. 141Walter Görlitz, for example, translated the Heeresdienstvorschrift Truppenführung (TF), HDv original German term “Truppengeneralstab” with 100/100 (Bonn: BMVg, 15 October 1998), Nr. 327. “Operational General Staff” (Görlitz, History of the 153der Verteidigung, Bundesministerium. German General Staff…, p 34). However, this term Heeresdienstvorschrift Führungsunterstützung, HDv could cause confusion with the term “operational 100/200 (Bonn: BMVg, 15 October 1998), Nr. 416. level of war”. The “Truppengeneralstab” describes general staff appointments on the tactical level of 154Ibid, Nr. 422. command — army corps, corps, divisions and bri- 155 gades. Therefore, in this paper the translation “troop At page 36 of this paper it is described how general staff” will be used. Scharnhorst left the battlefield after the Prussia’s defeat at Auerstedt. 142Scharnhorst. “Über den Nutzen für die Ar- 156 mee, daß den Offizieren ein Unterricht in der Krieg- Görlitz, History of the German General Staff skunst mitgetheilt würde”, quoted in: Höhn, p 312. …, p 27. 157 143“Reglement über die Bestzung der Stellen der Clausewitz. “Ueber das Leben und den Char- Portepee-Fähnriche und über die Wahl zum Offizier acter von Scharnhorst”, pp 5-6 (trans by the author). bei der Infanterie, Kavallerie und Artillerie”, quoted Clausewitz describes in his essay Scharnhorst’s effort in White, pp 136-7. in Blücher’s corps. Blücher’s report to King Freder- ick Wilhelm is also quoted in this essay. 144The “Allgemeine Kriegsschule” was opened 158 in Oktober 1810 and was the precursor of the “Krieg- Görlitz, History of the German General Staff sakademie” (War Academy). …, p 27. 159 145General Adolf Heusinger (1897-1982) was White, p 149. the first Chief of Staff Bundeswehr, from 1957-1961. 160With Scharnhorst, Gneisenau was appointed 146Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Fü B I first general staff officer (so called “Ia”) in Blücher’s

1, Az 10-20-12 (Bonn: 8 September 1959), (“Heus- corps. inger-Erlass”). 161Letter of 21 May 1813; ed in: Gersdorff, pp Alfred Schlieffen later underlined this tradition with 503-4. their statements: “General staff officers do not have

162 a name.” (Hans von Seeckt, Gedanken eines Soldaten General Hans von Seeckt and General Count ((Berlin: 1929)); and: “Get a lot done, without bring- ing to much attention to yourself – be more than you appear to be.” (Friedrich von Boetticher, Schlieffen (Göttingen, Muster-Schmitt, 1973). 163Görlitz, History of the German General Staff …, p 39. 164In 1996, 57 percent of the colonels and com- manders, and approximately 80 percent of the gener- als and admirals in the Bundeswehr had attended the two-year general staff and admiral staff course at the Führungsakademie of the Bundeswehr (Millotat, p 161). 165See page 30 of this paper. 166In 1996, 43 percent of the colonels and com- manders, and almost 20 percent of the generals and admirals in the Bundeswehr had not attended the two-year general staff and admiral staff course at the Führungsakademie of the Bundeswehr (Millotat, p 161). 167der Verteidigung, Bundesministerium. Bunde-swehr 2002, Sachstand und Perspektiven (Bonn: BMVg, 2002), pp 46-7. 168See pages 40-1 of this paper.