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OSW Commentary Centre for Eastern Studies NUMBER 276 | 28.06.2018 www.osw.waw.pl Nord Stream 2 divides the West Agata Łoskot-Strachota, Rafał Bajczuk, Szymon Kardaś In recent weeks the US has stepped up its campaign against the Nord Stream 2 project. Wash- ington is putting pressure on Berlin to withdraw its support for the project, and is threatening to use increasingly powerful measures, including sanctions on European companies involved in the gas pipeline’s implementation. The growing dispute between the US and Germany over Nord Stream 2 has become an element of the broader controversy surrounding the project in the EU and is leading to deeper divisions between the member states. It has brought to the fore the differences in approaches to gas cooperation with Russia as well as approaches to the development of Russia’s strategic gas pipeline projects. While Germany, but also Austria, the Netherlands and a number of other countries, limit their approach to commercial issues, Poland, the Baltic States, Denmark and the US also see it as having security implications which do not only relate to energy. The conflict over Nord Stream 2 is also part of the game concern- ing the future shape of the gas market in Europe, and the roles played by individual external suppliers (mainly Russia, but also to an increasing extent the US) and companies such as Gaz- prom and its European partners. The Nord Stream 2 case has become a major challenge of the EU’s cohesion and its relations with the US and Russia. Gameplay on Nord Stream 2 brings short term political benefits to Russia. The project has not only caused a rift between the EU member states, it has also become a source of increased friction in transatlantic relations. The actions taken by Washington and Berlin with regard to Nord Stream 2 will have the greatest impact on its future. Although Berlin has changed its rhetoric and Chancellor Merkel has acknowledged that project has a political dimension in addition to the commercial one, Germany is unwavering in its support for NS2, trying to limit its negative consequences to problems regarding Ukrainian transit. Thus Berlin does not refer to the strategic concerns of the Central European and Scandinavian countries, the European Commission (EC) and the US which are not related directly to Ukraine. America’s tough game against Nord Stream 2. First of all, the US perceives the pro- Stream 2 ject as a challenge to Europe’s energy security, and the EU’s new gas links with Russia as hin- The US has been opposing the implementa- dering diversification of the gas supply, and also tion of Nord Stream 2 since the project was the stability and security of Europe, especially announced in 2015 during Barack Obama’s Central and Eastern Europe. The current admin- administration. During the presidency of Don- istration is thus continuing the traditional US ald Trump, the US’s stance on the matter has policy towards new gas pipelines linking Russia become entrenched. There are at least two and Europe. The opposition to Nord Stream 2 reasons for the current US opposition to Nord as a challenge to European security has become OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 273 1 particularly relevant in the context of Russia’s In recent months, the likelihood of CAATSA annexation of Crimea and the Russian-Ukrain- being imposed on European firms involved in ian conflict in Donbas. The US position on the Nord Stream 2 has increased3. This is illustrat- project is confirmed by statements of repre- ed by the increasingly frequent warnings, e.g. sentatives of the State Department, including on 17 May in Berlin, Deputy Assistant Secre- by both the current and previous US Secretary tary at the Bureau of Energy Resources, San- of State. dra Oudkirk said that the US was “exerting as Secondly, Washington’s opposition to NS2 much persuasive power as we possibly can” to could help accomplish the Trump administra- stop the project, and reiterated the possibility tion’s energy policy goal, which is to increase of sanctions. European diplomats also consider exports of US LNG – including to the Europe- sanctions likely. an market. The support for domestic exports is in part testified by the comments made by Donald Trump (for example, during his visit to In recent months, the likelihood of US Poland and during the US-Baltic summit), and sanctions being imposed on European by the Secretary of Energy. According to them, firms involved in Nord Stream 2 has in- a higher level of US LNG exports could contribute creased. to the diversification of supplies in Europe and a reduction on the dependence on Russian sup- plies, mainly in Central & Eastern Europe. Nord Stream 2 is also the subject of increas- The key American instrument impacting on ingly intensive American political efforts. Nord Stream 2 implementation is the so-called It became one of the subjects discussed by the CAATSA1 – the sanctions package imposed on US president with EU leaders (Trump discussed Russia in 2017, affecting, among other things, NS2 with presidents of the Baltic countries and the Russian energy sector and existing or Chancellor Merkel). According to media reports planned export pipelines from Russia (among Trump was to offer Merkel a return to negotia- them Nord Stream 2, the only project referred tions on a new EU-US trade agreement4 if Ger- to by name). Germany, a range of other Euro- many withdraws its support for Nord Stream 2. pean countries, and the European Comission2, US diplomacy activity on the project has also protested against the US law introducing the intensified in recent months. State Depart- sanctions. As a result of European, including ment officials have been openly criticising Nord German, lobbying efforts, the document and Stream 2 in Brussels and Berlin, calling upon State Department instructions on CAATSA im- member states to oppose the project, and en- plementation, was supplemented by the provi- couraged some of them, for instance Denmark sion that the potential launching of sanctions and Sweden, to take measures to hamper NS2 should be “in coordination with allies”, but ulti- implementation. Security challenges in the Bal- mately the US president has the right to decide tic Sea area have also been raised publicly, such to impose them by himself. as the greater risk of surveillance by Russian 3 For example R. Gramer, K. Johnson, D. De Luce, U.S. Close to Imposing Sanctions on European Companies in Russian Pipeline Project, “Foreign Policy”, 1.06.2018 http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/01/u-s-close-to-im- 1 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions posing-sanctions-on-european-companies-in-russian- Act, US Department of Treasury, 2.08.2017. pipeline-project-nord-stream-two-germany-energy- 2 For more on this subject see S. Kardaś, I. Wiśniewska, gas-oil-putin/amp/?__twitter_impression=true Ustawa o amerykańskich sankcjach wobec Rosji, “Analizy 4 B. Pancevski, Trump Presses Germany to Drop Russian OSW”, 4.08.2017 https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikac- Pipeline for Trade Deal, “Wall Street Journal”, 17.05.2018, je/analizy/2017-08-04/ustawa-o-amerykanskich-sankc- https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-presses-germany- jach-przeciwko-rosji to-drop-russian-pipeline-for-trade-deal-1526566415 OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 273 2 intelligence once Nord Stream 2 is constructed Diagram 1. Sources of gas imports to the EU, (surveillance equipment on the Baltic Sea bed)5. 2017 It has also been reported that Trump might try Libya 1.3% other 3.9% to introduce the issues of gas and imports from Nigeria 2.4% Qatar 6.0% Russia to the NATO discussions agenda6. At the same time, US efforts to support the di- Algieria 12.4% Russia 37.0% versification of gas supplies in Europe are con- tinually visible. The construction of new LNG terminals, for instance in Croatia and Greece, supported by US diplomacy, could enable in- Norway 36.9% creased EU imports of LNG, including from the US. In addition, the Americans have also been Source: Eurostat unequivocal in their support for other Europe- an diversification projects such as the Southern Diagram 2. US LNG exports in 2013–2017 Gas Corridor and the Baltic Pipe, and inter- (bcm) connections integrating the European market 25 [bcm] (among other things for the Slovak-Ukrainian 20 interconnector which enables Ukraine to im- port gas from the EU). US companies have also 15 been involving in new European exploration 10 projects (e.g. on the Romanian Black Sea shelf at present). 5 The actual volume of US gas exports to Europe 0 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 is determined by commercial decisions made by the private US firms selling LNG and the prices Source: www.eia.doe.gov on global markets. Although US LNG exports to Europe rose in 2017 in comparison to 2016, it Diagram 3. Directions of US LNG exports, still represents a negligible portion of the EU’s 2017 overall needs – less than 1% of total imports Africa 1.0% Europa 10.3% – and cannot be compared with supplies from America (N&S) Russia, Norway, or Algeria. America’s most im- 29.6% portant gas importers remain Mexico, South Ko- rea, and China (see diagrams 1, 2 and 3). In the first months of 2018, higher prices and demand resulted in rising US LNG exports to Asian coun- Asia 59.1% tries, while only three cargos arrived in the EU. Source: www.eia.doe.gov 5 A. Shalal, Russia-Germany gas pipeline raises intel- ligence concerns - U.S. official, Reuters, 17.05.2018, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-germany-rus- sia-pipeline/russia-germany-gas-pipeline-raises-intelli- gence-concerns-u-s-official-idUKKCN1II0V7 6 J.
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