Nordic Security: Moving Towards NATO?

CSS Analyses in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich N0. 189, April 2016, Editor: Christian Nünlist

Nordic Security: Moving towards NATO? Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine has also been a wake-up call for the Nordic countries of Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Denmark. Despite a common sense of Nordic identity, their security and defense policies have differed. Since 2014, the renewed Russian threat in their vicinity has triggered closer cooperation. Their defense policies are currently being revised, but the main focal point is NATO rather than the notion of a Nordic security community.

By Jannicke Fiskvik

Events in Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 challenge the post-Cold War geopolitical situation in Europe. This has also strongly affected the Nordic region. For the first time since World War II, a state that shares borders with Finland and Norway has seized a part of a neighboring country by military means. Accordingly, Nordic governments are rethinking their own security strategy. Although Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Denmark seek good long-term relations with Russia, they were all decisive in dem- onstrating support for Ukraine and con- demning Russian military aggression. A non-response would have signaled a tacit acceptance of Russia’s violation of international law.

The Nordic states are all committed to A Norwegian submarine in a fjord near Bergen during NATO’s Submarine Warfare Exercise maintaining their contribution to interna- “Dynamic Mongoose 14”. NATO tional security and international law. They also share similarities of culture, climate, demography, historical heritage, and a strong sense of Nordic community. How- been somewhat informal and diffuse in na- dramatically intensified their relations with ever, despite the many similarities and geo- ture. Has Russian aggression changed the NATO since 2014. They play a crucial role graphical proximity, the countries have dif- conditions for Nordic defense cooperation? in NATO’s defense planning for a Crimea- fered in their security and defense policy type scenario in the Baltic Sea region, as and outlook. Moreover, two of them are The formal security policy and the security the strategic importance of Northern Eu- EU members (Sweden, Finland), one is policy situation in the Nordic countries has rope has grown. only a member of NATO (Norway), and been much the same as in 1949. Practical one is a member of both NATO and EU security policy, however, has changed sig- Nordic Defense Cooperation (Denmark). The different alignments have nificantly in all four states. Finland and During the Cold War, defense cooperation made Nordic defense cooperation chal- Sweden have both drawn considerably between the Nordic countries was highly lenging – a cooperation that has always nearer to the North Atlantic alliance, and constrained. Negotiations on a Scandinavi-

an defense union in 1948 – 9 failed to bridge forces of all four countries have undergone tions among the Finnish public; those in national interests, and Nordic governments major reforms, although at different times favor of joining NATO continue to argue opted for different security policy align- and at different speed. that Finnish capabilities are insufficient, ments. Denmark and Norway joined and that Russia may already consider Fin- NATO in 1949 as founding members, In the wake of the Russian-Georgian War land a de-facto NATO member. Oppo- while Finland and Sweden remained una- of 2008, the Nordic countries looked ever nents are still concerned that NATO mem- ligned. A Nordic Council was established more askance to their large neighbor in the bership will cause Finland to be designated in 1952, but was hampered by an informal east. The Finns were particular wary of ten- a potential enemy of Russia, and provoke ban on discussions of foreign policy and sions between the Baltic States and Russia, retaliation from Moscow. As part of the was restricted to non-security related coop- while the Norwegians kept their eyes on current debate and in connection with the eration. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the High North. Still, the events of 2008 forthcoming whitepaper on security policy, their different security policy alignments, did not lead to any large reevaluations of there will be a new study on the potential Denmark, Norway, and Sweden cooperated Nordic security policy thinking. The Swed- implications of full Finnish NATO mem- informally on military matters such as in- ish assessment was that Russian motives bership. telligence and air operations. Despite its of- for the intervention were driven by an ex- ficial neutrality policy, Sweden secretly co- pansionist geostrategic agenda in the Cau- While the Finnish Defense Forces are un- operated with NATO during the Cold War casus, and did not concern the Baltic area. dergoing a major reform, the defense doc- in preparing for a potential Soviet attack. After 2014, however, Russia’s course of ac- trine is still based on the basic principles of tion has been viewed as the biggest chal- maintaining national capabilities with ter- With the end of the East-West confronta- lenge to Europe’s security. Worries in the ritorial defense and general conscription. tion, Finland and Sweden regained more Nordic countries have been growing, espe- An interesting and contradictory point in freedom of maneuver in their foreign poli- cially concerning the Baltic Sea region. current Finnish defense thinking is that cy. The two countries joined NATO’s Part- Finland must continue to have a credible nership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994, Finland: Bordering on Russia defense on its own, even as a completely in- and became EU members in 1995. Moreo- Finland responded immediately to Mos- dependent national defense is no longer ver, the prohibition against foreign-policy cow’s decision to annex Crimea by sup- viewed as a viable concept. coordination in the Nordic Council was porting the Ukrainian side. Helsinki issued lifted in 1991, making it possible to an urgent call for political dialog, and the Sweden: Protecting Gotland strengthen Nordic cooperation in the secu- role of the Organization for Security and In the 2015 Swedish Defense Bill, the rity and defense field. Cooperation was in- Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has been events in Ukraine are described as the of key importance. During greatest challenge to the current European Denmark is now focusing more 2014, Finland increased its fi- security structure. In light of Russian ag- nancial support and the number gression, the Swedish government empha- on defense in the nearby area, of observers involved in the sized the need for strong European coop- and Sweden is turning its focus OSCE field mission to Ukraine. eration with the EU at the core, and was With EUR 2 million and 19 one of the initiators of the EU Advisory back eastwards towards Russia. observers, it is one of the largest Mission to Ukraine. For Sweden, the Eu- contributors to the mission. Al- ropean and transatlantic agreements to tensified and new institutions were estab- though Finland has been cautious about support Ukraine, as well as a clear and lished, including for defense procurement imposing economic sanctions on Moscow principled policy to counter Russia, have and coordinating military peace support over Ukraine, the EU sanctions are seen as been important. Sweden also contributed operations. Intra-Nordic defense coopera- a legitimate way of influencing Russia. funding and personnel to the OSCE. tion was still very informal, and several planned procurement projects were aban- Finnish defense policy is marked by conti- A serious concern in Sweden is that Russia doned. nuity. Due to geographical proximity and has demonstrated its ability to gather its the long shared border, Russia is, and has military resources quickly and carry out In the late 2000s, there was a new drive for long been, perceived as the main potential complex operations in its neighborhood enhancing Nordic defense cooperation. threat that guides Finnish strategic think- without any warning. The annexation of The Nordic Defense Cooperation (NOR- ing. This latter point was reemphasized by Crimea accelerated a debate on the capa- DEFCO) organization was set up in No- the Finnish minister of defense following bilities of the Swedish armed forces and vember 2009, facilitating cooperation in the Russian-Georgian War in 2008. Events the military presence on Gotland – a stra- the fields of support structures, procure- in Ukraine have led to concerns that Fin- tegically important Baltic island where ment, development, and planning. While land’s defense capability will deteriorate spending cuts in recent years have all but all decision-making is based on consensus, without increased investment. eliminated defenses. After the events in each country has the possibility to opt out Ukraine, from a Swedish point of view, the of any activity or project. The creation of The growing assertiveness of Russia has re- Baltic Sea region is the area most exposed NORDEFCO was mainly based on eco- vived discussions about Finland’s defense to increased Russian military activity. A nomic considerations. Like other Europe- strategy, particular regarding the possibility potential crisis or conflict situation in Swe- an countries in the post-Cold War era, the of NATO membership. Although mem- den’s vicinity is believed to be possible, giv- Nordic countries have faced shrinking bership does not have majority support, en the limited military resources of the budgets, rising costs of defense equipment, there is now a greater readiness to discuss Baltic States, the relative closeness to Rus- and demands that they take part in inter- the issue. Russia’s recent role has in many sia, and the need of the West to move mili- national military operations. The armed ways reinforced the already existing posi- tary units quickly.

Sweden’s partnership with NATO is char- The Geostrategic Position of the Nordic Countries acterized as comprehensive and well devel- oped. Since 2013, Sweden has participated as a partner in the NATO Response Force (NRF). Moreover, in 2014, Sweden signed an agreement with NATO regarding host nation support. The government intends to increase Swedish participation in NATO’s most advanced and complex exercises, pri- marily within the NRF framework, as well as in NATO’s large-scale exercises. In this regard, the importance of participating in exercises taking place in the vicinity of Sweden is emphasized.

Over the past years, the Swedish Armed Forces have undergone major changes. The aim of the 2009 Defense Bill was to com- plete the transition to a flexible, modern, and professional force that is able to operate with international partners. The 2015 Defense Bill, however, shifts the focus back to territorial defense, where the main pri- ority of the armed forces is to prevent an armed attack. However, unlike during the Cold War era, the measures are not taken based exclusively on Swedish conditions considered in isolation. Today, Swedish defense thinking also takes into account the larger Baltic Sea, as well as European and the global contexts. Denmark: Eyeing the Baltics The Danish response to the events in Crimea and eastern Ukraine has been framed by its status as a member of both Regarding the geopolitical situation, it is signed an historical agreement with Swe- the EU and NATO. As an EU member, it widely agreed that Denmark enjoys an ad- den on increased military cooperation that has been important for Denmark to show vantageous location, geographically speak- enables Danish military aircraft and ships that Russia’s actions have consequences. At ing. Accordingly, Russia is not seen as a di- to operate in Swedish airspace and waters. the same time, Copenhagen has empha- rect threat to Danish territory, as seen by A contributing factor to this decision was sized the necessity of maintaining a dialog the fact that Russia is barely mentioned in increased Russian activity in the Baltic Sea between Russia and the EU. The immedi- the current Defense Agreement for the pe- region. ate Danish military response following the riod of 2013 – 7. Considering the implica- Ukraine crisis was undertaken in the tions of the Ukraine crisis for Danish secu- Norway: Defending the High North framework of NATO. rity and defense policy, it would seem that Like the other Nordic countries, Norway the need to defend the country’s immedi- perceived the annexation of Crimea and The first Danish military reaction was to ate neighborhood is on the agenda. Shortly Russia’s military actions in eastern Ukraine contribute six F-16 fighter aircraft to the after the Cold War, Denmark adopted an as marking a considerable change in the se- Baltic Air Policing mission. This was the active foreign policy and moved away from curity political situation in Europe. The first time Danish forces have been used in territorial defense. Territorial defense will Norwegian government joined the EU connection with crisis management for probably not be reinstated, but the focus is economic sanctions on Russia and con- NATO’s new members. During 2014, likely to move more to the Baltic States demned Russia’s actions together with oth- Denmark contributed to a number of reas- now that the conditions for its active for- er countries in the region. On the military surance measures managed by NATO. eign and security policy have changed. Un- side, Norway, like Denmark, responded to Among other outcomes, the Ukraine crisis like during the Cold War period, Den- the tense situation through NATO. Dur- led to several military exercises, which are mark’s strategic border has moved ing 2014, the Norwegian Armed Forces normally performed in Denmark, being eastwards after NATO enlargement. As for contributed ships and command personnel moved to the Baltic countries. Moreover, Nordic defense cooperation, Denmark has to NATO’s standing mine-clearing force in troops and equipment have been sent to been an outlier in terms of its view of Nor- the Baltic Sea as part of reassurance meas- the Baltics and Poland amid the crisis in dic security challenges – largely due to its ures. At the end of 2014, the Norwegian the Ukraine – giving a clear signal of soli- global outlook. Post-2014, however, Den- army participated in a long-term exercise darity to NATO countries that feel vulner- mark is seeking more military cooperation in Latvia, signaling Norway’s support of its able. with its neighbors. In 2015, Denmark allies in the East. Moreover, the Norwegian

Air Force participated in the Swedish-led shared geographical space with shared ing the transatlantic link. In other words, observation flights over Ukraine during the problems, Nordic security priorities are the change toward a Nordic security com- Crimea crisis. disparate. After the end of the Cold War, munity seems to be taking place in a trans- each country has faced a different point of atlantic context, and more specifically Although Russia is rarely described as a the compass; Norway with its focus in the through NATO. threat, Norway pays close attention to the north, Finland orienting itself eastward, High North, which adjoins both countries. Sweden looking to the west, and Denmark The priorities and refocus of NATO after The Arctic has always been central to Nor- with its global engagement to the south. the Wales 2014 summit have affected Den- wegian security and defense thinking, in- mark and Norway, but also the non-aligned cluding after the end of the Cold War, due Has Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine countries Finland and Sweden. The public to the fear that its allies were losing interest significantly changed the conditions for and political debates in the two latter coun- in the northern flank. In 2014, due to in- defense cooperation between the Nordic tries over possible NATO membership are creased Russian activities in Norway’s vi- countries? After Crimea, there is a com- more heated, although it does not seem cinity, measures were taken to increase mon Nordic view that the security situa- likely that they will join anytime soon. Norway’s military presence in the north. tion in their vicinity has notably deterio- Both governments have commissioned re- For Norway, the annexation of Crimea rated. Accordingly, Russia’s actions have ports on the potential implications of a showed that Russia has the ability and the brought the different Nordic geopolitical NATO membership, even though they will to use military force to reach political outlooks closer together. Denmark is now currently seem unwilling to risk a reaction goals abroad. The combination of Russian focusing more on defense in the nearby from Moscow by joining the alliance. In great-power ambitions, military armament, area, and Sweden is turning its security fo- this regard, events in one of the Baltic and interests in the northern areas – with cus back eastwards towards Russia. While States are more likely to serve as a game- many important Russian military installa- there is no discontinuity in Finnish defense changer. After Wales 2014, both Finland tions being situated on the Kola Peninsula policy, the acknowledgement of the coun- and Sweden are seeking closer cooperation – are considered a challenge to the future try’s dependence on external support for its as PfP countries to the extent that they stability of the High North. defense is notable. In Norway, there has may be regarded as informal NATO mem- been an increased focus on the High North bers. If the Ukraine scenario were to be re- Three premises have been central in the de- and territorial defense since 2014. peated in the Baltics, there is a possibility bate about Norwegian defense. First, Nor- that Finland and Sweden may join NATO way is a small state with a great power as a On the one hand, there are no clear signs in response to Russian threats. In this situ- neighbor; second, the ability to defend that Russia has pushed the Nordic coun- ation, the issue of NATO membership will Norway depends on military aid from its tries significantly closer to each other. On arguably gain further incentive. Finland allies; and third, Norway is different from the other hand, the countries are no longer and Norway are expected to publish new other small states due to its vast ocean are- nervous about provoking Russia by in- security and defense whitepapers this year, as, which over time have been vastly ex- creasing their cooperation, either. In 2015, while Denmark is preparing a new defense panded through the conventions on the the Nordic defense ministers stated in a agreement for its armed forces. The docu- law of the sea. Russia is a key factor in Os- joint feature article that they sought to ments will likely reflect the changed condi- lo’s security and defense policy thinking, strengthen Nordic defense cooperation, tions post-2014. and the Norwegian military presence in particularly on information-sharing, joint the High North has only been strength- military training, and coordinating activi- ened due to Russian behavior, both in ties overall. They confirmed that the situa- Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. tion was no longer “business as usual” and Jannicke Fiskvik is a Ph.D. candidate at the stated that the Nordic countries had to ad- Department of Historical Studies at the A Nordic Security Community? just themselves to a new normal condition. Norwegian University of Science and Technology Historically, geopolitics has divided the However, Nordic cooperation is to take (NTNU) in Trondheim. She was a Visiting Fellow at Nordic region more often than it has uni- place within the framework of NATO and the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich fied it on hard security issues. In spite of a the EU, and the emphasis is on maintain- from August to December 2015.

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