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This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree (e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following terms and conditions of use: • This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. • A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge. • This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author. • The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author. • When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. The Rough Ground of Character: A Philosophical Investigation Into Character Development, Examining a Wilderness Expedition Case Study Through a Virtue Ethical Lens V. Paul Stonehouse Doctor of Philosophy The University of Edinburgh 2011 Dedication For Amanda It is with you that I have come closest to having a teleia philia (VIII 3§6). Thank you for sharing your vision of eudaimonia with me, and bringing such depth and meaning to our moral journey, both on and off the trail. For Findley Your coming into existence halfway through this project brought a purpose and reality to what might have remained an academic exercise. For Plato’s warning, that one’s character is greatly influenced by one’s upbringing (II 3§2), has been a constant thought since your birth. Know that as your father, I have striven, however fallibly, to model and instill within you the many virtues examined within this thesis. ii Declaration I have composed this thesis, and the work therein is my own. No part of this thesis has been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification. Signed: Date: 9 August 2011 Publications Part of the research presented in this PhD thesis has been published in the following: Beames, S., & Stonehouse, P. (2007). Individual liberty and social order on expeditions. Horizons, 40, 22-24. Stonehouse, P. (2007). Recording in the wilds: A reflection on research-technology needs on an expedition. Australian Journal of Outdoor Education, 11(1), 47-49. Stonehouse, P. (2009). Virtue ethics and expeditions. In S. Beames (Ed.), Understanding Educational Expeditions (pp. 17-23). Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. Stonehouse, P. (2011). The rough ground of character: A philosophical investigation into character development on a wilderness expedition through a virtue ethical lens [Presentation abstract]. Journal of Outdoor Recreation, Education, and Leadership, 3(2), 108-111. Stonehouse, P., Allison, P., & Carr, D. (2011). Aristotle, Plato, and Socrates: Ancient Greek perspectives on experiential learning. In T. E. Smith, & C. Knapp (Eds.), Sourcebook of experiential education: Key thinkers and their contributions (pp. 18-25). New York: Routledge. iii List of Contents Declaration.................................................................................................................iii! List of Figures............................................................................................................. x! Abstract...................................................................................................................... xi! Preface......................................................................................................................xiii! Justification.....................................................................................................................................xiii! Thesis at a Glance............................................................................................................................ xv! Acknowledgments .......................................................................................................................... xix! Abbreviations and Ancient Citation Conventions ..............................................xxii! Chapter 1. Outdoor Adventure Education and Character.................................... 1! 1.1 Framing the Thesis Within the Discipline of Outdoor Education............................................... 1! 1.1.1 Outdoor Adventure Education ............................................................................................ 1! 1.1.2 Outdoor Adventure Education Literature Review .............................................................. 5! 1.2 The Assumption That OAE Develops Character ........................................................................ 6! 1.2.1 Antecedents to the Assumption of Character Development Within OAE Programmes .... 6! 1.2.1.1 The Classical Greeks.................................................................................................. 6! 1.2.1.2 Sport ........................................................................................................................... 8! 1.2.1.3 The Camping Movement............................................................................................ 9! 1.2.1.4 The Scouting Movement.......................................................................................... 11! 1.2.1.5 Expeditions As Morals Means ................................................................................. 13! 1.2.2 OAE As a Moral Equivalent of War................................................................................. 17! 1.2.2.1 War and Character.................................................................................................... 17! 1.2.2.2 The Essay: A Moral Equivalent of War................................................................... 19! 1.2.2.3 OAE As a Moral Equivalent to War: Hahn and Outward Bound ............................ 20! 1.2.2.4 OAE’s Connotations of War .................................................................................... 23! 1.2.3 The Continuing Connection Between Character Development and OAE........................ 24! 1.3 Character and OAE: Voices of Dissent..................................................................................... 28! 1.3.1 Hahn and the Problem of Follow-up................................................................................. 30! 1.3.2 Martial Character’s Incompatibility With OAE ............................................................... 31! 1.3.2.1 Marshalling the Martial Out of OAE ....................................................................... 32! 1.3.2.2 War, the Immoral Equivalent of Adventure............................................................. 33! 1.3.3 “Character,” a Term of Disaffection................................................................................. 35! 1.3.4 Researching Character ...................................................................................................... 37! 1.3.4.1 Roberts et al. and the Character Industry ................................................................. 37! 1.3.4.2 Brookes and the Neo-Hahnian Critique ................................................................... 37! 1.3.5 Philosophical Problems With Character ........................................................................... 40! 1.4 A Virtue Ethical Perspective on Character Within OAE .......................................................... 42! 1.4.1 A Call for Philosophical Inquiry Within OAE ................................................................. 42! 1.4.2 Moving Forward by Looking Back: Hahn’s Moral Vision .............................................. 43! 1.4.3 A Virtue Ethical View of Character ................................................................................. 47! 1.4.4 A Vector for This Thesis .................................................................................................. 47! 1.4.4.1 A Softer-side of Character ....................................................................................... 47! 1.4.4.2 A Virtue Ethical Perspective on a Wilderness Expedition....................................... 48! Chapter 2. The Virtue of Character....................................................................... 51! iv 2.1 Framing the Problem ................................................................................................................. 52! 2.1.1 No View From Nowhere................................................................................................... 52! 2.1.2 The Three Traditions ........................................................................................................ 52! 2.1.2.1 Deontological Ethics ................................................................................................ 53! 2.1.2.2 Utilitarian Ethics ...................................................................................................... 53! 2.1.2.3 Virtue Ethics............................................................................................................. 54! 2.2 Aristotelian Virtue Ethics: An Introduction .............................................................................. 57! 2.2.1 The Life of Aristotle ......................................................................................................... 57! 2.2.2 Ethical Texts ..................................................................................................................... 58! 2.2.3 The Basic Argument of the Ethics...................................................................................
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