CDA L'Institut Institute de la CAD

~ 1987 ~

THE CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE L’INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE

ASSESSING 'S APPROACH TO CHINA'S RISE

ALSO IN THIS ISSUE NATO AND RUSSIA INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER-TERRORISM DEVELOPING MEMORY OF THE AFGHAN WAR WOMEN AS PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS TIME FOR A NEW WHITE PAPER

AUTUMN 2015 | VOLUME 20, NUMBER 2 AUTOMNE 2015 | VOLUME 20, NUMÉRO 2 VOLUME 20 NUMBER 2: AUTUMN / AUTOMNE 2015

PRESIDENT / PRÉSIDENT - Daniel Gosselin, CMM, CD (Ret’d)

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR / DIRECTEUR-GÉNÉRAL Tony Battista

EDITOR / RÉDACTEUR Dr. David S. McDonough, PhD

CDA INSTITUTE – EDITORIAL BOARD / L'INSTITUT DE LA CAD – COMITÉ DE LA RÉDACTION Ferry de Kerckhove (Chair/Président) Lieutenant-général Richard Evraire, CMM, CD (Ret’d) Colonel Brett Boudreau, CD (Ret’d) Dan Donovan Colonel Alain Pellerin, OMM, CD, MA (Ret’d) Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson, CMM, MSM, CD (Ret’d)

CDA Institute / L’Institut de la CAD 151 Slater Street, Suite 412A 151, rue Slater, Suite 412A ON K1P 5H3

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ON TRACK is published by the CDA Institute.

Mission Statement. It is the goal of the CDA Institute to promote informed public debate on security and defence issues and the vital role played by the in society. It is intended that ON TRACK facilitate this educational mandate by featuring articles that explore security, defence, and strategic issues that may have an impact on Canadian interests and on the safety of its citizens. The views expressed in ON TRACK are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the CDA Institute.

ON TRACK est publié par l’Institut de la CAD.

Énoncé de mission. L’Institut de la CAD a pour but de non seulement encourager un débat public éclairé à propos des problématiques concernant la sécurité et de défense canadienne, mais aussi de promouvoir le rôle vital joué par les Forces armées canadiennes dans la société. Nous souhaitons que « ON TRACK » facilite ce mandat éducatif en mettant en vedette une gamme d'articles qui explorent la sécurité, la défense et le domaine stratégique pouvant avoir un impact sur les intérêts du Canada et sur la sécurité de ses citoyens. Les The Honourable Hugh D. Segal is the recipient of the CDA Institute's Vimy points de vues exprimés dans « ON TRACK » reflètent les vues des auteurs et pas nécessairement ceux de l’Institut de la CAD. Award for 2015. This year’s Gala Dinner, to be held on 6 November 2015, marks the Copyright © 2015. ISSN 1916-6699 ON TRACK (Print) 25th Anniversary of the Vimy Award. A special numbered commemorative book, (imprimé) The Vimy Award 25 Years with a Companion History of the Conference of Defence Copyright © 2015. ISSN 1916-6702 ON TRACK (Online) (en ligne) Associations Institute, will be available for purchase at this event. COVER PHOTO: Canadian Forces Combat Camera, DND. Her Majesty's Canadian Ship (FFH 335) is assisted For further information, please contact Denise Lemay at (613) 290‑6198 or by two harbor tugboats as the ship departs Pearl Harbor for a missile exercise during Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) [email protected]. Exercise 2014 on 29 July 2014.

PHOTO DE LA PAGE COUVERTURE: Caméra de combat des Forces canadiennes, MDN. Le Navire canadien L’honorable Hugh D. Segal est le lauréat du Prix Vimy de l’Institut de la CAD de 2015. de Sa Majesté Calgary (FFH 335) obtient l’aide de deux remorqueurs tandis qu’il quitte Pearl Harbor pour participer Le dîner gala cette année, qui aura lieu le 6 novembre 2015, est une grande occasion à un exercice de missiles, pendant l’exercice Rim of the qui marquera la vingt-cinquième anniversaire de la création du Prix Vimy. Lors de Pacific (RIMPAC), le 29 juillet 2014. cet évènement, il sera possible de se procurer le livre spécial commémoratif Le Prix Permission is granted to reproduce, in whole or in part, Vimy 25 Ans accompagné de la genèse et de l’histoire de l’Institut de la conférence des articles from ON TRACK. A credit line is desired. For associations de la défense, qui fut créé pour fêter cette anniversaire. inquiries contact the Editor, David McDonough at: david. [email protected].

Permission est accordée de reproduire en tout ou en partie des Pour plus de renseignements, veuillez contacter Denise Lemay au (613) 290-6198 ou à articles de « ON TRACK ». Nous souhaitons que la source soit [email protected]. mentionnée. Pour demander des renseignements, contactez David McDonough au [email protected]. CONTENTS

FROM THE EDITOR 2 LE MOT DU RÉDACTEUR 3 Dr. David McDonough LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 4 7 EDITORIAL – A DEFENCE POLICY BASED ON NATIONAL INTERESTS Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson (Ret’d) 5

WOMEN AS PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS: CANADIAN VALUES ON THE FRONT LINE Drs. Stéfanie von Hlatky and Christian Leuprecht 7 25 INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER-TERRORISM FOR CANADIAN NATIONAL SECURITY Dr. Jeremy Littlewood 11

FROM IMPERIAL SIBLINGS TO STRATEGIC COUSINS Dr. John Blaxland 14

ALL QUIET ON THE EASTERN FRONT? ASSESSING CANADA’S 33 APPROACH TO CHINA’S RISE David Beitelman 18 CDA INSTITUTE BOARD OF DIRECTORS / NATO AND RUSSIA: FROM AMBIVALENCE TO DÉTENTE LE CONSEIL D’ADMINISTRATION DE L’INSTITUT DE LA CAD Dr. Alexander Moens 25 Major-General John Adams (Ret’d) | Colonel Brett Boudreau (Ret’d) | Honorary THE (ALREADY) FORGOTTEN LEGACY OF CANADA’S WHOLE OF Colonel Darrell Bricker | Dr. Ian Brodie | Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas S. GOVERNMENT EFFORT IN KANDAHAR (2006-2012) Caldwell | Mr. Jamie Carroll | Mr. Richard Dr. Howard Coombs 29 Cohen | Mr. Terry Colfer | Mr. David Collins | Dr. (Honorary Colonel) John Scott Cowan | Mr. Dan Donovan | Lieutenant- CONTRIBUTING TO THE LEGACY: GERTRUDE KEARNS, THE ART général Richard Evraire (ret) | Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel Justin Fogarty | OF COMMAND, AND THE DEVELOPING MEMORY OF THE Major-General David Fraser (Ret’d) | AFGHAN WAR Lieutenant-général Michel Gauthier (ret) | Brigadier-General Bernd A. Goetze, Dr. Craig Leslie Mantle 33 PhD (Ret’d) | Honorary Colonel Blake C. Goldring | Major-General Daniel Gosselin (Ret'd) | Général Raymond Henault (ret) | THE CANADIAN-AMERICAN “SPECIAL” DEFENCE RELATIONSHIP: Honorary Colonel Paul Hindo | Honorary NEW CHALLENGES AND DEMANDS Colonel Tim Hogarth | M. Ferry de Kerckhove | Dr. George A. Lampropoulos | Dr. Rob Huebert 39 Lieutenant-général Marc Lessard (ret) | M. Pierre Lortie | Lieutenant-General George Macdonald (Ret’d) | Brigadier-General W. THREE QUESTIONS: THE BASIS OF A NEW DEFENCE POLICY Don Macnamara (Ret’d) | Vice-Admiral REVIEW Dean McFadden (Ret’d) | Mme. Louise Mercier | Mr. Sean Murray | Honorary Brigadier-General Dr. James Cox (Ret'd) 42 Colonel Hanif (Chiko) Nanji | Dr. Roland Paris | Colonel Alain Pellerin (ret) | Colonel George Petrolekas (Ret'd) | The Hon. TIME FOR A NEW WHITE PAPER? David Pratt | Honorary Captain (N) Colin Dr. James Fergusson 46 Robertson | Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson (Ret’d) | Mr. Jeffery Simpson | M. André Sincennes | Mr. Bob Walker | Commodore BOOK REVIEWS 50 Kelly Williams (Ret’d) Independent and Informed CDA Institute Autonomne et renseigné FROM THE EDITOR

Dr. David McDonough

In the intervening months since the last issue of ON TRACK, effectiveness and wisdom of Canada’s response to China’s rise. Canada has found itself in the midst of one of the longest federal election campaigns in modern history, a campaign that began in Given concerns about Russia’s increasing belligerence and recent early August and will finally conclude on 19 October 2015. At action in Crimea and Ukraine, we are fortunate to have Dr. the time of writing, it is unclear which political party (or possibly Alexander Moens from Simon Fraser University discuss the a combination of parties) may have the opportunity to form a continued importance of the NATO Alliance in this issue. government. Canada certainly has a long and very close history with NATO, At the CDA Institute, we have been busy acting as an important perhaps most recently demonstrated by its role in the NATO- forum for lively discussion on these and other important strategic led mission in Afghanistan. Dr. Howard Coombs at the issues of concern to Canadians. One only needs to look at the RMCC Kingston, alongside being a CDA Institute Research numerous commentaries written by Canadian and international Fellow, provides a retrospective look at the Canadian mission experts available on our Blog: The Forum. By coincidence, this in Afghanistan. A different take on this issue is explored by issue comes at a time very near the election date – so we have Dr. Craig Mantle, also a Research Fellow at the CDA Institute, chosen to use the opportunity to feature several articles offering who explores how war art – and particularly the works of artist advice and insights on security and defence issues to the new Gertrude Kearns – will likely influence the memory of the government. Afghan mission.

We are pleased to begin this issue with an Editorial by CDA The final three articles in this issue explore the future direction of Institute Board Member Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson (Ret'd), Canadian defence policy. The first article is by Dr. Rob Huebert who explores the role of national interests in any future Canadian at the University of Calgary, who looks at the changing nature of defence policy. the critical Canada-US strategic relationship. The second, written by Brigadier-General Dr. Jim Cox (Ret’d), looks at the guiding To explore gender integration in the Canadian Armed Forces questions that should inform a new government’s defence (CAF), which has become a critical issue following the release policy review. In the concluding article, Dr. Jim Fergusson at of the Deschamps report, we are delighted to have an article by the University of raises some important questions on Dr. Stéfanie von Hlatky at Queen’s University and Dr. Christian the ultimate effectiveness of any putative defence white paper or Leuprecht from the Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC) policy review. in Kingston. This issue concludes with books reviews byLindsay Coombs, a Among the Conservative government’s more controversial CDA Institute Analyst; Meaghan Hobman, Administration and initiatives has been on counterterrorism, as reflected in the Public Relations Manager at the CDA Institute; and political and ongoing debate on Bill C-51. The critical role of intelligence in defence analyst Adnan Qaiser. Canada’s counterterrorism policy is examined in this issue by Dr. Jez Littlewood at . I hope you find the contents of this issue of ON TRACK informative and interesting. With the exception of Canada’s role in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, political parties of all stripes have Sincerely yours, had very little to say about strategic developments in the Asia- David McDonough, PhD Pacific this election. To shed more light on these issues, Dr. John Blaxland at Australian National University, offers a historical perspective on the possible future direction of Canadian- Australian relations. He is followed by Dave Beitelman, a PhD candidate at Dalhousie University, who questions the

2 ON TRACK AUTUMN 2015 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné LE MOT DU RÉDACTEUR

David McDonough, Ph. D.

Depuis la publication du plus récent numéro de « ON TRACK, » réponse du Canada quant à la croissance stratégique de la Chine. le Canada se retrouve en plein milieu d’une campagne électorale qui est parmi la plus longue de son histoire. Cette campagne, qui Étant donné les préoccupations soulevées par la belligérance de débuta le 2 août, se terminera le 19 octobre 2015. Au moment la Russie et ses actions en Crimée et en Ukraine, nous sommes de la publication de ce numéro, il est impossible de prédire quel chanceux d’avoir un article par Alexander Moens, Ph. D., de parti, ou bien quel groupe de partis, aura l’opportunité de former l’Université Simon Fraser, au sujet du rôle de l’OTAN dans ce le prochain gouvernement. conflit.

À l’Institut de la CAD, on continue d’agir comme forum L’implication du Canada au sein de l’OTAN a toujours été important pour promouvoir la discussion sur des enjeux ayant importante, comme en témoigne la participation canadienne une importance stratégique pour le Canada. Il suffit de lire les dans la mission de l’OTAN en Afghanistan. Howard Coombs, nombreux articles sur notre blogue, « The Forum, » écrits par Ph. D., du Collège militaire royal du Canada à Kingston, qui des érudits de renommés national et international. Il tombe bien est également un chercheur « Fellow » avec l’Institut de la CAD, que ce numéro de « ON TRACK » soit publié durant la période écrit un article dans ce numéro sur la mission canadienne en électorale; nous avons ainsi décidé de mettre de l’avant plusieurs Afghanistan avec un point de vue rétrospectif. Sur ce même articles qui offrent des conseils au nouveau gouvernement sur des sujet, mais sous un angle différent, Craig Mantle, Ph. D., qui enjeux de sécurité et de défense nationale. est également un chercheur avec l’Institut de la CAD, écrit sur le thème de l’art en temps de guerre – plus précisément, il affirme Nous sommes heureux d’entamer ce numéro avec un éditorial que des œuvres d’art comme celles de l’artiste Gertrude Kearns du Vice-amiral Drew Robertson (ret), membre du conseil auront une influence sur la manière dont nous nous souvenons d’administration de l’Institut de la CAD, au sujet de l’intérêt de la mission en Afghanistan. national dans une politique de défense future. Les trois derniers articles dans ce numéro portent sur l’avenir Afin d’aborder le sujet des relations hommes-femmes au sein de la politique de défense canadienne. Le premier de ces articles des Forces armées canadiennes (FAC), un enjeu devenu plus est écrit par Rob Huebert, Ph. D., de l’Université de Calgary, pertinent suite à la publication du rapport Deschamps, nous au sujet de l’évolution des relations stratégiques entre le Canada sommes heureux de mettre de l’avant un article de Stéfanie von et les États-Unis. Par la suite, l’article du Brigadier-général Jim Hlatky, Ph. D., de l’Université Queen’s et Christian Leuprecht, Cox, Ph. D. (ret) examine les questions majeures qui devraient Ph. D., du Collège militaire royal du Canada à Kingston. influencer la politique de la défense du prochain gouvernement. Enfin, l’article de Jim Fergusson, Ph. D., de l’Université du Parmi les initiatives les plus controversées du gouvernement Manitoba, soulève des questions importantes sur l’efficacité d’un conservateur est la loi C-51 sur l’antiterrorisme. En faite, le rôle potentiel livre blanc sur la défense nationale. essentiel du renseignement dans la politique antiterroriste du Canada est le sujet d’un article dans ce numéro par Jez Littlewood, Le présent numéro se termine avec des critiques littéraires de Ph. D., de l’Université Carleton. Lindsay Coombs, analyste à l’Institut de la CAD; de Meaghan Hobman, gérante de l’administration et des relations publiques à À l’exception de la participation du Canada aux négociations du l’Institut de la CAD; et d’Adnan Qaiser, analyste en matières de Partenariat transpacifique, il y a eu très peu de discussion sur les politique et défense. développements stratégiques dans l’Asie-Pacifique par les partis politiques pendant la campagne. Afin d’approfondir la discussion J’espère que vous trouverez ce numéro de « ON TRACK » à la fois dans cette région, John Blaxland, Ph. D., de l’Université nationale intéressant et informatif. de l’Australie, offre une perspective historique sur l’avenir des relations entre l’Australie et le Canada. À la suite de cette parution Cordialement, est un article par Dave Beitelman, candidat au doctorat à David McDonough, Ph. D. l’Université Dalhousie, qui pose des questions sur l’efficacité de la

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Sir, As a one-time keen Naval Reservist, I identified strongly with the sentiments in Ken Hanson's article "Future Full of Uncertainty for Canadian Naval Reserves" (ON TRACK, Summer 2015). The future is not entirely clear for the RCN these days either, even if there is some blue sky on the horizon, so what can we expect for the Reserve? The Regular Forces have often conducted a 'beggar thy neighbour' policy with regard to the Reserves when times are tough with respect to manning, training and equipment. Despite the contribution of Reservists in Afghanistan, memories may be short.

Hanson notes the trend in the 1980s to assemble a large cadre of full-time reservists to train and qualify to man the MCDVs. The Reserve has always had a few folks who spent extended time on active duty - we called them 'Perma-Shads' in my day, not an entirely complimentary moniker. After all, if one wanted to go "Regular" why not go Regular if the RCN would accept you? But what this increased trend towards more full-time contracts portended was a departure from what the old RCNR had represented in the community - citizen sailors who were active and visible in (now) twenty-four Canadian cities and towns. They trained as well as they could and perhaps some lesser qualified were promoted beyond their professional level of naval competence, but want the Naval Reserve to maintain that requirements such as Afghanistan. If the they were present. community footprint that Commodore RCN really wants to kill it, that can be Hose laid out in desperation in the 1920s? accomplished quite easily. But the Reserve With the change in direction to more full- Will it allow it to do so? In fact, if the trend was never meant to be a mini-Regular time Reservists, much of this sentiment continues going in the direction Hanson Force, which is what some seem to hope it and camaraderie seems to have been suggests, perhaps this is a decision that is has become in recent years. lost, not only in the Divisions, but in the too important to be left to the RCN alone. communities as well. No one would argue I can but hope that the Commander RCN seriously about the underpinnings of a What have senior Naval Reserve officers and the newly appointed NR commodore, "One Navy" concept. In fact, even as an been advocating in the last fifteen Marta Mulkins, start giving the issues active Reserve officer in the 1970s and 80s, year? Have they had a voice in decision raised in Hanson's article some deep I never felt I was anything other than part making? I don't want to sound hidebound thought before it really is too late to salvage  of One Navy, and no one ever told me I but the Naval Reserve continues to what we can. Yours sincerely. wasn't. have a role to play in community and citizenship development - something David Collins So with the sea changes underway to-day, it used to do rather well, in addition to CDA Institute Board Member we have come full circle. Does the RCN fleet augmentation and staffing other 19 July 2015

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EDITORIAL A DEFENCE POLICY BASED ON NATIONAL INTERESTS

by Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson (Ret’d)

ost-election, will you be looking really needed for our security interests. repeatedly violated international norms. Pforward to the inevitable Defence Indeed, in the past two years alone, at Policy review? No matter which party It’s as if we Canadians don’t believe our least one and in some cases both have or parties take power, they will be participation matters internationally undertaken: coercion of neighbours confronted by both the declining and can’t see our own national interests. through force; unilateral action over capability of the Canadian Armed Worse, without a clear sense of those disputed territories, water, and airspace Forces and the rising complexity of the interests, governments over the past to demonstrate de facto sovereignty; international security environment, 20 years have failed to bring any invasion of neighbouring states; neither of which was annexation of territory and foreseen in the 2008 Canada "A political party that was serious about changing borders by force; First Defence Strategy attempts to temporarily fence (CFDS).1 Both factors create Canada’s defence would...ensure the government part of the global commons compounding risks to our understands the urgency of recapitalizing and – the high seas – for national national interests. restoring the capacity for relevant sovereign action control; and the fomenting of insurgency in neighbouring The CFDS level of ambition in the Canadian Armed Forces in general, and in states. was for Canada to be a our fighting fleets in particular." “credible player on the world For both, violating stage” through international international norms is not a leadership that could make “a meaningful sense of urgency in addressing the by-product of their actions; attempting contribution to the full spectrum of recapitalization of the CAF’s fighting to change them is central to their international operations.” But beyond fleets – the air and naval fighting fleets strategies. Their actions have not been lowering today’s readiness, removing in particular. The result has been a about mere disputes over rocks and $45 billion2 from the envisioned 20 steady erosion of Canada’s ability to act shoals or tactical level opportunism; year window (until 2026) of “stable and in its sovereign interests. Yet changes rather they should be seen as being predictable funding” has rendered the in the security environment remind us driven by their strategies for regional CFDS force structure unachievable, that growing risks to our security and control. Their actions and apparent at least without targeted additional prosperity demand capabilities that can strategies put our national interests funding, and exacerbated the damaging safeguard those interests. at risk, by clashing with the US-led delays in defence procurement. regional security regimes in Europe and As just one example of the changed Asia and challenging the international In part, these problems stem from a environment, consider the recent actions norms which have underpinned our strategy based on making a contribution of Russia and China – two countries prosperity and security for the past 70 abroad, rather than a clear appreciation not even mentioned in the CFDS even years. of the capabilities required to safeguard though much about their power and our national interests. After all, a potential for many of their recent These are not challenges the US should “meaningful contribution” can and has actions could have been foreseen when address alone. NATO’s strength is easily been redefined down to whatever that document was first published.3 derived from political and military is available to send, rather than what is These two great powers’ actions have risks being collectively borne by all

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allies. Nor, given the ongoing US regional strategy. International efforts Notes defence cutbacks, should one expect to both deter their strategy execution the United States to have the capacity while also furthering international 1. Canada, National Defence and to address these and other challenges engagement and cooperation may take Canadian Armed Forces, Canada around the globe without meaningful many years. Yet if Western nations are First Defence Strategy (Ottawa: allied and partner participation. A US engaged in a multi-decade challenge, 2008), http://www.forces.gc.ca/ force posture that today requires, for attempting to both integrate China en/about/canada-first-defence- example, naval deployments of nearly and Russia into international norms strategy.page. 10 months to maintain the persistent while deterring adventurism and forward presence that deterrence and preventing misadventure, then the cost 2. David Perry, “Defence Budget 2015: assurance require is not sustainable.4 As of our participation in deterrence will A Long-Term Funding Increase… the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs noted be judged more than worthwhile if that Maybe,” Canadian Defence and in the latest US Military Strategy, “global effort achieves these goals and so avoids Foreign Affairs Institute (now disorder [since 2011] has significantly conflict that could damage our security the Canadian Global Affairs increased while some of our comparative and prosperity. Institute), 1 May 2015, https:// military advantage has begun to erode.”5 d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/ Additional cuts due to sequestration There are, of course, many other cdfai/pages/532/attachments/ potentially loom ahead, and with them existing and developing security risks original/1430536647/Defence_ greater risk for US and NATO strategies. and challenges, whether regional such Budget_2015.pdf?1430536647. as terrorism and instability in the mid- The actions of Russia and China require East, or thematic, like ballistic missile 3. In fact, the government's 2008 that NATO in Europe and the US-led defence and cyber. Any new government Canada First Defence Strategy security regime in Asia respond to the will also have to assess the risks that such mentions only two foreign repeated violations of international issues pose to our national interests as it countries – the United States and norms by reassuring allies and partners crafts a defence policy. Afghanistan. while deterring conflict, coercion, and adventurism, in part through credible A political party that was serious 4. Jeanette Steele, “Navy’s top military capability persistently deployed about Canada’s defence would pledge officer makes final S.D. visit,” in both regions. Our allies need our to have a policy driven by current and The San Diego Union-Tribune, participation in the US-led security future risks to our national interests. 17 August 2015, http://www. regimes that underpin the international Such a policy would ensure the sandiegouniontribune.com/ rules-based order. More importantly, government understands the urgency of news/2015/aug/17/greenert-cno- Canada’s vital trade and security interests recapitalizing and restoring the capacity final-visit-sandiego/. in the stability of Europe and Asia, as for relevant sovereign action in the well as attendant security interests in Canadian Armed Forces in general, and 5. United States, Joint Chiefs of Staff, continental defence, are at risk. So too in our fighting fleets in particular. The National Military Strategy of more generally is our interest in the the United States of America 2015 maintenance of international norms, Any lesser effort at policy formulation (Washington, DC: June 2015), without which global security and our might allow us to make token http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/ prosperity are threatened. For Canada, contributions internationally. But they Documents/Publications/2015_ beyond participation in the regions, would not likely be sufficient to safeguard National_Military_Strategy.pdf. the current and developing capabilities our interests at home and abroad, of both Russia and China also require through meaningfully participation continental cooperation in defence with our allies and partners in shaping of the air and maritime approaches to a favourable security environment and North America, including in the Arctic. defending our security and prosperity. 

There are important and complex issues Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson (Ret’d) on which we have mutually beneficial is a former commander of the Royal cooperation with both countries: Canadian Navy and is member of the in trade with China and counter- CDA Institute Board of Directors. terrorism with Russia, for example. But neither is likely to abandon their

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WOMEN AS PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS: CANADIAN VALUES ON THE FRONT LINE

by Drs. Stéfanie von Hlatky and Christian Leuprecht

n 30 April 2015, the government levels to understand the CAF experience including female teams in combat units Oreleased the External Review into with gender integration. We conclude by is key to fulfilling mission objectives. Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment offering some modest suggestions. For cultural reasons, reaching deep into in the Canadian Armed Force, known communities and including women in as the Deschamps Report. This review, Women in the Military: Arguments political activities could not have been named after its external authority, former for Greater Integration achieved without the presence of female Supreme Court Justice Marie Deschamps, soldiers. Having a man search a woman presented some challenging findings The integration of women in the armed at a checkpoint would be an inconceivable for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). forces has proven controversial, especially contravention of cultural norms in these Acknowledging that sexual misconduct in the combat arms (infantry, armoured societies. Institutional diversity also offers is not unique to the CAF, the Report reconnaissance, artillery, engineers). operational advantages by increasing emphasizes its endemic nature within There are at least three good reasons for the skillsets required in postmodern the military, concluding “that there is an their inclusion: institutional legitimacy society and warfare.2 Hybrid wars of the underlying sexualized culture in the CAF in a democratic society; the functional future are likely to fuel demand for more that is hostile to women and LGTBQ imperative; and recruitment. women to fulfill some of these essential [Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual, and military tasks. However utilitarian, Queer] members, and conducive to more First, the citizen-soldier ideal in such instrumental arguments make a serious incidents of sexual harassment democratic societies holds that military strategic case for greater integration of and assault.”1 Indeed, the external review organizational culture should be in women, along with minorities and other was commissioned by then Chief of the line with the expectations of Canadian underrepresented Designated Group Defence Staff, General Thomas Lawson, society and the government: If women Members (DGMs), within the CAF. after victims of sexual harassment made face no professional restrictions in other their stories public as part of journalistic fields, the military should follow suit. Finally, there is the recruitment investigations featured in the Canadian A CAF that is broadly representative of argument. Broadening the military’s magazines Maclean’s and L’Ac t u a l i t é . Canadian society is likely to be more applicant pool by removing barriers to closely aligned with that society, which certain trades will boost recruitment This was not the first sex scandal for the translates into greater support from efforts. More applicants mean greater CAF. The military went through a similar taxpayers who ultimately float the armed competition, which should result in more ordeal in 1998, when incidents of sexual forces and its mission. Gender diversity, qualified recruits overall. Over the course harassment made the news and caused then, is a proxy litmus test of civil- of two world wars and the Cold War, the public outrage. Why has the CAF been so military relations: How proactive is the military gradually removed restrictions complacent? How might the Department institution as opposed to diversifying on the service of women until a decision of National Defence focus its efforts largely in response to external pressure, by the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal post-Deschamps? Can Canada’s action such as legislative change and para- (CHRT) in 1989 opened up all ranks and plan restore the excellent reputation it judicial adjudication? trades to women (except for submarine achieved when it was among the first service, which took until 2000). Non- countries to remove all barriers to women Second, there is a case to be made for discrimination legislation aside, Canada’s across military trades? In response to operational effectiveness and mission 1995 Employment Equity Act (EEA) these questions, we highlight the key success. Recent military experiences in actually requires federal institutions to be factors at the domestic and international Kosovo and Afghanistan confirm that proactive about remedying disadvantage

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and underrepresentation among DGMs: women, visible minorities, Aboriginal peoples, and persons with disabilities.

After unsuccessfully trying to negotiate exemptions to the EEA, the CAF was successful in delaying the lifting of restriction until 2002. The EEA has since resulted in the Canadian Armed Forces Employment Equity Relations, which, along with the CHRT decision, prompted the CAF to develop a methodology to establish annual recruiting targets. Still, the recruitment targets for the CAF, when compared to other A news conference in Ottawa with then Chief of the Defence Staff General Tom Lawson (second from right) at the release of the External Review security organizations, are into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces, also known as the Deschamps Report, named after its author, former not overly ambitious – so Supreme Court justice Marie Deschamps (right). (Image credit: National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces.) much so that the CAF A CAF that fails to accommodate by States (18 percent) and Latvia (16.5 recently altered the methodology so as drawing more extensively on a more percent), which all have more female to ensure that recruitment targets would diverse recruit pool under conditions of uniformed members of their armed not escalate. The target for women is 25.1 population aging and a tightening labour forces. However, allied data may not be percent, compared to the RCMP’s target market may either end up having to lower readily comparable to Canada due to of 30 percent. Yet, the CAF falls well short standards of recruitment – if it tries to policy differentials: some countries have of this and other DGM targets: in 2015 recruit from the same yet shrinking cohort gender segregated roles that may affect women make up 17 percent of officers on which it has conventionally drawn – or female representation while denying men and 13.4 percent of non-commissioned shrinking the size of the force if it cannot access to “feminized” occupational roles. members of the Regular Force, for a total find the requisite quality of recruit within of about 14.3 percent (16.6 percent in the its conventional yet shrinking recruit The Alliance has been collecting data Reserves, for a CAF total of 15 percent). pool, neither of which are desirable. As from each of its 28 member states through the CAF contemplates more ambitious a questionnaire, the Annual National The delta between already conservative change, the post-Deschamps taskforce, Reports to the NATO International employment equity representation which is mandated with implementing Military Staff Office of the Gender Adviser. targets and actual representation rates the core recommendations, has been NATO recently enhanced data collection suggest that there is room for the CAF looking internationally for best practices. from its member states in the hopes of to aim higher and do more. However, generating best practices for the Alliance that arguably runs counter to deeply Benchmarking: What Are Canada’s on gender integration in the armed engrained premises of force cohesion Allies Doing? forces of NATO members.3 Comparing and a tight institutional culture that national legislation and policies, human values homogeneity and conformity. Canada was among the first NATO allies resources trends, how gender is integrated Yet, a tightening labour market due to to remove almost all professional barriers in military operations, as well as sexual population aging is raising the specter of to women subsequent to the CHRT misconduct and harassment, NATO’s stiffer competition for talent. The CAF’s decision in 1989. Today, the CAF is Science for Peace and Security Program – functional imperative thus hinges on it actually more representative of society on collaborating with external stakeholders becoming an employer of choice for all a per capita basis than most NATO allies, and experts – concluded: (1) professional Canadians. save Hungary (20.3 percent), the United restrictions still exist for women in the

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A Naval Boarding Party member on HMCS during a port visit to Karachi Pakistan in 2009. (Image credit: WO Carole Morissette, Royal Canadian Navy.)

military in seven NATO member states, Canada has a similar opportunity with Conclusion though all of them allow women to join the Deschamps report and the CAF the national armed forces; (2) about Action Plan on Inappropriate Sexual Within the CAF, the removal of formal half of NATO’s member states support Behaviour. With Lieutenant-General restrictions to service has met with women’s integration in the military Christine Whitecross at the helm some success at improving recruitment through targeted efforts by the ministry of of implementing this Action Plan, trends outside of the military’s defence; (3) over three quarters of NATO momentum is building to embark on an traditional recruit pool of rural white states have incorporated gender training effort similar to Australia’s. heterosexual males. However, these as part of operational or pre-deployment incremental improvements have been training; (4) most if not all of NATO’s Key to this effort will be strong ownership spawned by outside pressure and para- member states face significant challenges of the process, from the military’s top judicial intervention, be it legislative when it comes to addressing incidents of brass and all the way down, and to make or policy change, as with the 1992 sexual misconduct and harassment. the link explicit between the need for Douglas case on homosexuals in the organizational culture to make policies military. By and large, then, the military A non-NATO ally, Australia, has been on diversity stick and effectively change has been reactionary on matters of at the forefront of establishing best the CAF’s institutional culture. If the first diversity. Moreover, improvements in practices. In 2009, the Australian few speeches by Chief of the Defence representation are not keeping pace with Defence Force took on ambitious reforms Staff, General , are any the changing demographics of Canadian called Pathway for Change that aimed to indication, he appears committed to the society. That is, inroads on improving transform the national military culture kind of transformative leadership that the recruitment and representation of to eliminate predatory behaviour and worked in the Australian Army, under women remain tepid, and the delta of establish a new professional standard their Chief, (now retired) Lieutenant- diversity in Canadian society relative that is safe for all service members, General David Morrison. to representation in the CAF is actually regardless of gender or background. growing. As the 1989 CHRT, multiple

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lawsuits, and Justice Deschamp’s 2015 handling of gender issues suggests that Dr. Christian Leuprecht is Professor of report suggest, the military leadership those well-intentioned efforts are bound Political Science at the Royal Military had hitherto underestimated the extent to fizzle unless federal politicians of all College of Canada and Senior Fellow at the of the equality gap and the external political stripes commit to holding the Macdonald Laurier Institute. He is cross- societal, political, and legal expectations CAF and it leadership’s feet to the fire. appointed to the Department of Political to remedy it. Second, the CAF’s institutional culture Studies and the School of Policy Studies will prove difficult to change unless and at Queen’s University where he is also a As compared to the 1990s, the CAF until there is an unwavering commitment fellow of the Institute of Intergovernmental no longer has retention issues among to improving the representation of Relations and the Queen’s Centre for DGMs: women who opt to serve appear DGMs. The CAF habitually justifies International and Defence Policy. to be no less dis/satisfied than men. And underrepresentation by observing that for the first time in the history of the apparently “they don’t want to join.” Royal Military College of Canada, four of If that is, indeed, the case – we are not Notes the top five cadets are women. So, there necessarily convinced that “they” do is some evidence to suggest that the CAF not want to join – then perhaps the 1. Marie Deschamps, External Review is on a positive trajectory. Nor is there operative question to ask is: Why would into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual robust comparative evidence that issue they not want to join? Finally, the CAF Harassment in the Canadian Armed of harassment and sexual assault are will fundamentally have to reassess its Forces (Ottawa: Department of any more pervasive in the CAF than in approach to civil-military relations. National Defence, 2015), executive other workplaces or sectors of Canadian Old sergeants like to say: “We’re here summary (i). society. However, the CAF appears to to defend democracy, not to practice have underestimated the extent to which it.” But Canadians have been clear: the 2. Jane Jenson and Martin Papillon, Canadians have higher expectations of CAF’s unique mission notwithstanding, The “Canadian Diversity Model” A civil servants in general, and those who they expect the CAF to reconcile the Repertoire in Search of a Framework serve in uniform in particular. defence of democracy with democracy’s (Ottawa: Canadian Policy Research fundamental norms and values.  Networks Inc., 2001). Rather than lagging behind, the federal government and the CAF – as the country’s Dr. Stéfanie von Hlatky is an assistant 3. UNSCR 1325 Reload: An Analysis single largest institutional employer – professor of political studies at Queen’s of Annual National Reports to should model employment equity to University and the Director of the Queen’s the NATO Committee on Gender the rest of Canadian society as well as Centre for International and Defence Perspectives from 1999-2013: our allies. But becoming an employer Policy (CIDP). Her new book, The Policies, Recruitment, Retention & of choice for all Canadians will require Future of US Extended Deterrence (co- Operations (Brussels: The NATO more than the 10 recommendations edited with Andreas Wenger) analyzes Science for Peace and Security outlined in the Deschamps report. US security commitments to NATO Programme, 2015). (Georgetown University Press, 2015). First, past precedent of the CAF’s

SUBMISSIONS LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

The Editor invites submissions of unpublished The Editor welcomes correspondence from manuscripts on all topics related to the Canadian readers on articles featured in this Journal. Armed Forces, Canada's security and defence Publication in ON TRACK is at the discretion of the policy, and international security more broadly. Editor. Anonymous letters will not be considered. Publication in ON TRACK is at the discretion of the Editor. Letter should be sent to the attention of the Editor by email (david.mcdonough@cdainstitute. Submissions should be between 2000-2500 ca) or to David McDonough, CDA Institute, 151 words and be sent in electronic format to david. Slater St, Suite 412A, Ottawa, ON, K1P 5H3. [email protected].

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INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER- TERRORISM FOR CANADIAN NATIONAL SECURITY

By Dr. Jeremy Littlewood

errorism has been described as (attacks) or activities that facilitate violence (from radicalization to violence T“the most significant and persistent terrorism (propaganda, recruitment, of individuals) or material support threat to Canada’s national security”1 procurement of materials, financing)? offences under the criminal code. Third, and the contemporary environment as Terrorism that poses a direct threat to the types of actors involved bring into being one where “the speed of change, Canada (and Canadians) or that which play the organizational dynamics of the and the ease with which people engaged poses a threat to Canadian interests? threat spectrum: from the true lone actor in threat-related activity connect And, terrorism that poses the most direct (i.e., one acting wholly independently means we no longer have the luxury of threat – ‘Sunni Violent Extremism’ to and radicalized to violence without time to contemplate our response.”2 use the old term from Canada’s Strategy any interactions with others), or a lone Any overview of counter-terrorism to Counter Terrorism or bin Ladenism actor with some contact, perhaps via the policy and strategy within a Western to use the Soufan Group’s term – or Internet, with like-minded individuals, democracy identifies intelligence as the terrorism of all kinds regardless of to a cell of self-starters or part of a foundation for success. Intelligence is ideological underpinnings? group, and how that group is organized, neither a panacea nor without risks, but directed, and controlled. Fourth, how the it is “the most vital element of successful The answer is all of the above, as plotters obtain funds, weapons, training, counterterrorism…[and] without such a careful reading of CSIS Director as well as target selection, intelligence, high-quality intelligence, it is likely Michel Coulombe’s evidence and other surveillance, and reconnaissance activity that all aspects of state response (legal, statements by officials make clear. prior to an attack are also part of the military, propagandist) will stumble So, what does the future hold for the threat spectrum. ineffectively.”3 incoming government, whatever its political orientation? Canada has not, as the 2007 CSIS Public Following the October 2014 attacks in Report notes, experienced a concerted Canada, resources have been shifted to No one can predict the future, but trends terrorist campaign for over two decades. counter this threat. Even with most of our can be identified – and in that realm the Yet, the recently released data on terrorist security intelligence resources focused near future does not look promising. The incidents in Canada between 1960 and on counter-terrorism – up to 70 percent incoming Government will quickly be 2014 provide unequivocal evidence that by some counts – and with the likelihood apprised on the extent of the terrorist Canada has experienced all types of that the Communications Security threat to Canada and its interests. This terrorism – nationalist, left-wing, right- Establishment (CSE) is allocating is itself too often misunderstood in wing, single issue, and religious.4 Other significant resources to assist the the public domain. Terrorist threats types of terrorism have not disappeared Canadian Security Intelligence Service cannot be reduced solely to a terrorist after 9/11: Canada has experienced a (CSIS) and Royal Canadian Mounted attack. Situational awareness requires few left-wing attacks, some connected Police (RCMP) as well as providing information related to a number of issues. to violent single issue groups, and intelligence support to Canadian Armed First, questions related to the causes of occasional incidents of violent right wing Forces with the mission in Iraq/Syria, the terrorism (the ‘root cause’ debate) and extremism. The predominant threat, issue is further complicated by some very the grievance(s) – real or perceived – however, has been and remains that from basic divisions and boundaries. Are we driving the individual, cell, or group to al-Qaeda, or al-Qaeda-inspired and its focused on terrorism at home (Canada) target Canada. Second, the facilitating offshoots, of which the Islamic State in or terrorism abroad (worldwide)? factors of propaganda, recruitment, and Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is the most Terrorism that results in a “bang” mobilization of individuals to perpetrate violent at this time.

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Despite only experiencing two attacks an identity with its own dress codes, As Thomas Hegghammer and Petter under this type, both in October ideas, values, rituals and prescribed Nesser observe, “IS [Islamic State] 2014, four plots have been thwarted behaviour, its own self-sustaining has not yet ‘gone global’ in the sense and led to convictions in the courts culture. Transmitted through peers, of having committed a substantial (Toronto-18 in 2006, Project Samossa through the media, at Schools, proportion of its resources to out-of- in 2010, the 2013 VIA rail plot, and colleges, at sports clubs or prayer area operations,” and there are few public Canada Day plot in groups alike, from parents to children, indications of its leadership preparing in 2013), and two individuals have been from brothers to sisters, through “attack teams for major operations in the convicted for facilitating plots in other internet magazines and carefully US or Europe,” much as al-Qaeda did in countries (Momin Khawaja [2004] and crafted videos, this movement was the 2000s. However, the Islamic State has Said Namouh [2009]). A number of resilient and deeply rooted. …it was inspired more attacks with “an average individuals have been prevented from something that had not existed a of two sympathiser attacks per month traveling abroad, with one conviction in decade before. It was one of the real – since al-Adnani’s call for individual the courts (Mohamed Hersi [2014]), and and worst – legacies of the 9/11 Wars.6 jihad was issued in September 2014.” at least seven Canadians are understood While often small scale, such attacks to have died fighting abroad. Since then, the individuals and also have a high rate of being carried out movements driving the ideology forward (nearly 50 percent). They conclude that This terrorist activity – demonstrable on the ground in Syria and Iraq, from the “implication for counterterrorism by court cases, convictions, evidence, Libya to Pakistan, through Nigeria and professionals is clear: worry not only and testimony in Parliament, and more Somalia have attracted thousands of about the foreign fighters, but also about reputable media reporting, as well as foreign fighters and inspired attacks in IS sympathisers who never made it to academic studies and data – is sufficient Western democracies. Terrorism within Syria.”9 to underline that there should not be Western Europe inspired by al-Qaeda any question of “Is there a threat?” between 2008 and 2013 remained a small In the United Kingdom, arrests related While the threat is low in terms of group/cell problem focused on particular to terrorism average over one per day scale (absolute numbers) and scope states and types of target. Petter Nesser in the year July 2014 to July 2015.10 Like (quality and sophistication of actual identifies an “increasingly heterogeneous other analysis, the picture emerging “is and planned attacks), it is nevertheless, threat” and a growth in activity despite the distinctive largely because of the young real. Moreover, the perceptions of the clear increase in activity across numerous age of the accused, the presence of terrorist ‘spectacular’ have lowered since conflicts. Furthermore, incidents more women, the role of social media in their “perpetrators have paralyzed major often than not still appear to be part of radicalization, and the desires of many world cities with only a few rifles or a activities from organized groups and of them to travel abroad and serve the shotgun and with shouted slogans” in networks: truly independent lone actor caliphate.”11 Analysis of the Canadian recent months.5 attacks are few in number.7 contingent of individuals and groups of friends who have traveled, attempted The al-Qaeda inspired threat can itself Within the United States, more recent to travel, or facilitated the Islamic State be divided into three categories: (1) al- work examining the period March and/or affiliates and inspired entities is Qaeda core and the Islamic State, which 2014 to mid-June 2015 identified 56 similar.12 represent the centre of the groups; (2) the individuals charged in the Federal Court affiliates of al-Qaeda or the wilayats of of the United States with supporting ISIL, So what is it likely to mean for ISIL; and (3) the inspired individuals and but the frequency has shown a marked intelligence? Most terrorism does not, cells with limited experience or training acceleration in 2015: “from an average in fact, result in large numbers of deaths and quite often no direct connections to rate of just over one per month (March or casualties. Neither is terrorism an either core or affiliates. As Jason Burke to December 2014) to an average rate of existential challenge to the Canadian observed in 2011, the traditional method over seven per month (from January to state, although it certainly is a threat of describing the threat based on its June 22, 2015).”8 Just over 50 percent of to national security and public safety. hardcore leadership, network of affiliates, the plotters aspired to be foreign fighters Furthermore, as empirical data and and its ideology, no longer captured the joining ISIL abroad; slightly under a fifth historical record suggests, “advanced scope or scale of the evolving threat: were facilitators of recruitment, funding, democracies have generally not suffered and logistics; and, the remainder – from high levels of chronic terrorism At its most dispersed, but most just under 30 percent – were domestic unless they were interfering in other widespread, level, this movement was plotters who are alleged to have devised countries’ affairs through military little more than a way of thinking, attacks on the US, of whom three of the intervention or occupations, or unless a way of understanding the world, 17 were killed. they had ongoing and unresolved

12 ON TRACK AUTUMN 2015 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné territorial conflicts.”13 Canada does not Recalibrating counter-terrorism efforts 6. Jason Burke, The 9/11 Wars have unresolved territorial conflicts of is on-going by necessity, but no Prime (London: Allen Lane, 2011), p. 476. the kind likely to result in a new wave Minister can afford to ignore the complex of terrorism. However, the country is realities of the threat landscape or the 7. Petter Nesser, “Toward and involved in expeditionary operations array of sources, methods, and means increasingly Heterogeneous Threat: abroad, most notably as part of the anti- required to address the threat.  A Chronology of Jihadist Terrorism ISIL coalition, where it is training forces in Europe 2008-2013,” Studies in in northern Iraq to withstand and roll Dr. Jez Littlewood is an Assistant Professor Conflict and Terrorism 37, 5 (2014), back ISIL, at the request of the Iraqi at NPSIA, Carleton University, and serves pp. 440-456. government, as well as undertaking air on the Executive of the Canadian network operations in Iraq and Syria. for research on Terrorism, Security and 8. “ISIS Cases in the United Society (TSAS). He served previously States: March 1, 2014 – June Open source and academic studies of with HM Forces (Army) in the UK, at the 22, 2015,” Center on National the emerging threat landscape tied to the United Nations Organization in Geneva, Security at Fordham Law, http:// Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and the ideology and on secondment to the UK Foreign centeronnationalsecurity.org/ of both point to a diverse, rapidly evolving, and Commonwealth Office. His academic sites/default/files/BY%20THE%20 and consistent threat. It is low-level, but work revolves around terrorism, weapons NUMBERS%20-%20ISIS%20 does not have to be sophisticated to work of mass destruction, and intelligence. CASES%20IN%20THE%20US.pdf. – given that attacks are often proclaimed as a spectacular by both the media and Notes 9. Thomas Hegghammer and Petter ideological supporters/sympathizers Nesser, “Assessing the Islamic State’s regardless of its outcome. Coinciding 1. Canada, Canadian Security Commitment to Attacking the with unrealistic expectations of zero Intelligence Service, Public Report West,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, 4 attacks, the intelligence community of 2013-2014 (Ottawa: 2015), p. 15, (2015), p. 27. Canada is very likely working close to its https://www.csis.gc.ca/pblctns/ maximum sustainable effort and every nnlrprt/2013-2014/2013-2014_ 10. Dominic Casciani, “Analysis: available permissible source, method, Public_Report_Inside_ENG.pdf. Record terror arrests - and younger and means to identify and thwart threats t o o,” BBC News, 10 September 2015, nationally and internationally. 2. Michel Coulombe (testimony), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk- The Standing Senate Committee 34212043. The incoming Prime Minister is, on National Security and Defence, therefore, likely to be advised that plots Evidence (Ottawa: 20 April 2015), 11. “ISIS Cases in the United States,” are ongoing and inevitable, an attack http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/sen/ p. 2. remains very likely, and the problem is committee/412/SECD/52040-E. not going to disappear anytime soon. HTM. 12. Amarnath Amarasingam, With indications that the containment “Canadian Foreign Fighters in and rolling back of the Islamic State could 3. Richard English, Terrorism: How to Syria: An Overview,” 4 March 2015, take up to a decade, and that counter- Respond (Oxford: Oxford University http://jihadology.net/2015/03/04/ terrorism successes in preventing ISIL Press, 2011) pp. 131-132. the-clear-banner-canadian-foreign- sympathizers from travel abroad could fighters-in-syria-an-overview/. result in them opting to attack at home, 4. See http://extremism.ca/ for the the next few years are unlikely to see Canadian Incident Database 13. Erica Chenoweth, “Terrorism and a diminishing threat from terrorism. (released 13 May 2015). For a Democracy,” Annual Review of Moreover, there is no simple option that summary of the data see CIDB Political Science 16 (2013), p. 370. is humanitarian only, or focuses solely on Descriptive Analysis, http:// the root causes and grievances. Canada, extremism.ca/Content/CIDB%20 like others, faces an immediacy problem Descriptive%20Analysis.pdf. – foreign fighters, facilitators, and domestic plotters who target Canada or 5. The Soufan Group, “The New intend to use Canada as a base for attacks Spectacular Terror Attack,” TSG against others. This problem cannot be IntelBrief (12 January 2015), http:// ignored without endangering public soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-the- safety. new-spectacular-terror-attack/.

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FROM IMPERIAL SIBLINGS TO STRATEGIC COUSINS*

by Dr. John Blaxland

wanted to reflect on the journeys of ICanada and Australia from being imperial siblings to strategic cousins. Siblings, as you know, tend to be close. They know each other very well. As part of empire that certainly was true. Cousins, however, may know each other well or hardly at all, depending on the vagaries of extended family dynamics.

In the days since the end of the British Empire, the latter is probably a fairer descriptor for the Canadian-Australian relationship. But let us step back and reflect on how we got to that point.

As Australia federated as a nation in 1901, it had troops fighting the Anglo-Boer War alongside forces from Canada, New Zealand, and the British isles, under the General Sir Arthur William Currie (left) and General Sir John Monash (right) presided over the Canadian and Australian corps in the First World War, respectively. (Image credit: Library and Archives Canada/Australian War Memorial catalogue.) command of Major-General Edward Hutton. He had served as commander of truth inspired by his alma mater, RMCC Newfoundlanders the sheer carnage of the New South Wales militia in the early Kingston. A gallant and erudite soldier, the Western Front would completely 1890s before being appointed General Bridges commanded the 1st Australian overshadow the Gallipoli experience. Officer Commanding of the Canadian Division at Gallipoli and later died from Thereafter, Australian and Canadian militia in the late 1890s. Canadians and wounds received there. Had he lived, who troops would be put through the meat Australians first fought together there on knows if he may have emerged as an army grinder with Canadian troops shining the South African Veldt as part of the 1st group commander presiding over what under Currie at Vimy Ridge in the spring Mounted Infantry Brigade. emerged as the national corps of John of 1917. Monash and Arthur Currie. But that was Thereafter a Scottish born former cadet not to be. Nonetheless, the Canadians and In late autumn 1917, not far from Ypres from the Royal Military College of Australians would develop further and or wipers, as the diggers used to call it, in Canada (RMCC) in Kingston, stronger ties alongside in the field of battle Flanders field, the 1st and Second Anzac would migrate with his parents to in the so-called Great War of 1914-1918. Corps would launch the first five attacks Australia and go on to have a remarkable of the battle of Passchendaele. Exhausted, career in the Australian armed forces. While Australians focus particularly on they would be relieved in place by Currie’s That man, Major-General Sir William the heroic deeds at Gallipoli, Canada’s Canadian Corps, which fought the final Throsby Bridges, was the founder of Royal Newfoundlanders, who only became four attacks of the battle and captured the Military College Duntroon – a college part of Canada in 1949, similarly remnants of the town by November. said to be modelled on West Point but in could claim credit – although for the

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With casualties mounting and calls for flu reportedly struck the Germans earlier During the Korean War, Australians and reinforcements getting louder, Canada, than the Allies, who would suffer the full Canadians would band together, much as like Australia, suffered divisive debates brunt of that deadly assault in the winter they had done in the Anglo-Boer War, this over the introduction of Conscription. after the armistice. So it is important to time as part of the 27th Commonwealth These debates would leave a scar keep things in perspective. Brigade. Together they fought and won across the political landscape in both the battle of Kapyong in April 1951. countries that would last for generations. After tallying up virtually sixty thousand Fighting this significant battle together, The debates coincided with Ireland’s dead each, the prime ministers of Canada alongside US, New Zealand, and British bloody Easter Uprising. In Australia, and Australia could argue that imperial forces in support, they held the Chinese resistance to conscription was identified solidarity managed to survive the war, forces at bay. At the same time Britain’s with Melbourne’s Irish Catholic but it would be among the conflict’s Gloucestershire Regiment, operating Archbishop Daniel Mannix. In Canada casualties. In the end, in the words of separately in the nearby Imjin river valley, it was associated with French Canadian Canadian historian Desmond Morton, fought on its own, and was overwhelmed. Catholics reluctant to fight in a far off Currie would turn the Canadians into The contrasting experiences demonstrated conflict in defence of one country that allies, not subordinates of Great Britain. the importance of strength in unity which had abandoned them 150 years before, Arguably the same could be said of the echoes through the years. France, and the resented conquering Australian Corps under Monash. power of that age, the British. Almost 50 years later another Australian, When it came to the Second World War, British, Canadian, American (ABCA) Meanwhile, back in Europe, not long the popular conception has been that brigade deployed on operations once after, Canadian pilots chased Baron Von while Australia fought in North Africa more; this time in East Timor under the Richtofen, of Red Baron fame, straight and the Pacific. Canada fought mostly banner of INTERFET (International Force into the killing zone of Australian ground in Europe and Italy. That is broadly for East Timor). There, under Major- gunners who finally brought down the correct. But while the 8th Division in General Peter Cosgrove and Brigadier German ace. The debate over who can the 2nd Australian Imperial Force was Mark Evans, troops from Canada and claim the glory for the kill endures to this being rounded up in Singapore and the Australia, alongside British and New day. Netherlands East Indies, a Canadian- Zealand forces and some American led formation was equally overwhelmed specialists as well Irish troops, operated By mid-1918, with the British and French by Japanese forces in Hong Kong. Over using their skills to help restore peace and armies exhausted and drained, the 50 percent of the Canadians who fought stability to a newly independent nation. Canadian and Australian corps, under there would never see home again. Currie and Monash, stood tried and More than 15 years after that fateful tested and ready. Their greatest moment In the dark days of 1942, Canada’s High deployment to East Timor, Australians was approaching. Commissioner to Australia, Major- find themselves once again working General Victor Odlum, suggested two alongside Canadians in remote places On 8 August 1918, just east of Amiens these divisions come to Australia to help stem in the Middle East, including Iraq and two corps, as part of General Rawlinson’s the Japanese advance. But few in Ottawa Afghanistan, demonstrating the enduring 4th , spearheaded the were willing to divert such substantial bonds and the utility of seeking to breakthrough that General Eric Von forces from the European theatre, collaborate further to bolster peace and Luddendorf would later describe as ‘The beyond the formation already lost to security, not just in the Middle East but in Black Day of the German Army.’ For it the Japanese at Hong Kong. Still, the 1st the Asia-Pacific as well. was at this point that the German defeat Canadian Special Wireless Group came became virtually inevitable. and around 1,000 Canadians operated We started talking about Currie and from Darwin in support of special Monash and the journey from being The next three months would see the signals intelligence operations against imperial siblings to strategic cousins. Yet, German Army rolled back with little the Japanese. Few realize just how much while reflecting back a century is a worthy pause. To be sure it was not the Canadians that secretive Canadian contribution endeavour in and of itself, one should and Australians doing this single- helped. And when Australian forces were remember that Canada and Australia handedly. Much of the heavy lifting had conducting amphibious operations in the have enduring common perspectives, been carried out by the French and British islands to Australia’s north, Canadians interests and concerns. We could choose Armies and the arrival of the American were similarly conducting amphibious to largely ignore each other, but we should Expeditionary Force, which by mid- operations to retake the island of Kiska in consciously act in pursuit of our common 1918 was in full swing. The blockade on the Aleutians, northeast of Japan. interests. Germany was biting hard and the Spanish

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The Mercator projection of the globe, stability, notably with peacekeeping collaboration and burden sharing is long with Australia at one corner and Canada skills, counterterrorism, humanitarian and under-explored. at the opposite corner, can lead one to assistance, disaster relief and cyber believe that these two countries are too resilience. Like with Currie and Monash a century far apart geographically to bother seeking ago, these are only a small handful of areas closer collaboration. But in fact Canada • Enhance bilateral defence and security where clever and efficient collaboration and Australia are roughly equidistant to cooperation. Both countries should could be considered as we reflect on the Northeast Asian hot spots – from the deepen their individual defence and the potential choices of these strategic Taiwan Straits to the Korean Peninsula. security dialogues and look for cost- cousins, Australia and Canada.  The geostrategic dynamics at work likely effective ways to do more together will continue to draw us together. across a broad sweep of areas from * This is an edited version of a talk delivered exercises to defence reform planning. at the annual Currie-Monash Dinner As the Asian century unfolds, and held at the Australian War Memorial in as Canada’s economic and security • Boost defence industry and economic Canberra on 12 August 2015. imperatives drive closer engagement, cooperation. Both countries should two more significant and enduring find ways to align defence procurement Dr. John Blaxland is a Senior Fellow at partners would be hard to find – a fact plans to find cost savings and share best the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre that should be noted by the incoming practices on equipment procurement.1 at ANU who writes about military new government in Ottawa following history, intelligence and security and Asia- the scheduled elections in October. For generations Canada and Australia Pacific affairs. He holds a PhD in War Both have a stake in the capabilities and have found themselves making uncannily Studies from the Royal Military College intentions of the United States Pacific similar choices concerning requirements of Canada. His publications include Command based in Hawaii. Both have for fighter aircraft, armoured vehicles, The Australian Army From Whitlam a vested interest in seeing China’s rise surface and sub-surface naval vessels, to Howard (CUP, 2014) and Strategic continue on a peaceful trajectory and for distant early warning, maritime patrol Cousins (2006). In 2014 he was awarded the East Asian order to adjust to changing and surveillance capabilities. a Minerva Research Initiative grant for dynamics in a benign way. Both countries a project, titled "Thailand's Military, the have strong imperatives to collaborate If we take the shipbuilding industry USA and China: Understanding how the further with each other as well as with for example, Canada’s like Australia’s, Thai Military Perceives The Great Powers like-minded counterparts. There is much has proven unsustainable on its own. and Implications For the US Rebalance.” to be gained from closer collaboration While the Australian government in the future on a wide range of fronts, recently announced its intention to Notes fostering capabilities that have repeatedly develop a continuous build surface fleet been demonstrated to be at their most construction program, skeptics point to 1. John Blaxland, “Closer Australia- effective when working together – at sea, the dismal track record of governments Canada Defence Cooperation?” on land, and in the air. following through on such commitments Australia-Canada Security beyond an electoral cycle or two. Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific With this in mind, Canadian and Paper No. 3 (Australian Strategic Australian defence and foreign policy Both countries need to replace their Policy Institute [ASPI} and Centre officials can work towards four key submarine fleets, yet neither Canada for International Governance objectives: nor Australia has the critical mass to Innovation [CIGI], September sustain its maritime defence industry 2013), https://www.cigionline.org/ • Strengthen regional security. Canada single-handedly. Long-term industrial publications/2013/9/closer-australia- and Australia must align their separate cooperation could see a longer production canada-defence-cooperation; defence and security engagement run and yield more benefits to industry. Leonard Edwards and Peter Jennings activities in East Asia, share lessons (Project Leaders), Facing West, learned and look for ways to maximize Perhaps some economies of scale can also Facing North: Canada and Australia their separate and collective impact in be found there with trade-offs in terms of in East Asia: Special Report (ASPI/ cooperating with regional friends. offshore patrol vessels and ice-breakers, CIGI, 2014), https://www.aspi.org. armoured vehicles, the development and au/publications/facing-west,-facing- • Bolster regional governance mechanism. use of remote sensors and weapons as well north-canada-and-australia-in-east- Canada and Australia should strengthen as our surprisingly similar indigenous- asia/SR_ASPI_CIGI_facing_west. regional capabilities that add to based forces. The list of potential points of pdf.

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ALL QUIET ON THE EASTERN FRONT? ASSESSING CANADA’S APPROACH TO CHINA’S RISE

by David Beitelman

hen asked what keeps him up With its muted response to China’s recent United States is Canada’s “most important Wat night, Canada’s new Chief of behavior in Asia-Pacific region, the ally and defence partner,” according to Defence Staff General Jonathan Vance Canadian government has shown that the Canadian government.5 In late 2013, named the Islamic State and Russian it cannot see the forest for the trees. A both countries signed the Canada-US aggression in Ukraine. The Islamic State in major strategic rebalancing is currently Asia-Pacific Defense Policy Cooperation Syria and the Levant (ISIL) ranked first as underway in the Asia-Pacific, driven Framework, meant to help coordinate a matter of practicality – Canadian Armed mostly by the expansion of China’s training operations in the region, though Forces (CAF) are involved in kinetic economic and military power, and specifics are not publicly available. Canada operations against ISIL militants in Syria Canada is watching from the sidelines. is also a member of the Trans-Pacific and Iraq. Russia’s behavior in Eastern Canada’s approach to the Asia-Pacific Partnership (TPP) initiative, which the Ukraine, by contrast, may pose a long- region, and China in particular, ignores government places within the broader term strategic threat, with General Vance the implications this rebalancing has on context of strengthening “North American saying, “Any actor of that size and strength Canadian strategic interests (economic, competitiveness.”6 The TPP is often seen as that is failing to follow international norms political, and military). a pillar of the US ‘rebalance’ to the Pacific of law and using force and a combined after 2011. force of instruments of national power to The typical characterizations of Canada’s change borders while not respecting the Asia-Pacific policy is that Canada wants Canada can maintain operational peaceful processes that ought to be used is to engage the region economically and independence from the United States, also a threat and it could manifest itself in politically, while staying distant from its but its interests in the Asia-Pacific are, something far more dangerous than (ISIL) security challenges, in order to: project on a strategic level, indecipherable from in the future.”1 an image of foreign policy independence those of its southern neighbour. Both from the US; position itself as an ‘honest countries are invested in maintaining What General Vance said about Russia, broker’ in regional disputes; and avoid security and stability in the region, however, could just as easily be said of alienating China.3 This approach is including freedom of navigation, a rules- China. Granted, China has not invaded a misguided on all fronts. based order, and economic access to “the sovereign state – an important distinction. most economically vibrant region of the Yet, with its recent land reclamation The notion that Canada is able to maintain w or l d ,” 7 – all of which depend on the US projects in the South China Sea, Beijing an independent foreign policy from the remaining the dominant regional player, has opted for a process of incrementally United States gives Canada too much if only to act as an ‘off-shore balancer’ shifting the status quo, often by using credit, or those that need convincing in the and keep regional power politics muted. non-military forces, that is eerily similar. region too little. While Canada can decide Canada’s foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific Yet, in contrast to Canadian action against where and when to deploy its armed forces, may differ in terms of tactics, but not in ISIL and the government’s bold rhetoric the terms of its own bilateral trade deals, strategy. Pretending otherwise by staying on Ukraine, China’s action has garnered and other routine foreign policies, it can quiet on key issues that undermine the nothing more than a statement of concern never escape America’s shadow. Canada regional strategic balance, like China’s land from then Foreign Affairs Minister John has made increasingly large contributions reclamation program, is self-defeating and Baird.2 The same was true when China to the US-organized biannual Rim of the a wasted opportunity for Canada to have a unilaterally declared an Air Defence Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises off the coast voice in the Pacific. Identification Zone over the East China of Hawaii – an exercise Canada has never Sea in November 2013. missed since its inception in 1971.4 The Another fallacious argument – that

18 ON TRACK AUTUMN 2015 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné

Canada wants to position itself as an Even more consequential, Canada’s muted influence here, what message does it send honest broker – stems from its brief response on regional security issues sends to Canada’s allies and partners in the leadership role in regional Track-II a mixed message to the countries that are region who do have immediate security diplomacy in the early 1990s, when it also potential economic partners. On the concerns with China? Why should these sponsored dialogues to help resolve one hand, Canada informs Asia-Pacific countries support Canadian interests, like disputes in the South China Sea. Yet, if nations about its commitment to regional membership in EAS or ADMM-Plus, if Canada wishes to be a mediator to help stability and security, and its interest in Canada will not support their interests? de-escalate regional tensions, then silence improving economic ties. On the other Manicom is correct when he says that is an odd policy choice. There is no reason hand, when the region’s largest and most Canadian diplomatic support is unlikely why Canada cannot be an honest broker ambitious state (China) threatens that to have much of an impact on curbing while still being vocal about its preference stability and security, Canada can only Chinese behavior. It does, however, towards maintaining the strategic status muster a statement of concern. Some have a considerable impact on Canada’s quo – a preference Canada supports observers (James Manicom, Jeremy reputation in the region and, by extension, with its actions and stated policy goals Paltiel) have sought to explain such the behavior of other regional states anyways. Rather than issuing a vague behavior with reference to Canada’s towards Canada. Even worse, Canada statement of concern, Canada could have interest in not alienating an important remains silent in the Asia-Pacific while asserted itself in the region by offering to economic partner like China, its inability flexing its muscles in Eastern Europe once-again sponsor a regional dialogue. to really modify Chinese behavior, or and the Middle East, where its military This, in turn, would bolster Canada’s bid its lack of security concerns vis-à-vis contributions are unlikely to make much to join the East Asia Summit (EAS) and China.9 These arguments reflect Canada’s of an impact either. the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting ignorance, willful or not, of what is at stake Plus (ADMM-Plus), which has never in the region and Canada’s place within it. The argument that Canada’s approach to been seriously entertained because of its the Asia-Pacific is heavily influenced by ‘fly-by-night’ reputation in the region.8 When Canada fails to use even its limited its desire to maintain amicable relations

HMCS Victoria sailing past the Japanese Ise-class helicopter destroyer at Pearl Harbour during the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) muiltinational excercises in 2014. (Image credit: Sgt Matthew McGregor, Canadian Forces Combat Camera, DND.)

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with China is closely related, and equally misplaced. As Manicom has argued, countries with close economic ties with China – including Australia, Japan, and South Korea – have all managed to effectively pursue policies which sharply rebuke aggressive Chinese actions.10 Before meeting then Chinese President Hu Jintao at the 2006 APEC Summit, Prime Minister Harper said that Canadians “don’t want us to sell out to the mighty dollar.” However, the government soon reversed course and has been courting Chinese The guided-missile destroyer USS Lassen (DDG 82) in an underway replenishment with the the replenishment oiler USNS Walter S. Diehl in the South investment and improved China Sea in April 2015. (Image credit: U.S. Navy photo by Lt. j.g. Lauren Chatmas.) trade relations since at the islands in the South China Sea and remain neutral. The Canadian Security least 2009. Highlights of these efforts include the adjacent waters and enjoys sovereign Intelligence Service, the Communications the $15.1-billion takeover of Canadian rights and jurisdiction over the relevant Security Establishment, and the Royal energy company Nexen in 2013 by China’s waters as well as the seabed and subsoil Canadian Mounted Police “devote the state-owned CNOOC (China National t h e re of .” 13 To back that up, China is in largest portion of their resources allocation Offshore Oil Corporation), and the signing the midst of a comprehensive military for counter-intelligence to countering of a Foreign Investment Promotion and modernization program, with a particular Chinese espionage.”15 China is often Protection Agreement (FIPA) between the emphasis on its naval and maritime law attributed to numerous cyber-intrusions 11 two countries in 2014. enforcement (MLE) capabilities. From and thefts of Canadian commercial and 2013-2014, it launched more naval vessels government networks, with the most Canada’s policies in the Asia-Pacific than any other country. The size of China’s recent high-profile incident being the July harken back to the 1990s, when China was overall naval assets dwarfs those of other 2014 hacking of the National Research more amenable to third-party arbitration states in the region. Its naval fleet includes Council’s computer systems.16 In light of and the stakes of maritime disputes were 303 combatants, including large and small these challenges, what is Canada to do? far less consequential. In the 1990s, China surface ships, amphibious vehicles, and was not challenging the regional order, nor 64 submarines; Japan, with the second First and foremost, Canada must speak was it anywhere near its current economic largest, has only 67 combatants, including out against any aggressive or destabilizing or military power. Today, China speaks of 18 submarines. China’s MLE assets show actions in the Asia-Pacific, Chinese or an ‘Asia for Asians,’ rejects United Nations a similar trend, with 205 total vessels otherwise. While Canada’s diplomatic arbitration of territorial disputes in the compared to Japan’s 78 (the second efforts are unlikely to directly affect the South China Sea, and warns “external largest).14 behavior of a large state, whether China countries” against “meddling” in the or Japan, it helps add weight to the voices 12 South China Sea. While not alone in China’s rapid military growth and of other weaker states and reinforces the undertaking reclamation projects in those modernization characterizes a country’s regional preferences. Remaining waters, China has been the most aggressive fundamental challenge to the US-led silent is a fool’s errand; Canada’s allegiances in the scope and pace of its activities. order, of which Canada is an important are well known and are routinely reaffirmed part. It is, in academic parlance, a systemic through its actions. Silence only reinforces Even more troubling, China has asserted challenge. And Canada cannot pretend it is the very perceptions Canada is hoping that it has “indisputable sovereignty over immune from this challenge or that it can to change. Furthermore, refraining from

20 ON TRACK AUTUMN 2015 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné chastising China’s behavior puts Canada strategically important fight, nor is the in a position of weakness in any future At the 2014 Shangri-La Summit, then region as consequential as far as global negotiations; it sends a signal that Canada Minster of Foreign Affairs John Baird order and stability is concerned. Russia’s is willing to alienate its allies in pursuit of told his audience: “Canada is prepared incursion into Ukraine and the seizure of its economic goals with China. If Canada to do its part to help strengthen peace, Crimea are indeed troubling, and pose a is unable or unwilling to deploy material security and stability in Asia. And we are direct challenge to European stability and assets to the region, the least it can do is be well positioned to do so.”20 The rhetoric, the NATO alliance itself. China’s challenge vocal and assert its interests though other however, does not match the reality. The in the Asia-Pacific is more insidious and is means. RCN is the most important service branch thus all the more dangerous. The response for Asia-Pacific engagement, but it is in the to this challenge from the United States, Secondly, if Canada is as serious about midst of a major recapitalization program Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the other engaging the region as it claims, it needs which has left a resource-strapped service states in the region, has been a hedging to forward-deploy naval assets. Retired with even more capability shortfalls. policy: engage China economically and Commodore Dr. Eric Lerhe has suggested Canada simply does not have the means encourage its participation in regional embedding a frigate with the Japanese- to increase its physical presence in the institutions while firmly challenging any based US 7th Fleet on a twelve-month region. The CAF are also operationally attempts to unilaterally alter the status cycle, or CP-140 aircraft and submarines stretched, with military engagements in quo. This is a policy advocated by many to Guam or another state in the region.17 the Middle East and Eastern Europe, and others, including Paul Evans and Bruce The deployment of material assets to the routine deployments to the Caribbean Gilley, and one which Canada should region is useful for two primary reasons. and elsewhere. The state of the CAF is a adopt.22 Canada need not be needlessly As Vice-Admiral Mark Norman has reflection of Canada’s political will; large bellicose towards China. But standing noted, “greater levels of presence abroad defence budgets are not particularly well firm for Canadian values and interests, equate to higher levels of influence for received by Canadian taxpayers. as well as those of our allies and partners Canada.”18 In addition, the Asia-Pacific in the region, is paramount. Neutrality is is a region where relationships count and More to the point, air and army assets are simply not an option.  where “being there with concrete assets is of less value in the Asia-Pacific, and so what matters and what opens doors in the pulling assets out of the Middle East or The author wishes to thank Eric Lerhe, diplomatic (and economic) realm.”19 Eastern Europe would not tip the scales Brian Bow, and David McDonough for in any meaningful way. This underscores their comments and suggestions, and to As such, embedding a frigate with the the importance of articulating a cohesive acknowledge the support of the Killam 7th Fleet is a solid policy suggestion Asia-Pacific policy, something the Trust and Social Sciences and Humanities that builds on capacities and policies Canadian government has yet to do. Research Council (SSHRC). which already exist; the Royal Canadian Australia and Japan, for example, have Navy (RCN) is uniquely capable of produced numerous reports detailing David A. Beitelman is a PhD Candidate interoperability with the United States. If their concerns regarding China’s rise and in Political Science at Dalhousie University the RCN is able to get its submarine fleet their plans for securing their interests. and a Doctoral Fellow at the Centre for to operate smoothly, it might also consider This makes it easier for both governments Foreign Policy Studies, where he served Lerhe’s suggestion of forward deploying to justify their defence budget increases.21 as Deputy Director from 2013-14. He has underwater assets on a sustained basis. Of course, Australia and Japan face published in International Journal, The Alternatively, Canada could consider far different strategic imperatives than Canadian Naval Review, Mic.com, the forward deploying a Disaster Assistance Canada. Without doubt, Canada will Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, and Response Team (DART) element, with never be a strategically important power H-Diplo. accompanying airlift capabilities. States in the region in the same way as Japan, in the Asia-Pacific region are often victim for example. But it can still be useful one, Notes to natural disasters and being nearby particularly when it works in conjunction will send an important message. DART with its allies. If Ottawa wants a voice in 1. Matthew Fisher, “General Jonathan elements could also train/cross-train with the region, it needs a sustained, physical Vance on stopping sexual abuse, regional counterparts on a sustained basis, presence. Accordingly, Canada should our biggest threats and his plans for making disaster relief operations more make the necessary investments in the the Forces,” National Post, 4 August efficient. Importantly, DART is cheaper appropriate defence platforms, such as 2015, http://news.nationalpost.com/ than building and deploying an additional frigates, allowing it to make a meaningful news/canada/general-jonathan- frigate, or deploying a submarine, even contribution to Asia-Pacific security. vance-on-stopping-sexual-abuse- if it would not be nearly as effective as our-biggest-threats-and-his-plans- stationing naval assets in the region. ISIL deserves a response but it is not a for-the-forces.

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8. See, for example, Sloan, “America’s mulroney. 2. John Baird, “Tensions in South rebalance to the Asia-Pacific,” p. 277. China Sea,” 19 May 2014, http:// 16. Steven Chase and Colin Freeze, www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/ 9. James Manicom, “Troubled waters: “Chinese hacked government news-communiques/2014/05/19a. Canada and the South China Sea,” The computers, Ottawa says,” The Globe aspx?lang=eng. Globe and Mail, 31 May 2012; Paltiel, and Mail, 29 July 2014, http:// “Canada’s China re-set,” p. 269. www.theglobeandmail.com/ 3. See for example: Jeremy Paltiel, news/national/chinese-hacked- “Canada’s China re-set: Strategic 10. Manicom, “Canadian debates,” p. government-computers-ottawa-says/ realignment or tactical repositioning? 290. article19818728/. Re-energizing the strategic partnership,” Canadian Foreign 11. “Nexen sale to Chinese goes against 17. See Eric Lerhe, “The Asia-Pacific and Policy Journal 18, 3 (September public opinion, NDP says,” CBC the Royal Canadian Navy,” Canadian 2012): p. 267; James Manicom, News, 2 October 2012, http://www. Global Affairs Institute, June 2015, p. “Canadian debates about China’s cbc.ca/news/politics/nexen-sale- 14; and “Time for a Canadian Pacific rise: Whither the “China threat”?” to-chinese-goes-against-public- Pivot?” Canadian Naval Review 9, 2 Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 18, opinion-ndp-says-1.1164879; Susan (2013): p. 3. 3 (September 2012): p. 295; Elinor Lunn, “Canada-China investment Sloan, “America’s rebalance to the treaty to come into force Oct. 1,” 18. Dave Perry, “Interview with Vice- Asia-Pacific: The impact on Canada’s CBC News, 12 September 2014, Admiral Mark Normal,” Canadian strategic thinking and maritime http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/ Naval Review 9, 3 (2013): p. 12. posture,” International Journal 70, 2 canada-china-investment-treaty-to- (June 2015): pp. 276-277. come-into-force-oct-1-1.2764075. 19. Sloan, “America’s rebalance to the Asia-Pacific,” p. 280. 4. James Manicom, “Canada’s Role in 12. Michael Holz, “China plans blunt the Asia-Pacific Rebalance: Prospects move into ‘open seas,’ warns 20. John Baird, “Address to the for Cooperation,” Asia Policy 18 foreign powers not to meddle,” The International Institute for Strategic (July 2014): p. 123. In 2012, Canada Christian Science Monitor, 26 May Studies,” 3 August 2014. deployed its largest-ever contribution 2015, http://www.csmonitor.com/ to RIMPAC, including more than World/Security-Watch/terrorism- 21. Justin McCurry, “Japan reveals 1,400 Forces personnel from all security/2015/0526/China-plans- record defence budget as tensions branches and six naval vessels, and blunt-move-into-open-seas-warns- with China grow,” The Guardian, senior officers assumed command foreign-powers-not-to-meddle- 14 January 2015, http://www. positions for the first time; in 2014, video. theguardian.com/world/2015/ Canada sent 1,000 personnel, four jan/14/japan-reveals-record-defence- naval vessels, and numerous aircraft. 13. United States, Department of budget-as-tensions-with-china- See Canada, National Defence and Defense, “Asia-Pacific Maritime grow); Andrew Greene, “Budget the Canadian Armed Forces, “Rim of Security Strategy,” p. 8. 2015: Defence to receive $750 the Pacific,” http://www.forces.gc.ca/ million boost to extend and expand en/operations-exercises/rimpac.page. 14. See ibid., pp. 10-13. overseas operations,” ABC News, 12 May 2015, http://www.abc.net.au/ 5. Canada, “Canada-U.S. Relations,” 15. Charles Burton, “Canada’s news/2015-05-12/defence-to-receive- http://can-am.gc.ca/relations/index. China policy under the Harper 750-million-boost/6464304. aspx?lang=eng. government,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 21, 1 (2015): p. 54; 22. Paul Evans, “Wanted: A Coherent 6. Canada, “The Trans-Pacific and Peter O’Neil, “’s China Policy,” OpenCanada.org, 7 Partnership (TPP),” http://can- approach to China is inadequate May 2014, http://opencanada.org/ am.gc.ca/relations/transpacific- and inconsistent, PM’s former features/the-think-tank/comments/ transpacifique.aspx?lang=eng. foreign policy adviser says,” National wanted-a-coherent-china-policy/; Post, 4 March 2015, http://news. Bruce Gilley, “Reawakening Canada’s 7. Manicom, “Canadian debates about nationalpost.com/news/canada/ China Policy,” Canadian Foreign China’s rise,” p. 293. canadian-politics/china-canada- Policy Journal 14, 2 (2008): pp. 121- foreign-policy-critique-david- 129.

22 ON TRACK AUTUMN 2015 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné

2015 VIMY AWARD

HUGH D. SEGAL, C.M. – CONFERENCE OF 1991 – The Right Honourable Joe Clark DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE 2015 1992 – General VIMY AWARD WINNER 1993 – Major–General Lewis Mackenzie 1994 – Major-General​ William Howard 28 August 2015, Ottawa. The CDA Institute is 1995 – Major-General​ Roméo Dallaire pleased to announce that the Honourable Hugh D. 1996 – Dr. Jack Granatstein Segal has been unanimously selected as the recipient 1997 – The Right Honourable Brian Dickson of the Vimy Award for 2015. This prestigious award 1998 – Vice-Admiral​ is presented annually to one prominent Canadian 1999 – Lieutenant-​General Charles H. Belzile who has made outstanding contributions towards 2000 – The Honourable Barnett Danson the security and defence of Canada and the 2001 – Leonard Birchall (Ret’d) preservation of our democratic values. The Award 2002 – Colonel, the Honourable John Fraser honours the bravery and sacrifices of the Canadian 2003 – General Paul Manson soldiers who were victorious at the Battle of Vimy 2004 – Dr. David Bercuson Ridge in April 1917. 2005 – Mr. G. Hamilton Southam 2006 – Brigadier-General​ David Fraser Mr. Segal is a distinguished Canadian who has exhibited the 2007 – General Raymond R. Henault highest standards of service to Canada. Among his many 2008 – General prominent responsibilities, he was Chief of Staff to the Prime 2009 – Warrant Officer William MacDonald Minister of Canada in the 1990s; taught at the University of 2010 – The Right Honourable Adrienne Clarkson Toronto Law School; and lectured in Strategic Studies on a pro-​ 2011 – Major-General​ Jonathan Vance bono basis for over 20 years at the Canadian Forces College in 2012 – Honorary Colonel Frederick Philip Mannix Toronto. He was appointed to the Canadian Senate in August 2013 – Brigadier-General​ W. Don Macnamara (Ret’d) 2005. 2014 – Honorary Colonel Blake Goldring (who dedicated the award to Warrant-​Officer Patrice Vincent and Corporal Nathan Mr. Segal retired from the Senate in June 2014 to accept an Cirillo) academic appointment as Master of Massey College, Toronto. 2015 – The Honourable Hugh D. Segal He is also an Adjunct Professor in the School of Policy Studies at Queen’s University and is a Lifetime Fellow of the Institute for The 2015 Vimy Award Selection Committee was composed of Research on Public Policy. Major-General​ Daniel Gosselin (Ret’d) as Chair and, as Members, Lieutenant-​General Guy Thibault, General (Ret’d), Mr. Segal was recently re-appointed​ Honorary Captain (N), Lieutenant-​General Richard J. Evraire (Ret’d), Lieutenant-​ Royal Canadian Navy. He has served as Chair of the Canadian General Charles Bouchard (Ret’d), Vice-Admiral​ Ron Buck Institute of Strategic Studies, and as founding Executive Vice (Ret’d), Lieutenant-​General Michel Gauthier (Ret’d), Dr. Oonagh President of the Canadian International Council. He has also Fitzgerald, Mme Louise Mercier, and Mr. Richard Bertrand. served on the Council of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute, the Fort The award will be presented to Mr. Segal on Friday, 6 November, Henry Guard, Kingston General Hospital and the Walter and at a mixed gala reception and dinner in the Canadian War Duncan Gordon Foundation. He is now Chairman of the NATO Museum, Ottawa. Dinner tickets and corporate sponsorship Council of Canada. opportunities are available by contacting Denise Lemay at denise. [email protected]. Recipients of the Vimy Award include eminent Canadians, from a wide variety of backgrounds. The complete list of the recipients for the first 25 years of the Vimy Award (listed in chronological order and with their title/rank​ – serving or retired – when they received the award) is as follows:

ON TRACK AUTOMNE 2015 23 Independent and Informed CDA Institute Autonomne et renseigné

PRIX VIMY 2015

HUGH D. SEGAL, C.M. – GAGNANT DU PRIX 1991 – Le très honorable Joe Clark VIMY 2015 DE L’INSTITUT DE LA CONFERENCE 1992 – Le Général John de Chastelain DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DEFENSE 1993 – Le Major-général​ Lewis Mackenzie 1994 – Le Major-général​ William Howard Le 28 août 2015. Ottawa. L’Institut de la CAD a 1995 – Le Major-général​ Roméo Dallaire le plaisir d’annoncer que l’honorable Hugh D. 1996 – M. Jack Granatstein Segal a été choisi à l’unanimité comme lauréat du 1997 – Le très honorable Brian Dickson Prix Vimy 2015. Ce prix prestigieux est présenté 1998 – Le Vice-Amiral​ Larry Murray annuellement à un canadien ou à une canadienne 1999 – Le Lieutenant-​Général Charles H. Belzile qui a contribué de façon exceptionnelle à la sécurité 2000 – L’honorable Barnett Danson et à la défense du Canada et à la préservation de 2001 – Le Commodore de l’air Leonard Birchall nos valeurs démocratiques. Le prix Vimy est ainsi (ret.) nommé en l’honneur de la bravoure et des sacrifices 2002 – Le Colonel, honorable John Fraser des soldats canadiens qui ont été victorieux lors de 2003 – Le Général Paul Manson la bataille de la Crête de Vimy, en avril 1917. 2004 – M. David Bercuson 2005 – M G. Hamilton Southam M. Segal est un canadien de grande renommée qui a démontré 2006 – Le Brigadier-général​ David Fraser un dévouement hors-pair​ au service du Canada. Il occupa le 2007 – Le Général Raymond R. Henault poste de Chef de cabinet du Premier Ministre du Canada dans 2008 – Le Général Rick Hillier les années 1990; a enseigné à l’université de Toronto (Faculté de 2009 – L’Adjudant William MacDonald Droit); et pendant plus de vingt ans, a été conférencier invité au 2010 – La très honorable Adrienne Clarkson collège d’État-major des Forces canadiennes à Toronto. Il fut 2011 – Le Major-général​ Jonathan Vance nommé Sénateur en août 2005. 2012 – Le Colonel honoraire Frederick Philip Mannix 2013 – Le Brigadier-général​ W. Don Macnamara (ret.) Le Sénateur Segal a pris sa retraite du Sénat en juin 2014 afin 2014 – Le Colonel honoraire Blake Goldring (qui a dedié le prix à d’accepter le poste de Recteur du Massey College à Toronto. Il l’Adjudant Patrice Vincent et au Caporal Nathan Cirillo) est aussi professeur-adjoint​ à l’université Queen’s (School of 2015 – L’honorable Hugh D. Segal Policy Studies) et membre à vie du ‹Institute for Research on Public Policy›. Le comité de sélection du Prix Vimy de 2015 était composé du Major-général​ Daniel Gosselin (ret.) qui le présidait, du M. Segal a récemment été nommé une deuxième fois au Lieutenant-​général Guy Thibault, du Général Raymond poste de capitaine de vaisseau (capv) honoraire, Marine royal Henault (ret.), du Lieutenant-​général Richard J. Evraire (ret.), canadienne. Il a occupé le poste de président du ‹Canadian du Lieutenant-​général Charles Bouchard (ret.), du Vice-​amiral Institute for Strategic Studies› et celui de vice-président​ Ron Buck (ret.), du Lieutenant-général​ Michel Gauthier (ret.), de fondateur du ‹Canadian International Council›. Il siégea aussi Madame Oonagh Fitzgerald, de Madame Louise Mercier, et de à titre de membre du ‹Council of the International Institute of M. Richard Bertrand. Strategic Studies›, du ‹Fort Henry Guard›, de l’hôpital général de Kingston et des fondations Walter et Duncan Gordon. Il est Le prix sera remis à M. Segal le vendredi 6 novembre au cours l’actuel président du ‹NATO Council of Canada›. d’une réception et d’un dîner de gala au Musée canadien de la guerre, à Ottawa. On peut se procurer des billets pour le dîner Les récipiendaires du Prix Vimy sont d’éminents Canadiens et profiter d’occasions de commandites d’entreprises en joignant provenant d’une grande variété de milieux. La liste complète Denise Lemay à l’adresse [email protected] . des 25 premiers récipiendaires du Prix Vimy (en ordre chronologique, et incluant le titre/​grade – en service ou à la retraite – qu’ils détenaient lors de leur intronisation au palmarès des lauréats du prix Vimy) est la suivante:

24 ON TRACK AUTUMN 2015 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné

NATO AND RUSSIA: FROM AMBIVALENCE TO DÉTENTE

by Dr. Alexander Moens

fter some twenty years (1991-2014) their respective countries.” These include Treaty of 1948 and the NATO Treaty a Aof ambivalence, NATO and Russia values of “no territorial aggrandizement, year later. What happened in the onset are again clashing loudly in all but arms. the freely expressed will of the peoples of the Cold War captures NATO’s soul. But some NATO nations and publics to choose their own government, The Soviet Union was a key ally of the are uncertain if moral and political due respect for existing obligations, West in defeating Nazi Germany. The right is actually on their side. There are collaboration in economic advancement, Western allies and Moscow shared a scholarly and editorial commentaries and practicable measures to lighten the common vice but lacked a common that argue NATO’s policy is to blame burden of armament.”2 virtue. Their collaboration could not be for the onset of this crisis. A prominent converted into cooperation on common American realist concluded that NATO The preamble to NATO’s founding principles. Instead, the sharp division of and European Union (EU) expansion as document captures the common beliefs between Soviet communism and well as democracy promotion triggered principles in the following clause: “The Western democracy on what constitutes Russia’s actions in Ukraine.1 Others parties to this treaty…are determined to individual freedom, legitimate political support the Russian view that NATO safeguard the freedom, common heritage order, and military action immediately broke its alleged promise to Moscow in and civilisation of their peoples, founded divided the two and, as a result, divided 1990 not to enlarge into Eastern Europe. on the principles of democracy, individual the European continent. The NATO soul liberty and the rule of law.”3 did not change after the end of the Cold NATO nations cannot have a coherent War. The common principles produced policy if they have no moral and political The common principles derive from action against civilian suffering in the clarity on this new confrontation with Judeo-Christian values of law and Balkans, and again in the attempt to Russia. We will not know what to think justice adjoined by liberal philosophy. bring accountable government and and do in the current ‘Cold War-lite’ or In a nutshell, the principles rest on two development to Afghanistan. ‘frigid peace,’ unless we understand our enduring beliefs: liberty resides in the own position and Russia’s policy. My individual, and the organization of free This is not a story of heroes and villains. purpose in this article is to make the individuals must be ordered by law The peoples of NATO are not nicer or point that the Western position is indeed expressing their common will. We have smarter or more moral than Russians or grounded in a reasonable balance of recently celebrated the 800th anniversary any other peoples. Rather, the mechanism legitimacy and interest. of the Magna Carta, an early version of the of liberal constitutional governance is common principles. The British Member objectively and morally better. Because NATO nations do not regard peace as of the European Parliament, Daniel law and government are circumscribed merely the absence of war. The true Hannan captured the point brilliantly by inalienable rights and the consent of conditions of peace include principles when he wrote that this document “raises the governed, this political order offers worth keeping. NATO arose from a the rules over the ruler.”4 more freedom and prosperity to more shared purpose for a principled peace people. To be sure, this is a generalization and international order which was Of course, principles alone do not explain rather than a law. The government of expressed a few years before the signing the rise and nature of NATO. The Anglo- Russia will do things that are good for of the 1949 Washington Treaty. The 1941 American alliance of World War II and the Russian people. At the same time, Atlantic Charter between Britain and the the NATO alliance are also products of selfish interest or deceit do not bypass United States declares: “certain common history and power. The alliance against the West. Governments of NATO may do principles in the national policies of Nazism paved the way for the Brussels things that betray their own principles.

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US soldiers on M1A2 Abrams tanks at the Adazi training area in Latvia in 2014. (Image credit: Sgt. 1st Class Jeremy Fowler, US Army.)

NATO members should never mistake conditions in accordance to their own power vis-à-vis Russia. NATO nations their common principles for their own treaties and agreements, but generally try affirmed this policy in the Founding motives or actions. The principles must to accommodate (often slowly) the wish Act with Russia in 1997. NATO defence be applied critically for each issue as of the peoples of these states. budgets and troop numbers have been NATO members seek to find unity of steadily declining and the promise of no purpose. The question of whether NATO acted new bases in new members has been kept. properly in this matter – in light of NATO has widened but not deepened. In Has NATO violated its common Russia’s evident displeasure that more fact, until the recent crisis, it has hollowed principles or broken its promises to set and more states have joined or shown an out in terms of military capability. off this new conflagration with Russia? interest in joining NATO and the EU – is a fair question, and the answer is plain. NATO, however, did err on this point Regardless of what constellation of The challenge of finding balance between once, and in so doing muddied its organizations national leaders had in legitimacy and interest was indeed met own record. The George W. Bush mind for the future of European affairs by NATO. The legitimate expression of administration wanted to rapidly after 1991, nearly all former states under sovereign states to join international admit Ukraine (and Georgia) into the Soviet control in Central and Eastern organizations of their choice is a moral Alliance, even though there was no clear Europe have joined Western economic, principle of ancient origin and has been democratic and legally expressed will in political, and military governance. We acknowledged in many international Ukraine to do so. Several allies resisted often hear the term “NATO expansion,” agreements, including in the Helsinki and the 2008 NATO summit produced the but this phrase does not express the Final Act of 1972 with Soviet (now unusual phrase: “We agreed today that dynamic. There is no central plan or Russian) active consent. At the same these countries (Ukraine and Georgia) strategy to expand NATO’s boundaries. time, NATO made sure not to move will become members of NATO.” The Rather, the dynamic is of newly elected troops, bases, equipment of significance phrase sounded like a policy conclusion governments that come into power or any other military posture into the and crossed the line of NATO’s principle with mandates to join the European new area, expressing clearly that it did of receiving rather than recruiting Union and NATO. Both organizations, not intend to treat NATO enlargement members. The Obama administration in return, put on some membership as an opportunity to enhance its military rightly corrected this mistake. The

26 ON TRACK AUTUMN 2015 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné phrase “will join” was never repeated. Eurasian Economic Union as a counter- Ukraine decisively to Putin’s approach Moreover, a well-meaning effort to ‘reset’ model.7 of “sovereign democracy” meant that relations with Russia was undertaken for many Ukrainians this was their last with some favourable results during the Let us be clear, Ukraine wanted to chance to join the West.10 presidency of Dmitry Medvedev. Soon diversify its trade and economic after Obama’s new approach, Ukrainian relationship as all states do (including Some accuse Western governments president Victor Yanukovych initiated with China) whenever they can. In of provoking Russia by sponsoring legislative change to put Ukraine back to the case of the EU Eastern Partners, it various non-governmental organizations ‘non-bloc’ status, thus removing NATO generally means enhancing trade with (NGOs) to foster democratic membership as a policy option. the West, as well as China, beyond their development in Ukraine. The charge is existing trading pattern with Russia. bogus. Democracy promotion NGOs What about broken promises? Mary Elise There is an element of competition going in Ukraine were not operating against Sarotte has done a thorough inquiry on. States pursue their economic interest Ukrainian law. Advancing democratic into this allegation with diplomatic when comparing a customs union with ideas through freedom of information correspondence now open to scholars.5 the EU or with Russia. The freedom is something the West should not feel To make a long story short, in early to engage in economic exchange as an ashamed about. 1990, both then Secretary of State James individual and as a country stands as clear Baker and German Chancellor Helmut in international affairs as the freedom to NATO nations stand on the political and Kohl in two private conversations with join international organizations. Russia moral high ground in the lead up to the Mikhael Gorbachev in the span of one has no objective grievance with the EU crisis, especially when we give due credit week alluded to the notion of NATO regarding the Eastern Partnerships. to Obama’s multiple attempts, including not moving east. Kohl, of course, hoped on missile defence, to engage Russia as to get Soviet agreement to German Russia has every right to persuade Ukraine a global partner. Ultimately, it was not Unification. Baker spoke without fiat to join the Eurasian Economic Union the competition over integration with from George H. W. Bush and none of the rather than the Eastern Partnership. the East or West that brought us into a Allied governments ever endorsed this or However, when Yanukovych changed his renewed military standoff. The politico- put it on paper. Even if they had, it could position just days prior to signing a deal military conflict broke out when Russia not have legal standing because it would with the EU, it appears that Russia was played bait and switch. Russia pretended violate both the CSCE (Conference on engaging in heavy-handed linkage. that the genuine popular pressure against Security and Cooperation in Europe) Yanukovych gave it a legal and moral and NATO treaties. In sum, Gorbachev To explain the popular uprising in right to grab a piece of territory (Crimea) is right to feel aggrieved and Baker and Ukraine, consider that Yanukovych’s belonging to another sovereign state Kohl should have been more careful with about face on the EU deal followed by and to set off and decisively sponsor a their word, but the Russian line that no the $15 billion Action Plan with Russia separatist struggle in the Donbas area. NATO expansion was an agreed promise a month later was the straw that broke On those violations the UN Charter is is a self-serving embellishment. the camel’s back in terms of popular clear. discontent in Kyiv and increasingly Some analysts suggest that the elsewhere in the country. The discontent Something has changed in Russia government in Moscow has cause to had been building in reaction to rather than in NATO or the EU, which interpret the European Union’s Eastern Yanukovych’s amassing executive explains the lead-up and final actions Partnership Program launched in 2009 powers by changing the power of the that triggered the crisis. The turn to the as a quasi-NATO expansion policy.6 parliament and the courts. Also, the Liberal West under Boris Yeltsin in the Meant to produce deep association in magnitude of corruption he and friendly 1990s is widely considered by Russians many policy areas, but without actual oligarchs undertook was even beyond the as a failure. Russia went from corrupt membership in the EU, the partnership Ukrainian pale. A growing segment of Communist Party rule to even more was to include Armenia, Azerbaijan, the public feared that energy dependence corrupt oligarchy, during which time Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. on Russia would only worsen under state assets were sold to a few while living Samuel Charap and Mikhail Troitskyi Yanukovych.8 By cancelling the EU conditions of the majority declined. assert that the EU’s initiative created an Partnership agreement under duress, Privatization is very different from “integration dilemma” or a zero-sum Yanukovych gave rise to a relatively small establishing rule of law, private property contest between the EU and Russia over but genuine uprising. By 24 November, rights, and independent courts. Political the future economic, political and foreign the protest grew to some 100,000 people institutions did not emerge to replace or policy security allegiance of the six states in the square.9 The fear that in the check the informal power of individual in question. Hence, Russia created the 2015 election Yanukovych would tie strong men. Russians continue to look

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to the state as the source of authority and The influence of NATO’s (and the EU’s) Global Politics and Strategy 56, 3 stability. Most Russians feel confirmed common principles is what matters. If (2014): pp. 95-101. in their mistrust of all things Western. our defence can be so clear as to produce Into this authoritarian ‘seed bed’ stepped a new détente with Russia, that is a good 8. Samuel Charap and Mikhail a strong leader who replaced the power outcome. It buys time and time is on our Troitskiy, "Russia, the West and the of the oligarchs with a controlling state side.  Integration Dilemma," Survival: apparatus which runs by means of Global Politics and Strategy 55, 6 informal networks or ‘sistema.’11 This Dr. Alexander Moens is professor of (2013): pp. 49-62 (see especially p. new ruling network in which former KGB Political Science at Simon Fraser University 50). officials play a key role is often referred and the 2015 Eisenhower Fellow at the to as Siloviki.12 Unlike the oligarchs, NATO Defense College in Rome. He is the 9. Andrew Wilson, Ukraine in Crisis: this security-intelligence elite has an author of The Foreign Policy of George What it Means for the West (New interest in Russia itself and in Russian W. Bush: Values, Strategy and Loyalty Haven and London: Yale University power. Authoritarianism as practiced (Ashgate, 2004) and Foreign Policy Under Press, 2014), pp. 49-51. by Putin means the pursuit of personal Carter (Westview Press, 1990). and national power at the expense of 10. Ibid, p. 68. international agreements when the Notes balance of power favours Russia. The 11. Joshua Yaffa attributes the term Ukrainian crisis offered an opportunity 1. John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the to Vladislav Surkov, an advisor to to advance Russian power. Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault," President Putin. See his "Putin’s Foreign Affairs 93, 5 (September/ Hard Turn," Foreign Affairs 94, 3 NATO’s optimal military posture October 2014): pp. 77-89. (May 2015): pp. 128-135. continues to be maximum certainty about defence of its members while 2. Atlantic Charter, 14 August 1941, as 12. For example, see Alena V. posing minimal military threat to Russia. posted by the Avalon Project, http:// Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise? In other words, the military employed avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic. Sistema, Power Networks and by NATO to deal with Russia’s buffer asp. Informal Governance (Cambridge: zone assertiveness must be as defensive Cambridge University Press, in nature as possible. This requires a 3. The North Atlantic Treaty, 2013); Ellen Mickiewicz, No careful calibration of power; signalling Washington, DC, 4 April 1949, Illusions: The Voices of Russia's that Russia cannot expand its buffer zone http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ Future Leaders (Oxford University and that NATO will not try to roll back official_texts_17120.htm (italics Press, 2014); Peter Pomerantsev, Russia’s gains militarily. added). Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible: The Surreal Heart of the It is not NATO’s weapons, but the 4. Daniel Hannan, “The Magna Carta New Russia (Public Affairs, 2014); common principles of its members that — the text that makes us who we Keith Gessen, "What's the Matter threaten this new version of Russian are ,” National Post, 15 June 2015. With Russia?" Foreign Affairs 93, 4 authoritarianism. The most important http://news.nationalpost.com/ (July/August, 2014): pp. 182-189; factor for Russians themselves and for full-comment/daniel-hannan-the- and William Zimmerman, Ruling the West remains its development into magna-carta-the-text-that-makes- Russia: Authoritarianism From a law- and institution-based society in us-who-we-are. the Revolution to Putin (Princeton which the rules are raised above the ruler. University Press, 2014). There are three things NATO nations 5. Mary Elise Sarotte, "A Broken must not do: blame themselves for the Promise?" Foreign Affairs 93, 5 13. Walter Laqueur, Putinism: Russia crisis because, as I have argued, that (September/October 2014): pp. 90- and its Future with the West (New is factually and normatively incorrect; 97. York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2015), second, overreact by turning NATO away 6. p. 51. from a defensive posture; and third, 7. Lawrence Freedman, "Ukraine and sacrifice the democratic and commercial the Art of Crisis Management," development of countries around Russia Survival: Global Politics and that want to move closer to the West for Strategy 56, 3 (2014): pp. 7-42; Neil the sake of Russia’s so-called need for a MacFarlane and Anand Menon, buffer zone. "The EU and Ukraine," Survival:

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THE (ALREADY) FORGOTTEN LEGACY OF CANADA’S WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT EFFORT IN KANDAHAR (2006-2012)*

By Dr. Howard Coombs

A DFAIT visit to Sarpoza Prison on 10 imperatives of national departments Lessons Learned conference to examine June, 2012 has confirmed that the last and agencies’ policy and practices the multi-agency experiences of the of Canada’s outstanding obligations in as well as those of our international Whole of Government effort. Key Kandahar Province, detainee monitoring, partners, primarily the United States but stakeholders involved in implementing has been fully and finally discharged. The including various NATO allies, had to be Canada’s Whole of Government effort last resident Canadian officer in Kandahar taken into account. All this was with an were involved in the workshop jointly will shortly depart KPRT for the final time, exceptionally fragile Afghan government managed by CIDA and Task Force bringing to a close almost seven years of and security apparatus; an insurgency, Kandahar, the Canadian military Canadian presence at KPRT and focused the strength of which had consistently mission. This was the only report engagement in Kandahar province. been underestimated by the international for the entire time that Canada was community; and shifting international active in Afghanistan that was jointly - “KPRT0579: Canada in Kandahar - Last and national views of both counter- commissioned and signed by both the Man Out” (10 June 2012)1 insurgency and nation-building. While Representative of Canada in Kandahar many hard-won lessons were identified and the Commander Task Force anada’s presence in southern as a result of this experience, they have Kandahar. The workshop produced a CAfghanistan ended not with the yet to be institutionalized. This fact has number of key lessons (i.e., what was and sounds of combat but this innocuous attendant implications for Canada in was not working) related to a number of email from the then American-led both the current and future domestic and important issue areas, including cross- Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction international environment. department civil-military bi-national Team (KPRT) signifying the end of the cooperation, the evolution of the KPRT, Canadian Whole of Government effort. Various inter-departmental perspectives, strategic communications, contracting Canada’s experience in Afghanistan, objectives, programs, plans, and activities and implementation of the ‘rule of law.’3 and particularly the south, offered an were evident as part of Canada’s “Whole of unprecedented challenge to the former Government” approach in Afghanistan, Firstly, the need to have expertise across Department of Foreign Affairs and which evolved from 2006 to 2011. the domains of security, governance, International Trade (DFAIT), the former This concept also occupied Canadian reconstruction and development was Canadian International Development implementation partners from civil highlighted. Without balanced civilian Agency (CIDA),2 the Department of society and the private sector, members expertise and support, the host nation National Defence (DND), as well as a of the international community, and is unable to extend its influence into host of other departments, organizations, Afghan authorities at all levels. It was the communities. While the Whole of and agencies. creative and responsive to the exigencies Government team had a good deal of of Canada’s most significant intervention sectoral and technical expertise, two areas The Afghan mission context required in any country since the Second World were cited as lacking Canadian civilian the Canadian government to put War. Depending on one’s outlook, for proficiency in the agrarian and conflict- together organizations, which did not some, Canada’s approach to whole of ridden environment of Kandahar: normally work collectively on such a government activities in Afghanistan was agriculture and justice. Secondly, the scale, to provide a coherent Canadian replete with flaws, or, alternatively, for need to have key personnel assigned effort in conjunction with that of others, rich in lessons. to other government departments and the international community. This particularly the Canadian military prior meant that the sometimes conflicting In early 2011, the KPRT organized a to the deployment was brought forward.

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consisting of “an integrated team of soldiers, development workers, diplomats and others who can protect themselves.” Such an organization would be funded and resourced sufficiently to deploy quickly and commence working effectively wherever required, regardless of security concerns.5 While Tamas’ proposal is geared more at the international rather than national level, the ability to create, deploy and sustain such a structure over the duration of the mission would permit Canada to maintain the skills and relationships so arduously gained over the length of the Afghanistan experience. For it to succeed, Canada’s capability The Canadian flag is folded during the Mission Transition Task Force (MTTF) last flag lowering ceremony at Kandahar Airfield on 1 and capacity must be improved, December 2011. (Image credit: Patrick Drouin, Canadian Forces Combat Camera, DND.) likely within existent funding envelopes. This effort will be Understanding other departmental Finally, while Canadian expertise was somewhat painful, to be sure, but the cultures and modes of operation recognized in the area of rule of law, cost of not doing so far outweighs any would have reduced friction between a more comprehensive and detailed budgetary constraints that will result different organizations, while improving program that would reach to the districts from current strategic reviews. Tamas communications and effectiveness. and their people would have been more aptly captures this with the comment that efficacious. “unstable regions affect us all”6 and in a Thirdly, the bi-national, civil-military global community of nations this is truer nature of the KPRT was effective, owing As Canada’s experience in Kandahar now than ever before – a situation that to the integrated governance structure put seems to indicate, twenty-first century will not change for the foreseeable future. in place by the Canadian and American interventions will likely require teams of leadership. It reached across the province people familiar with each other and their While these concepts have been clearly to the districts and assisted greatly in the capabilities. This suggests the need for the articulated, little has been done in the handover of structures, programming, establishment of integrated professional intervening years to institutionalize and operations. Fourthly, the need for development systems and the wider the lessons identified – to make them the civilian agencies of the Canadian use of inter-department assignments to lessons learned. As the Canadian government to be able to communicate increase operating familiarity between government looks forward towards to the media was emphasized. While government departments – including involvement with other fractured and DND has great latitude in dealing with DND, today’s Department of Foreign war-torn environments, like Iraq and the media, the former DFAIT and CIDA Affairs, Trade, and Development Syria, as well as threats at home, it needs did not, with a commensurate negative (DFATD), and others. Additionally, the to heed the lessons identified by our impact in informing the Canadian public Canadian government needs to increase contribution in southern Afghanistan of their activities and achievements. its pool of deployable capabilities, on and increase the effectiveness of its Fifthly, there is a need to standardize top of developing Whole of Government Whole of Government efforts. Only contracting procedures across the structures that contain a necessary cross- then could it meet the exigencies of Canadian Whole of Government effort. spectrum of skills and attributes, which the demands of the international and While the practices of the Canadian can deploy quickly to conflict or post- domestic environments. Otherwise, Armed Forces4 and DND are flexible and conflict areas. in the well known and much over used were deemed to represent ‘best practices,’ words of philosopher George Santayana: those of other departments were seen as, Canadian development specialist Andy “Those who cannot remember the past at times, problematic and cumbersome. Tamas advocates a “hybrid” organization

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are condemned to repeat it.”7 the Royal Military College of Canada, in Workshop,’ 02 June 2011,” 2 pp.; Kingston, Ontario, as well as a part-time and also, Canada, “Kandahar Sadly, we may no longer have the same Army Reserve Officer on the staff of the Lessons Learned Workshop, Task luxury of time to re-identify these and Doctrine Training Force Kandahar and Kandahar recent lessons and Canadians will Centre, also located in Kingston. He served Provincial Reconstruction Team, 24 bear the consequences of national ill- as a civilian advisor to the Commander February 2011.” Both documents in preparedness in meeting the complex of from September possession of the Author. and nuanced challenges which are the 2010 to July 2011. He is a Research Fellow hallmark of this century.  at the CDA Institute. 4. The title Canadian Forces was changed to Canadian Armed Forces *In part, this article uses research from Notes in March 2013. Howard G. Coombs, Canadian Whole of Government Operations Kandahar – 1. KPRT Email dated 06/13/2012 5. Andy Tamas, Warriors and Nation September 2010 to July 2011, Vimy Paper 10:34 AM, n.p. In possession of the Builders: Development and the (Ottawa: The Conference of Defence Author. Military in Afghanistan (Kingston: Associations Institute, December 2012). Canadian Defence Academy Press, I would like to thank Lindsay Coombs of 2. In June 2013, the former DFAIT and 2009), p. 219. the Conference of Defence Associations CIDA merged into the Department Institute and Anne Lavender of the of Foreign Affairs, Trade and 6. Ibid., p. 223. Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade Development (DFATD). and Development for their assistance in 7. Robert I. Fitzhenry, ed. Barnes editing this article. 3. Taken from Canada, Department of & Noble Book of Quotations - National Defence, “3350-1 (JLLO) Revised and Enlarged (New York: Dr. Howard G. Coombs is an Assistant ‘Report On Kandahar Whole Of HarperCollins, Inc., 1987), p. 166. Professor of History and War Studies at Government Lessons Learned

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Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné

CONTRIBUTING TO THE LEGACY: GERTRUDE KEARNS, THE ART OF COMMAND, AND THE DEVELOPING MEMORY OF THE AFGHAN WAR

By Dr. Craig Leslie Mantle

ow will future generations have documented through Hremember Canada’s mission in their work elements of Canada’s Afghanistan? What will be its legacy? major wars of the 20th Century It is perhaps too early to tell. Combat – the First, Second, and Korean, operations ceased in 2011 while complete respectively – and in so doing withdrawal of Canadian military have influenced how each conflict personnel occurred only in 2014. But has and will be remembered. The the lasting memory of Afghanistan same also applies to artists who has already started to take shape. The have recorded aspects of Canadian images of ramp ceremonies in Kandahar, peacekeeping missions, like Ian repatriation ceremonies in Trenton, Harding MacKay and his work on and the long convoy of black vehicles Somalia. somberly rolling down the Highway of Heroes have assumed something Through The Art of Command ~ of an iconic quality. The participants Portraits and Posters from Canada’s themselves have ensured that their Afghan Mission, Gertrude Kearns voices will be incorporated into whatever has done something similar, narrative emerges by contributing their contributing to the developing thoughts to anthologies1 or publishing memory of Afghanistan by their own full-length works.2 The exploring the “inner-soldier” of growth of charitable organizations to aid many of Canada’s senior military the military community is yet another leaders from this conflict and important dimension. And so the list describing the intellectual, even goes on. personal, challenges that they LAV III AS METAPHOR [Major-General David Fraser], 2015. (Image credit: Gertrude Kearns.) faced as commanders.4 Afghanistan Without a doubt, art strongly influences will surely be remembered, at commanders, all colonels and generals, how conflicts in which Canadians have least partially, as the “Difficult War”5 or were located in a separate room that participated, as either combatants or the “Long War.”6 Kearns’s art begins to began the installation. Painted on a black peacekeepers, are remembered. One need explain why. background, the heads are colourful and only visit the Canadian War Museum bright, mixing flesh tones and CADPAT (CWM) in Ottawa, where pieces from The Art of Command premiered at the Fort camouflage in varying proportions. As a its extensive collection of war art are on York Visitor Centre in Toronto from 5 consequence, the portraits have a digital display – encompassing prints, drawings, March until 14 June 2015. The exhibition feel that in some instances borders on sculptures, and paintings – to see the truth was divided into two main sections, the slightly abstract. Some of the subjects of this statement.3 Artists such as Frederick seemingly for reasons of space. Head- gaze off into the distance, while others Varley, Charles Comfort, and Ted Zuber only portraits of nine senior Canadian stare directly into the viewer’s eyes. No

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L-R: Lieutenant-Colonel Steve Jourdain, 2013; Lieutenant-General (ret’d) Marc Lessard, 2014; Lieutenant-Colonel François Dufault, 2014. (Image credit: Toni Hafkenscheid.)

one smiles. did not control the text as has sometimes has the feeling of reading a disjointed, yet been assumed; the artist always drove the fascinating, book when viewing the pieces The remaining pieces were located in discussion and set the research agenda. relating to Brigadier-General Richard a nearby corridor. At the entrance to In some cases, she asked for specific Giguère (THE WAY AHEAD, artist’s the hallway, ten full-length drawings of text in an officer’s own words; in other collection) or Colonel Ian Hope (THE various soldiers were presented. It is from instances, she morphed commentary from LONG FIGHT, artist’s collection). Viewers both the head portraits and drawings that many officers into one voice. As a result, certainly have to work at appreciating this come what is arguably the most interesting the text is exceptionally personal and art. Yet, the inclusion of so much text part of the exhibition, the 23 texted war uniquely crafted to each image, and if read may be a strength. In a very real sense, prints. Incorporating single words, pithy carefully, gives insight into the individual the texted prints are historical documents catchphrases, or complete sentences that as a commander and the multitude of in and of themselves, recording what pertain to the sitter and his experiences, challenges, some ultimately unresolvable, each soldier thought about his Afghan each print offers a partial window into the that he was forced to confront. Indeed, this experience at the time that the piece was mind of the subject. Although the prints body of work is as much about military created. Like the memory of the war itself, are specific to individual commanders, in concepts that interest Kearns, as it is about their impressions of their own experiences many cases they also reference the broader what actually occurred on the ground in may, perhaps will, change. period in which these soldiers served. Afghanistan. The decision to link text and Interestingly, a few pieces include either image was deliberate and far from hasty Early on, Kearns made the conscious attributable or anonymous criticism of the – certain words simply “worked” better decision to identify each commander subject by fellow soldiers. with certain leaders for both personal and on his respective piece and to secure professional reasons (and in a few cases, his approval of the final product. The The selection of text was, to varying degrees, so that a clever play-on-words might be latter decision challenged the creative a collaborative effort between Kearns employed!). process, as there was occasionally some and her subject, alternating between her “push back” – some things were perhaps own sound bite-like conceptualizations, For some, the prints may be endlessly better left unsaid or phrased a little denser more journalistic text, and even distracting because in many cases so much more diplomatically – but she wanted script-like blocks of dialogue. The officers text accompanies a subject’s portrait. One that. In her estimation, the back-and-

34 ON TRACK AUTUMN 2015 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné forth exchanges, when they occurred, window into the myriad professional entirely different (CORE COMMANDS: strengthened the end result and forced challenges that Canadian soldiers faced – Senior Leadership, Canada’s Afghan her to continue learning and considering and will surely face again. Mission). It is safe to say that without different perspectives throughout. She the City of Toronto’s wholehearted ultimately wanted to present an image The City of Toronto certainly did its part support, The Art of Command would with dynamic yet unsensational text that to further both of these ends. Aside not have come off as well as it did. In felt “right” for each officer, and of course, from providing an apropos venue, it paid Kearns’s estimation, this exhibition was “right” for her. for both the printing and framing of the an exemplar of cooperation between artist large texted prints, thereby ensuring and the expertise resident in community The exhibition’s offerings, as is usual for uniformity throughout the exhibition. galleries/museums. major shows like this, included more than The City’s Museums & Heritage Services just the passive display of art. During also contributed to the accompanying Gertrude Kearns has deep connections to these three-and-a-half months, Kearns catalogue, with Dr. Larry Ostola, the Toronto, her home since she was three- gave a number of lectures and guided director, writing a short introductory months-old, having been born on her tours to interested visitors, providing a foreword and Mr. Wayne Reeves, the chief father’s (Frederick Steiger) business trip degree of insight and behind-the-scenes curator, authoring an insightful essay on to St. John’s, Newfoundland in 1950 on commentary that would not otherwise Kearns and her war art from the Gulf the invitation of Premier Joey Smallwood. be available. That the artist was so readily War to Afghanistan. (Kearns’s own essay Apart from three years (1979 to 1982) in accessible was a boon for all, organizers followed his, as do various statements from South America, predominately in Brazil, and patrons alike. Owing to the success of the soldiers featured in the exhibition that she continues to reside in the city and the show, Kearns is hopeful that national she gathered.) Publicizing the exhibition maintains a home/studio there. Previously or provincial galleries across Canada will through both traditional and social media affiliated with several commercial galleries opt to host her exhibition in the near ensured that it received notice within and and the Propeller Centre for the Visual future. By so doing, they will inevitably beyond the city’s contemporary art scene Arts, a member-run and community- help preserve the memory of the war and military garrison. Reeves and his team oriented gallery in the heart of downtown, in Afghanistan through contemporary even suggested the title of the exhibition, she has been independent of commercial military art and simultaneously offer a Kearns having proposed something representation since 2005; the intense

L-R: SCIENCE OF WAR [Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie], 2012; JUST WAR THEORY [Brigadier-General David Fraser], 2012; HOPE OF WAR [Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope], 2012; LIGHT ‘EM UP [Captain Jon Hamilton], 2013; CONCEPT AND WAR [Brigadier-General Jonathan Vance], 2013 (Image credit: Toni Hafkenscheid.)

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Toronto; National While overseas, Kearns completed more Defence Headquarters than 50 small sketches and took reference (NDHQ), Ottawa; the photographs “outside the wire.” She Art Gallery of Nova completed many large paper studies in her Scotia, Halifax, and so Toronto studio afterwards. The body of on. Significantly, she work that resulted – six canvases, all three has also been the “war feet by four feet – were produced within artist in residence” at six months of her return to Toronto and the Royal Canadian have since been installed in six different Military Institute locales throughout the Department of (RCMI) in Toronto, National Defence (DND). The canvases a private members’ were framed and delivered to Colonel organization that Noonan at NDHQ in the fall of 2006. promotes education These six canvases, it should be noted, on matters related were very different from the subsequent to defence, security, independent (i.e., non-commissioned) and foreign affairs. works that make up The Art of Command; Since 1989, she has they incorporated a minimal amount of had numerous solo text and, in Kearns’s words, were “basically exhibitions in Toronto image pieces.” and has won several awards from such Kearns’s exposure to the Canadian Afghan organizations as the mission via TFA was the genesis for what Ontario Society of would culminate in 2015 with The Art

ANCIENT/MODERN 2006 Col M Hussin Andiwall (ANP PRT Kandahar after the Artists and the National of Command. This latter undertaking VBIED hit Jan 15 2006). (Image credit: Gertrude Kearns.) Aviation Museum. had the full support and unprecedented From 2003 to 2005, cooperation of DND despite it being and particular nature of her military following a decade of conducted outside of its purview and work has not meshed easily with their researched projects, she participated in control. It took about 10 years to create, outlooks. Given her need for completely the Canadian Forces Artists Program with the last piece completed in early independent access to the military and (CFAP), a military-run initiative designed 2015, just in time for exhibition. (For the flexibility in terms of both the content of to record military activity both at home sake of comparison, that’s the entire length her pieces and deadlines, she has preferred and abroad through art. of Canada’s combat mission and follow-on to remain autonomous. This approach, training mission, plus a few more years on the consequence of which is that she Working completely outside of the top of that for good measure!) manages every aspect of her career, CFAP framework, Kearns travelled on strongly influenced The Art of Command contract to Afghanistan in 2006 and And there is ample reason why the entire – she desired to have a comprehensive spent four-and-a-half weeks with Task project took a decade. Kearns first had to body of work finished before mounting Force Afghanistan (TFA), Rotation 0, find her subjects. She approached many of an exhibition, and to avoid altogether being embedded with the Canadian them on her own initiative; her connection both commercial pressures and the need Battle Group centred on the 1st Battalion, to the RCMI facilitated a number of to justify her work to a civilian audience Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry introductions, but it was mostly her prematurely, which an association with a in Kandahar. And, just prior to returning already-established reputation as an artist gallery would have occasioned. to Canada, she also found herself in that opened the door. Additionally, she Kabul with the Strategic Advisory Team, “harassed” some officers whom she hoped Kearns has worked, both officially and a Canadian undertaking to build capacity would participate (Major-General David unofficially, as a Canadian military/war within Afghan government departments Fraser finally relented after three years of artist for over two decades. Perhaps owing through mentorship. Then Colonel Steve hounding!), while sympathetic officers, to her independence, private collectors, Noonan, the commander of TFA in 2006, like Noonan, exerted influence from national institutions and universities, conceived of and organized the contract, within the military. To quote Lieutenant- more so than commercial galleries, have the time spent in Afghanistan being an Colonel Omer Lavoie, the commander of gravitated towards and shown her work. opportunity to collect material for the art Task Force 3-06, “But gentle coercion by Her paintings can consequently be found that would follow later that year. my superior chain of command and even at the CWM; Canadian Forces College,

36 ON TRACK AUTUMN 2015 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné less gentle persuasion by Gertrude email, “You have created a working prevailed, and here I am [appearing concept.” This print proved to be a in the exhibition].” watershed, establishing a starting point for the larger body of work Then, multiple sittings in Kearns’s to come, one that would explore studio had to be scheduled. For through image and text the senior officers in an army still tactical, operational and strategic engaged in Afghanistan, whether considerations that Canada’s fighting the Taliban or training leaders faced in Afghanistan. As Afghan security forces, this was Kearns said, Noonan was “the not always an easy task. Indeed, hinge into the concept.” “Once sittings were sometimes scheduled that initial piece was under my up to a year in advance. Colonel belt,” she recalled, “I knew I had Ian Hope found time en route from a unique direction for my art that Stuttgart, Germany to Edmonton would include both leadership in 2014 to meet with Kearns. and mission concepts; I could No one ever cancelled. Kearns breathe a sigh of relief.” The many always acknowledges the respect texted prints that followed, when and commitment these officers combined with the portraits, showed to her and her project: comprise The Art of Command. “It never ceased to amaze me that these commanders were willing to Mixing recent military history schedule work time for the project. with contemporary art, Gertrude I never took it for granted.” And Kearns has used large format then the difficult task of capturing portraits and texted prints as images and deciding on text began! the jumping-off point to explore PLAN/LEAD 2006 Colonel Steve Noonan. (Image credit: Gertrude Kearns.) the complexity of command in In the exhibition at Fort York, modern, asymmetric warfare. The Wayne Reeves, the curator, gave Art of Command is far from a passive an appreciative nod towards Steve The ink study, which Reeves installed as exhibition, for it invites viewers to Noonan, Kearns’s initial 2006 “employer.” an homage, proved to be a turning point engage with the history of the mission and Although Noonan is featured throughout in the progression from the TFA contract a handful of its protagonists, admittedly The Art of Command, Reeves installed to the independently-pursued and more a very important handful. For Kearns, a 2006 ink head study of Noonan with intellectual and conceptual works that personally, it is imperative that her work the collection of head-only portraits, followed. Kearns used this image as challenge traditional notions of military all of which date between 2011 and the ground to create her first and most art; all of her art has done that, and this 2014, to recognize his seminal role in visually-simple texted print, with the material is no different. If nothing more, the facilitating an in-theatre contract that digitally-overlaid words “PLANNING collection prompts viewers to think about would ultimately provide Kearns with a FROM THE FRONT” appearing at the the awesome responsibilities that Canada’s foundation from which to expand in order top, “LEADING FROM THE REAR” soldiers held in Afghanistan and the to realize a much larger goal. Although at the bottom, and Noonan’s head and complex and ever-changing environment stylistically the piece was “the odd man shoulders squarely in the centre (PLAN/ in which those responsibilities were out,” as the nine large heads, all the same LEAD, artist’s collection). exercised. How this art will influence the size, formed a visually-cohesive group, memory of Afghanistan in the decades to the ink study satisfied his sense of context Among other meanings – like where is come – significantly, marginally or not at and orientation. In a somewhat removed the front in an asymmetric war? – the all – remains to be seen. Only time will sense, Noonan was responsible for the poster, based as it is on an ironic and truly tell.  project, and this responsibility had to be supposed oxymoron, is meant to suggest acknowledged. that many operations had an Afghan- Dr. Craig Leslie Mantle is a Research face, that Canadians may have planned Fellow at the CDA Institute. He was most But Noonan did more than just get Kearns them, but that it was Afghans (with help) recently employed at the Canadian War to Afghanistan, where her larger and more that saw them through. Noonan initially Museum as the post-1945 historian. He is ambitious ideas began to germinate. He questioned her wording, but after Kearns the principal editor of In Their Own Words: reaffirmed that she was onto “something.” defended the content, he stated over Canadian Stories of Valour and Bravery

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from Afghanistan, 2001-2007 (Kingston: Leslie Mantle et al., eds., In Their Own ~ Military Art Treasures from the CDA Press, 2013), a collection of first- Words: Canadian Stories of Valour Canadian War Museum (Vancouver: person narratives by 23 Canadian soldiers and Bravery from Afghanistan, 2001- Douglas & McIntyre, 2000). who earned some of the nation’s highest 2007 (Kingston: CDA Press, 2013). honours for their actions in Southwest 4. See also, Craig Leslie Mantle, Asia. He would like to thank Ms. Gertrude 2. For instance, Harold Ristau, At Peace “Commanding Art: Gertrude Kearns Kearns for her assistance – without it, this with War: A Chaplain’s Meditations and Canada’s Afghan Mission,” CDA article would never have happened. from Afghanistan (Eugene, Oregon: Institute Blog: The Forum, 9 June Wipf & Stock, 2012); Robert Semrau, 2015, https://www.cdainstitute.ca/ Readers interested in acquiring collectable The Taliban Don’t Wave (Toronto: J. en/blog/entry/commanding-art- small edition, original fine art prints in Wiley & Sons, 2012); Ryan Flavelle, gertrude-kearns-and-canada-s- various sizes from The Art of Command are The Patrol: Seven Days in the Life of afghan-mission. encouraged to contact the artist directly at a Canadian Soldier in Afghanistan [email protected]. (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2011); 5. A phrase that has already seen Ray Wiss, FOB DOC: A Doctor on some use. See Emily Spencer, ed., Notes the Front Lines in Afghanistan: A The Difficult War: Perspectives on War Diary (Vancouver: Douglas & Insurgency and Special Operations 1. For instance, Melanie Graham, ed., McIntyre, 2009); and Ray Wiss, A Forces (Kingston and Toronto: CDA Afghanistan: A Canadian Story, Line in the Sand: Canadians at War Press and Dundurn Press, 2009). 2001-2014 (Ottawa: John McQuarrie in Kandahar (Toronto: Douglas & Photography, 2014); Kevin Patterson McIntyre, 2010). 6. Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope, “Agility and Jane Warren, eds., Outside the and Endurance: Task Force Orion in Wire: The War in Afghanistan in the 3. A glimpse of the CWM’s collection Helmand,” in Patterson and Warren, Words of Its Participants (Toronto: is to be had through Dean F. Oliver eds., Outside the Wire, p. 163. Random House, 2007); and Craig and Laura Brandon, Canvas of War

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A0163e0915_RHC_7,85x5,1.indd 1 07.09.15 13:38 38 ON TRACK AUTUMN 2015 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné

THE CANADIAN-AMERICAN “SPECIAL” DEFENCE RELATIONSHIP: NEW CHALLENGES AND DEMANDS

By Dr. Rob Huebert

he Canadian strategic environment of the Soviet Union, Canada endeavoured the top tier of fighting capability, therefore Thas begun one of its most challenging to demonstrate to the United States that allowing Canada to operate with the transformation since the end of the it was serious in its efforts to meet the Americans worldwide when Ottawa Cold War. There have been subtle but new Soviet threat. The focus of Canadian decided to act. fundamental changes to some of the most security and defence policy was to provide important elements of Canadian defence for the shared responsibility of defending In effect, Canadian strategic and defence and security policy. However these North American aerospace defence and policy was relatively straightforward. Keep transformations are occurring in a manner for providing for the maintenance of the Americans satisfied and Canada will that is not an immediately apparent and deterrence in both the Arctic and Europe. be protected. As a result, there has been are still in flux. From an institutional perspective, this little effort to develop a uniquely Canadian resulted in Canada’s full participation in strategic understanding of the international Since the early days of the Second World the North American Aerospace Defence threat environment or a determination as War the core the Canadian security (NORAD) Command agreement with to the core security threat to Canada. The requirement has been to ensure that the the United States and full participation in Department of National Defence has made United States is satisfied with Canadian NATO with the Americans and Europeans. some effort to understand the various defence efforts. Its large geographical size These two core alliances have acted as threats facing Canada over time, such combined with its small population has the central element of Canadian defence as when it was asked to create a specific always made an independent security policy since the 1950s to the current era. defence policy, often expressed as a white policy difficult, if not impossible. But its paper. But it is very difficult to identify any geography also placed it as a neighbour Canada has developed other elements sustained long-term Canadian effort to to the United States. As the Americans related to its security and defence policy, isolate threats to the country’s security, at shifted from being a significant military including long-term participation in least outside those developed in American power to the world’s strongest superpower, United Nations peacekeeping missions. and/or NATO threat evaluations. Even Canadian defence security was ultimately But these efforts have always been when a large number of Canadian are killed “guaranteed” by the Americans. The only secondary and ultimately discretionary to in the Air India terrorist attack in June provision, first established by the Kingston the core requirements of Canadian defence 1985, Canada did not deem it necessary Disposition, was that Canada needed policy. Canada has always been able to pick to develop a sustained anti-terrorist set of to do only enough to ensure that the and choose which exercises to support and policies until the American were attacked Americans did not feel vulnerable to any by what means. on 11 September 2001. action or inaction taken by Canada. As long as this requirement was met, all other Canadian security and defence policy has Where it is possible to find any indication security requirements and actions were also been based on the assumption that it of an independent Canadian security discretionary. It did not so much matter was best served through the procurement rationale, it has been to ensure that what Canada specifically did, so long as and development of military forces that Canadian economic security is protected. the Americans believed its neighbour was could be relatively easily integrated with This again ties back to the Americans. doing enough to prevent a third actor from American forces. This has resulted in a Ensure that the United States is satisfied being able to directly threaten the United long-term procurement history that has with Canadian defence efforts, and its States from Canadian territory. normally seen Canadian Armed Forces economic prosperity will continue through buying or building military equipment good relations with the Americans. In With the defeat of the Axis powers and rise that is combat capable and generally in those periods when the Americans

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Canadian and US soldiers during the field training portion of the Sabre Strike exercise in the Baltics on 16 June 2014. (Image credit: Staff Sgt. Brett Miller, US Army National Guard.) become concerned about the perceived non-state actors. While the US remains the Americans have deemed it necessary inadequacy of Canadian defence response, officially committed to both NORAD to improve the security of this border, it is not worries about the American and NATO as well as the maintenance one unintended consequence has been perceived threat that drives Canadian of its nuclear deterrent, it has become a further division of the two countries decision-makers but rather a concern increasingly focused on meeting the threat beyond geography. that the Americans could take action that posed by international terrorists groups would threaten the country’s economic and the states that support them. Since the attacks, a series of presidents prosperity. have entered office who do not appear to The 9/11 terrorist attacks altered believe as strongly as their predecessors in Ultimately, this 60-year old relationship substantially American understandings of the special relationship between Canada has allowed the Americans to feel secure national security. Some senior American and the United States. Both the Bush Jr. in North America, while ensuring that decision-makers such as Hillary Clinton and Obama administrations have not Canada is protected and can focus on its originally believed that the terrorists expressed the same appreciation of Canada own economic security. However, there had used Canada as an entry point into as has been the case in the past, and both are now clear indications that this core United States. While Clinton and other administrations have also ceased engaging relationship is entering a transformational American leaders came to recognize that in many of the ceremonial actions that period. Elements of the core Canadian- this was not the case, the attacks led to a reflect this friendship. The first foreign visits American security relationship are now major transformation of the Canadian- of these leaders have not been to Canada, undergoing a shift. This may be one of the American border. New security steps taken as was the tradition. Of course, this may periodical alterations that have occurred by the Americans drove home the fact that, just be specific to the two individuals who in the past, or it may be the beginning of a while the two North American partners have held office in this time. But it could much more fundamental shift. maintain a very close relationship, Canada indicate a shift in the overall American is a foreign country. Throughout the Cold appreciation of the relationship. The end of the Cold War combined with War, the ease of mobility across the border the development of the new threat of had always been seen as a point of pride At the same time, the attacks of 9/11 have international terrorism has resulted in for Canada. Proclaimed as the world’s also had an important impact on the a number of changes to the Canada-US longest undefended border, it had been relationship between Canada and NATO. security relationship. The American focus seen as evidence of the special relationship Following the attacks, the Paul Martin shifted from state-based threats to that of that existed between the two countries. As government invoked Article 5 of NATO’s

40 ON TRACK AUTUMN 2015 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné

Charter to approve the deployment of pillars. Traditionally Canadian officials Washington’s perspective. It may be military force to Afghanistan. This was were able to rely on NATO as a means that the current administration is more to assist the Americans in their efforts to of demonstrating their commitment focused on the environmental impact of a destroy the terrorists based within that to collective security to the Americans. continued reliance on oil. It could also be country and those who supported them. Given that the alliance faces significant that the US feels less dependent on Canada The Canadian effort was substantial and challenges today, the question remains as as before, given the development of new long-term. Canada initially deployed to whether Canadian officials will be able sources of American production through much of its navy to support the American to continue with this approach. shale oil in Texas and North Dakota. On efforts to destroy the Taliban and al-Qaeda, the other hand given the chronic drought followed by a significant commitment of The Canada-US relationship in NORAD conditions now plaguing much of the air and land assets – and ultimately the has also begun to transform. The increased southwest United States, a question that Canadian Armed Forces paid a heavy price Russian bomber patrols in the Arctic should be asked – will the demand for fresh in blood and treasure. has seemingly re-energized the need to water replace the American dependence modernize NORAD’s capabilities. This on Canadian oil? Of course the difficulty Traditionally, Canadian decision makers means updating the various missile and for Canada is that unlike with the case of engaged in NATO operations in part to aircraft detection systems. It will also oil, there is no agreement within Canadian gain a “seat at the table.” In a case of the mean Canada will have to update its society as to whether or not its fresh water Afghan mission, Canada was clearly increasingly aging fighter aircraft fleet. should be placed on sale? This alone raises engaged at a level that entitled it a “seat at With the political uncertainty surrounding the question as to what an increasingly the table” and beyond. The question that the Canadian efforts to acquire the F-35 as water deprived United States may do, if arose – one that has not yet been publicly a replacement, it is unclear how this will Canada ultimately decided against selling answered – is what did this actually mean? proceed. Furthermore, any modernization water. What were the benefits of being such an effort will be very expensive in addition important actor in this war? It is entirely to the acquisition of new fighters. All So what does this all mean? At a minimum, possible that Canadian military and these factors will require important it suggests that the special relationship political leaders, after all of these years of considerations and actions on the part of between Canada and the United States – wanting a larger voice in NATO’s councils, Canada, and will be politically difficult. which has provided for the foundation of may have discovered that it was not all But, in the absence of such Canadian Canadian security since at least the Second that we had assumed it to be. Of course, action, it may be possible that the United World War – is undergoing changes. There it is also entirely possible that there have States will become concerned regarding is not yet enough evidence to suggest a been important undisclosed benefits, and the Canadian commitment to the shared fundamental recasting of the relationship, Canadian decision-makers were therefore defence of North America. but Canadian leaders need to ensure that satisfied with the result. they do not simply assume all is proceeding Finally, one can also discern a shift in as normal. This relationship is central to But two other factors must also be American perceptions of Canada’s role Canadian international and economic considered. First, there have been in the economic security of the United security. If the Americans are not as suggestions that Canada was dissatisfied States. Nowhere is this clearer than in the convinced this relationship is something with the overall commitment of some supply of oil. Canada has been one of the “special,” as did their predecessors, then NATO partners in this conflict. While United States largest suppliers of energy. Canada will face an increasingly difficult never officially stated, there are indications American reaction to Pierre Trudeau’s challenge ahead.  that Canadian officials did not believe National Energy Program became one all the NATO partners were properly of the most important factors that led to Dr. Rob Huebert is an associate professor engaged in assisting the Americans who the free trade negotiations. In return for in the Department of Political Science at were attacked. Second, the economic crisis the elimination of rising American tariffs the University of Calgary. He is also a senior that exploded in 2008 has meant that the on Canadian goods, Canada agreed to research fellow at the Centre for Military Europeans focus on NATO is disjointed. a common energy market for North and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary; The lack of European attention has been America. While more attention was a research fellow with Canadian Global exasperated by their divided response to placed on suppliers such as Saudi Arabia Affairs Institute; and board member of Polar increased Russian assertiveness policies or Venezuela, Canada became one of the Knowledge Canada. His area of research and in particular the Russian intervention American largest suppliers of oil in the interests include: international relations, into the Ukraine. All of this has a 1990s. Judging from actions such as the strategic studies, the Law of the Sea, maritime significant impact on the alliance and will US reluctance to commit to major pipeline affairs, Canadian foreign and defence policy, increasingly complicate Canada’s efforts projects, this special economic relationship and circumpolar relations. to keep NATO as one of its core defence is increasingly now under question from

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THREE QUESTIONS: THE BASIS OF A NEW DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW

by Brigadier-General Dr. James Cox (Ret'd)

here have been considerable geo- Accordingly, this article identifies Tpolitical/strategic, technological, and three fundamental questions that global economic changes since Canada’s should form a basis for a thorough and last real defence policy statement in 2005.1 comprehensive defence policy review, Another defence policy review is therefore before government moves on to long overdue. The next government develop a new national defence policy. should waste no time getting on with Will we fight? Why will we fight? How it, but rather than immediately diving will we fight? into the same old issues of personnel strengths, new aircraft, promised ships, These three fundamental questions and more Arctic exercises, the next are examined in sections that follow. defence policy review should feature up- Time and space prohibit full answers, front, in-depth thinking about the basic so the focus falls on some of the larger nature of the Canadian national defence complex issues involved in pursuing enterprise. full responses. In the end, it seems each question might produce different Disappointingly, Prime Minister answers, depending on whether each Stephen Harper’s government is the only is examined in context of defending Canadian government since the Second Canada, defending North America World War to not publish an explicit in concert with the United States, or national defence policy. Many will contributing to the wider global peace National defence policy must further shout, hold on a minute! What about the and security environment. provide clear and defined reference to Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS)? our national values and national interests, Is that not the government’s expression The Basis of a True Defence Policy being sure to differentiate between the of national defence policy? In a word: two. A value represents an enduring and no. The CFDS has been inadequate and The essence of a true defence policy just good that appeals to all Canadians, unaffordable since it was published in lies in its conceptualization of Canada’s something that is worth fighting and 2008. It fails to address all components ultimate capability to defend our country, dying for. Government has been relatively of the overall national defence enterprise, preserve our liberal democratic way of consistent in identifying freedom, offers no substantive political objectives, life, and protect our state institutions democracy, rule of law and human rights and ignores any sense of prevailing from external threats. It should highlight as Canada’s national values and, to be fair, against adversaries in the post-modern and outline our determination to exploit these seem eminently sensible. security environment. The CFDS aspires the integrated and coordinated energy only to be “a detailed roadmap for the of all elements and instruments of state Interests also have intrinsic worth. They modernization of the Canadian Forces,” power, up to and including the use of are more tangible derivatives of values. in the words of the prime minister at the maximum violent force as a last resort. For instance, if Canadians value freedom, beginning of the document.2 A new, full Such a declaration should not only be one of the derived interests would be the defence policy review should first address aspirational, but should also provide defence of our political independence, truly foundational policy issues that go enduring inspiration to all Canadians. further supported by a prosperous well beyond mere procurement. economy, another national interest. The

42 ON TRACK AUTUMN 2015 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné promotion and defence of our national In thinking about possible cataclysmic Mexico?) to defend Canadian territory? interests are also worth great sacrifice in circumstances in which Canada might Beyond North America, Canadian blood and national treasure. find itself, Douglas Bland’s framework of inclination to fight seems to wane when two defence imperatives and one strategic considering our one strategic choice – To set the foundation for eventual choice is helpful.3 Bland’s first defence contributing to international peace and government consideration of values, imperative – the defence of Canada – security. How might our will to fight interests, and political objectives, three leads one to expect Canadians would in these circumstances be expressed as fundamental questions should first be fight if the country’s very existence a principle of action within national explored in any defence policy review: was threatened. But do all Canadian defence policy? Consider some recent citizens and their government see the history, in which rhetoric outpaced • Will we fight? ultimate defence of Canada as their action. • Why will we fight? collective responsibility? Are all, or • How will we fight? enough, of our multicultural diaspora During a March 2006 visit to Canadian sufficiently loyal and committed to troops at Kandahar Airfield, the Prime Complete responses to these simple Canada to fight if needed? Will we Minister was reported as saying, “You but still difficult questions require deep fight for, or with, all our allies or only can’t lead from the bleachers. I want thought, honest introspection, and the with close allies? Will the diaspora vote Canada to be a leader…. There will be courage to see our society as it really is. count affect the government’s decision some who want to cut and run, but Full and intelligent answers will provide to fight? Any defence policy review cutting and running is not my way and the basis for a new defence policy. faces a sophisticated challenge in it’s not the Canadian way.”4 However, in deriving a fundamental principle that early 2008, the government appointed Will We Fight? might motivate all Canadians to fight the Independent Panel on Canada’s in our own defence. As thinking moves Future Role in Afghanistan, led by former Perhaps the most fundamental question away from clearly fighting at home for Liberal Deputy Prime Minister John to be considered is: Will we fight? History ourselves to fighting elsewhere or for Manley, concluded that Canada should says we will … sometimes. It is unlikely, others, our motivations become more withdraw its troops from Afghanistan if anytime soon, that Canada will face the complicated. additional troops and more equipment, degree of existential danger endured particularly troop carrying helicopters, by Russia in the Second World War, Why Will We Fight? were not provided.5 The report also or by Israel in 1948, 1967, and 1973. encouraged a general winding down of Nonetheless, it must be asked whether If a defence policy review recognizes Canadian combat activity in favour of a Canadians and their government are Canadians will fight in their own re-orientation to a training role, which determined and prepared to fight for defence, the next large issue to be tackled eventually occurred in 2011. Neither their national existence, should it become is defining the conceptual argument the government nor the Manley panel necessary. for why we might fight abroad. Bland’s showed any political will to prevail framework is of some assistance here too, in the fight against the Taliban, even Some will think that such a discussion because the second defence imperative – though government rhetoric persistently is unnecessary, if not misguided. “Of defending North America in cooperation focused on the direct national security course we will fight if we need to, but we with the US – suggests we would threat posed by terrorists in Afghanistan; don’t have to talk about it,” they might also fight an existential threat to the highlighting the importance of helping say. However, despite history, it is not continent. Do we really see it as our role to develop a strong and democratic categorically established that Canadians to fight equally hard in all continental Afghanistan that would never again will fight in all circumstances. We have locales, or do we fight just hard enough become a terrorist haven. never faced an existential catastrophe and/or frequently enough to retain the with our backs to the wall (and the only confidence, support, and protection of Also in 2008, a dramatic global financial possible exception, the War of 1812, can the Americans? Do we help defend the collapse led to massive stimulus programs only in the loosest sense be considered Aleutian Islands as robustly as we might that sent western governments deep a ‘Canadian’ war). Admittedly, and defend Vancouver Island? What about into deficit. Canada’s fiscal surplus was fortunately, such a discussion may be the Polynia Islands? Do we see Mexico as eliminated, the federal deficit ballooned largely hypothetical, at least at present. part of North America, to be defended? to historic proportions, and the But it is necessary that it take place for The Gulf of Mexico? Cuba? Do we see Afghanistan mission suddenly became the purpose of laying down a basic Canada as part of North America in a much more expensive to maintain, at a conceptual marker. way that government should expect, and time the Canadian economy could not accept, reciprocal help from others (e.g., afford it. Canada, along with its NATO

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is there any acceptance outside of DND and the CAF that the national defence enterprise involves more than soldiers and defence bureaucrats?

One should also consider the historical habits of a “Canadian way of war,” so ably described in a book edited by Colonel Bernd Horn.6 General Jonathan Vance has described Canada’s approach to fighting as “contribution warfare.” He describes this approach as follows: “Canada has never taken Two CF-18 Hornets resume their activities over Iraq during in February 2015.. (Image credit: Canadian Forces Combat full responsibility for Camera, DND) running (and therefore the allies, would soon wind down their How Will We Fight? outcomes of) an overseas role in Afghanistan and most Canadian theatre of operation, preferring or being troops would come home by the end of This question demands a more profound relegated instead to a supporting role in 2014. National defence, diplomatic, and discussion than is normally found in providing Canadian blood and treasure development assistance budgets all faced the usual defence debates prevalent to shared strategic objectives.”7 Do we considerable and continuing cuts. It in Canadian academia or media. The now need to do otherwise? seems that leading and doing our bit have essence of this question revolves around a price limit. such fundamental concepts as national How will we fight in concert with allies mobilization; the role of various societal in the future? It might be time to ‘come Canada’s combat mission in Afghanistan components in the defence of Canada clean’ and clarify our premier intention offers a good example of both why Canada at home and abroad; the composition, to remain interoperable with American fought and then why Canada didn’t organization, location, equipping, and forces. Will we act only in concert with fight. Our Afghanistan mission pushed training of the Canadian Armed Forces US forces and admit to not wanting to government to the point of deciding (CAF); and the constitutional, legislated deploy CAF elements under incompetent whether it was in our best interest to fight and customary controls of the CAF (the United Nations military command, on in Afghanistan in order to counter global relationship between government, the missions that do not serve Canadian terrorism, or to not fight abroad in order population, and the profession of arms, interests. Recent history shows our clear to avoid over-burdening the Canadian etc.). preference for acting alongside the US economy. In 2005, we decided in favour and other close allies, such as Australia, of the former. In 2008 we decided in There is general acceptance that modern France, the UK, and the Netherlands. favour of the latter. Why? The salience of defence operations take place in a joint, This inclination becomes even clearer our interests changed. While there were interagency, multinational, and public when turning questions around and certainly partisan political machinations environment (JIMP). Is government asking: Would we have deployed to in play at the time, in the end, our mission structured and run in a manner that Afghanistan if the US had not? Would we in Afghanistan presented more of a threat allows for defence contributions from have bombed Gaddafi if the US had not? to the Canadian economy than it did to departments, other than the Department Would we now be bombing the Islamic the Taliban. We had to (and were able to) of National Defence (DND), to act in a State in Iraq and Syria if the US was not? stop fighting. whole-of-government manner at home Would we be in NATO if the US was not? and abroad? Most departments (e.g., An honest appraisal of the impact of our Once clear on why we fight, a defence Foreign Affairs, Public Safety, Transport alliances on how we will fight will be policy review should move on to Canada) lack any ‘surge’ capability to act critical to the honest formulation of any exploring how we will fight. alongside the CAF abroad in a timely future defence policy. manner. Perhaps more to the point,

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Organization is another consideration modernization might be a small clique 2. Canada, National Defence and the in how we fight. It is time to examine of well-heeled and politically influential Canadian Armed Forces, Canada exactly what comprises the national honourary appointments who insist on First Defence Strategy (Ottawa, 2008), defence intelligence enterprise. Contrary seeing all things through a rear-view p. 3. to popular (and lazy) opinion, it is much mirror. It is time for change and a defence more than the CAF. Do not all other review will find much grist for the mill 3. Douglas Bland, ed., “Defence Policy,” armed elements within Canadian society here. in Canada’s National Defence, Vol. have an ultimate role in contributing 1 (Kingston, Ontario: Queen’s to the defence of Canada when called Conclusion University, School of Policy Studies, upon? Consider that the Royal Canadian 1997), pp. 3-4. Mounted Police has served with the Canada has no real national defence CAF abroad, as have officials from policy today. The CFDS has been 4. "Canada committed to Afghan the Canada Border Services Agency, inadequate and unaffordable since its mission, Harper tells troops," Correctional Service Canada, Canadian inception. The geo-strategic security CBC News, 13 March 2006, http:// Security Intelligence Service, and the environment, the international threat www.cbc.ca/news/world/canada- Communications Security Establishment spectrum, technology, and the global committed-to-afghan-mission- Canada (CSEC), to name just a few. economic framework – all have changed harper-tells-troops-1.573722. CSEC, in fact, is involved in defence significantly since the last real defence operations daily. How about the Canadian review was conducted in 2004-05. This 5. John Manley, , Jake Coast Guard? Do armed agencies at the article has therefore called on the next Epp, Paul Tellier, and Pamela Wallin, provincial, territorial, and municipal government to conduct a new defence Report of the Independent Panel on level have a role in fighting for Canada? policy review, beginning with three Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan Any defence policy review should come fundamental questions. Will we fight? (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works to grips with a modern understanding of Why will we fight? How will we fight? and Government Services, 2008), pp. all players making up the entire defence Using Bland’s framework of two defence 37-38. enterprise. imperatives and one strategic choice, it becomes clear that there are considerable 6. Colonel Bernd Horn, ed., The Another aspect of overall CAF complexities involved in answering these Canadian Way of War: Serving the organization concerns the mixture and basic questions. In pursuing full, frank, National Interest (Toronto: Dundurn proportion Regular and Reserve Forces. and honest answers, a future defence Press, 2006). The National Defence Act also allows for policy review should set a firm and honest raising a Special Force when required. foundation for a new national defence 7. Colonel J.H. Vance, “Tactics without A defence policy review should address policy. If these questions are cast aside, Strategy or Why the Canadian the roles of each component and review future defence policy runs the risk of Forces Do Not Campaign,” in the conceptual relationships among being built on nothing more than shallow The Operational Art: Canadian all three. Are all three needed in their rhetoric, pathological partisanship, and Perspectives, eds. Allan English, present form? What changes are needed worst of all, ignorance.  Daniel Gosselin, Howard Coombs, to produce viable and effective military and Laurence M. Hickey (Kingston: forces in the post-modern period? What Brigadier-General Dr. Jim Cox (Ret'd) is Canadian Defence Academy Press, do we need to fight the “Forever War,” a Vice-President, Academic Affairs with the 2005), pp 271-292. term that is becoming popular among Canadian Military Intelligence Association western academics?8 and a Senior Fellow with the Macdonald- 8. See proceedings of the 2015 LENS Laurier Institute in Ottawa. He now teaches Conference, “Law in the Age of If there is any area that requires a new, Canadian foreign policy at the University the ‘Forever War,’” sponsored by modern, frank, sober, and indeed ‘hard- of Ottawa and Civil-Military Relations at the Duke University Centre on ass’ examination, this would be it. The Carleton University’s Norman Paterson Law, Ethics and National Security, current CAF organization, although School of International Affairs. http://web.law.duke.edu/lens/ ‘transformed’ during the last decade, conferences/2015/program. remains a prisoner of history, trapped Notes in an inefficient structure. The Reserve Force organization is particularly 1. Canada, Canada’s International anachronistic, top-heavy and grossly Policy Statement: A Role of Pride inefficient, and has been for a long time. and Influence in the World – Defence The most obstinate obstacle to true (Ottawa, March 2004).

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TIME FOR A NEW WHITE PAPER?

by Dr. James Fergusson

n the wake of this fall’s election, one a new White Paper will produce anything In both cases, elements of the new policy Imight expect the ‘new’ government of significance, regardless of who wins were translated into reality and remain to begin the process of constructing and the next election. Evaluating the case in-place. However, the bold changes issuing a new Defence White Paper. If for a new White Paper requires an proposed in both White Papers faded into either of the main opposition parties win, examination of the significance of past obscurity or were slowly, but inevitably, tradition indicates that this will occur as a White Papers, the underlying reality eroded and eliminated from within. By means to communicate to the Department of White Papers, and an assessment of the time of the Trudeau government’s of National Defence (DND), the public, change in the defence environment. major re-capitalization programme in allies, and the world at large their ‘new’ the mid-to-late 1970s, alliance priorities defence policy position and priorities. At the basic level, the fundamental had largely re-asserted themselves. The Moreover, the need for a Liberal or NDP objectives of Canadian defence policy unified armed forces became a relatively government to do so stems, in part, from have not changed, nor are they likely ever short-lived blip in history, even though the absence of defence policy within their to change – the defence of Canada, the it has been partly resurrected under the current electoral platforms. At least since defence of North America in cooperation label of ‘jointness,’ albeit with similar 1964, every new government has issued a with the United States, and contributing beneath-the-surface problems that formal White Paper. to international peace and security. While ultimately doomed unification. the specific language in the White Papers Even if the Conservatives are returned surrounding these three objectives vary The 1987 White Paper, reflecting the to power, there is still a possibility that over time, the objectives themselves Mulroney government’s commitment a new Defence White Paper will result. have not. The same can be said about the to restore the Armed Forces, provided The Canadian First Defence Strategy objectives concerning either support to the most detailed list of major new (CFDS), issued in 2008, has become civil authorities or defence investments procurement plans. Alas, this White Paper dated, not least of all as a function of meant to align with broader national was ‘dead’ in two years. A Paper set firmly the current budgetary/procurement economic circumstances and interests. within the Cold War became instantly situation. Promised stable long-term obsolete when the Cold War ended in funding increases have been replaced There have, of course, been significant late 1989. Even before this dramatic by a series of significant budget cuts. differences. In some cases, a White Paper transformation in the international Planned procurements have been pushed as a formal statement of government environment, the 1987 White Paper lay significantly into the future. The question policy approved by cabinet details in tatters with the significant budget of priorities now loom with changes in major shifts in defence policy. The cuts that arose in spring 1989. It must the international defence environment 1971 “Defence in the Seventies” called have been deeply embarrassing for the and emerging new defence technologies for a shift in priority from an alliance government’s departmental and military and capabilities. Moreover, for some driven policy and related investments to officials to repeatedly state in the years time, there have been rumours of a CFDS nationally driven set of priorities. The following that the 1987 White Paper ‘re-set’ in the works. 1964 White Paper, arguably the most remained operative. dramatic of all, set out the objectives of While the case for a new Defence White integration of common requirements The 1994 White Paper (arguably the most Paper appears strong on paper, whether among the military services and the hated of all by the military services, largely it is a truly useful exercise is another unification of the services loosely based because it detailed major budget cuts) in question. Indeed, one should ask whether upon a US Marine Corps model. many ways still guides defence policy. In

46 ON TRACK AUTUMN 2015 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné the context of the uncertainty of the post- On the other hand, it is also important to The general lack of detailed guidance Cold War defence environment, its level recognize that a White Paper is actually is also the product of the paucity of of generality and ambiguity committed constructed within a government knowledge about defence among elected the government to maintain “multi- department, and adopted via cabinet officials. Few elected officials enter office purpose, combat capable forces” without approval by the government. The ‘pen’ with any experience on the defence file, ever defining what this meant; a task left resides with the office of the Assistant and this includes the Prime Minister to the functional experts within National Deputy Minister for Policy in DND. (PM) and Ministers of National Defence Defence. It also provided the government The Paper is drafted on the basis of (MND).2 While the PM and MND do with the flexibility to respond to the new the best information available on the appoint advisors to their respective international security environment. Its government’s defence preferences, staffs, their level of expertise on the lineage, in both regards, remains present although such information is generally details of defence varies greatly. This is in the Martin government’s 2005 Defence limited as evident, for example, in the not the United States, where academic Statement and the 2008 CFDS. low, if not absent, profile of defence defence experts are in great quantity, during federal elections and the lack of and move in and out of government Of course, there are differences between any detailed policy platforms among as administrations change. Indicative, 1994, 2005 and 2008, even though policy the political parties. Policy officials also the Privy Council Office (PCO) in the fundamentals are constant. defence realm is staffed with CFDS, echoing 1987, also DND officials. The National provides a fairly detailed "Canada, as a function of its place as a minor Security Advisor is also a shopping list of military re- military power in the world, will wait to react and civil servant, rather than an capitalization projects, even follow the lead of the United States and its other outside expert at arms length though all of the projects from the bureaucracy. had been in the works before major allies, as it did following the end of the Cold 2008. Having been criticized War. As a result, the capacity for failing to deliver on its " of the political side of the funding commitments, and White Paper equation to pushing some of these projects further examine a wide range of possible sources, provide more detailed guidance is deeply into future, the lesson for the next including speeches to the House and constrained. Moreover, such guidance, as government – as it was for the Chrétien party views expressed in meeting of in 1964, is likely either to be potentially government after 1987 – is surely to avoid the Standing Committee on National unrealistic and problematic relative to detailed commitments. In other words, a Defence. But, in the end, officials are left the bureaucratic side of the equation. In future ‘new’ White Paper is most likely to piece together the likely parameters of other words, too much detailed guidance to reflect 1994 again, rather provide any what will and will not be acceptable to is more likely to be dismissed as naïve, detailed ‘new’ guidance. the government – the ‘best guess.’ This and undermined from within by the alone drives the outcome towards the functional military experts. Despite the This, in turn, raises the repeated concerns, general level. misplaced critiques of those who lament especially within the military, of the lack of the lack of detailed government guidance, government guidance for defence policy.1 The process also entails detailed its absence provides greater flexibility for On one hand, if history is any guide, there consultations with all the internal the internal actors to implement general is no reason to expect that the future stakeholders, the Minister and his/her policy in a realistic manner, time for government will delve more deeply to political staff, as well as the relevant ‘new’ governments to learn about the provide greater guidance. Lessons from the external departments, such as Foreign intricacies and complexity of the defence past indicate that greater guidance is more Affairs, Industry Canada, and Finance. world, and therefore the capacity to likely to be politically problematic in two The objective is to build an internal respond to the unexpected. ways. First, greater guidance creates the and external bureaucratic and political possibility that events beyond government consensus, which provides some Perhaps under these circumstances, control can quickly negate the guidance, assurances that the final Paper will be governments should consider moving as occurred in 1987 and 2008. Ambiguity acceptable to the Prime Minister and towards the American model to either and generality protect a government from Cabinet. issue annual national strategy statements charges of hypocrisy and inconsistency. or adopt the quadrennial review approach. Second, greater guidance, à la 1964, if In effect, the consensus building process Both would provide an opportunity at odds with military preferences and itself also promotes relative generality in for government to present policy interests, are likely to become even more the final White Paper. adjustments as a function of changes in problematic in execution. the international or national defence

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environment. Indeed, this approach American power, the rise of China, and of these changes, and arguments of was briefly adopted in the early 1990s the re-assertion of Russian regional transformation are at best premature. by the Mulroney government, which power portends a transformation of Until this becomes truly self-evident in an issued several annual defence statements. this environment. The post-Cold War environment of uncertainty, no Canadian Unfortunately, the statements provided age of discretionary Western military government is going to undertake major little of new substance, were politically intervention into local and regional defence policy changes. Canada, as a and publically ignored, and required a conflicts driven by humanitarian function of its place as a minor military significant investment of internal DND considerations and the ‘war on terror’ power in the world, will wait to react and resources, for little (if any) gain. It is is coming to an end. Great Power follow the lead of the United States and its highly unlikely that this would change, if competition and rivalries are returning other major allies, as it did following the the government decided to adopt either to dominate the defence and security end of the Cold War. American model. Moreover, whether environment. This, in turn, dictates a annual or quadrennial, the likelihood re-examination of Canadian foreign and Even if, or when this environment that the outcome would produce any defence policy. In addition, the rapid transforms, it is unlikely to have a more clarity on national defence policy pace of technological change relative significant impact on the fundamentals is very low, and simply reflects the low to military capabilities also requires a of defence policy laid down since the end priority attached to defence by Canadians re-examination of defence investment of the Second World War. Despite the and Canadian governments. priorities. Such a re-examination is also transformation occasioned by the end possible because procurement priorities of the Cold War, the fundamentals did Perhaps, the strongest case for a ‘new’ have been pushed into the future due to not change. Canada may have removed Defence White Paper, regardless of who the budgetary situation. its permanently stationed forces from wins the October election, resides in Europe, but its political commitment to the international defence and security However, there is no consensus European defence and security through environment. The relative decline of surrounding the nature and significance NATO has remained in place.

L-R: Public Works Minister Diane Finley, Defence Minister Jason Kenney, and Justice Minister Peter MacKay pose in front of a CH-148 Cyclone helicopter at 12 Wing Shearwater on 19 June 2015 (Image credit: .)

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As for the technology-investment candidate would potentially be the future Joint Parliamentary Committee study. question, it has long been the case that the of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Project, military faces major structural challenges in a manner reminiscent of the Chrétien While meaningful public consultations, in keeping up with technological change. government’s decision to cancel the and the value of a new government Calls to speed-up the procurement EH-101 Shipborne Helicopter project: communicating its Defence Policy process, and develop flexible initiatives to a decision whose ramifications are still through a formal White Paper should be able to insert new technologies as new with us today. Even so, the requirement to not be dismissed out of hand, do not platforms are acquired are longstanding. replace the aging CF-18s would remain, expect any future White Paper to deviate Structural impediments ranging from and while such a decision would extend significantly from its predecessors. The the changing health of the economy, the process, the likelihood that either fundamentals will remain in place, and broader governmental rules and policies a NPD of Liberal government would even if a new government attempts to concerning transparency, accountability, eliminate the capability altogether is deviate significantly, as on occasions in and competitiveness, and the internal extremely low. Once in power, the reality the past, the attempt is likely to fail for process of reconciling competing of the significance of combat-capable external and internal reasons. requirements and priorities are not going forces in the world of international to disappear. Moreover, if one examines politics would take hold. At best, or The only true measure of a government’s the recent National Shipbuilding worst, expect changes at the margins, but defence policy is not to be found in Procurement Strategy (NSPS), which not in the fundamentals. White Papers per se, but in the specific builds directly upon the CFDS and decisions the government makes over largely privileges Canadian industry, it is Of course, one cannot predict exactly time in terms of budgets, investments, highly unlikely that the next government, where a Liberal or NDP government will and commitments largely in reaction to a regardless of its political stripes, will go on the defence file. Part of the answer world beyond Canada’s control.  make any substantive changes. If there lies in terms of where such a government is one thing all the major parties agree might go on the foreign policy file as Dr. James Fergusson is the Director of the upon, it is employing defence investment well, which the Harper government Centre for Defence and Security Studies, dollars to support Canadian economic, has studiously avoided issuing a formal and Professor in the Department of Political industrial, and technological needs. White Paper. Regardless, the answer will Studies at the . He not likely be found in the next White has published numerous articles on strategic This, of course, raises the issue of whether Paper(s). Rather, it will be evident over studies, non-proliferation and arms control, a Liberal or NDP government is likely to time as the next government responds the defence industry, and Canadian foreign make a major shift in Canadian defence to unexpected international events, in and defence policy. policy, and communicate this in a new which pressures emerge internally, and White Paper. The possibility is arguably externally from Canada’s allies, or the Notes greatest with the NDP as function of its international community to commit the past, given its somewhat anti-military/ Canadian Armed Forces. 1. Although the literature is limited, anti-US positions during the Cold War. this criticism of government But the NDP under Thomas Mulcair All of this is not to suggest that a ‘new’ policy is evident in the work of has moved significantly to the policy Defence White Paper, potentially linked Douglas Bland and Robert Hartfiel. centre, and largely shed its hard left-wing, or married to a ‘new’ Foreign Policy White See Douglas Bland, “The Public ideological posture. Even though NDP Paper, is not in the future. Notwithstanding Management of Defence,” in Craig policy entails the complete withdrawal tradition driving a new government to go Stone, ed., The Public Management of Canada’s military commitments to the down this path, with the exception of a re- of Defence in Canada (Toronto: anti-ISIS coalition – the Liberals under elected Conservative government, much Breakout Press. 2009); Robert plan to only withdraw will hinge upon whether the outcome of Michael Hartfiel, “Planning without the air-strike component – this does not the election produces a clear winner, or guidance: Canadian defence amount to any indication that the NDP a minority government whose future is policy and planning, 1993-2004,” would make any significant changes to the likely to be short-lived. Nonetheless, a Canadian Public Administration 53, 3 fundamentals of Canadian defence. clear Liberal or NDP victory, or relatively (September 2010), pp. 323-349. stable tacit coalition, is likely to generate Indeed, there is little recent evidence to the conditions for a ‘new’ Defence White 2. One rare exception was the suggest that either the NDP or Liberals Paper, and the process may well repeat appointment of Gordon O’Connor, would make any significant changes 1994, in which a crafting of the White a retired general, as Harper’s first to those fundamentals. Certainly, one Paper occurred simultaneously with wide- Defence Minister, which created its would expect some changes to occur. One ranging public consultations through a own set of issues.

ON TRACK AUTOMNE 2015 49 Independent and Informed CDA Institute Autonomne et renseigné

BOOK REVIEWS

Unflinching: The Making of a in the chronicle, significant emphasis is weaknesses in the CAF health care Canadian Sniper, by Jody Mitic, placed upon illustrating the environment system, he also points to a greater need Toronto: Simon & Schuster, 2015, and ethos of the military as well as is effects to assist soldiers after they release. When 256 pages, ISBN 978-1-4767-9510-2 on its member, and systemic issues that lie examining Mitic’s departure from the CAF, at the very core of the CAF. Throughout one can discern that he clearly struggled Unflinching: The Making of a Canadian the book Mitic describes the stalwart when reintegrating into civilian life and Sniper, is the profound memoir of former sense of comraderie that is famous to the suffered a jarring loss of identity when soldier Jody Mitic. This powerful account military, in addition to a culture of loyalty, transitioning from military to civilian life. of one man’s personal journey in the perseverance, and dedication. A clear Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), from example of the latter quality was when Although Mitic successfully recovered training, through deployments to his Mitic suggested that he was “married to from his physical injuries, it is evident eventual release, portrays an authentic the army” (p. 136) for the duration of his that he struggled to mentally acclimate and relatable account of life in the military career. to civilian life. Given that Mitic’s story is Canadian military. Although one of sheer willpower and this book touches on an array “Afghanistan, 2007. I was a Master Corporal, part persistence in the face of of serious subjects – including adversity, it is not surprising mental health issues, as well of an elite sniper team sent on a mission to flush out that Mitic chose to channel as the challenges of juggling Taliban in an Afghan village. I had just turned thirty, his efforts towards assisting one’s family and personal wounded veterans by publicly relationships with one’s after three tours of duty overseas. I’d been shot at by advocating on their behalf. It commitment to the military – mortars, eyed the enemy through my scope, survived needs to be emphasized that Mitic’s uplifting and frequently even though Mitic describes through stealth and stamina. I’d been training for humorous anecdotes are sure numerous shortcomings, he to enthral readers from start to war my entire adult life. But nothing prepared me for expresses an overwhelmingly finish. what happened next. positive attitude towards the ” CAF and his time as a soldier. Since childhood, Mitic was -Jody Mitic Ultimately, thanks to dedicated determined to follow in the people like Mitic, many of the footsteps of his uncle by issues identified in Unflinching becoming a member of the Canadian Although Mitic expresses the sense of pertaining to veterans care are being Army. Throughout his wayward youth, honour and duty he felt while serving addressed. Mitic longed for a sense of belonging and in the CAF, he also underscores several chose to dedicate himself to serving a challenges he faced at the institutional Overall I found Unflinching to be an higher purpose. As readers follow Mitic’s level. For instance, due to limited resources engrossing read and I would highly progression in the military, from his he and his fellow snipers were unable to recommend this book to members of basic training to master sniper training, train with proper equipment (e.g., night the military community. That being said, the audience is able to appreciate his vision goggles, p. 163) prior to deployment Mitic takes great efforts to ensure that dedication and discipline. After a fateful and, resultantly, were initially unready this book could (and should) be read by explosion in Afghanistan, Mitic lost both to use the equipment in a theatre of war. the general public and even adds a rather of his legs below the knees. This single In addition, he dedicates a substantial useful (and colourful) glossary at the back moment transformed Mitic’s life and portion of chapter 10 to describe the of the book to explain military jargon and forced him to face a military health care effects of not having the proper weapons, slang in laymen terms. system that was unprepared for gravely like a handgun, available when acting as a wounded soldiers. Moreover, it catapulted Driver in Kabul, Afghanistan. Mitic’s memoir is genuine and heartfelt Mitic down a path that he was not yet which enables the reader to become ready to contemplate; his release from the Related to his portrayal of an ill-equipped completely engrossed in his stories. CAF. CAF were the challenges Mitic faced after Although sometimes memoirs are edited he sustained his injuries in Afghanistan. by their authors, so as to only portray the Of the main themes that are discussed Not only does he aptly describe some good side of its subject, Mitic does not

50 ON TRACK AUTUMN 2015 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné do this and portrays a clear reflection of Protections Force (UNPROFOR), the financial costs of burden sharing. In himself – both the good and the bad. His NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) addition, the author includes what he dubs anecdotes encourage its military readers and Stabilization Force (SFOR) for Bosnia- ‘hard civilian indicators’, which include to reminisce on their own war stories and Herzegovina, and lastly in Kosovo under foreign aid and assistance and NATO early days in military, like being yelled Operation Allied Force and the Kosovo common budgets. at when getting off the bus with all your Force (KFOR). kit and coursemates for the first time on Again, all seems to be coming up roses. training, that ‘pit of the stomach’ feeling The important difference Zyla brings to Canada is shown as the third highest before going on course, and initially the table is the introduction of relative (relative terms) personnel contributor wondering why you even joined in the (as opposed to absolute) force indicators, to peace operations of the second-tier first place only to later ‘embrace the suck.’ which considers contributions by states powers and the highest contributor in in relation to their total national force all other soft military power categories After readingUnflinching , the reader is strength. In other words, rather than among such states. What is equally compelled to reflect on the thousands just looking at the absolute number of impressive, is that when examining the of untold stories of the countless brave forces sent on these missions, emphasis is hard civilian factors, Canada punched individuals who have served our nation placed on how that number is calculated at a ‘major power’ level, contributing selflessly. For Jody Mitic and many others, as a percentage of a country’s total forces 4.7 percent of foreign assistance and 5.2 Remembrance Day does not occur just available. percent of NATO’s common budgets. And once a year, it is a daily affair.  with that, the author closes what I believe By using this relative force index, a new is a convincing case. Lindsay Coombs, Analyst, CDA Institute perspective quickly emerges. Canada jumps from the 9th ranked contributor by However, Zyla’s case for how national absolute force numbers to the 5th ranked preferences influenced behaviour is Sharing the Burden? NATO and Its contributor to IFOR; from 7th to 3rd in somewhat less sound. After wading Second Tier-Powers, by Benjamin contributions to SFOR, and from 6th to through Chapter 5’s very specific and Zyla, Toronto: University of Toronto 4th in contributions to KFOR. In each detailed empirical evidence, Chapter 6 Press, 2014, 344 pages, ISBN 978-1- case, the empirical evidence presented offers much greater generality – which 4426-1559-5 suggests that Canada not only shared a detracts from the argument. The author higher percentage of the collective burden suggests that the fall of the Berlin Wall, In Sharing the Burden? NATO and its than the NATO average, but more often breakup of the Warsaw Pact, and the Second-Tier Powers, author Benjamin Zyla than not ranked higher than comparable economic and political struggles of CEE sets out his objectives in a clear and up second-tier powers. The evidence also paved the way for a liberal peace paradigm front manner, which as a reader I certainly supports the notion that second-tier and a spreading of democratic values and appreciate. First, it is to produce empirical powers, in general, shouldered a larger systems to Central and Eastern Europe. evidence to demonstrate that second-tier burden than major powers when their For Canada, he suggests, it was an obvious powers, specifically Canada, were not the efforts were examined with the relative decision to engage politically and foster ‘Atlantic free riders’ of the 1990s, as many force index. relations, specifically economic ones, have so accused. Second, to show how which would be beneficial to a country the national preferences of these powers The second major part of this examination in recession. He continues, “Canada’s drove their motivations, behaviour, and is a look at the less-traditional soft power preferences were defined as ‘the survival contributions to NATO burden-sharing. contributions by NATO members, which of the nation state as a distinct entity; the While the work has left me fully convinced became increasingly important as NATO maintenance of democracy and freedom; of the first, I am less so of the second. moved away from an existence as a economic prosperity; and the physical collective defence force to a more flexible, safety of Canadians’” (p. 164). I first became intrigued with the thesis political entity focused on peacekeeping, in Chapters 4 and 5, where traditional nation-building, and Central and Eastern However, it seems overly simplistic to hard power indicators are unexpectedly European (CEE) security. The soft military say that Canada, as well as other NATO turned on their head. There, we examine indicators used by Zyla include the members, practiced enlargement and Canada’s military contribution to the contributing force to UN Peacekeeping engagement simply because a secure and UN mission of the first Gulf War, as well Personnel; financial contributions to prosperous East made sense for the West, as its involvement in various missions UN Peacekeeping Missions; defence and an insecure East was a threat. It would in the former Yugoslavia, including expenditures allocated to modernization have been preferential to provide more the European Community Monitoring and infrastructure; contributions to Rapid specific details, specifically regarding Mission (ECMM), the United Nations Reaction Forces; and finally, Ottawa’s the Canadian context at home. There are

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tidbits here and there that allude to the on the Soviet’s war in Afghanistan gives rarer” (p. 136) – a reference to the US war fiscal restraint, sovereignty issues, and credit where it is due: Pakistan. The war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban after the political instability of elections in that ended four decades of Cold War had 9/11. However, he does exonerate the CIA the 1990s, but nowhere are such issues been a rare conflict in which the United on the suggestion that it helped in creating addressed full on. States found itself standing at the sidelines, the phenomena of al-Qaeda and global letting Pakistan play a central role in what jihad, calling that claim “bad history” (p. My only other complaint, is that the thesis is remembered as ‘Afghan jihad.’ 151). and objectives of the book truly lie solely in Chapters 5-7. The preceding chapters Since it had been the Pakistan’s Inter- The book begins with discussing include a wealth of information on Services Intelligence (ISI) that planned, Afghanistan’s contemporary history, political theory and the changing ‘world trained, supported, and executed the jihad laying-down the Afghan political order’ following the Cold War, and read by employing native Afghans – who took landscape before the Soviet invasion. like a university text book for a political the war as their national obligation – and Peering into the thinking of Soviet science class. While it is important to Muslims fighters from across the Islamic leadership after the two Afghan coups, by establish liberal IR theory as the political world, the book could better be titled Muhammad Daud in July 1973 and Saur framework for the book, (as this becomes as, ‘What Pakistan Won.’ Riedel admits Revolution by Nur Mohammad Taraki important in understanding how states that “Afghan war was Zia’s war,” (p. xii) in April 1978, Riedel finds the 40th Red are assumed to think and act) as well referring to Pakistan’s President General Army pulling-off a surprise invasion that as to provide context for the changing Zia-ul-Haq. But, as ISI’s former director- took the US and CIA completely off-guard. environment, neither warrant the large general, Lieutenant-General Hameed amount of text that has been dedicated to Gul (Ret’d) proudly claimed, “It takes an Pakistan’s compulsion in becoming a it. Afghanistan to make an ISI.” frontline state is tied to its historical enmity with respective Afghan governments, as In the end, however, the reader is left quite America’s low-key role had obviously been none have recognized the Durand Line convinced that Canada, along with other due to geopolitical considerations. Any (border) between the two countries, with second-tier powers, have been wrongly direct involvement would not only have Kabul preferring instead to stoke the accused for shirking NATO burden- expanded the war to other international ‘Pashtunistan’ issue by claiming Pakistan’s sharing responsibilities in the 1990s, and theatres, but also brought US forces and Pashtun and Baluch areas. Soviet advance often shouldered more than their fair CIA in direct confrontation against Soviet towards the Arabian Sea was another share. It would be of extreme interest Union’s 40th Red Army and KGB – quite key concern for Pakistan (p. 26), besides and use to continue Zyla’s methodology similar to the Vietnam War. Engaging worries of hostile encirclement. As and compare contributions by Canada Pakistan in a decision-making process General Zia “feared a two-front war in to NATO in the 2000s and today, as the was the only option, as it provided the which Soviet Union and India dismantled looming elections have again brought sole access to the landlocked Afghanistan Pakistan” (p. 118), Pakistan’s air force about pointing fingers that Canada did not while maintaining plausible deniability (p. engaged in a number of dogfights during pull its weight.  146). Soviet cross-border incursions.

Meaghan Hobman, Administration and The book’s nine chapters examine the The author documents how the Soviets, Public Relations Manager, CDA Institute roles of the Afghan communists, the in collaboration with Afghan intelligence, Soviets, Afghan Mujahedeen, Pakistan, alongside India undertook covert the Saudis, successive US Presidents, and offensives inside Pakistan by supporting What We Won: America’s Secret War the CIA. Riedel deserves respect in how he terrorist organization Al-Zulfiqar and in Afghanistan 1979-89, by Bruce forthrightly and courageously points out Baluch separatists (p. 37). Quoting Indian Reidal, Brookings Institution Press, some of the CIA’s failures, despite being a agents for carrying-out Ojhri Camp 2014, 189 pages, ISBN: 978-0-8157- former CIA employee himself. He notes, (ammunition depot) blasts in Pakistan in 2584-8 for instance, that “CIA was risk averse” April 1988 (p. 70), Riedel singles-out India (p. 144), and unlike ISI and Britain’s MI6 for “not condemning” the Soviet invasion History chronicled by any vanquisher did not send its assets inside Afghanistan. in the UN General Assembly vote (p. 104). tends to be twisted in its favour. However, Acknowledging the CIA was effectively Highlighting the complexities of the drawing the theme from a cable sent by blind to “militant Sunni Islam” (p. 152), Afghan ethnicities, Riedel records the the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Riedel observes, “Rarely does a country infighting among seven Mujahedeen station chief in Islamabad in 1989, Bruce fight the same war in one generation; to groups and ISI’s preference for Pashtuns Riedel’s latest book titled What We Won fight it twice from opposite sides is even (pp. 42-43), which led to MI6’s decision to

52 ON TRACK AUTUMN 2015 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné train and equip Tajik forces under Ahmed Soviets” (p. 103). President Reagan, on Soviet withdrawal (pp. 125-126). Further, Shah Masoud. The author appreciates the other hand, changed the war objective the NIE could not see the implications the wisdom of General Akhtar Abdul into winning, and pushing the Soviets of Soviet defeat for the global Islamic Rehman, then director-general ISI, in from Afghanistan (p. 120). Finally, Riedel movement (p. 152). An earlier NIE in transforming the Mujhaedeen groups recognizes the roles of Congressman 1987 did not anticipate the wholesale as political parties for legitimacy and Charlie Wilson and Pakistan’s Honorary collapse of the USSR either (pp. 154-155). international recognition (p. 60). Riedel Consul in Houston, Joanne Herring, in Riedel attributes Soviet defeat on (i) being acknowledges the general’s valour, which funds appropriations and the availability an aggressor, leading to its international took him to construct a fully-equipped of Stinger missiles in 1986, which acted isolation; (ii) using conventional army, forward base-camp and training facility as a game-changer in the war resulting in untrained in guerrilla warfare; (iii) lack in Khost – called the “Zhawar Base” – and Soviet defeat. of adequate troops and resources; (iv) not defend it tooth-and-nail in three Soviet deploying forces at Pak-Afghan border; assaults (p. 53). However, criticizing the reversal of US (v) recklessly killing close to a million policy – ‘as failure’ – under President Afghans, losing hearts and minds; and (vi) General Zia, who was found by President George Bush (p. 129), the author notes a frequently changed and uncommitted Carter as “calm, very courageous and the downturn in US-Pakistan relations on leadership (p. 154). intelligent” (p. 96), shrewdly crafted his nuclear issue after “United States turned its war-strategy “keeping the pot boiling back on Afghanistan for the next decade” – Finally, in lessons learned, Riedel but not boil over” (p. 114). Yet he took clearly a strategic “mistake as Afghanistan establishes how secret/covert wars can greater risks, allowing his ISI to carry out was left to the mercy of warlords” (p. 132). produce “unintended consequences” (p. provocative cross-border raids – called As Pakistan felt betrayed for being used 143) – a lesson for Afghanistan, which has the “Bear-Baiting Operations” – reaching and later discarded after the war, Riedel always allowed its soil to be used for proxy up to the Soviet Central Asia across Amu highlights the similarity in the defeat of wars, thereby destabilizing itself and the Darya River in 1984 (pp. 65, 118). two superpowers in Afghanistan due to region. “the role played by Pakistan” – observing The book discusses Saudi financing, by that Washington had “lost Islamabad” (p. While the history of the world is written which Soviet weapons were provided to 136). in blood, it is also inked in flawed outlook the Mujahedeen in the first five years for and failed policies.  “plausible deniability” (p.103). Crediting Carrying out the war’s post-mortem, President Carter as “one of America’s most Riedel notes the flawed National Adnan Qaiser, defence and political successful presidential spymasters,” Riedel Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in March analyst ([email protected]) notes his strategy “to make the invasion 1988, which had erroneously predicted the as politically costly as possible for the fall of Najibullah’s government after the ON TRACK ADVERTIZING RATES

ON TRACK AUTOMNE 2015 53 CDA L'Institut Institute de la CAD

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