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How Did Kurdistan's Secession Crisis Serve Iraqi PM Haidar Al-Abadi

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How Did Kurdistan's Secession Crisis Serve Iraqi PM Haidar Al-Abadi Artical Name : How did Kurdistan¶s Secession Crisis Serve Iraqi PM Haidar Al-Abadi? Artical Subject : How did Kurdistan¶s Secession Crisis Serve Iraqi PM Haidar Al-Abadi? Publish Date: 24/10/2017 Auther Name: Future for Advanced Research and Studies Subject : 9/23/2021 2:11:39 PM 1 / 2 The crisis triggered by the September 25 referendum held by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the resulting developments culminating in Baghdad¶s recapture of disputed areas, have all rendered great political services to Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi who emerged as the main beneficiary of the crisis. His successful management of the Kurdish crisis and the elimination of ISIS in Iraq could enhance his chances in winning a second term in next year¶s parliamentary elections. Although he has so far failed to completely thwart Kurdistan¶s plan for independence, al-Abadi managed to significantly contain its repercussions through his successful crisis management which is characterized by the following: Geographical Gains1- Retaking Most Disputed Areas. On October 16, the Iraqi army was quick to wrest control of Kirkuk City and some areas in Nineveh province held by the Kurdish Peshmerga forces after ISIS swept across northern Iraq in June 2014. Moreover, it took military control of areas of disputed territory although the Iraqi constitution was used to regulate the dispute through peaceful means. The Peshmerga also retreated to the so-called Blue Line, which defines borders of areas held by the Kurds until the the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Economic Gains2- Controlling Trade and Resources. The Iraqi central government managed to retake control of economic resources held by the KRG. These include a huge oil wealth of Kirkuk estimated to have around 13 billion barrels of recoverable oil accounting for 12% of Iraq¶s total reserves. The central government's control of Kurdistan¶s border crossings and airspare has funnelled all the region¶s imports and exports to Baghdad. Economic Strangulation3- Isolating Kurdistan by the embargo imposed by Iran and Turkey on Kurdistan¶s oil trade. Ankara suspended Kurdistan¶s crude oil exports through its territory and handed over the oil terminal to the Iraqi federal authorities emphasizing that it will handle the exports only through Baghdad. Tehran too banned transportation of oil products by Iranian companies to and from Iraq¶s Kurdistan region and vowed to impose sanctions on violators. Because oil exports are Kurdistan's primary source of revenue, the siege threatens the KRG¶s ability to survive any longer. Imposing Sovereignty4- Partial Jurisdiction of the Federal Government. The Iraqi parliament passed punitive laws against Kurdistan and asked the government to implement them. One such law requires al-Abadi, in his capacity as the supreme commander of the armed forces to protect the country¶s territorial integrity, deploy troops to disputed areas as well as areas held by the Kurds after 2003, while also preventing all companies, and those from the oil sector in particular, from operating in disputed areas.The parliament also voted to oust the pro-KRG governor of Kirkuk province Najmaddin Kareem and asks President Fuad Masum to approve the decision. The approval indicates that Kurdish Masum rejects the Kurdistan leadership's separatism and that he is committed to preserving Iraq¶s unity. Regional Siege 5- Foiling Kurdistan¶s Independence Referendum from Gaining Regional Legitimacy. Al- Abadi managed to get regional states to deal exclusively with the Iraqi central government. Moreover, punitive measures taken by Baghdad, Ankara and Tehran were instrumental for the success of the central government¶s calls, following the referendum, to all states in the region and beyond to deal only with Baghdad regarding Kurdistan¶s affairs, and its border crossings and oil trade in particular. 6- Success in Exploiting Turkey¶s and Iran¶s Fears of Kurdistan¶s Secession. The Iraqi government¶s moves against the Kurdish bid to break away from Iraq were founded primarily on the rare yet perfect agreement between its neighbors Turkey and Iran about the need to decisively counter Kurdish separatism at all costs, because it poses a direct threat to their national security. The unprecedented support from both Turkey and Iran encouraged Baghdad to launch a direct military intervention and recapture large swathes of territory from the Kurdish Peshmerga forces. Image Changing7- Forcing al-Abadi¶s adversaries to deal with his government. This was evidenced by Turkey¶s announcement, after the crisis broke out, that it will deal solely with Iraqi central government regarding Kurdistan¶s affairs. After Turkish Foreign Minister described him as a ³weak politician´who is unable to fight the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) militants, Turkey finds itself compelled to cooperate with al-Abadi on foiling the Kurdish bid for secession.Arab Support8- Involving more Arab States in the Economic Siege. In addition to Iran and Turkey, Iraq succeeded in pushing four other Arab states, such as Egypt, Jordan, UAE and Lebanon, to suspend flights to Kurdistan. Moreover, at the Arab League meetings held after the Kurdistan referendum, Baghdad managed to secure Arabs¶explicit recognition of Iraq¶s territorial integrity and rejection of Kurdistan¶s attempt to break away.International Isolation9- Undermining Kurdistan¶s Attempt to Receive Support from International Powers. Kurdistan¶s President Masoud Barzani failed to push international powers to stop punitive measures taken against the autonomous region. The KRG expressed disappointment at the United States¶position of taking no sides in the conflict, and France¶s backing down from President Emmanuel Macron¶s earlier position of pressuring Baghdad into recognizing the legitimate rights of the Kurds and avoiding escalation. Distinct Characteristics10- Pitting the Kurds against their Leaders. A large segment of people in Kurdistan have come to believe the rhetoric on which al-Abadi remained focused since the referendum was held. Al-Abadi argues that Kurdistan¶s primary issue is its leaders¶corruption and mismanagement. A large number of Kurds now have the view that Kurdistan¶s leadership failed to build healthy relations with neighbors such as Turkey and Iran, where not only Baghdad but also Ankara and Tehran imposed sanctions against Kurdistan. Some Kurds are now certain that the root cause of the crisis is their leadership¶s failed governance. Undermining Unity11- Causing Internal Kurdish Divisions. The Iraqi army¶s success in retaking most disputed areas and Kirkuk in particular has served a blow to Kurdistan¶s home front. Old disagreements between Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) were revived after the KRG and the KDP accused the PUK¶s Peshmerga forces of treason and helping the Iraqi government army to recapture Kirkuk. The current rift between the Kurdistan¶s two major parties raises the spectre of a new Kurdish civil war reminiscent of the military conflict between the rival Kurdish factions during the mid-1990s.Restricting Kurdish options12- Al-Abadi¶s policy against the Kurdistan¶s secessionist bid succeeded in pushing the Kurdish leaders to take a reactive position since the start of the crisis. So far, the Kurds¶reactions to the Iraqi government¶s positions reveal their insistence on Baghdad to use dialogue and negotiations to solve the crisis.Personal GainsDespite the Iraqi government's successes in managing the crisis sparked by Kurdistan¶s referendum for independence, which are primarily credited to Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi, Abadi's government has failed to completely thwart the Kurds¶ambitions to break away from Iraq. However, Al-Abadi¶s successful management of the Kurdish crisis, recapturing dispute areas, pushing the Peshmerga forces to Kurdistan¶s traditional border, as well as defeating ISIS in Iraq, all would enhance his chances in winning a second term at the helm of the Iraqi government at the parliamentary elections to be held in April 2018. 9/23/2021 2:11:39 PM 2 / 2.
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