The Modern Model of the Battlefield Tour and Staff Ride: Post-1815 Prussian and German Traditions1 David Ian Hall2 At the end of the Second World War, the Historical Division of the Foreign Military Studies Branch, U.S. Army, Europe, commissioned a number of Mili- tary Review studies on pre-war enemy preparations and wartime operations. One study examined the function and conduct of “War Games” (Kriegsspiele) within the German Army.3 The principal author of the study was General der Infantrie Rudolf Michael Hofmann. Several first-class experts on German training also con- tributed to the study, including General Hans von Greiffenberg, General Fangher, Feldmarschall List, General Praun, and Generaloberst Franz Halder. The U.S. Army wanted to know what types of war games had been conducted by the Ger- man Army before and during the Second World War, and whether or not these ex- ercises had fulfilled their purposes as training devices. It was an ambitious project; in the German Army of the 1914–1945 period, the term “war game” was ap- plied rather liberally to cover a wide range of training exercises that included war games proper, map exercises, staff exercises, training trips, tactical walks, com- mand post exercises, sand-table exercises, battlefield tours, and staff rides. Some Kriegsspiele were based on hypothetical scenarios while others made extensive use of historical records and included long visits to the actual sites of past battles and campaigns. Given their diversity and their large variety of objectives, were war games—and in particular battlefield tours and staff rides—an effective means for testing new ideas of command, and good preparation for future operations? The Germans clearly believed that they were. Kriegsspiele, in their various guises, had been a core component of offi- cer training in the Prussian army since before the Napoleonic Wars. They were equally important throughout the nineteenth century and, as such, they featured prominently in the education and professional development of the officer corps in the Imperial Army of von Moltke, and subsequently von Schlieffen. After 1918, the German Army reconfirmed its faith in war games; first the Reichswehr and after 1935 the Wehrmacht were firmly convinced of the great importance of these theoretical exercises to the training of their officers and to the operational effec- tiveness of the army as a whole. Even after ignominious defeat in 1945, General 2 Dr Hall is a King’s College, London, Lecturer at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, UK. 2 A shorter version of this paper was presented at the 68Øh annual meeting of the Society for Military History held at the University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, May 23–26, 2001. 3 General Rudolf M. Hofmann, War Games MS # P-094. Trans. P. Luetzkendorf, Historical Divi- sion, Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, 1952. 93 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL Halder, never one to shy away from an opportunity to engage in a little self- congratulatory hubris, concluded his foreword to War Games by writing: “The acknowledged high standards of German officer training and the frequent suc- cesses of carefully prepared German operations are proofs of the high value of the war game.”4 In fact, merely by commissioning a study on German war games, the American army had conferred on both the games and their creators the high degree of status that many senior German army officers fully believed was deserved. The modern concept of war games—historical studies and practical exercises aimed at improving the professional standards of officers and army alike—is be- lieved to have had its origins in the seventeenth century with the development of the “military chess game,” an adaptation of regular chess that incorporated con- temporary interest in mathematical principles and emphasized their relationship to strategy and tactics. Innovative though it was, the game was also severely limited by the rigid characteristics of the chessboard. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, the military writer and tactician Georg Venturini transferred the game to a chart or map and thus began the development of the modern chartex and mapex, both regular features of staff college courses today.5 Battlefield tours, staff rides, tactical walks, and the serious study of military history all became features of officer training in the Prussian Army of Frederick the Great. Even at age 22, then an inexperienced and un-blooded Colonel, Fred- erick appreciated how essential professional education was to an effective and efficient army. He was, after all, not only the Crown Prince of Prussia but also a willing child of the Enlightenment. Frederick read the history of his predecessors, of the rulers and the armies of Prussia. He analyzed their successes and failures and identified the reasons for them. He also conducted personal battlefield tours and tactical walks, often searching out old veterans who could describe to him the battles that they had fought. Further encouragement for these activities came from his father, King Frederick William, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Im- perial Armies, Prince Eugen of Savoy. On a number of occasions, Eugen advised the young Frederick to “read military history ...tomeditate unceasingly on your profession and on the operations of great generals . and always to keep the great objectives of a campaign in view.” The pupil heeded the instructions of his tutor and, later, when the student became King and Commander he in turn implored his own officers to dedicate themselves to the profession of arms through personal study of the art of war.6 Frederick took immense interest in training the army. In 1743, after the First Silesian War (War of the Austrian Succession, 1740–1748), he inaugurated and 4 Generaloberst Franz Halder, “Foreword,” in Hofmann, War Games MS # P-094. 5 G. Venturini, Beschreibung und Regeln eines neuen Kriegs-Spiels (Schleswig, 1798) and War Games MS # P-094, xiv. 6 David Fraser, Frederick the Great (London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 2000), 44, 48-50; Nicholas Henderson, Prince Eugen of Savoy (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964). 94 NO.3, SEPTEMBER 02 personally directed large-scale autumn maneuvers of all arms. Eighteenth-century battles were won by precision maneuver and firepower. Frederick knew this and, through rigorous and regular formation drill and field training, he ensured that his army achieved tactical mobility, steadfastness under fire, and complete respon- siveness to command.7 Equally important to the army’s success was the train- ing of commanders. Hard-earned battle experience moved Frederick to formalize the education and training of his officer corps. A cadet school was established in Berlin along with two smaller feeder schools in East Prussia (Culm and Stolp). Regular officers received lectures on geography and fortifications during the win- ter months, followed by tactical rides and war games in spring and summer. This increase in intellectual activity was not to the liking of many of Frederick’s senior officers, who viewed it to be frightfully bourgeois and demeaning. “If experience were all a great general needs,” Frederick remonstrated, “the greatest would be Prince Eugene’s mules.”8 Ignoring their displeasure, Frederick persisted with his efforts to improve the professional skills of his key officers. Gifted commanders were often assembled for study days and staff rides. Frederick encouraged them to study “the ground.” During staff rides he questioned them on how they would at- tack or defend the position just reconnoitered; then their solutions were discussed. Finally, he urged them to teach themselves at all times. “When walking or riding, estimate distance, judge it. Then measure it.”9 With the advent of the French Revolution, and the expanding demands of mass armies and warfare that was increasingly technical (heavy artillery, engineers), the personal philosophy and traditions of the Great Soldier-King were no longer sufficient for the Prussian army to meet future challenges successfully. Colonel Christian von Massenbach was one of the first Prussian officers to call for major reforms. Between 1802 and 1803, he wrote four memoirs for Frederick William III, outlining improved training courses for officers and his desire to see staff training formalized in an advanced school for commanding officers.10 These were radical ideas at the time, perhaps too radical, because the combination of a cult of reverence for all things Frederician and the dead hand of tradition (as a means 7 R. R. Palmer, “Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bülow: From Dynastic to National War,” in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 95–99; Fraser, 126–129. Frederick’s operational doctrine is summarized clearly and concisely in W. von Bremen, Friedrich der Grosse (Berlin: B. Behr’s Verlag, 1905). See also Dennis Showalter, The Wars of Frederick the Great (London: Longman, 1995). 8 Karl Demeter, The German Officer-Corps in Society and State, 1650–1945, trans. Angus Mal- colm (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1965), 67. 9 Steven E. Clemente, For King and Kaiser! The Making of the Prussian Army Officer, 1860-1914 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 3–4; Fraser, 129–130. See also Military Instruction from the late King of Prussia to his Generals trans. (from the French) Major T. W. Forster (Sher- borne and London: printed by William Cruttwell, 1797). 10 William O. Shanahan, Prussian Military Reforms 1786-1813 (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1966) 72–73. 95 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL to future glory and success) proved too inert to overcome. All this changed in the autumn of 1806 with the Prussian army’s comprehensive defeats in the twin bat- tles of Jena and Auerstadt. Proud, perhaps arrogant, and definitely ignorant of the changing nature of warfare since 1792, the well-drilled but dated Prussian Army marched to its destruction blithely unaware that its tactical system was cumber- some and rigid, and that in its present form it had no place on the lively and violent battlefields now owned by Napoleon.11 Reforms followed quickly.