Midterm Prep Sheet History 492-3 / for October 6, 2009

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Midterm Prep Sheet History 492-3 / for October 6, 2009 Part I. Factual Questions (30 minutes) Directions: Below you will find examples of people and terms I expect you to know. Be prepared to identify and explain the significance of the each of them (note: only a selection will appear on the exam). In practice, you’ll want to be able to write out about 2-3 sentences in response to each question. So there is no space for you to try to summarize the entire course of battles or other key events. Focus on the basics: who fought, the outcome, and how this influenced the course of the war and/or Prussian military thinking down the road. People Frederick I Otto von Bismarck Frederick II Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher Frederick Wilhelm (Elector) Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder) Frederick Wilhelm I (King) Albrecht von Roon Frederick Wilhelm III Gerhard von Scharnhorst Wilhelm I Battles Terms Fehrbellin Alsace-Lorraine (Elsaß-Lothringen) Hohenfriedberg Auftragstaktik Jena and Auerstedt Bewegungskrieg Königgrätz East Prussia (Ostpreussen) Leipzig Kesselschlacht Rossbach Landwehr Sedan Schleswig-Holstein Warsaw Silesia (Schlesien) Zorndorf Part II. Essay Questions (30 minutes) Directions: You will need to write on one of the three essays below. Good essays will be structured clearly and display a sound command of historical detail. I strongly urge you to use only the lecture outlines and assigned books when studying; extraneous, outside material is not recommended, as it is likely to distract you from the essential points found in the course material. Please bring a fresh unmarked blue book with you to the exam. You will not be able to use any notes or other materials you have prepared in advance. In order to guarantee security, we will hold a grand re-distribution of blue books before the exam starts, so I’d prefer that you not write your name on the exam book you bring with you. 1. How was the Prussian “way of war” (whether on an organizational or operational level) shaped by external pressures and influences? Choose three of the following countries to discuss: the Netherlands, Sweden, Russia, Austria, France. How did Prussia’s interaction with these particular countries result in significant adjustments to Prussian military thinking and priorities? Does it nevertheless make sense to speak of an autonomous Prussian military tradition from 1660-1870? 2. We have often spoken of Clausewitz as a figure of his own time (1780-1831). How, in your view, did the experience of the Napoleonic Wars influence the author’s understanding of warfare? How might the central arguments of On War have differed if Clausewitz had been writing a generation earlier – around the time of Frederick the Great’s death in 1786? Be specific. Use this occasion to demonstrate your working knowledge of Clausewitz’ theories (and the historical context of the 18th and early 19th Centuries). 3. What, in your judgment, best accounts for the Prussian victory in 1870-71 – (a) the Prussian army’s high command, (b) the qualities of its soldiers, or (c) the nature of Prussia’s political and economic system? Naturally, all of these factors played a role; but choose one, and drawing upon Wawro and Citino, explain why this particular factor seems most significant in explaining the grounds for Prussian success. A complete answer will also explain why you attribute less significance to the other issues mentioned here. Think broadly! .

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