The Marshall Plan
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Marshall Plan & Berlin Airlift
Objectives: 1. Explain how the Marshall Plan, the Berlin airlift, and the creation of NATO helped achieve American goals in postwar Europe. 2. Assess the impact of two Communist advances on American foreign policy. 3. Summarize the effects of the cold war on American life. Main Idea: As the cold war intensified, American policy focused on rebuilding and unifying Western Europe. At home, emotionally charged spy cases raised fears of Communist infiltration into American society and government. Marshall Plan & Berlin Airlift • Secretary of State George C. Marshall created an economic plan to rebuild Europe after World War II. The Soviet Union and their Eastern European allies refused to take part in the Marshall Plan, but 16 European countries did accept economic aid from the U.S. ($13 billion over 4 years). • In 1948, to keep people from fleeing communism, Stalin blockaded Berlin. To avoid a war, the U.S. and Britain airlifted supplies to Berlin for 15 months called the Berlin Airlift. 1948 Berlin Airlift NATO & Warsaw Pact In 1949, NATO created a military alliance between 10 Western European countries, the U.S., and Canada. The countries viewed an attack against one country, as an attack against them all. In 1949, China becomes communist and Soviets create their atomic bomb, causing the U.S. to drastically increase peacetime defense spending to enforce Containment. In the 1950s, President Eisenhower will continue with Containment, even though his Secretary of State John Dulles wanted to end communism. The U.S. did not interfere in situations involving Soviet Satellite Nations. President Eisenhower did not want the Cold War to become an actual war. -
30Years 1953-1983
30Years 1953-1983 Group of the European People's Party (Christian -Demoeratie Group) 30Years 1953-1983 Group of the European People's Party (Christian -Demoeratie Group) Foreword . 3 Constitution declaration of the Christian-Democratic Group (1953 and 1958) . 4 The beginnings ............ ·~:.................................................. 9 From the Common Assembly to the European Parliament ........................... 12 The Community takes shape; consolidation within, recognition without . 15 A new impetus: consolidation, expansion, political cooperation ........................................................... 19 On the road to European Union .................................................. 23 On the threshold of direct elections and of a second enlargement .................................................... 26 The elected Parliament - Symbol of the sovereignty of the European people .......... 31 List of members of the Christian-Democratic Group ................................ 49 2 Foreword On 23 June 1953 the Christian-Democratic Political Group officially came into being within the then Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community. The Christian Democrats in the original six Community countries thus expressed their conscious and firm resolve to rise above a blinkered vision of egoistically determined national interests and forge a common, supranational consciousness in the service of all our peoples. From that moment our Group, whose tMrtieth anniversary we are now celebrating together with thirty years of political -
Truman Doctrine / Marshall Plan, Comecon & Cominform
Cold War Aim: To understand how USA used financial develops… aid to fight Communism in post-war Europe (Marshall Plan) Imagine you were reading this at the breakfast table, have a conversation with your neighbour, what might have been said? How does this headline make you feel? What is it trying to say? Key terms: Before WW2 After WW2 Isolationism: Containment: US policy before WW2 was US policy after WW2 was Isolationism, basically staying Containment (limiting the out of other countries affairs, spread of something), basically especially Europe’s as it is “so stopping the spread of far away” anyway! Communism outside a small number of countries What was the impact of the Truman Doctrine? Kennan’s ’Long Telegram’ confirmed Truman’s worst fears Stalin intended to spread Communism across Europe Truman’s military advisors told Truman the Soviets weren't strong enough to fight the USA. Truman said they didn't need to fight to increase their territories and power. What would you do if you were Truman at this stage? What can you see here, and why might this help Stalin out? Post war damage in Europe • Many European countries were in ruins • Homes, factories, infrastructure (roads, railways) • Poverty increases with anger and desperation Communism is actually quite attractive right now, the wealth of the rich will be redistributed (shared) to help us all, not just the few at the top! I see what Stalin is offering us! So, you see, Stalin doesn't need to go to war, he has a perfect scenario, the people are already discontented, he When you put -
Stanislaviv in the Face of the Polish-Soviet War 1939 Polish Garrison – Soviet Garrison
Open Military Studies 2020; 1: 70–78 Research Article Maciej Franz* Stanislaviv in the face of the Polish-Soviet War 1939 Polish Garrison – Soviet Garrison https://10.1515/openms-2020-0107 Received Oct 07, 2020; accepted Dec 11, 2020 Abstract: In 1921-1939 Stanyslaviv was one the bigger polish garrisons. The approach of the war the reason for leaving the town by polish troops. In September of 1939 the garrison in Stanyslaviv was rather small, consisting of small logistic units. Until now the historians have been interested in the face of this particular garrison in those few September days of 1939th. This is an attempt to showcase the most important events that happened while the polish troops were stationed in town and were still trying to provide peace and safety it and its people. Keywords: Polish troops, polish campaign, 1939, Second World War The Polish campaign of 1939, as the first episode of World War II, was not the same in all parts of Poland. For the inhabitants of Stanislaviv and a significant part of the Stanislaviv Voivodeship, it did not turn out to be a war against the Third Reich, but Soviet aggression – it is another episode on the long list of Polish- Russian armed conflicts in history. For people who lived in the western, southern and northern provinces of the Second Polish Republic, the war immediately took on a normal appearance. Air raids by enemy planes began, as a result – bombing, and a few days later the front was changed. The symbols of those days were mass groups of soldiers moving through these territories, both Polish soldiers who had to defend their homeland and those Germans who sought to conquer the Polish state. -
Bibliography
Bibliography I. Primary Sources A. Manuscript Collections and Government Archives Foreign Affairs Oral History Program (FAOHP), Georgetown University Washington, D.C. (copies also deposited at George C. Marshall Library) Everett Bellows (February 1989) David S. Brown (March 1989) Vincent V. Checchi (July 1990) Lincoln Gordon (January 1988) John J. Grady (August 1989) William Parks (November 1988) Melbourne Spector (December 1988) Joseph Toner (October 1989) Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. W. Averell Harriman Papers George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, Virginia Dowsley Clark Collection European Recovery Plan Commemoratives Collection William C. Foster Papers George C. Marshall Papers Marshall Plan Photograph Collection Forrest Pogue Interviews (Paul Hoffman and John McCloy) Harry B. Price Interviews (conducted 1952–54) ECA and OEEC Leland Barrows Richard M. Bissell Samuel Board Harlan Cleveland H. Van B. Cleveland John O. Coppock Glenn Craig D. A. Fitzgerald William C. Foster Theodore Geiger Lincoln Gordon W. Averell Harriman Carroll Hinman Paul Hoffman E. N. Holmgren John Lindeman Shaw Livermore Robert Marjolin Orbun V. Powell MacDonald Salter Melbourne Spector Harold Stein Donald C. Stone Allan Swim Samuel Van Hyning Greece (Americans) Michael H. B. Adler Leland Barrows Dowsley Clark John O. Coppock Helene Granby Joseph F. Heath Robert Hirschberg Paul A. Jenkins Brice M. Mace Lawrence B. Myers Walter E. Packard Paul R. Porter 163 Bibliography Greece (Americans—continued) Alan D. Strachan Edward A. Tenenbaum John O. Walker Greece (Greeks) Costa Hadjiagyras Constantin D. Tsatsos Italy (Americans) Vincent M. Barnett William E. Corfitzen Henry J. Costanzo Bartlett Harvey Thomas A. Lane Dominic J. Marcello Walter C. McAdoo Guido Nadzo Chauncey Parker Donald Simmons James Toughill Italy (Italians) Giovanni Malagodi Donato Menichella Ernesto Rossi Turkey (Americans) Clifton H. -
The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe
The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Maier, Charles S. 1981. The two postwar eras and the conditions for stability in twentieth-century Western Europe. American Historical Review 86(2): 327-352. Published Version doi:10.2307/1857441 Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4727674 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA AHR Forum The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentleth-CenturyWestern Europe CHARLES S. MAIER BROADCASTING over the BBC in November 1945, A. J. P. Taylor assured his lis- teners, "Nobody in Europe believes in the American way of life-that is, in pri- vate enterprise; or rather those who believe in it are a defeated party and a party which seems to have no more future than the Jacobites in England after 1688. "I Taylor proved to be wrong, or at least premature, about the end of pri- vate enterprise. The question here is why, at least in Western Europe, there was less transformation than he envisaged. Posed in broader terms, how did Western Europe achieve political and social stability by the mid-twentieth century after two great, destructive wars and the intervening upheaval. Historians often treat stability as a passive coming to rest or a societal inertia that requires no explanation. -
John F. Kennedy and Berlin Nicholas Labinski Marquette University
Marquette University e-Publications@Marquette Master's Theses (2009 -) Dissertations, Theses, and Professional Projects Evolution of a President: John F. Kennedy and Berlin Nicholas Labinski Marquette University Recommended Citation Labinski, Nicholas, "Evolution of a President: John F. Kennedy and Berlin" (2011). Master's Theses (2009 -). Paper 104. http://epublications.marquette.edu/theses_open/104 EVOLUTION OF A PRESIDENT: JOHN F. KENNEDYAND BERLIN by Nicholas Labinski A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School, Marquette University, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts Milwaukee, Wisconsin August 2011 ABSTRACT EVOLUTION OF A PRESIDENT: JOHN F. KENNEDYAND BERLIN Nicholas Labinski Marquette University, 2011 This paper examines John F. Kennedy’s rhetoric concerning the Berlin Crisis (1961-1963). Three major speeches are analyzed: Kennedy’s Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis , the Address at Rudolph Wilde Platz and the Address at the Free University. The study interrogates the rhetorical strategies implemented by Kennedy in confronting Khrushchev over the explosive situation in Berlin. The paper attempts to answer the following research questions: What is the historical context that helped frame the rhetorical situation Kennedy faced? What rhetorical strategies and tactics did Kennedy employ in these speeches? How might Kennedy's speeches extend our understanding of presidential public address? What is the impact of Kennedy's speeches on U.S. German relations and the development of U.S. and German Policy? What implications might these speeches have for the study and execution of presidential power and international diplomacy? Using a historical-rhetorical methodology that incorporates the historical circumstances surrounding the crisis into the analysis, this examination of Kennedy’s rhetoric reveals his evolution concerning Berlin and his Cold War strategy. -
Maurizio Martina “Ripescato” Al
MAURIZIO MARTINA “RIPESCATO” AL MIPAAF. ECCO IL GOVERNO M a t t e o R e n z i h a s c i o lto la riserva. Il giuramento del nuovo governo ci sarà domani alle 11.30. Dopo una “lunga chiacchierata” con il presidente della Repubblica sono state cambiate alcune carte in tavola: il vulnus era la giustizia. Orlando – notoriamente garantista – è stato spostato dall’Ambiente alla Giustizia e Galletti “dirottato” dall’Agricoltura all’Ambiente. Con “ripescaggio” di Maurizio Martina. Tanto più che i numeri al Senato per la fiducia sembravano già essere messi in discussione da Forza Italia. Una squadra di governo snella composta da 16 ministri di cui metà donne. È durato oltre due ore il vertice del premier incaricato Matteo Renzi con il capo dello Stato Giorgio Napolitano al Quirinale. Come previsto il fedelissimo Graziano Delrio sarà il sottosegretario alla Presidenza del Consiglio. All’Economia come lui stesso aveva annunciato via twitter il tecnico presidente dell’Istat Pier Carlo Padoan. Riconferma di Angelino Alfano agli Interni. A sorpresa Andrea Orlando alla Giustizia (era ministro uscente all’Ambiente). Maurizio Lupi alle Infrastrutture, Dario Franceschini alla Cultura, Giuliano Poletti di Legacoop al Lavoro e politiche sociali; al Mipaaf Maurizio Martina. Queste le donne ministro: Roberta Pinotti (Difesa), Stefania Giannini (Istruzione), Federica Guidi (Sviluppo Economico), Maria Elena Boschi (Riforme e Rapporti con il Parlamento), Federica Mogherini (Esteri), Beatrice Lorenzin (Sanità), Marianna Madia (Semplificazione) e Maria Carmela Lanzetta agli Affari Regionali e all’Ambiente Gianluca Galletti. “Dovendo far eun govenro che dura quattro anni è naturle che ci sia voluto un po di tempo, spiega il Premier incaricato. -
The Founding Fathers of Europe and the ECSC Mother
The gender of citizenship in Europe The founding fathers of Europe and the ECSC mother Mauve CARBONELL ABSTRACT The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which emerged from the Treaty of Paris signed on April 14, 1951, was a world of men, of “founding fathers” who pooled the heavy industries that were then entrusted to the ECSC (coal and steel). Its virtuous image as a founding myth and mold for today’s EU—a builder of European peace and reconciliation—is essentially male. Women, who were invisible, worked in the shadows of the High Authority of the ECSC and the other institutions that were established during the 1950s. They especially performed “office” duties (secretaries, stenographers, interpreters), which were an important part of the burgeoning Community administration, for instance as interpreters who served as links between men who did not speak the same language. Members of the High Authority: D. Spierenburg, P. Malvestiti, A. Coppé (front), and P. Finet, P.-O. Lapie, H. Potthoff, A. Wehrer, F. Hellwig and R. Reynaud (back). © EC, 1959. F. Etzel, U. Wenmakers, A. Coppé, J. Monnet and D. Spierenburg, April 30, 1953, Luxembourg. © USA/SRE, Paris and FJME, Lausanne. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which emerged from the Treaty of Paris signed on April 14, 1951, was a world of men, of “founding fathers” who pooled the heavy industries that were then entrusted to the ECSC (coal and steel). Its virtuous image—a builder of European peace and reconciliation—is essentially male. Where were the women in this first community? Although invisible, they nevertheless worked for a number of decades in the shadow of the founding fathers and European leaders. -
The Stagflation Crisis and the European Automotive Industry, 1973-85
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Diposit Digital de la Universitat de Barcelona The stagflation crisis and the European automotive industry, 1973-85 Jordi Catalan (Universitat de Barcelona) The dissemination of Fordist techniques in Western Europe during the golden age of capitalism led to terrific rates of auto production growth and massive motorization. However, since the late 1960s this process showed signs of exhaustion because demand from the lowest segments began to stagnate. Moreover, during the seventies, the intensification of labour conflicts, the multiplication of oil prices and the strengthened competitiveness of Japanese rivals in the world market significantly squeezed profits of European car assemblers. Key companies from the main producer countries, such as British Leyland, FIAT, Renault and SEAT, recorded huge losses and were forced to restructure. The degree of success in coping with the stagflation crisis depended on two groups of factors. On the one hand, successful survival depended on strategies followed by the firms to promote economies of scale and scope, process and product innovation, related diversification, internationalization and, sometimes, changes of ownership. On the other hand, firms benefited from long-term path-dependent growth in their countries of origin’s industrial systems. Indeed, two of the main winners of the period, Toyota and Volkswagen, can rightly be seen as outstanding examples of Confucian and Rhine capitalism. Both types of coordinated capitalism contributed to the success of their main car assemblers during the stagflation slump. However, since then, global convergence with Anglo-Saxon capitalism may have eroded some of the institutional bases of their strength. -
Are Gestures Worth a Thousand Words? an Analysis of Interviews in the Political Domain
Are Gestures Worth a Thousand Words? An Analysis of Interviews in the Political Domain Daniela Trotta Sara Tonelli Universita` degli Studi di Salerno Fondazione Bruno Kessler Via Giovanni Paolo II 132, Via Sommarive 18 Fisciano, Italy Trento, Italy [email protected] [email protected] Abstract may provide important information or significance to the accompanying speech and add clarity to the Speaker gestures are semantically co- expressive with speech and serve different children’s narrative (Colletta et al., 2015); they can pragmatic functions to accompany oral modal- be employed to facilitate lexical retrieval and re- ity. Therefore, gestures are an inseparable tain a turn in conversations stam2008gesture and part of the language system: they may add assist in verbalizing semantic content (Hostetter clarity to discourse, can be employed to et al., 2007). From this point of view, gestures fa- facilitate lexical retrieval and retain a turn in cilitate speakers in coming up with the words they conversations, assist in verbalizing semantic intend to say by sustaining the activation of a tar- content and facilitate speakers in coming up with the words they intend to say. This aspect get word’s semantic feature, long enough for the is particularly relevant in political discourse, process of word production to take place (Morsella where speakers try to apply communication and Krauss, 2004). strategies that are both clear and persuasive Gestures can also convey semantic meanings. using verbal and non-verbal cues. For example,M uller¨ et al.(2013) discuss the prin- In this paper we investigate the co-speech ges- ciples of meaning creation and the simultaneous tures of several Italian politicians during face- and linear structures of gesture forms. -
Politica E Istituzioni Negli Scritti Di Antonio Segni
Politica e istituzioni negli scritti di Antonio Segni Questa antologia di scritti politici vuol essere un con- tributo alla ricostruzione della biografia intellettuale e politica di Antonio Segni. L’interpretazione sull’opera di Segni ancora oggi prevalente – anche se, in seguito a recenti studi, comincia a mostrare le sue debolezze – è condizionata dalla decennale polemica politica sui fatti dell’estate del 19641. Si tratta di un’interpretazio- 1 Tra gli studi più recenti dedicati a Segni mi permetto di rinviare a S. Mura, Le esperienze istituzionali di Antonio Segni negli anni del Diario, in A. Segni, Diario (1956-1964), a cura di S. Mura, Bologna, il Mulino, 2012, pp. 21-97. Per un completo profilo biografico, A. Giovagnoli, Antonio Segni, in Il Parlamento Italiano. 1861-1988. Il centro-sinistra. La “stagione” di Moro e Nenni. 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Milano, Nuova Cei, 1992, pp. 244-268. Su Segni professore universitario e giurista, soprattutto: A. Mattone, Segni Antonio, in Dizionario biografico dei giuristi italiani (XII-XX secolo), diretto da I. Birocchi, E. Cortese, A. Mattone, M. N. Miletti, a cura di M. L. Carlino, G. De Giudici, E. Fab- bricatore, E. Mura, M. Sammarco, vol. II, Bologna, il Mulino, 2013, pp. 1843-1845; G. Fois, Storia dell’Università di Sassari 1859-1943, Roma, Carocci, 2000; A. Mattone, Gli studi giuridici e l’insegnamento del diritto (XVII-XX secolo), in Idem (a cura di), Storia dell’Università di Sassari, vol. I, Nuoro, Ilisso, 2010, pp. 221-230; F. Cipriani, Storie di processualisti e di oligarchi. La procedura civile nel Regno d’Italia (1866-1936), Milano, Giuffrè, 1991.