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mussolini.notebook December 02, 2008 ITALY, MUSSOLINI AND THE RISE OF THE GREAT WAR FASCISM • Declaration of neutrality • The united nationalstate Italy­1861. • The popular opinion divided­violent PROBLEMS; clashes between nationalists and • Division wealthy north/poor south. socialists. • Illiteracy • Benito Mussolini • Corruption, bureaucracy, limited • Declaration of war, 26.4.1915 confidence in the political system. (Treaty of London ­ secret promises • The Vatican state­papal ban of land areas). • Constant violent friction landowners • Massive casualties and suffering vs. landless peasants. • American emigration. • Cosa nostra (maffia) • Nationalists vs. socialists nov 17­18:55 nov 17­19:17 THE MUTILATED VICTORY • High hopes as Italy was on the Economic disaster: • many firms geared to the demands winning side. • 600 000 dead, 950 000 wounded of war ­ bankrupt. • • 250 000 crippled for life During 1919 the lira lost 2/3 of its • National bancrupcy, warinflation value. • • Returning soldiers unemployed many middle­class savings wiped • Italy disapointed and humiliated in out. • the peaceconference Strikes, factory occupations, food riots. nov 17­19:31 nov 27­19:32 FASCISM D'ANNUNZIO AND FIUME • 'Arditi' ­ special forces during the • Annoyed after the war Gabriele war organised themselves. Mussolini D'Annunzio organised a private army became a leading member. and invaded Fiume. He ruled the town • In 1919 he reorganised his group as a dictator for more than a year. A into the 'Fascio di Combattimento'. pirate state. • The objective was to fight • The town attracted young italians communism. Violent clashes, who enjoyed excitement. landowners and industrialists • The international opinion finally supported the fascists. forced Italy to take action and force D'Annunzio out of Fiume. • Mussolini admired D'Annunzio and became convinced he could make his way to power with direct force. nov 17­19:45 nov 17­20:19 1 mussolini.notebook December 02, 2008 FASCIST MOBILISATION Reasons for the rise of the Fascists (1920­22) • The clashes between socialists and fascists escalated 1920. The state Disgust in Italy at the terms of the peace treaties (didn't obtain was on the edge to civil war. A.H. territory) • Landowners, industrialists, bankers The Fascists represented a means to stop the socialists and the but also middle and lowered middle communists (in the eyes of conservative politicians, who sought to classes rallied behind the fascist moderate and control Fascism to their purposes) party in their fear of communism. • Economic fundament of the Mussolini was backed by wealthy industrialists and landowners movement. (b/c of their fear of socialist reforms) • The police usually didn't intervene Support from Pope Pius XI and the Vatican (who saw the with fascist violent expeditions. Fascists as an opportunity to normalize State­Church relationships) • In the parliamentary elections 1921 Lack of faith in Italy's institutions (failures of WWI, post­war the fascists succeeded in getting violence, high U?) 35/535 seats. After the March on Rome (October 22) the King offered the post of Prime Minister to Mussolini The violence of the Fascists (i.e.: blackshirts) intimidated opponents The complicity of the police and the army (who didn't suppress Fascist violence) nov 17­21:26 nov 18­09:05 AGRARIAN AND URBAN FASCISM Italy's capitalists expected Fascism to speed up modernization by authoritarian It was the furious escalation of the class war that consolidated the partnership means and a violent suppression of the left. between fascism and property. First in this process was the employment during The deliberate stimulation of anarchy served to keep propertied interests in a the winter of 1920 of Fascist paramilitary SQUADRISTI by the big landowners state of alarm. With the government unable or unwilling to intervene, Fascism who were determined to break the power of the peasant leagues and seemed the only safeguard; in effect, it acquired a monopoly of antibolshevism. cooperatives. This Agrarian fascism differed markedly from the Urban fascism; it was more terroristic and antidemocratic. Fascism the servant of a brutal right. The year 1920 ­ the establishment of a general confederation of industry (Confindustria) whose purpose was to counter working­class agitation by force if necessary. nov 24­10:19 nov 24­13:13 THE ELECTION OF 1921 1921 ­ 22 Because his party offered action Mussolini gained from the weakness of the Giolitti failed to hold his coalition together (Mussolini did his best to break up shifting governments and from the unrest in the country. Giolitti (p.m.) was the government. The fascists immediately took their seats with the Nationalists searching for allies against the socialists in 1921 and he decided to use the on the extreme right of the chamber in opposition to Giolitti). Giolitti was fascists. He believed he could easily dominate Mussolini. He made a sad replaced by Bonorni and he, in his turn, with Facta. None of them were able to mistake and he must be held responsible for giving Mussolini another chance. build up a stable government. At the same time local fascist leaders did their To bring the fascists into Giolitti's parliamentary coalition, it was first necessary best to cause unrest in the country. to include them in the national list of government­backed candidates. During the 1921 election the government used Fascist support to unseat Socialists deputies. The Fascists beat up opponents. The police remained neutral or actively aided them. 35 fascists out of a total of 535 seats were elected. nov 24­13:15 nov 24­13:17 2 mussolini.notebook December 02, 2008 Aristocratic nationalists provided an entry for Fascism into court circles. This MUSSOLINIS WAY TO POWER was also helped by the fact that Mussolini declared being a monarchist that The more the Fascists enjoyed the confidence of the power structure, the less same year. The aristocracy and the upper­bourgeoise tolerated fascism as long they needed a violent coup to obtain power. Eager to create the impression of as it performed certain tasks for them. It was a dangerous game to play. fascism as a revolutionary movement, Fascist propaganda later asserted that The new pope Pius XI (1922) and Mussolini were on good terms. power was taken by force in 1922. The truth was somewhat different. Liberals turned an blind eye to Fascist brutalities. Liberal journals saw fascist On 12 May 1922 the Fascists (63.000) took over the town of Ferrara and didn't assault on the most elementary rights as justified as the only alternative to leave before the government promised to carry out a scheme of public works anarchy. 'Fascism would grew tamer as times went by'. there. Mussolini was constantly terrified by the thought the government would Numerous italian intellectuals thought the same way, Fascism could be made use arms against fascist massactions, but they didn't. law­abiding. On 1 August 1922 the Socialists proclaimed a general strike as a protest against The army was loyal to king Victor Emmanuel III who feared a civil war. As a fascist actions in Romagna. This played into Mussolinis hands for he could offer result he made no effort to co­operate with the government against the growing to break the strike when the government did nothing. He could appear as the Fascist­movement. A movement which was supported by many property owners man to restore order while making use of his disorderly supporters. It provided who feared disorder and Communism. an excuse for further Fascist lawlessness. The strike collapsed after a day and The bulk of Fascism's popular support came from the petty bourgeoise or lower Mussolini and his Fascists gained increasing support. People began to feel that middle­class (small shopkeepers, clerical workers, teachers). These were the the Fascists might bring a return to order. On August 3, the fascist Squadristi ones who were not very poor but who didn't escape harm in the postwar slump. invaded the city hall of Milan and expelled its socialist administration. Now it The ones who dreamed of climbing up the ladder and at the same time were was only a matter of time before an attack on the legal capital, Rome. terrified by the thought of workers reaching the same hierarchial status as themselves. nov 24­13:21 nov 24­13:24 THE MARCH ON ROME 1922 But it takes two to fight and it was not at all certain that the liberal regime in The Italian government had virtually broken down by October 1922. P.M. Facta Rome would take up the challenge. suggested that the entire cabinet should resign and when this idea was turn Mussolini and his immediate followers had laid down plans for military action down by his colleagues he began to think in terms of a coalition with the but the army was still loyal to the King and it would have crushed any attempt fascists. to destroy the regime. At the same time the March on Rome was entrusted to a quadrumvirate (reflects Mussolini planned to take action on the 28 October with a massive Fascist the diverse elements within Fascism); march to Rome but he didn't want the fascist to threat the King or the Army. A General Emilio de Bono, the eldest, was a retired army officer and a nationalist clash with the army was to be avoided at all costs and army units were to be of the old school. treated with courtesy and friendliness. The main idea was to raise a ultimatum Italo Balbo, the youngest and typical of the extremist wing of Fascism (taste for to the government; violence). A NEW CABINET WITH AT LEAST 6 FASCIST MINISTERS IN IMPORTANT POSTS. Cesare De Vecchi was from the ultraconservative landowning class and a Facta decided to resign but his cabinet still ran the government until a new monarchist.
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