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Arabs and Tuareg Clash in Struggle for Destiny of Northern Mali

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Arabs and Tuareg Clash in Struggle for Destiny of Northern Mali Volume XI, Issue 10 u May 17, 2013 IN THIS ISSUE: briefs ...........................................................................................................................1 Has al-QaedA in Iran Gone Operational? The Evidence from CanadA By Nima Adelkah .............................................................................................................4 Lebanese Salafist Cleric Organizes Militia ForayS into Syria By Chris zambelis ...........................................................................................................6 Chadian soldiers patrol the streets of Gao, in northern Mali Ombatse: Nigerian Religious Cult Joins War on the State in Central Nigeria By Andrew McGregor ....................................................................................................8 Terrorism Monitor is a publication of The Jamestown Foundation. The Terrorism Monitor is designed to be read by policy-makers and other specialists yet be accessible ARABS AND TUAREG CLASH IN STRUGGLE FOR DESTINY OF to the general public. The opinions NORTHERN MALI expressed within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily Andrew McGregor reflect those of The Jamestown Foundation. New fighting between northern Mali’s Arab community and the Tuareg rebels working Unauthorized reproduction with French intervention forces in the region threatens to escalate into a wider or redistribution of this or any ethnic conflict in the run-up to July’s national elections. While efforts are under way Jamestown publication is strictly to ease tensions between the communities, there is also suspicion that some of these prohibited by law. efforts are opportunistic and designed to advance certain personal political agendas. The clashes, centered around the town of Bir, have involved members of the largely Tuareg Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA – a secular separatist movement) and the Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad (MAA), an Arab militia created in February 2012 as the Front de Libération nationale de l’Azawad (FLNA) and formed from members of earlier Arab militias and Arab soldiers of the Malian Army who deserted after the fall of Timbuktu to Islamist groups last year. For comments or questions about The MAA announced it had expelled Tuareg fighters belonging to the MNLA from our publications, please send an the town of Bir (30 miles northeast of Timbuktu) on April 22 after 14 to 15 MAA email to [email protected], or battlewagons entered the town. Movement spokesman Moloud Muhammad Ramadan contact us at: said the action was taken to protect village residents who were threatened by the MNLA’s presence, though there were later charges that MAA fighters looted Tuareg properties 1111 16th St. NW, Suite #320 in Bir (al-Akhbar [Nouakchott], April 22). French military aircraft overflew the town Washington, dC • 20036 several times to observe the situation, though they did not send in ground forces (RFI, Tel: (202) 483-8888 April 26). As clashes between Arabs and Tuareg intensified, troops from Burkina Faso Fax: (202) 483-8337 and the Malian Army entered Bir on May 6 (AP, May 7). The Arab fighters withdrew, but remained close to the town to observe developments and await an opportunity to Copyright ©2011 return. TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE TERRORISM MONITOR, VISIT http://www.jamestown.org TerrorismMonitor Volume XI u Issue 10 u May 17, 2013 Malian troops conducted searches and carried out arrests trader was taken (RFI, May 2). in Bir, but they and the Burkinabe force withdrew by May 10, leaving the town open to new outbreaks of violence as Besides the Arab “self-defense” militias, Malian Arabs a column of Arab battlewagons re-entered Bir on May 11, seeking reforms through legal and democratic means formed looting homes and shops while searching for Tuareg men. al-Karama (dignity) last year in the Mauritanian capital of MAA spokesmen Moloud Muhammad Ramadan admitted Nouakchott, where many Malian Arabs have taken refuge that the Arab fighters were members of the MAA, but insisted for the duration of hostilities in northern Mali. Though they were operating outside the movement’s control in an they admit they lack political experience, al-Karama leaders effort to retrieve items looted from the Arab community in say they will not concede the right to govern to “cunning” In Khalil by Tuareg members of the MNLA (RFI, May 12). and more experienced political operators who rule through The local Tuareg community claims to have had nothing to “the lie, the plot and the threat” (Mali Actualités, April 12). do with the MNLA looting of In Khalil. Ramadan denied The leader of al-Karama is Muhammad Tahir Ould al-Hajj, charges that Tuareg livestock at Bir were slaughtered by a leading member of the Timbuktu Arab community. The MAA fighters and stated that the MAA “has nothing against movement’s secretary, Muhammad Ould Mahmud, insists al- the Tuareg, but hunts the MNLA wherever it may be” (Mali Karama opposes all forms of terrorism and drug-trafficking Actualités, May 5). and welcomes the recent establishment of a national dialogue and Reconciliation Commission (Mali Actualités, May 4). The trouble in Bir has its direct origin in the MNLA’s occupation of the border town of In Khalil in February, which In a parallel effort to find a political solution to the situation Arab residents claim was followed by wide-scale pillaging in northern Mali, the High Council of Azawad was formed on and rape. The MAA responded by attacking the MNLA May 2 by a number of Kidal community leaders and headed positions in In Khalil on February 23 with a column led by by Muhammad ag Intallah, a son of the chief of the Ifoghas MAA military commander Colonel Hussein Ould Ghulam. Tuareg of Kidal, Intallah ag Attaher. The mainly Tuareg group The Arab militia was driven off after being hit by French says it seeks to unite all the “sons of the Azawad” under a airstrikes in support of the MNLA (Le Combat [Bamako], single banner to negotiate with Bamako without recourse February 23; see Terrorism Monitor Brief, March 8). to armed struggle, partition or alliance with Islamist groups (RFI, May 7). However, despite accusations that the HCA is To press their demands for the return of Arab property or nothing more than a renamed version of the rebel MNLA, cash compensation, MAA fighters kidnapped the son of the that movement has announced it wants no part of the HCA Tuareg marabout (Islamic religious scholar) of Bir, who and is seeking direct negotiations with Bamako (RFI, April remains missing (RFI, May 9). However, Arab elders in the 26; May 8). Bamako, in turn, insists on MNLA disarmament town opposed the kidnapping, suggesting it would result only before talks can begin. There are, however, reports that in more violence between the communities (RFI, April 29). fighters of the largely Tuareg Mouvement Islamique de l’Azawad (MIA) led by Alghabass ag Intallah (another son Clashes between Tuareg and Arab groups have occurred and designated successor of the Ifoghas chief) are integrating elsewhere in northern Mali as well. Arab residents of Anefis, into the MNLA. These reports would seem to confirm earlier a town roughly halfway between Gao and Kidal, complain charges that the recently formed MIA was nothing more than that Tuareg fighters of the MNLA entered that town on April a way-station for Ansar al-din defectors seeking to join the 24, killing four Arab merchants before cleaning out their secular MNLA before direct talks resume with Bamako (RFI, shop and charging fees to pass through MNLA checkpoints April 29; for Alghabass ag Intallah and the MIA, see Militant (Procès Verbal [Bamako], May 1). It is not only the rebel Leadership Monitor, January 30). Tuareg that have come into conflict with the Arabs of northern Mali; Arab residents of the town of Taguilalt (60 The Arab-Tuareg tensions are escalating as the defeated miles outside of Gao) have complained that Tuareg troops Islamist groups turn to terrorist tactics to prolong their of the Malian Army (presumably part of Colonel al-Hajj ag- struggle against French “Crusaders,” their military allies and Gamou’s command) looted the village on April 16, arresting the Malian state: 12 Arab men and “provoking and humiliating “other Arab residents (al-Akhbar [Nouakchott], April 17). The Timbuktu • On May 4, two Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Arab community is still calling for information on the Africa (MUJWA) suicide bombers killed two members whereabouts of eight Arab traders and one Songhai member of the Malian military when they attacked a patrol near who they claim were abducted by Malian troops on February Gao (RFI, May 5). 14. Malian authorities in Timbuktu claim only one Arab • On May 10, three suicide bombers attacked a Malian 2 TerrorismMonitor Volume XI u Issue 10 u May 17, 2013 Army checkpoint in Gossi, while a fourth was killed Rather than operating with the rest of the African units that trying to enter the Gossi military camp. In the early gathered in Bamako but played no important role in the hours of the same day, an assailant tried to drive a car fighting, Nigérien troops entered northern Mali alongside bomb into the camp used by Nigérien troops in Menaka, Chadian forces from Mali’s southern border with Niger. but was killed when his car exploded under fire from Niger now deploys over 650 soldiers in northern Mali at the camp’s guards (Reuters, May 10; AFP, May 10). The Gao, Ansongo and Menaka (RFI, May 12). The Nigérien Niger deployment has also been struck by the death in base at Menaka was the target of a May 10 suicide attack. A Bamako of its senior officer, General yaya Seyni Garba, car full of explosives managed to burst through the gates of apparently from natural causes (Agence de Presse the camp, but was destroyed by Nigérien troops without any Africaine, May 11). casualties other than the suicide attacker (AFP, May 10). • Three suicide bombers struck in Gossi on May 11, wounding two soldiers, while a fourth suicide bomber Niger President Mahamadou Issoufou, who has met three was killed in Menaka before he could detonate his times in the last year with French president François Hollande, explosives.
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