TRANSFORMATION AND ‘EUROPEANIZATION’ OF GREEK POLITICAL CULTURE: THE CASE OF POLITICAL PARTIES BETWEEN 1974-2000
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES OF MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY
BY
HÜLYA ALKAN
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
JANUARY, 2004.
Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences
______
Prof.Dr.Sencer Ayata Director
I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.
______
Prof.Dr.Feride Acar Head of Department
This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.
______
Assist.Prof.Dr. Kürşad Ertuğrul
Examining Committee Members
Assist.Prof.Dr. Kürşad Ertuğrul ______
Assist.Prof.Dr. Fatih Tayfur ______
Assist.Prof.Dr. Canan Aslan Akman ______
ABSTRACT
TRANSFORMATION AND ‘EUROPEANIZATION’ OF GREEK POLITICAL CULTURE: THE CASE OF POLITICAL PARTIES BETWEEN 1974-2000
Alkan, Hülya
M.S., Department of Political Science and Public Administration
Supervisor: Assist.Prof.Dr. Kürşad Ertuğrul
January 2004, 191 pages
This thesis analyses the ‘dualistic’ structure of Greek political culture formed by traditionalist and modernist wings in a historical context by concentrating on post-1974 era. The dissolution of the dictatorship in 1974 constituted a turning point both for Greek politics and Greek political culture. In this point, political parties played the key role in the process of transition and consolidation of democracy and reshaping Greek political culture. Accession into the EC was another historical step for Greek politics and political culture. Deepening of integration with the EC (EU) and Europeanization process has profoundly affected socio-political, economic structure and institutional modernization of Greece. Europeanization of Greece reformulated the hegemony struggle between traditionalist and modernist wings in favor of the latter. Especially,
iii coming to power of Simitis with a pro-European understanding and ‘modernization’ discourse reinforced the hegemony of modernist wing over the traditionalist one.
Keywords: Political Culture, Greek Identity, PASOK, ND, Europeanization.
iv ÖZ
YUNAN SİYASAL KÜLTÜRÜNÜN DÖNÜŞÜMÜ VE
‘AVRUPALILAŞMASI’: 1974-2000 YILLARI ARASINDA SİYASAL
PARTİLER ÖRNEĞİ
Alkan, Hülya
Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi
Tez Yöneticisi : Yard.Doç.Dr. Kürşad Ertuğrul
Ocak 2004, 191 sayfa
Bu çalışma, geleneksel ve modernist kanatlar tarafından kurulu Yunan siyasal kültürünün dönüşümünü tarihsel bir çerçeve içinde ve 1974 sonrası döneme ağırlık vererek incelemiştir. 1974 yılında ülkedeki dikta rejiminin çöküşü hem Yunan siyaseti hem de Yunan siyasal kültürü açısından bir dönüm noktası olmuştur. Bu noktada, siyasal partiler demokrasiye geçiş, demokrasinin güçlendirilmesi sürecinde ve Yunan siyasal kültürünün şekillenişinde önemli bir rol oynadı. Avrupa Topluluğu’na katılım Yunan siyaseti ve siyasal kültürü için diğer bir tarihi bir adımı oluşturdu. Avrupa Topluluğu’na
v (Avrupa Birliği’ne) entegrasyon sürecinin derinleşmesi ve Avrupalılaşma süreci
Yunanistan’ın sosyo-kültürel, ekonomik yapısı ve kurumsal modernleşmesini derinden etkilemiştir. Yunanistan’ın Avrupalılaşması, geleneksel ve modernist kanatlar arasındaki hegemonya mücadelesini modernist kanat lehine değiştirmiştir.Özellikle, 1996 yılında
Simitis’in Avrupa yanlısı bir anlayış ve modernleşme söylemiyle iktidara gelişi, modernist kanadın geleneksel kanat üzerindeki üstünlüğünü güçlendirmiştir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Siyasal Kültür, Yunan Kimliği, PASOK, ND, Avrupalılaşma.
vi
To my dear family…
vii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my gratefulness to my supervisor Assist. Prof Dr. Kürşad
Ertuğrul for his invaluable support throughout my studies. This thesis would be next to nothing without his sincere and continuous guidance. It was a special opportunity for me to study with him because I learned much from his valuable comments and corrections during the process of writing this thesis.
I also would like to thank to Assist.Prof.Dr. Fatih Tayfur and Assist.Prof.Dr. Canan
Aslan for their encouragements, precious suggestions and corrections.
I am indebted much to my family for their support and strong faith in me. Lastly, many thanks go to my dear friends Effie Pappa, Alexandra Nikolakopoulou, Maria
Maniatakou, Suna Güzin Aydemir, Faruk Tuncay and also Asst.Prof.Dr. Kostas Ifantis for their willingness to help me.
viii
I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.
Date: 30.01.2004 Signature:
ix TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………….iii
ÖZ……………………………………………………………………………….……v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………………………....vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………………………………………………..x
LIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………………………...xii
INTRODUCTION...... 1
CHAPTER
1. TRANSFORMATION AND EUROPEANIZATION OF GREEK POLITICAL CULTURE……………………………...... 14
1.1 Greek National Identity………………………………………………..16
1.1.1 Ancient Greek Culture…………………………………………….18
1.1.2 Orthodoxy…………………………………………………………29
1.2 Historical Overview of the ‘Duality’ of Greek Political Culture: Traditionalists versus Modernists from the Establishment of Greek Nation- State till the Junta of 1974…………………………………...40
1.3 ‘Duality’ of Greek Political Culture……………………...... 51
2. TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN POST-1974 ERA….66
2.1 1974 as a Landmark in the History of Greek Politics……………...... 66
2.2 Accession Debates on EC Membership…………………………...... 83
x 2.2.1 Pan Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK)…………………...... 86
2.2.2 New Democracy (ND)………………………………...... 107
2.2.3 The Communist Party of Greece (KKE)……………………...... 116
2.2.4 The Communist Party of Greece-Internal (KKE-Es)………...... 118
2.2.5 Evaluation of Political Parties Concerning the Political Culture...... 119
2.3 Changing Value Orientations in Greek Public Opinion in the Process of Europeanization…………………………………………...... 121
3. GREEK POLITICAL CULTURE IN METAPOLITEFSI…………………....140
3.1 ‘Europeanization’ of Greek Political Culture...... 153
3.2 Simitis and ‘Modernization’: A New Era in Greek Political Culture.....163
4. CONCLUSION………………………………………………………...... 175
REFERENCES……………………………………………………………...... 182
xi LIST OF TABLES
TABLE
1. The Feeling of Satisfaction with The Way Democracy Works...... 121
2. Attitudes Towards the Unification of Western Europe...... 123
3. The Feeling that One’s Country Has Benefited from Being a Member of the European Community...... 125
4. Interest in Politics...... 126
5. Interest in EC Politics...... 127
6. Attitudes Towards the Single European Market...... 128
7. Trust in Political Institutions...... 129
8. Support for European Union Membership...... 130
9. Benefit From European Union Membership...... 130
10. Trust in The European Union...... 131
11. Support for a European Constitution...... 132
12. Support for Enlargement...... 133
13. Interest in European Union News...... 134
14. Dialogue On Europe: Interest in Taking Part in Discussions...... 135
15. Image of The European Union...... 137
16. European Identity and Pride...... 138 xii 17. National Pride...... 139
xiii INTRODUCTION
In my thesis, it will be presented the main framework and transformation of Greek political culture since the establishment of Greek nation-state to the present by concentrating on the post-1974 era. Post-1974 era has a unique meaning in terms of directing this process in line with ‘Europeanization’. In that sense, accession into EC and gradual integration of Greece with the EC (EU) constituted one of the main driving force for institutional change and gradual transformation of Greek political culture in favor of the modernist wing. 1990s could be easily asserted as the decade of reformulation for Greece in terms of economy, politics and culture. Actually, the so-called overall reconstructions in those realms were based on the emergence of democratisation process in 1974. The year 1974 represents a milestone in Greek politics with the dissolution of military regime, which lasted from 1967 till 1974. The collapse of the dictatorship, indeed, initiated unique and manifold processes shaping
Greek politics and, in this sense, withdrawal of the army from the politics was a considerable development concerning for Greek democratisation. The post-1974 era in Greece witnesses the great success of the political parties as the major players in terms of the institutionalisation of Greek democracy.
Reformulation and consolidation of democracy in Greece were realised concomitantly with the accession process into the European Community. 1 Reconstruction of democracy in 1974 at the same time dragged along Greek politics to the debates of accession. It should be underlined that, both in terms of domestic and foreign politics the EC could be expressed metaphorically as the litmus paper, with substantial force determining party politics. Attitudes of Greek political parties towards the EC (EU) reflected at the same time their ideological positions, policy objectives in the certain fields i.e. economy, socio-cultural affairs, and especially their projections in terms of re-formulation, re-organisation, and modernisation of
Greek society.
The dynamics of post-1974 period initiated a new era concerning the transition to a
“liberal” democracy. According to R. Hague and M. Harrop this process involved high and open level of competition for power within a stable framework of institutions. Parties, elections, interest groups and mass media are inseparable components of liberal democracy for the articulation of popular interests and preferences (quoted in Pridham, 1984:11). According to Pridham, three
Mediterranean countries (Greece, Spain and Portugal) have successfully reconstructed their political institutional structures, but not their system-supportive political cultures after transition process. Changes in political culture may be accelerated by traumatic and mass-perceived experiences like war or by revolution.
In addition existence and growth of a system-supportive political culture is very important concerning the eventual stabilization of new democracies as in the case of
Greece (Pridham, 1984).
2 In case of Greece, determined will of Karamanlis regarding the efforts the construction of a “liberal” democracy provided the smooth transition to the democracy and vision of EC membership played, in a way, the most driving force in this process. The rise of Papandreou towards 1980s and his coming power in 1981 constituted one of the big steps in the process of consolidation of democracy. His attempt for transforming Greek people from ‘electorate’ into ‘real citizens’ was one of the most critical indicators to establish a system-supportive political culture.
However, endemic features of Greek political culture and continuities coming from the past emerged as main obstacles in front of the system-supportive political culture.
In short, the “rapid” transition and consolidation of democracy could not display the same pace in favor of a system-supportive political culture. It is true that changes and shifts in political culture were stimulated by political-institutional change in Greece.
The changing political-institutional profile of Greece in line with the
Europeanization process brought about the shift in Greek political culture in favor of the modernist wing over the traditionalist one.
As mentioned above political parties of the post-dictatorship era were the main figures shaping Greek politics. Especially, two parties of Greek politics led this process. New Democracy (ND) founded by Constantine Karamanlis and Pan
Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) founded by Andreas Papandreou as the major parties of post-1974 Greek politics guided and shaped this process. ND and PASOK carried out their party politics and ideological struggle by knitting a debate around
EC membership and as known this debate was formulated with two motto espoused respectively by Karamanlis and Papandreou; “Greece belongs to the West” versus
3 “Greece belongs to Greeks”. Even though Karamanlis initiated the accession process, it was realised by Papandreou, the leader of PASOK, who at the beginning, had projected his political rhetoric with an anti-EC discourse. Greece entered into EC in
1981. Due to requirements of EC membership the so-called process of
‘Europeanization of Greek politics’ began in real terms. Europeanization process made itself felt in every main field such as economy, politics and socio-cultural areas.
Europeanization, as a complex and difficult process and constantly renewing itself, has a huge influence in political, economic and cultural pattern of the member countries. Despite its transforming power, it cannot be one-fold process; the will and political, economic and socio-cultural background of the member countries constitute the main determinant regarding the penetration of Europeanization into the domestic architecture of the member and candidate countries. Europeanization is an ambiguous and multi-faceted concept. Therefore, usage of this concept continues creating debates concerning its meaning but as known it started to be intensively pronounced with the process of deepening of the European integration with the bold steps in order to realize this integration, such as Single European Act, Maastricht
Treaty, Amsterdam and Nice Agreements. In this study, it is not my aim to discuss the emergence or implications of Europeanization. However, deepening of EU integration and enlargement of the EU made us intensively face to this concept.
4 In this regard, it is necessary to define the conceptions of Europeanization.
Europeanization is defined by Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso and Thomas
Risse as
the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal and social institutions associated with political problem solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules. Political institutionalisation involves the development of formal and informal rules, procedures, norms and practices governing politics at the European, national, and subnational levels (Cowles, Caparosa and Risse,2001:3)1
In short, it said that Europeanization in the context of EU penetrates the economic, political, institutional, social and cultural level. In this sense, its requirements and implications give birth to new shifts, reformulations or transformations at these levels.
In the case of Greece, there is an interesting point regarding the process of
Europeanization. The 1990s could be pronounced as the decade of replacement of the concept of “Europeanization” with that of “Modernization”.
The 1990s is conspicuous as a period of change in Greek politics. Greek politics entered into a new period identified by the end of charismatic politics and polarisation, the emergence of an ideological convergence and political consensus, the loosening of party discipline, declining public interest in politics and in parties
(Keridis, 1997: 91).
1Also see “The many faces of Europeanization” by Johan P. Olsen http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp02_2.htm 5 Through the deepening of EU integration especially in both economy and politics,
Greece faced both political and economic challenges in the 1990s. The most important of them is the quantitative reduction and qualitative change of state’s role in the Greek economy and society. In the context of EU requirements, Greece was required to realise free-market reforms and have a more powerful civil society.
According to Keridis, there was a broad consensus concerning state’s role in economy in the context of limitation of itself to the provision of social services and strategic planning (Keridis, 1997: 93). In this sense, Greece has to deal seriously with the problems emerging from the requirements of EU to realise its structural readjustments. Contrary to the political picture of the 1970s and the 1980s, both of the two major political parties (ND and PASOK) are committed to Euro-federalists.
Now, Greece remains one of the most ardent supporters of deeper integration of EU.
It could be comfortably asserted that there is no divergence in terms of the realisation of reforms in the line with the regulations of the EU.
As mentioned before, the 1990s became the decade of important structural changes in the economy, politics and culture. ‘Dualistic structure’ of political culture of
Greece has been profoundly influenced by these processes. Indeed, political culture of Greece involves such a conceptualisation, of ‘duality’. Moreover, Greek national identity encompasses this ‘duality’ within its core. Such a structure is presented in terms of two contrasting wings: the underdog/traditionalist and the modernist one, but this duality has an overlapping nature changing from era to era in Greek politics.
Some turning points in Greek political history constituted the hegemony of one of them both as discourse and practice. Both wings posses different derivations and they
6 existed since the establishment of the Greek nation state. Over time they became inseparable and permanent feature of Greek society and influenced Greece’s political development till now.
Now, I would like to introduce these two wings of Greek political culture in terms of their conceptualisations. The two-fold structure of Greek political culture consisted of “underdog” and “modernist” cultures. The change has been in favour of latter’s autonomy from underdog one. In Diamandouros’s conceptualisation, the underdog culture is anti-western, parochial, clientalist and statist in outlook, whereas the modernist one pro-western, outward looking and inspired by the ideas deriving from the Enlightenment.
In this study, the ‘dualistic’ structure of Greek political culture is analysed by referring especially to the works of Diamandouros. He has considerable works both in English and Greek in terms of the analysis of the historical context and evaluation of Greek political culture. Diamandouros puts forward a specific two-folded structure in his analysis; underdog culture versus modernist culture. In this study it is going to be argued that Greek political culture could not be easily reducible to modernist and underdog cultures. Because, in Greek political history both wings of this culture have been interlinked by nature of their characteristics. In 2000, ‘identity card crisis’ reveals the concurrence of them. As seen in that case, the reaction of the church could be evaluated as a reaction of the traditionalist wing towards the hegemonic discourse of the modernist wing. Diamadouros’ conceptualisation of Greek political culture as a two-folded structure ignores the historical complexity of Greek history
7 because such a structure is a consequence of it. This historical reality includes, structurally, tradition and modernity within itself. In this regard, Helleno-Christian identity discourse could be seen as a glum between tradition and modernity. The
‘antagonistic’ character of modernist discourse attained hegemony over the traditionalist one, a set the components of both of them are going to continue keeping their existence and it should be kept in mind that this issue is still being debated.
The 1990s symbolise ascendancy of modernist wing in the ‘dualistic’ structure of
Greek political culture. In Greece’s political history, both these two ‘rival culture’ had terms to be more dominant than other despite their overlapping character.
Dimitris Keridis has used an interesting metaphor to identify the last decade of Greek politics. According to him, the withdrawal of Papandreou, the last charismatic leader dominating Greek public life during almost the last quarter of 20th century, and the election of Constantine Simitis as the new prime minister could be defined as the end of ‘Latin American politics’ and the beginning of ‘European’ politics in Greece
(Keridis, 1997: 91-92).
The 1990s was the decade of modernisation as referred by much of the political discourse in Greece over the last decade especially after Simitis’ coming to power in
1996. According to Diamandouros, the election of Simitis was expected to extend the prospects of the modernist wing with Simitis’ pro-EU attitude (Diamandouros, 1997:
32) The ascendancy of the modernist wing could constitute ‘threat’ for the traditionalist (underdog culture) wing of Greek political culture. The identity card
‘crisis’ illustrates obviously the reaction to reform and to further initiatives
8 secularisation put forward by the modernist wing. This ‘crisis’ will be dealt with in detail in the following chapters, in so far as it displays that the struggle between the two ‘rival cultures’ still keeps its vigour.
The process of ‘modernisation’ in Greece has been closely connected to the perspectives of European integration. Modernisation is being conceived as a process of transformation in the political culture to construct new forms of governance and to redefine the connections between state apparatuses and socio-economic structures. In terms of political culture, it can be argued that the 1990s was the decade of rapid socio-economic restructuring, and modernisation was the key word of the reform process. According to Zambeta, modernisation is characterised by a change of conditions and change in the context of social and political power, and it was manifested as a political support to get over the traditional characteristics of Greek political culture.2
The electoral victory of Simitis in 1996, leader of the ‘modernising wing’ of PASOK and opponent of Andreas Papandreou meant a new era in Greek politics especially in internal party relations. As mentioned by P.C. Ioakamidis, Simitis is accepted as one of the most pro-European figures in Greek politics. Upon assuming power, he initiated a vigorous programme for Greece’s Europeanization by, among other things, looking for meeting the so-called ‘convergence criteria’ for the accession of
Greece to the euro.3 The triumph of PASOK in the elections of September 1996
2 “Modernisation and the would be Entrepreneurial Culture” by Evie Zambeta < www. ioe.ac.uk/ccs/conference2000/papers/pc/zambeta.html> 17.06.2003
3
In this study, the so-called ‘duality’ of Greek political culture will be analysed with a focus on the long-lasting conflict between traditionalist and modernist wings of the
Greek political culture. In particular, their derivations, evolutions and interrelationship between each other during history particularly in the context of
‘metapolitefsi’ (metapolitefsi refers to the post-dictatorship era in modern Greek history and politics) especially the era following the dissolution of seven-year- dictatorship will be discussed. Essentially, the Greek accession into the EC played the crucial role in transforming the hegemony of these two wings. EC and
Europeanization as the final outcome was a turning point for politics, economy and culture of Greece. In the post-dictatorship era, the political parties directed this process by playing the major role in this road. Concerning the role of the political parties in shaping politics after the dissolution of dictatorship, their establishment, and main characteristics in the framework of political culture will be elaborated.
Accession into EC is the benchmark of Greek political development, in this sense, political attitudes towards EC (EU) has a critical importance in terms of analysing
Greek politics and political culture concerning penetration of EC process almost every aspect of Greek politics, economy and culture. Europeanization process constituted the key word of their formation as a new social, economic and political order in Greece. The uneasy relationship between EU and Greece took a radical turn in the 1990s. In other words, the consensus on EU and Europeanization is consolidated by the Greek political parties (except for Communist Party of Greece),
10 and Greek society and it was presented as a new concept with Simitis’s coming to power representing as the new face of PASOK and the initiator of a new era forging modernist hegemony over traditionalist one in Greek political culture. Also Simitis initiated a new era in terms of replacing ‘Europeanization’ with ‘Modernization’.
His arrival not only initiated radical change in the internal logic and structure of
PASOK but also a new path in terms of the relationship between EU and Greece and hegemony of modernist wing over the traditionalist wing in political culture comparing with Papandreou era.
In the 1st chapter of this study, Greek national identity issue and the two basic components of this identity will be introduced. This is necessary for full grasp of
Greek political culture. Also, a discussion of the Greek national identity is a good starting point in order to have a sound understanding of the cultural duality.
Concerning the oscillation between East and West, while ancient Greek culture overtakes as an inclusive component, Orthodoxy constitutes the main pillar constituting the exclusive component in the uneasy relationship with West. As a second sub-title, an introduction will be made towards a detailed analysis of the political culture of Greece by presenting the derivation, and the evolution of the duality. Some turning points, which had a determining role shaping Greek political culture since the establishment of Greek nation-state till the junta, collapsed in 1974 will be presented.
In the 2nd chapter, firstly the evolution of Greek political culture will be presented through a review of the Greek politics from the 1960s up to the 1990s and
11 transformation of Greek political parties. Dissolution of the dictatorship in 1974 presents the landmark of Greek political development. In the first decade of post- dictatorship era, Greece found itself in fierce debates over accession of Greece into
EC. They are very important debates in order to understand political parties’s domestic and foreign policy orientations and ideologies. After collapse of the dictatorship the rapid transition and consolidation of democracies was realized by the political parties, which were key agents of metapolitefsi. As known, the political parties are inseparable part of a modern democratic regime. In the case of Greece, they played important role as the main actors of consolidation of Greek democracy transformation of political culture. Therefore, the historical development and the main features of the structure of these political parties need to be evaluated. Also in this part, changing attitudes of Greek public opinion in the process of
Europeanization will be analysed. It is crucial to observe the pro-European attitude of
Greek Public opinion comparing to 1980s.
In the last chapter, Greek politics and Greek political culture, in metapolitefsi era will be discussed briefly, and the discourse of ‘Europeanization’ of Greek political culture will be presented by focusing on its consequences and dimensions. Finally, it will be emphasized that Simitis inaugurated a new era in Greek political scene with the motto of ‘modernization’. In this sense, Simitis represents the new face of
PASOK and the ‘hegemony’ of the modernist wing in Greek political culture.
Together with Simitis’s coming to political scene, the discourse and process of
‘Europeanization’ were replaced with ‘Modernization’.
12 To conclude, this study argues that the EC constituted a critical moment for both domestic and foreign politics of Greece, and this process profoundly affected and directed the hegemony struggle between two wings. Especially seeing of the accomplishment of ‘Economic Monetary Union’ as a national goal accelerated the process of ‘Europeanization’ of Greek politics, economy and culture. The structural changes characterizing the post-1996 era constituted another critical moment of
Greek historical development as indicative of a new era summed up the motto of
‘Modernization’ pronounced by Prime Minister Kostas Simitis. Simitis’ coming to power initiated a new era regarding the hegemony struggle between the traditionalist and modernist wing in favour of the latter. As a result, EU and the process of
Europeanization affected Greece almost in every field. For the dimension of Greek political culture 1990s proclaimed the hegemony of modernist wing over traditionalist one.
13 CHAPTER 1
TRANSFORMATION and ‘EUROPEANIZATION’ of GREEK POLITICAL
CULTURE
Political culture can be defined as the complex set of orientations and discourses that actors use while trying to make sense of, to explain or to legitimise/delegitimise prevalent political arrangements in political system (Mouzelis, 1995: 31).
Gabriel Almond first introduced the concept of political culture in 1956. According to him, political culture had certain autonomy and yet was related to the general culture; it did not “coincide” with the political system because patterns of orientation to politics transcend the boundaries of political systems. Almond and Verba refined the conception of political culture in The Civic Culture (1963) (Chilcote, 1981: 223).
They classified political culture into three types: parochial political culture, implying that individuals have low expectation and awareness of government and generally are not involved; subject political culture, in which, individuals are aware of the outcomes of government but do not take part in the processes that conclude policy decisions; and the last one was participant political culture in that individuals are active and involved in the system as a whole, that is both the input and output processes. Almond in collaboration with G. Bingham Powell, revised his definition: 14 “Political culture is the pattern of individual attitudes and orientations towards politics among the members of a political system. It is the subjective realm which underlies and gives meaning to political actions” (Almond, 1966:50). Other writers have reiterated Almond’s conceptualisation of political culture. Pye defined political culture as providing
an ordered subjective realm of politics and this can be found on two levels. For the individual the political culture provides controlling guidelines for effective political behaviour, and for the collectivity it gives a systematic structure of values and rational considerations and organisations (quoted in Chilcote, 1981:225).
Similarly, Sidney’s formulation suggests that political culture “consists of the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place” (quoted in Chilcote 1981:225).
There are several critiques against Almond’s conceptualisation. Chilcote defines the early theories concerning political culture as ‘orthodox’, and he suggests that in these studies political culture is conceived of in an ideal form as a civic culture. They are classificatory and descriptive rather than analytical. Edward Lehman found such early studies of political culture “reduce cultural factors either to social system’ or
‘treat them as merely the statistical aggregation of the intrapsychic orientations of the individual members of society” (Lehman, 1972:362). William Bostock mentioned that the typology of political culture suggested by Almond and Verba was based on descriptive rather than analytic criteria and that since no theoretical construct was formed, such a use of political culture was not explanatory enough and not predictive
(Chilcote, 1981:236).
15 A radical challenge in terms of the critique of the studies on political culture came from the Marxist perspective. The Marxist standpoint perceived the orthodox understanding of political culture and socialization as manifestation of the ideological superstructure of a bourgeois capitalist society (Chilcote, 1981:240).
In this study, the analysis and evaluation of Greek political culture will be argued by referring to Mouzelis’s understanding of political culture. In this sense, it should be mentioned that without taking into consideration the Greek historical development, a proper analysis of Greek political culture can not be developed. Political culture needs to be analysed as a dynamic characteristic of the whole system rooted in the historical background of Greece. The main events shaping Greek political culture constitute the main determinants in order to develop an understanding on Greek political culture. With such approach, political culture could not be evaluated independent from its actors (political parties, interest groups) and carriers. In this framework, concerning the political circumstances after 1974, political parties and the EC process had and have been shaping that role in terms of the development of
Greek political culture. The EC process is critical for understanding the changing ideologies, orientations and policies of the political parties during the acceleration of
Europeanization process.
1.1 Greek National Identity
So far an outline of Greek political culture has been presented and now the main elements of the modern Greek identity, an inseparable part of that political culture
16 will be introduced. It is necessary to understand the main pillars and elements of modern Greek identity for grasping the Greek political culture as a whole. Analysis of modern Greek identity is really difficult because of its complex structure. In this regard, we have to deal with a series of interrelated components such as ancient
Greek culture, heritage of Byzantium, Orthodoxy, east-west oscillation and historical continuity.
Greek national identity and meaning of this identity has a long history in terms of ongoing debates over them. The components of Greek national identity could be regarded as an articulation of dichotomous elements. Ancient Greek culture and
Orthodoxy are the main elements of this identity. The articulation of the dichotomous components reflects that the Greek national identity is relatively ‘unique’ and these challenging characteristics created debates on Greek national identity and the meaning of Greekness.
According to Greek nationalist view, ancient Greek culture forms the intellectual property of the Greek nation state while its geographical and/or cultural neighbours are excluded from this heritage. This cultural heritage has been regarded as an essential component of the nation’s existence.4
4 “New Greek Nationalism” by Triandafyllidou, A., M. and Mikrakis, A.
The image of Ancient Greek culture as the historical origin is the main pillar shaping
Eurocentrism and European identity discourse. Since, ancient Greek culture was idealized as the root of Western civilization.
Historical changes that occurred during the eighteenth and nineteenth century in the continent brought along the search for a secular understanding of the foundations of
European history and culture. New political, social and intellectual conditions involved a revised myth of foundation and the past itself had to be formed in such a way that a consistent path could be discerned leading from the beginning of Europe to its imagined destiny (Held, 1997:255).
Enlightenment could be formulated as a catalyst of a new era for Balkans in terms of reconsideration of the basic social and cultural problems confronting local society.
This process led to the reinterpretation of its history and visualization of its political future in terms of the new ideas. In this sense, the Enlightenment had profound creative influence and force in terms of transforming the life of the Balkan peoples under Ottoman rule at the ideological level. Enlightenment could be seen as the ideological catalyst of the national awakening in the Balkans (Kitromilides, 1994b:
59).
From the late 18th century to the second phase of the 19th century influence of the
Enlightenment among the Greeks could be seen very clearly in terms of the growth of a historiographical literature containing mostly translations and also original
18 books about the history and civilization of Greece. This neo-classical trend helped modern Greeks to perceive themselves as the descendants and heirs of the ancients.
This conception of ethnic community from the classical to modern Hellenes that was the direct product of the reception of Enlightenment neoclassicism into Greek thought, provided the essential element of the self-definition of the Modern Greeks
(1994b: 58-59).
As Chouliras stresses;
The moment of creation of Greece as a modern nation state entitled, according to tenets of 19th century nationalism, to a heritage and a cultural patrimony- coincided with a widespread but ambivalent recognition of Greeks as primordial Europeans (Chouliras, 1993:79).
The huge symbolic value pre-national / pre-modern Hellenism is not only particular trait making Greece different from most other nation states. Actually such an over- appreciation of Hellenistic heritage and Greek myth was, to a great extent, almost the product of Western European modernity (Tsoukalas, 1999:8).
Especially during 19th century we witness Greek Enlightenment Movement. This period and thinkers of this movement questioned Greece’s place: Where does Greece belong? Pro-Europeanist scholars claimed that Greeks should follow the European values taking its base from ancient Greek culture. For instance, as Renieris was prompt to declare at the beginning of these debates, Greece was western and
European ‘by her nature’, and it was on this account that westernisation was deemed appropriate. Referring importance to ancient Greek culture in the process of
19 westernisation of Greece, according to Kostas Palamas5 western patterns should be adopted on the ground of that they were part of Hellenic legacy (Varouxakis,
1995:32).
According to, Renieris, who is one of the important Greek scholars on the philosophy of history in 19th century,
Ancient Greece found herself between Europe and Asia, between West and East, no less than modern Greece. However the question was posed in very different terms, because for ancient Greece the moral, as well as the physical, light was coming from the East rather than from the West, as it does today. Greek civilization itself was at that time an offspring of eastern civilisation (1995:20-21).
Pro-European scholars claimed that if it was assumed that Greece was by her nature
Oriental, the adoption of Europeanisation would be detrimental for Greek culture.
Also, it was maintained that, by adopting European political and cultural patterns and by imitating Europe, Greece was not adopting and receiving any alien ways. Rather she was re-considering her own ancestral legacy that had been kept in and adapted to the changing circumstances of the modern world during its long exile in the West
(1995:32). According to Koumanoudis, European civilization was based on ancient
Greece and was therefore not only appropriate but also necessary for the modern
Greeks (1995:23).
During the nineteenth and the early decades of the twentieth century the issue of association between Greece and Europe was of supreme importance to the degree
5 He was one of the prominent figures of Modern Greek poetry also he strove to blend the traditions and thought of both East and West to improve a sense of Greek consciousness. (Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 1997:173) 20 that in the minds of the Greeks it was related to their nation’s political and cultural development.
In their quest to characterize Greece’s position in the modern period and its relation with Europe, Vernardakis, Dragoumis and the Psychrists (Yiannis Psycharis who had a considerable works on Greek language and he was one of the important thinkers of the Greek Enlightenment and his followers) looked for a number of alternatives. One of these was offered by the idea of an Eastern or Balkan Federation along the lines of a more or less Greek-dominated ethnicity. Another important Greek scholar
Yannopoluas, claimed that the Greeks deserved a better treatment and that the
Europeans were unappreciative to the ‘ancestor’ to whom they were heavily indebted
(1995:31).
Eugenios Voulgaris, Iosipos Moisiodax, Adamantios Korais were the most well known great thinkers of the Greek Enlightenment. Voulgaris envisaged that intellectual reform would provide the appropriate moral substratum for the attainment of political change and refoundation of an enlightened Christian monarchy over the Orthodox peoples of southeastern Europe in the place of Ottoman autocracy. He had a strong sense of the religious heritage of Orthodoxy as the primary source of values and the defining element of identity in the Greek East. In his opinion, European philosophy and science, European institutions and practices were adoptable only if they could be accommodated into a framework of Orthodox doctrine and custom. On the question of the extent of the acceptance of European models in Greek culture, there is disagreement between Voulgaris and Moisiodax.
21 He argued for an entire adoption of European practices and values as the only solution in order to escape stagnation and ignorance. Korais wrote about the achievements and benefits of the civilization of Enlightened Europe. In his opinion to confirm their European identity, the Greeks and the other Orthodox peoples of southeastern Europe had to catch up with secular enlightenment (Kitromilides,
1995:5-7).
Ancient Greek culture found also its expression in the discourse of the political parties in Greece, especially in the process of European integration. The right and left-wing parties positioned themselves via two historically contrasting cultural concepts, the ‘ancient past’ and ‘Orthodoxy’ that equalized being European and not-
European. In this point, ambiguity of modern Greek culture is clear. While Classical
Greece was forming an inclusive element of modern Greek identity as a link to
European identity, Orthodoxy was seen as an exclusive component of this articulation. As it is going to be dealt with below, this ambiguity is reflected through the image of ‘Hellono-Christian’ identity. In this sense, the discourse of ‘Hellono-
Christian identity was used by New Democracy and such a discourse reflects a version of the perception of national identity.
The ancient past was promoted and stressed by the moderate right-New Democracy- by describing Hellenism as the oldest democracy of the world.6 Promotion of classical Greece could be seen as a part the attempt to make Greece as a legitimate part of European Union in the process of integration.
6 “Reluctant Europeans Negotiating Greek Identity during the Macedonia Crisis” by George Gavrilis < http://www.replika.c3.hu/english/02/03gavri.htm> 26.01.2003 22 According to Constantine Tsoukalas, who has a critical approach to the idea that of
Greece is the ancestor of European civilization;
The origins of civilization were traced down to Hellas not only by the ‘Greeks’ themselves, but by ‘foreigners’…Not only ancient Greece was considered as the greatest achievements of human history but Europeans also tended to flatter themselves by discovering their own idealized ancestors in the ancient Greece. As a matter of fact, European expansionism and domination was based on the construction and appropriation of the racist myth of an eternally superior and indigenous proto-European civilization, which was clearly distinguishable, ever since its origins, from the inferior and barbaric Orient (Tsoukalas, 1999:8).
European idolization of classical antiquity emerged as a basic component of the newly defined essence of an inherently superior Western civilization. It was their own cultural self-images that Europeans were looking for to capture in their idealized historical looking glass. Indeed, the notions of rationality, modernity, emancipation and progress emerged as necessary elements of the conception of a universal and cumulative cultural evolution under the leadership of an inherently superior Europe
(Tsoukalas, 2001:30).
The problem of the cultural orientation of modern Hellenism created discussions among the Greek intellectuals that whether Modern Hellenism is or must be culturally defined in relation to the “west” and Europe, to the tradition of which it has already linked itself and should link more, or whether Greece must chase a tradition which is closer to the cultural space of the East. ‘We belong the East’ versus
‘We belong the West’ is the intensive form of this dilemma. The blending of the foreign, innovative component (Western European culture) with the native, Greek component (ancient and Byzantine elements, classical Greek and Byzantine-
23 Christian ideas) and articulation with the ancient world through the foreign components form a particular type of tradition-innovation blend identifying modern
Greek culture (Babiniotis, 1995:226-233).
Regarding so-called oscillation between East and West in the process of identity construction, Greek nationhood and statehood not only did handle the problem of describing what they ‘were’ but also were compelled to regard themselves as heirs of classical antiquity concerning to their given idealized past (Tsoukalas, 1999:10).
Greek national identity has been reconstructed by means of territorialization and politicization of ethnic and cultural traditions. Smith’s distinction between ethnic and cultural nations put Greek national community among the category of ethnic nations.
In this regard any questioning of the ‘hellenecity’ of Alexander the Great is conceived as a threat to the very essence of the nation since such a questioning expresses doubts on the continuity of the national community through history.7
Greek nationality arose in opposition to the Romioi identity. Greeks were distinguished from Turks concerning ethnicity and religion and also they were contrasted to their neighbouring Slavic populations on the grounds having classical
Greek culture.8
In this point, the focus will be on the opposition between Romioi and Hellenism.
The contrast between Romioi and Hellenes reflects a deep dichotomy of the Greek
7
Orthodox ‘millet’ (nation). 9
As Tsoukalas expresses,
After their nominal ‘Hellenization’, Greeks would have had to agree upon the main lines of their historical development. If the glory of antiquity provided the inevitable and unquestionable historical origin of the new nation, the question whether Byzantium should be integrated into their myth of national continuity, or should be read as a sort of prolonged ‘dark age’ leading to the Ottoman conquest (Tsoukalas, 1999:11).
The ambiguity of ‘Greekness’ is also another critical point creating debates. The distinction between Romioi and Hellenes reflects a deep dichotomy of the Greek identity discourse and reflects the opposition between tradition and modernity. This struggle between tradition and modernity could be seen as an inevitable function of the essence of modern Hellenism (Tsoukalas, 1993:67). In this sense, the Hellono-
Christian identity discourse could be formulated as the ambiguity of Greekness
(Tsoukalas, 1993:73).
In the Greek case, the discourse of Hellono-Christian identity presents an articulation of the basic features of Greek identity. In a sense, Hellono-Christian identity discourse could be considered as a feasible synthetic response to the conflicting
9
In this regard, the analysis of Kitromilides that presents a theoratical framework including the issue of historical continuity can be emphasized. According to
Kitromilides, the doctrine of national unity concerning the Greek national identity throughout the 19th century was articulated on three levels. On a social level, it stressed the need for national unity within Greece, with uniformity and homogeneity becoming prevalent norms of cultural discourse. On a geographical level, it stressed the unity of Hellenism, of the Greek nation as an integral whole bringing together its constituent parts within and outside the kingdom; and on a historical level, it stressed the unity of Greek nation along a temporal dimension, emphasizing its uninterrupted continuity throughout the centuries from Homeric through Byzantine to modern times. On the historical level the theory of historical continuity attempted to overcome the insecurities over national identity that originated from the cultural antinomies and contradictions between major elements of the Greek legacy, classical
Greece and Medieval Christian Byzantium (Kitromilides, 1994a: 167-168).
Constantine Paparigopoulos, one of the most important scholars of the age of Greek
Enlightenment managed to provide a new conceptualisation of Greek identity on the basis of a threefold continuum of Greek history, which articulated the heritage of pagan Hellenism, Orthodox Byzantium and modern status of Greece as a secular
European state. According to him, conception of Greek history, -ancient, Byzantine and modern period- recognizing each period as an indispensable part of Greek
26 experience provided a dualistic essence in terms of consisting of both secular and
Orthodox elements (Kitromilides, 1995:11-12).
The projection of Byzantium as an inseparable part of Greek identity and history was the product of intellectual efforts of Paparrigopoulos. In his book ‘History of the
Greek nation’, he managed to bring Byzantium and the Great Idea together as elements of the political culture of romantic Hellenism. With this projection
Paparrigopoulos integrated Byzantium into the continuum of Greek historical development that had a crucial influence on Greek political thought (Kitromilides,
1998:27-28).
The tension in the two-folded image of Greek cultural sources composed paradoxes in terms of ambivalence of Greek identity: Classical era and Byzantine era.
Byzantine heritage has a linking characteristic between Classical and modern Greece.
In this regard, the continuity of Modern Greek culture includes this chain: Ancient-
Byzantine and Modern era.
Another important tenet forging the tie between European civilization and modern
Greek identity is the dilemma between European civilization and Orthodoxy. The opposition of Latin Christianity and Eastern Christianity formed the exclusive dimension in the process of articulation of Greek identity and culture to European one. In this process, Greece took her place by representing the main actor of Eastern
Christianity with the heritage of Byzantine.
27 Greek national identity and the components of this identity found themselves in a dichotomous discourse. The outlines of the continuing debate on the meaning of modern Greek identity was articulated between the two dichotomous imageries: on the one hand, the Greek nation state has been regarded as the modern West’s incarnation of an idealized ancient Greek culture, on the other hand to far lesser extent, the Greek nation-state was symbolized as the modern representation of the
Eastern Roman Empire that was essentially Byzantine, Orthodox and Ottoman printed (Prodromou, 1996: 134).
For some Greek intellectuals, such ambivalence between East and West or in other words a conflict between tradition and modernity constituted a unique source of cultural inspiration and ‘essence’ of modern Greek identity (Tsoukalas, 1999: 13).
In this part, it was tried to analyse the place of ancient past in Greek history and politics concerning the question of where Greece belongs; West or East. In this sense, use of ancient Greek culture had a pragmatist attitude for giving its place in the West. Such an oscillation pre-existed before the establishment of Greek nation- state especially in 19th century with the Greek Enlightenment process and this question created ongoing debates coming down to present among Greek
Enlightenment thinkers and scholars studying modern Greek identity and culture. It is a fact that, ancient Greek past became one of the main pillar of Greek national identity discourse and constituted the nodal point in terms of forging ties between
Greece and Europe.
28 1.1.2 Orthodoxy
Orthodoxy is one of the major elements of modern Greek identity and at the same time it can be said that Orthodoxy had a contribution in terms of constructing the process of Greek nation building. The relationship between church and state is another dimension in modern Greek identity and political culture of Greece because the Church has a place in Greece not only religious but as a political and social institution.
Being Orthodox and Greek was regarded as inseparable components of Greek identity and even today if the 98% of the population of Greece is taken into account as Orthodox, the relationship between these two is easily understandable.
Under the Ottoman Empire, definition of many inhabitants had been based on religious identification and in this point; Greekness meant being an Orthodox
Christian. In other words, religious and national identifications were one and the same.
The “millet” system is the main indicator of the affiliation between religion and nationality. Concerning the millet system, church-state relations constituted a turning point in the evolving nature of the legitimacy of the Eastern Orthodox Church whose new legal-formal position as institutional representative of the Orthodox Christianity meant that the Church’s religious legitimacy was supplemented by political legitimacy, and that religious and political identities had become inseparable elements (Prodromou, 1994:127-128).
29 Millet system contributed to the preservation of Orthodox and more specifically
Greek identity at the same time by providing a broader context or worldview, a sense of ecumenicity (1994:42).
The fall of Constantinople in 1453 had significantly affected the Church. The
Patriarch of Constantinople was given some powers so the church became not only a religious but also governing institution. The Patriarch, as a spiritual head of the
Orthodox Church also became liable to the Ottoman Sultan as the civil administrator of the Orthodox Christians within the empire (Legg and Roberts, 1997:102).
Orthodoxy’s role in the nation building both for Greek case and Balkan national history is worth analysing. According to Kitromilides;
A whole tradition of Balkan historiography is nevertheless premised on the assumption that Orthodox Christianity and the Orthodox Church played a major role in nation-building, by preserving collective identity under the Ottomans and by preparing the advent to independence…
In this point, Kitromilides mentions that preservation of collective identity under
Ottoman rule by keeping Christian subjects from their Muslim rulers is not national but religious.
Furthermore, the Orthodox Church, and its especially monastic institutions, preserved the languages and the medieval imperial memories of the Balkan peoples, a heritage that in time was to be politicised by nationalism and made the basis of historiographical anachronisms. The church, however, as an institution of the Ottoman state remained a supranational organization and, by virtue of its own doctrinal principles, a non-national one. It was only the confusions arising from the coincidence that power in the Orthodox Church was wielded by a Greek-speaking hierarchy that created ‘ethnic’ antagonisms within it before the age of nationalism. It was the eventual abandonment of the ecumenicity of Orthodoxy, and the ‘nationalization’ of the churches, that brought intense national 30 conflicts into the life of the Orthodox Church and nurtured the assumption concerning the affinity between orthodoxy and nationality (Kitromilides, 1994a: 178).
The Patriarchate of Constantinople reacted to the spread of the ideas or principles that emerged with the Enlightenment. In this sense, influence of the Enlightenment upon the Greek Enlightenment and war of independence must be underlined.
However, Orthodoxy’s role in the process of nation-building in terms of the preservation of Greek identity could not be undernarrated but taking into consideration the reaction of the Patriarchate towards struggle for national independence, the role of Orthodoxy in that process makes it a bit questionable.
The conflict was articulated after 1789, when it became clear to traditional religious leaders where the intellectual changes and the liberal principles of the Enlightenment were leading. The active opposition of Patriarchate of Constantinople, especially under Patriarch Gregory V (1797-8, 1806-8 and 1818-21) to the spread of the Enlightenment in Greek-education and culture and to the Greek national movement, which sprang from it, constitute the clearest sign of antinomy between Orthodoxy and nationalism. Gregory V condemned, by appealing to the principles of Orthodoxy doctrine, both the radical republicanism of Rhigas Velestinlis in 1798 and the outbreak of the Greek Revolution in 1821 (1994a: 179).
The Patriarchate by means of a series of acts and pronouncements of its holy synod, displayed its opposition to nationalism (1994a: 181). The conflict between Patriarch and the new administration of newly independent Greece resulted proclamation
Church of Greece to be independent from the Patriarch.
Orthodox tradition has been a very important component in the political culture of
Greece. The strong relationship between church and state is a considerable heritage
31 coming from Byzantium and went on under the Ottoman rule and the modern Greek state (Stavrou, 1995:38).
The historical link of Orthodoxy in Greece formed a relationship between church and ethnicity that established the faith as a strong force in political consciousness (Fokas,
2000:283) and perceptions of culture as a link between church and state continue to exist and Orthodoxy is still seen as a preserver and expression of national cultural identity (2000:284).
The 1960s in Greece witnessed a great debate in terms of the social relevance of the church and the need for reforms. During the junta period, the colonels explicitly saw
Orthodox symbolism as an authoritarian culture emphasizing Eastern Christian heritage and reactionary anti-communism, through the slogan of ‘A Greece of
Christian Greeks’ (Prodromou, 1994:130-134).
The 1975 Constitution as the bedrock for Greece’s new democratic regime presented a window of opportunity for the radical changes in terms of religious dis- establishment and a range of factors affecting religious vitality (Prodromou,
1998:111). At an institutional level, the Orthodox Church became the ‘established’ religious organization in Greece through a royal directive. Since then the Church of
Greece enjoys the status of the state-established religion in Greece.
After the collapse of dictatorship and through acceleration of the process accession of Greece to the EC, the Church’s position has been revised as a part of the project of
32 modernization. Secularisation of the Church came to the agenda as a part of modernization project. The emergence of modern Greece initiated steps of secularisation process for the Greek Orthodox Church. In this sense, proclamation of the autocephalous Greek Church as independent from the Patriarch could be regarded as a first step of this secularisation process. The dissolution of dictatorship in 1974 as a watershed in Greek politics initiated the second bold step regarding secularisation process (Prodromou, 1998:107).
The 1975 Constitutional debates set the framework for the discussion of Orthodoxy in the process of emergent democracy after junta period, which lasted from 1967-74.
There are three important points for the church-state relations that appeared after
PASOK assumed power in 1981. Firstly, the debates left no doubt that democracy- building process as a project of re-making both state and civil society would involve transformation in the country’s secularisation profile. Secondly, the mutual causality between democratisation and religious transformation was illustrated in the processes that created the compromises in the final constitutional articles on religion. As a third point, secularisation emerges as a meaningful construct for discussing the relationship between democracy and religion. The approaches of the New
Democracy and PASOK to church-state relations involved competing opinions on the extent and objectives of religious dis-establishment as the issue of religious vitality was implicit in how each party understood the implications of Church-State institutional relations for the Orthodoxy’s potential role in civil society. The parties of the post-era 1981 and the process of consolidation of democracy brought about the redefinition of church-state relations. In this process the policies of PASOK named
33 ‘allaghi’ (change) occupied an important place the unresolved status of the Orthodox
Church vis-à-vis the state and civil society (Prodromou, 1998:113-116).
Reformulation of church-state relations involved the competing views on the extent and objective of religious dis-establishment with the different approaches of PASOK and ND. During the ongoing consolidation of democracy from 1975-81 the ND government avoided any major changes in Church-state relations, reflecting
Karamanlis’ interpretation of the political and economic priorities for institutionalising democracy. PASOK’s victory in 1981 elections, the party’s discourse of ‘allaghi’ included a revision of status of the Orthodox Church vis-à-vis the state and within civil society (Prodromou, 1998:107-115).
PASOK’s program for allaghi, with its mix of democratic socialism and populism, conceptualised that the dis-establisment of the Orthodox Church and the democratisation of the ecclesiastical structure in terms of the Church’s influence on the state power, on the one hand, and the Church’s role in civil society, on the other (Prodromou, 1998:133).
Hence it can be argued that Orthodoxy’s role in the process of identity construction is unquestionable regarding Orthodoxy as one of the critical constructive element of
Greek identity and interaction between religion and culture.
It is necessary therefore to introduce the discussions on Neo-Orthodoxy. The emergence of Neo-Orthodox current could be interpreted as an initiative in terms of the rejuvenation of the traditionalist wing in Greek political culture taking into consideration Orthodoxy’s role in the composition of traditionalist wing.
34 The term of Neo Orthodoxy came to agenda in 1980s. The aim of the intellectuals of
‘neo-orthodoxy’ to rediscover the essence of Orthodoxy and its potential as a component of the Greek nation, Orthodox Christians are distinguished not only from non-Christian traditions but also from the Roman Catholics and Protestants (Fokas,
2000:289).
According to Giannaras, who has been accepted as one of the most important representatives of this movement, neo-Orthodoxy not only represented religious revival but also a real acquaintance with the spiritual heritage of Orthodox civilization, clearly differentiated from that of the West (Makrides, 1998:142).
The Neo-Orthodox current of the 1980s was different from the Orthodox revival in the 1960s. The latter was more or less confined to the religious-theological domain, while the former transcended the attention of those who had previously had little or no interest at all in Orthodoxy. Neo-Orthodoxy emphasized the significance of
Orthodox Byzantine tradition for the Modern Greece, and its differences from the
West (1998:145-146). In Giannaras’s opinion, Modern Greece like Byzantium lies at the crossroads between East and West and both have affected it, but it preserves its specificity and otherness (Makrides, 1998:149).
From a range of academic and political perspectives, Greece as an Orthodox
Christian country is considered un-European, un-Western, consigned to a civilisational camp different from that of its fellow members of the EU and the rest of the West (Fokas, 2000:282).
35 According to Fokas;
The construction of the modern Greek state drafted Western, liberal political institutions onto the traditional Greek heritage. The result was the emergence of two powerful and often sharply conflicting cultural traditions, ‘embedded in the novel (Western)’ and the antecedent (Byzantine-Ottoman) elements of the Modern Greek historical experience, which, overtime, reproduced themselves through ongoing and overlapping processes of interaction, accretion, assimilation and adaptation (Fokas, 2000:283).
Taking into consideration religious and national homogeneity in Greece and
Orthodoxy’s place as a powerful element pervasive many aspects of national consciousness reflects an important trait of Greece with reference to the west and
Europe (Fokas, 2000:290).
According to Prodromou, Greek Orthodoxy and the church are described in terms of authoritarianism and reactionary nationalism and are thus considered inconsistent with modern, Western, pluralist democracy and this idea is used as the chief marker for redrawing the new European order into cultural spaces-‘the civilized Europe of the modern West and the Other European civilization of the Non-West (Prodromou,
1996:125-131).
A thorough analysis of the place of Greece in the EU involves taking into consideration the role played by Orthodoxy as one of the main tenets of modern
Greek identity and also as a focal point for international and external perceptions specifically about Greece and its relation to the West (Fokas, 2000:275).
As presented above, Orthodoxy constituted, in a sense, the most powerful component in the process of the construction of Greek national identity. It derives from
36 Orthodoxy’s role under Ottoman past by gathering Greeks under ‘Rum Millet’. Over time, the articulation between ‘being Greek’ and ‘being Orthodox’ formed another reference point for this identity. The Ottoman past and the conflict between ‘Latin
Christianity’ and ‘Eastern Christianity’ gave Orthodoxy as an exclusive character in this oscillation between East and West. Also, the historical process of Orthodoxy made it become the most critical pillar of ‘tradition’ and representative of the traditionalist wing in Greek political culture.
In this sense, there is another important point that needs to be concentrated on which is the “crisis of identity card”. A series of reforms aiming at modernizing the Greek legal apparatus related mostly to the issue of human rights came to agenda in 2000.
One of them was the deletion of religion from identity cards. This reform aimed at preventing discrimination against non-Orthodox Greek citizens. This view was not shared by Archbishop Christodoulos –the head of the Holy Synod of the autocephalous Church of Greece and religious leader of the Greek Orthodox majority of the population. Towards such a decision a reaction arose and it has polarised
Greek society and has been dominating political life and media coverage for most of
2000 and 2001. Archbishop Christodoulos led a campaign to oppose it, articulating a discourse that was characterized by a clear political profile. He referred to this exclusion as a coup d’etat and started a struggle to overturn it. This struggle contained mass demonstrations that were attended by hundreds of thousands of people in Thessaloniki and Athens, interventions in the media and a campaign to gather as many signatures as possible calling for a referendum on the issue. This polarisation was also reflected within the parliament. New Democracy supported
37 almost unconditionally the Archbishop. On 28 August 2001, it was announced that the Church had managed to gather 3.008.901 signatures for a referendum on the optional inclusion in Greek identity cards. After receiving the Archbishop and a representation of the Holy Synod that was supposed to inform him on the number of signatures collected for the Church petition, Constantine Stephanopoulos, the
President of Greece, issued a statement that
The conditions for the calling of a referendum on the issue of identity cards have not been met, everybody is obliged to abide by the rules of the current Law and the signatures which were collected with a procedure that falls outside legally instituted procedures cannot overturn the provisions of the Constitution (Stavrakakis, 2002)
As was mentioned above, Archbishop had a crucial role in this ‘crisis’ of identity card. His discourse primarily was a political discourse. For the Archbishop it is obvious that, with the deepening integration of Greece with EU “the state has ceased to be the obvious guarantor of national identity”. Consequently, “The salvation of
Hellenism can only be the task and accomplishment of the Church”. Such an attitude of Archbishop proved the claims that there is a ‘politicised discourse of the Greek
Church’. In fact, a short view in modern Greek history shows us that it was not the only incident. In the 20th century the overt politicisation of the Church took different forms: The Church supported the king against the modernist Venizelos; it played an active role in the ideological aspect of the ‘struggle against communism’ during the
Civil War; and was largely obedient to the ‘religious ideology’ (a Greece of Christian
Greeks) introduced by the colonels. The growing centrality of the Orthodox Church in the 1990s and the popular response to initiatives like the petition for a referendum on identity cards have to be understood in relation to the background of a variety of external and internal dislocations identifying the late 1980s and early 1990s: these
38 contain internal political developments (scandals, corruption, etc.) leading to increasing cynicism and political alienation, as well as international events (collapse of Soviet Union). Also, the main reason preparing this reaction could be sought under the membership and full participation in the EU with the increasing hegemony of the demand for ‘modernisation’. The resistance or reaction has taken a populist direction led by the Archbishop (Stavrakakis, 2002).
This case, so-called ‘identity-card crisis’ emerged when PASOK government attempted to take one more step towards secularisation, and abandon the requirements for Greek citizens to state their religion in their identity cards. The
Church reacted fiercely and this can be evaluated as a reaction to EU and
Europeanization. This reform attempt was regarded as a part of modernization process especially in terms of human rights. Such a reaction organised under the leadership Church authorities especially with the initiative of Archbishop
Christodoulos could be formulated as a reaction of traditionalist wing. This crisis can be seen as a reflection of the struggle between “modernist” versus “traditionalist” which characterizes the Greek political culture. Moreover this crisis expresses the persisting appeal of the “traditionalist” wing despite the hegemony of “modernisers”.
Such a reaction can not be underestimated and it is on the one hand a remarkable example concerning powerful role of Orthodoxy in Greek society, on the other hand it is an ‘interesting’ case drawing attention to the ‘politicised’ discourse of the Greek
Church.
39 1.2 Historical Overview of the ‘Duality’ of Greek Political Culture:
Traditionalists versus Modernists from the Establishment of Greek Nation-state till the Junta of 1974
In order to have a comprehensive understanding or opinion on Greek political culture it was necessary to have an idea of modern Greek identity. I think that without a view on the structure of modern Greek identity, it was difficult to grasp origins, context and evolution of Greek political culture.
The political history of Greece in the 19th century and mostly in the 20th century containing ‘revolutions’, dynastic change, oscillation between constitutional monarchy and republic, military coups, general governmental instability, situated the country apart from most other Western European countries (Legg and Roberts,
1997:3).
The analysis of Greek political culture necessarily should start with the Greek experience under Ottoman rule. Greek society lived under Ottoman rule as Orthodox
Christian millet for almost four centuries and this rule had critical a influence on attitudes towards politics, power, the state, law etc. Fundamentally, we are talking about a predominantly agrarian, pre-capitalist society and economy that flourished at the periphery of a “theocratic, Asiatic empire” (Diamandouros: 1983:44).
The conflict between modernizers and traditional indigenous elites during the War of
Independence is significant in this regard because it tended to involve pre-existing cleavages, social, political or cultural. In this sense, reformation of these pre-existing
40 cleavages after the formation of modern Greek nation-state created major conflict between an “old society” and a new state (1983:47).
The Byzantine heritage and experiences under the Ottoman rule gave rise to many socio-cultural practices. Mostly patronage-clientage, “rousfeti” (political favours) and personality politics have dominated the Greek scene as a result of this heritage.
Western European influence has been significant since the late 18th century, particularly in providing models for constitutions and governmental institutions
(Papacosma: 1983:35).
Greece gained its independence largely as a result of direct foreign intervention of three Great powers, and this left a legacy of political and economic dependence
(Macridis, 1981:7). During modernisation of Greece, the modernizers, through their familiarity with the operation of Western institutions, were able to attain control of the critical posts and institutions of the state. This was greatly important in order to use the state as a means for the modernization and the rationalization of the society from above (Diamandouros, 1983:47).
The introduction of modern political institutions, which were the products of capitalist social formations supported by powerful middle classes, upon a precapitalist social order gave rise to a tense relationship between state and society.
This relationship had significant consequences for the modern Greek political system by strengthening inherited attitudes of distrust and manipulation towards the state
(Diamandouros, 1983:47-48).
41 Liberal parliamentary institutions were introduced with the construction of modern
Greek state but these were never profoundly internalised in the Greek political culture, as in the case with western liberal ideas in general. Diamandouros indicated that this was due to a number of factors, such as the impact of the illiberal, patriarchical Ottoman rule, the traumatic experiences inflicted by the behaviour of western powers towards Greece, the weakness of the Greek bourgeoisie, the prevailing powers of traditionalist elites, the dominance of nationalist and irredentist ideologies as well as the absence of long and stable links with the European
Enlightenment (Tsinisizelis, 2002:68).
The borrowed institutions and innovations were drafted into Greek culture. Because of the conflict between the Greek cultural values and western ones, these institutions did not function in the same mode, as did the originals (Legg and Roberts,
1997:108).
In Greek nation-building process, the idea of the nation precedes the formation of the state, which in turn transforms this nation into a political identity. The making of the
Greek state and nation, comprising its parliamentary system, took place in an environment that was principally a non-capitalist socio-economic structure. Greece in the 19th century was predominantly an agrarian society whose later economic development has been of a quasi-capitalist character. The latter is marked by three notable factors. First, Greek economic capital has been more commercial and small business-based. Second, most of the economic development has been mediated by state as the main mechanism of surplus distribution. Third, an institutionalised
42 capitalist market intrinsically has never been a major element of Greek development and petty bourgeois patterns of life have tended to predominate (Demertzis,
1997:108-110).
As was mentioned above, there are key events in Greek history that dominantly shaped political development and political culture of Greece. One of them is the
1909 military coup. The period lasting from the 19th century until the 1909 military coup10 was named as oligarchic clientelism by Nicos Mouzelis, and Greek political development was characterized by limited political representation whereby a small number of families of notables (the so called tzakia) had a control over lower class votes via clientelistic means.
The highly decentralized form of clientelism was greatly influenced by the result of the 1909 military coup. After 1909 coup, the elections held in 1910 and coming to power of Venizelos’s Liberal Party led to the break-up of the quasi-monopolistic hold the tzakia families had been exercising over the means of domination. This era brought ‘new man’ into political scene, and therefore broadened the circle of those who actively participated in politics. Despite efforts of Venizelos to restructure his liberal party along western European legal bureaucratic principles of organization,
Greek political parties kept their marked particularistic/clientelistic character during
10 Political crises in 1909 caused by Greece’s failure have gains in international politics. There was increasing uneasiness among the newer professional and commercial classes in the growing cities; the old political leaders, who were remnants of families that had come to power during the revolution, had not understood the problems of these new groups. The military League felt that the Crown and the oligarchy of semi hereditary politicians formed during the 19th century has mismanaged both foreign and domestic policy and caused the defeat of Greek nationalist aspirations. (Legg, 1969: 68) 43 the whole of interwar period and right up to the 1967-74 military dictatorship
(Mouzelis, 1995:18-19).
The social, political and cultural struggles of the early 19th century and the construction of the modern state in that country produced two sharply conflicting cultures, which emerged during the war of Greek Independence and crystallised in the course of the following two to three decades. Two interrelated developments that
Greece has in common with other late-industrializing societies added to the intensity of the conflict between the two cultures: construction of the modern state based on the importation of western liberal political institutions of primarily British
(parliamentary system) and French (administration) inspiration, and the tense, delicate and antagonistic state-society relationship which was the outcome of the negative articulation between exogenously derived state institutions and the predominantly precapitalist economy and society in which they were embedded
(Diamandouros, 1993:2-3).
In the first decade after the war of independence, Bavarianism11 and absolutism, both alien and highly resented forces symbolizing the exclusion of the Greeks from control of their own affairs, contributed largely to the sharp increase in the cleavage separating state and society. The experience of the war of 1897 with the Ottoman
Empire12 helped shape a permanently traumatised political culture, in which two
11 After independence of Greece in 1833 the European powers installed a Bavarian prince King Otto, a Bavarian German Prince, to keep Greeks in order. This usage has a metaphorical function here just to refer to the monarchy that was abolished in December 1974. 12 In 1896 an upheaval broke out in Crete against the Turks and Greece declared war on Ottomans in 1897. The war ended with defeat of Greeks. After the war, Crete was granted autonomous status under the Ottoman suzerainty. (Clogg,1992: 70-71) 44 conflicting conceptions of Greece and of her political system existed side by side; the
Greece of the present, small, poor, ill-governed and backward; and the Greece of the future which was to be large, powerful, developed, civilised (Diamandouros,
1983:50).
The processes following the 1909 military intervention in politics and Venizelos’s coming to Greek political scene following 1910 elections initiated the liberalisation of the political system and the decline of the oligarchic dominance in the years up to
1915. However, such a process was paralysed due to a number of upheavals revolving around two critical developments that boldly characterized the period between 1915-40. The first was the great ‘National Schism’, which derived from a constitutional confrontation between Venizelos and the monarch on the basis of the crucial issue of Greece’s entry into the First World War. The second was the defeat in Asia Minor. The Catastrophe of Asia Minor had been really a traumatic experience for contemporary Greek society. A deep sense of loss, disorientation, and alienation coupled with widespread insecurity and despair inevitably shaped both collective and individual attitudes towards state and politics (Diamandouros,
1983:51).
The ‘Great Idea’ was the abstract form of Greek nationalism. The Great Idea and
Greek nationalism in general were stirred up not only by the ambitions for a territorial expansion but also by the necessity to construct internal and ideological coherence. National irredentism and national liberation struggles, as were described in the ‘Great Idea’ vision, and the continuous turmoil of the hostile neighbourhood,
45 in which the modern Greek state was situated, initiated a series of internal crises and provided enough stimulus for the centralization of the political system (Blavoukos,
2002:11).
Emergence of a working-class movement was the third development that played a more lasting role in shaping the evolution of the Greek political system and of the national political culture (Diamandouros, 1983:51).
Establishment of the Metaxas13 dictatorship in 1936 marked the beginnings of a deep separation of Greek society whose demarcating trait would be the dominance of the
Greek right over an exclusivist political system (1983:51). Foreign invasion and occupation and national resistance to occupation were the events that followed
Metaxas dictatorship. During and after the Second World War, England was a key actor in Greek politics and supported the return of the king (George II) to reinforce its political power because monarchy was regarded as a national symbol against communism and as a guarantee that Greece would remain linked to the western interests. End of civil war14 (1946-1949) in 1949 brought America to Greek political scene (Papacosma, 1983:36-37). Perhaps the most important outcome of the Greek
13 Metaxas was a minor politician on the far-right during inter-war period. The King George II appointed him as prime minister in 1936. Then he proclaimed the dictatorship on 4 August 1936 and abolished key articles in the constitution by claiming that the country was under communist take-over. (Clogg, 1992: 142-145) 14 The German invasion and the triple Axis occupation of Greece led to the struggle against the occupation forces which became at the same time a struggle for national liberation and democratisation of political, social and economic life. In 1941 Communists established National Liberation Front (EAM) and also National People’s Liberation Army (ELAS) was established as its military wing. They did not only fight against occupiers but also the right-wing resistance groups. When the German occupiers withdrew from Greece in October 1944, these communist groups continued to exert their influence and soon a fully-fledged civil war started. Due to the support given by Soviet Bloc to the Greek Communists, the Civil war lasted until 1949 and ended in defeat of communists (Clogg, 1992:125-144) 46 civil war was the dislocation of the previously almost unequivocal correspondence of
‘Right’ with positive values and ‘Left’ with greatly the negative ones (Pappas,
1999:186). As it was correctly expressed, the historical legacy of the Greek Civil war was the profound division between ‘Right’ and ‘Left’.
The political right dominated the 1950s, but opposition endured from the left and the center had developed an increasingly broad base of popular support by the early
1960s. Despite the victory of the Center Party of Papandreou in 1964 elections, he was forced out of the office in the summer of 1965. The monarch- King Constantine
II- maintained to incite controversy as he created and manipulated governments for the defence of right-wing interests. As it is known, the ‘Colonels’ declared that they were providing solutions to the chronic problems of political turmoil in the form of military dictatorship (Papacosma, 1983:37).
It is necessary to elaborate on the events causing 1967 military intervention politics that had critical consequences for the Greek historical development. George
Papandreou, the leader of Centre Union Party, came to power in 1964. The first event causing the crisis between King Constantine and G.Papandreou emerged due to conflict over who had the right to replace the Minister of Defence. In 1964, Andreas
Papandreou, the son of George Papandreou, was elected to the Parliament. His attitudes in terms of overtly criticising the King, NATO and US foreign policy toward Greece disturbed military. Also, he was alleged to have been involved a clandestine organization of leftist officers known as ASPIDA but his involvement was never been proved. The Cyprus Crisis contributed to military intervention as an
47 external factor. Cyprus became the nodal point in Greek-Turkish and Greek-
American relations. This evolved into an anti-NATO and anti-American issue particularly among the left political forces. G. Papandreou tried to realize the settlement through UN rather than NATO and US and opposed ERE’s NATO- oriented policy for the Cyprus. Also Papandreou’s government’s proposal for the reduction of military budget alarmed the army. The popularity of G. Papandreou and the fear of his victory in the scheduled 1967 elections were important reasons for the coup. Greece remained under military rule between 1967-74. In short, internal turmoil and weakness in the Greek social structure and, of course, American interference and interests can be considered as causes of the dictatorship (Dobratz and Kourvetaris, 1987: 54-62)
As one tries to look through developments since the fall of dictatorship in 1974, and to reflect on their impact over the political culture in the years ahead, a number of considerations deserve attention. Chiefly, it is necessary to recognise that the political system installed in Greece following the return to democratic rule is by far the most open that this country has known in its modern existence (Papacosma,
1983:36-7). The abolition of monarchy, the end of politically exclusionary state of emergency that followed the civil war; the debasement of ‘veto groups’ such as the military and para-constitutional cycles, the renewal of political personnel, the construction of an open competitive political system, the pluralistic reorganization of the party system, and the expansion of political communication are some of the major developments mainly determined by the dynamics and conjunction of transition to the republic (Demertzis, 1997:117). Above all, the emergence, for the
48 first time since Venizelos, of a new political party, PASOK, situated to the left of center, and capable of openly, legally and legitimately bidding for power, form obvious signs of a major liberalisation of the Greek political system (Papacosma,
1983:36-37).
The political cleavages of the country have profound historical roots inherited from two traumatic periods: the National Schism of 1915-22 and the Civil War 1946-49.
The National schism was between right and anti-right coalition and the second was between communist or left and anti-communist division. During the 1960s and mostly after 1974 the two cleavages overlapped therefore the major political families corresponded to two major parties. Still, it should be kept in mind that the cleavage between right and anti-right does not comply with the traditional right-left division characterizing most European political cultures (Demertzis, 1997:111).
The analysis of Greece’s political culture have consisted of the contradictions between two dichotomous tendencies-Western and non-Western- where the latter are characterized by the ‘formidable confining conditions’ to modernization and democratisation posed by a sultanistic heritage identified the long Byzantine
(Church, Law) and Ottoman (state) heritages (Prodromou, 1996:137-138).
In Diamandouros’s opinion, in Greece, there is a continuing all-pervasive distinction between two types of mutually antagonistic political orientations. One is more traditionally oriented, indigenously based, inward-looking political orientation, hostile to Enlightenment thoughts as well as to the institutional arrangements of
49 Western modernity. The other one is a modernising, outward-looking orientation, trying to ‘catch up’ with the West by adjusting Western institutions, ideas and values.
According to Diamandouros, the two cultures are interrelated in such a way that one or the other attains the upper hand-and loses it again depending on the political conjuncture (Diamandouros, 1994:20-23).
Accession to EC enmeshed in the old cleavage between ‘Westernizers’ and
‘Traditionalists’. The cleavage refers to the age-old question as to whether Greece belongs to the ‘West’ or the ‘East’. Viewed from this perspective, the challenge facing the country upon accession to EC in 1981 was how to bridge the gap between its political, economic and cultural identity as a Western European country with its
Eastern location and traditions (Tsinisizelis, 2002:66).
According to Diamandouros, accession to the EU and its following need for socio- economic and political adjustment form the most important force which, acting as an unequivocal ally of the forces adhering to the modernizing culture, is slowly but inexorably helping to shift the balance of the historical development in favour of the permanent ascendancy of that culture (Diamandouros, 1993:20).
Viewed from a cultural perspective, Greece emerges as a distinct example in the EU in which it is the only member state having a distinct cultural identity composing
Orthodoxy, the Byzantine tradition and classical past (Ioakamidis, 1996:46).
50 As mentioned above, Greek political culture draws its roots from the establishment of modern Greek state. Indeed, political history of Greece presents the main source to understand the overlapping character and relation between rival wings of Greek political culture. In this regard, Greece’s history, its experiences as‘millet’ under
Ottoman rule and the developments following independence, gives the key points of this conflict. During its history from independence till 1990s, there are major developments in terms of observing hegemony and rivalry between these two wings.
To illustrate, 1915 known as ‘Great Schism’, 1936-40 Metaxas Dictatorship, 1946-49
Greek Civil War, 1967-74 dictatorship era could be counted as nodal points of Greek historical development and illustrate rivalry between, in a way, right and left and/or traditionalists and modernists as components of the Greek political culture.
1.3 ‘Duality’ of Greek Political Culture
So far the constitutive elements of Greek political culture have been introduced by focusing on the key events starting from the construction of the modern Greek state till the fall of the dictatorship. As has been mentioned above, this so-called ‘duality’ created intense academic debates: Does the Greek political culture have a dualistic character or not? In order to carry out a more detailed analysis of Greek political culture, in this context, it is necessary to engage with the works and opinions of
Nikiforos Diamandouros and interpretations of them.
Diamondouros has a general approach to outline a dualistic cultural profile for
Southern Europe. According to him, in the case of Southern Europe, encounter with
51 the political and ideological shock waves unleashed upon the rest of the continent by the French Revolution and liberalism, throughout the early decades of 19th century, brought about critical juncture (Diamandouros uses this concept referring the works of Seymour Martin Lipset, Stein Rokkan and Ruth Berins Collier, David Collier in terms of a disrupting and reorienting encounter of a prevalent order with a novel force having a long-term impact on the developmental trajectory of a given society).
This deeply influenced and reshaped the history of the societies in the region and set them on a novel and separate developmental route. Its most enduring historical heritage was the ‘cultural dualism’ which, for about a century and a half, became the distinctive characteristic of these countries, pitting defenders of the old order against proponents of the novel and effectually serving as the restrictive condition to the decisive break with the past (Diamandouros, 1994:8-10).
According to Demertzis, interpreting contemporary Greek political culture in terms of ‘cultural dualism’ can lead to ignorance two critical and interrelated points: first, by contrasting tradition with modernisation ignores the fact that there is not one single tradition and that modernization cannot exist outside a framework of some tradition: thus tradition is not something negative by definition. Second, it characterizes tradition and modernization as two pre-constituted and mutually exclusive rather than inter-constituted and interrelated cultural entities; for the point is not that there are two conflicting political identities as much as that is contradiction between tradition and modernity and every individual or collective political actor. Demertzis conceptualises the contemporary culture of Greece as
“inverted syncretism”. This refers to the articulation of modernity and tradition in
52 Greek political culture (“Syncretism” was used by political scientist to refer to the functional interrelation of heterogeneous features whenever two different political cultures communicate.). In Greece, an almost inverted process appeared: keeping just a formal status, modernising patterns lost their original function whereas traditional ones remained intact or even became rejuvenated (Demertzis, 1997:117-119).
Charalambis and Demertzis argue that Greek political culture should be analysed on the ground of a special articulation among three analytically separate but historically interrelated elements a) actual policy implementation and everyday political behaviour b) establishment of the capitalist market in Greece and the organization of
Greek political System c) overall historical parameters (quoted in Moschanos,
1997:326).
It can be argued that Diamandouros’s approach to Greek political culture has reductionist dimension in terms of his conceptualisation the relationship between two wings in the form of ‘conflict’ or rivalry. Diamandouros refer to the fundamental turning points of Greek historical development to legitimise the so-called conflict between traditionalist and modernist wing. Contrary to Diamandouros’s framework for Greek political culture, Demertzis and Charalambis presented a different framework. As mentioned above, these ‘opposite’ components of Greek political culture were perceived as the sine qua non pillars of the wholeness of this culture.
Such an approach was described bilateral, functional and inseparable interrelation. In my opinion, such an approach, taking into account the inseparable character of
53 tradition and modernity within Greek political culture, presents broader framework for analysing it.
In the Greek case, the so-called ‘dualistic structure’ of political culture is understandable if one looks through the establishment of Greek-nation state. In the process of establishment of Greek nation-state the imposition of Western political institutions on traditional structures gave birth to the seed of the so-called duality since the beginning. According to Diamandouros, based on his assumptions, the
Greek case fits well into this general pattern. The establishment of modern Greece during the half of the 19th century involved the introduction in that country of
Western, liberal political institutions (e.g., constitutionalism, rule of law, legal- bureaucratic state, regular army) and their drafting onto traditional and precapitalist, indigenous structures that were essentially the product of the long Byzantine
(Church, law) and Ottoman (state) heritages. Given the main political and cultural reorientation in state-society relations, which this process involved, put itself with social, political, and cultural struggles in the reformulation of power relations within
Greece that played the key role (Diamandouros, 1994:10-11).
Diamandouros thus underlines to the evolution of so-called dualistic political culture of Greece. The older of the two cultures mirrors the historical realities of the Greek
“longue duree” that impregnated in the Balkan-Ottoman legacy and deeply affected by the Orthodox Church that historically, intellectually, as well as theologically, had long sustained a strongly, anti-western stance. This is a culture distinguished by a pronounced introvertedness; a powerful statist orientation coupled with a deep
54 ambivalence concerning capitalism and the market mechanism; a decided preference for paternalism and protection, and a lingering adherence to precapitalist practices, a universe of moral sentiments in which parochial and, quite often, primordial attachments and the intolerance of the alien; a latent authoritarian orientation fostered by the structures of Ottoman rule and by the powerful heritage of what Weber termed a “sultanistic regime”; and a hesitating attitude towards innovation (Diamandouros,
1994:12-13).
Predominance of Orthodoxy in terms of shaping of this culture needs to be emphasized. The gradual estrangement of the medieval Orthodox world from its
Catholic counterpart and the formal break emerged in 1054 added a new dimension of external threat perception (this time from the West) to the culture of Orthodoxy.
Critical in the development of this Orthodox worldview was the role of the
Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople, historically considered as the primus inter pares within Eastern Orthodoxy and dominated during by the Greek component of the Orthodox world (Diamandouros, 1994:13-14).
To recapitulate, this can be defined as a powerful underdog culture, which became, over time, specially established firmly among the very extensive, traditional, more introverted, and least competitive strata and sectors of Greek society. The distinctive feature of these strata was their involvement in activities (subsistence agriculture, petty commodity production not geared to exports, finance, import-substitution, industries, and the overinflated and unproductive state and unproductive state- and wider public sector) marked, above all, by low productivity, low competitiveness, the
55 weakness of economic, political, and cultural linkages to outer world and to the international economy, the aversion to reform, and powerful, affective commitments to various adaptations of domestic structures inherited from long Ottoman tradition.
Taking into consideration this manifold set of characteristics and system of meanings, this culture’s ‘project’ of society and its vision of Greece at the national, regional and international systems and its understanding of change and modernization is deeply defensive, protectionist. In this framework, the state has historically been considered as the motor force for the defensive modernization of
Greek society. In Diamandouros’s opinion, this is a view of modernization common among late developing societies, which reflects this culture’s ambivalence towards the liberal, Western model of socio-economic change and which historically proves itself in the willingness to search for, and experiment with, “alternative” paths to modernity. This is a culture that can be said to assert the loyalty of a majority of the
Greek population since independence (Diamandouros, 1994:20-22).
The younger of the two cultures in modern Greece takes its intellectual origins from the Enlightenment and from the tradition of political liberalism deriving from it.
Secular and extrovert in orientation, it has tended to look to the nations of the developed industrial West for inspiration and for support in performing its programs.
Over time, it has been embodied with a distinct preference for reform, whether in society, economy, or polity, conceived to promote rationalization along liberal, democratic, and capitalist lines. This is a culture that entirely has tended to support the creation and intensification of international linkages for Greece and to advance its integration into the international system. The distinctive feature of this culture was
56 its being more outward-looking and less prejudiced than its rival (Diamandouros,
1994:22-23).
The main social and political actors who became the basic carriers of this culture, sharing and shaping its assumptions, embracing and adapting its imagery, have been;
-within Greece, the popular strata and elites more closely identified with cultural, economic (agricultural, commercial, or, over time, industrial), and political activities relating them to the international system;
-the Greek Diaspora communities in the Ottoman empire, Southern Russia, and
Western Europe, a very large part of which was involved in commercial and, to a lesser extent, banking activities that both linked it to, and made it particularly sensitive about, developments in the international political, cultural, and economic environment; and,
- their intellectual followers both inside and outside the Greek state (Diamandouros,
1994:24).
The reformist culture was the rising element in the Greek world from roughly the end of 19th century until the mid-1930s. From then on till the end of the colonels’ dictatorship in 1974, it entered a period of slow but pronounced decrease paralleling the gradual destruction of the Diaspora communities and the exhaustion of the
Venizelist project, both of which had long persisted it. During this long period, the underdog culture experienced a growing preeminence in Greek politics. The structural changes in both domestic and international Greek politics associated with the establishment of the Third Greek Republic in 1974, and the subsequent Greek
57 entry into the EC brought a dynamic which imparted a new vitality to the reformist tradition. Accession into EC set out a period of considerable revival which has enabled it gradually to challenge its rival in a bid for ascendancy during the current phase in the evolution of Greek political life (Diamandouros, 1994:26-27).
In spite of the conflicts between the modernist’ strategy for political development and the almost entirely reactive attitude of the traditionalists, both groups had to deal with the cultural heritages of state-society disarticulation and a delicate, religious sense of collective identity within the context of nation-statehood. The modernists and traditionalists not only had very distinguishing views for the meaning of the new-nation state, but also drew very several interpretations of the impact of the historical past on the exigencies of building a modern Greek nation state. The Greek modernists were a relatively distinct group including of several distinctive elements whose respective economic interests, ideological orientations, and intellectual histories converged such that they equated modernization with westernisation. This conception of modernity was largely the articulation of Greek intellectuals who had been educated in the Western European Diaspora and who viewed independence from the Ottomans as a victory for Enlightenment ideas. As with the institutional project of shaping a modern Greek polity, the modernists’ ideological project of constructing a modern Greek nation took the Enlightenment philosophy of Western
Europe as the point of reference (Prodromou, 1993:203-204).
According to Prodromou, the military intervention of the colonels in 1967 mirrors the political crystallization of the contradictions in Greek culture that had become
58 increasingly irreconcilable over the course of the 20th century. The military’s direct intervention in politics broke any weak sense of integration between state and society. Failure of the authoritarian regime to legitimatise and institutionalise itself must be interpreted as societal rejection of a state discerned as hostile and incursive.
The dictatorship tried to develop an economic development strategy, which was strictly modelled on standards of Western capitalist industrialization. In spite of rates of economic growth and per capita income improvements, indigenous restrictions related to Greece’s late industrialization generated a dualist economy with aggravated inequalities and inefficiencies, and deepened the cleavage between the state and those segments of society negatively affected by the structural dislocations of the westernising economic pattern (Prodromou, 1993:216-217).
Another important point is related with clientelism as a structural feature of Greek political culture. Clientelism has always been one of the most important traits in
Greek politics. Clientelist practices as a structural component of traditionalist wing were heritage of Ottoman past and over-time instead of elimination; they carried on surviving and reproduced in the new political and administrative system of the state.
As Lyrintzis mentioned, cleavages, charismatic leaders, populism and clientelism generally characterize Greek politics.15 The modern Greek state has played a determinant role in shaping Greek society. Since the formation of modern Greek state, state intervention in socio-economic and political developments has been effective ranging from the organizational and economic infrastructure to the shaping
15 Katia Vlachos-Dengler < www.kgs.harvard.edu/kokkalis/GSW3/Katia_Vlachos.pdf> 12.06.2003 59 of industrial relations. It has been argued that the Greek state has also upheld the basic mechanisms for the ‘incorporation’ of the masses into political system by promoting and enlarging the clientelistic networks that characterized Greek social relations and by often encouraging a populist logic by the political parties. Until post-war period, civil society and especially the organizations of the lower classes remained under the tutelage of the state. It has been convincingly argued that civil society has been deprived of any autonomy vis-à-vis the state that always managed to encompass any independent initiative coming from ‘below’. State intervention and influence was achieved either through direct involvement in the union’ politics- clientelistic networks provided the necessary and proper mechanisms of access to the ministry of labour-or through a controlled system of collective negotiation (Lyrintzis,
2002:90-91).
There are various definitions on the mode of interest representation. According to
Mouzelis, the mode of organization of lower-class interests in Greece is
‘incorporative’ (it is characterized by the de facto control of the state over associations, which are weak and subjected to state manipulation). For Mouzelis, there are two types of ‘incorporation’: clientelism and populism and both of them can be found in semi-peripheral societies as in the case of Greece. The other opinion suggested by Tsoukalas is ‘clientelistic corporatism’ that involves corporatist arrangements between the state and preferred social groups. The founded corporatist arrangements promote the interests of the bourgeoisie and fractions of the urban
60 middle strata through selective distribution of state subsidies and public employment opportunities to governing party loyalists.16
In Greece, democracy has been related closely to a clientelistic domination of bureaucracy. Government changes are directly associated with following administrative changes. Bureaucratic clientelism, in essence, a recent phenomenon in
Greece is different from the older forms of clientelism in that a party bureaucracy acts in an organized, bureaucratic mode to permeate state mechanism with party devotees and distribute favors to party clients. A political culture evolving around the logic of individual intermediation with the power holders, a pluralist but polarized party system, have contributed to the subjection of the administrative system to the fluctuations of the political system making the former entirely dependent on the latter. The formal confederate organizations of the movement of workers, farmers and public employees have remained under the shadow and interventions of the state. During the short periods of authoritarian rule (1925-26,
1936-40 and 1967-74) and during the monitored democratic regime of the post-civil war era the pressure of the state on the working class was much tighter than in the periods of relatively stable democratic rule (1928-32, most of the 1960s and from
1974 to the present). Since 1974 new social movements have emerged in the areas of culture, environment protection, women’s issues, consumer’s rights. In this sense, one may conclude that the prevalence of state corporatism in industrial relation is partially responsible for the underdevelopment of new social movements.17
16 “The Remains of Authoritarianism: Bureaucracy and Civil Society in Post Authoritarian Greece” by Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos
The expansion of state activity did not produce public goods and benefits as often as it supplied personal opportunities in the form of employment or contacts. Citizens didn’t conceive the possibility of collective action because every contact, every demand and every response, was perceived as private and opposed to others. The strength of local, family-oriented clientage networks provided security and, at the same time, mediated relations with the centre (Legg, 1977:286-287).
Patron-client relations have been inseparable part of the Greek political life since the days of Ottoman rule. According to, Tsoukalas there exists a ‘closed’ system of social interactions, whose circle of life starts and ends in these relations. Mouzelis suggests that the Greek political system has moved from “decentralized to centralized clientelism” in the interwar year and to even more centralized populism in the post-authoritarian period. According to Charalambis Third Greek republic is a party democracy because the political parties precludes any other type of political representation (quoted in Tsinisizelis and Chryssochoou, 1996:25-27).
Pre-capitalist phase of Greek social formation (1821-1870) was characterized by a huge state apparatus, controlled by the crown and a more or less fragmented political oligarchy at the head of extensive clientelistic networks (Mouzelis, 1980:241-242).
In the process of transition to post-oligarchic politics in Greece, the deepening of the
62 political system and the inclusion of new strata in the political game were not accomplished through autonomous and massive trade unions and working-class parties, but by clientelistic means. There is difference between 19th century oligarchic clientelism and political patronage system of the post-oligarchic period.
The huge expansion of the state bureaucracy and the centralization of the major parties altered the more traditional type of clientelism under which local notables had had such tight control over their voters and enjoyed such high autonomy vis-à-vis the national leaders that parties on the national level were simply loose coalitions of political barons. The entrance into politics of new social elements after 1909 and the decline of the tzakia families meant the reinforcing of the parties’ central organization as orientations, allegiances and resources shifted from the local to the national level. These developments in turn meant that traditional clientelism had to give way to more centralized forms of party and state-centered patronage (Mouzelis,
1986:45).
According to Mouzelis, ‘modernization’ does not exclude clientelism: Patronage networks tend to continue in a modified, less traditional form even after the decline of oligarchic politics and the development of industrial capitalism. In this regard,
Venizelos, in his project of restructuring Greek politics, was intensively critical of the corruption and moral degeneracy of the old political establishment, that it stimulated the people to discard the yoke of the tzakia families, and advocated greater social justice (Mouzelis, 1986:76-79).
63 Over-employment in the public sector constituted one of the main features of the state’s gigantism. The clientelistic nature of Greek politics was a crucial factor for huge expansion employment in the public sector. From the early 1960s till the country’s entry into the EC, one of the constant and indisputable components of economic policy was increasingly entrepreneurial expansion of the public sector. The expansion entrepreneurial activity of the public sector was accomplished through the operating of network of patron-client relations and ‘dependencies’. The huge economic state interventions driven by clientelistic, political motives gave rise to a paternalistic, regulatory model, clearly at odds with the economic logic of the EU.18
Mouzelis perceives the history of the modern Greek society as a series of external interventions such as national independence mostly on interference of Great Powers,
Minor Asia Catastrophe, Civil War, the military dictatorship (1967-74). He also suggests clientelism as the primary political framework in order to understand Greek relations of power. Mouzelis explicitly connects clientelism to precapitalist social relations. Therefore, the relevance of the concept to his schema of Greece’s underdevelopment is evident (quoted in Gourgouris, 1996:65-66).
Western economic dominance and political tutelage has long been regarded by radical nationalist, ‘dependency’ theorists and the neo-Marxists left as being largely responsible for the relatively stunted and ‘dependent’ development of the Greek state, economy and bourgeoisie. In these ‘anti-imperialist’ perspectives, Greece’s accession and its subservience to EC rules have amounted to the maintenance of a
18 < www.ekem.gr/europeanization_en.html> 12.06.2003. 64 western capitalist imperialism. These perceptions, coupled with the prolonged struggle to develop a fully ‘independent’ Greek national state, economy and identity after centuries of Ottoman and Western domination, lie at the heart of any attempt to grasp the reasons why the question EC and NATO helped to separate politically conscious Greeks into two mutually hostile camps from the 1950s down to the 1980s
(Bideleux, 1996:131).
This part attempted at analysing ‘dualistic structure’ of Greek political culture. It is generally accepted that this so-called ‘duality’ constitutes the main point regarding
Greek national identity and Greek political culture and it can be formulated as the echo of the dualistic nature of Greekness over Greek political culture. However, though it can be said that there is an ongoing conflict between these two ‘rival’ cultures, these two wings are the inseparable parts of political culture. Therefore, in this study, a standpoint, which is closer to the views of Demertzis, is taken. As mentioned by Demertzis and Charamlambis this duality should be analysed as an the articulation forged between modernity and tradition in other words a form of syncretism in terms of the functional interrelation of traditionalist and modernist wings.
65 CHAPTER 2
TRANSFORMATION OF GREEK POLITICAL PARTIES IN POST-1974
ERA
So far it was attempted to introduce an outline of the Greek political culture after the construction of modern Greek nation-state. Some characteristics that are regarded as inseparable components of Greek politics during its history were also delineated.
Below, post-authoritarian period of Greek politics is going to be analysed mainly in terms of political parties considered as consolidating power of democracy in Greece.
As will be mentioned below, the role of political parties has a crucial significance both in the re-establishment of parliamentary democracy and the evolution of Greek political culture.
2.1 1974 as a Landmark in The History of Greek Politics
The collapse of 7-year dictatorship triggered a new era in Greek politics as well as in socio-economic life of Greece. Essentially, this period was mostly shaped by the discussions over accession to EU. It could be easily said that in terms of the process of consolidation of democracy political parties played a key role. Especially, accession process to EC created great discussions between the political parties. They perceived EC as not only economic union but also a political one. 66 The history of Greek politics in post-authoritarian period is described on the basis of two concepts: transition and consolidation. Both of them can be considered as analytically different stages within the process of regime change. Transition started with agreements on the basic rules of the game and resulted in the establishment of pluralist institutions. Consolidation is a cumulative process that requires the gradual removal of the uncertainties of the immediate post-authoritarian period, the establishment of new forms of political expression and participation and strengthening of the legitimacy of the new regime. Though It is hard to give exact dates on the initiation or on the conclusion of each phase, it might be argued that
Greek transition had reached its final stages by early 1980s (Doukas, 1993:510-511).
It should be also mentioned that transition and consolidation are separate but linked processes. Consolidation is not an extension of transition. In this context, P.
Schmitter notes
Democratic consolidation poses distinctive problems to political actors…to a significant degree. Democratic consolidation involves new actors, new rules, new processes and, perhaps, even new values and resources. This is not to say that everything changes when a polity ‘shifts’ into democratic consolidation. Many of the persons and collectivises will be the same, but they will be facing different problems, making different calculations and behaving in different ways… (Schmitter, 1986:64).
In Greek case, it can be said that rise of PASOK, relatively, consolidated the democracy. PASOK emerged as a new actor in Greek political scene with a novel discourse ‘allaghi’ (change). Their modernization project concerning politicising masses and transforming Greek society and other reforms in line with this new modernization project constituted the signs of consolidation of democracy in Greece.
67 The military regime during the period 1967-74 was not supported by any distinctive social class, the exceptions being the tiny, despite economically strong, group of ship owners and internationally-oriented financiers, as well as some highly conservative sections among the peasants. The dictatorship dissolved in July 1974 for three main reasons:
a. The failure to gather its support from any large social group upon which it
could rely on legitimising its rule.
b. The inability to deal efficiently with any of the social and economic problems
of the country.
c. The lack of internal unity among the ruling junta with respect to the policies
to be continued or the type of political system to be brought about on a
permanent basis (Ioakamidis, 1984:34-37).
The experience of the dictatorship made it obvious that political modernization was a political necessity and also the only way to adjust social and economic pressures.
The abolition of monarchy in 1974 facilitated the consolidation process and the democratisation of the new political system (Featherstone, 1990:182).The results of the 1981 elections indicates the significant changes concerning the ‘typology’ and the structure of political forces in Greece. For the first time in Greek politics, it appears that there is a party system composed of three parties parallel to three distinct ideological and political positions (Ioakamidis, 1984:44-45).
Up until the last twenty years, Greek political parties, with the noticeable exception of the extreme left, changed little from 19th century antecedents. Although the
68 politicians who ruled newly established Greece had conflicting visions, existing authority relationships remained largely undisturbed. For the most Greeks, loyalty was lodged in personal relationships that finally led to individual political leaders, not to any particular institutional arrangement. The link between party leaders and individual voters ran through networks of local patrons. After civil war, Greek parties could be grouped into three political families: the right, the center, and the left. The main trait of the major parties was their maintenance of clientelistic natures.
Throughout the early post-war period, right and center together were difficult to distinguish because both adopted an anticommunist attitude at home and abroad. The major parties, by default, had to be located in the type of ‘catch-all’ parties-parties that draw support from all groups of voters. This required a complex appeal aimed at traditional clients that stressed the personality of the leader and at the same time the uniqueness of the party program (Legg and Roberts, 1997:135-137).
The ancestry of the modern Greek right traces back to the interwar People’s Party. Its ideology and policies were largely defined in opposition to the Liberal Party founded by Venizelos in 1910. The Liberal Party’s conflict with People’s Party over the issue of the monarchy powerfully characterized interwar Greek politics that became known as the ‘National Schism’. After its low performance in the 1950 and 1951 elections the People’s Party was gradually absorbed by the ‘Greek Rally’, established in 1951 by Alexander Papagos, the victor of the civil war. The Rally’s victory in
1952 elections initiated uninterrupted right-wing rule between 1952-1963. After
Papagos’s death, his successor Constantine Karamanlis terminated the Greek Rally and established his own party, the ‘National Radical Union’. Under Karamanlis’s
69 leadership National Radical Union (ERE) remained in power till 1963 and continued playing a major role in Greek politics till the 1967 coup. During the same period, the centre did not manage to remain united or to provide a reliable alternative to the right. The fragmentation of the Liberal Party and other centre forces ended in 1961, when the Centre Union was established. The Centre Union won the 1963 and 1964 elections but remained in power in power just till 1965 when, after the King’s intervention in party politics, the party split and its right-wing defected to establish a new government with parliamentary support of ERE. This government marked the beginning of a term of governmental instability, and at the same time incited a process of political radicalisation that found a symbol and a leader in Andreas, son of
George Papandreou, who had entered into Greek politics in 1964. The elections planned in 1967 were expected to terminate with a comfortable majority for the
Center Union dominated by its center-left faction led by Andreas Papandreou. The military coup of April 1967 pre-empted such a result and destroyed any hope of political change (Lyrintzis, 1984:100-101).
The KKE (Communist Party of Greece) was founded in 1918 and its organisation and policies developed along the lines dictated by the international movement. The
KKE, remained a marginal force during the interwar period, and it was just during the Axis occupation that the KKE handled to revive its secret organisations, which then became the motor force of the resistance movement, and it developed as the major element in the ‘National Liberation Front’ (EAM), however for a variety of reasons EAM and the KKE finally became involved in an armed confrontation with the forces of right. The Civil War (1946-1949) resulted in an absolute defeat of the
70 Left, and led a new schism between the victorious ‘nationally minded’ Greeks on the one hand and the communists and their sympathisers on the other. The KKE was outlawed and the left-wing sympathisers were suppressed by right-wing governments and their specially planned ‘extra-legal’ and ‘para-state’ mechanisms. The left then found a new source of political expression in the ‘United Democratic Left’ (EDA) in
1951. It could be said that to the extent that the EDA was a front for the KKE, the latter occupied the Greek left during this period (Lyrintzis, 1984:100-101).
In short, it could be said that three-block party system emerged in post-war period.
Both the Center Union and ERE were parties constructed structurally around a network of local notables; while their unity and electoral appeal depended on the personalities of their national leaders and on the efficiency of their clientelistic relationships. Therefore, clientelism at the organizational and anti-communism at the ideological level marked the nature and performance of the post-war political parties
(Lyrintzis, 1984:101).
So far an outline of the political scheme till 1974 has been presented in order to grasp the following developments in Greek politics. As known, Greek political system had to function under the shadow of foreign interventions and it had considerable influence in every aspect of Greek history. Such an influence could be observed in terms of economy, politics and culture of Greece. In this regard, pre-1974 and post-
1974 were the two critical eras in terms of evaluating and developing sound understandings on Greek politics. As it is going to be dealt with below, these two eras have both similarities and differences concerning politics, economy and culture.
71 Post-1974 era represents a very different page regarding reformulation of network of relations. In other words, so-called Third-Republic brought itself with new formulations for Greece and such an era especially revolved around the debates of
EC accession.
The resulting dependence here that was both economic and political became structural characteristic of Greek politics, whose influences were clear in every phase of the modern Greek history. The state emerged as a powerful a ubiquitous entity whose mechanisms were largely exercised by the parties in power -mainly right-wing parties- to consolidate their power and increase their clientelistic networks. Due to, the country’s late and limited industrial development the state played a key role in economy and every aspect of social and political life. By allotting huge economic sources received in foreign aid, and by playing dominant role in the rapid economic development of the 1950s and 1960s, state-controlled agencies gained a crucial role in the Greek political system. The state and the parties thus became closely related and often interdependent forces, the former describing the scope of the parties’ activity and the latter depending on and at the same time affecting the former by using its mechanisms to consolidate their power and attract mass support. These factors directly related to the weakness of the political institutions, the vulnerability and the clientelistic nature of the political parties and the oscillation between authoritarian and democratic regimes. These characteristics of Greek party politics are especially helpful in grasping the close identification of the political right with the state and the lack of identity and organizational independence that marked almost all non-communist parties. In conclusion, serious antagonisms between political
72 leaders, the clientelistic nature of the Greek political parties, the failure to unify all social and political forces into the political system by eliminating the communist and left-wing forces from every access to power and by isolating them both politically and ideologically and, last but not at least, the attempts to control from above every social and political development that could lead to social and political change were the key features of what has been described as a system of ‘guided democracy’ or
‘restrictive parliamentarism’. The increasing significance of party leadership in allocating favours and spoils, in combination with the central role played by the state apparatus in the operating the clientelistic system allow one to speak ‘bureaucratic clientelism’ rather than merely ‘party-directed patronage’. Bureaucratic clientelism is characterised by an organised expansion of existing posts and departments in the public sector and the addition of new ones in an attempt to secure power and sustain a party’s electoral base. When the state has always played a key role in economic and political development, it was very likely that the parties in government turns to the state as the mere means for consolidating their power, and this further undermines their organisation and ideology. Such a political party, with the clientelistic networks based on and led through a complex combination of party mechanisms and the state apparatus (Lyrintzis, 1984:101-104).
There are similarities and continuity between pre 1967 and post 1974 party systems.
The political right represented by ND failed essentially to become a modern mass party; it relied on traditional practices of ‘bureaucratic clientelism’. PASOK projected itself as a force for social and economic change and capitalised on the failures and weakness of ND very effectively, but it has all the same revealed a
73 certain ideological inconsistency (Lyrintzis, 1984:114-115) (A broad elaboration concerning foundation, ideology and projections of ND and PASOK is going to be dealt with in the following chapter).
With the exception of the extreme right, the post 1974 political parties played a positive role in ensuring the smooth transition to parliamentary democracy in devising relatively stable party system. The foundation of PASOK, its organization and ideology and its rise to power provided the main novelty, but this was due firstly to a process identified by charismatic leadership, populist ideology and tactics and organizational activism. On the other hand, the fact that the political right has failed to renovate itself and thus grow out of the old clientelistic practices strengthened the image of a party system struggling between renewal and traditional practices.
Finally, the communist left, though the only political force with a well-organized and institutionalised mass membership, did not cope with to integrate new elements
(Lyrintzis, 1984:116).
The main characteristics of the post-war political parties were their organizational weakness and clientelistic nature. Thus, clientelism, class cleavages, historical background and foreign independence have also played a major role in forming
Greek politics (Lyrintzis, 1984:102).
According to Diamandouros, Karamanlis’ strategy concerning the consolidation of democracy involved distinct but overlapping components:
74 a. National reconciliation and an end to the civil war divisions continued in the
post-war political system; b. Radical redistribution of power among the main political actors that had
dominated the post-war political system; c. Democratisation of the Greek right to make it capable of playing a crucial and
positive role in the new project that is restoration of democracy; d. Creation of the conditions that would allow the left, encompassing new left-of-
centre forces, to take part fully in the political system, in the process legitimating
it further and contributing to its long-term consolidation; and e. The establishment of new institutions capable of adjusting the full range of
political forces in the country, and the creation of essential rules of the game
which would ensure the smooth operation and continuing viability of the new,
inclusive political system (Diamandouros, 1984:59).
Karamanlis, during his leadership, strove to achieve the goal of modernisation by maintaining strategies on the ideological and organizational level. He sought to construct a new identity with a anti-communist discourse that had marked the right for nearly forty years since the beginning of its virtually uninterrupted dominance of
Greek politics in 1935 and which had been the main characteristic of the National
Radical Union (ERE) during the 1950s and 1960s. On the organizational level, the foundation of ND was announced as the beginning of a new era for the Greek right and for Greek politics marked by the abandonment of the traditional party-of- notables structure so peculiar to the bourgeois Greek parties, penetrated as they were with clientelistic practices and their accompanying personalistic politics
75 (Diamandouros, 1984:61). The most important change in the left with respect to the past undoubtedly was the legalisation of the KKE (Mavrogordatos, 1983:72).
Traditionally, Greek political parties have been greatly based on personal connections and charisma, lacking real organization with mass membership and tending to appeal to narrow segments of the electorate. Greeks have maintained their personal contacts-usually through a patron-client relationship- to favour their individual (or family) interests rather than developing and pursuing common interests through mass political organizations and interest groups.19
All parties of the Third Republic, in one way or the other had adopted the consolidation of democracy and social prosperity as their primary objectives. In an effort to meet the apprehension of the opposition parties concerning the country’s international orientation, Karamanlis stated that ‘Greece belongs to the West’. This statement was soon mentioned not only as an adaptation to the orientation of the country’s foreign policy but also as a strategy to link the country’s future with prospects of Europe and its dynamics. These indeed formed the main arguments for stimulating support in terms of making the democratic institutions more secure and attaining better institutional support for further economic development. Political actors who inaugurated the processes and founded institutions required to meet the new demands equated ‘Europeanization’ with modernization. They hoped to force the political system of the country to transfer and embrace the dominant logic,
19 “Greek Civil Society and The Impact of Globalization” by Katia Vlachos-Dengler < www.kgs.harvard.edu/kokkalis/GSW3/Katia_Vlachos.pdf > 12.06.2003.
76 dynamic organizational traits and behaviour, which distinguished the other modern
European countries (Spourdalakis, 2002:102).
After 1974, the first and yet crucial step towards ‘Europeanization’ was realized as part of the efforts to modernize the Greek political system. This modernization, which transformed party structures and the culture of newly established parties, was not only a response to the European orientation of the country. It actually occurred within the political and cultural framework of the immediate post-junta era. In this framework, the organizational transformation of the Greek party system should be regarded only indirectly related to the European orientation of the country
(Spourdalakis, 2002:102-103).
In spite of the broad popular legitimacy of the post-1974 regime, relations between the parties persist to display a deep-rooted and emotional polarization between ‘left’ and ‘right’. Consolidation through consensualism or accommodation has not happened, and the individual voter has supported a party not only (or perhaps mainly) by virtue of his/her membership of a particular socio-economic group, but also by adopting a political identification on either side of the party division.
Traditionally a main determining factor of the level of party support has also been the appeal of key personalities – for instance, the charisma of Karamanlis and
Andreas Papandreou - that has favoured some fluidity in voter choices. This personalism revealed the lack of internal party democracy and the autocracy of the leader (Featherstone, 1990:188-190).
77 The foregoing discussion has already stressed the relative power of the state over civil society, and the ideological positions of the political parties during the new democratic period have been significantly influenced by changing attitudes to the role of the state. In the Greek context, weak social structures have contributed to a lack of authority independent of the state; owing to parties both autocratic and interventionist natures. Such intervention from above is but an extension of how the parties themselves have maintained the power of the leadership over the grass roots in their own internal affairs (Featherstone, 1990:191-192).
According to Featherstone, some key points emerge regarding the characteristics of political parties in post-authoritarian period. First, the parties have seen the use of state apparatus as an instrument of expanding their own hegemony through intervention and incorporation. State pressures and encroachment have a penetrative influence on Greek civil society. The state tradition not only has been paternalistic, but also elitist: power has been centralized. Traditionally the parties have been interventionist in civil society, despite the weakness of their own social roots. After
1974, intervention still came from the ‘top’; and in spite of PASOK’s decentralist promises, the party found it difficult to give up past practices. The effectual function of democratic processes in civil society have been limited by the weakness of social structures independent of the state and by the persistence of traditional attitudes and practices. Structures that appear democratic have been weakened by the inability of civil society and by the continuance of illiberal, corrupted social norms and behaviour. Part of this wider social character has been the persisting relevance of personality and of personalism in party politics; traditionally, charisma and
78 clientelism integrated when ideologies and collective organization could not. The third point is not a vicious circle: indeed, a gradual process of change is in operation, with the traditions of the past on the defensive. Featherstone also draws attention to the vital role played by political parties in Greek politics. As he mentioned, the process of consolidating the new democratic regime after 1974 has seen a major role displayed by the political parties. As the link between state action and wider society, their effect has been of critical importance, yet the character of Greek society has basically shaped the nature of their contribution. Examining their role emphasizes the relative importance of traditional attitudes and past divisions on the one hand, and new norms and behaviour on the other. Observing the behaviour of Greek political parties will therefore remain essential in understanding the progress of the new regime (Featherstone, 1990:195-196).
In Greek case, political parties as key factors in the democratic consolidation were both the ‘format’ and the ‘mechanics’ of the new post-junta period (Spourdalakis,
1996:167). What had preceded the Metapolitefsi i.e. both the seven-year dictatorship and the events that led to it, were not particularly leading to a comprehensive and collective strategy for the democratisation process. The traditionally weak and suppressed civil society emerged especially after the authoritarian experience, incapable of articulating any strategy for transition ‘from below’. Thus, the burden of the democratisation process had to be overcome by the dominant and unchallenged charisma of the post-authoritarian Prime Minister, Karamanlis. The successful democratisation of the country was also the outcome of the ‘support’ he possessed or managed to organize among the political elites. In Karamanlis’s project
79 for democratisation, the key role was reserved for political parties (Spourdalakis,
1996:168-169).
In fact, to the extent that party systems contribute to the political articulation of state power, the post-authoritarian Greek party system, contributed to the maintenance of an all-powerful executive, a standard feature of the country since the 19th century.
The post-authoritarian party system and the institutions of the political system present both the signs of break and continuity with the practices of pre-junta polity
(Spourdalakis, 1996:170-171).
The new social demands rising from post-war development of the country, which as early as the 1960s pointed to the need for a new form of political representation; the experience of the junta itself, which had contributed decidedly to the dissolution of the political discourse of ‘guided democracy’; the radicalising effect of the (limited) resistance and international climate can be listed among the prime factors behind the need to found a new party system (Spourdalakis, 1996:172).
Overall, the post-authoritarian political parties in Greece were composed of two competing trends: one that represented a rupture with the past and suggested its totally new traits and the other, which displayed strong signs of lack of change. In fact, all dimensions of the party system that soon after the first transition period, developed into what was insightfully defined as tripolar with bipolar competition, showed these contradictory trends. If one can cast some doubt on the parties’ contribution to renewing political elites or on the novelty of their ideology; the
80 novelty of their organization is beyond doubt. Also we observe a co-existence of elements of novelty and renewal with practices of continuity with the past
(Spourdalakis, 1996:173).
There is no doubt that this bureaucratic clientelism had a great integrative effect on society and contributed crucially to the consolidation process.In spite of the new character of the party system in all spheres-ideological, organisational and in terms of political practice and strategy as well as its contribution to renewing political personnel- Greek political parties displayed strong components of the pre- authoritarian party-political practices. The phenomena of intense ‘partyness’, the practices of bureaucratic clientelism, society’s incapacity to integrate autonomously its conflicting interests, the actual role of democratic institutions, and the subsequent reproduction of a ‘heavy state’, could be counted as impediments to the further democratisation and renewal of the Greek politics and society (Spourdalakis,
1996:176-178).
After the dissolution of dictatorship in Greece, two dominant parties, ND and
PASOK, alternated in power till now. However, none of them managed to achieve stability and both continued combating to gain voters offering a mix of populism and nationalism (Sapelli, 1995:191).
The Greek transition to democracy was realized relatively fast. Prime Minister
Constantine Karamanlis was able to construct a liberal democratic model that marked a major break with the past. Karamanlis’ legalisation of the Communist parties in
81 September 1974 gave the new parliamentary regime a totally different ground from its 1960s predecessor. The new system quickly passed its first exam with the
November 1974 election, broadly considered as the fairest electoral contest to have been held up till the in Greece’s post-war history (Verney, 1990:203-204).
Parliamentary elections were held in November 1974 with the participation of four main parties. The right was represented by ‘New Democracy’ founded by
Karamanlis, and the political center by a revival of the old ‘Center Union’. The traditional left was represented by the alliance of the two communist parties that consisted of the remnants of the old EDA. Under the label ‘United Left’ the communist left hided the deep divisions within its constituent parts and PASOK founded by Papandreou presented itself as a socialist party espousing radical change in Greek society (Lyrintzis, 1984:104).
The 1974 elections resulted in the victory of Karamanlis. Thus the election of 1974 represents a turning point Greek transition to democracy. It has such an importance that it is analysed as the beginning of Third Greek Republic in Greece’s political development. The dire experiences of dictatorship taught many lessons for Greek politicians and this process gave the role to the political parties as major players in the process of transition to democracy given the absence of any other agencies.
Transition and consolidation of Greek democracy had a fervent history in the light of
Greece’s accession into EC. After 1974, EC became the main reference point in terms of paving the way to democracy. EC was mostly regarded as the guarantor of
82 democratic regime of Greece and apparently it solved the problem regarding
Greece’s oscillation between East and West. Greece experienced fierce debates on accession especially revolved around between PASOK and ND. Greece became the member of the EC in 1981 when PASOK was in power. It is a fact that EC membership and the subsequent requirements deriving from membership with the deepening of integration process, EC/EU possessed a determining role in domestic and foreign politics of Greece.
2.2 Accession Debates on EC Membership
In this part, the focus will be on the accession debates on EC membership by giving more detailed outline of the political parties in the post-authoritarian period in
Greece. These debates are very important regarding the analysis of Greek political culture. Since, political parties had a huge and leading role in shaping the political culture concerning so-called ‘cultural dualism’ and it remains the reality of Greek politics and political culture today. Accession debates highlight the ideology and principles of the political orientations. It is important to explain the argumentations towards EC as they are very helpful in terms of the analysis of Greek politics.
In a society so sensitive to the foreign influences on the domestic regime, the relationship with EC has always been considered in political terms. In the cold-war climate of the late 1950s and early 1960s, the association with the Community had been regarded as part of the anti-Soviet defence system, with all parties discerned the
EC as an economic adjunct to NATO. The right-wing governing party, the National
83 Radical Union, had expected the 1962 Association Agreement, by reinforcing
Greece’s ties to the West, to strengthen the existing political structures. While the
Center Union also approved the EC link as part of its general support for a western- type system, it seems that some in the party hoped that closer ties with the West
European democracies would foster a liberalization of Greece’s authoritarian parliamentarism. At the same time, United Democratic Left, which refused Greece’s western orientation, clamorously opposed any kind of link with the EC, which it believed would enhance US domination and perpetuate, so-called the current undemocratic system (Verney, 1990:206-207).
But in the post-1974 era, when Greece was seeking a new route, the EC acquired a new importance. The way in which the EC had distinguished its attitude towards the dictatorship from that of the US suggested that two major elements of the western alliance could no longer be considered as identical. For its supporters in Greece, EC membership seemed to maintain the promise that a country which had been an object of superpower politics throughout its modern history could finally become a more autonomous player on the international and also on the domestic affairs. In addition, the Community’s response (freezing of the Greek association) to the coup had emphasized the fact that the EC link had direct implications for the democratisation of the Greek political system. By limiting the Association Agreement to its ‘current administration’, the Community had made the point that its relationship with Greece depended on the existence of an elected Parliament. It is so obvious that the stabilization of the parliamentary system and accession to the EC were firmly connected. It is worth noting that this opinion was shared by the European
84 Commission, which explicitly linked an affirmative reply to the Greek, Spanish, and
Portuguese applications for full membership with the consolidation of new democratic regimes. At the same time, in Greece, both supporters and opponents of accession believed that EC membership would locate Greece into a particular institutional model, closely resembling that of the West European liberal democracies. Hence in Greece it was believed that EC membership referred a permanent commitment to the current Community definition of democratic system
(Verney, 1990:206-208).
The country’s need for the rapid development of its economy and its political and cultural institutions have had a pre-eminent theme in the press and in political discussions since the fall of dictatorship in 1974. For the supporters of full integration of Greece into the EEC was mostly regarded in order to reach the level of
‘democratic maturity’ and social welfare of Western countries (Mouzelis, 1978:149).
During the discussions on Greece’s entry into the Common Market, in the late 1970s, the east- west division came to the agenda again. For Karamanlis, membership in the
EC meant primarily entrenchment in Greece of democratic government in terms of fundamental freedoms, majority rule, and the rule of law. The Euro-communists –
Communist Party of Interior- saw future possibilities for a democratic socialist path in Western Europe, referring to the difficult choices of a democratic left. For
PASOK, Greece did not belong to the West. One of the goals of prime minister
Karamanlis and of other supporters of entry to the community was the reinforcement of Greek democracy through the membership in the community (Fatouros, 1993:29).
85 Accession and the following integration process had a huge role in shaping Greek political culture. Accession debates over EC membership is closely related to the ideology and projections of the Greek political parties in terms of construction and consolidation of Greek democracy. The debates over accession and their justifications concerning accession into EC provided considerable clues in the process of forming their political standpoints.
2.2.1 Pan Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK)
PASOK was founded by Andreas Papandreou in 1974. The party was distinguished from both the old center and the traditional communist left. The new party drew together the PAK group (Pan Hellenic Liberation Movement) members of other resistance organizations and cadres that emerged during the struggle against the military regime, as well as various independent figures from traditional left and the old centre and centre left. PASOK itself has asserted that it has integrated three different currents in Greek politics: the resistance movement during war-time and those organizations relating to it; the second one refers to the Centre Union and its centre-left action, and the third consists of the forces that emerged during the resistance against junta. The party’s ideology was formulated on the basis of the concepts of national independence, popular sovereignty, and social liberation. In the framework of these objectives, PASOK later espoused Greece’s withdrawal from
NATO and EEC, the removal of US military bases in Greece, the socialisation of the means of production, (to be distinguished from nationalism), self-management and decentralisation. PASOK presented itself as a radical socialist party supporting a
86 road to socialism different from both the communist and social democratic model.
PASOK’s stress on national independence appealed to all social strata concerned about the problems and implications of foreign interference. By advocating a ‘Greek road to socialism’ and defining the enemy as the ‘foreign factor’ (imperialism and multinational capital) and those few privileged associated with it, PASOK was able to mobilize large parts of the population. In a society in which it was anathema to be a communist, and where anti-communism had for decades dominated the ideological sphere, PASOK by presenting itself as an independent socialist party created a force that was progressive and belonged to the left without relevance to the disgrace of communism. The party claimed to represent in general ‘under-privileged’ Greeks, defined as a broad social bloc including “farmers, workers, employees, craftsmen, and artisans, the youth and all the people who are subject to exploitation by modern monopoly capital, local as well as foreign”. Therefore, PASOK aimed to appeal to its followers not as a class but as the people or the ‘nation’. PASOK’s most significant innovation was its establishment of a well-structured mass organization. Also another important point was the primacy of Papandreou’s role within the party.
PASOK’s organisation was a fundamental novelty for a non-communist Greek political party. From its foundation, PASOK appeared to be depending on clientelism as a means for communicating with the electorate and gathering mass support. The presence of a dominant and charismatic leadership together with its relatively ambiguous Third World oriented ideology has strengthened this populist image of
PASOK (Lyrintzis, 1984:109-113).
87 Indeed, after the restoration of democracy in 1974, the major change was the rise of
PASOK. Papandreou claimed that PASOK was not like other Greek political parties.
PASOK’s triumph was important, not because it represented itself as being on the left but because “change” had replaced “socialism” as the significant trait of the party. In this regard, such a replacement draws attention because the outcome of the civil war was the fear of domestic communism as well as an attachment to the West
(Legg and Roberts, 1997:141-143). PASOK’s coming power in a way can be considered as a attempt aiming at reformulation of the former traditional relationship between state and society in order to transform it into more rational and participant one.
PASOK’s attitude towards EC during the period in which it was in power is an interesting case. Initially seeing the fall of dictatorship as no more than ‘a change of the NATO guard in Athens’, Andreas Papandreou proclaimed that he had established
PASOK, not as a political party but as a national liberation movement struggling to free Greece from imperialist control. In line with the dependency approach, the party ascribed the fragility of Greek democracy to the country’s mode of incorporation into the world capitalist system. It suggested that democracy had to be distorted or suppressed in peripheral countries like Greece to assure they played their allotted economic role in the service of metropolitan monopoly capital. Rather than expecting accession to promote democratic prospects by shifting it from the margins to the metropolis of the capitalist system, PASOK persisted that EC entry would make democracy constantly unstable by adhering an unequal relationship. In the party’s opinion the Community, absolutely penetrated by American monopoly capital and
88 part of ‘the same syndicate’ as NATO, offered no alternative to US domination.
Hence, adopting a slogan of ‘Greece for the Greeks’, PASOK called for a break with the imperialist system as the only way to reach a healthy democracy in Greece.
According to Verney, because of the close link between geopolitical orientation and the political system, PASOK’s challenge to the former was generally interpreted as necessarily extending to latter. But indeed, it was never expressed openly that the party’s emphatic anti-imperialism involved the rejection of western institutions. The ground of its programme was broad popular participation through decentralized decision-making and ‘socialization’, central to its economic strategy (Verney,
1990:209-210).
The theoretical formulations of the center-periphery were central in PASOK’s ideology and located Greece to the periphery (Stavrou, 1988:14-21). PASOK evaluated NATO and EC as part of the same organization of Western forces but this discourse decisively and progressively was shifted from 1977 onwards
(Diamandouros, 1995:30-31). During the period between 1974 and 1981 PASOK managed to form itself as a wholly new party with a new political identity and new ideas. According to Lyrintzis, it did this by exploiting, and at the same time surpassing, the old divisions of Greek politics, namely, those between conservatives and liberals, communists and anti-communists and by advancing a new cleavage between the right wing and anti-right and anti-right forces. PASOK emerged as the champion of the anti-right wing forces and represented society as being split by the basic division between an all-including ‘non-privileged’ majority, which it claimed to representing, and a tiny ‘privileged’ oligarchy, representing foreign interests and
89 domestic monopolies, which was pronounced as the enemy. The major goal of the party, therefore, was the overthrow of the right and the socialist transformation of society, which was to be realised through PASOK’s ‘third road to socialism’
(Lyrintzis, 1993:29).
During the 1974-81 period PASOK made several changes in its programme and repeatedly readapted the party’s policies. Thus, as the 1981 election approached, the emphasis had shifted from the socialist transformation of society to the need for comprehensive change or Allaghi (‘Change’, indeed, became the key slogan during the 1981 electoral campaign). PASOK was successful in propagating these ideas by gathering on the personality and charisma of the party’s founder and driving force of
Andreas Papandreou. PASOK was able to construct a populist ideological discourse, which managed to captivate all social strata dissatisfied with the long dominance of the right. It embraced and enforced a ‘populist mode of political incorporation’, whose main goal was the incorporation into the political system of social strata excluded from its previous right-wing governments. Society was seen as divided into two camps, one of which is defined as the cause of social and economic problems.
Hence, it suppressed all class or other divisions that exist in society in order to create one main cleavage, that people and the privileged or between the people and the power elite. As a result, it organized not a specific class or class alliance, but the people or the masses in general, and it was this capacity of populism to disguise all social differences that explained its ability rapidly to mobilise large and heterogeneous sections of society (Lyrintzis, 1993:30).
90 Thus, PASOK exercised the populist discourse in order to build its political identity.
It disregarded all social divisions that identified the social forces forming its social base and addressed them as a mass of people united and struggling against the common enemy; defined as ‘the right’. In Lyrintzis opinion, the expansion of
PASOK’s electoral base and its final rise to power was realized through a vague programme for change, which promised to satisfy all the contradictory interests of the several social groups that supported the party. The vagueness and oversimplified nature of PASOK’s populist discourse permitted the party to disguise the contradictory interests of its social base and to convince the electorate that was necessary. PASOK’s populism was summarized in the party’s pre-electoral slogan, as ‘PASOK in government: the People in power’. The plebiscitarian structure and the paternalistic nature of PASOK’s internal functioning originate from by diminishing all differences to one key cleavage and oversimplifying the social and political space.
Populism, hence, became as a bridge between society and politics. In a country where the state has always played a critical social and economic role, it was relatively easy for a well-organised party to become a collective patron by using a complex combination of party mechanisms and state structures. Needless to say, the overlapping of party and state structure was at the expense of the efficiency, modernisation, and rationalisation of the public sector (Lyrintzis, 1993:31-33).
In its 1977 electoral programme, PASOK had moved itself from its previous bold rejection of the government’s plan to join the EEC. However, the intensity of this part of its opposition decreased, when it came to be expressed, not as part of the
Movement’s general strategy for the ‘socialist transformation of Greek society’ but
91 rather in the context of particular technical problems which the menacing ratification would have caused (Spourdalakis, 1988:183).
According to Spourdalakis, Greek political culture is nationalist and internationalist at the same time. Hence, to conduct politics in a legitimate and effective fashion in the Greek context, political leadership must adopt some dimension of widespread nationalist political discourse, but meanwhile it must gain international acknowledgement and prestige either by promoting good public relations with western heads of state, and/or through a foreign country as ideal model (1988:191).
(This was and is true for both the right and the left of the political spectrum. But whereas right-wing leaderships have tended to give importance to good public relations with their Western European counterparts, the left traditionally put forward foreign models of development as the living legitimising ground of the correctness of their political strategy.) (Spourdalakis, 1988:216).
In 1979 Papandreou had presented the ratification of the Accession Treaty as a
‘democratic’ issue. The ratification of the Accession Treaty had a great effect on opposition attitudes that was expressed by the question of institutional participation.
Both PASOK and the KKE had previously displayed a total refusal to collaborate or reconcile through spectacular boycotts of national parliamentary debates on key points related to EC membership. But now accession was more or less a fait accompli, both parties decided not only send representatives to European Parliament, but also to integrate them into the relevant transnational party groups alongside more pro-EC fellows from other member-states. The 1981 election displayed that the
92 Greek political system of the 1970s, with a different relationship to its international environment from its 1960s predecessor, was flexible enough to allow alternation of government between two leading parties. This enabled for PASOK administration to exist in cohabitation, not only with the 1975 Constitution, but also with overall domestic and international framework established by Karamanlis: As PASOK’s attitude consequently shifted from direct opposition to gradual adaptation to EC membership (Verney, 1990:214-251).
However, as the 1981 elections approached with the prospects of victory increasing,
PASOK began to abandon its Third World discourse. As far as Greece’s position in the EEC was concerned, PASOK reiterated its promise to seek a referendum on the issue, but also it made clear at the same time that it would take part in the
Community’s structures in order to reduce the negative effects of Greece’s participation in the EEC. The slogan of ‘Allaghi’ (change) came to dominate
PASOK’s message. Also it should be kept in mind that, PASOK’s victory in 1981 owed much to the personality of Papandreou, who dominated its campaign and monopolised all its rallies and demonstrations (Lyrintzis, 1984:109-114).
The elections of 1981 triggered the institutionalisation of a different party system. In that election PASOK came to power. Upon the election of Karamanlis as president of the republic ND lost its leader. PASOK, at the same time reinforced its position as the new party in power. Finally, a clear bipolarisation of the party system emerged ensuing disappearance of the center and rightist formations (Diamandouros,
1995:347-348).
93 During the 1980s, a consensus arose on EC membership, with PASOK’s changing its policy towards European Community and abandoning its systemic objections to the community. The Greek Communist Party also later revaluated its attitude in a similar manner. As Verney has argued, the prolonged debate over the EC fulfilled an important need at the subjective level through the public airing of Greece’s role in the world. This exercise and the subsequent cross-party acceptance of the country’s new European vocation contributed meaning totally to the process of consolidation.
In this regard, it is possible to say that Papandreou’s nationalist approach in external relations during the 1980s executed a certain transitional function, as a bridge on the road towards final achievement of democratic consolidation (Diamandouros,
1995:176).
It was only after the election of the 1981, when rhetoric and ideology had had to face to reality that this situation began to change. The history of changing Greek stances to the Community, as expressed through the political parties, is in many regards entirely the history of the evolution of PASOK’s relationships with Europe during this period (Pettifer, 1995:101).
The electoral victory of PASOK brought about changes in terms of personnel, ideology, and organization. Mouzelis has drawn a historical parallel to depict the importance of the change of personnel, according to him, in the same way that
Venizelism broke the restrictive, oligarchic control that a number of notable families were using over the means of domination in the 19th century Greece, so PASOK’s coming to power has broken the hold that the pre-dictatorial parliamentary elites had
94 on Greek politics. In both cases, one sees coming of a ‘new men’ into the political arena-‘new’ not only in the sense that there was a systematic difference in class roots between the old and the new political elites, but also ‘new’ in the sense that throughout the ancien regime the latter were political outsiders or were only marginally entangled with the political game (Featherstone, 1990:186). In that sense, both coming to power of Venizelos and A. Papandreou are comparable in terms of a radical transformation of the political system referring not only to the renewal of political personel but also restructuring of the polity’s basic organisational structures.
(Mouzelis, 1987:271)
The victory of PASOK in 1981 has had a symbolic historical significance. A party self-described as socialist was now faced with the task of reforming the inefficient and centralised state bureaucracy, rationalising and modernising underdeveloped socio-economic structures and introducing new practices of popular participation
(Doukas, 1993:511).
PASOK managed to convince a considerable part of the moderate electorate that the radical movement of 1974 had become, by 1981, a responsible party of government.
Despite the fact that ND had contributed to the modernisation and liberalisation of the political process, it remained indecisive regarding its own renewal. Following the departure of Karamanlis, and in view of the apparent rise of PASOK, an internal friction arose between those advocating the continuation of the state paternalism of the past and the supporters of the party’s programmatic renewal along neo-liberal routes. Although this division did not result in an organisational split, ND’s failure to
95 solve the dilemma in favour of the latter current alienated those sectors of society, which demanded a gradual reform of the post-authoritarian system of government
(1993:512).
PASOK’s years in power underwent a number of phases till 1990s. Initially, the leadership of the party used in a north-south discourse that concluded to the rejection of the ‘community solution’ to national economic problems. Apart from the electoral considerations, the principle of ‘national independence’ has acted as a main obstacle to changing PASOK’s European policy. The second phase was marked with, the memorandum of March 1982 on the ‘special’ problems challenging the Greek economy after the accession. This document was an obvious mark that the Greek government was considering the idea of staying in the EC on the terms of the
Accession Treaty, rather than seeking alternative paths of action. The third phase came with government’s support of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1985. What seems to summarize the atmosphere of this phase is that the central question asked by party members was no more whether Greece should stay in the EC, but how to promote the conditions of membership (Tsinisizelis and Chryssochoou, 1996:29).
The Memorandum of 1982 also provided another significant dimension of domestic policy, in other words, the need to sustain the state’s extensive authority over the economic development of the country. After 1985 two basic developments defined the relations between Greece and EC: introduction of SEA and new economic policies. Instead of keeping a distance with the EC as in the previous years, PASOK sought to participate actively in the reform process of Communities. PASOK started
96 to emerge as defenders of the less privileged European countries espousing the
Communities support for empowering them to modernise. Before the summit that introduced the discussion on the SEA, the Greek government emerged on a new route for Greece’s economic convergence with the EC criteria (Botsiou, 2002:25).
Deeper integration is viewed as a sine qua non for the success of the unique process of integration. Greece’s future challenges certainly will be triple: sustenance of orientation and sustenance of progress, accomplishment of the targets of deeper integration as well as viable enlargement policies and prominent role in the formation of the Union’s new edifice (Botsiou, 2002:32).
According to Tsinisizelis, Greek governments have pursued a policy of uneasy interdependence toward the Union in order to maintain a maximum degree of freedom in the management of both internal and external affairs between 1981-96.
Responsibility for Greece’s EU policy bases on the central government that possesses near monopoly positions for no other institutions, central or local, can effectually challenge its authority. This point reflects that the nature of Greek politics is connected directly with the current state of integration: the recentralisation of national political power in favour of the executive branches of government
(Tsinisizelis and Chryssochoou, 1996:32).
To recapitulate and revise the developments in terms of PASOK’s history and also
Greek politics, 1981, the year of Greece’s entry to EC and PASOK’s coming to power can be regarded as a logical end point in terms of consolidation of democracy
97 in Greece. PASOK came to power and it represented an alternation in power.
PASOK’s coming to power put an end to the 45 years of uninterrupted dominance of the Greek right in Greek political life (Diamandouros, 1995:29).
Towards the mid-1980s, the attitude of what the Financial Times had described “one foot in, one foot out” was step by step abandoned. Through most of the 1980s and (to a lesser extent) in the early 1990s, Greece constructed a focus of policy divergence within the Community, and an impediment to European political cooperation and the deepening of European integration. During most of the 1980s and in the early 1990s,
Greece was largely regarded as the EU’s weakest link. Its marginalization inside the
EU was taken for granted, its failure to meet the EMU objectives was predicted as certain, and several pundits were even playing with the idea of Greece becoming the first member ever to be ejected from the EU (Pagoulatos, 2002:4-5).
Greece’s relations with EU till the 1990s followed relatively an uneasy profile.
Relations with the EU could be analysed under three phases. The first phase coinciding with PASOK’s first term in government (1981-1985) kept its uneasy relationship with the EC. It derived from PASOK’s anticapitalist, nationalist discourse. Absence from the Confederation of the Socialist Parties of the EC and
Socialist International till 1989 could be an indicator in terms of PASOK’s exceptional attitude. Admission of the memorandum of 1982 could be regarded as the most noticeable factor affecting the relations between EC and Greece. After the
1985-87-stabilization program PASOK started to shift its uneasy attitude towards
EC. PASOK, during its government (1985-1989), became a supporter of European
98 integration, ratifying SEA, supporting the CAP, social cohesion policies, and a larger
EU budget, arguing for a Common Foreign and Security Policy, after ratifying the
Maastricht Treaty. However, in this period despite reinforcing the integration, some problems emerged due to internal problems of Greece fuelled by financial and political scandals. During that phase, political discourse in Greece revolved around
PASOK/anti-PASOK polarization and this internal turbulence affected relations with the EC. The third final phase of divergence from the EU was throughout the early
1990s under the ND government. There were two major reasons for that divergence: first the deterioration of the economy appeared to have definitely removed Greece from nominal convergence prospect, making it an unreliable partner in implementing the terms of the EC’s successive balance of payments. The second was Greece’s split with the EU members deriving from Greece’s adoption of a nationalistic discourse in the dispute over the name of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Pagoulatos,
2002:5-7).
The landmark was the Maastricht Treaty with its strict schedule and vision for the
European future. Therefore, the political cleavage of discourse over Europe among political parties was swiftly transformed from the outdated ‘yes or no to EC/EU membership’ into the arguments over which the governing parties would more successfully express the country’s demands and protect interests in process of
European integration. However the real challenge for the European future of the country’s party system was its capacity to react to the challenges presented by the political organs of the EU (Spourdalakis, 2002:105-106).
99 PASOK’s eight-year (1981-89) stay in power was important dimension in terms of the weakening of traditional cleavages in politics-that is between communists and anti-communists, left and right. The cleavage between left and right still carries on as being the most important division in politics, but it is no longer the same in the past.
It is a fact that PASOK helped the reorganisation and renewal of the right. ND introduced several neo-liberal ideas into its political discourse and emerged as the mere power apparently capable of achieving the rationalisation, modernisation and honest management of society and economy (Lyrintzis, 1993:37).
PASOK’s emergence and rise to power is pronounced as a ‘phenomenon’, so-called
‘PASOK phenomenon’. Yet this can not be explained merely on the basis of its appeal as a pragmatic party of modernization. Above all, it shared some of the characteristics of its rightist rival, in other words, the lack of internal democratic procedures and their dependence in terms of organisational cohesion, electoral appeal and ideology upon their respective leaders. The major difference was that PASOK was the first non-communist party to create an effective mass organization nation- wide. Indeed, the most evident political change realized by PASOK was the radical reconstruction of the political class. The traditional elite had survived authoritarianism with its intact prestige; under the management of Karamanlis it determined the nature and product of the transition. On the other hand, throughout the consolidation phase, new social strata entered the political arena. This development undermined the traditional clientelistic networks upon which the old political class had based its electoral support and created the conditions for the emergence of new political elites (Doukas, 1993:512-513).
100 According to Doukas, PASOK’s appeals to the ambiguous concepts of the ‘people’ and the ‘underprivileged’, as well as its anti-establishment, anti-elite rhetoric were in fact symbols of a populist logic which concealed the need for real changes of the post-authoritarian political system. At the same time, its programme addressed some of the chronic socio-economic problems emanating from the absence of social welfare system and of a tradition of rational economic planning. From this perspective, it presented an attractive proposition to a broad spectrum- of the electorate irrespective of cross-class or regional divisions (Doukas, 1993:513).
‘PASOK is the people’ asserted an excessively attractive slogan, not only for grasping the imagination of separate individuals, but also for transforming them into a solid group, the mass following of PASOK (Pappas, 1995:315). However, under
PASOK, the traditional state-society relationship was not completely revised. Civil society has typically been obscured by the state owing to its inability to develop strong pluralist forces, while interest groups have been dependent on political parties
(Doukas, 1993:514). According to Featherstone, PASOK was the first to recognize the increasing influence of interest groups: it sought to merge them ‘into the party mechanism when that was possible’ or at least to cooperate with them in order to spread its own influence. This was in keeping with its idea of forming a coalition of the ‘underprivileged’ and of redistributing power (Featherstone, 1990:192).
It is largely accepted by the scholars studying Greek politics that, a new type of clientelism emerged with the PASOK triumph: The party apparatus supplanted the deputy as the mechanism for serving constituents. After the restoration of democracy, in first several elections there was extensive rejuvenation of the political
101 elite. A change in the character of political clientelism appeared after the 1981 election when PASOK came to power. A bureaucratic clientelism outgrew of and alongside the more traditional form. Traditional clientelism concentrated on the local notable and village clients brought party-and state-oriented clientelism (Legg and
Roberts, 1997:145-146).
According to Pappas, clientelism is as both a way of social incorporation and a mode of political organization. In post-1974 era, clientelism went through important transformation and readjustments. What about the form of clientelism in post-junta period? First, comparing to previous eras, no individual or groups of individuals were a priori excluded from clientelistic relations, anyone who wished to become an active member of the party currently in government was entitled to some kind of spoils. In other words, participation in clientelistic exchanges became an absolutely obtainable aim for would-be clients. Second, the new mode of clientelism included organizations rather than individuals. Third, clientelism became formalized, since it now involved manifest evidence of loyalty for taking on new clients. Such could be maintained activity for promoting the party cause at the local level, electoral mobilization, or card-carrying party membership. Fourth, insofar as both ND and
PASOK embraced similar clientelistic practices, the latter also became systematic
(Pappas, 1999:198-199).
In the opinion of Pappas, Greece differentiates in two important regards, both of them related to gigantism and salience of parties in its political system. First, in the experience of more advanced democracies, the state apparatus already enjoys relative
102 autonomy vis-à-vis parties, as an outcome of both reducing political controls over the administration and the growing professionalization of state bureaucracies. In contrast, the Greek state’s dependence on the party in governmental power causes a narrowing of political control over the state administration, and involves state appointees to be selected on the basis of party affiliation rather than professional expertise (Pappas, 1999:202-203).
To many observers, PASOK initially emerged to be paragon of a modern bureaucratic party. It had an operating, apparently democratic organization that was separated from the state apparatus and the parliament. Papandreou’s original themes were “national independence, popular sovereignty, and social liberation.” The intellectual underpinning was that Greece was economically and political underdeveloped and therefore dependent on international capitalist system (Legg and
Roberts, 1997:151-152).
The Panhellenic Socialist Movement, PASOK, was certainly panhellenic, since it had been able to permeate into every corner of society. In addition, under a charismatic leader whose well-articulated populist discourse stirred up the masses, it did resemble a movement rather than a party (Pappas, 1995:197-200).
PASOK was the first party that introduced organizational structures similar to those developed through a relatively strong network of hierarchically articulated relations and was defined through internal party statutes. One must presume that PASOK never became a genuinely institutionalised democratic party, with a structure and
103 culture like its European partners. Indeed, it must be said that, PASOK’s mass democratic structure facilitated the development of relations and reinforcing of political ties with other European parties, particularly with those with similar political and ideological orientations and background (Spourdalakis, 2002:103).
As Spourdalakis explains, PASOK’s creation was the outcome of three main factors: the socio-economic development of Greece in the post World War II era and the politics to which this development gave a birth in the mid-1960s; the resistance organizations that arose during the dictatorship; and the peculiarities and of the charisma of Papandreou. In the subsequent post war period, the working class of
Greece in effect kept at the margin of the political arena. Political mobilisation was carried through the old clientelistic structures, while the state using the ghost of the civil war and security valve of emigration, managed to keep social unrest under control. Nevertheless, as the economic and demographic map of the country changed, so did the population’s attachment to the system of clientelism and the manner of conducting politics in the country as a whole (Spourdalakis, 1988:276).
According to Prodromou, Communist parties did not manage to devise any coherent and convincing criticism of PASOK’s organizational and political developments.
They, at the same time, also failed to devise an attractive and threatening alternative to PASOK’s increasing popularity. The political discourse and culture was also leading to PASOK’s eventual development (quoted in 1988:279).
104 Following the analysis of Prodromou, it can be said that Papandreou founded
PASOK as an instrument for realizing a new social order understood from a cultural perspective that was neither westernist nor traditionalist. Examination of the party’s organizational structure and ideology indicates the ways in which Papandreou’s vision for democracy and modernity unified elements of both the traditionalist and westernist cultural currents, and supported radical change (by opposing to gradual reforms) as the only means of cultural reconciliation. The founding of PASOK was perhaps the most prominent sign of the opening of the political space resulting from the dissolution of authoritarian rule (Prodromou, 1993:224).
The most important aspect distinguishing PASOK’s radical strategy and cultural potential was that the party’s projects for restructuring the criteria of national unity were incompatible with the social order that existed. The Declaration of 3
September, the foundational statement of the party’s ideological vision, was a reinterpretation of the country’s political and economic problems in terms that bypassed the existing modernist versus traditionalist critiques, by embodying elements of both to arrive at a new conception of modernity for Greek society
(Prodromou, 1993:225).
The overwhelming victory of PASOK in the October 1981 elections was evidence to
Papandreou’s leadership in successfully reconstructing PASOK as a populist party with a catch-all strategy. But paradoxically, the party’s ideological and organizational transformation over the 1974-1981 period had led to the internalisation of the cultural contradictions in Greek society within the party
105 structure itself. Rather than helping to articulate a new basis for national cohesion and thereby to promote a modern, democratic collective identity, Papandreou’s populism deliberately highlighted the westernist/traditionalist fault lines in the national community. Similarly, as the organizational structure of the party employed the typical features of bureaucratic clientelism, the traditional dependence on vertical networks was strengthened at the expense of trying to promote horizontal participatory mechanisms, suggesting limited possibilities for reconstructing the state much less for a more accurate articulation of relations between state and civil society
(Prodromou, 1993:236-237).
Karamanlis’ metaphor of the regime change as a moment of national rebirth underlined the idea of democratisation as a landmark for cultural transformation.
However, it was PASOK that held the unique role to play as the means for effecting such cultural transformation, based on the party’s promise for reconciling the two basic sources of contradiction and tension in Greek culture within the larger program of building a modern, democratic society in Greece. Refusing the equation of modernization with westernisation, Papandreou used dependency theory, and populist culture to propose an alternative view of modernization that, he suggested accounted for the democratic structural and political factors and international constraints specific to Greece’s route towards democracy. Papandreou’s plan for allaghi, hence, presented the promise of resolving the disarticulation between the state and society and of creating an inclusive, integrated collectivity, both of which were fundamental to resolving the tensions in Greek culture (Prodromou, 1993:247).
106 PASOK used a discourse that functioned above class contradictions: through the logic of equivalence, a range of groups could define themselves with the entity termed “the people”. Moreover, Papandreou employed populism to suggest that
Greek political identity was not Western, but was unable to use the same logic to supply a positive articulation of the country’s political identity. Given the country’s cultural formation, it is not surprising that the PASOK stress on non-Westernness evoked subjective notions of the Eastern, Orthodox dimensions of Greek collective identity (Prodromou, 1993:250).
2.2.2 New Democracy (ND)
The foundation of ND by Karamanlis represented an important step in terms of regrouping and modernising the traditional right. He presented ND as a new center- right party that had nothing in common with its predecessor (ERE), because it abandoned the ERE’s anti-communism and embraced more progressive and socio- economic policies. However, it was argued that ND failed essentially to design a convincing image of a modern, center-right party, and this was directly related to its inability to devise and articulate a coherent ideology and to create a well-structured mass organization. Though the party’s basic ideological principles were described by
Karamanlis at the 1979 congress as ‘radical liberalism’. The ND never developed these ideas nor did it define exactly what was meant by ‘radical liberalism’. ND depended largely from the beginning on its founder’s charisma and prestige as the leader who restored democracy in Greece. This was obviously illustrated during the
1974 electoral campaign, when the slogan ‘Karamanlis or the tanks’ showed how the
107 party’s leader was designed as the sole guarantor of the preservation of the Greece’s newly-won democratic freedom, and this accounted for the party’s outstanding performance in the elections of 1974. At the same time, the party’s neutral stance about the monarchy marked the end of the close identification of the Greek right with the Crown. Greece’s entry into the EEC was presented as the party’s main achievement coloured by Karamanlis’ motto ‘Greece belongs to the West’. The election of Karamanlis as President of the Republic deprived the party of its undisputed and highly popular leader, and the only person that could guarantee the party’s electoral prospects. After Karamanlis, George Rallis was elected and under the pressure from the party’s right wing, Rallis was gradually forced to abandon appeals to the political centre and to espouse an increasingly right-wing strategy. The lack of a consistent ideology became more damaging, and it failed to present a dynamic set of policies for the future that could divert the rising challenge from
PASOK. Though ND played a critical and significant role in terms of consolidation of democracy in Greece, it failed to operate as an effective and well-institutionalised political and social force. The election of Averoff to the party’s leadership did little to reform the internal unity of the party and the intermittent debates about a new leadership and the need to renovate the party’s ideology and policies showed a deep discord between a conservative and a progressive, center-oriented wing in the party
(Lyrintzis, 1984:106-109).
ND declared itself first and foremost committed to parliamentary democracy, and stood decisively against communism and fascism. On domestic front, the ND emphasized the need for ‘social justice’, an element new to conservative thinking in
108 Greece. Also, ND underlined the need for economic development based on ‘a free democratic economy’, in which the state would play the role of locomotive.
According to the assertion of its founder, ND was the outcome of national necessity.
In an effort to fundamentally promote the Greek society’s depoliticization, meanwhile compensating for both the populist rhetoric of PASOK and its own inadequacy in handling with social class, ND put forward a contemporary version of the standard right-wing belief in the nation, the ethnos. This, in the official ND ideology, clearly includes of all subjects of national state (Pappas, 1999:143-144).
Karamanlis, ever since the re-formation of democracy in 1974, argued that binding
Greece decisively to the West was the best way of consolidating and preserving democracy. In terms of politicisation of the masses, ND and PASOK had quite different strategies. While ND was essentially trying to depoliticise society, its major opponent, PASOK, was projecting a perception of a dichotomous and conflicting world, so further mobilizing the projected hyper-politicisation. Quite aside from its limitations in devising and perpetuating an appealing message, ND was also compelled to take up defensive positions in subjects concerning ideology, and this largely explained its defeat in 1981. ND Party Congress hold in 1979, Karamanlis defined his party as ‘radical liberal’; he was seeking to stress the increasingly liberal character of its party’s progressiveness, its readiness to break with the past, and its occasional appeal to social democratic politics (Pappas, 1999:152-154).
Karamanlis endeavoured to shape the political conscience of the Greeks along two major lines: the creation of new institutions adjusted to contemporary realities, and
109 the development of a new ethos in the conduct of politics. Consequently, Karamanlis had used the concept of the people in the sense of citizenry or, more extensively, the nation itself. In this logic, political parties keeping the national interest should, almost by definition, declare themselves against all major rivalries in civil society. In contrast, the PASOK leader constructed his populist discourse upon a notion of the class of the ‘non-privileged’ Greeks (Pappas, 1999:158).
Constantine Karamanlis can comfortably be pronounced as the restorer of democracy in Greece. Karamanlis achieved the shift from authoritarian to democratic politics. It also realized an intrepid transformation from the restricted democracy of the post- war years that led to military regime, to a truly representative one (Pappas, 1995:63).
To compensate for both the populist rhetoric of PASOK and its own deficiency in handling with social class, ND presented a contemporary account of the standard right-wing belief in the nation, the ethnos (Pappas, 1995:220). According to
Karamanlis, ‘the nation and Orthodoxy’ have become in the Greek conscience practically synonymous concepts, which together form Hellono-Christian civilization
(Fokas, 2000:285-286).
The discourse ‘Hellono-Christian’ identity of Greece and Greeks had been inseparable part of his political discourse as his oft-repeated motto ‘Greece belongs to the West’. The very ambiguity of the ‘Hellono-Christian’ identity discourse has concealed the choice between a traditional national culture and a class culture behind the internalised ambiguity of ‘Greekness’ (Tsoukalas, 1993:73). Actually, Hellono-
110 Orthodox discourse used by Karamanlis constitutes another dimension in terms of oscillation between modernity and tradition. Since, such a discourse embodies
Greece’s cultural tension between its underdog and modernist wings within itself.
In the process accession into the EC, Karamanlis’ efforts are undeniable.
Karamanlis, as the first prime minister of post-junta Greece, placed democratic stabilization high on the list of topics for discussion on Greece’s entry to EC. ND hoped EC membership would ensure national security by reinforcing Greece in relation to Turkey, and it also expected free trade with Western Europe to stir up
Greece’s economic development, invigorating the emergence of a modern capitalist state on the EC model. Karamanlis viewed EC membership as first and foremost political, as it is concerned with the consolidation of democracy and the future of the nation. ND’s major argument was that Greece’s democratic institutions would be reinforced within the democratic west (Verney, 1990:208-209).
In an effort to counter the apprehension of the opposition parties concerning the country’s international orientation, he mentioned that ‘Greece belongs to the West’.
This expression was soon stated not only as an adjustment to the orientation of the country’s foreign policy but also strategy to connect the country’s future with the prospects of Europe and dynamic of it. These also formed the main argumentations for mobilizing support to make the democratic institutions safer and to obtain better institutional support for further economic development (Spourdalakis, 2002:102).
111 When Karamanlis used his famous motto ‘We belong to the West’ to propagandise for Greek accession, he was not referring only to economic or strategic options. On the symbolic and ideological level, this formulation alluded to the differences between East and West, adding a new dimension to the ongoing debate in Greece concerning the need to modernise the traditional structures of Greek society and the direction that modernization should take (Panagiotopoulou, 1997:353). Actually this motto ‘We belong to the West’ could be equated with Karamanlis. In accordance with his thoughts concerning Europe he mentioned that;
“Geographically Greece belongs to the Balkan Peninsula. Culturally it not only belongs to Europe, it is the cradle of European civilization, and even name ‘Europe’ is Greek…Quite simply, it was there that she felt belonged” (Kartakis,1993: 19).
Karamanlis’s efforts on the basis of the perspective that integration was indisputable and inseparable for the preservation of peace, stability and development in Europe set his efforts for the inclusion of Greece into the unification at the top of his political agenda (Botsiou, 2002:19).
Karamanlis also always referred to the necessity of European unification and the importance of Greece’s cultural identity and place in terms of this unification. In his speech delivered in 1978 to the Townhall of Aachen he mentioned that;
…European culture is a synthesis of Hellenistic, Roman and Christian spirit. A synthesis to which the Greek spirit introduced the idea of the Freedom, Truth and Beauty; the Roman spirit contributed the idea of the State and Justice and to which the Christian spirit gave Faith and Love (Karamanlis, 1979: 38).
112 ND, under the leadership of Karamanlis during the early years of the restoration, enabled the modernization of party system by allowing to the full participation of the left but ND remained relatively traditional party. PASOK, though having a well- articulated organizational structure, essentially was the personal vehicle of one man:
Andreas Papandreou. He did not let any serious rival to rise; disagreements ended in expulsions or resignations (Legg and Roberts, 1997:147-148).
The entry into EU was asserted by ND on the ground that, in the framework of
European solidarity, “the national independence of all members is consolidated; democratic freedoms are shored up; economic development is accelerated; and social and economic progress becomes, with the cooperation of all, a common fruit”.
Though there have been questions concerning accession’s negative social consequences, ND’s European strategy has never become a point of dispute within the party. Instead, what has become an object of dispute within the party over the years is the nature of the policy to be adopted for economic development and modernization. Karamanlis seemed to believe, as the statement quoted above displays, that Greek economic development and modernization within the community would be the logical outcome of a process of steady productive investment strengthened and supported by Community inflows and technology and capital. This modernization policy of active production involved a more or less interventionist state in order to promote economic development and also to sustain social cohesion through social policy measures. Actually, that was the exact meaning of the ideology of ‘radical liberalism’ adopted by ND during the Karamanlis years
(Moschanos, 1997:327-328).
113 The departure of Karamanlis from ND’s leadership in 1980 marked the beginning of a process of ideological transformation in the party from radical liberalism to pure liberalism. After Mitsotakis became party leader in 1985 this process was intensified and the party’s ideology was gradually adjusted to the principles of neo-liberalism.
Neoliberal economic strategy suggested that Greek economic development and modernization within the Community would now be the logical conclusion of the privatisation of the major state-controlled economic activities and the full cooperation of market mechanisms in an integrated internal Community market
(Moschanos, 1997:329).
To recapitulate, it could be said that, for Karamanlis, the regime change was a branching route in the country’s trajectory for development. Karamanlis suggested two notions, both fundamentally cultural in nature, which pointed out that the political transformation supplied a window of opportunity for a cultural metamorphosis that would influence the politics of building a democratic society in
Greece. The two notions were national reconciliation and modernization. The nation and modernization were the thematic subtext of the politics of the regime change, and they revealed the cultural contradictions that had characterized Greek politics and society (Prodromou, 1993:192-193).
Insofar as it is possible to define cultural tendencies within individual political parties, ND was the heir to the modernist/westernist cultural current. Karamanlis had spent his formative political years advocating westernist policies and orientations, and he had a conception of democracy and he adjusted a reformist strategy for
114 modernizing Greece that drew greatly on his ideas about Greece’s delayed democratisation. The distinctive trait of Karamanlis’ reformist approach in terms of restoration of democracy in Greece was the (1993:222) ideal-typification of the
Western European developmental model, with certain accommodations for the constraints of the Greek context, as implied in Karamanlis’ often-cited statement that
“Greece belongs to the West”. Karamanlis clearly linked the country’s prospects for institutionalising genuine democracy (as opposed to the guided democracy which had gained it for much of the post WWII period) with the need to modernize the political and social system along western European lines. It is crucial to recognize that Karamanlis’ strategy for democratisation and modernization was based on continuity with those structures of politics and society, which imitated western prototypes, albeit with a stress on the reform of these structures. In this regard, ND stood as the latest reconfiguration of the westernist cultural perspective. Karamanlis emphasized that the reformism, as the best instrument for regulating both state and civil society, involved promoting a new sense of national unity. But according to
Prodromou, the overt westernism, secularism, refusal of class-based analytic solutions to the country’s economic imbalances, and incremental approach to establishing incorporative mechanisms of politics meant that the ND culture was fundamentally one which projected to modernize Greek society by ruling out structural and cultural realities which themselves operated as effective restraints on the party’s potential capabilities to transform the political and social system
(1993:223).
115 2.2.3 The Communist Party of Greece (KKE)
The dictatorship brought the surface the problems of internal division that has identified the communist left during the post-war years. The then EDA’s strategy and policies had already been a cause of disagreement between the section of the leadership of the KKE which remained outside Greece in eastern Europe and the leading party members who had stayed in Greece. The dissident members formed an interior bureau of the KKE that, after the fall of junta, became the KKE Interior party. Attitudes towards the Soviet model of socialism, the question of loyalty and dependence on Moscow and the opening to Euro-communist ideas were the major lines of difference the two branches of the Greek communist left. The KKE opposed the ND government on fundamentalist grounds, regarding it as a vehicle of western imperialism. However, the KKE Interior had adjusted a strategy of unity of action of all democratic forces, from the communist left to the democratic right, aiming at strengthening democracy in Greece and thus in its view facilitating the road to socialism (Lyrintzis, 1984:114-115).
In Greece, the KKE shifted from a semiloyal position in 1974 to a position of fully loyalty towards to regime. At the moment of democratic inauguration, the KKE was an Orthodox communist party close to the Soviet Union and sustaining the traditional conceptions of dictatorship of the proletariat and democratic centralism. Two key events, one international and one domestic, pushed the party towards integration: the dissolution of Soviet Union meant that the party totally lost its international reference point, and a domestic crisis caused by scandals and bad economic performance of the
PASOK government gave rise the way to a new and unprecedented role for the party
116 in government. The culmination of this process was its participation in a coalition government with ND in 1989-1990. The party’s subsequent behaviour reaffirms its total integration within the regime (Diamandouros, 1995:365-367).
KKE remains as a modern bureaucratic party, but it lacks a real mass base and is restricted to the political ghetto of the extreme left (Legg and Roberts, 1997:148). In terms of accession into EC, KKE’s argumentations were differed naturally from the other political parties. The Communist Party of Greece advocated moving towards the political and economic pattern of the opposing military camp. For this party, the
Soviet model was the route to socialism and the latter the only democratic system. At the same time, the EC was regarded as representing unredeemed capitalism, whose aim of easing income transfer from labour to the monopolies could not be accomplished under a democratic system. The KKE defined EC entry as “an international act by which Greece would decisively turn its back on the socialist word and socialist ideas”. The party considered accession as designed to sustain an imperialist control over Greece, which it regarded as wholly incompatible with democracy. The party did not agree that accession could provide greater leeway for
Greek democracy by enhancing the country’s autonomy within the imperialist camp.
Not only did it see the EC wholly less important than US influence, but also it claimed that even within the Community, inequality between the member-states was safeguarded institutionally (Verney, 1990:210).
In the pre-entry period, the orthodox KKE took the position as an opposing party towards EC and European integration, emphasizing the issue of national
117 independence. KKE’s opposition of Greek accession to the EU found economic justification in the law of uneven and combined development of capital, which requires the sustenance of dependence and under development (Moschanos,
1997:333).
Legalisation of KKE was very critical concerning transition and consolidation of democracy in Greece. Although KKE took place in the parliament, Greek political spectrum is apparently tri-polar system; actually the political struggle revolves around mostly between ND and PASOK. KKE continues keeping its strict opposition towards EU.
2.2.4. KKE-Es
The KKE-Esoterkiou (KKE-Internal), established following the split in the Central
Committee of the KKE in January 1968, also defined democracy as socialist democracy and agreed that democratic dangers would only vanish with the end of imperialist dependence. This party considered a move to the Soviet camp as neither desirable nor feasible, at the same time believing that PASOK’s non-alignment would in practice ‘bind the country even more suffocatingly to the US’ with destructive democratic results. Like other Euro-communist parties, the KKE-Es was thus compelled to base its hopes on a radical change in the international environment, expected to end in the collapse of both the Soviet and the other imperialist blocs (Verney, 1990:210-211).
118 2.2.5 Evaluation of Political Parties Concerning the Political Culture
Taking into consideration the critical importance EC’s role in shaping Greek politics and discourses and policies put forward by political parties, I would like to re- evaluate the accession debates. The accession debates display that none of the parties saw the problem of democratisation as a simple question of constructing representative institutions. In their varying ways, all saw democracy in terms of a total system that connected the political and economic levels to the external dimension. They considered EC membership as a system-defining choice, determining political and economic structures and fixing geopolitical orientation.
Hence all the parties believed that EC entry would lock Greece into the particular political and economic pattern represented by Western Europe. As a result, their acceptance or refusal of EC membership was determined by whether or not they wanted to see this kind of ‘western’ system to be formed in Greece. Underlying the debate of this question was the main shared assumption that there could be no return to the pre-1967 era. At the subjective level, the EC debate fulfilled a significant need.
Democratic consolidation is a subjective process, requiring the actors coming to view the existing system as the framework within which they have to function, regardless of whether their final aim is to sustain (Verney, 1990:211-213).
To recapitulate, the main role in shaping Greek politics mostly was shared by the two mainstream parties: PASOK and ND. Papandreou and Karamanlis constituted the main figures of the ‘Metapolitefsi’. They came to Greek political scene with the
119 discourse of ‘novelty’ in spite of having similar characteristics in the pre-dictatorship era.
Karamanlis was unanimously accepted as the architecture of transition to democracy in Greece. He championed the membership for the EC and conceived membership as the guarantor of Greek democracy. For Karamanlis, concerning Greece’s political development, it was unobtainable opportunity to make Greece as equal partner of its continent, Europe, and he confirmed his idea with the motto of ‘Greece belongs to the West’. Karamanlis also perceived this membership as invaluable means for his
‘modernization’ project for Greece. He stressed Greece’s ties to the West also promoted the uniqueness of Greece by emphasising Hellono-Christian identity. In this regard, his discourse presents an internal duality of his project. In the one hand, he wants to make Greece as an ‘equal’ member of the EC, on the other hand he always referred to the distinct identity of Greece in comparison to the other European countries. It should be emphasized that his opinion about de-politicisation of the masses from Greek political scene constituted another dilemma of his modernization project.
Papandreou founded PASOK as a means for the realization of a new social order and his rapid ‘short march’ to power emerged the ‘PASOK phenomenon’ in Greek politics. In contrast to Karamanlis, PASOK objected fiercely to the modernization project of Karamanlis by defending independency in terms of belonging neither West nor East. ‘Allaghi’ constituted the key word of his modernization project representing the novelty to be formed by PASOK. He also objected to Karamanlis by
120 denouncing ‘politicisation of masses’ in order to make Greek people real citizens
instead of being electorate. It was really a very important feature of his
modernization project. It is a fact that, PASOK’s coming to power constitutes a very
unique momentum in Greek politics by representing the first non-communist, left
wing party in Greek political history and actually shifting from being an ardent
opponent to ardent supporter of EC (EU) formed the another oscillation point of
PASOK.
2.3 Changing Orientations in Greek Public Opinion In The Process of
Europeanization
In this part, the changing orientations of Greek public opinion will be evaluated in
the process of Europeanization.
The Feeling of Satisfaction with the Way Democracy Works
This table below shows the opinion of Greek people concerning the question “On the
whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied
with the way democracy works (in your country)?”
Table 1. The Feeling of Satisfaction with the Way Democracy Works
years very fairly not very not at all no reply Total N satisfied satisfied satisfied satisfied 1980 X-XI 20 33 23 22 2 100 1000
1981 X-XI 24 28 18 23 7 100 1000
1982 III-IV 19 41 21 11 8 100 1199
1982 X 23 35 25 9 8 100 1000
121 (Table 1 cont.)
1983 III-IV 19 40 21 13 7 100 1000
1983 X 24 37 20 11 8 100 1000
1984 III-IV 19 41 21 13 6 100 1000
1984 X-XI 18 39 24 13 6 100 1000
1985 III-IV 19 40 20 13 8 100 1000
1985 X-XI 19 32 26 16 7 100 1000
1986 III-IV 18 38 17 20 7 100 1000
1986 X-XI 23 34 22 17 4 100 1000
1987 IV 11 38 23 21 7 100 1000
1988 III-IV 14 37 20 24 5 100 1000
1988 X-XI 16 36 32 10 6 100 1000
1989 X-XI 11 37 25 23 4 100 2000
1990 III-IV 7 27 25 38 3 100 1000
1990 X-XI 8 36 34 19 3 100 1000
1991 III 5 32 35 25 3 100 1000
1991 X-XI 5 29 39 23 4 100 1000
1992 III-IV 6 30 39 21 4 100 1000
1992 IX-X 6 28 38 27 1 100 1000
1993 X-XI 5 34 41 18 2 100 1000
Source: Eurobarometer, Trend Variables 1974-93, European Commission, May 1994
As seen in the table, Greek people, in general, are not satisfied with the way
democracy works. Although accession into the EC contributed to the consolidation
process of democracy in Greece, the trend ‘very satisfied’ declined from in the
period between 1980s and 1990s. It could be explained with financial and political
turbulence.
122 Attitudes towards the Unification of Western Europe
This table below shows the opinion of Greek people concerning the question “In
general, is you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe? If for, are
you very much for this, or only to some extent? If against, are you only to some
extent against or very much against?”
Table 2. Attitudes towards the Unification of Western Europe
for very For to some against to some against very Years much extent extent much no reply Total N 1980 X-XI 33 26 12 11 18 100 1000
1981 IV 30 30 12 13 15 100 1000
1981 X-XI 36 29 7 8 20 100 1199
1982 III-IV 29 29 10 7 25 100 1000
1982 X 36 27 8 7 22 100 1000
1983 III-IV 31 30 6 6 27 100 1000
1983 X 40 29 5 5 21 100 1000
1984 III-IV 28 29 11 9 23 100 1000
1984 X-XI 32 35 9 7 17 100 1000
1985 III-IV 34 28 9 6 23 100 1000
1985 X-XI 27 26 15 8 24 100 1000
1986 III-IV 35 21 14 4 26 100 1000
1987 IV 35 29 14 6 16 100 1000
1987 X-XI 37 32 9 5 17 100 1000
1988 III-IV 33 32 9 5 21 100 1000
1988 X-XI 44 34 6 2 14 100 2000
1989 III-IV 40 38 8 2 12 100 1000
1989 VII 44 31 5 2 18 100 1000
1989 X-XI 54 28 3 3 12 100 1000
1990 III-IV 57 24 5 3 11 100 1000
123 (Table 2 cont.)
1990 X-XI 48 32 5 3 12 100 1000
1991 III 42 37 7 3 11 100 1000
1991 X-XI 47 35 5 2 11 100 1000
1992 IX-X 42 39 6 5 8 100 1000
1992 XI 44 36 7 4 9 100 1000
1993 III-IV 41 38 7 5 9 100 1000
1993 X-XI 49 36 4 3 8 100 1000
Source: Eurobarometer, Trend Variables 1974-93, European Commission, May 1994
Greek public opinion followed a positive attitude since 1980s till 1993 concerning
the unification. Such a trend displays in general, internalization of integration with
the EC (EU) by the Greeks.
The Feeling that One’s Country Has Benefited from Being a Member of the
European Community
This table below shows the opinion of Greek people concerning the question “Taking
everything into consideration, would you say that (your country) has on balance
benefited or not from being a member of the European Community (Common
Market)?”
124 Table 3. The Feeling That One’s Country Has Benefited from Being a Member of The European Community
Years benefited not benefited no reply Total N
1983 III-IV 44 25 31 100 1000
1984 III-IV 44 35 21 100 1000
1984 X-XI 51 28 21 100 1199
1985 III-IV 49 26 25 100 1000
1986 III-IV 50 23 27 100 1000
1986 X-XI 60 20 20 100 1000
1987 I 58 29 13 100 600
1987 IV 54 25 21 100 1000
1987 X-XI 64 19 17 100 1000
1988 III-IV 55 20 25 100 1000
1988 X-XI 68 15 17 100 1000
1989 III-IV 72 11 17 100 1000
1989 VII 73 8 19 100 1000
1989 X-XI 76 10 14 100 2000
1990 III-IV 79 10 11 100 1000
1990 X-XI 78 9 13 100 2000
1991 III 76 12 12 100 1000
1991 X-XI 73 14 13 100 1000
1992 III-IV 73 13 14 100 1000
1992 IX-X 70 17 13 100 1000
1992 XI 73 15 12 100 1000
1993 III-IV 72 17 11 100 1000
1993 X-XI 79 9 12 100 1000
Source: Eurobarometer, Trend Variables 1974-93, European Commission, May 1994.
125 According to data above, Greek people believe that Greece benefited from being a member of the EC. This opinion was widely accepted in the 1990s. Comparing the
44% of 1983 with the 79% of 1993 it can be said that there is a big difference in favor of benefit from the EC. The growing volume of EU financial inflows influenced the change of public perceptions after the 1980s.
Interest in Politics
This table below shows the opinion of Greek people concerning the question “To what extent would you say you are interested in politics?”
Table 4. Interest in Politics
Years a great deal to some extent not much not at all no reply total N
1983 III-IV 18 27 25 30 0 100 1000
1988 X-XI 12 30 32 25 1 100 1000
1989 III-IV 16 37 29 11 1 100 1000
1990 III-IV 19 36 29 11 1 100 1000
1990 X-XI 16 38 32 14 0 100 1000
Source: Eurobarometer, Trend Variables 1974-93, European Commission, May 1994.
Greek public opinion displays that they are, to some extent, interested in politics.
Interest in EC Politics
This table below shows the opinion of Greek people concerning the question “To what extent would you say you are interested in European politics, that is to say
126 matters related to the European Community: a great deal, to some extent, not much or not at all?”
Table 5. Interest in EC Politics
Years a great deal to some extent not much not at all no reply total N
1982 III-IV 26 35 29 10 100 1199
1986 X-XI 27 40 24 9 100 1000
1988 X-XI 10 27 35 27 1 100 1000
1989 III-IV 10 35 36 18 1 100 1000
1989 VII 9 32 34 24 1 100 1000
1989 X-XI 24 40 24 9 3 100 1000
1990 III-IV 20 37 25 15 3 100 1000
1993 III-IV 9 39 35 15 2 100 1000
Source: Eurobarometer, Trend Variables 1974-93, European Commission, May 1994
Greek public opinion displays that they are, to some extent, interested in EC politics.
As seen, this interest follows an increasing trend in 1990s comparing to 1980s. As seen above a sharp decline in the percentage of ‘a great deal’ draws attention. This can be explained the delicate term between EU and Greece deriving from the issue of
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
Attitudes towards the Single European Market
This table below shows the opinion of Greek people concerning the question
“Personally, would you say that Single European Market which came about at the beginning of 1993 makes you feel very hopeful, rather hopeful, rather fearful or very fearful?” 127 Table 6. Attitudes towards the Single European Market
Years very hopeful rather hopeful rather fearful very fearful no reply Total N
1988 X-XI 33 25 16 9 17 100 1000
1989 III-IV 39 27 10 7 17 100 1000
1989 VII 38 24 8 5 25 100 1000
1990 III-IV 30 25 19 14 12 100 1000
1990 X-XI 24 33 20 7 16 100 1000
1991 III 33 35 14 8 10 100 1000
1991 X-XI 21 33 23 13 10 100 1000
1992 III-IV 21 37 19 9 14 100 1000
1992 IX-X 20 41 14 9 16 100 1000
1993 III-IV 17 47 13 6 17 100 1000
1993 X-XI 19 51 8 5 17 100 1000
Source: Eurobarometer, Trend Variables 1974-93, European Commission, May 1994
Greek public opinion shows that Greek people are rather hopeful about Single
European Market. Such an opinion displays the positive attitude of Greek people
towards economic integration.
Trust in Political Institutions
This table below defines the results the trust four political institutions: the national
parliaments, the national governments, the civil service and political parties.
Trust in Political Institutions (Average trust level of 4 institutions in % by country)
128 Table 7. Trust in Political Institutions
Country (%) Luxemburg 57 The Netherlands 52 Denmark 50 Austria 45 Finland 43 Ireland 42 Sweden 40 Spain 40 Portugal 39 Germany 36 Belgium 36 Average EU15 35 Greece 34 France 32 United Kingdom 31 Italy 25 Source: Eurobarometer, No.55, May 2001.
As seen above, percentage trust of Greek people is one of the lowest in the European
Union. It is interesting that Greek people have more trust towards European institutions and bodies than political institutions in their country.
Support for European Union Membership
This table shows people in member countries’ support their country’s membership to the European Union. As seen from the table below, Greek public opinion fairly supports Greece’s membership to the EU. Concerning the average of EU15 (48% evaluates membership as a good thing), Greek public opinion is above the EU15.
129 Table 8. Support for European Union Membership
Country Good Thing (%) Bad Thing (%) L723 IRL 72 4 NL 63 9 I577 E577 P578 GR 57 10 B548 F4912 EU15 48 13 DK 48 21 D4511 FIN 36 23 A3421 S3337 UK 29 24
Source: Eurobarometer, No.55, May 2001. Percentage “don’t know” not shown.
Benefit from European Union Membership
This table shows people opinion concerning the benefit deriving from EU membership.
Table 9. Benefit from European Union Membership
Country Benefited (%) Not Benefited (%)
IRL 83 5
GR 69 19
P 68 16
L 66 16
NL 63 20
DK 61 24
B 55 23
E 54 21
I 49 24
130 (Table 9 cont.)
F 47 28
EU15 45 30
D 39 37
A 38 42
FIN 38 44
UK 29 38
S 27 55
Source: Eurobarometer, No.55,May 2001. Percentage “don’t know” not shown.
As seen above, Greek public is in favor of benefit from EU. The percentage of public opinion in favor of benefit from the EU is fairly above the EU15 average.
Trust in the European Union
This table shows the level of trust in European Union and 9 of its institutions and bodies in the 15 member states. As seen below, the level of trust for the EU and its institutions and bodies is very high and much above the average of the EU15 in the case of Greece.
Table 10. Trust in the European Union
Country Tend to trust (%) Tend not to trust (%)
P 63 21
L 58 28
GR 55 36
E 54 31
I 53 24
IRL 49 20
131 (Table 10 cont.)
B 47 36
NL 43 37
EU15 41 40
F 41 45
DK 37 55
A 36 50
D 33 44
FIN 33 50
UK 25 49
S 25 64
Source: Eurobarometer, No.55, May 2001. Percentage “don’t know” not shown.
Support for a European Union Constitution
This table below shows the opinions of the people of the EU concerning the question
“Should the European Union have a constitution?” As seen in the table Greece is the
most ardent supporter of preparation of an EU constitution. Such an opinion is
understandable regarding the pro-European and Euro-Federalist attitude of PASOK
especially in the 1990s.
Table 11. Support for a European Union Constitution
Country Should (%) Should not (%)
GR 76 11
I 75 6
NL 70 15
B 67 11
S 65 10
132 (Table 11. cont.)
F 64 9
D 63 8
EU15 62 10
A 61 10
E 59 11
L 57 11
IRL 56 6
P 55 7
FIN 49 32
UK 44 10
DK 42 37
Source: Eurobarometer, No.55, May 2001. Percentage “don’t know” not shown.
Support for Enlargement
This table below shows the opinion of People of EU countries concerning the
enlargement of the EU.
Table 12. Support for Enlargement
Enlargement: for or against?
Country FOR (%) AGAINST (%)
GR 70 18
IRL 59 18
E 55 17
P 52 25
I 51 22
S 50 37
DK 50 40
FIN 45 41
133 (Table 12. Cont.)
B 44 39
EU15 43 35
L 43 42
NL 42 41
UK 35 34
D 35 42
F 35 47
A 33 49
Source: Eurobarometer, No.55, May 2001. Percentage “don’t know” not shown.
As seen above, Greek people have the highest percentage in favor of enlargement of
EU. It could be explained with their strong desire concerning Cyprus’ accession into
the EU.
Interest in European Union News
This table below shows the interest of people of EU countries about the European
Union.
Table 13. Interest in European Union News
Country Paying a lot of Paying a little Paying no attention
attention (%) attention(%) at all (%)
GR 40 43 16
A 34 49 16
I 32 52 15
DK 30 58 12
L 28 52 17
134 (Table 13. cont.)
FIN 26 58 14
S 23 59 18
EU15 23 59 18
E 18 55 27
F 17 52 30
UK 17 34 47
IRL 14 47 38
NL 13 52 34
B 13 50 36
D 11 42 44
Source: Eurobarometer, No.55,May 2001. Percentage “don’t know” not shown.
As seen above, Greek people have the highest percentage concerning interest in EU
news.
Dialogue on Europe: Interest in Taking Part in Discussions
This table below shows the level of interest of people of EU countries in taking part
in discussions on Europe.
Table 14. Dialogue on Europe: Interest In Taking Part In Discussions
Country yes (%) no (%)
GR 50 46
DK 36 58
S 33 60
F 32 62
I 30 48
P 30 61
135 (Table 14. cont.)
L 27 63
A 26 59
EU15 26 62
NL 26 66
E 25 68
UK 21 70
B 21 73
FIN 20 76
D 19 64
IRL 17 70
Source: European Barometer, No.55, May 2001. Percentage “Don’t know” not shown.
As seen above, Greek people are the most interested in taking part discussions on
Europe. As mentioned above, high percentage of interest of Greek people’ interest in
EU is quite relating to the increasing pro-European attitude of PASOK especially with coming to power of Simitis.
Image of the European Union
This table below shows the opinion of people of EU countries concerning the question “In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a positive, fairly positive, fairly negative or very negative image?
136 Table 15. Image of the European Union
Country very+fairly positive (%) fairly+very negative (%) neutral (%)
I 72 4 19
IRL 71 5 16
P 65 7 21
L 60 9 28
E 57 5 32
GR 57 8 30
B 53 7 33
EU15 49 14 31
F 49 15 33
NL 46 12 39
D 44 12 37
DK 38 23 36
A 32 21 42
FIN 31 24 41
UK 30 29 29
S 27 36 34
Source: Eurobarometer, No.57, May 2002. Percentage “don’t know” not shown.
As seen above, EU has a positive image for Greek people. The percentage of positive attitude is above the EU15 average.
137 European Identity and Pride
This table below shows the opinion of people of EU countries concerning the feeling
Europeanness.
Table 16. European Identity and Pride
Country European Nationality and European and Nationality (Nationality) only (%) European (%) Nationality (%) only (%) I 4 65 9 20
L 14 43 13 26
E 4 60 4 28
F 4 52 8 33
B 5 49 10 34
DK 2 55 5 38
EU15 4 48 7 38
D 6 43 10 39
NL 2 48 7 41
P 2 49 4 43
A 2 39 11 45
IRL 3 43 4 47
GR 2 46 4 48
S 1 38 5 54
FIN 1 40 3 55
UK 4 28 4 62
Source: Eurobarometer, No.57, May 2002. Percentage “don’t know” not shown.
138 National Pride
Table 17. National Pride
Country Very and not very +not fairly proud (%) at all proud (%) GR 97 3
IRL 97 2
FIN 95 4
I 91 7
P 91 7
UK 91 7
DK 91 7
S 90 8
E 90 7
F 86 10
A 86 9
EU15 85 11
NL 85 12
L 84 13
B 79 16
D 70 22
Source: Eurobarometer, No.57, May 2002. Percentage “don’t know” not shown.
As seen above, Greek people are very proud of their national identity. They see themselves as firstly Greek than European. The level of feeling Europeanness is not also high in other European countries. So, taking into consideration the percentages of other countries, definition of Greek people themselves as Greek instead of
European is understandable.
139
CHAPTER 3
GREEK POLITICAL CULTURE IN METAPOLITEFSI
In this part, it is going to be argued ongoing transformation of Greek political culture. As constantly mentioned above, 1974 as a year of end of dictatorship initiated a new era for Greek politics. New political parties, although keeping mostly their former cadres and habits, emerged wit a ‘novelty’ discourse. Accession debates greatly marked this period till 1980s and these debates were conducted fundamentally between PASOK and ND. Below, it is going to be dealt with the
Greek political development starting from 1960s till 1990s in the framework of
Greek political culture.
In essence, Greek political culture has been portrayed as one in which traditional, premodern elements superseded modern democratic ones, and the outcome being that culture does not support a really democratic political system (Kioukias, 1993:53).
In Greece, party competition has assimilated class struggle. Consequently, Greek politics may be regarded a zero-sum game including two major political parties that seek to grasp control of the state (Kioukias, 1993:54).
140 The typical conservative policy for stabilizing the political system has been to hold the masses as far from the state as possible. Particularly, after the Second World
War, this policy was maintained through the following practices: clientelism, corporatism and the suppression of the left-wing ideologies (Kioukias, 1993:55).
In 1960s, specific developments appeared in Greece that typically identify cultures moving in the direction of a mass-society- for instance, increasing social mobility, urbanization, ‘the revolution of rising expectations’, relative deprivation, frustration, and calls by economically and politically excluded strata for state redistribution.
Under such circumstances the existing system of power and the instruments of its domination were seriously questioned. But the feelings of the dissatisfied popular strata could not be translated into clearly articulated political demands until opposition parties intervened in order to take advantage of the situation. The Center
Union in particular emerged to promote a liberal order including of a ‘fair state’ the universal application of political and social rights, and the upgrading of parliament and fair party competition. The left-wing EDA stressed the state’s need to grant political rights as well as welfare rights. Both parties were struggling to politicise and mobilize the formed system of power. The triumph of Center Union seemed to pledge the beginning of political modernization. In reality, this victory caused a perpetual crisis of modernization during which the traditional elites tried several methods of cancelling the modernization process. Finally, amid a climate of so-called
‘mass praetorianism’ the military, the defender of tradition, conducted the coup of
1967, proposing regression from modernization as the problem’s solution (Kioukias,
1993:55-56).
141 The turbulent period of 1960s, despite its traumatic features, stirred up new visions expressed by Andreas Papandreou and Constantine Karamanlis. Both these two leaders shared a concern about the failures of parliamentary democracy to function properly in Greece. According to Karamanlis, the cause was the overwhelming party antagonisms and society’s consequent politicisation. Therefore, the solution should have been the establishment of a quasi-presidential government that would be powerful enough to remain above party and class antagonisms and hence to serve public interest. For Papandreou, on the other hand, the extreme politicisation resulted from the existence of unfair authoritarian state. Hence, the solution was a participatory political order integrating the masses into the political system. These two sets of ideas became predominant after the dictatorship’s dissolution in 1974.
Indeed, the revolution of rising expectations had not succeeded in the 1960s and during the dictatorship, thus becoming more imperative in the liberal climate of the metapolitefsi. The PASOK appeared to have a new constructive vision of political and social change that, despite the party’s declaration that it had merged ideas from past generations of left-wing persuasion, apparently differentiated from anything tried before. But to maintain its radical vision while remaining committed at the same time to democratic politics (‘the democratic road to socialism’) it needed to behave like a social movement capable of getting every corner of society in order to bring out support for its cause. Finally, the long-term goal of effecting the socialist transformation of society involved the consensus of broad social forces that must be rebuilt via ideology. PASOK soon emerged as a powerful mass party, the first of its kind in Greek political history- a party that, by means of a huge network of
142 organizational units, extended its campaign for allaghi (socialist change) to every corner of Greek society (Kioukias, 1993:56-58).
ND, the major opposition party, permanently sought to become an active player in ideological politics. By managing to transform itself into a real mass party with links to several social movements, and by introducing the ideological formula of neo- liberalism, it hoped to equalize opponents’ effectiveness in ideological influence
(Kioukias, 1993:59-60).
The political forces gathered around Papandreou learned totally different lessons from the crisis of the 1960s from those learned by the conservatives grouped around
Karamanlis. While fiercely criticizing classical republicanism and semi-presidential solution, the socialists put forward their own proposals for a participatory social order that they felt would be the best solution for the traditional problems of the
Greek political system. Aiming at transforming the traditional political culture into a new, participatory one, they supported reforms that would reach the deepest values and beliefs of Greek society (Kioukias, 1993:60).
On PASOK side, the first thing needed was a new political culture-a participant and cooperative one- to replace the traditional political culture that was identified by apathy and irresponsible individualism. The masses had to change from an
‘electorate’ into an ‘aware public’ the ‘society of private individuals’ had to change into ‘political society’ and ‘society of solidarity’. Party competition had to become institutionalised. Formal representation via the electoral process had to be enhanced
143 by ‘direct democracy’, i.e., the broadening of the political participation of the people through forms and institutions such as syndicalist organizations and local government. The Greek state had to become ‘a social state’ committed to welfare rights and generous redistribution to the popular strata. Objections were raised to the capitalist spirit and the free market conception supposedly contained by the 1975
Constitution (Kioukias, 1993:61-62).
Plans for the corporatist representation of key interest groups such as trade unions and farmers’ associations designed the idea of forcing social groups into a cooperative relationship with the state. Finally, as far as reshaping political culture is concerned, PASOK conducted a coherent policy of political socialization and opinion-formation for state and social institutions (Kioukias, 1993:63-64).
According to Kioukias, the period under PASOK could be described in terms of the positive contributions to the modernization and transformation of political culture in
Greece: the institutionalisation of free competition among political parties and the consequent transformation of Greek democracy into a real party democracy, the legitimisation and free operation of class struggle, the broadened access to politics offered to a new social strata. It must be said that the ground for such developments had been prepared during the years of the conservative administration (Kioukias,
1993:65-66).
It can be argued that Greek political culture became more democratic in the sense that it became imbued with values that legitimatise and favor politicisation, hence
144 increasing political participation. Another sign of progress toward a modern democratic political culture was the atmosphere of permissiveness and diplomacy that penetrated Greek society apparently due to the emergent ideology of people’s rights and to newly introduced rules of ideological politics (Kioukias, 1993:66).
In April 1990, ND came to power with a neoliberal orientation. This party has apparently initiated its own hegemonic project that promised to establish the rules and norm of modern liberal democracy. Insofar as political culture is concerned, it seems that ‘the return to individualism’ is the major value through which this party hopes to heal the traditional deficiencies of Greek politics, which are believed to have been aggravated by the collectivist prejudice and the egalitarian excesses of socialist ideology. In other words, it appeared that a culture of individual responsibility was ND’s reply to the problem of ‘irresponsible individualism’, which it might be said, was supplemented by a kind of ‘irresponsible collectivism’ under the effect of socialist ideology (Kioukias, 1993:69-70).
The political transformation in the post-1974 represents a landmark in terms of the development of both cultures. The emergence of political democracy enabled to initiate novel as well as powerful, long-term processes of social and political change that have deeply influenced the evolution of both of them. The most important of these ongoing and as-yet incomplete processes are: a. the emancipation of the execution of foreign policy from foreign tutelage as an equal member of EU; b. the democratisation of domestic politics with spill-overs into society and culture and c.
Europeanization of Greek politics and culture—a development intimately linked with
145 Greece’s accession to the EC but had deep, longer-term implications for the structure of Greek economy and society (Diamandouros, 1994:28-29). In that sense, it can be said that from 1974 onwards Greece has been following a road for ‘catching up with the West’ and this process characterized by the concept of Europeanization. In a way it meant economic and political reinforcing of the Greek state through modernization and development (Tayfur, 1989:91).
In terms of state-society relations, emergence of the new democratic environment enabled the reformulation of the relationship between these two in favor of the latter.
The widespread view on Greek civil society presumes that the Greek civil society is weaker comparing to the other Western European countries. After the transition to democracy in 1974, the relations between the state and civil society were altered, as the power of central state, which had reached an apogee under the seven-year military dictatorship, was balanced by the parties of New Democracy and PASOK, which alternated in power forming single-party governments throughout the last 20 years. 20
After 1974, civil society has demonstrated sings of awakening, especially in the form of civil associations and unions of public employees. Still civil society remains relatively weak, being overrun by the practices of State Corporation, which have survived, during the period of post-war ‘guided’ democracy and the seven-year dictatorship. As a result, it seems acceptable to argue that civil society and
20 “The Remains of Authoritarianism: Bureaucracy and Civil Society in Post Authoritarian Greece” by Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos
According to Sotiropoulos, the restoration of democracy in 1974 marked the beginning of a relative diminishment of the state’s role, but at the same time it put forward the ever present and increasingly important party intervention and control over the organized interests. The predominant and omnipotent role of the state has been held responsible for the weakness of the Greek civil society and the relative absence of independent associations and non-governmental organizations. During the last two decades the balance of power between state and society has shifted in favor of the latter. The 1980s identify the beginning of a resurgence of Greek civil society displayed in the rising numbers of voluntary associations active mainly in cultural issues as well as in the expansion and reinforcing of new social movements with the ecology and feminist organizations being the main examples. In Greece both the ND and PASOK governments accepted, propagated and applied a programme for the
Europeanization of Greek economy and society. An important aspect of the
Europeanization project was the redefinition of the relations between state and
21
According to Diamandouros, post-1974 period can be divided into two sub periods: the first starts from 1974 till 1985. The second one begins in the latter year and comes to the present. Diamandouros distinguishes the first sub-period as the incorporative moment because a. the incorporation of a certain strata (In
Diamandouros’s opinion;
the distinguishing characteristic of these strata was their involvement in activities (subsistence agriculture, petty commodity production not geared to exports, finance, import-substitution industries, and the overinflated and unproductive state and wider public sector) marked, above all, by low productivity, low competitiveness, the absence or tenuousness of economic, political, and cultural linkages to outer world and to the international economy, the aversion to reform, and powerful, affective commitments to various adaptations of domestic structures inherited from the long Ottoman tradition) (Diamandouros, 1994:20-21) into political democracy formed in Greece after 1974. b. their autonomous participation in the political system through the institutional mechanisms provided for that purpose primarily by PASOK and KKE c. their clear ideological (1974-1981) and political ascendancy (1981-1985) in Greek society and politics. Post-1985 era, which is called moment of entrenchment, is to be understood as a period in which the incorporative momentum reached its limits, as the social forces which had served as its main carriers entered a phase of entrenchment, hence acting more as confining conditions inhibiting the restructuring and transformation necessary for their 148 substantive integration into the Greek economy and society than as an instrument for further change (Diamandouros, 1994:30).
Emergence of political democracy and the concluding incorporation into the political system of social forces which, since the end of the civil war had remained effectively expelled from the political process had a deep influence on the two cultures
(Diamandouros, 1994:34).
The quest for the deepening of democracy as well as for the enlargement of its range took a variety of forms. Underpinning all of these however was the desire to bring
Greek politics and economy closer to the norms and patterns dominant in the advanced industrial democracies of Europe. It is especially crucial that the official reason for the Greek application to the Community gave priority to the need to enhance democratic politics and structures in Greece and paid less attention to economic restructuring and revitalization (Diamandouros, 1994:36-37).
As Diamandouros argues, democratisation had a key position in the discourse of the underdog culture from the very beginning of the post-authoritarian period.
Democratisation in the context of the underdog culture included two temporally interrelated but analytically distinct processes: the first was characterized by the rise to political equality and subsequent political and ideological ascendancy of the social forces adhering to this culture. Graphically captured by the green rising sun used by
PASOK as its key symbol, this process formed the essence of what Diamandouros has called the incorporative moment in post-authoritarian Greek politics and culture.
149 The rise of PASOK to power in 1981 at the vanguard of what had become known as the country’s “progressive forces” marked the high point in these strata’s long march to political power (Diamandouros, 1994:37).
The populist conception of democracy constituted the only most predominant feature of the incorporative moment in the post-authoritarian period. The Greek underdog culture can be said to have served as the logic of integration during the first decade of the post-authoritarian period. The strong populist discourse that it produced during this incorporative moment played as a potent ideological vehicle in a bid to consolidate its emerging ascendancy and to make dominant its particularist essence
(Diamandouros, 1994:39).
In the opinion of Diamandouros, accession to the EC was especially significant for the reformist culture. Its importance should be understood at two interrelated levels.
Firstly accession into the Community presented the prospect for both political and economic rationalization and reform-concepts central to the reformist culture. The community was regarded as a guarantor for democratic stability and enhanced security as well as a catalyst for much-needed structural change. Finally accession to the Community provided Greece the privileged status of belonging in the same exclusive “club” as the “developed” and “advanced” countries of the first-world
(Diamandouros, 1994:40-41).
It could be easily concluded that, accession into EC brought new patterns in terms of cultural, political and institutional levels. Though these patterns emanated from
150 outside Greece, they came to become an integral part of the country’s domestic political scene. As a natural consequence of such an integration, political, economic and cultural settings of the country were profoundly influenced by the EC. In other words, the EC can, from this perspective, properly be considered as a powerful force potentially capable of supplying enough support and momentum for the social and political forces adhering to the reformist culture to constitute the reforms, rationalization of structures, and total changes in Greek polity and economy essential for the country’s fuller integration into the rapidly evolving mechanisms of the
Community and to assure its capacity to enjoy commensurately from them
(Diamandouros, 1994:41-42).
The year of 1985 initiated a reverse trend and accompanied in a period that had important consequences for the underdog culture. It could be concluded that its political and ideological carriers experienced a distinct loss of momentum and increasingly applied to defensive strategies devised to block the erosion of gains occurred during the incorporative moment and to guarantee their pertaining capacity to play a key role in Greek politics. Success in the maintenance of this strategy has meant that the ascendant forces adhering to the underdog culture have effectively emerged as the confining condition preventing further rationalization and modernization of the Greek political system. Therefore, this development gives right to us to consider this era of post authoritarian Greek politics as its “moment of entrenchment”. Meanwhile, the inability of the reformist culture to get over these confining conditions has ended in a period of pronounced and lasting indeterminacy that remains the single most important characteristic of Greek politics as the country
151 searches its way through the final decade of the country (Diamandouros, 1994:45-
46).
The imposition of an austerity program in October 1985 represents the latest reversal in the long and continuing struggle for supremacy between these two rival cultures.
The clear message included in the 1985 austerity program was the logic of reform and it was deeply defined with the modernist culture. In this regard, it became ascendant in the domain of politics and economy of Greek historical development. A structural aspect of both cultural traditions has been their inability to translate successfully into permanent ascendancy, let alone hegemony (Diamandouros,
1994:51-52).
Diamandouros defines the increasing integration of Greece into the EC and the consequent need to adopt its economic and political structures to those of the
Community as the single most significant force in terms of ‘catching up the West’.
This force, attaching to the reformist culture, is slowly but inexorably helping to bend the balance of Greek historical development in favor of the constant ascendancy of that culture (Diamandouros, 1994:53).
The long-term implications of integration form a direct threat to the ideological and political underpinnings of the underdog culture. It was for this reason that the prospect of accession to the community originally produced such acrimony and opposition among the social forces adhering to that culture, particularly during the period prior to 1981 (Diamandouros, 1994:54).
152 When ND came to power in 1990, ND’s program conceived the radical contraction of the over-inflated state and wider public sector by means of both privatisation of many state-owned or state-controlled enterprises and the rationalization of the overstaffed and inefficient public bureaucracy, the liberalization of the Greek market.
Also in line with its neo-liberal logic, ND espoused the promotion of more competitive and rational structures which will make possible Greek polity, economy, and society to cooperate more closely with its European partners and reverse the trends towards the country’s growing marginalization within the Community that had happened over much of the preceding decade (Diamandouros, 1994:55-57).
As mentioned above, the balance between the traditionalist and modernist wings of
Greek political culture shifted in favor of the latter concerning the last three decades.
In this regard, EC played the key role. Actually, such a process witnessed basically reformulation of state-church relations, state-society, state-economy relations and transformation of weak Greek civil society into more powerful and “free” one. It should not be forgotten that EC penetration and Europeanization process affected almost every field of Greece and increasing consensus on keeping strong ties and supporting of integration between the major parties and among Greek society sustained and enhanced this transformation.
3.1 ‘Europeanization’ of Greek Political Culture
In the previous parts the main characteristics of Greek political culture have been highlighted since its establishment till 1990s. As has been emphasized before,
153 accession to EC (EU) had a huge significance in terms of Greek political culture regarding the tension or so-called dualism between traditionalist and modernist wings of that culture.
Greece’s membership to European Community is considered as a landmark in the
Greek history regarding economic, political and cultural aspects. EU membership also represents a watershed in terms of Greek politics. From the very beginning of the accession process, EU formed a delicate source of discussions due to different opinions on it. Through the acceleration of integration process, these discussions started gaining prominence. The prominence of these discussions at large derived from the requirements of the integration. In this regard, all the requirements of integration gave birth to a new concept that is ‘Europeanization’. This concept emerged within the process of European integration. The ongoing process of deepening and enlargement of EU brought about new discussions with novel meanings. As a result of these developments it is very hard to give a certain and clear definition of this concept. The very concept of Europeanization creates discussions and ambivalence and multifaceted character of this concept puts another obstacle in front of reaching any consensus.
The 1974 transition to liberal democracy after 7-year military dictatorship was a historical landmark that created the Third Hellenic Republic and Greece’s contemporary party structure. EC membership was considered as a guarantor of democracy, stability and security. Also what must not be forgotten is that there is a relatively undisputable agreement among Greek policy elites and public that, since
154 the country’s accession, the EU has been regarded as the most significant driving force of Greece’s socio-political, economic and institutional modernization. As another consequence of these developments, the EU membership constituted the crucial component in the evolution process of a more conscious and increasingly more autonomous civil society (Pagoulatos, 2002:3-13).
Europeanization is seen as the process describing the impact of EU membership or prospective membership on politics, society and economy. According to Ioakamidis
(Ioakamidis, 2002), Europeanization is experienced differently by member states due to the factors such as state formation, the patterns of policy-making, the political culture, also the balance of power between state and society. Ioakamidis formulates
Europeanization in terms of two basic types: Responsive and Intended
Europeanization. In responsive Europeanization, Europeanization does not constitute a substitute for modernization and change and it results from the interactive diffusion between the national political system, institutions and different elites on the one hand and the EU system and processes on the other. In other words, it represents a political process, in so far as it is not being involved by political actors and it is not embedded in a political and ideological design for political change. In intended Europeanization, there is powerful intention and project designed by political actors to transfer into their political systems the logic, dynamics, organizational traits, behavioral and regulatory patterns related to European integration. Therefore it is clear that in this case Europeanization represents a political or even an ideological programme for change because of these traits of intended Europeanization, it is much complex in the scope its implications in terms
155 of its territorial and thematic penetration. Taking into consideration this typification,
Ioakamidis situates Greece in the type of “intended Europeanization”. In case of
Greece, what can be said comfortably is that this process has deeply penetrated the
Greek political system and brought reformulations in at least four different but interrelated levels in terms of regulatory, functional, territorial and institutional.
*Loosening the state’s power on the social institutions and strengthening the latter’s autonomy.
*Expanding existing opportunities or new facilities for the participation of interest groups in the process of policy-making both at national and European levels.
*Loosening Athens’s grip on the regions via a process of regional decentralization greatly stimulated by EU membership.
*Weakening the dominant position of the party system in Greek society and consequently lessening the role of clientelistic system as an input forming state- society relations.
*De-externalising foreign policy by expanding its scope and agenda and bringing new agents into the process of policy formulation and application.
Naturally the Europeanization process has given birth to new types of political conflicts and ideological cleavages. As a consequence of this process, it can be said that the old ideological cleavage between right and left has been replaced by a new ideological conflict between Europeanist/modernisers and traditionalists. Generally the traditionalists treat Europeanization as a force threatening the country’s traditional cultural patterns and resist against the adjustment of the political and socio-economic systems compliance with the logic and requirements of integration.22
22 < www.ekem.gr/europeanization_en.html>12.06.2003 156 In this regard, a different conceptualisation of Europeanization can be introduced.
According to Aldrich,
Europeanization is an incremental process reorienting the direction and form politics to the degree that EU political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy making (quoted in Ioakamidis, 1996:33).
Ioakimidis approaches Europenization by terming two defining process interrelated to each other: Asynchronic and Autarkic Europeanization. Asynchronic
Europeanization suggests that certain important elements of the State’s political system have become rapidly and extensively Europeanized, while other important components of government and administration could not succeed as former. The result of this unbalanced Europeanization is the emergence of systemic tensions and conflicts between the Europeanized parts on the one hand and less developed in this respect on the other. While Asynchronic Europeanization defines the pace and intensity of Europeanization, the nature and content of the phenomenon is described by autarkic Europeanization. It means that the political system and elites seek to internalise European inputs and logic as a means of supporting their continued control in terms of structural stability and practices, ideological attitudes, policy objectives, resources and orientations, rather than as a means of altering or adjusting to the new environmental conditions and new dynamics generated by EU membership. According to Ioakamidis, the Greek domestic political environment is sustaining a process of Europeanization distinguished by these two forms. The asynchronic process tends to generate a dualistic system of structural, organisational and behavioral patterns that works to split Greek society, on the one hand, into the modern, European section to internalise the European inputs and logic of action, on the other, into the hellonocentric, traditional section which resists, opposes or 157 reluctantly admit the need for change. The autarkic nature of the Europeanization process refers to the political actors and, particularly, the leading political elites. It appears that these elites are inclined to regard Europeanization in the narrow perspective of accepting the need to expand the legitimacy of the political system but then agreeing to scarcely any change in the basic structural architecture of the system or in its fundamental political objectives. Hence the European logic enters the system and rallies pressures and demand for change (Ioakamidis, 1996:34).
Ioakamidis makes a periodization of the stages of Europeanization in the case of
Greece. The first stage of Europeanization starts in 1975, the year that Greece submitted its application for full membership of EU. He ends the first period in 1985 as the beginning of the end of agonizing process in which the political implications of taking part in EU and the request for a special loan to support the troubled Greek economy presented by the Greek Government to the EU in 1985. Consequently, this year can be taken as starting the second phase of this process and as a turning point in dealing with the ideological dilemma of the integration process. The main elements of the process of Europeanization in the first period (1975 and 1985) can be described as the contribution to the consolidation of the newly-established democratic institutions, emergence of pressures that led to administrative adjustments for coping with the requirements of Community membership, underpinning the foreign policy orientation of the country. The first period can also be divided into two sub periods: 1975-1981 and 1981-1985. During the period 1975-
1981 the main political debate was about the political merits and ideological aspect of the accession. The second sub-period (1981-1985) was characterized by efforts of
158 PASOK Governments to design an independent strategy for the socio-political modernisation of the country. In the period 1983-1985 Greece showed, consciously or unconsciously, resistance to the adjustment to Europeanization process in three particular fields:
*Resistance to the pressures originated from the EU for reformulating the economic role and functions of the state and state-society relationship.
*Resistance to Europeanization of foreign policy strategies and objectives in terms of ignorance to the consensus requirements of European Political Cooperation.
*Refusal to approve plans for deepening of European Integration at the institutional level or expanding the range of integration to security and defence areas (Ioakamidis,
1996:34-38).
The second period starts in 1985. This year represents a landmark as a result of political performance conducted by PASOK. In that year, the PASOK Government shifted its ambivalent policy towards the EU and took a more stable policy orientation towards EU and European integration. Why did PASOK shift its policy towards EU? The flow of great amount financial transfers that made Greece excessively dependent on the EU budget for recovering its welfare was surely a forcible consideration. The factor for the change of PASOK’s ambivalent position was that Greece enjoyed important bargaining power in the regional environment, particularly the relationship between Greece and Turkey. After 1985, the process of
Europeanization started to penetrate more intensively the whole socio-economic system. The Europeanization of Greek politics mainly revolved around a single subject: the redefinition of the role, scope, size, and functions of the state. The
159 Europeanisation process especially after 1985 put itself firmly in terms of redrawing the border between state and society. It required shifting of the patronising functions, controls and regulations executed by the state as a direct consequence of its clientelistic and corporatist structures. The intensification of Europeanization also formed the conditions of wider participation in policy-making and policy-planning.
In this regard, Ioakamidis points out that Europeanisation of Greek politics depends on the efforts and willingness of the political parties to discard these clientelistic relationships in terms of transformation of themselves into modern institutions. The
Europeanisation or so-called modernization of Greek politics forms an indispensable component of transformation of political culture especially in the area of the political parties as the main players of this process (Ioakamidis, 1996:39-48).
Thus, the Europeanization process entails reformulation of the function and role of state-society relationship. The political parties as key factors of politics have a considerable role in terms of transformation of this network. However, the political parties still tend to see the state as the means for meeting clientelistic demands, as a platform for allocating favors and as patron for their supporters that were seen as clients of the state bureaucracy. Such a structural characteristic of Greek politics created tension in terms of adjustment and adhering to the requirements of EU. This structuring constitutes a critical obstacle to deepening the Europeanization of Greek politics.
As was stressed above, EC membership for Greece is treated as the main indispensable determinant of modernising process of politics in Greece. EU
160 membership refers not only as a turning point in Greek history but also another aspect of Greek politics, with a disputable and value-laden concept, which is modernization. It is not the purpose of this study to discuss the implications of the concept of modernization. But this concept has an interesting dimension in the case of Greece. Accession to EU and deepening of European integration, and emergence of Europeanization brought about a process of modernization.
The theme of modernization has been referred to by much of the political discourse in Greece over the last decade. As Mouzelis mentioned, ‘modernization’ is a much- abused term as it has different meanings in different contexts. Modernization has often been equalized in the past with the approximation to Western values, norms and practices but an emphasis on market economics, technocratic administration. So that, ‘modernization’ in the case of Greece is narrated as ‘Europeanization’.
According to Iokamidis, Europeanization embraced a fragmentation and penetration of Greek society in terms of asynchronic (involving a dualistic system of modern,
Europeanized elites clashing with Helleno-centric, traditional opponents) and autarkic modalities (with elites looking for including EU impacts under a traditional clientelistic-corporatist culture). The ideological impact of EU membership could be depicted in terms of hegemony of ideas and Greek public opinion is overwhelmingly positive for deeper integration into EU, but sections of society are better informed of, and more willing to internalise, EU demands than others (quoted in Featherstone,
1998:23-35).
161 In the 1990s and early 2000s the political dynamic sphere formed of a manifold mixture of pressure between continuity and change in Greece. As has been underlined by Tayfur, domestic politics of Greece has been prevailed since the early
1990s by the hegemony struggle between defenders of modernization that trying to impose contemporary European values and ways of upon Greek political, economic and social structures and traditional actors that resisting towards this change and reformulation (quoted in Tayfur, 2003:124)
According to Featherstone, the impact of Europeanization, given the relative economic weakness of peripheral states, is without doubt more remarkable and of a distinct form in these societies than for those of the EU core. Also, many of the elements of the Greek economic, social and political condition have a lot in common with the other Southern Europe. Common points of state tradition are interrelated with similar poor performance in respecting EU rules. In this regard, with the process of Europeanization Greece becomes more dependent on the core of the EU and more subject to its hegemony. Therefore, in order to understand the nature of changes underway in the Greek politics in the 1990s, one must refer to the nature of its
Europeanization (Featherstone, 1998:36-38).
The Greek case indicates that, Europeanization process and EU membership can have a crucial role in reinforcing democratic institutions and expanding the range of the democratic process by working with the new social and political actors. Also it is convincingly discussed that EU membership had a great role in terms of reconstruction of political, democratic stability in Greece, a country plagued by
162 instability and authoritarian role until at least 1974 that the year of the collapse of military regime.23
In this sense, it should be underlined that one must take into consideration that this cleavage between traditionalists and modernizers in terms of adjustment to
Europeanization process seems loosening its power gradually. Both of the most powerful political parties of the political scene of Greek politics, PASOK and New
Democracy (ND), do not have disagreement about it anymore. Especially, Simitis government initiated a new era both in terms of PASOK and the logic of
Europeanization or in Simitis’ words ‘modernization’.
3.2 Simitis and ‘Modernization’: A New Era in Greek Political Culture
As has been mentioned above, in the 1990s, especially with the rise of Simitis, a new concept ‘modernization’ has been pronounced in Greek politics. It is actually worth examining both in terms of PASOK and Greek politics pronounced in the 1990s. It can be said that ‘Europeanization’ was, in a sense, replaced with the concept of
‘modernization’. In this study, it is not our concern to define modernization or carry out a theoretical analysis of its origins and composition. What is attempted is to disclose the perception of modernization in the discourse of Simitis as the new face of PASOK.
23 < www.ekem.gr/europeanization_en.html>12.06.2003 163 The concept of modernization is definitely broad and due to its ambiguous character, its usage encounters with interpretative controversies. For the southeastern Europe, modernization as a cultural and political project operated divisively on the ideological level because it entailed challenges to conventional self-definitions. The idea of modernization in the age of enlightenment in the Balkans fundamentally involved the projection of West European models of culture and behaviour as prototypes to be imitated in southeastern Europe. Besides the introduction of modern ideas, structures and forms in several fields of human experience, this perspective included two explicit political projects: first the European idea as an ideal type was thought to consist of the code of civil liberties as an essential component. Hence, liberalism reached Southeastern Europe as fundamentally the political edge of modernizing ideas. Secondly, the model of European political and social organization also contained the idea of diverse and independent national communities, held together by their language, cultural traditions and social freedoms
(Kitromilides, 1993:75-77).
Much of the political discourse in Greece over the last decade has referred, implicitly or explicitly, to the concept of modernization. Modernization has often been equated in the past in Greece (and generally in Southeastern Europe) with an approximation to western European norms and practices. In a sense modernization in Greece was identified with Europeanization. According to Featherstone, ‘Europeanization’ is, to some degree, a regional manifestation of globalisation (Featherstone, 1998:23-27).
Given the relative economic weakness of the peripheral states, the effect of EU is
164 undoubtedly more remarkable and of a distinctive form in these societies than for those of the EU core (Featherstone, 1998:36).
According to Mouzelis, among the countries that entered the development race a century or so later than the nations of Western Europe we may involve Greece, as well as several other Balkan, Latin American, and Asian countries. For a variety of reasons, the nation-state in these latecomers took a form that of its Western-European predecessors and in these cases, the ‘modern’ did not manage to become dominant, did not achieve in peripheralizing the ‘traditional’. Instead, in these countries the modern and traditional have come to coexist side by side in unstable balance. In more concrete sense, on the political level the central state penetrated the periphery, but it failed to marginalize the dominant particularistic, clientelistic components. It means that the expansion of political rights downwards was much more restricted.
Hence, the mobilization and integration of people into the center took a more vertical and authoritarian form. In a sense, the articulation of modern and traditional in late modernization tends to lead to a more disarticulated capitalist economy, a more authoritarian polity and a more formalistic/disorienting culture (Mouzelis, 1996:219-
220). In case of Greece, the country failed to use the important resources stemmed from its 19th century export trade in order to modernize its agriculture and link it effectively with a competitive industrial sector (Mouzelis, 1996:221-222).
Modernisation is being conceived as a new era in process of transformation regarding political culture that tends to build new forms of governance and to reformulate the connections between state apparatuses and socio-economic
165 structures. The shift in the political culture, of the Socialist party in particular, was already apparent in the policies followed at the second part of the decade. Gradually but steadily Europe began to be a key determinant at every field of national policy. In the 1990s the task of inclusion of Greece to the EMU was the asserted goal of almost all the political agenda, (except for KKE). This goal has met the broader social consensus and became motivating factor for Greek society. The view that the Greek economy should be modernised and adapted to the general European trends in order to meet the Maastricht criteria, although it had difficult socio-economic outcomes, was not seriously doubted by the major social actors. The major policies followed during the 1990s were oriented towards the European nominal convergence. In terms of political culture, it can be argued that during this period of rapid socio-economic restructuring the main comprehensive change has occurred within the PASOK. The major ideological term is pronounced as ‘Modernisation’. Modernisation is characterized as a change of conditions and context of social and political power and it was manifested as a political support to get over the traditional characteristics of
Greek political culture. Simitis evaluates this period as completion of the transition to modernity and he associates modernisation to a situation of economic development and social prosperity. In an article published in Kathimerini (30.05.1999) he argues that;
Greece is now rapidly importing labour force’ that is an indicator of economic development. Also multiculturalism is acknowledged- and celebrated ‘Greece is rapidly transformed from a country of high cultural homogeneity to an increasingly multicultural society.
In Simitis view, “the real modernisation exists when the whole society, the most dynamic parts of it, at all the social strata and classes, achieve a cultural transition towards the new realities caused by these breaks with the past”. In this sense 166 modernisation is regarded as a political and cultural transition relied on the most progressive and dynamic parts of the society that are able to have a quick reply to the requirements of globalisation.24
If the 1980s was totally the decade of policy experimentation, inefficient economic management, and discontinued measures, the 1990s was a decade of stability, consistency and continuity in policy direction, as well as of a gradual construction of economic policy success. During the 1980s, PASOK and ND had been divided and profoundly polarized over economic and structural policies. By the time the
Socialists recaptured power, nevertheless, the same economic strategy for fulfilling
EMU entry requirements was formally shared by both parties (Pagoulatos, 2002:7-8).
In the beginning of 1990s, when Greece shifted the direction of its economic policies, a parallel realignment has been realized in the realm of ideas.
Modernization and catching-up with Europe became major ideological views of both
ND and PASOK. Simitis’ coming to power as prime minister and the leader of
PASOK has a considerable importance in terms of the pronouncement of modernization discourse. Simitis used the concept of ‘modernization’ as a bedrock of his political discourse and understanding. Simitis, the architect –as the then Economy
Minister- of the 1985-87 stabilization, had been always defined with PASOK’s pro-
European and reformist wing. His election in 1996 was instrumental in executing the transformation of PASOK into a mainstream European social democratic party, and a champion of promoting European integration as part of a broader political agenda of
24 “Modernisation and the would be Entrepreneurial Culture” by Evie Zambeta
ND, who are relatively more nationalistic and sceptical towards some of the impacts of European integration. On the other hand, doubtlessly, the leadership of ND party remains as pro-EU as ever. True to its pro –European tradition, the ND party today thinks Greece and Europe as inseparable. In the words of Kostas Karamanlis, leader of ND,
we believe in Europe but we care deeply about Greece. We want to enhance our cooperation with all other Europeans, but we will always love profoundly our land and its people. We are committed to our extended European family, but our priority is to address the needs of our immediate Greek one. In short, if we believe so much in Europe, it is precisely because of our original belief in Greece and its potential (Pagoulatos, 2002:9-10).
In the 1990s, the ripening of PASOK into a modern, and the social learning resulting from increasing interaction with EU counterparts, have all contributed to a greater degree of maturity of Greek interest organizations and labour unions (Pagoulatos,
2002:13).
The most crucial cause behind EU’s increasing popularity with the Greek public seems to have been the gradual transformation of PASOK into an increasingly pro- integration political force. Meanwhile, the pro-PASOK, left-of-center part of the electorate becomes growingly favourable to the EU (Pagoulatos, 2002:27).
According to Simitis, the EU is close to the completion of economic integration and is taking steps toward political integration. These developments will ultimately
168 reformulate the conditions of international competition in the sense that the international division of labor will be conditioned by the antagonisms of supranational elites. Hence the logic of the nation-state will gradually but steadily be replaced by postnational arrangements. For Simitis, it means that it is in the ‘national interest’ to rise the country’s position through cooperation and to describe the rules of the game together with EU partners instead of trying only to take financial resources from the EU by any means (Moschanos, 1997:332).
Simitis’s coming to power and “modernization” vision both in terms of PASOK and
Greece revolved around more effective membership in the EU supporting federal structure in the EU and political priorities influenced by neo-liberal paradigm as a response to nationalist and populist discourse of Papandreou. In this sense, Simitis represents radical break from Papandreou’s ‘PASOK’ both in terms of policy objectives for Greece and political discourse.
The variety of political stances upon the issue of European integration refers to ideological differences, political expediencies, the complexity of Greek society, and conflicting social interests. The point is that these different positions tend to effect both the content and form of the process of socio-political modernization in Greece, making them part of the broader European processes of both ‘negative integration’ and ‘positive integration’ terms reintroduced into the European integration literature by John Pinder. He used ‘negative integration’ for that part of “economic integration that includes of the removal of discrimination”, whereas by ‘positive integration’ he meant the “formation and application of coordinated and common policies in order to
169 fulfil economic and welfare objectives other than the removal of discrimination”. In this sense, negative integration refers to measures aimed at the completion of the internal market and positive integration refers a process leading toward economic and political union (Moschanos, 1997:333).
ND has supported the process of European integration on the basis that accession to the EU will strengthen Greece as to develop its economy and reinforce its liberal democratic institutions. The parties of the Left have either supported European integration on the grounds that Europe represents a new field of class struggle or have refused it on the grounds that accession to the EU would involve for Greece an intensification of the historical process of dependence and underdevelopment. More compatibly, both PASOK and ND have relied on a technocratic form of modernization, stressing the role of experts and state bureaucrats. In practice, both parties have fluctuated between the EU logic of market modernization, which tends to generate social tensions and the following political necessity for the state social policy measures, which tend to weaken the very process of economic management and modernization (Moschanos, 1997:339).
In Greece, the 1990s and the beginning of 2000 reflect an important step in case of
PASOK which is the party having crucial role in shaping perceptions of
Europeanization. The very concept of ‘modernization’ symbolizes the key word of
PASOK with the Simitis’s rise to power in 1996.
170 The election of Kostas Simitis in 1996, leader of the ‘modernizing wing’ of PASOK and the opponent of Andreas Papandreou meant reformulation of party’s discourse by starting the era of ‘modernization’ and rise of Simitis at the same time identifies a shift in the organisational tradition of PASOK. The triumph of PASOK in the elections of September 1996 contributed to the stabilization of the new power bloc of the party and the motto of modernization claims as the new ideological impetus of the party (Bilios, 2003:7-8).
When PASOK came to power in 1981, it had to deal with two facts. The first was
Greece’s accession to the EEC in 1981. The second was PASOK’s keeping out of the rearrangement processes of the development of state institutions. PASOK used the state apparatus as a mechanism to occupy state power. PASOK failed to give a new set of social aspiration to the state above and beyond its own ideological and political definitions (Bilios, 2003:11-12).
PASOK’s modernization policy, built around Greek membership in the European
Union, reinforced PASOK’s influence among higher social strata and a significant section of capital, as well as intellectuals traditionally distrustful of Papandreou’s
‘nationalist’ and ‘demagogic’ discourse. The demand for political modernization is used not only as a connective tissue in the pre-election for PASOK, but greatly as a legitimising reference of state policy itself (Bilios, 2003:17-18).
In the Greek political life of the post-war era until the end of 1980s, the competition between the political forces, the practices of the political parties and political
171 behaviour of the citizens was over-defined by the major cleavage ‘Right-Anti-Right’
(Bilios, 2003:19).
According to the modernization wing within PASOK, the modernization of the country requires the reform of the party itself and its transition into a ‘new’ modern party. A significant component differentiating PASOK of today from the one of the past is the area of its social (base) reference. The concept of ‘the people’ as a subject for history is lost together with the vision of socialism. The ‘nation’ now is replaced with the ‘people’. A highlighting example of the new ideology is the identification of the policy regarding the accession to the EMU, as a national policy. It is unquestionable that the social segregations were self-obvious in the old-PASOK, which identified itself only with one part of the people, namely non-privileged one.
In today’s political discourse of PASOK, such social divisions and references are rare. An additional factor that identifies PASOK today is its internal organizational reform. The aim of this attempt is the breaking of the old party structure, which was orientated towards the state power and its benefits. This structure was organised in such a way that the simple communication between the party and the governmental power was ensured; this structure was responsible for the nepotism phenomena of the
1980s. In other words, what is aimed at, through the organization re-structuring of
PASOK, is a novel, more rational relationship among party, the government and the society (with reference to civil-society) (Bilios, 2003:29-30).
172 It must be emphasized, coming to power of Simitis with a reformist understanding in line with pro-EU in 1996, the ‘socialist’ began to adapt a relatively determined policy of structural reforms and market liberalization (Tayfur, 2003:125)
To recapitulate, the 1990s and Simitis era for Greece, it can be asserted that Greece displays itself as a model country especially with the deepening and enlargement of
EU which realized radical transformation concerning especially economy, social modernization and understanding of democracy. The support for deepening Greece’s
European integration can be clearly observed throughout the leadership of Simitis in that a federal model of EU has been advocated.
Concerning Simitis’s pro-European attitude, Europeanization is regarded as the best rational strategy in order to realize modernist transformation of Greek state and society. Acceleration of the pro-European vision in the 1990s made itself apparent in the main fields of Greece. To illustrate, diminishing state’s role in the economy and acceleration of privatisation, efforts aiming at transforming Greek public administration into a more rational and efficient one, strengthening Greek civil society in terms of independent associations and non-governmental organizations can all be observed in this era.
However, as was reiterated about the issue of the replacement of “Europeanization” with “Modernization”, it could not be claimed that Europeanization ended.
Modernization was presented as a new path concerning the reinforcement of the
Europeanization process. Such a concept was also employed against national,
173 populist and charismatic understanding of leadership practiced by Andreas
Papandreou. Such a new strategy employed by Simitis aimed at reforming the old structure, and ideology, and forging a new one with the ‘modernization’ discourse and programme.
174 CONCLUSION
In this study, it was tried to analyse the transformation, in a way Europeanization of
Greek political culture since the establishment of Greek nation-state till 1996. Greek political culture was mostly formulated as a conflict between its two wings and such an approach defined Greek political culture as a structure formed by two main “rival” components: “traditional” and “modernist”. Although the conflict between these two wings could be formulated in a “dualism” axis, such a definition continues to create ongoing debates over the relationship between these two main components. Indeed, these two pillars of the Greek political culture can not be evaluated separately since they are the constitutive dynamics of a structure completing each other. In other words, “traditionalist” and “modernist” character of Greek political culture are sine qua non for each other. This dualism takes its derivations from the ambiguous nature of “Greekness”. In this regard, their sine qua non character could be observed throughout the Greek political history up to the present.
There is an important and interesting point in the Greek historical development that needs to be dealt with; that is, almost all the turning points shaping the Greek political culture and enabling ascendancy one of the two wings over the other was realised as a consequence of foreign interventions. Minor Asia Catastrophe, Civil
175 War, the military dictatorship (1967-74) could be presented as some of the main events forming Greek political culture.
As mentioned above, the ambiguity of Greekness found also its expression in the formulation of Greek political culture. Modern Greek identity discourse revolved around many elements generally opposing each other. In this study, only the main ones were focused upon representing this so-called opposition: Ancient Greek culture and Orthodoxy.
Ancient Greek culture was mainly regarded as the most important pillar linking
Greece to the West. However, such an idealization of ancient Greek past was mostly a product of Westernizers. Ancient Greek past functioned as the starting point in the process of forging modern Greek identity in terms of the problem of historical continuity articulated as ancient-Byzantium- Greek nation-state.
Orthodoxy has always functioned as the main representative of the traditionalist wing both in terms of forging modern Greek identity and Greek political culture. The huge and critical role of Orthodoxy in the process of making modern Greek identity is indisputable. In this regard, it should be mentioned that Helleno-Orthodoxy discourse is the best example in terms of illustrating the tension in Greek identity by gathering the opposed elements of this identity. Orthodoxy had such an important role in
Greek identity that being “Orthodox” and being “Greek” became the same things.
The so-called conflict between these two wings is still alive as it is easily conceived from the “identity card crisis” in 2000. This “crisis” displays that there is still
176 ongoing conflict in order to have hegemony over the modernist wing. However,
Orthodoxy as the main representative of the traditionalist wing lost its ascendancy with the hegemony of modernist wing but the last “crisis” draws attention in terms of illustrating the hegemony crisis between these two wings.
Accession into EC and European integration represents a benchmark for Greece. The history of the accession started in 1964 with the Athens Agreement and Greece became the member of the EC in 1981. Accession came after one of the most turbulent periods, the military dictatorship, of Greece and in this sense it was interpreted as the guarantor of democracy and stability in Greece. As mentioned before, EC membership was regarded as an unobtainable opportunity enabling
Greece an “equal” member of the community. The focus on “equality” is critical as mentioned by Karamanlis in the daily Kathimerini “entry into the EEC could first and foremost free Greece from all forms of foreign interventions and dependencies”
(11.04.1978). Papandreou fiercely opposed this view expressed by Karamanlis. For
Papandreou, EEC was another platform making and reinforcing Greece’s dependency.
In the process of transition and consolidation of democracy in Greece, the role of the parties is unarguable. It should be mentioned that the legalisation of KKE was another critical point contributing to the process of transition in Greece. However,
ND and PASOK played the main shaping role of Greek politics, and of course Greek political culture, in post-dictatorship Greece. Both of them emerged with a “novelty” discourse in Greek political scene.
177 In Greece, political parties had been the architectures of institutional change. It is undeniable that, one of the very driving forces for institutional change was the EC
(EU). Taking into consideration the shaping role of institutional change concerning the way of societies’ evolution, Europeanization process had a great effect over the hegemony struggle between the ‘traditionalist’ and ‘modernist’ wings in favour of the latter. This process can’t be reduced to direct shaping effect on cultural structure.
In other words rapid transformation of politics does not mean the rapid transformation of cultural structure and institutions. The popular support for change and a new understanding of politics were the key ingredients of concomitant transformation in Greece. There was an experience of rapid transformation in terms of transition and consolidation of democracy and Europeanization concerning political institutional structure in Greece. Deepening of integration and pro-European attitude of Greek public opinion brought gradually the hegemony of modernist wing over the traditionalist one. However, this process did not follow a linear path concerning the hegemony of modernist wing. Some fluctuations concerning the hegemony of modernist wing was shaken by the reaction of traditionalist wing as in the case of “identity card crisis”.
ND and PASOK created their own modernization projects by pronouncing their
‘novelties’ in the beginning of metapolitefsi. . Karamanlis’s modernization projection, in a way, was based on “westernisation”. It could be claimed that for
Karamanlis EC membership was a common denominator reducing modernization to democratisation, westernisation and Europeanization. Actually his project encompassed mostly modernist elements, Helleno-Christian identity discourse and
178 his cautious attitude towards Church and secularisation, his opinion on de- politicisation of the masses constituted the ambiguous points expressing his oscillation.
PASOK’s foundation and emergence as a mass party also its rapid coming to power is evaluated as PASOK “phenomena” in Greek politics. PASOK was the first mass left party coming to power in Greece. Like Karamanlis, Papandreou’s charismatic leadership was the distinguishing character of both their leadership comparing to other figures in the Greek historical development. PASOK came to Greek political scene with its “mysterious” slogan “allaghi” and strong opposition to the Greece’s accession into the EC. In this sense, accession into EC was the first discussion point shaping the ideological path of the mainstream parties in Greece in that term.
PASOK had considerable contribution on behalf of modernization in terms of secularisation of state-church relations, politicisation of the masses in order to transform them from “electorate” into real “citizens”. Allaghi was the keyword to express all the initiatives for a radical transformation of Greek politics, economy, social affairs, state-society and state-church relations. It represented ‘socialist transformation’ of the Greek society. Indeed, concerning PASOK’s power in the
Greek political scene in terms of duration it is obvious that PASOK was the main player of Greek politics. PASOK experienced ambivalent attitudes towards EC during its power. However, through the championship of EC membership was conducted by Karamanlis, Greece became the member of the EC when PASOK was in power. The troubled and uneasy relationship between EC and PASOK is worth paying attention in terms of the transformation of the strong opposition into ardent
179 supporter of the EU. Especially towards mid-1980s PASOK’s attitude and opinion on EC showed radical changes comparing its discourse in 1970s. In the 1980s, membership had become irreversible path for PASOK especially in terms of
Community’s contribution to recover Greece’s fragile economy. The shift in the attitude of PASOK towards EC (EU), in real sense, starts in the 1990s. Economic
Monetary Union (EMU) is a turning point in that sense. Deepening of integration and penetration of Europeanization process almost in every field of Greece made this process irreversible.
In the 1990s, PASOK has become one of the ardent supporters of deepening of integration and enlargement of the EU representing itself as the stabilizing power for the Balkans and promoting a federal EU. Particularly Simitis’s coming to power accelerated this process and drew a new path in Greek politics. Simitis could be announced as the figure symbolizing the replacement of the key concepts for Greek historical development; that is the replacement of “Europeanization” with that of
“Modernization”. There is a consensus among the scholars studying on Greek politics that Simitis initiated a new era with the motto of “modernization” enabling hegemony of modernist wing over the traditionalist one.
To conclude, two-folded structure of Greek political culture underwent a considerable transformation in favour of modernist dynamic. As illustrated by the
“identity card crisis” in 2000, the hegemony struggle between these two wings still continues. Actually this crisis was fuelled by Christodoulos’s fierce reaction to the secularisation efforts of PASOK, which was tried to be realized in accordance with
180 EU requirements. The hegemony struggle between the two wings seems to be dominated by the modernist wing on the basis of the leverage provided by the
Europeanization process. Actually, modernist hegemony clearly proclaimed itself with Simitis’s coming to power. Simitis symbolising a new face of PASOK emphasized the concept of “modernization”, concerning both in terms of PASOK’s internal structure and a new path for Greek politics. These changes have been enhanced and reinforced by the pro-European attitudes and policies of Simitis.
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