Thelongresistance-1858-1975-Nguyenkhacvien.Pdf
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THE LONG RESISTANCE NGUYEN KHAC VIEN THE LONG RESISTANCE 1B5B - 1975 FOREIGN LANGUAGES PUBLISHING I{OUSE HANOI - 7975 Foreutortl Tbe great oictory oI tlLr, .rltritt,q oI tt17 5, i,r;/Lich led to tbe contplete liberaliott ol Sorrtb Vit/. Nan, zp:as tbe result ot' tnore thart t c(tltt .), of rtt rr,qglc aaged by tbe Vietnarncse pcopk: to tr,llrritt tbcir in:d.epsr7.r.e and freedorn. 1'bis -strr.tg,qlc u)(t.\ .vtcces- sioely conducted against tbc Frcnch colottiali.tt:, t.bL' Japaruese occilp(ttion troops, /l.tost ol Cltirrttg Kai, sbek, British troops, aurl lrt.stly Altt'ricttt lrtrcc.r. It TDent througb matt1, .t/d.q.t. Wltilt: t/.tr' r'ttlirc Viet- nd,mese people took, pttrt itt il trt tll litttt's, tl.tt'poLit- ical line aclopted, lik.c tl.n' tttt'll.torlt of rrctiott oruL tbe prospects for thc fttttrtt'. rliffr'rt'rl ftc,ttt onc stage to another accorrlitt.g to t/tr' sotitrl d.at.tc.s, par.sonalities, orgdnizdtion.r rturl Darli,'s tl /|tt hentl of thc national tilou(lilent. ln tbi.s /.took. u.:t: lty lo attul..ysc tbis cotnplex and cocntfrrl ptriorl. a'lLic/.t i., but arz introductory steD to Vict Nan'.r coil/()/)tpor(try bistory. Hanoi, lune r975 Contents I - The Loss of Independence 9 II - The Establishment of the Colonial Regime (r897-r9r8) z6 III - Economic Transfotmations and First Lanrlaratks of the National and Democratic Revolution (tgr9-r929) 47 IV - From the Economic Depression to World lVar II. Regrouping of National and Democratic Forces (t91o-t919) 68 V - Viet Nam during World u7ar II 86 VI - The Founding of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam Og+s-ry+6) ro4 VII - The Resistance to French Aggression (tgCS-rStD t24 VIII - The Building of the First Bases of Socialism and the Struggle Agaiost American Neo-Colo- nialism (r954-r97y) r4j IX - The Collapse of the Neo-Colonial Regime Ggtyrgt) rs j APPENDIX - A Circular Letter Sent Out by Nghe Tinh Patriots 229 - Political Thescs of the Indochinese Communist Party (October r93o) 21i - Appeal for Nationwide Resistance (December 20, 1946) ztr - Program of the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation (December 196o) 242 - Statement of the South Viet Nain NFL Centtal Com- mittee Concerning the Intensi6cation and Expansion of the US Imperialists' Aggressive lVar in South Viet Nam (March zz, t961) 24t - Appeal to Compatriots and Fighters Throughout thc Country (July q, ry66) 2t4 2t9 - Testament I _ THE LOSS OF INDEPBNDENCE - Forward to the Future 263 The Can Yuong Movement On April rt, 184J, French wa_rships sank five armoured iunks of the Vietnamdse fleet in Da Nang port. On August 3i, r8y8, a French squadron attacked Da Nang again, thus rnarking the beginning of a war of colonial conquest by French imperialism, to be waged in many stages from r8t8 to t884, until the total annexation of the country. Facing that aggression, there were, on the Vietnamese side, two parties with oppoSite views : one standing for compromise, the other for resistance. The king and the high dignitaties of the Court were frightened by the modern weapoos used by the French and misjudged the latter's intentions, believing that, coming frofi so tar away, they wete less interested in conquering the country than in wresting commercial advantages. Moreover, the Nguyen monarchy, refiogtade to'the core afld constantly busy repres- sing internal insurreitions, was oeither able nor willing to mobilize all the energies of the nation to oppose the aggres- sion. All these reasons urged the king' and the high dignitaries to practise' a policy of peace and negotiation, trying to placate the aggressors with more and more im- pbrtant concessions. On the other hand, a number of man- darins, the great maiority of the scholars, and the people as a whole, heirs to a long tradition o[ struggle for national independence, put up e fierce .resistaflqe. While the royal troops offered only weak resistance, that of the popular forces was powerful and protracted, and compelled French imperialism to wage a long and costly war. But the defec- Saigon was beleaguered on the morning of February tion of the monarchy, the only force which could theo 17, t85<1; in the evening the royal troops evacuated it. play a guiding role on a national scale, undermined the Meanwhilc, rcinforccmcnts were pouring in from the efforts of the Vietflamese patriots. neighbouring provinccs, among them ;,Boc voiunteers rccruitccl The French colonialists used particularly cunning by Iocnl notablcs. Thus rcinforccd, the Saigon garrisorr crrcirclcd They began by gaining a foothold on a portion of thc French troops who had entered the tactics. town, the territory and having it ceded to them by the Court of l)utting thcrn in a clifficult position. However, the Court of Ilue Hue through a treaty in due form. The aggressors thus did not ordcr any countcr-attack, hoping for a_compromise by won a springboard to prepare for new annexations, and a ncgotiation. Thc Frcnch took advantage of this indecision respite to annihilate the people's resistance in the occu- to gain time. In 186o, aftcr a ncw victo- pied zones. They then violated the treaty, and resumed rious offensive of the Western powcrs against China, France was the conquest. New concession by the Court, new treaty. able to concentrate the wholc of its naval force operating New violatiofl, new conquest. The same scenario recurred in the Far East to break the siege of Saigon and conquer, again and again until total annexation ; from concession in 186r, the three eastern provinces to concession the monarchy ended in capitulation and of Cochinchina, which comprised, besides, three western betrayal. The king and the high dignitaries preferred provinces. -independence selling out national in exchange for a few privileges that the conquerors left them to vrin them over. Responsible for the safeguarding of national independ- ence and honour, they gradually became agents of the foreigners and put themselves at the latter's service by repressing the people's patriotic movement. The support The defeats of the A,nnamese army had no efiect that the Court of Hue tried to obtain from the Chinese on the insurrectional state of the occupied territories. empire itself on the decline and exposcd to r'X/estern - The resistance was general. pallu aggressions - could not deviate the course of events. The French historian de la Barridre, an eye-witness, wrote : The fact is that the resistance centre \tras every- where, subdivided ad infinitum, rearly Loss of Saigon and the Three Eastern Provinces of as many rimes as there were iiving Annamese. It would be more Cochinchina exact to consider each peasant who was fastening a sheaf of rice plants as a centre of resistance. After having occupied Da Nang, the French troops burnt it down, but were not strong enough to threaten j the capital city and compel the Court of Hue to make !: :'f'",?n^ :t #.,i,ii concessions. Bishop Pellerin proposed to the French com- mand to attack the Red River delta where 4oo,ooo The popular character of the resistance was also seen rffhereas Catholics, he said, were ready to rise up in support of the in the change in tactics. the royal troops oper- operation. The French command, however, preferred taking ated in close formations and greatly f.eared French long- its troops to the South, where rice trade was thrivinS. range weapons, the popular forces practised guerilla 10 77 time. A sincarc patt;iot, he did not want to ienounce the strugglc, but, brought up as a Confucian, he did not feel hc c<-lulcl <Jisobcy the king. Hc was about to obey the lnttcr's orclcr, whcn clclcgrLcs oI the popular forces and thc pcoplc lloclictl to his catnp and besought him to rcmain lcailcr o[t tlrc lnovcl]lcnt, dubbing him "Com- manclcr-in-Chicf, Pncificr of thc French." Truong Dinh to ask for quick reinforcements. cornplic<J with thc pcoplc's will and took command of the It was the Court of Hue which got the French troops insurrection. The patriotic rcsisters fought heroically. The Annamese, armed with weapons ineffective against our carbines, rushed at our men with a blind energy that:testified to a rate courage and extraor- dinary abnegation. (F. diately ordered the popular forces to withdraw from the Vial, oP' cit.) aforesaid provinces. Their guerilla tactics put the French troops to a hard The order was not obeyed. The French historian F' Vial test. Pallu de 1a Barridre wrote : u/rote : There is ro more painful, dull and tiring sight than he had that of the French moving over land and \rater. One nd that the adversaries is continually in sight, the other edoubt- of the enemy persistently slips away, it seems regular never. As as though we were hitting only a vacuum. trooPs. (op. cit.) (The First Years of French Cochinchina) Civil rcsistance was also orgatized in all forms' The The insurrection was led by Truong Dinh, who was rnaiority of notables and mandarins refused to collaborate head of an agricultural settlement when the French wiih tlic cncmy. Thc poct Nguyen Dinh Chieu, though a occupied regions and, together with attacked Saigon. Together with volunteers he came to the blind mur, lcft thc highly patriotic works' rescue of thg town. After its fall he withdrew to Go Cong other schr:lars, wrotc Howcvcr, thc ordcr coming from the Court to stop all resistancc sowccl confusion in the people's minds. It had sent to Frarncc a mission led by Phan Thanh Gip'r-r to negotiatc thc retrocession of the lost provinces.