Classical and Political Humanitarianisms in an Era of Military Interventionism and the War on Terror Ambiguity, Prescription, Jus in Bello and Jus Ad Bellum

journal of international humanitarian legal studies 8 (2017) 33-112 brill.com/ihls Classical and Political Humanitarianisms in an Era of Military Interventionism and the War on Terror Ambiguity, Prescription, Jus in Bello and Jus ad Bellum Matthew Bywater London School of Economics and Political Science graduate [email protected] Abstract This paper scrutinises the modus operandi of classical and political humanitarianism: the use of ambiguity and prescription to frame calls for international action to protect civilians, and public commentary on jus in bello and jus ad bellum. It does so by in- novatively considering the perspectives of belligerents alongside those of humanitarian actors, so as to identify how belligerents have responded to the two humanitarian modus operandi, and to ascertain the connection of humanitarian actors to the wars and international military interventions that they have implicitly or explicitly called for or endorsed. The paper finds that the response of belligerents differs from what both classical and political humanitarians expect. Even where humanitarians maintain ambiguity, the intention to will military action remains present and even the documentation and reporting of violence will bolster military intervention. Such consequences will be perceptible to belligerents, who may restrict humanitarian space. When humanitarians advance jus ad bellum perspectives, the humanitarian identity envisioned by classicists is not necessarily compromised. But belligerents are positively influenced by such perspectives only when those perspectives coincide with their own position. Keywords humanitarianism – humanitarian action – military intervention – war – témoignage – speaking out – advocacy – perceptions – belligerents The historical period since the end of the Cold War has been a particularly tumultuous one for the humanitarian community. As scores of armed conflicts arose from the ashes of the Cold War order, the humanitarian sector has found © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/18781527-00801005Downloaded from Brill.com09/24/2021 10:06:16AM via free access <UN> 34 Bywater itself repeatedly advocating for international involvement to help guarantee the protection and security of affected civilian populations, calling on multi- ple occasions for Western- or United Nations (un)-led military action. One aid commentator referred to the call for military intervention as “the most striking example of humanitarianism unbound”.1 William DeMars examines the exchange of information between the intelligence and the humanitarian ngo community in the 1990s, including how ngo information served as a prelude and justification for international military intervention, where he noted “the enduring convergence of attention by both communities to the casual linkages between war and humanitarian suffering”.2 Anthropologist Didier Fassin considers the interaction between humanitarians and the military in emergency settings: the two sides come together…in a reciprocal and asymmetry depen- dency – the military increasingly calling on humanitarians to legiti- mise their interventions and the latter needing the former to ensure their safety…On a deeper and more subtle level, the two share many more realities and values than they believe or admit to themselves[:]… a habitus,…[a] way of isolating themselves from the surrounding population,…[a] vision of the world and particularly the way they think of local societies as undifferentiated,… [and how they] treat the sovereignty of national states…The relations between the two worlds are…essentially structural – the product of intervention itself… This reality…does not escape local protagonists. Not only do they not draw any practical distinction between the military and humanitarians, who appear to them to belong to the same entity of an intervention that is both massive and remote, but they see no moral difference between the logic of the military and the intentions of humanitarians.3 Still to be ascertained is the extent to which humanitarian agencies can 1 2 legitimately3 claim to keep a distance, as seen by themselves and by bellig erents, 1 A. de Waal and R. Omaar, Humanitarianism Unbound: Current Dilemmas Facing Multi- Mandate Relief Operations in Political Emergencies (1994), at 2. 2 W. DeMars, “Hazardous Partnership: ngos and American Intelligence in Small Wars”, 14(2) Int. J. of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 193 (2001). doi: 10.1080/088506001300063154; W. DeMars, ngos and Transnational Networks: Wild Cards in World Politics (2005), at 125–7. 3 M. Pandolfi and D. Fassin, “Introduction: Military and Humanitarian Government in the Age of Intervention”, in M. Pandolfi and D. Fassin (eds.), Contemporary States of Emergency: The Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions 9 (2010), at 15; D. Fassin, “Heart of Humaneness: The Moral Economy of Humanitarian Intervention”, in M. Pandolfi and D. Fassin (eds.), Contemporary States of Emergency: The Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions 269 (2010), at 284–5. journal of international humanitarian legalDownloaded studies from Brill.com09/24/2021 8 (2017) 33-112 10:06:16AM via free access <UN> Classical and Political Humanitarianisms 35 from the military interventions that ensue following their requests for greater international involvement and the wars which they have, implicitly or explicitly, endorsed. To date, no comprehensive study exists of how belligerents re- spond to security-based advocacy, in a given context or in general. Moreover, almost all studies on perceptions of humanitarian actors in conflict zones con- firm the considerable difference between how humanitarians are perceived and how humanitarians see themselves, yet most do not identify why and how different local population groups view particular humanitarian actors and actions.4 This paper enters the long-running debate between the classical and political forms of humanitarianism on how humanitarian actors position themselves in relation to political and military force, war and military intervention. It scrutinises two key dividing lines between the humanitarianisms: firstly, between the use of ambiguity and prescription when making calls for international action to protect civilian populations and, secondly, between commentary on the conduct (jus in bello) and justness (jus ad bellum) of war. Taking an innovative approach in response to the gap in the literature, the paper examines the perspectives of belligerents alongside those of humanitarian actors. Four case studies of armed conflict are drawn upon in which aid agencies have tak en public positions in support of or against international military intervention: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, with a con- cluding reference made to the present-day case of Syria. The paper begins with an overview of the classical-political humanitarianism typology. Section 2 delves into the range of public positions adopted by humanitarian agencies on the four cases of military intervention and war: ambiguous calls for action, prescriptive calls for military intervention and pronouncements on jus in bello and jus ad bellum. This section illustrates the effectiveness and limitations of the respective modus operandi of classical and political humanitarianism from the standpoint of the humanitarian actors themselves. The rest of the paper is devoted to the practical ramifications of humanitarian positioning in the field, that is to say, how the belligerents from the case studies perceived and reacted to classical and political types of positioning. It also depicts how Western-led military intervention impacts the operating environment for humanitarian organisations based in the territories subject to intervention. Section 3.1 draws upon the example of Serbia and tests the classicist assumption that ambiguity represents the best option to avoid 4 4 D. Dijkzeul and C. Wakenge, “Doing good, but looking bad? Local perceptions of two humanitarian organisations in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo”, 34(4) Disasters 1139 (2010), at 1145–6. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7717.2010.01187.x. journal of international humanitarian legal studiesDownloaded 8 (2017)from Brill.com09/24/2021 33-112 10:06:16AM via free access <UN> 36 Bywater a backlash from belligerents and maintain operational humanitarian space. Section 3.2, drawing upon the examples of Afghanistan and Iraq, examines the opposing classical and political assumptions that pronouncements on jus ad bellum affect, respectively, negatively and positively belligerents and their will- ingness to accord humanitarian space. This paper identifies the “ambiguity-prescription” quandary, which afflicts classical humanitarian actors who advocate for solutions on behalf of civilian populations at risk of violence while refraining from prescribing a specific political or military action. I argue that this quandary not a quandary simply because coherence dictates that those who will the ends should will the means. When a humanitarian agency takes refuge in ambiguity and avoids calling for military action, any intention to will such action will lurk beneath the surface. Even where agencies stick to the documentation of violence and reporting of abuses, they can inadvertently bolster military intervention. Such consequences will be perceptible to belligerents. As I argue, the line between ambiguity and prescription is far thinner than commonly presumed, as much as from the perspective of belligerents

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