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Contested Seas: Maritime Domain Awareness in Northern Europe

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Contested Seas: Maritime Domain Awareness in Northern Europe COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK MARCH 2018 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW Washington, DC 20036 202 887 0200 | www.csis.org Lanham • Boulder • New York • London 4501 Forbes Boulevard Contested Seas Lanham, MD 20706 301 459 3366 | www.rowman.com Maritime Domain Awareness in Northern Europe PROJECT DIRECTOR Kathleen H. Hicks AUTHORS Andrew Metrick Kathleen H. Hicks ISBN 978-1-4422-8067-0 Ë|xHSLEOCy280670z v*:+:!:+:! A Report of the CSIS INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM Blank MARCH 2018 Contested Seas Maritime Domain Awareness in Northern Europe PROJECT DIRECTOR Kathleen H. Hicks AUTHORS Andrew Metrick Kathleen H. Hicks A Report of the CSIS INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM Lanham • Boulder • New York • London About CSIS For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked to develop solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. Today, CSIS scholars are providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 fulltime staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration. Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in November 2015. Former U.S. deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre has served as the Center’s president and chief executive officer since 2000. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2018 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. ISBN: 978-1-4422-8067-0 (pb); 978-1-4422-8068-7 (eBook) Center for Strategic & International Studies Rowman & Littlefield 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW 4501 Forbes Boulevard Washington, DC 20036 Lanham, MD 20706 202-887-0200 | www.csis.org 301-459-3366 | www.rowman.com Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................. IV Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................................. VII Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 1 Chapter 1: The Russia Challenge ........................................................................................................... 4 Maritime Hybrid Warfare ...................................................................................................................... 5 Cyber and Electronic Warfare ............................................................................................................. 7 Long-range Strike ............................................................................................................................... 10 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 11 Chapter 2: Maritime Domain Awareness: Today and Tomorrow ................................................... 12 History .................................................................................................................................................... 12 Maritime Domain Awareness Today ................................................................................................ 15 A Vision for the Future ....................................................................................................................... 20 Chapter 3: Regional Capabilities .......................................................................................................... 22 Baltic Sea .............................................................................................................................................. 22 Norwegian Sea .................................................................................................................................... 32 Chapter 4: Recommendations ............................................................................................................. 42 A Regional Approach: Guiding Strategy ......................................................................................... 42 Priority Recommendations ............................................................................................................... 42 Other Recommendations ................................................................................................................. 44 About the Authors .................................................................................................................................. 50 | III Executive Summary Northern Europe, and specifically the Baltic and Norwegian Seas, has been the site of increasingly provocative and destabilizing Russian actions. The country’s use of a range of military, diplomatic, and economic tools to undermine the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its allies highlights the need to monitor and understand Russian activity. The region is characterized by complex factors like unique geographic features, considerable civilian maritime traffic, the presence of advanced Russian and Western military capabilities, and strategic proximity to Russia and the Kola peninsula, home to the Russian Northern Fleet. While the Norwegian and Baltic Seas do differ in key ways, they are linked by the emerging risk posed by Russia’s long-range strike capabilities. Responding to Russian challenges across the competitive space requires a deep understanding of the Northern European maritime environment. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), defined by the United States as the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of a nation or region, is an exceptionally broad concept. At its core, MDA has three functions: the collection of raw data, the analysis of that data, and the action of disseminating information to and coordinating among the different components of the framework. In order to provide security in Northern Europe, NATO and its allies must use MDA frameworks to understand and respond to the challenges above, on, and underneath the sea, as well as the surrounding land environment. While some constructive work has been done to address the evolving Russian threat, NATO and its partners must make changes to their current MDA capabilities to evolve alongside with it. Russia presents three challenges of particular concern to the MDA efforts in Northern Europe: maritime hybrid warfare, electronic and cyber warfare capabilities, and long-range strike systems. 1. Maritime Hybrid Warfare—The Russian military is experienced and effective in its use of hybrid warfare, seen in Syria, Crimea, and Northern Europe. The ambiguity possible in the maritime domain lends itself well to this strategy. Russia uses three specific approaches in this realm: deception through different types of vessels including civilian ships, deniable forces like the amphibious and light infantry that easily navigate the complex Baltic and Norwegian Seas, and the country’s well-developed and diverse force for seabed warfare. 2. Cyber and Electronic Warfare—Russia’s advanced EW capabilities have the potential to hinder information gathering and dissemination methods, which are both vital functions of MDA. These capabilities are challenging for military personnel but potentially devastating in civilian contexts, especially as civilian networks and technology (like GPS) are far less secure. 3. Long-Range Strike Capabilities—New challenges for NATO and Northern European partners have emerged with Russia’s development of a long-range precision strike complex. The weapons, now being mounted on new and existing Russian naval vessels, give these vessels the option to stay in the Barents or White Seas and strike targets across Northern Europe. IV | Contested Seas This, combined with air force capabilities based on the Kola Peninsula and in Kaliningrad, presents threats unlike any seen by NATO before. These capabilities require NATO and its partners to use MDA frameworks to monitor launch platforms across the domain. The modern history of MDA begins in the United States, with Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 13 (HSPD-13) / National Security Presidential Directive – 41 (NSPD-41) issued in 2004 by President George W. Bush. The document lays out core interests for the United States to enhance security in the maritime domain and creates a cooperative framework to support MDA operations across different spheres. At the same time, the European concept of maritime security awareness was built upon the U.S. definition of the challenge, placed within the context of rising illicit traffic in the Mediterranean. A weakness of the original MDA and Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) concepts
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