CSS Analyses in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich N0. 189, April 2016, Editor: Christian Nünlist Nordic Security: Moving towards NATO? Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine has also been a wake-up call for the Nordic countries of Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Denmark. Despite a common sense of Nordic identity, their security and defense policies have differed. Since 2014, the renewed Russian threat in their vicinity has triggered closer cooperation. Their defense policies are currently being revised, but the main focal point is NATO rather than the notion of a Nordic security community. By Jannicke Fiskvik Events in Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 challenge the post-Cold War geopolitical situation in Europe. This has also strongly affected the Nordic region. For the first time since World War II, a state that shares borders with Finland and Norway has seized a part of a neighboring country by military means. Accordingly, Nordic governments are rethinking their own security strategy. Although Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Denmark seek good long-term relations with Russia, they were all decisive in dem- onstrating support for Ukraine and con- demning Russian military aggression. A non-response would have signaled a tacit acceptance of Russia’s violation of interna- tional law. The Nordic states are all committed to A Norwegian submarine in a fjord near Bergen during NATO’s Submarine Warfare Exercise maintaining their contribution to interna- “Dynamic Mongoose 14”. NATO tional security and international law. They also share similarities of culture, climate, demography, historical heritage, and a strong sense of Nordic community. How- been somewhat informal and diffuse in na- dramatically intensified their relations with ever, despite the many similarities and geo- ture. Has Russian aggression changed the NATO since 2014. They play a crucial role graphical proximity, the countries have dif- conditions for Nordic defense cooperation? in NATO’s defense planning for a Crimea- fered in their security and defense policy type scenario in the Baltic Sea region, as and outlook. Moreover, two of them are The formal security policy and the security the strategic importance of Northern Eu- EU members (Sweden, Finland), one is policy situation in the Nordic countries has rope has grown. only a member of NATO (Norway), and been much the same as in 1949. Practical one is a member of both NATO and EU security policy, however, has changed sig- Nordic Defense Cooperation (Denmark). The different alignments have nificantly in all four states. Finland and During the Cold War, defense cooperation made Nordic defense cooperation chal- Sweden have both drawn considerably between the Nordic countries was highly lenging – a cooperation that has always nearer to the North Atlantic alliance, and constrained. Negotiations on a Scandinavi- © 2016 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich 1 CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 189, April 2016 an defense union in 1948 – 9 failed to bridge forces of all four countries have undergone tions among the Finnish public; those in national interests, and Nordic governments major reforms, although at different times favor of joining NATO continue to argue opted for different security policy align- and at different speed. that Finnish capabilities are insufficient, ments. Denmark and Norway joined and that Russia may already consider Fin- NATO in 1949 as founding members, In the wake of the Russian-Georgian War land a de-facto NATO member. Oppo- while Finland and Sweden remained una- of 2008, the Nordic countries looked ever nents are still concerned that NATO mem- ligned. A Nordic Council was established more askance to their large neighbor in the bership will cause Finland to be designated in 1952, but was hampered by an informal east. The Finns were particular wary of ten- a potential enemy of Russia, and provoke ban on discussions of foreign policy and sions between the Baltic States and Russia, retaliation from Moscow. As part of the was restricted to non-security related coop- while the Norwegians kept their eyes on current debate and in connection with the eration. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the High North. Still, the events of 2008 forthcoming whitepaper on security policy, their different security policy alignments, did not lead to any large reevaluations of there will be a new study on the potential Denmark, Norway, and Sweden cooperated Nordic security policy thinking. The Swed- implications of full Finnish NATO mem- informally on military matters such as in- ish assessment was that Russian motives bership. telligence and air operations. Despite its of- for the intervention were driven by an ex- ficial neutrality policy, Sweden secretly co- pansionist geostrategic agenda in the Cau- While the Finnish Defense Forces are un- operated with NATO during the Cold War casus, and did not concern the Baltic area. dergoing a major reform, the defense doc- in preparing for a potential Soviet attack. After 2014, however, Russia’s course of ac- trine is still based on the basic principles of tion has been viewed as the biggest chal- maintaining national capabilities with ter- With the end of the East-West confronta- lenge to Europe’s security. Worries in the ritorial defense and general conscription. tion, Finland and Sweden regained more Nordic countries have been growing, espe- An interesting and contradictory point in freedom of maneuver in their foreign poli- cially concerning the Baltic Sea region. current Finnish defense thinking is that cy. The two countries joined NATO’s Part- Finland must continue to have a credible nership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994, Finland: Bordering on Russia defense on its own, even as a completely in- and became EU members in 1995. Moreo- Finland responded immediately to Mos- dependent national defense is no longer ver, the prohibition against foreign-policy cow’s decision to annex Crimea by sup- viewed as a viable concept. coordination in the Nordic Council was porting the Ukrainian side. Helsinki issued lifted in 1991, making it possible to an urgent call for political dialog, and the Sweden: Protecting Gotland strengthen Nordic cooperation in the secu- role of the Organization for Security and In the 2015 Swedish Defense Bill, the rity and defense field. Cooperation was in- Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has been events in Ukraine are described as the of key importance. During greatest challenge to the current European Denmark is now focusing more 2014, Finland increased its fi- security structure. In light of Russian ag- nancial support and the number gression, the Swedish government empha- on defense in the nearby area, of observers involved in the sized the need for strong European coop- and Sweden is turning its focus OSCE field mission to Ukraine. eration with the EU at the core, and was With EUR 2 million and 19 one of the initiators of the EU Advisory back eastwards towards Russia. observers, it is one of the largest Mission to Ukraine. For Sweden, the Eu- contributors to the mission. Al- ropean and transatlantic agreements to tensified and new institutions were estab- though Finland has been cautious about support Ukraine, as well as a clear and lished, including for defense procurement imposing economic sanctions on Moscow principled policy to counter Russia, have and coordinating military peace support over Ukraine, the EU sanctions are seen as been important. Sweden also contributed operations. Intra-Nordic defense coopera- a legitimate way of influencing Russia. funding and personnel to the OSCE. tion was still very informal, and several planned procurement projects were aban- Finnish defense policy is marked by conti- A serious concern in Sweden is that Russia doned. nuity. Due to geographical proximity and has demonstrated its ability to gather its the long shared border, Russia is, and has military resources quickly and carry out In the late 2000s, there was a new drive for long been, perceived as the main potential complex operations in its neighborhood enhancing Nordic defense cooperation. threat that guides Finnish strategic think- without any warning. The annexation of The Nordic Defense Cooperation (NOR- ing. This latter point was reemphasized by Crimea accelerated a debate on the capa- DEFCO) organization was set up in No- the Finnish minister of defense following bilities of the Swedish armed forces and vember 2009, facilitating cooperation in the Russian-Georgian War in 2008. Events the military presence on Gotland – a stra- the fields of support structures, procure- in Ukraine have led to concerns that Fin- tegically important Baltic island where ment, development, and planning. While land’s defense capability will deteriorate spending cuts in recent years have all but all decision-making is based on consensus, without increased investment. eliminated defenses. After the events in each country has the possibility to opt out Ukraine, from a Swedish point of view, the of any activity or project. The creation of The growing assertiveness of Russia has re- Baltic Sea region is the area most exposed NORDEFCO was mainly based on eco- vived discussions about Finland’s defense to increased Russian military activity. A nomic considerations. Like other Europe- strategy, particular regarding the possibility potential crisis or conflict situation in Swe- an countries in the post-Cold War era, the of NATO membership. Although mem- den’s vicinity is believed to be possible, giv- Nordic countries have faced shrinking bership does not have majority support, en the limited military resources of the budgets, rising costs of defense equipment, there is now a greater readiness to discuss Baltic States, the relative closeness to Rus- and demands that they take part in inter- the issue. Russia’s recent role has in many sia, and the need of the West to move mili- national military operations. The armed ways reinforced the already existing posi- tary units quickly. © 2016 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich 2 CSS Analyses in Security Policy No.