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‘ ’ ’ also by opinion in the Arab world generally, particularly over his use of military forces and his violent dealings with the rebels.
It became apparent that the political rights of Iraqi’s diverse sectarian and ethnic groups needed to be guaranteed. Owing to the immediate effects of granting legitimacy to the IGC, the most prominent political leaders in the Iraqi arena participated in the IGC forum: Jalal Talabani (PUK), Masoud Barzani (KDP), Iyad Allawi (Iraqi National Accord), Ahmed Chalabi (Iraqi National Congress), Ibrahim al-Jaafari (Islamic Dawa Party), Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim (Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq), Adnan Pachachi (Assembly of Independent Democrats), Mohsen Abdel Hamid (Iraqi Islamic Party), Ezzedine Salim (Islamic Dawa Party). Interestingly the IGC included two women in its structure, Sondul Chapouk, representing the Turkmen faction, and Aquila Al-Hashimi, who served in the IGC until she was assassinated on 25 September 2003 (and was replaced by Salama al- Khufaji on 8 December 2003). 218
Article 36 of the TAL stated that the National Assembly would elect the head of state and its two deputies to form the Presidency Council (PC), whose main function was to represent the sovereignty of Iraq and oversee the higher affairs of the country. The Presidency Council would be elected on the basis of a single list and by a two-thirds majority vote of the members’ votes. In addition, the National Assembly had the power to dismiss any member of the Presidency Council for incompetence or lack of integrity by a three-fourths majority vote of its members; in the case of a vacancy in the Presidency Council, the National Assembly should, on the basis of a vote of two- thirds of its members, elect a replacement to fill the vacancy.219
To pre-empt future constitutional deadlocks, negotiations over the distribution of powers with the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) dealt with the government establishment, in effect reflecting the Kurdish position on acquiring certain sovereign rights as an entitlement of the Kurdish nation, along with the speedy implementation of Article
218 Kenneth Katzman and Alfred B. Prados, p.3
219 For details see Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, available at htm/دﺳﺎﺗﯿﺮ%20ﻋﺮاﻗﯿﺔhttp://www.dostoor.jeeran.com.2010% 97 ’
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“ ” “ was established on 14 July 1958. Third, the Law of the National Council of Revolutionary Command No. 25 of 1963, on 4 April 1963; the Interim Constitution of 1964. Forth: the Interim Constitution of 1968. Fifthly, the Iraqi State Administration Law for the Transitional Period, 2004, which it could be deemed to be the first opportunity for the Kurds to participate in writing the draft of Iraqi constitution.249 In same context, some scholars are argued that the Treaty of Sevres, signed 10 August 1920 could be regarded as a first constitution for Iraq until The Fundamental Law was passed in 1929. The Interim Constitution was adopted after the Republic was established on 14 July 1958. Then followed the Constitution of the Kingdom of Iraq on 1925; the Second Amendment Act of the Basic Law for the year 1925; the Interim Constitution of 1958; the Law of the National Council of Revolutionary Command No. 25 of 1963, on 4 April 1963; the Interim Constitution of 1964; the Interim Constitution of 1968; and the Iraqi State Administration Law for the Transitional Period, 2004.250
into effect right after it was signed by the king on March 21, 1925”. See “Iraq since 1918 British occupation and the mandatory regime”. Available at
250 Iraqi Basic Law of 1925 (in Arabic), By Investigator Foundation for Culture and Guidance,; ; … … “ ” ’ ’ “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” ’ “ ” ’ ’ “ ” “ ” “ ” ‘ ’ “ ” “ ” ’ ‘ ’ ’ ’ ’ “ ” ’ ’ “ ” ’ ’ “ ” “ ” “ “ ” ’ ‘ ’ ’ “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” ’ ’ ‘ ’ “ ” “ ” ‘ ’ ‘ ’ “ ” “ ” ’ ’ ’ “ ” ‘ ’ ‘ ’ “ ” ’ “ ’ ‘ ’ “ ” “ ’ ” “… ” “… ” ’ “ ” ’ “ ” “ “ ” “ ” ” “ ” ’ “ ” ’ “ ” “ ” “ ” ’ ’ ‘ ’ ’ “ ” “ ” ’ “ ” ’ ’ “ ” “ ” “ ” “ “ ” “ ” “ ” ‘ ’ ’ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ’ “ ” ” ’ … ‘ ’ ’ “ ” “ ” ‘ ’ “ ” ’ ’ ’ ’ “ “ ” ” “ ” ’ ’ ’ ’ … ’ “ ‘ ’ ” ’ ’ ‘ ’ ’ “ ” “ ” ’ ’ “ ” “ ” ’ ‘ ’ ’ ‘ ’ ’ ’ “ ” ’ ’ “ ” ’ ‘ ’ ’ ‘ ’ “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” ’ ’ “ ” “ ” ’ ’ ’ ’ “ ’ ” ’ “ ’ “ ’ ” ’ ’ ’ ‘ ’ “ ” “ ” “ ” ’ ’ ’ ’ “ ” ’ “ ” “ ” “ ” ‘ ’ “ ” ’ ’ “ ” “ ” ’ “ ” “ ” ’ ’ ’ ’ “ ” ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ “ ” ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ “ ” ’ ’ ‘ ’ ’ “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” ’ ’ ’ “ ” ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ‘ ’ ’ ’ ’ – “ ” ’ ’ “ ” ’ ” ’ ‘ “ ” census has been conducted, in order to enable displaced people who have been compulsorily deported and expelled from their home and region are compensated or returned home.402 Article 58, section B of the TAL clearly indicated the demographic manipulations and changes made to the administrative boundaries by the previous regime through expulsions, expropriations, and the process of Arabization, and called for these injustices to be remedies, stating that, The previous regime also manipulated and changed administrative boundaries for political ends. The Presidency Council of the Iraqi Transitional Government shall make recommendations to the National Assembly on remedying these unjust changes in the permanent constitution. In the event the Presidency Council is unable to agree unanimously on a set of recommendations, it shall unanimously appoint a neutral arbitrator to examine the issue and make recommendations. In the event the Presidency Council is unable to agree on an arbitrator, it shall request the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint a distinguished international person to be the arbitrator.403 It is quite evident that the Kurdish negotiators during the drafting of the permanent constitution were able to insure the inclusion of Article 140 which was an amended version of the TAL’s Article 58. According to Article 140, a census and a referendum were to be held before completion of the first stage in the implementation of Article 140, which was the normalisation stage. This was regarded as the more complex part of the process, since it required the resolution of property disputes and was likely to take some years to resolve. Although the Kurds insisted on a referendum, there was no guarantee that they would have the necessary numbers to win a referendum, and that they would therefore have to depend on the restoration of the districts that had been separated from Kirkuk by the Baath regime, which would greatly escalate the proportion of Kurds in Kirkuk compared with other ethnic groups. 402 Carole A. O’Leary and Charles G. MacDonald, ‘The Kurdish Identity Kurds in a Democratic Iraq and Beyond’, in “ ”, (eds.) Charles G. MacDonald and Carole A. O’Leary, (University Press of Florida, 2007), p. 258 403 The Transitional Administrative Law, Available at: htm>, Access Date: 25 August 2009.دﺳﺎﺗﯿﺮ%20ﻋﺮاﻗﯿﺔURL:http://www.dostoor.jeeran.com/2010%> 188 ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ “ ” ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ‘ ’ ’ “ ” ’ “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” ’ “ ” ’ “… ” ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ’ ‘ ’ “ ” ’ ‘ ’ ’ ‘ ’ “ ” “ ” ’ “ ” ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ “ ” ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ “ ” ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ‘ ’ “ ” ’ “ ” “ ” ’ ’ ’ ’ “ ” ’ … ’ ’ ’ “ ” “… ” “ ” ’ “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” … ’ ’ “ ” ’ … ’ ’ ’ “ ” ’ “ ” ’ “ ” “ ” ’ ’ “ ‘ ” ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ “ ” ’ ’ ’ ’ “ ” “ ’ ” “ ” ’ ’ “ ” “ ” ’ ’ “ ” ’ ‘ … … ’ ’ ’ ‘ ‘ ’ ’ ’ … “ ” ’ “ ” ’ ’ ’ • • • • • “ ” “ ” ’ ’ ’ ’ “ ” “ ” ’ ’ ’ “ ” “ ” ’ ’ “ ” ’ ’ ’ ’ “ ” “ ” ’ ’ ’ “ ” ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ “ ” ’ ’ ’ ’ “ ” “ ” “ ” ’ ’ ’ ’ ‘ ’ ’ ’ “ ” ’ “ ” “ ’ ’ “ …” ’ ’ ’ “ ” “ ” ’ “ ” ’ ’ ’ “ ” ’ ’ ’ “ ” “ ’ ” “ ” “ ” ’ ’ “ ” ’ ’ “ ” . ’ “ ” ’ ’ ’ “ ’ ” “ ” ’ ’ ’ ’ “ ” “ ” ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ “ ” “ ” ’ ’ ’ ’ “ ” – ’ ‘ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ “ ” ’ ’ ’ “ ” ” “ “ ” ’ ’ ’ ’ “ ’ ” ’ “ ” ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ – – ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ 3 . 8 50 4 4 . 4 4 45 9 3 6 . 7 3 1 . 40 6 3 35 2 . 8 2 30 4 . 25 5 . 1 9 2 1 20 3 . 4 1 15 10 5 0 7 5 7 5 6 7 9 9 9 1 1 1 Kurds Arabs Turcoman Chaldean,Syrian,Assyrian, Armenian, and others 0 0 700000 0 7 1 6 600000 0 0 0 6 500000 8 3 400000 0 300000 0 0 0 2 0 3 0 1 200000 3 9 0 0 5 1 . . 0 2 4 0 5 6 100000 . 6 0 1 1 1 2 1 0 l i , s s n r a n d a t b y a r n a s i o m r u a s n T o e A K e A c d , r l m n a u r a h T A i Population Percentage c r , y n S a 70.00% 62.50% 60.00% 50.00% 40.00% 30.00% 21.40% 20.00% 15.10% 10.00% 1% 0.00% r s s n A a b d n r , a a m r u n e o A a K d i l c r r a y u h s T c s , A n , a i n n a i e r y m Ratio S 0 0 0 9 3 140000 1 0 0 0 8 120000 9 100000 80000 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 60000 2 7 2 0 0 0 0 40000 5 0 . 6 3 1 . 1 3 5 0 2 . 6 1 20000 2 0 l , s s n a a n a d b t d l r a a o i m a r u r T o h A K y c C s r , s u n n A T e a , i n n a e i r m y r S Population Percentage A 60% 51.50% 50% 36.30% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%10% s s n C d a b , r a n m 2.20% r u a o A i K c n r e u T m r A n e , a n d a l i r a y h s s A , n a i r Ratio y S ِ ◌ ِ ◌ ِ ◌ A r a b s K u r d s F a i l i K u r d T u r c o m a n A r m i n i a n A s s y r i a n O t h e r u n k n o w n A r a b s K u r d s F a i l i K u r d T u r c o m a n A r m e n i a n A s s y r i a n O t h e r s u n K n o w n 80% 75.60% 70% 70% 60% 50% 50% 40% 30% 25.70% 20% 10% 0% 1947 1957 1965 1977 6 9 9 8 7 4 7 2 1 4 2 25000 8 5 8 1 20000 7 3 2 15000 0 9 1 2 8 8 1 0 10000 2 9 2 7 5 7 5 4 4 4 1 3 4 1 9 1 3 2 7 3 5000 2 5 2 1 5 8 1 1 7 0 4 0 3 0 Khaneqin Saadiya Qorato Maydan Population Kurds Arabs Turcoman 6 3 8 5 40000 3 35000 6 3 8 6 5 30000 0 2 6 2 2 25000 4 6 2 8 1 3 20000 2 1 3 1 4 1 8 1 4 15000 8 9 3 3 5 9 5 8 8 0 7 1 8 6 9 2 8 10000 6 4 2 5 6 2 7 1 4 4 4 8 3 3 1 2 5 0 3 0 6 2 1 5 5000 8 1 6 0 0 0 Khaneqin Jalawla Saadoya Qorato Maiydan Population Kurds Arabs Turcoman 5 7 6 4 45000 4 40000 35000 2 2 8 8 2 30000 3 8 0 2 8 2 1 25000 2 0 2 6 4 6 8 0 6 2 1 20000 5 1 3 2 1 2 15000 1 4 0 7 1 5 10000 3 7 9 6 5 5 5 2 2 8 6 2 1 5 7 5 2 2 5000 2 5 5 1 6 2 5 0 7 8 1 7 0 3 2 0 6 6 1 0 3 1 0 5 0 3 3 1 7 0 Khaneqin Jalawla Saadiya Maiydan Qorato Population Kurds Arabs Turcoman Others 6 9 4 8 40000 2 4 2 9 7 3 3 3 0 2 3 35000 2 6 6 8 30000 4 5 2 6 6 1 2 2 4 5 25000 8 9 9 1 7 1 20000 15000 9 3 10000 8 4 5 1 3 4 8 8 2 6 1 3 1 8 1 5000 1 6 0 Khaneqin Jalawla Saadiya Population Kurds Arabs Turcoman 8 7 6 4 9 1 9 6 50000 4 4 9 3 6 45000 8 3 4 40000 7 8 7 1 3 3 5 2 9 35000 7 4 2 6 30000 2 9 9 6 25000 9 1 20000 15000 6 0 6 6 2 5 10000 4 4 5 9 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 0 5000 9 0 Khaneqin Jalawla Saadiya Population Kurds Arabs Turcoman 17853 18000 16000 14980 14000 12000 10000 8835 8000 7004 6000 4807 4000 50 2000 80 21 42 45 0 Khaneqin Jalawla Saadiya Qorato Maydan no. villages population – ‘ ’ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ’ ‘ ’ ……………… ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ’ ‘ ’ “ ” ‘ ’ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ “ ” ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ’ ‘ ’ “ ” ‘ ’ “ ” ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ “ ” ‘ ’ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ “ ” “ ” ‘ ’ “ ” “ ” “ ” ‘ ’ ‘ ” ‘ ’ ‘ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ “ ” ’ ‘ ’ “ ” ‘ ’ “ ” ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ “ ’ ” ‘ ’ “ ” ‘ ’ “ ” ‘ ’ ’ “ ” ‘ ’ ’ “ ’ ” ‘ ’ “ “ ” ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ “ ” ‘ ’ ‘ ’ “ ” ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ “ ” ‘ ’ ’ ’ ’ “ ” ‘ ’ ‘ ’ “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” . “ ” “ ” ‘ ’ ‘ ’ “ ” ‘ ’ ‘ ’ “ ’ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” “ ” ‘ ’ ‘ ’ “ ” “ ‘ ” “ ’ ” ‘ ’ “ ” “ ” “ ” ’ ’ ’