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ACCOMMODATING TO THE LOSS OF EMPIRE: IS THERE A POST-IMPERIAL MILITARY SYNDROME?
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the
Graduate School of The Ohio State University
By
Tanya M. Charljck-Paley, M.A.
*******
The Ohio State University 1997
Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor Donald A. Sylvan, Adviser
Professor Kimberly Marten Zisk Adviser Professor Robert Billings Department of Political Science UMI Number: 9801660
Copyright 1997 by Charlicb-Paley, Tanya Michelle
All rights reserved.
UMI Microform 9801660 Copyright 1997, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 Copyright by Tanya M. CharKck-Paley 1997 ABSTRACT
The current unorthodox role of the Russian military in domestic politics and the abysmal state of Russian military reforms are not primarily the result of internal changes within the Soviet/Russian society, regime and economy. They are not merely examples of a post-communist military, but of a post-imperial military, an organization in decline.
Until recently, organizational decline was an understudied phenomena in the life-cycle of organizations. However, current research has shown that the problems that managers encounter in declining organizations are qualitatively different than the challenges they face in organizations undergoing growth or maturation. This means that militaries that are facing declining budgets and prestige as a result of the loss of their imperial role are different organizations than militaries operating in an environment characterized by a relatively stable demand for their services. This dissertation will argue that an increase in the level of internal political participation and a fragmented military characterized by intense intra-organizational conflict are symptoms which can be directly attributed to splits in the way in which military ofiBcers from different generations and service branches characterize the loss of their external and internal empires. These splits are net unique to the Russian case, they are an example of a more generalizable phenomenon, a post imperial syndrome. Without an understanding of this general cross-national phenomenon through a comparative case study with other states which have had similar experiences
(such as France 1945-1962), scholars of the Soviet and post-Soviet military, security studies and civil-military relations miss the opportunity to learn from the past or to contribute to an understanding of future challenges facing other declining militaries.
lU ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to thank my advisor Don Sylvan for his unwavering intellectual and personal support, encouragement, counsel and dedication in correcting both my errors and omissions.
I thank Kim Zisk for her commitment to me and to the research endeavor; for her very careful readings o f previous drafts, her suggestions of data sources on the Russian military and her assistance in preparing for the field research portion of this dissertation.
I also would like to thank Bob Billings for the special cross-disciplinary perspective he gave to the research project, always pushing me to clarify assumptions and hypotheses.
I also wish to thank the following people who have given very useful comments on previous incarnations o f this document: Bill Boettcher, Michael Fischerkeller, Pascal
Venesson, Ed Kolodziej, Peg Hermann, Rick Herrmann and the members of the National
Science Foundation Research Training Group Fellowship on Collective Decision Making.
I am also grateful to my parents, Robert and Judith Charlick who gave both substantive and emotional support throughout the long process of completing this dissertation. Special thanks also go to my husband, Daniel Paley, for always believing in me.
This research was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation
iv (DIR-9113599) to the Mershon Center Research Training Group on the Role of Cognition in Collective Decision Making. It was also supported by a National Security Education
Program Graduate Enhancement Fellowship and a grant from the Graduate School of the
Ohio State University. VITA
October 14, 1968 ...... Bom - Talence, France
Summer, 1988 ...... Intern, Political-Military Division American Embassy, Paris, France
May, 1989 ...... B A. Political Science, Kenyon College Gambier, OH
1989-1990...... Placement Assistant, Partners in International Education and Training, Washington, D C
May, 1994...... M.A. Political Science, The Ohio State University
1990...... Graduate Fellow, Ohio State University
1991-present...... Graduate Teaching and Research Associate, The Ohio State University
FIELDS OF STUDY
Major Field; Political Science
Specializing in International Relations and Comparative Politics
VI TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page Abstract...... ii
Acknowledgments ...... iv
Vita...... vi
List of Figures...... xiii
Chapters: 1. Literature Review and Research Hypotheses ...... 1 1.1 Introduction...... I 1.2 Literature Review...... 4 1.2.1 An Integrative Overview ...... 4 1.2.2 Cognitive Constructs for Describing Reality: the Use of Stories...... 6 1.2.2.1 The Limits of Previous Approaches to the Role of Cognition 7 12.2.2 Problem Representation and Solution: the Story Model ...... 8 1.2.3 Civil-Mlitary Relations ...... 10 1.2.3.1 The Apotitical Military: Objective Civilian Control ...... 11 1.2.3.2 Holding the Military at Bay: Subjective Civilian Control ...... 13 1.2.3.3 A False Dichotomy: The Political Nature of All Militaries...... 13 1.2.3.4 When Are Militaries Most Likely to Enter Politics? ...... 16 1.2.3.5 Military Political Participation: An Evaluation ...... 17 1.2.4. Organizational Decline and Reform: How Organizational Structures and Decision Processes Change in Response to Dramatic Environmental Changes ...... 19 1.2.4.1 Introduction and Definitions ...... 19 1.2.4.2 Declining Organizations: The Struggle Between Status Quo Defensive Centralization and Innovation ...... 20 1.2.4.3 Turn-Around Strategies: Matching the Perceived Type of Change to the Successfiil Strategy...... 22 1.2.4.4 Summing it All Up: Paths to Renewal or Accelerated Decline 25
vu 1.2.5 Why Should Security Studies Care About Domestic and Organizational Processes? ...... 25 1.3 Dissertation Overview ...... 27
2. Research Methodology...... 30 2.1 Introduction/Chapter Overview ...... 30 2.2 Research Design...... 30 2.2.1 Quasi-Experimental Interventions ...... 30 2.2.2 Comparative Case Studies ...... 32 2.2.3 Case Selection ...... 33 2.2.4 Structured Focused Case Studies ...... 35 2.2.5 Summary of Research Design...... 36 2.3 Variable Operationalization/Measurement ...... 38 2.3.1 Measuring Officers’ Problem Representations; The Modified Story Model ...... 39 2.3.2 Post-Imperial Organizational Structures ...... 42 2.3.3 Post-Imperial Organizational Reform Strategies...... 44 2.4 Data Collection ...... 46 2.4.1 Soviet/Russian C ase ...... 46 2.4.2 French Case ...... 49 2.5 Content Analysis of Data; Types of Analysis and Its Limitations ...... 49 2.6 Conclusion ...... 51
3. Understanding the Loss of Empire: Soviet Union/Russia ...... 57 3.1 Chapter Overview...... 57 3.2 Establishing a Baseline ...... 58 3.2.1 The General Story o f the Soviet Military 1980-1988 ...... 58 3.2.2 Victory in the Great Patriotic War: An Important Illustration of a General Pattern ...... 62 3.2.3 The Warsaw Pact: A Baseline Story of the Empire ...... 64 3.2.4 The Baseline, In Summary ...... 66 3.3 The Withdrawal from Eastern Europe ...... 69 3.3.1 Withdrawal as an Illustration of Our Progressiveness: A Signal of Our Success...... 70 3.3.2 Opposition to Withdrawal: A Hasty and Incompetently Created Policy ...... 78 3.3.3 Withdrawal as Break in Belonging ...... 83 3.4 Understanding the Collapse of the Soviet Union ...... 87 3.4.1 Confronting the Rise of Separatist Sentiment in the Soviet Union 1991 ...... 89 3.4.2 The Dissolution of the Soviet Union ...... 96
vm 3.4.3 “That Which Takes a Day to Destroy Takes Years to Rebuild” 1990-1994...... 101 3.5 Challenges to the Integrity of the Russian Federation: Chechnya ...... 106 3.5.1 Pro-Union, But Not Military Action to Prop it U p ...... 108 3.5.2 Pro-Negotiation, Pro-Army...... 113 3.5.3 Pro-Military, Pro-War...... 115 3.6 Conclusion to the Chapter: A Post-Imperial Trend in Military Stories...... 120
4. Civil-Military Relations: Redefining the Military’s Role Within the Russian Post-Imperial State ...... 135 4.1 Chapter Overview...... 135 4.2 Establishing a Baseline: Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet State ...... 138 4.3 The Be^nnmg of Challenges to the Story: 1989-1991 ...... 143 4.3.1 Are the Army and People United?: The Emergence of New Threats to the State Within Society ...... 144 4.3.1.1 An Internal Role is Necessary to Preserve OfiBcers’ Unity With the State and Most People ...... 145 4.3.1.2 Military’s Role is Only to Protect the State From External Threats ...... 147 4.3.1.3 Break in Belonging ...... 149 4.3.2 Questioning the Infallibility of Leadership Decisions ...... 152 4.3.3 Summary...... 154 4.4 Stories of the 1991 Coup and the Role of the Military ...... 155 4.4.1 Story of Non-Participation ...... 157 4.4.2 Cause ofPutsch 1991: Why it Was Necessary to Participate .159 4.5 Stories of October 1993: Choosing Between Branches of the Government ...... 161 4:5.1 Pro-Yeltsin ...... 164 4.5.2 AgmnstTelstin ...... 166 4.5.3 Post-October 1993: Cooptation of Mediocre Commanders 168 4.6 Chapter Conclusion ...... 170
5. Post-Imperial Russian Military Structures, Dynamics and Reforms ...... 186 5.1 Chapter Overview...... 186 5.2 Post-Imperial Militaries are Organizations in Decline ...... 189 5.2.1 Baseline Organizational Reforms: Restructuring in the Early Gorbachev Years...... 190 5.2.2 Indicators of Rapid Envkonmentai C ha^e and Organizational Decline ...... 192 5.2.2.1 Environmental Change ...... 192
IX 5.2.2.2 The Declining Post-Imperial Military Budget ...... 193 5.2.2.3 Rapidly Declining Professional Prestige ...... 196 5.2.2.4 Conclusion/Summary ...... 198 5.3 Organizational Dynamics/ Changes in Decision-Making Structures ...... 198 5.3 .1 Baseline Soviet Decision-Making Structures: The Chain of Command Before the Loss of Empire ...... 200 5.3.2 Signs of Organizational Fragmentation andConflict ...... 202 5.3.2.1 Persormel Turnover ...... 202 5.3.2.2 Rival Decision-Making Structures ...... 203 5.3.2.3 Conclusion: The Effects of Structural Fragmentation and Conflict ...... 208 5.4 General Orientation of Reforms ...... 210 5.4.1 The Soviet Armed Forces Before 1989 ...... 211 5.4.2 Soviet Reforms: Reacting to the Loss of Empire...... 213 5.4.2.1 Reactive Defense ...... 213 5.4.2.2 The Middle Point: Reactive Defense and Domain Substitution ...... 214 5.4.2.3 Domain Substitution/Experimentation ...... 215 5.4.3 A Brief Flirtation with a New Warsaw Pact Structure: Reactive Defense of the CIS ...... 218 5.4.4 Russian Reforms ...... 219 5.4.4.1 Domain Defense ...... 220 5.4.4 2 Domain Substitution ...... 222 5.4.5 Conclusion ...... 224 5.5 Branch Differences ...... 225 5.5.1 Navy ...... 226 5.5.2 Strategic Forces...... 229 5.5.3 Ground Forces ...... 231 5.5.4 Air Force...... 236 5.5.5 Conclusion ...... 241 5.6 Chapter Conclusion ...... 242
6. Understanding the Loss of Indochina and Algeria: The Post-Imperial Stories of French Mlitary Officers ...... 252 6.1 Introduction/Chapter Overview ...... 252 6.2 Stories About the External Empire and Withdrawal ...... 255 6.2.1 Establishing a Baseline ...... 256 6.2.2 Indochina- Loss of the External Empire ...... 259 6.2.2.1 Minority View: Withdrawal as an Inevitable and Positive Step..260 6.2.2 2 Majority View: Withdrawal as Abandonment ...... 261 6.2.2 3 Conclusion ...... 264 6.2.3 Algeria: the Internal Empire ...... 265 6.2.3.1 1956-1958 Unanimous Opposition to Withdrawal ...... 267 6 2.3.2 1958-1961 Splits in the Stories as the Military Faces Imminent Withdrawal ...... 271 6.2.3.3 Conclusion ...... 277 6.2.4 Conclusion on Loss of Empire ...... 278 6.3 Political Participation: Stories of the Military’s Internal Role ... .280 6.3.1 Establishing a Baseline ...... 282 6.3.2 Decolonization and Civil-Military Relations: Indochina ...... 284 6.3.3 Early Algeria 1956-1958 ...... 286 6.3.4 May 13,1958 and Beyond ...... 288 6.3.4.1 Data Analysis ...... 290 6.3.4.2 Conclusion ...... 294 6.3.5 January 24, 1960 Week of Barricades ...... 296 6.3.5.1 Data Analysis ...... 299 6.3.5.2 Conclusion ...... 301 6.3.6 April 22, 1961 Putsch...... 302 6.3.6.1 Pro-Putsch...... 304 6.3.6.2 Why Putsch Failed ...... 308 6.4 Conclusion ...... 309
7. French Post-Imperial Military Fragmentation and Reform ...... 325 7.1 Chapter Introduction and Overview ...... 325 7.2 An Organization in Decline?: Indicators of Rapid Environmental Change and Organizational Decline ...... 328 7.2.1 Budget ...... 328 7.2.2 Prestige...... 330 7.2.3 Salaries ...... 330 7.2.4 Housing ...... 331 7.2.5 Conclusion ...... 332 7.3 Indicators of Post-Imperial Organizational Fragmentation 333 7.3.1 Personnel Turn-Over ...... 334 7.3.2 Organizational Structure...... 335 7.3.3 Conclusion ...... 338 7.4 General Orientation of Reforms ...... 338 7.4.1 Imperial Military Reform: The French Armed Forces from 1945-1961...... 339 7.4.2 Post-Imperial Military Reform ...... 342 7.4.3 Conclusion ...... 345 7.5 Divisions Within the Military About the Post-Imperial Environment and Reform ...... 346 7.5.1 Army ...... 347 7.5.2 Army Elite Troops: Paratroopers and Foreign Legionnaires 349 7.5.3 Air Force ...... 351
XI 7.5.4 Navy ...... 352 7.5.5 Generational Divisions ...... 353 7.6 Conclusion ...... 355
8. Conclusion...... 362 8.1 Chapter Overview ...... 362 8.2 Lessons from Cross-Case Comparison with France ...... 364 8.2.1 Stories About the Loss of Empire ...... 364 8.2.2 The Civil-Military Relationship and Post-Imperial Military Political Participation ...... 369 8.2.3 Post-Imperial Military Reform; Splits in the Direction of the Post-Imperial Military Budget and Structure ...... 374 8.2.4 Conclusion ...... 382 8.3 Looking Ahead: the Russian Military in the Future ...... 385 8.4 Directions for Future Research ...... 387
Bibliography...... 395
APPENDICES
A. An Overview of Working Hypotheses ...... 421 B. Story Coding Sheet ...... 423 C. Interview Protocol ...... 424 D. Organizational Coding Sheet ...... 426 E. Biographical Information for Russian Military Officer Corps ...... 427
XU LIST OF FIGURES
Figurg Pagg
I. I Managerial Responses to Conditions of Decline ...... 29
2.1 Hypothesized Model of Variables and Their Relationships ...... 53
2.2 Original Story Model ...... 54
2.3 Adapted Story Model ...... 55
2.4 Organizational Reform Strategies...... 56
3.1 Baseline Story of the Soviet Military’s External Role ...... 123
3.2 Story of The Great Patriotic W ar...... 124
3.3 Story of Warsaw Pact...... 125
3.4 Withdrawal as a Symbol of our Progressiveness and Foreign Policy Success ... 126
3.5 Opposition to Withdrawal from Eastern Europe ...... 127
3.6 Brothers No M ore...... 128
3.7 Defending the Constitution, Dividing the State & People ...... 129
3.8 The Dissolution of the Soviet Union ...... 130
3.9 That Which Took a Day to Destroy Takes Years to Rebuild, 1992-1994 ...... 131
3.10 Pro-Union but not Military Action ...... 132
xm 3.11 Pro-Negotiation and Pro-Army ...... 133
3.12 Chechnya; Pro-military, Pro-war ...... 134
4.1 Baseline Story of the Military’s Internal Role ...... 176
4.2 An Internal Role is Necessary ...... 177
4.3 External Role Only ...... 178
4.4 Break in Belonging, 1990-91 ...... 179
4.5 Are Leaders Infallible? A Break in State-Military Unity ...... 180
4.6 Story of Non-Participation, Opposition to Coup 1991 ...... 181
4.7 Why it Was Necessary to Participate in Putsch ...... 182
4.8 October 1993; Why participated against White House (on Yeltsin’s side) ...... 183
4.9 October 1993; Why participated against Yeltsin ...... 184
4.10 Cooptation of Military Through Promotion of Mediocre Commanders ...... 185
5.1 Organization of the Soviet Armed Forces ...... 248
5.2 Prospective Structure of Russian Armed Forces ...... 249
5.3 Air Force Alliance with Paratroopers ...... 250
5.4 Air Force as Independent High-Tech Branch ...... 251
6.1 Baseline Story of the French Military’s External Role ...... 312
6.2 Withdrawal as an Inevitable and Positive Step ...... 313
6.3 Withdrawal as Abandonment ...... 314
6.4 Unanimous Opposition to Withdrawal: 1956-1958 ...... 315
6.5 1958-1961 Status Quo ...... 316
6.6 1958-1961 Pro-Negotiation...... 317
xiv 6.7 Baseline Internal Role of French Military ...... 318
6.8 Decolonization and Civil-Military Relations: Indochina ...... 319
6.9 Early Algeria...... 320
6.10 May 13, 1958 ...... 321
6.11 Week of the Barricades ...... 323
6.12 Pro-Putsch...... 324
6.13 Why Putsch Failed ...... 325
7.1 Defense Policy-Making Structure 1958-1962 ...... 358
7.2 1962 Defense Policy Structure...... 359
7.3 Defense Budget by Service ...... 360
7.4 Fluctuations in Army, Air Force, and Navy Manpower ...... 361
8.1 Summary of Hypotheses and Case Results ...... 392
XV CHAPTER 1
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
1.1 INTRODUCTION
There are few processes as far-reaching for a modem state as the loss of its
empire. This change is even more dramatic when the state undergoes an internal
dissolution, separating a core state from its internal empire. This research will address the
impact of this double decolonization on a particular functional sub-division of the state, its
military. How do military officers respond to this loss of state jurisdiction over the colonial territory? What are the behavioral strategies advocated by military officers to respond to this change? What are the likely effects of the loss of both a state's empire and its internal territorial integrity on the organizational structure and intra-organizational dynamics of its military? What are the political consequences of these behavioral and structural responses? This dissertation will explore the processes which occur in military organizations as officers attempt to explain and to respond to the loss of both an 'external'
(colonial) and an 'internal' (federal) empire. It will test the claim that military organizations from otherwise very different states share a common imperial legacy which colors the nature of both the civil-military relationship and the national security policy
debates taking place in the post-imperial era.
As I will show in the next section, scholars from the civil-military relations,
political psychology and organizational processes theoretical traditions will find this
dissertation useful because it makes several important contributions to these literatures.
First, the research examines alternative (non-coup) types of political participation by otherwise “professional” officers in a condition of major stress and environmental turmoil and isolates what contributes to increased domestic political participation. Secondly, for the first time in an applied setting this research traces the way in which the cognitive construct of story-telling changes over time, examining the sequence and process whereby elements of a story are adapted to fit a changing reality. Finally, this research shows that, contrary to the literature on small groups in crisis, organizations in crisis are characterized by fragmentation and political interest-group formation rather than constriction and consensus formation or group think.
The central hypothesis of this research is that there exists a common post-imperial syndrome. This syndrome will consist of two principal components; one behavioral and the other organizational-structural. First, post-imperial military officers have significant motives for new patterns of behavior. The experience of losing an external and then an internal empire poses serious new challenges to the maintenance of state control over the degree and nature of military participation in domestic political life. In other words, one common effect of the loss of an empire on a nation's military officer corps is their increased political participation. (For more on the importance of control and the strategies which states follow to keep their militaries in check, refer to the upcoming section which
reviews the literature on civil-military relations.)
The content and degree of political participation, however, will depend upon the
particular way in which these individuals have understood the reasons for and impact of
their loss. Thus, in order to understand the nature and consequences of political
participation advocated in the military oflBcer corps the data chapters examine the different
ways military ofiBcers portray both the decolonization process and the post-imperial legacy
for the domestic political environment. What are the stories ofiBcers tell of their
experiences and who tells what story? Once I have ascertained the content their
explanations, I explore the link between the way they explain the loss of empire and the
degree and type of political participation they advocate. Why do some individuals and
some particular segments of the military advocate more political behaviors than others?
What are the policy consequences of an increasingly political military? Finally, is all political participation by military ofiBcers dangerous for regime or international regional stability?
The second component of the post-imperial syndrome concerns the particular direction of organizational structural reform within the military organization. It is hypothesized that post-imperial militaries share the common challenge of internal fragmentation and conflict in response to a decline of organizational prestige and resources. Not all sub-components of the organization will fare equally. This leads to interest-group based struggles between organizational service, rank and generational factions. Those branches which can maintain prestige and preserve a special role for the military in the former colonial space will gain at the expense of traditional and costly ground forces.
The case studies explore the presence of these common post-imperial challenges.
In the conclusion I will turn to an analysis of what Actors determine whether post-imperial militaries can engineer an organizational rebirth. In order to answer this question, I will examine the degree of conflict or consensus within the military officer corps over what the organization needs to do, the resources which each military organization has at its disposal and the turn-around strategies which are attempted either from within the organization or by the state in order to re-achieve effective state security. The degree to which militaries can successfully reorient their organizations has particular policy implications both for the post-imperial state itself and for the states it interacts with in the international system.
Ironically, in both case studies the data shows that post-imperial militaries have a strong preference for their state to “go it alone” in national security affairs, preferring regional self-reliance to multilateral cooperation, even when their ability to do so had been significantly compromised. Their success in engineering an organizational tum-around may be largely what determines whether post-imperial militaries are ultimately able to pressure the state to pursue regional self-reliance.
1.2. LITERATURE REVIEW
1.2.1. An Integrative Overview of the Literatures Surveyed
The research questions outlined in the introduction above build upon previous research in security studies and civil-military relations by adding important insights gained from an understanding of how cognitive processes shape organizational, domestic, and international political behavior. This additional information is particularly useful during periods of dramatic social and political transformation. In this section I will briefly describe the sources and foundations of my research approach and the bases for the hypotheses I will be testing in the case studies that form the bulk of the study. The hypotheses derived in this section will be summarized in the following section.
The literature review begins with a discussion of the scholarship in both political science and psychology on the role of cognition in problem-solving. This section focuses on the claim that individuals and decision-making groups construct and tell stories to understand and discuss complex and changing environments. Note that, as I will explore in chapter two, the stories they tell are not necessarily ^onym ous with what military officers privately think. Instead this section will be examining the public and politically- conditioned discourse of different groups of military officers.
After completing the overview of the literature on the role of stories in political behavior, I will then describe the research on militaries as organizations. What sets military organizations apart from other bureaucracies in the government? Secondly, since the most obvious difference between military organizations and other bureaucracies is their potential for violence, I will discuss research on the ideal and actual nature of the relationship between the military and the state. What is the appropriate division of responsibility between the two and what does each side expect from the other? When do militaries advocate a change in this relationship?
The final section addresses the work within political science and organizational psychology on organizations in decline. What happens to organizations that face a severe loss of resources and prestige? How do organizational structures change, and what is the
impact of organizational processes on decision-making and implementation? How can
organizations reorient themselves to a new environmental situation or niche? Finally, I
will explore what my research can contribute to the field of international relations: why
should we do research on domestic and organizational processes?
1.2.2 Cognitive Constructs for Describing Reality; The Use of Stories
Political scientists have increasingly come to realize that cognition is a critical
variable in decision making/ An assertion o f this research is that military officers as
members of a policy community, attempt to understand the meaning of complex events,
particularly in turbulent political and social environments. The way in which they
understand these events directly shape the solutions or actions which they advocate. Since
political phenomena are not objective, we can expect that their reactions will vary based
upon several different ways in which the same stimuli can be perceived and explained.
These interpretations and explanations must be measured. This next section will briefly
review the ways in which scholars in the past have described and measured cognition and
its role on decision making and action. A review of these previous attempts leads to the
need for an approach which builds upon but moves beyond some of the limitations of
these approaches. The story model of problem representation provides a rigorous method
for measuring the ways in which military officers make sense of their environment and
persuade others of their interpretation. This research takes the story model even further.
1 See Bonham, 1994; Brecher, 1972; George, 1979; Hermann, 1984; Herrmann, 1985; Jervis, 1976; Simon, 1985; Khong, 1991; Walker, 1987 and many others for examples of models of foreign policy decision-making which included psychological variables. by applying it to a real world situation (much of the work on the story model has been laboratory studies of decision-making), and adding the dimension of a time-series analysis, examining the use and adaptation of the structure and content of stories over time and across regime, system and societal changes.
1.2.2.1 The Limits of Previous Approaches to the Role of Cognition
Much of the previous work on the role of cognition in decision-making has been largely focused on how decision-makers understand the motivation of other states. For example, previous work on the role of cognition in foreign policy, has focused upon the images which decision-makers hold of other states based upon an evaluation of the relative threat or opportunity which that state poses, the target state’s level of capability relative to one’s own, and its culture relative to one’s own.(Herrmann 1985) Other approaches have examined how states understand their own and other states’ roles in the international system. (Walker 1987) For the research question to be examined in this dissertation these approaches are limited by their exclusive emphasis on state-level characteristics.
A second approach to examining the role of belief and cognition in shaping foreign policy is the operational code. The instrumental and philosophical components of the operational code construct specifically address an individual's beliefs about political life and can include non-state actors. These elements of an individual's operational code exert an indirect influence on political behavior by influencing how an individual processes incoming stimuli and therefore how he/she diagnoses the situation. Thus, operational code beliefs act as a "causal nexus" between beliefs and decisions. While also a valuable contribution, this approach is limited by the fact that it is only at the level of the individual
decision-maker and is limited to general approaches to the world. (George 1979)
A final approach to understanding how cognition conditions decisions is found in
the work on cognitive mapping. Cognitive maps are representations of the causal links a
person or group makes between concepts. Thus, cognitive maps are created to model
posited relationships within a specific policy domain. The maps are composed of concepts
as points, and causal links or arrows which include valences of positive or negative
causation.(Axelrod 1976; 5) Applications of this technique have included how integrated
sets of categories, descriptions, evaluations and explanations not only constrain decision
options but also define the "reality" within which the discussion of decision options is
conducted. (Bonham and Shapiro 1994) However, cognitive mapping has traditionally
focused only on one type of relationship between its individual elements, namely
causation.^
1.2.2.2. Problem Representation and Solution: The Storv Model
The research for the case studies in this study uses a final method of characterizing
decision-makers' mental representations or beliefs about the environment in which they
operate; the story model of problem representation. This model builds upon the previous
three approaches but is more flexible in the types of actors which are included as
important participants in events and in the types of relationships which can exist between
actors, goals, and actions. It argues that a cognitive representation can be captured by
2 An exception to this is the latest work by Bonham, Sergeev and Parshin (1997) which shares the goal of this work in mapping non-causal knowledge structures (which they argue are more appropriate for non-Westem decision makers.)
8 asking what story the participant or group has created to explain incoming evidence and previous behavior. The story can be thought of as being rooted in common metaphors used to understand the evidence which an individual or a group confronts. (Khong 1991 ;
Voss 1992: for examples of work on the use of metaphors for problem-solving.)
It is contended that story construction enables the critical organization and interpretation of evidence that individuals or groups require in order to decide on a response that is deemed appropriate to the changing circumstances. Previous empirical work has shown that individuals and groups do indeed use stories to understand situations and make decisions. In a study of the decision-making process of jurors, Nancy
Pennington and Reid Hastie found that the jurors imposed a narrative story organization on the incoming information they received during a trial.(Pennington and Hastie 1986)
This finding has been corroborated in a study by Sylvan, Haddad and Ostrom testing whether groups of experimental subjects facing the task of deciphering a foreign policy decision making situation use story constructions for evidence evaluation. Their results indicate that in each of their experimental groups, participant self-reports and researcher observations show an attempt during group discussion to agree on a consistent "theme,"
"narrative" or "story."(Sylvan, Haddad, and Ostrom 1994: 23)
This research builds upon the existing research on the use of stories to formulate
Hypothesis I: When a military experiences the loss o f its state's empire, officers will formulate a new story that justifies the change in their status. In the data chapters of the dissertation this hypothesis is tested by examining the degree to which there are changes from the baseline or pre-intervention story about the imperial relationship, across time that can be plausibly linked to the imperial withdrawal. As I will discuss in the next section, I expect that this new story will motivate new patterns in civil-military relations in the post imperial era.
1.2,3. Civil-MHitary Relations
Civil-military relations as a field of study has often been criticized as being non- cumulative. One of the reasons that those who study civil-military relations sometimes talk past each other is that they do not even agree on how to define and operationalize the very dynamic which they are studying. What is civil-military relations? Samuel
Huntington a forerunner in this field described civil-military relations as a system of interdependent elements; the formal position of military institutions within a government, the informal influence of members of the military within society and the nature of the dominant political culture of both society and the military. The goal of civil-military relations is then posited to be the achievement of a stable combination of these three elements without the utmecessary sacrifice of other societal values.(Huntington 1957: vii- viii, 2)
In practice, this broad definition of civil-military relations has been narrowed significantly. Most scholars who study civil-military relations focus either on instances of direct military intervention into political life, or on efforts by civilians to establish state control over the dangerous military monopoly on the use of force. Less analysis has been done on non-coup behavior and on alternative modes of military political behavior more generally. (Norden 1996:10-13 for a cogent critique of the field of civil-military relations and the need for a broader analytical agenda) The lack of attention to these important
10 political phenomena can be at least partly explained by the nature of the original work on civil-military relations. The early theoretical and case-study analyses of civil-military relations framed the diagnosis and description of civil-military relationships in terms of two ideal-typical models of state control over military behavior. In the next section I will present these two models with the argument that the dichotomy that they create is a false one and must be overcome in order to examine the multiple ways in which military officers can increase their political participation including, but not limited to, threatening the government with a military coup.
1.2.3.1 The Apolitical Military: Objective Civilian Control
The ideal relationship between the modem military and the state was described by early scholars in the study of civil-military relations as one in which the military seeks civilian supremacy over its activities and accepts a role as servant to the state. This power structure was seen as an indicator of a stable and mature society. Carl von Clausewitz framed this perspective in his seminal work On War. The professional military seeks autonomy in the execution of its art and yet defines itself as being in service to the political authority of the state. In this way, Clausewitz argues that war is at one and the same time an autonomous science with its own method and goals, and yet is subordinate because its ultimate purposes come from outside itself. "War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means."(Clausewitz 1976:69) The professional soldier does not and should not have a desire to enter the political debate over the appropriate policy goals.
This early formulation of the civil-military relationship was more fully explored by
Samuel Huntington in The Soldier and the State. Huntington described this ideal-typical
11 model of the apolitical military voluntarily subordinated to the state as an example of what he terms ‘objective civilian control.’ Objective civilian control over the military occurs when military oflScers view themselves as professionals. Their professionalism is manifested in a definition of their role in society in terms of the expertise, or particular skills and knowledge which they alone hold. This expertise allows them to render service to a particular client (either the state or society.) Their monopoly on an important area of expertise and their pride in their role as servants of the state is also manifested in a strong sense of afiBliation as part of an exclusive and organic group. This last element
Huntington terms ‘corporateness.’ The combination of corporateness and expertise in violence can be dangerous for a society. Professional militaries possess the potential for significant political influence if they are allowed to use their knowledge and skills to further their corporate interests, unchecked by the state or society. (Huntington 1957:8-
11)
In order to alleviate some of the dangers this combination poses, societies have attempted to achieve state control over the military. When a military meets all three of these criterion; of expertise, service and corporateness, there is civilian control because the military believes itself unqualified to participate in domestic politics and thus is isolated from the sources of its potential political power. In other words, the ideal civil-military relationship is to create an apolitical military. Conversely, the state's control over the relationship is said to decrease as the military becomes progressively involved in institutional, class and constitutional politics.(Huntington 1957:8-11,85)
12 1.2.3.2 Holding the military at bay: subjective civilian control
Without objective civilian control, without an apolitical military, the state is forced to attempt subjective civilian control over the military. In a situation of subjective civilian control, the military is held at bay through the exercise of civilian power and the showering of material privilege. Often in a case of subjective civilian control the military becomes a tool of one political faction against another. Thus militaries can enter politics if a subgroup of the state, or the group of elites which have been seen as its client, are under attack. Subjective civilian control is sometimes likened to an interest-group view of the relationship between military officers and state officials. This is clearly the less desirable option. It has been posited that once the military is engaged in any political behavior, civilians have lost a good degree of their control.
1.2.3.3. A False Dichotomy: The Political Nature of all Militaries
It is precisely this dichotomy of either objective civilian control over an apolitical military or subjective control (or more often the lack of control) over a politically dangerous military which leads both analysts and political practitioners to equate military political participation with attempts to overthrow the government. Not all political participation by the military aims at overthrowing the state or at instituting military rule.
Militaries are bureaucratic organizations within a state and so we can expect them to engage in the type of behaviors which analysts have described as bureaucratic politics.
In his work Colton provides a useful method for conceptualizing political participation. He divides military political participation based upon the scope of the issues with which the military is involved and the political m eans the military employs to achieve
13 their issue-related goals.(CoIton 1979) One way to operationalize the level of political involvement when the means used are indirect, is exemplified by the division of domestic decision-making power, into two categories decision influence and decision authority.
Decision influence is control over the collection and analysis of information needed to reach a decision. By using their relative monopoly on defense-related expertise militaries can affect the structuring of policy options and alternatives considered by domestic decision makers. Those withdiecw/on authority, by contrast, actually select the option for implementation. (Meyer 1985:39)
This research will operationalize the level of domestic political participation through an examination of; the scope of issues with which the military is involved, the means it employs for political involvement, and the degree of decision influence versus decision authority it possesses. At a minimum, military officers within professional military organizations will strive to have their corporate or institutional needs met. This can be considered to be the basis for Timothy Colton's idea of a civil-military contract between the state and its military.
Colton argues that all states with professionalized militaries have to negotiate an arrangement with the military in which each side agrees to a particular division of responsibilities and rewards. This contractual relationship is a part of objective civilian control, even though militaries can be expected to engage in some political behavior. The contract is posited to have core elements which transcend the particular state and military.
All militaries under objective civilian control agree to ensure the state's external defense and territorial integrity and promise to refl-ain fi'om direct political participation. In return,
14 the state agrees to provide the military with domestic political stability, legitimate leadership, and material support for its professional activities. Colton, thus challenged students of Soviet civil-military relations to move to a more flexible framework of the process of power and influence in the hands of both politicians and military officers.
(Colton 1978:63)
Colton's description of the distribution of responsibility and reward has been challenged by some scholars, particularly those that have studied the civil-military relationships that occur in developing countries. In a study of the Brazilian military in the years leading up to the coup of 1964, Alfred Stepan describes a situation in which professional standards, and a high degree o f institutionalization within the military coexisted with an increasing degree of military participation in domestic politics. He terms this new pattern of civil-military relations ‘new professionalism’. How could military officers see themselves as professionals (as defined by Clausewitz and Huntington) and still see an appropriate role for themselves in domestic politics? The explanation that
Stepan offers is that during this time period the military perceived a palpable threat to the internal security of the nation and to the military itself. This led them to redefine national security. In 1959, the chief ideologue of the new Brazilian army school. Colonel Golbery, articulated this new view of national security when he argued that in times of severe crisis,
“the arena of politics is permeated by adverse pressures, creating a form of universalization of the factors of security, enlarging the crea of the politics of national security to a point where it absorbs all the national activities.”(Stepan 1986:141) As a
15 result of this new view of their professional responsibilities and expertise, these highly
professionalized military ofiBcers became much more concerned with political problems.
1.2.3.4. When are militaries most likely to enter domestic politics?
From Huntington onward, analysts have argued that what keeps the military
neutralized as a political force is its sense of corporate or professional identity. Many
analysts have argue that military oflBcers will enter domestic politics if and when they feel
that their corporate identity is threatened or that their institutional needs are no longer
met.(Perlmutter 1980; 13; Zisk 1993: 14)^ Corporate identity and institutional needs may
be a variable instead of a constant in the civil-military relationship. Both Stepan and
Colton’s work points to the importance of empirically measuring the military’s perception
of its sphere of expertise and responsibilities vis a vis the state and society. Colton
predicts that the military will hold the state to its end of a civil-military relations contract.
The state forfeits the agreement when it is no longer perceived by military officers as
providing domestic political stability, legitimate leadership and material rewards for
military service. Once the contract has been invalidated, the military is no longer bound to
remain apolitical.(Colton 1979:281) However, this prediction is predicated on a particular
hypothesis o f the content of civil-military contracts. The key to understanding the timing,
degree and content of domestic political participation by military officers is a careful
empirical study of military officer’s corporate identity and their expectations of the
distribution of policy responsibility within the state. Civilian control will be present when
3 In her study of militaries and doctrinal iimovation Zisk hypothesizes that the military officer does not resist all innovation. Instead, only potential innovation that threatens the military officer corps’ definition of itself and its prerogatives will be resisted.
16 the military as an institution accepts the governments definition of the appropriate division
of labor. Governments will have greater success in defining these terms if civilian
institutions are seen as strong and legitimate.(Craig 1955; Welch 1976:2,323/
1.2.3.5 Military Political Participation: An Evaluation
Is all participation destabilizing? What general policy preferences might we expect
military officers in post-imperial societies to hold? The most universal preference
attributed to professional militaries is the desire for a stable domestic environment free of
significant threats to organizational health and autonomy. (Janowitz 1959) This preference
is so fundamental that militaries are posited to react first to these internal threats before
reacting, to foreign threats to state security. (Zisk 1993: 30) It is in this regard that military
ofiBcers are sometimes described as conservative, preferring a recognized client to a new
one. Thus they have been posited to value change only when they are faced with a
pronounced failure of the status quo.(Posen 1984) This conservatism has been linked to a
desire to guard the existing order, even from democracy.(Huntington 1968: 221). And
yet, military ofiBcers tend to hold a strong predisposition toward nationalism, as defined by
love of coimtry and a pragmatism that might lead some to value innovation if change was
seen as the only path to state survival and international system prestige.
It would appear that there is some disagreement among analysts concerning how
military ofiBcers respond to changes in their environment. I hypothesize that this confusion
4 Craig argues that militaries can also be dangerous political entities if they give their loyalty to the abstract state but not to its particular government. This can be exacerbated when the military’s corporate identity is defined in contrast to the inferior populace. This combination in the Prussian military led the military to spurn the Weimar Republic, contributing to the failure of democracy and the rise of fascism.
17 will be mirrored in the officer corps. There will be splits between conservatives and
innovation entrepreneurs. These splits will be tied to how they understand the past and
their future options.
This review of the civil-military relations literature on the nature and motivations
o f military political participation has yielded the basis for the next major hypothesis of the
dissertation. Hypothesis 2: When there are contested definitions o f the appropriate distribution o fpolicy responsibility between the state and the military and when military officers see states institutions as weak, they will cuivocate an increase in their level o f domestic political participation. By this testing this hypothesis this study will make a contribution to the research on civil-military relations by empirically examining both the degree of non-coup political participation in each military and the definition officers hold of these two critical independent variables. As I will argue in the case studies, both of these empirical pre-conditions to non-coup political participation are elements of the new stories some groups of officers construct in the post-imperial period. The direction of the post-imperial military organization’s policy preferences will be largely determined by who prevails within the organization and by what strategies civilians pursue to present the military with as many reassuring options as possible. This makes an examination of organizational reform and organizational political struggles vital to understanding the fate of post-imperial militaries.
18 1.2.4. Organizational Decline and Reform; How Organizational Structures and
Decision Processes Change in Response ta Dramatic Environmental Changes
1.2.4.1. Introduction and Definitions
In the 1980s and 1990s, we have become increasingly aware of the need to understand processes of downsizing, decline and even the death of organizations. Until recently, organizational decline was an understudied phenomena in the life-cycle of organizations. Much of the research in business administration and organizational psychology has focused on processes of organizational growth and maturation. However, current research has shown that the problems that managers encounter in declining organizations are qualitatively different than the challenges they face in organizations undergoing growth or maturation.
Organizations are engaged in a process of interpreting important changes in their environment. In this research 1 am studying how military organizations respond to a radical environmental change, what organizational psychologists term an "organizational crisis."(Milbum, Schuler, and Watman 1983: 1144-1147) or organizational decline.
Decline has been defined as a two-stage process. In the first stage the organization loses its ability to successfully operate within its environment. This can be caused by several factors. There may be a dramatic change in the environment. These radical organizational environmental changes may include severe domestic budget or policy reforms, the emergence of vacuums of power within the leadership of the constituency which they serve, or changes in the distribution of power within the international system more generally. The organization may be part of an industry that is shrinking or shifting.
19 Alternatively, the organization may have brought about its own decline by making
decisions that have put it out of touch with the demands of its client(s). As a result of
either environmental or organizational changes, the organization enters the second stage
of decline, in which its resources are reduced. (Cameron, Sutton, and Whetton 1988:5-7)
Hypothesis 3: Post-imperial militaries perceive a radical decrease in their resources and
organizational prestige as a result o f the loss o f their external and internal empires. In
the case studies, this hypothesis will be tested by ©camming whether there was a period of
radical decrease in the resources available to the military in the post-imperial period and
whether this decrease can be chronologically linked to the loss of their external and
internal empires.
1.2.4.2 Declining Organizations : The Struggle Between Status-Quo Defensive
Centralization and Innovation
In order to experiment with new organizational services, a frame-breaking change within the organization may be necessary. However, this type of frame-breaking change is unusual. Many bureaucratic/ideologically-based institutions tend to initially view change as negative, retrenching in reaction to threat, and arguing forihe maintenance of the status quo. This tendency toward reflexive constriction of the organization, is described in
Staw’s threat-rigidity hypothesis. In his work he claims that organizations respond to perceived threats in their environment by greater centralization of decision making and formalization of communication channels. This is manifested as restricted information processing with increased reliance on past experience, and a constriction of authority and conservation of resources, like a turtle pulling into its shell. (Staw, Sandelands, and
20 Dutton 1981) This research however posits that Staw’s threat rigidity hypothesis is not an accurate description of the dynamics which occur in post-imperial military organizations.
The literature on organizational and small group response to crisis, and its expectation of threat rigidity, is not an accurate description of large organizations, such as the military, which are facing a significant organizational threat in a very political environment.
Instead, based upon the literature on organizations in decline, we should expect that as the resource base within the organization shrinks, afi’agmented pluralism emerges.
Special interest groups will become important vehicles for fighting to protect turf and resource allocations. Not all of these groups will be equally successful and not all will be equally affected or threatened by the changes.(Cameron, Kim, and Whetton 1988: 209;
Lawrence and Lorsch 1967: see for other literature on organizational decline from an organizational environment perspective; Morgan 1986; Pffeffer and Salancik 1978).
Because of this struggle for self-preservation, organizations in decline are characterized by organizational processes that include; scape-goating of members, high rates of member turn-over, low morale and increased conflict between fragments of the organization. This type of organizational house-cleaning may be characterized by some or all of the following; a reformed mission, an altered distribution of power and status within subgroups, new organizational structures, new communication/decision-making patterns, and new leadership, often fi’om outside the organization. (Tushman 1988: 69) This type of politically-driven conflict within an organization can impede organizational adaptation or alternatively, it can encourage creativity.(Cameron, Sutton, and Whetton 1988: 5-7)
21 Thus, this research would expect Hypothesis 4: Militaries which experience a loss o f an external and internal empire are characterized byfragmented organizational structures and interest-group based struggles between organizational factions.
1.2.4.3. Turn-around strategies: Matching the perceived type of change to the successful
Strategy.(Figure i.,i)
Charles Hermann, in an essay on change in foreign policy behavior, argues that external environmental shocks or crisis are possible “change agents.” The degree of change in organizational output depends upon whether and how the decision process within the organization responds to the “change agent.” (Hermann 1990: 3-21) This diagnosis of threat/opportunity may deviate from the rational view that argues that attention is allocated to issues of highest cost to the organization. Herbert Simon first introduced this concept with his discussion of bounded or procedural rationality. He argued that constraints are imposed on the degree to which decision makers can operate rationally, due to both the uncertainties of the external situation, the constraints on perfect information and the limited cognitive capacity of the decision maker.(Simon 1985)
Bounded rationality leads to selective information processing and limited consideration of alternatives. In an empirical study of which specific dimensions an organization uses to diagnose strategic issues, Dutton, Walton and Abrahamson found that 59 percent of the attributes mentioned by respondents were captured in five dimensions concerning the organization's mission and role, its environment and its relationship with outside entities.(Dutton, Walton, and Abrahamson 1989: 384)
22 This study focuses on the effect of a particular environmental change on organizational structure and processes. However, not all change has the same effect. In the business world, organizations have been conceived as operating in an environment composed of niches, which in turn are bounded by the availability of resources, by technology and culture, and by the degree of consumer demand for an organization’s output. A decrease in the amount of resources available to the organization can result from a decrease in iha size of the niche within which the organization resides (a decrease in the volum e o f demand for the organization’s output), and/or from a change in the sluzpe of the niche ( requiring d i r e n t organizational output.)
Applying this literature from business to the military organization yields the expectation that officers’ definitions of the nature of the change their organization is facing becomes a critical variable for determining their behavioral preferences.(Cameron and
Zammuto 1988: 120-126) Using these same dimensions, we can derive hypotheses for the case studies in this dissertation. Hypothesis 5: When military officers perceive a decrease in the overall demandfo r the military in the post-imperial society (change in niche size) they are likely to engage in reactive defense o f their organizational structure and advocate threat-rigidity behaviors. Hypothesis 6: When military officers see the change as substantive (change in niche shape) they are likely to advocate radical reform or experimental domain substitution, mainly in the form o f new technologies or more cost-efficient and streamlined organizational structures. In other words, their preferred strategy will depend upon whether they feel that the services expected of the military have merely decreased, or whether they have qualitatively changed. This choice can have
23 significant consequences for the organization’s future. Reactive defense of old
prerogatives when innovation is more appropriate may exacerbate the process of
organizational decline.
However, as I am arguing, whether rational or not, this strategic issue diagnosis
may not be uniform across all sub-sections of the organization. Instead group sub-cultures
exist which are a combination of formal and informal constructs. Examples of elements
of this group sub-culture include beliefs, values, myths and norms. (Vertzberger 1990;
192-259) Service branches within the military will have different subcultures shaped by and shaping differences in their fimction within the military organization. Thus, in order to understand the research question of how military organizations respond to a fundamental transformation of their environment, we need to understand how they have evaluated that alteration in terms of normal organizational roles, the nature of the environment, key actors within the organization’s operating environment and standard organizational relationships with those actors over time. In other words, we need to analyze differences in the stories they have constructed. Differences in the stories which military officers tell about the loss of their internal and external empires and its impact on civil-military relations will serve as a link to understanding the organizational struggles and choices analyzed in this section of the research. We would expect factors such as service afBliation and rank/generational afBliation to affect the stories ofiBcers tell due to differing subcultures and socialization. Hypothesis 7: Service, rank and generational variables all serve as important bases fo r variation both in the interpretation o f the challenges facing the post-imperial military and in the policy responses o f that fragment or group.
24 1 .2.4.4. Summing it all up: Paths to Renewal or Accelerated Decline
In reviewing the literature on organizational structures and organizational decline,
I have argued that an essential element of the post-imperial syndrome in militaries is the
experience of being an organization in decline. Organizations in decline face significant
challenges and choices as they try to engineer a turn-around in their fortunes. In order to
understand this element of the post-imperial syndrome, in the case analyses I will examine
several variables; the nature of the organization’s environment and the perceptions within
the organization of the types of change around them; the degree of conflict or consensus
between groups in the organization regarding what the organization needs to do, the
differential impact of the changes within the organization (are the changes directly
impacting all of the organization or just some subsections?) and the strategies being
employed by organizational managers. Crisis, threat and defeat can lead to either
retrenchment or and innovation/experimentation. Even innovation can lead to
organizational collapse. In the conclusion to this study I will examine the implications of
the case studies. Given all of the challenges and roadblocks in the way of organizational
rebuilding, how do some post-imperial military organizations find their way out and what
are the implications of the paths they take? Alternatively, what are the mechanisms by
which they can avert a resource shortage and end their decline?
1.2.5. Why should Security Studies Care about Domestic and Organizational
Processes?
The dominant paradigm in the study of international relations, particularly on international security questions, has been the neo-Realist system-level theory of the
25 behavior of states in the international system. For the most part, these structural theories
were developed during the Cold War and reflect the Cold War context. The most
important attempt by this school to parsimoniously portray the Cold War international
system was Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics. His comparatively deductive
scheme is driven entirely by one constant in the international system, the absence of
supranational authority above states, and one variable, the number of great powers in the anarchic system. According to Waltz and others, it is better to focus on the structure of the system, for example the distribution of power among the important state units, and to treat all other variables as residual elements, elements which may be periodically causally important, but are not a part of the system's essential structure.(Keohane 1986;
Morgenthau 1985; Waltz 1979)
With the end of the Cold War, we can no longer assume that all states agree on the number and identity of the great powers. We may profit from revisiting older versions of
Realism. In his book. Power and International Relations Inis Claude presents what he calls the manually-operated version of balance of power theory. In this formulation, in order for a system to survive intact, at least some actors have to understand the nature of the existing balance of power system and act with the intention of preserving this balance. (Claude 1962) In other words, older versions of balance of power theories required the analyst to focus on how the actors understand the system in which they are participating. Furthermore, these representations become more important as the number of major players proliferate and the balancing game becomes more difficult.
26 I would argue that the number of variations on how decision-makers within the
states understand their environment increases exponentially with an expansion in the
fluidity and complexity of the international environment itself.(Deutsch and Singer 1964;
Rosecrance 1966: for work on the effects of multi-polarity on system stability and the
attention actors pay to each other.) The destruction of the Cold War structural symmetry
has taken with it the ease with which even scholars and practioners of structural theories
can posit clear power and motivation calculations by actors. Instead, in times of radical
change and system redefinition the ways in which the actors make sense of a complex
environment, and determine their role within it, is critical. In fact, this judgement may determine actors' power and motivation calculations.
Structural theories alone are not likely to be suflBcient guides to the future complexities of international political relationships. Analysis of systemic interactions cannot be confined to balance of power calculations. Instead, causation seems to run in every direction, including reciprocal feedback, between domestic change and international behavior. The important issues of concern to system theorists, such as the military and alliance behavior of states, are affected by these interconnections. (Snyder 1993)
1.3 Dissertation Overview
In the next chapter I will outline the comparative case study methodology that will be used to test the hypotheses derived in this chapter. I will then present the justification for the choice of the two cases for the dissertation, the Soviet Union 1980-1995 and
France and 1945-1962. The last sections of Chapter Two discuss the ways in which the key variables will be operationalized, the data sources for testing changes in each variable
27 and the content analysis technique used to code the data. Chapters Three through Seven present the results of the case studies. After deriving hypotheses and testing them in the
Soviet Union 1980-1995 in the first three data chapters, I turn in the last two chapters to a brief examination of how these effects may be generalizable to another case, the French withdrawal "from Indochina and the Algerian War, 1945-1962. Finally, the dissertation ends with a discussion of the conclusions which can be drawn from the case studies and the implications for future research.
2 8 Continuity of Environmental Change
Type of change in niche Continuous Change Discontinuous Change Change in Niche Size EROSION CONTRACTION
Source of Conflict: Source of Conflict: Threat
Stagnation Tactics: Reactive
Tactics: Proactive Strategies:
Stratçgiçs: Domain Defense/
Domain Offense Consolidation Change in Niche Shape DISSOLUTION COLLAPSE
Source of Conflict: Source of Conflict: Confusion
Contention Tactics: Experimental
Tactics: Enactive Strategies:
Strategies: Domain Substitution
Domain Creation
Figure 2.1: MANAGERIAL RESPONSES TO CONDITIONS OF DECLINE (Cameron and Zammuto 1988: 123)
29 CHAPTER 2
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
2.1 INTRODUCTION/CHAPTER OVERVIEW:
This chapter presents the methodology which guided this research project. Since the research combines a quasi-experimental design with a comparative case study I present
each of those techniques in the first two sections of this chapter. The last sections of the chapter discuss the ways in which the key variables were measured, the data sources used for testing changes in each of the variables and finally, the content analysis technique used to code a portion of the data.
2.2 RESEARCH DESIGN
2.2.1 Ouasi-Experimental Interventions
This research uses a quasi-experimental research design in order to measure the hypothesized impact of the loss of empire on the cognitive and organizational variables outlined in the previous chapter. The quasi-experimental design is an important tool for social scientists because many significant social and political phenomena only exist in the real world, outside o f the controlled setting of the laboratory. Studying the impact of events as they happen carries with it limitations in the amount of control the researcher has
30 over manipulations of timing, recipients and randomization of exposure to an experimental stimulus. The quasi-experimental method is an appropriate method to use in these types of situations. In exchange for a lesser degree of experimental control, this research technique allows its user to have a greater degree of confidence that the results are representative of more than the artificial conditions of the lab. Thus, it increases the external validity of the research findings.
The basic premise of the quasi-experimental research design is that the researcher can isolate a dramatic, recognizable event that occurs within a distinct increment of time.
This event serves as the “quasi-experimental intervention.” The research design then tests the hypothesis that the important dependent variables will also show a dramatic change attributable to the intervention. In this design the independent variables, or quasi- experimental treatments are the loss of an external and internal empire. The dependent variables are the cognitive constructs military officers hold to understand their role in civil- military relations and national security and the organizational decision making and implementation structures in each military. Measurements are thus taken before and after each loss. Identical or highly similar results across the time period surrounding the intervention would fail to reject the null hypothesis. The study is falsifiable since there is a clear test of the hypothesis that the dependent and independent variables would covary. If they do not covary, then I have failed to show that there is a conclusive effect of the loss of empire. (Campbell and Stanley 1963:204-213)
The quasi-experimental design described above has a few problems, however. The most significant problem with relying solely on a quasi-experimental pre- and post- test is
31 the potential inability of the design to isolate the effects of the experimental treatment from those of other spurious and coterminous changes. This is a serious challenge to the internal validity of the research since with a quasi-experimental design alone, observed differences in the stories and organizational structures of the military can not be directly attributed to the loss of empire. Therefore, this research combines the quasi-experimental principles of research design with a comparative case study method.
2.2.2. Comparative Case Studies
“A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident.”(Yin 1994: 13) The comparative case study ultimately takes as its goal the rigorous specification of empirical relationships between two or more variables through the careful selection of cases for comparison. This careful comparison will allow me to uncover what the common effect of the loss of empire is on militaries and what may be classified as more unique, case-specific and less-generalizable dynamics.
The process of comparison is not confined to case studies, or qualitative methods of research. Both qualitative and quantitative research techniques must devise procedures for the careful elimination of alternative explanations to their results and conclusions. The statistical method eliminates these so-called spurious findings through the use of statistical significance coefficients. In order to be reliable and meaningfiil, however, these statistical coefficients require large sample sizes. In other words, the phenomena under examination must occur frequently enough to-create-a large-pool (ff prospective candidates for analysis.
32 Many interesting phenomena do not, however, occur frequently enough to enable the application of statistical significance tests. Furthermore, analysts have become increasingly fiustrated with the fact that correlation is limited in its implications or possibilities for inference. Qualitative analysis allows the researcher to gain more insight into patterns of causation as well as correlation. In summary, qualitative methods, such as the comparative case study, allow the researcher to examine uncommon occurrences or to examine more common phenomena in more depth than is possible with statistical methods.
2.2.3. Case Selection
The comparative case study method, particularly the technique of structured focused case studies discussed below, seeks to limit the possibility of spurious findings through the careful selection of cases and the rigorous consideration of alternative explanations. Thus, formal rules for case selection and case analysis become critical to the success of the study in either generating or testing hypotheses.(Eckstein 1975; Lijphardt
1971) There are two alternative methods for selecting cases for controlled comparison.
These two sets of case selection rules have been somewhat confusingly named the methods of “most similar systems design” and “most different systems design”. The most similar systems design, favored by Lijphardt and Smelser, requires cases which match on a ll but the independent and dependent variables under examination. By selecting cases which are as similar as possible, the analyst is able to eliminate most, if not all, alternative variables which could account for any observed relationships between the independent and dependent variables. The-problem with-the-most sitmlar systems design is the relative rarity of such parallel cases. The alternative, favored by Przeworski and Teune, is the
33 most different systems design. This design seeks cases which are similar on the dependent variable, but differ across possible independent or explanatory variables. In this approach, the analyst seeks to isolate those few variables that covary with the dependent variables.
All variables which do not covary are eliminated as plausible explanations for the changes in the dependent variables. (Freindreis 1983)
This research uses a combination of the two case selection methods. The initial case selection was made using the most different systems design. Cases were selected in which militaries faced both a loss of their external empire and some degree of threat to their state’s territorial integrity (loss of internal empire.) 1 selected two cases which met this double-criterion : France from 1945-1962 (the loss of Southeast Asia and Algeria) and the Soviet Union from 1980-1995 (the loss of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics.) Thus, in both cases, 1 will be able to systematically measure the effect of the loss of an internal and external empire on the two dependent variables; problem representations and organizational structures. 1 am positing that changes in the two critical independent variables, the type and pace of withdrawal and degree of challenge to territorial integrity will covary with changes in organizational stories and structures. This covariation is posited to occur despite the many differences between these two cases.
It should be readily apparent that while Russia and France share a common experience of external and internal decolonization, there are many more differences between these countries. One fundamental difference between the cases was the type of regime governing each state during the decolomzation process^ While France was undergoing a change from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic, the Soviet Union experienced
34 attempts to reform the post-totalitarian Soviet state through perestoika and glasnost, and then a regime transition towards democracy. Equally radically different were the economic conditions present in each country. France maintained a modified capitalist economy with some state socialism while the Russian economy underwent a transition fi"om central planning towards free market capitalism. Finally, the position of the state in the international system at the beginning of the analysis of each case is different. France was a regional power in 1945 whereas the Soviet Union was a super-power. By selecting cases that are so different in so many fundamental respects, I have created a hard test for the study’s hypothesis that a post-imperial syndrome exists in each military, as measured through common changes in cognitive representations and organizational structures.
After spending the bulk of the analysis examining the similar dynamics in otherwise different states, I will turn in the concluding chapter of this book to an examination of the explanations for differences in the degree of change in organizational structures and ofBcer’s stories. For this last section of the research analysis, I will be using the method of most similar systems design. In important respects these two cases have experienced common histories and yet their fates have been different. The most similar systems design will allow me to isolate what factors other than the loss of empire might contribute to their dissimilar fates.
2.2.4. Structured Focused Case Studies (see Figure 2.1 Hypothesized Model of
Variables and Their Relationships)
In order to-increase the rigor of the case studies and convmcingly demonstrate causality between variables, I will not be merely comparing across two cases. Both cases
35 will also be analyzed using the “within case” method of structured focused case studies.
In his presentation of this method of research, Alexander George defines a comparison as
“focused” if the investigator examines only those aspects of the each case that are believed to be relevant to the research objectives and data requirements of the study. Similarly, a controlled comparison o f cases is “structured” when the investigator defines and standardizes the data requirements across each of the cases studies. This standardization is accomplished by formulating theoretically-relevant general questions to ask of each case.(George 1979) The general questions to be asked of each case, in their most general form, are the testable hypotheses 1 derived fi’om the literature review in Chapter One.
These hypotheses are included in the Appendix A at the end of this volume.
The final element of rigor in a structured focused case study is the addition of
“process-tracing.” By paying particular attention to the process by which changes in variables occur over time, 1 will be better able to demonstrate the degree of influence that a particular independent variable (in this case the loss of empire) had on the value of the dependent variables. Process tracing allows for the construction of an argument about the potency of the loss of empire and the pa th which it takes in influencing the process o f the reformation of military officers’ identity, role conception and behavior as well as organizational adaptation.
2.2.5. Summary of Research Design
The specific aim o f this research design is to produce valid results through the rigorous elimination of spurious variables. The test for scientific research is its degree of; constmct, internal and external validity and the reliability of the data. To evaluate
36 construct validity, we must ask whether the researcher is actually measuring what she
thinks she is measuring. The best way to achieve construct validity is through the
establishment of a chain of evidence achieved through the use of triangulation of data.
Multiple sources of evidence are combined to form a convincing argument. This will be
accomplished through the technique of process-tracing described above. Internal validity is similar to construct validity. It requires the establishment of a causal relationship as distinguished from rival explanations for the effect. This too can be accomplished through explanation-building and time-series analysis. The final source of validity is external. This requires the analyst to establish the domain to which her results can be generalized. This requires a careful specification of the theoretically-derived scope conditions under which the analyst expects to be able to generalize. One of the best ways to expand the generalizability of results is through the replication of findings in a multiple case study.
This research examines two cases as the first cut at isolating what I hope will be a more generalizable phenomenon. The current study seeks to isolate a generalizable phenomenon for states whose militaries experience both a loss of their external empire and challenges to the territorial integrity of their internal empire.
The final test for scientific research is the reliability of the data collection, or the degree to which results can be replicated. In the next section, I will address the way in which I used structured focused questions, standardized coding sheets and data selection rules in order to increase the reproducibility and rigor of the research results. (Yin 1994:
33-37)
37 In summary, I have shown that a qualitative research design is the most
appropriate method to address the research questions which I laid out in Chapter One. In
order to examine whether there is a post-imperial syndrome, I have selected two cases based on a rigorous set of rules for case selection. These cases are; the Soviet Union and then Russia from 1980-1995 and Fourth and Fifth Republic France 1945-1962. With these two cases 1 will attempt to prove that there is a common impact of two particular independent variables (the loss of an external empire and a challenge to the integrity of an internal empire) on the theoretically and policy-relevant dependent variables of officers’ stories about their external and internal roles and their strategies for organizational adaptation. To accomplish this, the effect of this series o f pivotal changes is measured as a quasi-experimental stimulus, then each case is analyzed as a whole through a historical examination of how the variables evolved over time and what contributed to their evolution.
2.3. VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION/MEASUREMENT
This study examines changes in two sets of dependent variables. In the next two chapters of this study 1 examine the problem representations of military officers by showing that military officers tell public stories about the process and result of the loss of their internal and external empires. The first chapter examines the stories which military officers tell of their external role in assuring state security. The second analyzes their stories about their internal role, or the nature of civilian power and the limits of the civil- military relationship. The second set of dependent variables describe organizational decision-making structures, personnel dynamics and policy preferences. In order to
38 adequately isolate the quasi-experimental effect of the loss of empire on each of these
variables, careful specification and standardized operationalization of the variables across
time and between each of the cases is necessary. This section will address how each of
these variables was defined and measured.
2.3.1 Measuring Officers’ Problem Representations; The Modified Story Model
A fundamental goal of this research is to be able to systematically measure and
compare the ways in which military oflBcers described the behavior they were asked to
perform and the choices they faced both in the conduct of foreign policy and in the
domestic political transition. To achieve this goal, I have chosen to build off of the work
of both political scientists and cognitive psychologists who have created and begun to
employ the story model of problem representation in order to understand the antecedents
to particular policy choices. (Hastie 1983; Khong ; Pennington and Hastie 1986; Sylvan,
Haddad, and Ostrom 1994; Sylvan 1992; Voss 1992)
The operationalization of military ofBcers’ stories builds upon work originally
done by Pennington and Hastie in their examination of juror decision making. In their
study of the ways in which jurors came to a verdict decision in a trial, they argued that the jurors organized the evidence they heard during the trial into a story form. These jurors
then used the stories they had created to argue for a particular verdict in the group’s
deliberations. Based upon this research, Pennington and Hastie developed a model of the elements of a story. Their model is reproduced in Figure 2.2 . The model posits that there is a universal episode schema which individuals use to link together information about cause and effect, the nature of the environment in which action takes place, the roles
39 of key participants, and finally, the actions which should be taken. Thus, the set of relationships usually expressed in an episode schema begins with events which then trigger the process of initiating both a main character’s psychological state and his/her goa/ 5 .
These three variables, then provide the reasons for the character’s subsequent actions and the ultimate outcome of the episode, the consequence of the action taken. (Hastie 1983;
Pennington and Hastie 1986)
While this model is drawn firom work on cognitive psychology, particularly the use of schemas in information processing (Fiske and Taylor 1991; Rummelhart 1975), I will not be attempting to make overtly cognitive claims. Instead of using the model to capture the inner thoughts of military officers, I will be examining the ways in which ofBcers have publicly represented their choices. The public representation of choice, particularly in a political environment, is at least one step removed from the private thoughts of the individual. Thus, it is quite likely that an individual would hold a private view of their appropriate role in the post-imperial era and articulate a very different view publicly, due to a variety of pressures and rewards in their organizational and domestic environment.
Since this research is precisely interested in the political and policy behavior of post imperial militaries, it is the public story (the sum of their personal views self-censored to reflect environmental constraints) which matters.
Because I am interested in examining the way choices are framed and understood in a political context, I have adapted Pennington and Hastie’s model. There are several key differences between my quasi-experimental research setting and that of a jury deliberating in secret. The first major difference is that, unlike the jury in a court case,
40 these military ofBcers are involved in an iterative process of story construction and adaptation. They know the other players in their story, as well as their intended audience, very well from previous interactions. Secondly, unlike jurors impartially arriving at a judgement based upon court-room testimony, these military officers are themselves a part of the action rather than second-hand observers. Thus, in the research environment I am examining, social and political world events do not occur in a vacuum. There are a set of expectations that officers bring about their own roles and relationships which may pre-date the story-event. In the stories that will be measured here I expect the important relationships to be primarily between the society, the military, the state and perhaps some external enemy. Like the established model, I also expect responses to occur within a system of organizational and personal goals. This combination of roles and goals then conditions the response which military officers suggest for the problem. However, unlike in the court rooni, their response may take several forms. Responses may be either concrete behavior, verbal behavior advocating what they would like to see happen
(behavior advocated,) or some combination of both. Finally, I have added a category to the story construct. In many cases military officers are telling the story in order to articulate a lesson about the past with significant intended implications for future individual and organizational behavior and goals. This is summarized in Figure 2.3;
Adapted Story Model.
Whose stories are these? Although the data for the story analysis is collected from individual military officers (as described below), this research is ultimately interested in aggregating individual statements into major groupings or dominant stories told within
41 each military organization. This aim is important for both clarity in theory building and for policy-relevance. Only those problem representations which are viable organizational alternatives will have an impact on the ultimate direction of security policy, civil-military relations or organizational reform. In order to resolve this problem, once individual stories were coded using the story coding sheet shown in Appendix B, commonalities were sought across individual statements within the same chronological period. Stories which matched on the broad story categories were combined. Stories which differed significantly on any one of the story elements were treated as a separate or new story.
Only stories which had three or more influential proponents were included in the analysis.
(Herrmann 1988; Shapiro 1988; Sylvan 1992: see for similar methods of problem representation aggregation)
2.3.5. Post-Imperial Organizational Structures (see Appendix D : Organizational
Coding Sheet)
In order to examine the consequences of organizational decline for military decision-making structures and organizational dynamics, measures are needed of the hypothesized fragmented pluralism and interest-group based calculations. This research will measure organizational fi"agmentation and conflict through three hypothesized effects on post-imperial militaries’ organizational structures: large-scale personnel turn-over, the emergence of rival decision-making structures within the organization, and fights between sub-groups over resource allocations. The existence of persoimel turnover is easily demonstrated through organizational records of resignations and promotions. The emergence of rival decision-making structures can be measured by examining both real
42 and proposed changes in the formal organizational decision making and chain of command
structures. However, informal channels of decision influence should not be ignored.
These effects are testable and falsifiable. Failure to provide evidence for
fragmentation and conflict would support the rival literature on organizations in crisis
which proposes that they are characterized by threat rigidity. In their review of this
literature, Staw et al. develop a model which predicts that an impending threat caused by
environmental change will lead to the restriction of information through the increased
centralization of organizational decision making authority and the constriction of control
through the standardization of decision-making procedures.(Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton
1981) Centralization has traditionally been measured as a reduction in the size and
number of organizational decision bodies (Bozeman 1979; Hermann 1963)
Standardization of decision-making procedures is observable in the increased use of more
explicit and uniform decision and allocation criteria, following a routinized decision
making process. Staw et al. terms this a “mechanistic shift” in organizational structure.
This is clearly at odds with the research hypothesis of organizational fragmentation and the
proliferation of rival decision units within the organization.
One of the long accepted hypotheses in the psychological literature on group
behavior is that an external threat draws group members together and increases group cohesiveness. (Sherif 1953) This literature also predicts an increase in group cohesiveness
and group think, or pressures toward uniformity in issue diagnosis and behavior, during crisis. Group think is operationalized as the exclusion of divergent information or
differing viewpoints from the group producing a shared illusion of unanimity concerning
43 central beliefs and judgements and the support of the existing group leadership. (Janis
1972) While cohesiveness and elimination of dissention may occur in sub-groups within the post-imperial military organization, the presence of an organizational-level uniformity and cohesiveness would result in a failure to demonstrate the hypothesized effects.
2.3.3. Post-Imperial Organizational Reform Strategies (See Figure2.4)
In addition to an interest in the effect of organizational decline on the structure and dynamics of post-imperial militaries, this research will explore the consequences of the loss of empire for the reform strategies these militaries undertake. In this study I will test the hypothesis that the way in which military organizations and sub-groups of officers understand the nature of the changes which they face in the post-imperial environment will shape their reform policy preferences. In Chapter One, I presented the theoretical basis for this fundamental expectation. When officers perceive a decrease in the overall demand for the military in the post-imperial society, what I called a change in niche size, they are hypothesized to favor a reactive defense of their organizational mission and structure.
This type of defensive behavior is posited to be typical of bureaucracies and other ideologically-based institutions. In this research reactive domain defense or consolidation is operationalized as an attempt to prevent the core domain from being abolished. A domain is defined as the population served, the technology employed and the service rendered, or the sum of the major activities of the organization. These attempts will include an argument that the organization ought to be maintained at status quo levels because of the grave symbolic and political implications of a cutback. If the status quo is not possible, they will consist of arguments for consolidation of core products and
44 services. Finally, members of the organization may attempt to buffer the organization from hostile environmental conditions through inter-organizational coalitions (Cameron and Zammuto 1988).
When post-imperial military officers see the changes engendered by the loss of empire as substantive, what I have called a change in niche shape rather than in overall demand, they are hypothesized to advocate radical reform or experimental domain substitution. This reform strategy can be operationalized as either the replacement of old activities with completely new tasks, or a diversification of organizational activities, expanding those activities that the organization does well. (Cameron and Zammuto 1988)
Finally, when faced with an environmental threat, organizations with a proud history may not see the stimulus as threatening at all. (Tushman 1988) This would result in a policy of denial, operationalized as the absence of a discussion of budget or resource cuts and no account of decreased resources in the reform plans advocated. These plans may even be characterized by an argument that the niche size has increased.
As Chapter One illustrated, the above analysis of the diagnosis and reform prescriptions advocated should be done both at the organizational and the sub- organizational or branch levels. Within an organization each functionally differentiated group may have their own sub-culture. Political jockeying can lead to different coalitions espousing different values and different views of change. (Morgan 1986) The tensions surrounding the process of organizational design and redesign can provide the analyst with insight into organizational power structures and factions. This is because issues of organizational identity usually remain latent during periods of stability and growth but
45 become of central importance when members are presented with evidence that their
organizations may be flawed, particularly when choices must be made about which parts
of an organization should be eliminated and which should be retained. (Whetton 1988)
2.4. DATA COLLECTION
2.4.1 Soviet/Russian case
How was data collected in order to operationalize each of the key variables
discussed above? For the primary case in the dissertation, the Soviet/Russian case, a
combination of press analysis and elite interviewing was used. A press analysis has the
advantage of being an unobtrusive data collection technique, since the materials were not
generated explicitly for the case study. It also affords the kind of broad coverage that is
needed to be able to trace the same variables across a long time-series. The disadvantage,
however, of relying upon materials in the press and local professional journals is that
generalizability of results may be limited by the degree to which some authors are blocked
while others have privileged access. In order to try to circumvent this problem, newspapers and journals were selected which had different bases of support and different preferred authors.
The newspapers selected for the Soviet/Russian case were divided into two periods, from 1980-1992 when censorship precluded the emergence of an independent press and the period after 1992 when the Russian press exploded and fractured into many papers supporting many different political orientations. In the period of 1980-1992, the main newspaper consulted for articles by military ofBcers was foasnava Zvezda. the paper of the Defense Ministry. Krasnaya Zvezda was one of the top five papers in the country
46 especially during the Soviet period, for news coverage in general. It served three groups
of readers: active military officers who receive the publication at their place of service,
retired military officers, and a small number of civilians who subscribed for various
reasons including traditions going back to WWn when the paper was very influential and
well-regarded.(Goltz 1996)
During the majority of the Soviet period the content of articles and editorials in
Krasnaya Zvezda was under the direct supervision of Glavpol which would read all of the
articles and sign the text on the most sensitive topics in order to make sure that it was
clear that they had seen it. Thus until 1992 the paper was a direct reflection of the views
of the Defense Minister. The turning point in editorial policy on content of the newspaper
was 3-4 years ago with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and especially with the removal
of the direct supervision of Glavpol. Currently the views expressed in the editorials are not
the views of the Minister of Defense's office but instead the opinions of their author.
(Goltz 1996)
Two journals were also used in the 1980-1992 period. These were Kommunist
Vooruzhenikh SiT. the organ of the political division of the Ministry of Defense, and
Voennaya Mysl’. the declassified version of the journal of the General Staff Voennaya
Mysl is considered the more scholarly and more theoretical of the two journals.
In the period fi'om 1993-1995, the above sources were supplemented by party newspapers from across the political spectrum. They included; Pravda Rossii. the paper of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Moskovskaya Pravda. the paper of the
Moscow chapter of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (still in existence),
47 Rossiskaya Gazeta. the paper aligned with Yeltsin and those in power, Sevodnya. the paper of the business community especially Mosbank, Den', the most popular opposition newspaper (formerly called Zavtra), and Russkii Sobor, the nationalist paper of Aleksandr
Steriegov a former KGB general. Many of these papers are in limited circulation and were collected in Moscow.
Within this poll of potential sources the first selection rule was that only articles written by military officers at the middle-level or above were include. All of these articles which seemed to address the research topic for the 1980-1995 period were copied and initially skimmed to see if they provided answers to research questions. All those which did were analyzed more deeply and included in the aggregation into stories and proposals for organizational reform. Well over 1000 articles were processed for the Soviet/Russian case.
The press analysis was supplemented by a small number of elite interviews conducted in Moscow by the researcher fi’om January-April, 1996. Interviews were obtained through the snowball technique. The interview sample is heavily weighted by reform-minded officers associated with IMEMO, the economic research institute and
ISKAN, the Institute for the Study of USA and Canada, as these were the officers most willing to speak to an American researcher. A standard interview questionnaire was used.
This is included in Appendix C at the back of this volume. However, interviews were not limited to answering only these questions. Most of the interviews focused upon the portion of the questionnaire with which the respondent felt most comfortable. Due to the small size and unrepresentative nature of the sample, interview data was used primarily to
48 provide face validity for press analysis results. Finally, these two categories of primary-
source data were supplemented by consultation of the work of scholars and practitioners
writing on the Soviet and Russian military.
2.4.2. French Case
The data for the French case study is drawn from the abundant scholarship on
French civil-military relations and decolonization from 1945-1962. Secondary sources
were selected in consultation with several specialists on the French military. These
sources include both English and French-language historical analyses, journalistic accounts
and social science research studies. In addition these secondary analyses were
supplemented by transcripts from military court martials and memoirs by military ofBcers.
2.5. CONTENT ANALYSIS OF DATA, TYPES OF ANALYSIS AND ITS
LIMITATIONS
What is content analysis and why do it? Content analysis is any research technique
for making inferences by specifically and objectively identifying specified charactersitics
within a text. Much o f content analysis research is motivated by the search for a technique
which is unobtrusive. Content analysis is especially important when the subject’s own
language is crucial to the research design. (Krippendorf 1980)
The content analysis procedure involves two processes: the specification of the
content categories to be measured and the application of rules for identifying and recording the characteristics when they occur in the data. Content categories should be
explcitly tied to theory and hypotheses. (Stone 1966) There are two methods of content analysis; quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative content analysis counts the frequency
49 of words, or phrases and then infers meaning by running a statistical regression on the data. The alternative is qualitative, non-frequency analysis in which a coder eliminates irrelevant words based upon context and examines overall themes. It is this later approach which is most conducive to building theories because it allows for the interpretation and inclusion of previously unseen patterns and combinations. There are structural components of any speech that can only be understood with non-frequency analysis.(George 1959) This research will employ a qualitative analytic approach, coding texts for the elements of the story discussed in the earlier section on operationalizing the story model and summarized in the sample coding sheet in the Appendix.
How should content analysis research be evaluated? In order to be considered rigorous, content analysis must meet several requirements. It must be objective, systematic, generalizable and limited to the analysis of overt content. In order to be considered objective and systematic each step in the process of data selection and collection must be carried out according to explicitly formulated rules and procedures.
The rules and procedures guiding the data collection and coding for this research have been elaborated in the previous sections of this chapter. In order to be considered generalizable, the findings should have theoretical relevance. Finally, content analysis should only seek to identify the manifest content or surface meaning of the text.
Underlying meanings are inferred later at the data interpretation stage. The validity of the results of a content analysis are judged by content validity and concurrent validity.
Content validity asks: are the results plausible, do they mesh with other information we have on the subject? Concurrent validity seeks to discern whether the measure is able to
50 distinguish between sources with known differences? (Holsti 1969) Finally, in a multi
method research study such as this one, content analysis can be judged by the degree of correlation with results from other research techniques seeking to measure the same phenomena. (Krippendorf 1980)
Content analysis is invariably attacked for naively assuming that textual data are an accurate reflection of the beliefs, calculations, emotions or attitudes of the speaker. If the speaker can not comfortably eliminate the possibility that a speaker may be using language for persuasion and influence, then it is argued, the researcher must include a consideration of the context and intended audience of each statement before inferences may be drawn about the true beliefs or cognitions of the speaker. (George 1959; Larson 1988) However, in my content analysis of the stories military officers tell, I am not seeking to describe the true inner thoughts of the individuals but instead their public representations o f their choices. These public statements in the press are shaped by both their own private cognitions and the constraints they perceive in the domestic and international political environment in which they operate. Their choices are articulated in a particular way to serve a number of goals (including persuasion and political survival). This analysis recognizes manipulation as both inevitable and desirable, since the study is of the political rhetoric and the publicly advocated behavioral responses of individuals and groups.
2.6 CONCLUSION;
The research reported in the case studies that will follow was carefully and rigorously conceived and conducted. It consists of multiple methods, a quasi-experimental design combined with a stmctured focused comparative case study. In addition, the
51 research examines multiple sources of evidence including; elite interviews, a content
analysis of press articles, an examination of memoirs, and consultation of secondary
sources for content validity of the results. As a multiple-method, multi-source, multi-case
study this research presents a serious test for the existence of the cluster of important variables I have termed a post-imperial syndrome, as outlined in Chapter One.
52 ^ Contested Definitions 1 of Appropriate Policy Responsibility
Changes in Military Officers’ Increased Domestic Stories Political Participation
Perception of the State as Weakened _
Loss of Empire Fragmented Organizational Structures and Interest-Group Based Politics
Radical Decrease in ^ Material Resources & Prestige
Differing Policy Preferences Based Upon Definition of ^ Environmental Change
Figure 2.1 Hypothesized Model of Variables and Their Relationships
53 INITIATING EVEHT(S)
fnitiate
PHYSICAL STATE(S) PSYCHOLOGICAL STATE(S)
initiate GOAL(S)
initiate reason
reason
ACTIOH(S)
result
COKSEQUEKCE(S)
Figure 2.2 Original Story Model
54 Initiating Event: I
Relationship Between Actors: Goal(s); I I Actions Taken:
Actions advocated/Lesson:
Figure 2.3 Adapted Story Model
55 Type of change Abrupt Change Perceived No Change Perceived
Change in Niche Size REACTIVE DEFENSE DENIAL
Change in Niche Shape EXPERIMENTAL DOMAIN CONSOLIDATION OF CREATION/ STATUS QUO SUBSTITUTION
Figure 2.4 ; Organizational Reform Strategies
56 CHAPTERS
UNDERSTANDING THE LOSS OF EMPIRE
3.1 CHAPTER OVERVIEW:
How do Russian military ofiBcers define what happened to them in the five to six year period of 1989-1995? How have Soviet military officers understood the withdrawal from Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Chechen bid for independence? How has this successive loss of territory, and imperial influence changed the way in which officers understand their role in providing state security against external attack (what I will be calling their external role)! In order to examine the degree and nature of change in their explanations, I will begin this section of the chapter with the argument that there was one predominant external role conception that Soviet military officers held during the period 1980-1989/90, the period before the beginning of the progressive process of imperial decolonization. First, I will describe this general base-line story and then I will provide a concrete (pre-intervention) illustration of the general external role conception; the story of military victory in the Great Patriotic War/World
War Two. Once I have provided the outlines of tMs basic external role conception, this chapter will begin to test the first hypothesis outlined in Chapter One, Hypothesis One:
57 When a military experiences the loss o f its state's empire, officers willformulate a new story that justifies the change in its status. This new story will motivate new patterns of civil-military relations in the post-imperial era. I will test this hypothesis by examining whether there are changes from the baseline or pre-intervention data as a result of three stages in the loss of their empire: the withdrawal from Eastern Europe, the collapse of the
Soviet Union ^ d the outbreak of War in the Caucasus. By tracing their stories across these three key events, I will be able to describe the different patterns in the ways in which military officers understood the particular processes of losing the external and internal empire that they had pledged to defend. I will describe the content of military officer’s stories about the imperial relationship and the lessons they argue should be drawn from the events.
3.2. ESTABLISHING A BASELINE
3.2.1 The General Story of the Soviet Military 1980-1988(Figure 3.1)
This chapter begins with an examination of the way in which middle- level and senior military officers in the Soviet Union framed their external role and their relationship towards the members of the Warsaw Pact. None of these baseline findings are meant to be shocking or particularly novel. It is possible that they even mask dissention and the seeds of disbelief and cynicism. However, this unanimity of message played a reassuring and important role in military life. This common and reassuring baseline is important as a measure of the dependent variable before the introduction of this chapter’s critical independent variable, the loss of an external and internal empire. Thu&this section serves
58 to set the stage for the changes which I have hypothesized will occur in the story as the empire begins to crumble.
The first step in the data analysis was to establish a baseline story or set of stories which existed well before the withdrawal from Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact, the two events which I am arguing characterize the loss of Soviet imperial influence in Eastern Europe. Establishing this baseline is not hard to do in the Soviet case since the content of press articles during this period was monitored by the Communist
Party. Thus, this baseline measurement literally represents the “party line.” Since almost all military officers were Communists and had been schooled in the party propaganda, I am not concerned that this may not reflect their true thoughts. Even if they disagreed with the following view of the world and their role in it, they nevertheless communicated with each other based upon this expectation. I will argue that this communication within the public domain acquired a life of its own. Military officers either expressed public dissatisfaction when they felt that reality did not match this baseline, or they continued to tell stories that matched the baseline relationships even when the world around them had changed.
The baseline story of the Soviet military’s external role, like all of the stories analyzed in this chapter, begins with an event or a state of being, that initiates the main characters’ (in this case the military ofiBcers’) goals and role conceptions, and military ofiBcers’ relationships to other actors in the story. These goals and relationships then mold the nature of both the actions which are taken to respond to the event and the actions which are advocated. The story ends with the consequence of these actions and often
59 includes a pithy lesson for future conduct. During the period from 1980-1988 the most general story military oflScers told of their external role begins with the creation of the
Soviet State apd the beginning of its existence in the international state system. Once the
Soviet state was created, military ofiBcers were charged with defending the state and the particular socialist achievements it embodied. However, the scope of their goals was broader than mere state survival. They saw themselves as responsible for ensuring world peace and aiding other socialist militaries. An example which is typical of the general tenor of this unanimous message can be found in top-ranking military propagandist Dmitrii
Volkogonov’s “Commentary on the Role of the Armed Forces.” In this article
Volkogonov states that the Soviet military’s role is “defense of our borders and of the
Soviet state including the achievements of Socialism. Further it is to ensure peace in the world and to aid other militaries in protecting their revolutions. The Soviet military is an instrument of peace.” (Volkogonov 1986)
The key relationships which Soviet military officers describe in this story are those between the military and the Soviet people, the Soviet state and the larger socialist community, as well as the larger relationship between the Soviet Union and the imperialist world powers. The Soviet military, as will be explored even more fully in stories on their internal role in the next chapter, saw themselves in this period as being tied to the Soviet people. They were their shield fi’om danger, and the defender of progress. “The army has a powerfW tie to the people and a justified goal of war, to protect socialism. This kind of army is unbeatable.” (Vorob'ev 1980) In their relationship with the larger socialist community, they saw themselves as the pioneers on a new path with a responsibility to
60 help others to follow their example. They describe themselves as “a pioneer on the path of mankind’s renewal, the bulwark of peace and progress” (Editorial 1987) with “a responsibility to help liberate people and aid them in their path toward socialism.”
(Editorial 1980c) They were ‘internationalists’, ”a part of the unbroken unity of socialist brotherhood among neighboring socialist states.”(Semenov 1980) They were liberators and friends, “serving as a support for citizen revolutions in countries all over the world.”
(Vorob'ev 1980). Finally, the Soviet military and the socialist community it supported had a definite eneipy, the West. These forces of imperialism were portrayed as aggressive and cunning, as evidenced in the following few examples of many in this genre. “Imperialism, headed by aggressive US circles, is always looking for ways to undermine socialist power, not sparing any efibrts at espionage and ideological subversion. We must guard against
Western efforts to drive a wedge in the unbroken ranks of socialist brotherhood through the encouragement of nationalistic prejudices which weaken the resolve of our military men.’’(Semenov 1980) “The aggressive intentions of imperialists could lead to uncountable losses to humanity if they are not nipped in the bud.”(Naumenko 1985) “The
West propagates the myth of Bolshevik hordes and has tried to intimidate its people.”
(Lobov 1988)
The combination of these goals/roles and their relationships with other actors in the international system led to a series of actions in which the Soviet military was forced to defend the Motherland from attack, either direct and actual or indirect and feared.
Thus according to this baseline story, “Our armed forces have only drawn swords against those who have attacked the socialist motherland, its freedom and the socialist gains. The
61 Soviet military has stood and does stand for peace. Socialism and peace are
inseparable.”(J^ushev 1987) The West, on the other hand, “has announced various regions
as being of vital importance. These regions are getting closer and closer to the Soviet
Union. They have even established a rapid reaction force as a tool against national liberation movements."(Semenov 1980) The story ends with a lesson for the future that is based upon the past. In order to be able to continue to defend the Soviet Union against these threats to its existence, “It is important to support the defensive capability of our
Motherland at such a level that potential aggressors know well that an attack on the security o f the Soviet state, on the peaceful life of the Soviet people will be answered with a decisive response.” (Evseev 1985) This is important because Soviet military men;
“Remember at what cost our people achieved freedom and independence, and they well understand that the higher our battle readiness, the less likely it is that aggressive imperialist adventures will occur and the more secure will be the Soviet state.”(lzmailov
1985)
3.2.2 Victory in the Great Patriotic War; An Important Illustration of the General
Pattern (Figure 3.2)
The general story of the external role of the Soviet military during the pre withdrawal period can be more concretely illustrated in the story which military officers tell of their victory in World War Two, what they call “The Great Patriotic War.” This story was so often repeated and served such an important function in the culture of the
Soviet military that it too; became publically uncontestaHe;(Azrarf 1987; Erikson 1993;
Garthoff 1989; Holloway 1989/90; Scott 1984) The story begins with the surprise attack
62 on the Soviet border by Fascist Germany, what is often termed “the brown plague.” The enemy’s superior force and the element of surprise initially forced the Soviet Army back into the interior of the country. But because of the indelible link between the military and the Soviet people, the people gave everything they had to the front. There was an ideological and political union of the Party, the people, and the state and a deep friendship between the peoples of the Soviet Union. While Fascist Germany sought to enslave the people in a “brown plague,” the Soviet military sought the defense of their socialist accomplishmepts. This led the Soviet military to act in a heroic and decisive marmer.
They unceasingly fought the hated enemy, with unparalleled achievements and great heroism. OfiBpers displayed mass heroism, selflessness and high military skill. Because of their courage they changed the course of events, and delivered the decisive blow in saving the USSR and the world civilization from the brown plague. The immediate consequence of their victory was that they showed the superiority of Soviet military science and arts, and demonstrated the unbeatable power of this new type of army. The more long-term consequence of their action was that they created favorable conditions for socialist revolutions in Europe and Asia, and for the rapid increase of national freedom movements.
Thus they strengthened the position of progressive peace-loving forces and showed the advantage of a socialist economic system. Capitalism, by contrast entered a new stage of its general crisis. Unfortunately, the West did not learn the lesson of the War: those who plan war against the Soviet Union will fail. (Editorial 1987; Evseev 1985; Izmailov 1985;
Naumenko 1985)
63 3.2.3, The Warsaw Pact; A Baseline Story of the Empire (Figure 3.3)
The oflBcial story of the Warsaw Pact begins where the story of the Great Patriotic
War ends, with the Soviet military’s victory against Germany, and their liberation of
Eastern Europe from fascism. This victory creates a new relationship with the people of
Eastern Europe, forged out of the unequal sacrifice of the Soviet military and yet the
common collaborative experience of fighting together in the resistance. This creates a
tension between equality and Soviet superiority that coexists in the story that Soviet
military ofiBcers told in 1980-1988 of the creation and maintenance of the Warsaw Pact.
The Soviet sacrifice was great. “The Warsaw Pact was forged from the blood of our best sons who battled together against fascism. More than 1 million Soviet soldiers died liberating neighbor countries.” (Editorial 1980b) Soviet soldiers spent more than a year in their liberating mission against fascism on the territory of Europe. This liberating mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Second World War was “without precedent in history and was the basis for the later strengthening of the unity of the people and armies of the brother socialist countries.” (Kulikov 1985b) Not only did the Soviet Union send its own sons to liberate the people of Eastern Europe, but they also supported them during the war by helping to train foreign military units that participated in the liberation hand in hand with Soviet forces and after the war by helping rebuild their economies. “The military of the Soviet Union in defeating fascism created the conducive conditions for the victory of the people’s revolutions." (Kulikov 1985b) The sacrifice and unequal price paid by the Soviet Union for the liberation of the Warsaw Pact countries is reflected in military
64 realities. “Soviet forces are the foundation of the pact’s military strength.” (Rumyantsev
1982)
And yet, the relationship with the Warsaw Pact countries is characterized as one of friendship and equality. International socialist relations are based upon complete sovereignty, voluntary unity, close mutual activities on the international stage, and mutually beneficial cooperation and assistance. This is a new and higher type of international relationship. (Editorial 1980a; Kulikov 1985a; Matsulenko 1985) Each government participant in the pact is an equal partner in the military cooperation. Actions are taken only with the agreement of all the interested parties.(Monin 1988) The pact is further characterized as an “indestructible friendship” (Editorial 1985a) characterized by a
“unity of the views of its participants.” and ’’true respect.”(Zyuzin 1985)
This tension between equality and Soviet superiority is important because it may provide some clues as to how Soviet military officers would react to the loss of this empire. If indeed, the countries of the Warsaw Pact are equal collaborators for peace, then their emergence as independent states does not negate past relationships. However, if these regimes are perceived as subordinate and dependent upon their Soviet patron during this period, then it is harder to imagine stability and peace without the Soviet
Union. It is also more difficult to reconcile oneself to a now-hostile Eastern European population which in the past was portrayed as grateful. Thus, this tension creates the seeds of conflict within the Soviet military officer corps as they attempt to understand their withdrawal and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.
65 The goal of the Soviet military officers within the framework of the Warsaw Pact
is to increase military cooperation in order to preserve sovereignty, independence and
territorial integrity of socialist states from imperialist aggressors and to support the forces
of progress, democracy and peace.(Gribov 1985; Kulikov 1985b; Rumyantsev 1982). The
result of the relationships and goals outlined above is that the Warsaw Pact has become an
“example of international relations free from national egoism”(Rumyantsev 1982).
Socialist cooperation is the source of practically all the important constructive initiatives
on behalf of peace. (Editorial 1980a) As such the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies
have achieved strategic parity with the West, prevented nuclear war, facilitated the shift
from cold war to detente, and had an important role in preparing Helsinki
Conference. (Gribov 1985; Kulikov 1988) The story of the Warsaw Pact ends with the
following lesson; “Human history does not include any other military friendship whose
influence has been so important on the fate of humanity and whose goal has been so
beneficent.” (Katrich 1985).
3.2.4. The Baseline. In Summary
There are remarkable similarities across these baseline stories. In each case, Soviet
military officers portray themselves as dedicated to a higher cause than just their own
state’s security. These causes include; world peace, the progress of the human race and
socialist internationalism. A few examples may serve as an illustration. Soviet military
authors characterize themselves and the Soviet state as; “a pioneer on the path of mankind’s renewal, the bulwark of peace and progress,” “an instrument of peace,”, with the responsibility to “help liberate people and aid them in their path toward socialism,”
66 and a “support for citizen revolutions in countries all over the world.” The Soviet military through its dedication and skill has, “saved the people of Europe and Asia from Fascist enslavement. And thus saved world civilization.’’(Editorial 1987; Editorial 1980c;
Volkogonov 1986; Vorob'ev 1980)
This dedication to a large cause seems unexpected for a professional military. In the section on civil-military relations in Chapter One, I argued that scholarship on professional militaries stresses two important characteristics of the relationship. First, the military is said to place importance on its monopoly of national security policy expertise, knowledge which military officers alone hold. (Fluntington 1957) In addition, militaries are expected to negotiate contracts or implicit agreements about the distribution of policy responsibility. While the specifics of these contracts may vary, militaries are generally expected to be responsible for ensuring the state’s external defense and territorial integrity, in exchange promising to refrain from direct political participation. World peace and the progress of the human race are, therefore, unusual spheres of responsibility and knowledge for militaries. They seem more overtly political than mere territorial defense.
As I will show in the discussion of the French baseline view of the external empire, dedication to a larger and more political cause seems to be an attribute shared by imperial militaries.
Furthermore, these lofty goals are only achieved at great cost. The supreme symbol of this sacrifice is the enormous number of Soviet soldiers who died during World
War n as they liberated Eastern Europe and created the conducive conditions for socialist state revolutions/empire-formation. According to the officers, more than 1 million Soviet
67 soldiers died liberating neighbor countries and Soviet soldiers spent more than a year in their liberating mission against fascism on the territory of Europe. The liberating mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Second World War was “without precedent in history and was the basis for the later strengthening of the unity of the people and armies of the brother socialist countries.”(Editorial 1980b) As a result of this; “All Freedom-loving peoples around the world rallied around the USSR as the center of the anti-fascist movement.’’(Kulikov 1985b) In return, these sacrifices are recognized and appreciated by their own people as well as the people of Eastern Europe.
The second common element in each baseline (propaganda) story is the perception that other socialist countries share their goals and their methods for achieving them and feel positively toward their friend and their liberator. Theirs is an “indestructible friendship” (Editorial 1985a), based upon the “unity of views of its participants” (Editorial
1985b); “There is true respect by the working people of the Warsaw Pact armies who are guarding the peaceful labor of the peoples of the socialist community.” (Zyuzin 1985).
Based upon these relationships each author advocates being beneficent but strong to avoid aggression by those who do not share their goals. Battle readiness and strategic parity are uniformly cited as the path to peace and victory and yet in each case they are convinced that they could overcome even a severe battle disadvantage through their high morale. The moral or pithy lesson of all these stories includes the special place that the
Soviet Army holds in human history as a progressive and beneficent force. “History shows that an am y that protects the people’s interests and has its unqualified support is unbeatable”.(Katrich 1985) Those who attempt to take on a military union with this at its
68 foundation are surely bound for failure. But does the Red Army have the unqualified
support of the people of Eastern Europe? How do military officers reconcile this baseline
story with the dramatic changes that are about to occur?
3.3. THE WITHDRAWAL FROM EASTERN EUROPE fredefining the
relationship of the Soviet Union and E.E.)
On December 7, 1988, speaking at the United Nations, Gorbachev promised large
unilateral cuts in conventional forces in Europe by 1991 and a shift to a defensive military
posture. This represented a turning point in the relationship which military generals had
with Gorbachev and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is now clear that many top generals
were very angry at the direction of international security policy. Not even a week later on
December 15, 1988 Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev resigned fi"om his post as chief of the
General Staff and First Deputy Defense Minister. While he denied the connection between
his resignation and Gorbachev’s speech it is highly probable that his resignation was the
only way in which he could register his dissatisfaction with the announced policy, given
norms of Communist Party Discipline. (Akhromeyev 1989) Indeed, even resigning was a
major break with Party tradition. After the speech, the organs of the Defense Ministry
such as Krasnaya Zvezda began to carry veiled critiques of Gorbachev. (Goltz 1996)
The tension was heightened when a year after the UN Speech, in October of 1989,
Gorbachev announced that the USSR “has no moral or political right to intervene in the events happening in Eastern Europe.” By removing any threat of military intervention to reassert Soviet will over their Eastern European neighbors, Gorbachev set the stage for the dramatic events which unfolded in 1989 and 1990 in these countries. In the next few
69 months the Berlin Wall fell and free elections and regime transitions occurred in almost all
of the former satellite Eastern European nations. In 1990 and 1991 Soviet troops
completed their withdrawal from Czechoslovakia and Germany. On October 26, 1991
Gorbachev agreed to withdraw all Soviet troops from Poland by the end of 1992. (Young
1992) What Jiappened to military ofiScers views of themselves and their external role
during this time period? In the first hypothesis laid out in the previous literature review
section, I posited; When a military experiences the loss o f its state's empire, officers will formulate a new story that justifies the change in its status. This new story will motivate
new patterns o f civil-military relations in the post-imperial era. In fact, the experience of
losing their bases and influence in Eastern Europe was described and publicly interpreted
differently by different groups of officers. In my analysis of statements made by middle-
level and senior military officers during the period of 1988-1992,1 was able to isolate
three separate stories or ways in which they understood the events engendered by
Gorbachev’s UN speech promising withdrawal and the decision to allow the Eastern
European democratic transitions and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact to proceed
without Soviet interference.
3.3.1 Withdrawal as an DIustration of Our Progressiveness, a Signal of our Success
(Figure 3.4)
Given the general wisdom that much of the military was angry with the direction of
security policy and the decision to unilaterally withdraw Soviet troops from Europe, it
may seem somewhat surprising that the first of these stories is a basically positive view of these changes and the political decisions made by the Soviet state. This story of the
70 withdrawal begins with the recognition that a new situation has taken shape in the world.
The implementation of “New Political Thinking”, Gorbachev’s strategy for international security, has lowered military tension in the world and reduced tension within the Soviet
Union. Within this context, the Soviet military’s goal should be to strengthen world peace, and to avoid a military confrontation through a never-ending arms race. However, they should also be able to guarantee the security of the Soviet state and repel aggression at any time.
The relationship of the Soviet military to the states and people of Eastern Europe remains positive as well: it is one of voluntary friendship.“Soviet servicemen did not enter a single one of the 13 East European countries as aggressors. We entered some states as enemy territory. We entered other countries on the basis of bilateral treaties and agreements. The groups of Soviet forces are stationed abroad temporarily. Their presence there is conditional upon fulfilling the allies’ pledges under the Warsaw Pact.”
(Lobov 1989) This voluntary presence is rooted in the story of the Warsaw Pact as forged from the sacrifice of Soviet soldiers. This sacrifice is still recognized by the people of these countries, although it has been conveniently forgotten by their politicians. “The peoples of Europe have not forgotten how Soviet soldiers gave their lives for liberation.
However, certain politicians have forgotten or are trying to forget this.”(Lushev 1991)
The Warsaw Pact has been a positive force in regional and world politics. ”During the post-War period, Soviet troops acted as a stabilizing factor for Europe’s security.
They maintained good neighborly relations which today have reached a qualitatively new level. In 1945 we came as liberators. We return to our homeland with a firm belief in
71 peace and good neighborly reiations.”(Burlakov 1991) The accomplishments of the
Warsaw Pact are such that it has enabled its own elimination. It is no longer needed due
to its own success. “This is no tragedy at all. The long-standing presence of Soviet
troops was not the best way of stabilizing the situation in Europe and all over the world.
When troops are stationed on foreign territory this is unreasonable. The fact that they are
now returning home is the right thing.” (Ovchinnikov 1991) In fact according to those
who propound this story, the continuing presence of the military has become a liability
rather than a protection. “There are over 7 million troops under arms in Europe now.
They are the very best troops, with best equipment, and weaponry. If arms are constantly
increased then there will come a time when they shoot by themselves.”(Tatamikov 1989)
“We did not intend to remain in Eastern Europe forever. Times change. The world
changes. But the army is not to blame for the fact that it is leaving. It has accomplished
its historic mission with honor. We do not have the feeling that we are leaving as the
vanquished.” (Lushev 1991) “The departure of our units, of our people from fraternal
Czechoslovakia does not mean the end of their friendship with members of the
Czechoslovak people’s Army and the civilian population. We deeply value this friendship.
The time will come when Soviet troops will leave the territory of Czechoslovakia completely. Now we support the new process which is the continuation of new political thinking in the framework of glasnost, democratization and humanization of socialism”
(Vorob'ev 1989a) ’Today we see the contradiction in the thought that one’s own borders must be defended on another’s territory.” (Afinogenev 1992)
72 Thus, the reduction of forces and their relocation back to within the borders of the
Soviet Union is a seen as a reasonable response to the new situation, the goals of the military and the relationships which have always existed in the region. The military withdrawal is merely a continuation of the previous policy, the concrete manifestation of
Soviet intentions and their adherence to the New Political Thinking of Gorbachev (which is not so new after all). “The socialist community countries have undertaken to reduce their armed forces because they consider it important and necessary to prove by deeds the sincerity of their intentions and their adherence to the new political thinking. The remaining forces and means are sufficient to guarantee the reliable defense of the USSR and the entire socialist community.” (Lobov 1989) The consequence of this policy will be the continuation of the trend towards peace and a lessening of tension. “Our peace initiative is the practical implementation of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy course of demilitarizing international relations and shaping a new means of ensuring universal security based upon the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense. These decisions can not but have a beneficial effect on world public opinion by increasing trust in the
Soviet Union’s policy and the rejection of the “enemy image.’’(Fursin 1989) “Our reductions will also create favorable conditions for talks on conventional arms reduction, eliminating the possibility of sudden attack and large-scale offensive operations.”
(Omichev 1989) The story ends with the pithy lesson, that the withdrawal of troops is an inevitable and positive sign that security policies have been right along, but that this does not mean the end of threats, or the need fw vigilance. No. matter.how great the. success is in strengthening peace, a military threat for the USSR remains. Naturally it has become
73 lessened, as compared to the early 1980s. That’s why the reduction of forces was possible. But imperialist sources of war and aggression remain, therefore there is a limit to unilateral reductions and there is a need for a European Security System. (Zhgelov
1991)
In Summary;
What is noteworthy about this story is that it really does not represent a new definition of the Soviet military’s external role after the loss of empire. In fact it seems to match the important common elements of the pre-withdrawal stories I described above. In
Figure 3.4 you can see that Soviet soldiers continue to see themselves as part of a group dedicated to the higher cause of world peace. Their ascribed goal has not changed. In fact, they seem to implicitly take responsibility and even credit for the events which have led to the need for troop withdrawals and a lessening of influence in the region.
Unchanged also is the relationship between their goal and the actions that have been taken.
Indeed, these military ofiBcers see the withdrawal as merely a result of their dedication to the higher cause of world peace. They feel that this dedication has led to new political thinking, a lowering of political tension in the world and ultimately the opportunity to withdraw a large portion of their troops stationed abroad. ’’Our peace initiative is the practical implementation of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy course of demilitarizing international relations and shaping a new means of ensuring universal security based upon the principle of reasonable sufiBciency for defense.”(Omichev 1989)
Those who espouse this version of the events see the preferred path, of action as creating favorable conditions for further peace steps, such as arms limitation talks
74 encouraging a reciprocal troop response from NATO. They see no contradiction between the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the still-important goals of ensuring Soviet security through the maintenance of defensive readiness and a high level of Soviet combat capability. “The Defense Ministry is ensuring that these cutbacks are carried out painlessly, ensuring job resettlement for ofBcers and maintaining defense readiness and combat capabilities of the Armed Forces.”(Lobov 1989) The lesson they draw from the withdrawal is that it is the beginning of new neighborly relations, not Just with host countries but with the world. In other words, the withdrawal of troops is a logical way to achieve their goal to bring about strategic parity and peace at a lower material cost and in an environment of reduced tension.
The final common element which this story shares with those of the previous period is that these military officers continue to perceive that they enjoy the support, fnendship and gratitude of the people of the Warsaw Pact states for their sacrifices.
However, there is also a hint of change in these relationships between the military and the people and the military and the state . These military officers have separated out some politicians who are “oddities.” Some political leaders in the Warsaw Pact countries do not seem to remember the “facts.” (They have forgotten the fact that the Soviet military sacrificed for their freedom and prosperity!) Thus the only change from the baseline in this story is a slight modification of the relationships military officers hold with others.
How can we characterize this group of military officers? What might explain their optimistic assessment of the causes and meatnng behind the-withdrawal? In order to answer this question, I examined the constraints of the particular environment within
75 which these officers operated and the personalities and potential motivations which
military officers espousing this optimistic story might have. Biographical data was
available for three of the officers espousing this story; General Vladimir Lobov, Army
General P.G. ^ushev and Colonel- General Matvey Burlakov. An analysis of their
backgrounds (see Appendix D) yields the following similarities.
All three men are commanders of Ground Forces (either infantry or armored
forces) and each served in a leadership post either as commander of the Soviet forces in a
Warsaw Pact country or as Main Commander of the Warsaw Pact forces. Another
striking similarity for the three men is that there is no mention of military service in
Afghanistan, a characteristic which can be used to set this group apart from other groups to be described later. Finally, each had an economic interest in withdrawal. General
Lobov was known to be a proponent of a progressive military doctrine, favoring parity only in nuclear forces in order to redirect money toward high technology weaponry and structural changes in the staffing of the military. (Krotov 1992; 66-69) General Lushev and Colonel General Burlakov both personally commercially benefitted from the withdrawal process. Burlakov was stationed first in Hungary during the withdrawal of the Southern Group of Forces and then in Germany during the withdrawal of the Western
Group of Forces. During this time he formed his own company called “Mir” to sell resources the military had to leave behind. General Lushev also had favorable business transactions as a result of the Soviet troop and equipment withdrawals. On April 29, 1991
Lushev was removed frt)m his post after his name-was-mentioned in a Parliamentary
Committee on the breach of laws. He was accused of “buying immovable assets at a
76 reduced price.”(Bronskaya 1994: 325) Army General Lushev only began to espouse this story relatively late. The press article coded for this story was dated February 28, 1991.
For those military oflScers at the Lieutenant, Major and Colonel level, for whom no biographical data was available, there may have been a different motivation. Open dissension with the regime by military oflScers was not yet acceptable. Military oflScers and military press sources were among the last to experience the openness or glasnost that had begun in other segments of Soviet society. (Goltz 1996) OflScers may have feared expressing dissatisfaction with the initial policy for fear of losing their jobs. This is not a far-fetched scenario at all since, in fact, the military was downsizing as a result of cuts in conventional forces. The downsizing policy was used as a way to eliminate undesirable officers. “Whoever wants to go can go. However, those who are not doing their service well will also be discharged.”(Kusnetsov 1989) Finally, military officers may have been genuinely optimistic about the withdrawal. A large military presence in the Eastern
European empire was consuming a lot of resources. While the withdrawal was expensive in the short-term, its long-term impact could have been very positive for those military officers who wanted to see a redirection of funds into the high-technology computerized weapons they needed to be able to compete against the United States and other Western militaries.
As this last data suggests there may have been positive incentives for expressing this story in the press. Lobov, for example, was promoted in the post-imperial period and held important military leadership posts. This poses somewhat of a chicken and egg problem. Did military officers go on to get positions of influence because they held this
77 view of the withdrawal? Or did they hold this view of the withdrawal for merely
instrumental reasons? While this is an important question, it is not detrimental to the findings reported here that such a story was told about the withdrawal, that the story shared important elements with the stories told before the Soviet withdrawal and that this story played ap influential role in the political environment of the Soviet Union.
3.3.2. Opposition to Withdrawal; A Hastv and Incompetently Created Policy
(Figure 3.5)
The second story I was able to isolate, is a marked departure from those stories that have been described until now. Military officers continue to view their appropriate mission as dedication to the higher goal of peace in Europe. However, those military officers who espouse this version of events argue that the choice to withdraw fi-om
Eastern Europe stands in contradiction to this goal and to the previous strategies they employed to achieve it. This view separates the military leadership from civilian political leaders because the military officers place the blame for this negative decision squarely on the shoulders of civilians. These military officers argued that Gorbachev did not recognize or realize the complexities and difficulties of a large and quick withdrawal fi-om Europe.
Some felt that maybe he did not even know how many troops were involved. That's how out of touch with daily military realities he was perceived to be. (Goltz 1996)
According to those officers who tell this story, the decision to withdraw troops fi-om Europe and the actual accords negotiated with each former Warsaw Pact country thus stood in contradiction to the stated goals of the military to support peace in Europe, to preserve the integrity and power of Soviet state, and to support their fellow officers’
78 needs (those who were being pulled back without any material or psychological support
from the state). This situation was even further exacerbated by the view of the
relationships which existed in the Warsaw Pact, in the international environment within
which it operated and within the Soviet state. “The support of peace in Europe by
Warsaw Pact is tied to its ability to deliver a decisive blow to aggression. This comes from historical experience. The international political actions of the countries of socialist brotherhood are based upon a firm foundation-military strategic parity that guarantees the
security of socialism. The only real path to protecting socialism is the support of a high level of battle readiness of the united forces of the Warsaw Pact and their readiness to repel any aggression.’’(Lushev 1989)
Unlike those who saw the withdrawal as positive proof of success in international politics, these military ofiBcers saw it as an abandonment of what had been a successful policy of security through strategic parity with the West and battle readiness. This situation was necessary to maintain because; “There is a truth of military capability and there is a truth of intentions which NATO is trying so hard to hide. They are not willing to give up the idea of the confrontation of 2 blocks in Europe. The withdrawal of Soviet troops is occurring at the same time as the transformation of the Warsaw Pact, the unification of Germany and the strengthening of NATO. This is creating destabilizing conditions within the region. The situation with NATO is similar to what it was before the creation of the Warsaw Pact. They have invited us to join them, but in fact they will not allow that to happen.’’(Committee 1990)
79 Finally, they saw the accords as proof that they had been ignored in the security policy-making process. “The accords on withdrawal were signed without the consent or consultation of the Minister of Defense.”(Lebed 1994) In its most radical form some argued that, “The NCnistry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassies caused the fall of the
Eastern European regimes by financing groups like Civic Forum and directing the Prague demonstrations. (Alksnis 1991)
For these officers, the effect of new political thinking as operationalized through the withdrawal, has been the demoralization of troops, the destabilization of the region and a reduction in state security through lowered battle readiness. ’The military withdrawal that then followed has been a hasty and not properly thought out policy.”
(Alksnis 1991) “The reduction of Armed forces and their withdrawal was carried out in conditions of lack of legal and social guarantees for servicemen and their families. These are the best equipped and most numerous divisions. All of those coming back are resettling in the European portion of the Soviet Union. This is leading to a low quality of life for everyone. The withdrawal is a military-political problem, but when they return home it becomes a social problem. (Editorial 1990)
Instead, these military officers advocate the creation of a new common European military union. (Note this is subtly different fi’om the European security arrangement sought by those in the previous story, it is a military union.) “It is dangerous to force this quickly. Instead gradual steps should be taken in this direction. Soviet military doctrine should be revisited due to the multifaceted new situation; the goaLof de&nse, the tasks of the military, likely enemies and allies in war, means to repel aggression,... We need to
80 make sure that we can ensure our own security within our own borders as well as the
security of Europe. (Danilevich 1990) Interestingly, perhaps because this story is told
somewhat later than the previous one (and even by officers looking back on the experience), there is no mention of whether the people o f Eastern Europe continue to value the Soviet military either for its past or its current role in the security of the region.
The goals of the military officers and their advocated actions to meet this goal remain unchanged. They are still committed to world peace and ensuring the security of the Eurasia. However, the relationships they describe have significantly changed. Officers no longer speak of a union between the state and the military as they did in the pre imperial period. Instead they consider that they were not consulted and can not be held accountable for the decisions made by civilian leaders. These civilian decisions are perceived to be in direct contradiction to their goal of peace and security. They are destabilizing to the region. They advocate instead the maintenance of strategic parity at a high level of military readiness. This stoiy leaves its teller with the overwhelming impression of civilian culpability and stupidity. This civilian stupidity has had direct negative effects on the everyday life of military officers as well as the broader military issues of combat capability and the ability to protect their state’s national security. The direct lesson of this story is that when the military is not consulted in its own field of expertise, the results are disastrous. However, this explanation also paves the way for a need to oppose civilian leadership if the military is to achieve their goals.
How can we characterize the group of military officers that tells this story?
Background information was only available on four of the military officers; the same
81 General Lushev discussed above, Colonel-General Danilevich, Lieutenant General
Aleksandr Lebed, and Colonel Viktor Alksnis. Colonel Danilevich probably matches the
background of the committee members drafting the plans for military reform and Soviet
military doctrine cited in the Voennaya Mysl article. He was a relatively liberal General
Staff ofBcer. General Lushev seems to be a special case. Perhaps he truly felt that the
withdrawal was ill-advised until he realized that he could gain economically from it. In
that case, perhaps he switched his story later to court the civilian leadership in the hopes
that they would protect him from impending scandal. I can only speculate.
What is clear is that both Colonel Alksnis and General Lebed have some
similarities, although they are dissimilar in many ways as well. Both men were trained in
Air Force academies, Lebed commanded an air battalion in Afghanistan and later an elite
paratroop division. Both men are considered nationalists. Lebed has become the
champion of ethnic Russians, while Alksnis’s main goal in 1991 was to preserve the
integrity of the Soviet Union. Both men have become domestic political figures. Alksnis
was elected as a People’s Deputy to the Supreme Soviet in 1989. Lebed has been a
candidate of the Congress of Russian Communities Party for People’s Deputy and
President. (Bronskaya 1994) Perhaps the motivation for telling this story was political or perhaps the fact that they held this version of events led them to enter political life as they themselves claim. (Lebed 1994) However, the similarities should not be overstated.
While Lebed is a nationalist, he is not a radical or reactionary like Alksnis. Lebed actively supported Yeltsin during the 199\ coup attempt and protected the-White House. Alksnis
82 became an advocate for restoring the Soviet Union through radical means and supported the August 1991 putsch.
3.3,3. Withdrawal as a Break from Belonging: (Figure 3.6)
The final story about the events surrounding the withdrawal from Eastern Europe is prompted not so much by the withdrawal itself as by the dynamics occurring within the former Warsaw Pact during the withdrawal. It represents a change in the story about the relationship between the Soviet military and the people and governments of the Warsaw
Pact. This story fills the gap in the previous story about the way in which military officers have redefined their relationship to the population of their former empire. I have called this story, “Brothers No More.” In this version of events, military authors continue to see themselves as dedicated to a higher ideal, now slightly modified as democracy and peace as well as the sovereignty, independence and the territorial integrity of themselves and their allies. But they see themselves as undervalued and spumed by the people. They are bitter about their unrecognized sacrifices. ‘Tn one of our regiments 2 days ago a large group of children gathered at the entrance to the base to ask our Soviet soldiers to go home.” (Vorob'ev 1989b) “For as long as ilicy felt the pressure they smiled and as soon as they tasted freedom, they stopped said hello. Instead they should coolly determine what their interests are. We are leaving. We understand that this is dictated by the new situation and newly perceived interests, but we think the withdrawal of troops should reinforce the mutual sympathy of our peoples. Our renewal merits understanding and tolerance on the part of or neighbors, not suspicion.” (Markushin 1991)
83 Furthermore, they see Eastern European countries as seeking to isolate the Soviet
Union and to get the most materially out of them as illustrated in this address given by the representative of the Soviet command in Poland. “The Polish government is now trying to renegotiate the withdrawal protocol for Soviet troops. In this new protocol they are treating Soviet soldiers as occupiers, as international criminals and are proposing to send them out of their country like prisoners of war in sealed and locked Polish customs railroad cars, without their own weapons or military technology. They are ignominiously sending away the troops which unselfishly gave their lives for Polish liberation fi"om fascist occupation. If Poland will not agree to the terms of the agreement we have made on the withdrawal, then we will return to the territory of the Soviet Union superpower according to our plans and our routes. If this occurs we can only take responsibility for the life and health of Soviet citizens and can not take responsibility for what occurs to Poles. We must avoid what has happened to those who have already been withdrawn. (Lyubnina
1991)
While the East European states are no longer brothers, they are neighbors with a history of cornmercial, scientific and cultural as well as military ties. Neighbors do not have to love each other and do not share the same familial bond, but they do have to cooperate. “The epoch of unanimity and cohesion has past. Not all European members see the pact as beneficial. However, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are tied; commercially, scientifically, culturally, agriculturally, and in the military and technical sphere. The consequence of the rupture of these eould-be fetal/Fu»o«s^’(Lyutov 1990)
Weakening the activities of the Warsaw Treaty has already created a vacuum in the
84 security system. Joint constructive eflForts by the USSR and its neighbors are all the more necessary. These could be bilateral, trilateral or multilateral agreements. Some seek to isolate the Soviet Union from the process. This is absolutely impermissible. There is no miraculous force of nature that is going to abolish our being neighbors. In view of this, we need to stop posturing and get down to work. (Markushin 1991)
Thus, the story begins with military oflBcers asserting that they continue to retain an important global mission. They are dedicated not just to the external defense of the
Warsaw Pact countries but also to furthering democracy and peace. However, the relationships they held in the pre-imperial period have now clearly been altered. They are no longer appreciated but instead are spumed by the people. Not only are the leaders of these Eastern European states ungrateful to the Soviet Union and the Red Army for their past sacrifices, they are trying to extract as much resources as possible from their former brothers and liberators. Finally, they are no longer brothers, instead they are neighbors seeking merely to live next to each and negotiate areas of common concern. As neighbors, the Soviet Union and its former empire must seek to cooperate when it is in their mutual interest. By the end of the story, changes in the relationship between the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and between the Soviet military and the Eastern
European people have led officers to advocate a new goal for the Soviet military. The lesson of this story is that withdrawal must be negotiated on their own terms so that they can meet Soviet needs first (battle readiness and military morale at home). They have learned that they need to look out for themselves and that, sacrifice for higher goals is not appreciated by others. ‘Tor us, the task of ensuring the country’s defense will have to be
85 shouldered entirely by our own armed forces. The front line of defense was always the
territory of Eastern Europe. With the liquidation of the Warsaw Pact this buffer has
dissolved.”(Afinogenev 1992)
With the loss of their higher goal, the Soviet military does indeed have a new story
and a new role in the world that reflects the fact that they are no longer an imperial power
and do not have to act or appear as their benefactor. What is noteworthy about the character of this group of officers is that they are predominantly middle-level officers, at the colonel rank (a variable which will become more important later in the analysis.) As 1 will argue in Chapters Five and Seven, these men may have more motivation to redefine their relationship to their neighbors and to the state’s leadership than their more senior colleagues since they can logically expect their careers to extend for longer.
When a military experiences the loss o f its state's empire, officers will formulate a new story that justifies the change in its status. This new story will motivate new patterns o f civil-military relations in the post-imperial era. I have described three groups of officers and three stories which they used to understand the experience of the withdrawal from Eastern Europe. The stories do include new story elements. In all three stories there is a trend toward; the loss of a higher ideal and the realization that they need to look out more for their own interests. As I will discuss below, these trends are echoed in the stories which military officers hold about their role within the Soviet State as it faces its own disintegration.
86 3.4 UNDERSTANDING THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION
In the Spring of 1990, Russia faced the first major challenge to its internal empire, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, when the Baltic republics announced their intention to secede and become independent states. This was most poignantly characterized by the Estonian Republic, the second Soviet republic to announce its secessionist intentions (Lithuania was the first). On March, 30 1990 the Estonian
Supreme Soviet passed a resolution that stated that Estonia did not recognize Soviet authority on its territory and that it considered itself a fully-occupied country. On May 4,
1990 Latvia was the last of these republics to declare its independence. These declarations by the newly-elected Presidents of these republics profoundly affected the lives of servicemen and officers stationed in these areas, including the Baltic Fleet, and the
Strategic Rocket Forces. Republics began to develop legislation demanding that their draftees be allowed to serve only on their home territory.
The process of “republicazation” escalated even further when these three Baltic republics plus Armenia and Moldova ended their participation in the All-Union Draft and set up their own militaries. During this time, Gorbachev was working to develop a Union
Treaty which would be mutually acceptable. In its original version presented to the USSR
Supreme Soviet and Congress of People’s Deputies and approved in mid- December this treaty denied the republics any role in defense and foreign policy. Tension was increased with the Baltic states who refused to accept anything short of fiiU sovereignty. On January
13, 1991 "independent/volunteer” paratroopers and tank units attacked a radio and television center in Vilnius, Lithuania. Fourteen people were killed and 160 were
87 wounded in the fighting. Despite their rejection of responsibility for the attack, many saw
this action as evidence o f the increased influence of the Ministry of Defense in internal
politics.
In an attempt to counter this wave of secession and troop creation, on March 17,
1991 there was a referendum on the Union Treaty. The day before the poll. Defense
Minister Dmitriy Yazov published an appeal in Krasnaya Zvezda urging servicemen to
vote “yes” on the Union. He argued, “Our motherland’s fi-eedom and independence are
inseparably linked with the unity of its peoples... A yes vote for the Union means that the
armed forces would be preserved.”(Yazov 199 la) More than 70% of Soviet citizens
voted to keep the Union as a ‘Tederation of Sovereign and Equal States”, but Armenia,
Georgia, Moldava and the Baltic states boycotted the referendum. Through the spring
and summer of 1991 Gorbachev continued to battle to save the structure of the Soviet
Union in some altered form. In addition to the Union treaty, he proposed the “Nine Plus
One” Accords which would give the republics a greater voice in how they reformed their
economies. On July 24, 1991 Gorbachev announced that the accords would be signed
August 20, 1991. On August 19, 1991 he was thwarted by a putsch aimed at preserving the integrity of the union. This attempt was unsuccessfiil, and had the effect of actually
accelerating the dissolution of the Soviet Union. On December 17, 1991 Yeltsin and
Gorbachev agreed that the Soviet Union would cease to exist on January 1, 1992. Efforts to create a joint military and strategic force for the newly created Commonwealth of
Independent States on December 30, 1991 were futile. By the Spring of 1992, Russia
88 was the last republic to announce its own Ministry of Defense and the creation of Russian military forces. By June 1992 the C.I.S. Joint Forces Military Command was dissolved.
This section will examine how Russian military ofiBcers viewed this sequence of events and the impact that they had on the role and relationship of the Armed Forces to the newly defined state. How do Russian military oflBcers view themselves and their role during this tumultuous time? How do the stories that they create compare to either the baseline stories they held of their external role or to the stories they created to understand the withdrawal fi'om Eastern Europe? Do we find the same splits in the ofiBcer corps between those that support the new policies and those that oppose them? This section differs fi’om the preceding one insofar as the stories described are told at different times in the process, thus the groups of oflBcers are not as distinct. Instead, I will argue in this section that military officers’ stories seem to converge around an amalgam of elements of the three stories created to understand their earlier withdrawal. Their stories include some of the elements described in the baseline external role stories, but unlike the stories for
Eastern Europe, all three stories of the dissolution of the Soviet state contain important elements in common, elements which will have an important impact on the nature of the relationship between the state and the military in the post-imperial period.
3.4.1. Confronting the Rise of Separatist Sentiment in the Soviet Union. 1991
(Figure 3.7)
This first story is an attempt to understand and describe the events surrounding the secession of the Baltic states. Since this is relatively early in the chronology of internal imperial collapse, this story does not yet recognize its inevitability. In this story the stated
89 goal of military officers is, above all, to defend the values and constitution of USSR. “The
servicemen swears an oath to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and he is obliged to
protect the Cpnstitution of the USSR. In accordance with Article 31, the USSR Armed
Forces are obliged to defend the country’s integrity. If someone infringes on our integrity, the Army is obliged to defend the Homeland from these separatist activities.”
(Akhromeyev 1991b) In concrete terms this means that their goal was to seek to preserve the union, and to maintain order and the security of Soviet citizens while preventing bloodshed . As in both the baseline and the European stories, the military still has a higher goal to which they are devoting themselves, although it is unclear at this point whether the values of the USSR are socialism or democracy.
In addition, the military still sees itself as tied to the people, or at least the majority of the people. The army is the tool of the people and of the state ‘The army has been and always will be with the people; it only serves the peoples’ interests.” (Grebenyuk 1991)
“Since August the will of the people as expressed in the All-Union referendum has been
Ignored- that the Union should continue. The army is capable of helping the politicians.
The army itself does not want and will not force the people to do anything they do not want to do.” (Kozhendayev 1991) “We are sons of all of the former Soviet Republics. We want all of the republics to live on in a union. It is not important what this union is called.
The most important thing is that we live together, that we preserve the unity of the armed forces. Only unification can save us from the imminent danger of destroying the century- old ties which have linked the history o f our peoples on one-sixth of the earth.” Eastern
90 European countries are our neighbors but Soviet republics are family.” The military is the glue that holds this family together. (Burlakov 1991)
While the majority of the people are perceived to be behind the preservation of the
sanctity of the Soviet family by the military, there are some extremists who are not. These extremists do not deserve the protection of the army, but rather pose a danger to the ordinary citizen and need to be stopped. ’There are two categories of citizens: those who followed Landsbergis and came out of the Supreme Soviet building with arms in their possession and those who opposed the government without arms. Those who acted against the government without arms were of course in need of protection.”(Klokotov
1991) In addition to treading upon the security of citizens, these extremists are engaging in anti-military acts. “We are referred to as occupiers and looked upon as second class citizens. They have violated our constitutional rights and belittled our dignity. Yeltsin considers the organizers and inspirers of acts of violence against us to be democrats while those who are being deprived of their basic human rights and humiliated are considered to be reactionary forces. Instead the reactionary forces are the national-separatist and resurgent neo-fascist forces.” (Editorial 1991b)
Paralleling the division of people into a healthy majority and a minority of extremists, military officers espousing this story make a sharp division between legitimate union political structures and their leaders and an illegitimate secessionist republic leadership. A few examples of this trend include; T t is the Congress of People’s Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet and the President of the USSR that determine what methods the military will employ.’’(Akhromeyev 1991b) ‘Today it seems that the power
91 organs of some union republics are competing among themselves in the ignoble business of bringing the armed forces down.”(Shlyaga 1991) “Republic leaders are seeking
“insensible goals” of their own army. Instead, guaranteeing the country’s defense capability is the task of the central leadership. Those calling for national armies are abusing the nationalist feelings of people. They are populists.” (Grebenyuk 1991) “In the country there is chaos and lawlessness, corruption and banditry. The economy has been destroyed. Nationalist forces are hastily setting up their own guards and tomorrow they will be going into battle. The final restraining force- the armed forces- is falling apart”. (Kozhendayev 1991)
The separatist-nationalists are portrayed as aggressive and crafty. A single-minded and coordinated operation to create bourgeois style dictatorship has been conducted under cover of slogans of democracy. “They have declared that Lithuania is in a state of war with the Soviet Union and calls have been made to purge Lithuanian territory of agents and occupiers from other states. These are planned actions aimed at provoking clashes.”
(Editorial 1991b) Rights are being disregarded. This has occurred through the adoption of a series of hasty, anti-constitutional legislative acts and measures which have actually resulted in the mass violation of the political rights and freedoms of citizens and especially in the inhumane treatment of soldiers and their families. “On March 11, 1990 the
Lithuanian Council of Ministers announced that the Constitution of the USSR is not in force on their territory. But Soviet troops are on the territory and they are guided by the
Constitution. So it is the leadership of Lithuania that is engendering, confrontation. They are afraid of the normal constitutional processes for a republic to secede.” (Shlyaga 1991)
92 Finally, these republics have weakened not only the constitution but the military itself by
creating "antiyconstitutional armed formations in Lithuania even after they have been banned by USSR legislation and presidential decree. They have been formed for the purpose of moral and physical terror.”(Lobov 1991)
In the context of these goals and perceived relationships between the players, the military ofiBcers advocate restraint and discipline and call for defensive measures to counter-act the destructive forces of the aggressive minority. Only our restraint, discipline, and organization has made it possible to avoid many causalities. ”We appeal to the
President and the Peoples’ Deputies that all laws and resolutions contravening the constitution be annulled and that the implementation of the constitution and laws of the
USSR be safeguarded in practice as well. The development of society without force is only possible under the condition of compliance with the constitution and other laws and with normal parliamentary activities. Parliamentary methods are being replaced by the crowd. One step remains until the use of force.” (Moiseyev 1990)
However, they also warn of dire consequences if their hope in the Union political leadership is misplaced. “We demand an end to the whipping up of anti-Army propaganda and the malicious attempts to split the Armed Forces. We are counting on concrete action to normalize the situation in Lithuania and the other Baltic republics and we are prepared to actively promote this. If the proper measures are not taken we will be forced to defend ourselves and our families, our honor and our dignity. This could have unpredictable consequences.’’(Editwial 1991hy The story ends with a lesson and a challenge to those who oppose the maintenance of the Soviet Union. “When the political struggle goes
93 beyond the framework of the constitution, the Army and Navy will stand in defense of the constitution.’’(Akhromeyev 1991a)
In Summary: fs This a New Story?
This story signals another step in the evolution of the elements of the baseline story begun during the withdrawal from Eastern Europe. This story posits that the military is dedicated to a higher goal than mere state survival, its goal is the defense of the values of the Soviet state as well as its laws, embodied in the Constitution. However, this goal is no longer global in scope. These military ofiBcers are echoing the conclusions of ofiBcer in the previous story (Figure 3.6). The scope of the military’s mission has been narrowed.
Defending the Soviet state and its laws is a smaller and more self-centered goal.
Secondly, while the military continues to see itself inextricably tied to the people as their shield and tool, it must acknowledge the existence of a minority of politicians and extremists in the population who seek to harm this unity. Only by creating a dichotomy in both society and the political leadership, can the military avoid a feeling of separation or alienation from either.
Finally, the portrayal of the minority and the need for vigilance and action in this story parallels the portrayal of the imperialist West as an enemy in earlier stories. The enemy is crafty and aggressive, dictatorship under cover of democracy, declaring war on
USSR. Both the West and these extremists pose not just a physical but also an ideological challenge to the state. Nevertheless, just as in the baseline story, military ofiBcers remain optimistic that their side will prevail and they appeal to the Union leadership to undertake measures to fight the enemy. However, they also back this appeal up with threats of
94 internal domestic political action if the situation is not remedied. This appeal, although a seeming parallel to the baseline story, later has important behavioral implications.
How can we characterize this group of oflScers? They seem to fall into two groups. The first of these groups includes; Varennikov, Chemavin, Shlyaga, and Yazov.
For these senior members of the group, there is no common service affiliation. They include both Army, Navy and Political Administration members. What is distinctive is their age. All of these men were bora in the 1920s and most served in World War II.
Finally, these men all participated in varying degrees in the August 1991 putsch attempt on the side of the Committee for National Salvation. The process of dividing society and the political leadership into groups and marginalizing the opposition became more than an academic exercise for these men. As I will discuss in the next chapter, it encouraged a shift in their bphavior and their view of the civil-military relationship.
The second group of officers telling this story, has a very different background.
This subgroup includes officers who were supportive of the withdrawal from Eastern
Europe such as Burlakov and Lobov as well as the Chief of the General Staff Kozhendaev.
This group would include reform-oriented professional soldiers whose most recent experience with withdrawal was positive. Withdrawal served to strengthen the military and the Sovief state and furthered a lofty goal. Now they are faced with the possibility of having to withdraw again. Since this story takes place before the withdrawal is a fa it accompli, comparing this story with the European stories is a bit difficult, however, there is a sense of bitterness and betrayal in this story that is similar to that portrayed in Figure
3.6. Military officers see their professional dedication as undervalued, and they perceive
95 others trying to hurt them through anti-army propaganda and acts. (Klokotov 1991;
Lobov 1991; Yazov 1991b) What is ironic is that by seeking to stop this “extremist minority” from breaking up the country officers engaged in a coup , a coup which galvanized the people on the side of the minority nationalist and separatist groups and allowed them to win.
Although an initial analysis yields many similarities between this story and the
1980-1988 baseline story, further reflection reveals that in fact all of the elements of the story have been altered in order to continue to support the old status quo. The military’s goal has been narrowed in scope, the relationships which military officers hold with at least part of society and the republican leadership has changed. Finally, the actions that these military officers are advocating as a consequence have changed as well. For the first time, they are advocating independent domestic political action if their needs are not met.
It is a new story in its structure told by the old guard and embittered reformers.
3.4.2. The Dissolution of the Soviet Union (Figure 3.8)
The second story about the process of the dissolution of the Soviet Union emerges later in the process as individual republics announce the creation of their own militaries.
These militaries are a rival structure to the C.I.S. Unified Command proposed as the successor of the Soviet Armed Forces. Faced with the possibility of not only a collapse of the Soviet state but a division of the Soviet military, officers no longer hold out a lofty goal for their organization. They are no longer dedicated to anything higher than ensuring the defense and security of the people and they are unsure what this mission means or who the enemy to their security is. Our goal is “to ensure that our people are reliably defended
96 and safeguarded.” (Lobov 1991) “When we speak of the indivisible army of the C.I.S. we can understand its functions. If we divide the army; against whom are we defending ourselves, whom are we attacking?”(Rutskoi 1992b)
The military voices that tell this story express a profound disappointment with current civilian political leadership. They no longer are able to divide the leaders into good and bad guys. Instead, all politicians are seen as capable only of destruction. ‘The government has come into its own when there has been something to destroy, but they have done nothing at all when it is question of creating something.” (Terekhov 1992)
“Through the will of the politicians, all subjects of the Commonwealth have been drawn into the militarization process.”(Miranovich 1992) Even the tie to the people seems to have been lessened since it is the people’s awakened nationalism that is partially driving the disintegration process. “Republics seek their own states to soothe the awakened national consciousness of their people who are seeking independence and see the military as a symbol of state power.” (Editorial 1991a)
Finally, military ofiBcers express concern not just for themselves but for the larger issues of state control and prestige as well as state security. They argue that the military is a test case of the power of the Russian state either independently or within the C.I.S., to retain control over its institutions. “The state was ruined. We regard it as a mighty state, although with defects and shortcomings. It was ruined very successfully in an instant. If the army is ruined with the same success, practically in an instant, with an avalanche afifect, then everything else will be ruined just as successfully. (Terekhov 1992) In addition to issues of prestige they express real and pragmatic concerns about Russian and regional
97 safety should the Soviet Armed Forces fracture into multiple ethnically-loyal armies. ‘The more individual armed forces the more danger of confrontation between them. The USSR is a nuclear power. The more nuclear republics, the greater chance of unsanctioned nuclear use.” (Lobov 1991) ‘Torming national detachments will not only increase the danger of inter-ethnic conflicts, it will increase the material and financial resources needed to support our security. As never before we need social stability in all regions and constant attention to the reliability of our defense.” (Shlyaga 1991) These safety concerns are exacerbated by institutional concerns that just as in the withdrawal from Eastern
Europe, in this second internal withdrawal Russian military ofiBcers were forced to leave behind the best equipment, that which was stationed closer to the likely combat zone. “We left the best technology in Belorus and Ukraine.”(Podkolzin 1994) As a result, the most capable units the latest hardware and strategic supply depots fell to the others. “What took place was an irreversible process of pilfering. Could we look on calmly without reacting to what was happening? Could we remain silent and indifferent while witnessing the final collapse and demoralization of the Army?” (Rutskoi 1992c)
Given this system of goals and relationships, the military officers are forced to reluctantly advocate and accept the legal creation of a Russian military, while still seeking to compromise with the new Republican military and political leadership and to integrate troops into the Commonwealth collective defense structure. Their faith in the possibility of still somehow saving the union is based upon a history of friendship between the republics and especially between military ofiBcers now serving iftthe other armies. “We advocate a united multinational armed forces for the entire Soviet Union!” (Editorial
98 1991b) “Allow the republics sovereignty on civic defense but the armed forces can only be united. The army must be united and indivisible!” (Rutskoi 1992a) “Basic agreements are needed between republics on the inviolability of borders, and refraining from launching a first strike.”(Afinogenev 1992) “A compromise may be possible. The military’s sense of internationalism and the fiiendships forged while serving may help to temper the threat of national armies also.(Editorial 1991a) ‘Tf we have been able to reach an agreement with the United States on a reduction of conventional arms, if we have been able to reach an agreement on the withdrawal of our troops from the F.R.G., it seems to me that it is all the more the case that we can reach an agreement with these republics with which we are linked by long-standing bonds of fiiendship.”(Shaposhnikov 1991)
The lesson of this story seems to be that the Russian state must reverse the situation both within the military and the region before it is too late. In order to do this, new leadership is needed, including a strong government that will reverse the slide in
Russia’s fortunes and in the condition of the military. “The problem is that we do not have a strong government leadership. We need a strong government along with all possible means to guarantee the unity of the people and to strengthen our status as a super-power. The preservation of Russia’s historic individuality is the main task for all
Russians.”(Pozdnyakov 1992) The state is seen as clearly not meeting its side of the civil- military relations bargain. Concern about the fleet and the armed services as a whole is the inherent characteristic of a state leader. “Soldiers and sailors are bound by an oath to give selfless service, the state must repay with concern.’’(Rutskoi 1992c)
99 In summary:
The story which these military ofiBcers tell of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Soviet military, like the one before it, is a hybrid of both new elements and portions of the baseline and Eastern European stories. This story continues the trend in the post-imperial period of a gradual narrowing of the military’s goal. In this story, the military has abandoned any reference to a political mission to support global or national values. The military’s only role is to ensure the defense and security of the Russian people.
Just as in the stories told by those who opposed the withdrawal from Eastern Europe, these military ofiBcers see the actions taken, the loss of military bases and equipment as well as a unified military structure as being in contradiction with their limited goal of ensuring the security of the Russian people. Withdrawal both increases the possibility of conflict within the former Soviet space and results in less military readiness through less equipment and resources at their disposal. Also like military oflBcers who opposed the withdrawal from Eastern Europe, these military ofiBcers place the blame for this disaster squarely on the shoulders of incompetent politicians who have now twice betrayed their trust. “As a result o f political intrigues and manipulations, yesterday’s defenders of a unified Motherland, without moving, have swiftly found themselves outside the borders of their own state.”(Terekhov 1992) I do not agree that what is happening is either natural or inevitable.’’(Kotenkov 1992).
Finally, while there is some ambivalence expressed for the first time about the people, in the end of the story they are still the source of hope. Since the republics are linked by bonds of fnendship, the separatist movement is unnatural. This continued faith in
100 the people and the power of their friendship for one another can be traced back to the baseline story which military officers held of the positive feelings of friendship which existed in the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union and the inextricable link of the military to the people. Howçver, the actions military officers advocate as a result of this story are closer to the post-imperial stories than they are to the baseline that came before it. These military officers call for a common C.I.S. collective defense and a strong government based upon new political leadership. They call for new civilian leaders capable of reversing the negative trends that threaten to lead to a loss of superpower status and have brought the region to the brink of inter-Republic conflict.
How can we characterize this group of military officers? Unlike other authors of earlier stories, this group is hard to characterize. There are no defining rank, or service characteristics. The political orientation of Shaposhnikov, Rutskoi and Terekhov spans from moderate to radical nationalist. This seems to be a characteristic cross-section of the military as a whole.
3.4.3. “That Which Took a Day to Destroy Takes Years to Rebuild; 1992-1994"
(Figure 3.9)
The last story which I found Russian military officers telling about the internal decolonization process begins with the realization that a C.I.S. military integration is not forthcoming and that the Russian military will have to stand on its own. “Due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of troops from Eastern European countries, the strategic reserves will consist of only our troops without any aid from other former members of the Union and they will exist only on our soil.”(Bel'kov 1993) What
101 then will be the goal of the independent Russian military? In this story, the Russian Armed
Forces are given a new higher goal to dedicate themselves to: the sovereignty and integrity
of Russia and its neighbors, and the freedom and independence of Russians both inside
Russia and in the Near Abroad, or the former internal colonies. This mission is all the more necessary since Russia now faces security threats both internally and externally in the
“Near Abroad” (F.S.U.). (Bel'kov 1993; Grachev 1992; Lebed 1994; Rutskoi 1993)
Particularly troubling is the instability of Russia’s southern borders.(Klokotov 1993) “I believe that the source o f real danger is not located at the end of the world. It is posed by the conflicts inside the country.” (Stolyarov 1992) “The borders of the former USSR have turned into a potentially dangerous zone. The disintegration of the Soviet Union means a dangerous rise in the conflictive situations within the C.I.S. that are near the borders of
Russia. This is even more dangerous since many of these areas have massive military capability, a pppulation o f lower political culture and the absence of democratic traditions.
The danger is of a spill-over of a civil war into Russia.” (Klimenko 1992)
In its characterization of other relationships, however, this story is remarkably similar to those told before it. Although it is now clear that norms and expectations of friendliness and internationalism, as articulated in the baseline story have been attacked, they have not completely destroyed the possibility for compromise and cooperation.
Despite their best efforts the republics are inter-dependent. “There has been a militarization of inter-ethnic/national relations and a growth of aggressiveness. We have destroyed ‘the indestructible bonds of friendship’ and the ‘international unity of society’ has appeared powerless before the onslaught of nationalism. The ‘new historical society of
10 2 people’ has stopped existing. (Grachev 1992) “The governments that were members of the former USSR are seeking political independence, but they have not become nor can they become independent one from another. The military-political processes that are developing in each, in some measure or other, touch on us all.” (Rutskoi 1993) “The desire to leave Russia is due in part to the leadership’s inability to formulate new rules for compatible coexistence on the one hand in wanting to consider itself of one mind, not understanding that Russia is its own C.I.S., not understanding that the hegemony of the center and the local separatism can only lead to an explosion in which both will be defeated. The silent majority in the center does not want either side to prevail. We need to find a cotmpon language. The healthy and large center is waiting for a consolidation of not just democratic forces, but also forces with new ideas.” (Shaposhnikov 1994) Again, this story includes a condemnation of extremist political leadership on both sides o f the political spectrum, postulation of a silent majority, presumably aligned with the military, and a call for new leadership and new ideas.
The inter-dependence of the Republics and the possibility of new leadership which could articulate a new plan for coexistence, leads Russian military officers to believe that there is still hope for a new collective security arrangement. However, unlike in the past when the story emphasized a tension between equality and Soviet/Russian superiority,
Russian military officers are now clear; Russia will be the preeminent player. “Russia will be the center of any new arrangement.”(Turchenko 1992) Thus as a result of the goals and relationships as they are told in fins story; Russia must play a leadership role in the
Near Abroad. Responding to a poll at the All-Officer’s Assembly in 1993 only 27% of
103 ofiBcers excluded the legality of an internal role for the military in the C.I.S. (Near
Abroad). 67% were convinced of this function despite the consensus that the use of the army in areas of inter-ethnic tension by the leadership of the Soviet Union led to a negative relationship with society. (Rodachin 1993) Russia must now play a peacekeeping role in the region since she is the only power capable of keeping the peace. “Russia’s highest interests are to preserve the C.I.S. and to transform it into a regional subsystem of the UN, functioning under its principles. We also need to strengthen the ability of our mobile troops. We need to be able to meet any historical challenge.” (Rutskoi 1993)
“Russia historically was the guarantor of the reconciliation of other peoples and always came to their Jielp in difiScult times. In all the conflicts she behaved as a relative and never as a stranger. Russia is now dedicating her basic strength to regulating crisis situations on her borders since stability and peace on her territory is of utmost importance for Russia and her citizens, 25 million of which live in the Near Abroad. She was and remains the only force capable of carrying out this task.” (Kondratiev 1994)
The lesson of this story is that there is still hope for the redefinition and recreation of a new interpal collective arrangement and perhaps even the rebirth of a privileged relationship with members of the Warsaw Pact. The rebuilding process will not be easy.
“The fall of the Soviet Union and the creation of independent governments brought massive problems to the Armed Forces. Just as we solve one, ten more arise in their place. That which takes a day to destroy takes years to rebuild.”(Ivanyuk 1993) But with new leadership, new ideas and the support of the healthy aid large political center it is possible. “We must not lose hope in the possibility of military cooperation and the
104 implementation of the idea of collective security.’’(Miranovich 1992) ‘It is also important to restore the pes between the former Soviet Union and the members of the former
Warsaw Pact.” (Sinaisldi 1992)
In Summary:
Once again this story is a mix of old and new. As they face the realization that the internal decolonization process is a reality, these Russian military officers recognize that there is a need to look out, above all, for Russians, particularly Russians living outside
Russia. This represents a new goal for the military that extends beyond its borders but is not global in scope. The post-imperial military has found a regional goal. They will support the freedom and independence of Russians living in the Near Abroad while protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of state borders.
This new regional goal is coupled with a redefinition of the relationships between the military, the Russian state, the Russian people and the neighboring republics. While the republics are “Brothers no More” their fates are even more closely tied together than they were with their Eastern European neighbors. For this reason, even as they recognize their separation, they have already begun to recreate the possibility of new collective structures.
However, unlike the baseline stories about the old collective structures, these Russian military officers are much clearer that there will be no question that Russia is now the clear predominant player. Finally, in a continuation of a growing trend, this story repeats its condemnation of the current political leadership and their inability to understand the security requirements of the situation. This incompetent leadership fails to recognize that compromise is now needed while continuing to defend Russian core interests. Instead the
105 military has chosen to ally itself with the healthy and large political center that favors compromise.
How can we characterize this group o f military oflBcers? Background information was available for the following officers; General Pavel Grachev, Lieutenant-General
Aleksandr Lebed, General Aleksandr Rutskoi, and Marshall Yevgenii Shaposhnikov. An analysis of the background of all of these men reveals that they are members of what
Russians call the Afghan cohort. Unlike the senior officers inFigure 3.7, their defining war experience is the Afghanistan war. Many of them served as commanders in multiple tours of duty in this war. They represent the next generation of military leadership and the generation that has taken positions of power within the Yeltsin administration. Finally, the overwhelming majority of them are Air Force officers, representing perhaps not just a generational, but also a functional shift in the distribution of influence.
3.5. CHALLENGES TO THE INTEGRITY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:
CHECHNYA
In the final chapter of the process of imperial disintegration, as the Russian
Federation was adjusting to its new relationship to the other republics in the loose
Commonwealth of Independent States and recoiling from a power struggle between the executive and legislative branches of its government, a new threat emerged to the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. Previously ‘autonomous’ republics within the Federation had already begun to declare their independence fi'om Moscow. The most important challenge to Moscow’s dominion was launched by Dudaev, a former General in the Soviet Armed Forces. During the time that Estonia declared independence Dudaev
106 was stationed there and refused the Presidential order to block the Estonian Secessionist
Parliament. In 1990 he was elected President of Chechnya-Ingushetia. He declared the independence of Chechnya in 1991. It was not until 1992-1993 that opponents began to direct attacks on his leadership. (Bronskaya 1994) By 1994, the attempts to resolve the
Chechen claims within a Confederation had reached a stalemate. On November 29, 1994 the Security Council considered the question “On the réintroduction o f Constitutional
Legality, order and peace in the Chechen Republic” The President published his views on
Chechnya on that same date. On November 30, 1994, in connection with the continuation of fighting and the lack of response to a cease-fire demand in conjunction with Article 88 of the constitqtion. Presidential Decree #213 7c was published “On the Methods to
Reintroduce Constitutional Legality and Order in the Chechen Republic” This decree established a leadership group which sought to liquidate the military formations, and any support of Dudaev’s regime and to establish a state of emergency on the territory of the
Chechen Republic. On this group sat Grachev (its head) Egorov, Erin, Kruglov, Kulikov,
Nikolaev, Panichev, Pastukov, Starovoitov, Stepashin, Shirshov, and Yushinkov. This group was given full powers in accordance with a Ministry of Defense Decree. (Grachev
1995)
I am not attempting in this section to present all views of the Chechen War. In the interest of some historical distance, I have ended the analysis with 1995 when the Russian state declared an interim victory over the separatist Chechen fighters. This last section is merely meant to be the beginning of an inquiry into whether the stories which military officers have used to describe the threats to Russian integrity and the appropriate counter
107 measures seem to continue the trends which I have found in the previous two sections on
post-imperial stories.
In examining the stories which military officers used to describe the events in
Chechnya, I found a fundamental divide between stories which supported negotiations (of which I will describe two variants) and a story supporting military action in Chechnya as the only logical solution. For those military officers who supported negotiation, there were two fundamentally different reasons, coming from different posited relationships between the military and the state, and two different views of the possibility for the preservation of the Federation. In other words, there were two different stories leading them to favor negotiation.
3.5.1. Pro-Union. But Not Military Action to Prop it Up (Figure 3.10)
The first negotiation story begins with the realization that the territorial integrity of the Russian state is under attack, much in the same way that the Soviet Union’s existence was challenged only two years earlier. There is “a wave o f‘republicazation’ rolling through our oblasts. There may soon be no Russian state.” (Goltz 1993) This wave parallels the ‘parade of sovereignty’ which occurred in 1991 when “the masses seized upon the idea of the struggle with the imperial center.” (Editorial 1993) However, despite the dangers to the Russian state, civilians should not be tempted to excessively rely on military force. “We should recall Napoleon’s comment on the discomfort of sitting on top of bayonets. Instead our patriotic history has many examples of rulers who came to power with the blood of their enemies on their hands. How their fates ended is known to all. Military support has been a beneficial basis the rebirth of dictators capable of giving
108 those commands quietly not only to their subordinates but also to their citizens.”
(Shaposhnikov 1995; 280-283) Thus, this story argues that negotiation is necessary because civilians can not rely on the open support of the military if they want to be perceived as legitimate. The military’s goal is to maintain order, prevent bloodshed and preserve the Federation, but not if the end-result is a bloody dictatorship supported by military force.
There are two relationships which this story posits that lead it to the hopeful conclusion thqt a successful negotiated settlement is possible. Like any of the post imperial stories described in this chapter, proponents of this story argue that there are actually two categories of people and politicians. The problems are being created by a small group of greedy politicians and businessmen, the only possible beneficiaries of local independence. ‘Tirms have become independent of the center. They are looking for the best rate of taxation. Moscow businessmen understand this and are supporting regional separatism... Qblast leaders will receive a Presidential cross or ministerial portfolios instead of oblast spots in the Supreme Soviet, and, most importantly, the possibility to manage land and industry. All the simpler people, the citizens, will receive in return is a coat of arms, a flag, a hymn and a constitution, and in the long term the lowering of their standard of living, new borders and new conflicts.”(Goltz 1993) No one tells them the difiBculties they will face in the financial-economic, political and military spheres. And no one says that having begun this process, as in the case of the fall of the Soviet Union, it could assume an irreversible character. Who does this benefit? The-population of the region? They have quickly found out that their rich national heritage does not allow them
109 to live richly as an independent state. The people who benefit from this sovereignization
and republicazation are the local governing elite, those who were formerly representatives
to the local Soviet and now have an opportunity to be President. What if this process lead
to an even further splitting of the armed forces? We have doubts about whether we will
be able to survive the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but it is clear that we would not be
able to survive the dissolution of Russia.” (Editorial 1993)
The healthy majority even in the secessionist areas seeks to avoid the dissolution of
the Russian Federation. This is because they understand the degree to which their fates
and lives are linked with those of other subjects in the Federation. ‘Tt is well known how
economically tied Russia’s oblasts are with each other. But so is the infrastructure.”(Goltz
1993) “Economically, socially and in everyday ways the Russian Federation is more
closely integrated than the former republics of the Soviet Union were.’’(Shaposhnikov
1995: 280-283) “Is it really true that the ambitions of a small group of people in the
different principalities of the Russian Federation are stronger than the joint will and work
of the healthy majority to avoid such a fate?”( Shaposhnikov 1995: 280-283)
The only possible consequence of allowing the wave of republicazation to go
unchecked is the disintegration of a Great Power.(Goltz 1993) Russia stands at the brink
of collapse. The fate of Russia can only be like the fate of the former Soviet Union. “Can we find one sovereign government, one people who have it better as a result of
sovereignty? The destruction of economic and cultural ties, the construction of currency and customs barriers, the ripping apart of a single powerful army, and the serious- weakening of military readiness, that’s what we have to show for sovereignty. Problems,
110 problems and more problems.” (Editorial 1993) “Russia would not survive the creation of its own C.I.S. That kind of a disintegration would turn Russia into nothing. We would have to start all over, if we had not lost our tenacity. That kind of a fiiture would only be wished by sick people.” (Shaposhnikov 1995: 280-283)
Since that fate would only be wished by sick people, and certainly not then by the healthy majority, this story ends with a call to action, a call not to their fellow military oflhcers but to the political leadership. “The time to reverse our last steps exists but as always it is shprt.” (Goltz 1993) Instead of those placing an emphasis on the forceful resolution of problems, sending the military into the ‘hot spots,’ politicians should be seeking to abandon their extremist positions of either hegemony and chauvinism or separatism and nationalism. The people of Russia must find political leaders who can achieve a compromise. “We need to develop maximal agreement on a mutually acceptable basis for law and a legal basis for resolving all of the key problems of our existence., a balance between commonalities and exceptions. In this way we can achieve unity and fi-eedom.” (Shaposhnikov 1995: 280-283)
In Summary:
The first story told about Chechnya is told by professional military officers who consider themselves part of the silent majority of non-politically active people. Thus, this is a direct application of the final story used to understand the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in a new situation, the potential dissolution of the Russian Federation.
However, this story to understand the disintegrative forces withnrthe Russian Federation also has much in common with its predecessors. Like the story used to explain the early
III stages of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the military’s goal is the preservation of the Federation or the territorial integrity of the Union, and the defense of the constitution of Russia. Note however, that the Constitution of the Russian Federation in 1993 is a very different constitution from the Soviet Union’s constitution in 1991. This may explain why defense of the constitution and its values required military force in 1991 against the
Baltic states, but now requires compromise and negotiation in keeping with the transition the country is making towards democracy. This could be construed as signs of support within a segment of the military for the new democratic values of the Russian society and state.
Another shared characteristic of this story with those told of the withdrawal from
Eastern Europe and the Dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Army is the continued attempt to divide the population and the political and economic elites into categories which emphasize the marginality of the nationalist-separatist position relative to the will of the masses. In creating these relationship categories, there is the suggestion that some political leaders are corrupt and undemocratic, seeking only their own gain and greater power even at the expense of the wishes of the majority of the population, and yet there is still hope in this story that new leadership can be found that will end this pattern.
Finally, there is the suggestion that this final battle has even greater stakes than the previous two stages of imperial collapse. Recalling elements of the baseline story as well as Figures 3.4 and 3.5, this story makes the argument that there is both a psychological interdependence of fiiendship and shared history as well as a, more pra^atic economic and structural interdependence of the subjects of the Russian Federation that is even
112 stronger than the Soviet Union had with members of the Warsaw Pact, or the republics of the Soviet Union shared. As a consequence, Russia can not afford to lose this struggle to the minority. The only way to avoid the possibility of loss is to find political leaders committed to seeking mutually-acceptable legal mechanisms to preserve Russia’s integrity.
3.5.2. Pro-Negotiation. Pro-Army (Figure 3 .11)
The second story in favor of negotiation has a very different view of the proper relationship between the military and the Russian state. This story has a much simpler structure than some of the others, because it has very few characters. This is a story only about the state and its military as both face the prospect of further disintegration. The story begins with the declaration of Chechen independence from the Russian Federation and the creation of independent Chechen military units. Facing these developments, the military’s goal is to preserve the integrity and the power of the Russian Federation. Thus the story concurs with others on the appropriate goal for the military. However, like the story described above, the military officers telling this story believe that the appropriate way to achieve this goal is not through war with Chechnya.
This rejection of war as a means to attain their goals is based upon two fundamental relationships. First, these military officers are convinced that a war in
Chechnya is unwinnable. This conviction is based upon their historical experiences in both
Afghanistan and in ethnic conflicts within the Soviet Union. (Gromov 1995) “There can be no wirmer, just like in Armenia^and Azerbaidjan.” (Lebed 1994) Dissent even reached the
Russian ffigh Command. Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Georgii Kondratev
113 and Colonel General Valerii Mironov joined fellow Generals Gromov and Lebed in
publically criticizing the use of force in Chechnya. (Thomas 1995: 263) Opposition was also based upon a realistic assessment of their reduced fighting capabilities. Eleven generals of the military council of the Ground Forces including the commander. Colonel
General Vladimir Semenov appealed to the State Duma that Russian forces were not prepared for such an operation. (Thomas 1995:262)
Finally, there was the recognition that since the war was unwinnable, it is detrimental to the strength and prestige of the Russian military. This has implications not just for the fate of the military but also ultimately for the fate of the Russian state itself.
“The preservation of the army is the basis for the preservation of the integrity of the government. Politicians need the support of the army behind them.” (Lebed 1994) Both
Lebed and Gromov are political figures as well as officers.
Since the army is the glue holding the Russian Federation together, keeping the army strong is more important than militarily intervening in Chechnya. Thus, this story ends by calling for an immediate withdrawal of troops and the commencement of talks to resolve the conflict. “We must and we can talk with them. We have lost all sense there.”(Lebed 1994) General Boris Gromov, the main military expert in the Russian
Foreign Ministry, has called for the immediate withdrawal of troops from Chechnya. In justifying his solution he drew parallels between the Afghan and Chechen wars, expressing regret that the Russian authorities have not learned anything from their predecessors failures in Afghanistan. The main lesson of Afghanistan was “that one should never unleash a war against a whole people, especially inside one’s own country.” (Gromov
114 1995) This story continues the trend of cynicism and criticism of civilians’ grasp on military realities.
In light of recent events, including the attempts by Lebed to negotiate a settlement to the Chechen conflict, the current importance of this story has increased. It provides the antecedents and explanation for Lebed’s conviction that the war in Chechnya must be stopped, not by an all-out attempt to eliminate the enemy but by a negotiated settlement.
In its depiction of the political leadership, however, it also shows why Lebed has been getting such a lukewarm reception for these efforts from Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin and the commanders of the internal military forces also stationed in Chechnya.
3.5.3, Pro-Military. Pro-War (Figure 3.12)
The final story of the first stage of the Chechen conflict is told by those military ofiBcers who hold leadership positions within the Yeltsin administration and the military command stationed on the ground. Not surprisingly, these military officers tell a very different story, one that supports the military and the military action that has been undertaken as the only possible way to meet military and state goals. The story begins with the same stimulus or initiating action, the declaration of Chechen independence and the creation of illegal independent military formations within the Chechen autonomous republic. Given this provocation, it is the military’s goal to stabilize the situation in
Chechnya, to disarm the illegal military formations, and to re-establish legality and order in accordance with the laws of the Russian federation. (Grachev 1995)
The officers and enlisted men on the ground in Chechnya are described as having high morale and confidence in the fact that the use of military force is the right thing to do.
115 (Kvashin 1995) “Many soldiers have asked to serve past their draft terms, to not be
transferred to the reserves, but to remain in their subdivisions until the end of the conflict.
This of course speaks to the high morale of our soldiers and ofiBcers.” (Podkolzin 1995)
However, they are not getting the full material or psychological support they need. “The
soldiers and ofiBcers who are participating in military action in Chechnya possess the
characteristics of our great nation. The debt of everyone who is not on the frontlines is to
support the army, the soldiers, which, no matter what, are solving their tasks and are thinking of the great and indivisible Russia. (Kvashin 1995) “50% of the commanders of
Army pilots in Chechnya were pilots in the Afghanistan War. They are all first class experienced pilots. But the resources accorded to Army pilots and air operations are low and decreasing. Furthermore, now that the conflict has moved into the city, air power is harder to use since visibility is low.(Pavlov 1995)
The military ofiBcers who tell this story, though a very different segment of the military than those described in the first story above, also engage in a division of the people into two categories: the majority who do not support Dudaev and his separatist guerilla fighter, and the fanatics, embittered people, veteran criminals and mercenaries who do. “This is our territory and it is our people. Not all of them are bandits. The majority do not support Dudaev and separatism. Those who fight with Dudaev are a diverse group. There are fanatics, there are embittered people, and there are veteran criminals (some Afghans who know our pilots).’’(Pavlov 1995) In addition, these radicals are getting funds and weapons from outside governments. “Those-that æ-e fighting against us are from the old military school. Mercenaries from other governments with battle
116 experience. Our main enemy is their technology and arms. Many of them have links to
Japanese weaponry that is more effective than that of the Russian soldiers.” (Podkolzin
1995) Finally, continuing the theme of corrupt and selfish business participation in separatist struggles, this story argues that; “There are some Russians who have allied themselves with Dudaev seeing a chance to get rich off the war. The Chechen mafia gets most of its money fi'om Moscow banks.”(Grachev 1995) Peaceful negotiation is impossible with these people since; “The illegal military formations which Dudaev created were not in order to be able to peacefully settle the fate of the Chechen Republic. They were created for military confrontation. This is a truth that even now is not understood by many politicians.” (Kvashin 1995) In addition, Dudaev’s minority forces have had a destabilizing influence on the geopolitical situation in the entire Caucasus region. “Under the slogan of military nationalism and separatism Dudaev is accumulating strength among the population of the contiguous regions with Chechnya, the North Caucasus, in his military confi’ontation with Federal forces. Within Chechnya he continues to head military groups, using psychological means of battle with the goal of provoking a negative reaction among Chechens of the actions of the Russian leadership.” (Grachev 1995)
Despite the fact that their side is right and should be supported by the majority, society has not provided the military with the psychological support it needs. In an echo of what will be described in the next chapter on internal roles in domestic Russian politics, these military ofBcers blame the press for intentionally misreporting their activities and creating negative feelings in society toward mflitary, disrupting the link they have with the people. “The press has been intentionally misreporting our activities in Chechnya. In
117 the best instance they are incompetent on military questions, having never served, in the worst they are malicious. Right now it seems beneficial to someone to push the Air Force aside fi'om solving tasks of establishing a constitutional order and destroying illegal military formations in Chechnya. That’s why they have organized these attacks in the mass media calling the Air Force criminals. They create negative feelings in society toward the military and its aviators.” (Pavlov 1995) ’’Contrary to reports in the media, the Air
Force has not bombed hospitals, markets or nursery schools. We have never had such a mission and Air Force officers would never initiate such as action independently.”
(Deynekin 1995) “We never planned a blitzkrieg as has been written in some sources.”(Grachev 1995) “The press is portraying only one side and it has double standards. Wfiy doesn’t the journalist probe into the reasons for the emergence of
Dudaev’s regime or the mechanisms for solving the conflict? Combat, battles and war are all the last acts of a political drama. The military can not hide their actions fi'om the public like the politicians can.”(Rodionov 1995) This last quote has the sting of underhanded criticism of political leaders, perhaps the most criticism that can be voiced by a sitting military commander, beholden to the political leadership and the Minister of Defense for his position.
Given the nature of the Dudaev regime and his supporters, the goals of the Russian military, and the conviction that despite bad press the majority of society does support their efforts, these military officers argue that decisive military action, such as that which has already been undertaken, is necessary.(Grachev 1995) No limitations should be made on the conduct of the war. “We can not stop at half-way, or limit ourselves to half
118 measures.” (Podkolzin 1995). An all-out offensive will be aided by the fact that the
majority of those residing in the Chechen republic do not support Dudaev. “I think that the
conflict will end when the people, the farmers and laborers, kill the bandits themselves.
Life takes care of itself.” (Pavlov 1995)
This story ends with a very different historical analogy than did the previous one.
The Chechen War can be compared to the Great Patriotic War : ‘Tifty years ago in
defeating Fascism we saved Europe, today in breaking the back of Chechen fascism we
have practically saved the integrity of the Russia government. Chechnya shows that
Russia has both an experienced and competent officer corps.” (Shevtsov 1995) Thus the
chapter ends with an explicit reference to the baseline story of the Russian military with which it began, but how similar is this story to the original?
Summary:
In what ways is this story similar to the baseline story of the Soviet military’s external role and relationship with the state and its empire? The story begins with a portrayal of military officers as courageously fighting an uphill battle, persuaded of the rightness of their cause, displaying high morale, and military skill. A second parallel in this story to the earlier WWII baseline, is in the portrayal of the enemy. Dudaev and his troops are equated to the fascists. They are cunning and aggressive. “More than once we have had threats fi'om Chechnya that they will use nuclear weapons in acts of nuclear terrorism. They have developed plans for air strikes of the important government and military objects in the Russiarr Federation. Dudaev and hrs side did everything they could to lead the negotiation process to a dead end.” (Grachev 1995) Their cunning can be seen
119 in their attempts to lure the military into launching strikes on civilian locations. (Pavlov
1995) This all sounds distinctively parallel to the Baseline story of World War H.
However, the parallel ends there. In this story, the relationships between the military, the state and the people have fundamentally changed in the post-imperial period. The military does not have the same support from society or from the state as it had in the 1980-1988 period. In fact, the military is under-funded, and its link with the people is being disrupted by a negative portrayal in the media.
There are just as many echoes in this story of the new post-imperial stories described in the later sections of this chapter. The most striking parallel is in the continued attempt to divide or categorize elements of society and political leadership in order to maintain the comfortable position of being in the healthy majority facing a minority of extremists. In this way, they are continuing to marginalize the support of separatists and maintain a link with the people. Finally, although these are the voices closest to the people in power, there is tempered criticism of civilians particularly those who are not giving material support to the military and who are attempting to limit its activities to “half-measures.”
3.6 CONCLUSIONS TO THE CHAPTER: A POST-IMPERIAL TREND IN
MILITARY STORIES?
This chapter has presented an analysis of how the stories which military officers tell of their goals, their relationships with key players and the actions which they should undertake have changed as a result of the successive loss of their external empire in
Eastern Europe, their internal empire in the Soviet Union and a final challenge to the
120 integrity of the Russian Federation itself (another internal empire?). The goal of this chapter was to test the hypothesis laid out in Chapter One: When a military experiences the loss o f its state’s empire, military officers willformulate a new story that justifies the change in its status. This new story will motivate new behavioral patterns o f civil- military relations in the post-imperial era What can we conclude about the presence of such a post-imperial effect on the stories ofiBcers held?
I would argue that the overall trend in the data presented supports the existence of such an effect. First, a comparison of the elements of the stories in each of the three post imperial stages reveals significant changes from the baseline in every component of the story structure; goals, relationships with the former imperial state leadership and people, relationships with the Russian people and the Russian state, and finally the actions which they advocate. While there are clear divisions in the stories which different groups of military ofBcers held across time, there are also common threads which run through the post-imperial period. The elements which I posit constitute the new post-imperial story are; the loss of a higher ideal and the need to look out for one’s own state and one’s own institution, an increasing loss of trust and a growing cynicism about the existing political leadership, a call for new ideas and new leaders, and a continuing faith in the majority of the population. To what extent does this trend pose a threat to the civil-military relationship? If military ofBcers hold this view of the actors in their environment and this distribution of blame, what is the impact on the degree and nature of political participation which Russian military ofBcers advocate within the Russian state and society? In other
121 words what do military officers think is their internal role, if any, within the post-imperial state? These are the questions to be explored in the next chapter.
122 Initiating Event: Creation and Maintenance of the Soviet State’s Security in the World. 1 Relationship Between Actors: Goal(s): 1)Soviet military as bulwark of 1)Defense o f the Soviet State and peace and people’s progress, tied Socialist Achievements to the people. 2) to ensure world peace 2) Soviet military as 3) to aid other socialist militaries internationalists, part of unbroken unity of socialist brotherhood 3) Against imperialists who are always looking to undermine, socialist power using nationalistic prejudices
Actions: 1) Our armed forces have only drawn swords against those who attack the motherland 2) The West has announced that certain areas of the world are vitally important to them. These regions are getting closer to the Soviet Union 1 Action advocated/Lesson: We must be always on our guard. We must maintain high battle readiness The stronger we are the less likely will be aggressive imperialist adventures and the more secure will be the Soviet state (lesson o f past sacrifice)
Figure 3.1: Baseline Story of the Soviet Military’s External Role
123 [nitiatinu Event; Surprise Attack by Fascist Germany/ Brown Plague 1 I Relationship Between Actors: Goal(s): I ) The enemy had superior force t )Defcnse of the Soviet State and 2) There was an ideological and Socialist Accomplishments, against Fascist political unity and friendship of Germany who was seeking to enslave people the Communist Party, the Soviet in a brown plague people and the Red Army I I Actions: L) Unceasingly fought the enemy 2) officers displayed mass heroism; selflessness, and high military skill
Consequence: 1)changed the course of events 2) saved both the USSR and the entire world civilization 3) showed superiority of Soviet military science 4) created favorable conditions for socialist revolutions in Europe and Asia. 5) strengthened the position of peace-loving forces 6) capitalism entered a new stage of crisis I Lesson: Those who plan war against the Soviet Union will fail.
Figure 3.2 Story of The Great Patriotic War
124 Initiating Event: Creation and Maintenance of Warsaw Pact I
Relationship Between Actors: Goal(s): 1) Sacrifice o f Soviets in WWU; 1) Increase military cooperation to preserve soldiers died in liberation, fought the sovereignty, independence and territorial with resistance units Soviet Union integrity o f Soviet Union and member states trained, and then S.U. helped 2) support progress democracy and peace rebuild economies after the War 2)There is an indestructible friendship o f the members begun with common bloodshed and based upon a unity o f views, and solidarity 3) Soviet forces form the backbone of the pact’s strength, but the pact is based upon sovereignty, voluntary unity, and beneficial cooperation
Actions: 1) Source of all constructive initiatives on behalf of peace; prevented nuclear war, facilitated detente, Helsinki Accords 2) achieved strategic parity with the West. 3) provides an example of international relations free from national egoism
Consequence/Lesson: Human history does not include any other military friendship whose influence has been so important for the fate of humanity and whose goal has been so beneficent.
Figure 3.3: Story o f Warsaw Pact
125 Initiating Event; New Political Thinking has lowered political tension in the world
Relationship of Actors: Goal(s): 1) Too many troops and weapons in Strengthen World Peace, Avoid military Europe confrontation, and guarantee state security by 2) Soviet troops are stationed abroad being able to repel any aggression temporarily and conditional upon the agreement o f the Warsaw Pact countries 3)The army has accomplished its historic mission with honor, and acted Actions: as a stabilizing force in Europe, but 1)a major reduction of armed forces by 500,000, now stability can be achieved in a better way. cut down to levels sufficient for defense alone 2) we have proved by deeds the sincerity o f our 4)The people of Europe have not intentions, we have implemented our new political forgotten the Soviet’s sacrifice for thinking. their liberation, although it seems 3) The Defense Ministry is using the cuts to remove some politicians have those who are not performing well. They are ensuring 5) The departure of the units does not job resettlement for officers mean the end o f a fiiendship highly 4) We have retained defensive readiness and combat capabilities valued on both sides
Consequence: 1. Increased trust in the Soviet Union, rejection of enemy image 2. NATO will have to reply to our reductions 3) created favorable conditions for arms limitation talks and eliminated the possibility o f sudden large-scale offensives
Action Advocated/Lesson: Today good neighborly relations have reached a new and higher level. The withdrawal of our troops is an inevitable and positive sign that our policies have been right.
Figure 3.4; Withdrawal as a Symbol o f our progressiveness and foreign policy success
126 Initiating Event: Accords on withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe
Goal(s): Support of peace in Europe Relationship with Actors: preservation o f the integrity and power 1)The West is trying to hide it, of the Soviet state but they are not willing to give up Support of fellow officers’ needs the idea of the confrontation of 2 blocks in Europe T 2)The best equipped and largest divisions are stationed in Europe. Actions: I) withdrawal was hasty and not carefully planned; The security of the Warsaw Pact countries is tied to their ability to emphasis was put on the rapid deployment of the first and second echelons, without preparing the deliver a decisive military response to aggression. This infrastructure or developing a new plan for battle requires strategic parity and battle readiness readiness. 3) These accords are the fault and 1 product of the Ministry of Consequence: Foreign Affiurs alone. There was 1.Demoralization o f troops, lack of material no consultation of the Minister of and social guarantees. Defense 2.Destabilization o f the region 3) lowering of battle readiness in particular units and military as a whole.
Action Advocated/Lesson: 1 .must maintain parity with West . 2. need to take gradual steps toward a European union 3. need to ensure our own security by increasing battle readiness and morale
When the military is not consulted in its own held of expertise, the results are disastrous
Figure 3.5 Opposition to Withdrawal from Eastern Europe:
127 Initiating Event: Increasing hostility o f Eastern European governments and people
Relationship Between Actors: Goal(s): 1) Warsaw Pact was always a 1) Increase military cooperation to preserve voluntary alliance. If there is no the sovereignty, independence and territorial more voluntary desire for it, it integrity o f Soviet Union and member states should cease. 2) support progress democracy and peace 2) Soviet fulfilled their international duty for over 45 years, guarded and defended Eastern Europe without Actions: compensation except for a buffer 1) Dissolution of the Warsaw Pact zone, first line o f defense 2) Eastern European governments are trying to 3)The Soviet Union and E.E. are isolate the Soviet Union inextricably tied commercially, 3) Eastern European governments are seeking to scientifically, agriculturally and in renegotiate the withdrawal agreements in order to the military and technical sphere. get compensation for their “losses” It seems as if our brothers only smiled at us when they were coerced, now tfiat they are fi’ee Consequence: they smile no m ore 1.vacuum in the security system. NATO will have to be eliminated too 2. the task of ensuring Soviet defense is now shouldered entirely by Soviet military, with no buffer.
Actions Advocated: 1)joint constructive agreements between countries that will remain neighbors. Our renewal merits tolerance and understanding, not suspicion 2)withdrawal on our terms and with our own timetable, in order to ensure battle readiness and morale at home
Figure 3.6: Brothers No More
128 Initiating Event: Rise of Separatist Sentiment and Baltic Attempts at Secession
Relationship Between Actors: Goal(s): 1)division o f politicians and govt 1.Maintain Order, Prevent Bloodshed, Defend into legitimate union and Values and Constitution of USSR, preserve illegitimate republic. Military Union, defend interests of citizens and ensure subordinate to Soviet executive their reliable defense and security and legislative powers and the 2. Separatists seek to discredit military and set healthy part of society. Republic them in opposition to elements o f the seek to bring armed forces down. government and the people. 2) Division of people into two categories: those who are armed extremists, supporters of Actions: secession and those unarmed 1. Separatists adopted hasty anti-constitutional legislative acts citizens who stand against them. to create dictatorship under cover of democracy. The army protects those who are 2. Republics created anti-constitutional military attachments, unarmed. The majority of the declaring war on USSR, and seeking to remove “occupiers” population is for Union. 3. Soviet paratroopers and tank units attacked the radio and 3)The extremists refer to military television station in Vilnius killing 14 and wounding 160. as occupiers, and treat officers as 4. Yeltsin appealed to servicemen not to carry out their second class citizens, have no constitutional duty and not to follow their commanders’ respect for constitution, may orders. invite in outside governments im Actions Advocated: 1) restraint and discipline to avoid casualties 2) appeal to President and Supreme Soviet to implement Constitution and laws of USSR 3) demand an end to anti-army propaganda and attempts to split armed forces 4) If proper measures are not taken we will be forced to defend ourselves, our families, our honor and our dignity.
Lesson: When the Political Struggle Goes Beyond the Framework o f the Constitution, the Army and Navy will stand in defense o f the Constitution.
Figure 3.7: Defending the Constitution, Dividing the State & People
129 Initiating Event; The Dissolution of the Soviet Union, Coexistence of CIS and Republic Annies
Relationship Between Actors: Goal(s): 1)politicians capable o f To ensure the reliable defense and security of destruction only, have drawn all the people. If we divide the army, against people into the process of whom are we attacking and who are we militarization. The local defending? governing elite are the true beneficiaries o f this “parade of sovereignty”. Actions Taken: 2) The military is a test case. If 1) Creation of Republic armies, including aimouncement of military is ruined as thoroughly Russian military (reluctantly) and quickly as the Soviet state, so 2) We were forced to leave the best equipment behind. will everything else. 3) republics seek own military as a symbol of statehood in order to Consequence: Defense Capability has Been soothe awakened nationalist Undermined, inter-ethnic conflict is more feelings in population. likely, greater material expenditures are 4) the more armed forces, the needed to support all separate militaries, many more danger of confiict between officers find themselves outside their own them, especially dangerous for state, thousands o f human destinies have been nuclear republics crippled. 5) republics are linked by bonds fiiendship
Actions Advocated: 1) compromise is possible. Temper the danger of republic armies with previous fiiendships between officers and sense of internationalism 2) supremacy of CIS legislation defense, more integration of troops into CIS structures 3) need for strong government to maintain status as superpower 4) state should show concern for military needs
Figure 3.8: The Dissolution of the Soviet Union
130 Initiating Event: Realization that CIS military integration is not forthcoming, Russia stands alone I Relationship Between Actors: Goal(s): 1) The only strategic reserves 1) Guarantee the Freedom and Independence Russia has are its own on its own ofR ussians soil 2) Preserve the Sovereignty and Integrity of 2) Russia should be the center of Russia and its neighbors any new security of arrangement 3) presence o f internal and external dangers to a weakened Russian Federation 4) International bonds of Actions Taken: friendship” and “international The leadership’s inability to formulate new rules for unity” have been powerless compatible coexistence reflect a lack of understanding that against onslaught o f nationalism, both hegemony and separatism lead to an explosion. but w e are still inexorably linked. 5) There is a healthy and large political center that seeks I compromise and diversity. Actions advocated: Russians bear no hostility to 1 Defend Russians in Near Abroad if under locals, but can’t return home threat 2) Continue to Work for Military'Cooperation • and Collective Security (restore old ties) 3) Play an Internal Role within Near Abroad 4) Object to Withdrawal in the Near Abroad, need to stay as peacekeepers
Lesson: That which took a Day to Destroy Takes Years to Rebuild We need new leadership and new Ideas to Carry this Out
Figure 3.9: That Which Took a Day to Destroy Takes Years to Rebuild, 1992-1994
131 Initiating Event: Rise o f Separatist Sentiment, Wave of “Republicazation” within the Russian State
Relationship Between Actors: Goal(s): 1)The more civilized and stable a 1.Maintain Order, Prevent Bloodshed, Defend society, the less the leaders need Values and Constitution of Russia, preserve the support of force. Military "Federation. support is not the best form of legitimacy. Instead, it has been the basis of dictatorship.. Actions: 2) Division of people into two 1. Separatists are looking for greater rights than they had categories: the healthy majority before under the Soviet Union. As soon as they call that seek to avoid the dissolution themselves governments, they acquire the attributes of a of the Russian Federation and a government small group of greedy politicians 2. Separatists are playing a dangerous game. Who says and businessmen. their borders will be less contested? 3)Economically socially and in 3. We are taking steps to turn Russia into a Confederation. everyday ways, the Russian Federation is even more closely integrated than the former republics of the Soviet Union Action Advocated: were. We need politicians who are capable of solving problems through peaceful means. We need to develop a legal basis that is acceptable to all for resolving these problems.
Consequence: 1) This sovereignization will end in the disintegration of a Great Power. Russia would not survive the creation of its own C.I.S. 2) Oblast leaders will benefit, but the simpler people will get symbols of statehood but in the long term a lower standard o f living, new borders and new conflicts
Lesson: The time to reverse our last steps exists, but, as always, it is short.
Figure 3.10; Pro-Union but not Military Action
132 Initiating Event: Declaration of Chechen Independence, Creation of Chechen Military Units I Relationship Between Actors: 1)There can be no winner in a war with Chechnya. It is just like Goal(s): in Armenia and Azerbaidjan. Preservation of the Integrity and the Power of 2) Politicians need the support of the Russian Federation. the army behind them. The preservation of the army is the basis o f the preservation o f the integrity of the government.
Actions Advocated: 1. We must and we can talk with them. 2. We need an immediate withdrawal o f Russian troops.
Lesson: Russian Authorities have not learned the lesson of Afganistan. One should never unleash a war against a whole people, especially inside one’s own country.
Figure 3.11 Chechnya; Pro-Negotiation and Pro-Army
133 Initiating Event: Declaration of Chechen Independence, Creation o f Illegal Military Formations
Goal(s): Relationship Between Actors: To stabilize the situation in Chechnya, to 1)The Russian soldiers and disarm the illegal military formations, to officers in Chechnya embody the establish legality and order in accordance with characteristics o f a great nation. the laws o f the Russian Federation Their morale is high. But they are not receiving full support from the state, their resources are Actions Taken: limited. 1. Dudaev has turned the Chechen republic into a criminal 2) Division of people into two zone, has threatened security of Russian Federation and has categories: the majority who do done everything to thwart negotiations. Dudaev’s military is not support Dudaev and the destabilizing the geopolitical situation in the Caucasus as a fanatics, embittered people, whole. veteran criminals and mercenaries 2. Use o f military force by Russia begun in December 1994, who do. These people are helped was right thing to do. Military set up a four-stage plan to by outside governments. stabilize the situation. 3)The media is intentionally 3.Despite reports, we have not dropped a single bomb in the misreporting military activities in cities or launched a blitzkrieg. Checimya. They are portraying only one side. This portrayal is creating negative feelings in Actions Advocated: society tow ard the military. 1. A process of peace talks should be accompanied by severe demands, we should not limit ourselves to half-measures. 2. The conflict will end when the people kill the bandits themselves.
Lesson: Fifty years ago in defeating Fascism, we saved Europe, today in breaking the back of Chechen Fascism we practically saved the integrity of the Russian government. Chechnya shows that Russia has both an experienced and a competent officer corps.
Figure 3.12 Chechnya: Pro-military, Pre-war
134 CHAPTER 4:
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS - REDEFINING THE MILITARY’S ROLE WITHIN THE RUSSIAN POST-IMPERIAL STATE
4.1 CHAPTER OVERVIEW:
In the previous chapter, I examined a growing consensus among middle to high- level military oflBcers that they no longer had a higher purpose to legitimate their activities.
In the place of a dedication to the ideals of world peace and global progress was a need for military officers to look out for their own state’s security and for the fate of their own institution. As they withdrew, Soviet and then Russian oflBcers narrowed their sphere of responsibility from the global to the state and even to the organizational level. This retrenchment was coupled with a growing cynicism about the existing political leadership.
In the stories which military oflBcers told in the previous chapter there were signs of mistrust of the current civilian leadership and a sense that civilians should not be allowed to decide military affairs. This mistrust in the current leadership was coupled with a call for new ideas and new leaders, but also a continuing faith in the majority of the population and in their ability to remedy the situation by selecting new political representatives. This is the beginning of evidence for what I would term a new “post-imperial” story. In this
135 chapter I will examine the challenges which this new story poses to the nature of civil- military relations.
What did Soviet/Russian military oflBcers think they should do (if anything) about the radical ch^ges which they witnessed and described in the previous chapter? In
Chapter One I presented the theoretical foundations upon which this chapter is based.
This dissertation builds upon the argument that all states with professionalized militaries have to negotiate an arrangement with the military in which each side agrees to a particular division of responsibilities and rewards. This contractual relationship is a part of objective civilian control, even though militaries can be expected to engage in some political behavior. The contract is posited to have core elements which transcend the particular state and military. All militaries under objective civilian control agree to ensure the state's external defense and territorial integrity and promise to refrain from direct political participation. In return, the state agrees to provide the military with domestic political stability, legitimate leadership, and material support for its professional activities.
(Colton 1978:63) Military oflBcers will become more active in domestic politics if and when they feel that their corporate identity is threatened or that their institutional needs are no longer met. (Perlmutter 1980:13; Zisk 1993) Civilian control will be present when the military as an institution accepts the government’s definition of the appropriate division of labor. Governments will have greater success in defining these terms if civilian institutions are seen as strong and legitimate.(Aguerro forthcoming: 195; Craig 1955;
Welch 1976:2,323)
136 By extending the insights of civil-military relations to non- coup political behavior,
I arrived at the second hypothesis on post-imperial militaries. Hypothesis Two: When there are contested definitions o f the appropriate distribution ofpolicy responsibility between the state and the military and when military officers see state institutions as weak, they will advocate an increase in their level o f domestic political participation. In order to test this hypothesis, I will explore the evolution of the way in which military officers define their role within the state fi-om the imperial to the post-imperial period.
Does the loss of their imperial mission and the sense of civilian incompetence and state instability that military officers described as its legacy result in new military definitions of the nature of the civil-military contract in the post-imperial period? Has their perception of the existing and the preferred relationship between society, the military, and the state changed?
In starting to trace the effect of changes in the state and society on the perceptions of the civil-military relationship, I sought a baseline story which could be used to mark the direction and degree of change that occurred in military officers’ descriptions of their role within society (what I am terming their “internal role ”) Thus, first I will demonstrate that a consensus existed on the nature of the civil-military relationship from 1980-1988. Not coincidentally, this baseline consensus began to break down at the same time as the consensus on the external role, in 1989. The rest of the chapter will be devoted to an examination of how officers’ stories of their internal role changed as three pivotal events unfolded within the Soviet/Rusaan state; the maturation of glasnost within Soviet society, the August 1991 coup attempt, and the October 1993 showdown between the President
137 and Parliament. At each of these stages in the emergence of the post-imperial state, the
military was challenged to reexamine its role within society and within the regime.
4.2. ESTABLISHING A BASELINE: CTVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE
SOVIET STATE (Figure 4.1)
In the military press from 1980-1988 there is only one clear story of the
relationship between the military, society and the party. This unity of message is not a
coincidence. The press during this period was monitored by an oflBce in the Ministry of
Defense (Glavpol) and by special political oflBcers of the Main Political Administration.
(Goltz 1996) The only authors to write about the relationship between the military, the
party and the state were political oflBcers writing oflBcially sanctioned propaganda in order
to mold both the attitudes and the behavior of military men and civilians alike. Therefore, just as in the baseline measurement for their external role, arriving at a common baseline
story of the military’s internal role within the Soviet state was not diflBcult. There was
only one oflBcial story. This story was repeated so frequently that it became almost a
mantra. The fact that it was propaganda, however, does not necessarily detract from its
importance as the foundation, across several generations of Soviet military oflBcers, of the
public expectations of their own role and responsibilities and their expectations of others
in society. A§ changes began to occur in the nature of the relationship between the state, the military, the party, and society these changes were filtered, at least initially through this basic story. As I will argue in the next section, attachment to this story gave way to
expressions of disillusionment and bitterness when it no longer matched the reality of oflBcers’ daily lives.
138 The story which political officers told during the 1980-1988 period begins with the
birth of the Soviet state, and a new type of socialist army. This new socialist army’s goal
is said to be the protection of the Soviet state and its unique accomplishments from the
aggressive powers which seek to destroy it. The justification of this goal is an off-quoted
phrase fi-om Lenin; “Any revolution is only worth something if it is able to defend
itself.”(Editorial 1987) These enemies to state security can lie both within the state and
outside its borders. The army is the instrument of socialist self-defense for the proletariat
and the poor peasants, protecting them against the dangers of kulak-bourgeois
Bonapartism, supported by foreign imperialism.(Vorob'ev 1980)
After the establishment of socialism and the liquidation of internal enemies, this
new Soviet state is able to have a new relationship between the military and society, an
indivisible unity between the military and the people. The military is the instrument of the
people. “Soviet military men live at one in thought and deed with their people.” (Editorial
1981a) “They share the same troubles and the same happiness.” (Izmailov 1985) The oath
of the Soviet military servicemen specifically addresses this relationship. “The working
people call upon you, and the work they have called you to do is your natural and proper
work.” These words of Lenin were used in the text of the military’s oath from 1919
onward. (Editorial 1980) It is this unity with the people that gives the Soviet Armed
Forces their military advantage. “The power of the Soviet army is the devotion of its people, the sense of ownership which they have in it, which can have no parallel in a capitalist country."(Naumenko 1985) A concrete example of this expected dynamic is found in an interview with the head of the Border Guards who states; “The Soviet people
139 constantly help the Border Guards to arrest border violators. Many are members of the
people’s volunteer militia teams. Our young friends, the pioneers and school children, also
help us to guard the border.” (Matrosov 1985) The military is a proud and determined
group, hardened by their sacrifices, but enjoying support and prestige among society. “The
party, the government and all of our peoples highly value our difBcult martial service.”
(Editorial 1981b)
The second component of this story about the Soviet civil-military relationship is
the role the armed forces were expected to play within society. The new socialist army,
the people’s army, was portrayed as a moral example for society. (Vorob'ev 1985)
Through universal conscription the military was also expected to play a important role in
the molding of Soviet citizens through the military patriotic education of all Soviet youths.
(Matrosov 1985) During this period the Soviet military was touted as the “schoolhouse of
the peoples.” (Blank 1992:7) In addition, the military was expected to participate actively
in state fimctions including service as a delegate of the Communist Party to the Supreme
Soviet. Finally, in the strategic concepts and implementation of their external security
mission the Soviet military was given considerable latitude.(Blank 1992:4; Holloway
1989/90:6; Rice 1987) “In the Soviet Union the military had virtual monopoly over its internal operations, a significant degree of autonomy in decision-making over military strategy and force posture, some influence over resource allocation, and virtually no involvement or control over the foreign and domestic policies of the state.” (Busza 1996:
168)
140 In the context of these expectations about the civil-military relationship and the
responsibilities and roles of each group, the story ends with particular appropriate actions
already taken as well as advocated by military officers. The actions include the
achievement of greater battle readiness and a higher level of power than existed at the end
of the Great Patriotic War (WWII) This battle readiness and strength has enabled the
creation of conducive conditions for the development of socialism not just in the USSR but also in other countries. This hastens the world revolutionary processes. (Editorial
1981a) In this official story of the regime, the distribution of policy responsibility is clear.
Officers must spare no personal effort to ensure constant battle readiness. The state is responsible for furnishing them with the most modem weapons and battle technology to carry this out, as well as keeping the Soviet economy mobilized for war. (Editorial 1987;
Naumenko 1985)
Summary of the Baseline:
Soviet military officers during the baseline period portrayed themselves as indivisibly united with the Soviet people, and as a subordinate instrument of the people’s government. As an indivisible part of society, military officers were expected to participate, at the bidding of the people and the state, in local and state governance structures and in the molding of Soviet citizens through patriotic military education and military servicp. Their main role once was to protect the Soviet state from both internal and external threats to its security. However, with the end of the civil war, these internal threats were efimmated. The military was never again used against the people. Instead,
141 there was a true unity of the people, the military and the state. (Editorial 1981a; Lushev
1987)
In reality, however, during the 1980-1988 period the military was more closely tied to the party than it was to the people directly. The Army, Navy and military -industrial complex developed as an enormous isolated organization protected from any outside influence. The Communist Party played the role of controller and protector. "It suppressed any and all attempts by society to glance into those secret comers where military policy was bom." (Kirshin 1993:3) This party-military symbiosis in the Soviet
Union was described by Odom.(Odom 1978) This alliance was both ideological and practical. Imperial-military concems, needs for intervention to maintain imperial control in the Warsaw Pact, were justified through ideology.
In addition, there was no system of legal measures to ensure civil control of the
Army. Civil-military harmony was assured through a state whose influence was growing, whose citizens were quiet and who was committed to having forces superior to any one of its adversaries no matter the cost (Azrael 1987; Gelman 1991) In summary, as a result of an effective distribution of responsibility and the support of state stmctures by the people, from 1980-1988 military officers describe the Soviet state as strong and growing in power and advocate a circumscribed political role.
142 4.3. THE BEGINNING OF CHALLENGES TO THE STORY: 1989-1991
In the period from 1989 until the August coup in 1991, military oflBcers not only
experienced the fall of the Berlin Wall in Eastern Europe and the ensuing troop
withdrawals described in Chapter 3, but also an internal regime change. On March 26,
1989 the first multi-party elections to the Congress of People’s Deputies were held since
1917. In this election many oflBcial communist candidates, including military oflBcers,
were defeated. The Communist Party’s constitutional monopoly of power had ended. In
addition, military oflBcers began to experience criticism of their institution in an open
press. This combination led to a perception by the high military leadership that attempts by
civilians to monitor the military and to uncover the truth of the situation within the Army
were actually attacks seeking to humiliate the Army. (Kirshin 1993; Lepingwell 1992) In
addition, criticism of the military mounted as a result of military action at the behest of the
Soviet leadership in hot spots throughout the Soviet Union. There was great disagreement within the oflBcer corps about what these new relationships meant for their role within the Soviet state and indeed about whether there would be a Soviet state at all.
This section examines this interim period for the oflBcer corps after the loss of their
Eastern European empire became evident and before the August 1991 coup and the ensuing dissolution of the Soviet state. Did the story military oflBcers told about the civil- military relationship change? I will show that during this period there was a two-pronged challenge to the internal baseline story that mirrors the changes that were occurring in their external role. Military oflBcers during this period began to express doubts in the degree of unity of the military with either the people or the state. What do these changes
143 suggest fo r the hypothesis set forth earlier that when there are contested definitions o f the
appropriate distribution o f policy responsibility between the state and the military and
when military officers see state institutions as weak, military officers will advocate an
increase in their level o f domestic political participation? As I argued in analysis of the
baseline story, the strength of the Soviet state was portrayed as a direct result of the unity
between the people, the state and the military. With this unity in doubt, the strength of the
state is in question. This section will present several emerging solutions to the challenge which this presents to Soviet civil-military relations.
4.3.1 Are the Army and the People United?; The Emergence of New Threats to the
State Within Society
The first evidence that military officers were beginning to sense a challenge to the old story of civil-military relations is seen in the heated debate which occurred within the journals of the officer corps in 1989 and 1990 regarding the degree to which the military should be used to ensure stability within the Soviet state. It was becoming increasingly clear to most military officers that the state was being threatened by emerging nationalist and separatist groups. What was more controversial was whether the military’s policy responsibilities included becoming an internal security force or whether this job should be done by some other organization ‘ There were contested definitions o f the policy responsibility o f the military both within the military officer corps and between the
* There was even a debate about the degree to which the military had possessed an internal role during the Soviet era. Military journals during this period began to discuss incidents in the Soviet past, such as the use o f the military to suppress mass demonstrations like the one which occurred in Novcherkassk in June 1962.
144 officers and the civilian leadership which was sending them in to put down ethnic unrest
within the Soviet Union. This tension increased over time.
4.3.1 .1. An Internal Role is Necessary to Preserve Officers’ Unity with the State and Most
People (Figure 4.2)
The first story to emerge in response to the changes of 1989 was a modification of
the baseline story. The military’s goal remained unchanged in this story: the military is
charged with protecting and defending the Soviet State fi-om both external and internal threats. Now, the internal part of their role had again become salient. An internal threat to the Soviet state had reemerged, a circumstance which had not occurred in the Soviet
Union since the Civil War. Unchanged, also, was the relationship which the military has with the state and the majority of the Soviet population. The majority of the Soviet population was still united with the military and the state. However, a small sub-group had emerged, threatening the unity, the security, and the rights of Soviet citizens. “Under conditions of separatist and anti-societal forces, the military is the appointed guarantor of the integrity of the country, the bulwark of stability for the regime, the buttress of the decisions of the people’s parliament, and the guarantor of the personal safety of citizens.”(Skorodenko 1989) In this situation it is the military’s role to protect the state fi-om these internal threats and to protect the constitutional rights and personal security of its citizens. The military should be used to eliminate the threat which this minority poses.
“The military must be willing to fulfill this internal function and stand with weapons against a segment of society.” (Belyakov 1989) These military officers argue that history shows the wisdom of such military action and the consequences of inaction in internal
145 crises. In 1980, Polish Military Officers created a Military Council of National Salvation.
This Council “preserved the constitutional people’s power and was a guarantor of stability in the country.” By contrast, in Czechoslovakia in 1968 the leadership of the Party and the state “took practically no measures against a counter-revolutionary coup and the country approached civil war.”(Kizyon 1991) “Who recently saved Poland from national chaos, anarchy and humiliation, who held her fast at the last minute at the edge of the abyss? The
Polish Army! And so whom is the enemy vilifying? Of course those who would guard the socialist fatherland- the people’s Army.” (Rash 1989: 15) By January 1991, some military officers were telling this story to justify intervention in the Baltic republics. (Yazov
1991b)^
Thus, within this story, the distribution of policy responsibility remains unchanged.
In return for fulfilling their internal function, the military can expect to receive state financial support. There is no one else to perform this function, still needed and wanted by the people and the government. “The government leadership needs to recognize that the military is a fundamentally important institution of government and that a high quality military needs to be supported.” (Tyushke\ach 1991) This story is couched as not much of a departure from the baseline stories. The military officers in this story still see themselves as united with both the people and the state and they are optimistic about the degree of state support which they will receive.
^General Varrenikov who later played a leading role in the coup attempt was apparently responsible for the Vilnius crackdown. (Lepingwell 1992)
146 Characterizing the authors of this story is difficult. There seem to be no discernible patterns in their rank and additional information about their background was not available. However, one interesting note about this story is the degree to which its structure parallels the stories which were emerging during this period to explain the military’s external role. Like the stories in the previous chapter, the perceived relationships between the military and society were the first story- elements to change.
The first sign of this change is the attempt by military officers to isolate and marginalize the opposition in order to maintain their claim that the military is united with the people.
The second important component of this story concems the way in which the past internal roles and goals are interpreted. The military officers recounting this story espouse a continuity between the role of the military in the past and in the present. For them, the military has always been involved in removing internal threats in order to protect the majority of citizens. One military officer in this group even cited the use of military force in Novcherkass in June 1962 to break up unsanctioned demonstrations as an example of this continuity. (Belyakov 1989) For these officers, the military’s action against internal enemies in the early days of the Soviet revolution was relevant for determining the appropriate role for the military facing new threats. As the next story shows, not all military officers shared this interpretation of their organization’s history. In fact, most did not.
4.3.1.2. Military’s Role is Only to Protect the State from External Threats (Figure 4.3)
The second and majority-held version of the same events argues that while there were clear challenges to the security of the Soviet state, it was not appropriate for the
147 military to be the organization that addresses the threat. The story begins with the
emergence of nationalistic representatives in a number of regions of the country. People
have been registering their dissatisfaction with some aspects of the socialist system. Their
strikes and demonstrations have been used by the anti-Soviet element to further their own political goals. However, unlike the previous story, these military officers do not espouse an internal role for the military. The military’s role, as a professionalized military organization is simply the protection of the state from external threats to its security.
“With the liquidation of the remnants of organized anti-socialist and anti-Soviet forces after the Civil War, the internal function of the military was dropped and the military did not act against its own people. Now there have emerged new schisms in society, nationalists who seek to destabilize the social order and who have been able to draw to them believers in their cause.” (Vorob'ev 1989) By contrast, politicians have been using military units to support order. They have been attempting to reactivate the old internal role for the military which was eliminated after the Civil War. By asking them to undertake actions that are no longer appropriate for a professional military, government officials are jeopardizing the union which the military still believes it has with the people.
Use of the military internally only exacerbates the schisms in society which are emerging.
“The use of the army to restore order in the cities is an extremely undesirable measure. It brings callosal damage to the prestige of the army and to its unity with the people, the foundation of battle readiness.”(Grachev 1991)
Because these military officers have a different organizational goal, derived from a different reading of recent organizational and national history, they advocate a very
148 different set of military and state behaviors. The new distribution of policy responsibility that the government is suggesting for the military is being seriously contested in this story.
In order to bring the situation back in line with the appropriate military roles and goals, these military officers advocate the use of Internal NCnistry troops against society, not the military. (Samsonov 1990) Prophetically, the opposition of General Grachev and General
Samsonov to an internal role presaged the important role they played in refusing to support the use of military force in the August, 1991 coup. For this decision both officers were rewarded with leadership posts. This story’s significance can not be underestimated.
It became the basis for the dominant story about the military’s internal role through the events of August 1991 and October 1993. Those who held this story in 1989-1991 are the same group that supported Yeltsin in 1991 and in 1993.
4.3.1.3. A Break in Belonging (Figure 4.4)
In the final story of this series, military officers began to express publicly that even their unity with the people might be in doubt. Under Gorbachev’s leadership and the program of glasnost military policy had increasingly become the subject of public debate.
This public criticism was initiated in a January 1987 Plenum of the Central Committee and exacerbated after the Mathias Rust affair (in which a young German pilot was able to land on Red Square). Much of the criticism was directed against sources of ineffectiveness in the military. For the first time the military’s privileged place in society was called into question. (Holloway 1989/90:6)
Reactions to these attacks are illustrated in a story wMek I have called “Break ht
Belonging”. In the military officers’ statements that were coded for this story, there is a
149 continued acceptance of a goal for the military of protecting the state from both external and internal threats. However, unlike in the past stories where the opposition was marginalized and small, these threats seem to be coming from multiple segments of society. There are real forces in Soviet society that are trying to drive a wedge between the army and the people. “There are attempts to incite conscripts to evade military service, and to foster hatred of officers and scorn for military ritual, military traditions and the defense o f the fatherland. What we have is a struggle for servicemen’s minds and hearts. This is a very serious attempt to undermine the role of the military as the guarantor of statehood, political stability, security and sovereignty.” (Bel'kov 1989)
The relationship which the military has to society is changing. Elements in the media, the cultural intelligentsia, the old-believer communists and the mafia are all attacking the military. “Never before in our society have the officer and the army been subjected to such moral humiliation, such slanderous criticism in certain mass media and in verbal and printed statements. It is impossible not to see that someone is trying to present the military as something foreign, even in opposition to society.”(Yazov 1989)
“Separatists and nationalists are calling our soldiers ‘occupiers’” (Zolotuxhin 1990)
Members of bpth the cultural intelligentsia and the mafia see the military as competition and see it in their interest to weaken the military and its ties to society. A second force believes in the old ways and wants to stop the process of perestroika and democracy.
They direct their hopes towards the military, and thus help to contribute to fears of a military coup and thus anti-military sentiment. (Zolotuxhin 1996)
150 With the exception of the mafia, these forces are all segments o f the political
leadership. In this environment, the army sees itself as the healthiest part of society and
has the responsibility to prevent it fi’om social and political ruin. This characterization of the battles within society clearly seems compatible with a view of the state as weak, although this is never directly stated. Remember that as discussed in the previous chapter, this is occurring in the context of an emerging threat of internal decolonization; Baltic declarations of independence, and discussions over the new Union treaty, the ‘*Nine Plus
One agreement.” Within this context, military proposals to consolidate power in Congress of People’s Deputies particularly to resist their division into national units, to reform themselves fi-om the bottom up, and to increase their efforts in the struggle for the hearts and minds of society seem modest, but they clearly represent an increase from the baseline actions advocated previously. (Petrushenko 1990)
How can we characterize the group of military officers who hold this story?
While complete information was only available for Yazov, I will argue that like the story before it, this story contains the seeds of a prototype that will become more important as events unfold in 1991 and 1993. Yazov serves as the link between this story and that of the putschists since he was a member of the coup leadership. The fact that Yazov was trained as an infantry oflBcer and served as a Commander of a motorized rifle division is the beginning of a pattern that will be more fully explored in the next historical phase of the case study, August 1991.
151 4.3.2. Ouestipning the Infallibility of Leadership Decisions (Figure 4.5)
In addition to an increasing sense of alienation from large segments of society, military oflBcers during this period were beginning to question the infallibility of the political leadership and the regime. (Achalov 1990; Bel'kov 1989; Chemavin 1991;
Dmitriev 1989; Kizyon 1991; Rodionov 1991) This story begins with a perception of the weakening of the moral authority of the government. This engenders a change in the relationships military oflBcers perceive between the state, the military and the people.
Under these conditions these military oflBcers still see it as the military’s function to ensure the security of the state, but they question the existence of the previous union between the state, the military and society that was described in the baseline story. Instead the people are described as a separate entity from the state structures themselves. The military organization stands as a bridge between the people and the state. The military is the tool of both the government and the people, and, as such, military oflBcers answer only when the executive and legislative organs agree that force must be used. This is because when military force is used without a popular mandate, it breaks the union of the people and the military, the people blame the military for its behavior and not the leadership that ordered it. (Bel'kov 1989) This mistrust of the political leadership seems to parallel the feelings of alienation described in the Eastern European stories. The mistrust seems to be fairly deep.
Military oflBcers who tell this story argue that they must prevent the voluntaristic use of the military by defensive elites seeking to keep political ofiBce despite the contrary wishes of the people. “We should not deny that the military is the tool of the government. The government delineates the forms and methods of its use, in accord with legislative and
152 executive organs. They and only they are able to make decisions about the use of the military. However, this power can be misused. One possible scenario would be if the leadership discredited themselves. After losing their moral authority to lead, they might try to keep themselves in power by using the army to discipline the people. This would clearly be a hypertrophy of the army’s function.’’(Rodionov 1991)
The story ends by advocating a legislative push for the development of a legal mechanism to keep elite use of the military in check. In this way the people can rest assured that tbe military still will not go against them, that it has no internal function. “In order to avoid the use of the military by defensive elites, we need a legal mechanism which excludes the voluntaristic use of the army. If the army leaves its barracks in peacetime, even in the name of the most humanitarian goals, it is fulfilling some function other than its own. The public can rest assured that the army has no internal political function and that in the army no one would go against their own people.”(Kizyon 1991) In this story it is clear that if military ofiBcers have to chose between the political leadership of the state and the will of the people, they will side with the people, even if they must disobey politicians’ orders. At least in the case of one of the authors of this story. General Rodionov, this position may be the result of personal hardships endured because of previous devotion to the civilian leadership. In 1989 at the request of Gorbachev, General Rodionov commanded an attack against demonstrators in Tblisi that killed 20 and wounded 130.
This incident was later investigated by a Parliamentary commission. (Gelman 1991)
153 4.3.3 Summary;
In the period from 1989-1991 there were emerging splits between at least two groups of military officers over the appropriate role of the military and the distribution of policy responsibility between the military, the state and the troops of the Internal Ministry.
There was also a change in the perception of the strength and legitimacy o f state institutions and sitting political leaders. Finally, as I hypothesized, increasingly contested definitions of the appropriate distribution of policy responsibility between the state and the military and a perception of the weakening of state institutions, were accompanied by a trend toward greater advocacy by military officers of political action within the Parliament to strengthen the legal limits on the use of force, activities within society to win over public opinion and activities within their organization to reform themselves to meet their new roles and relationships.
In the March, 1989 elections, the military put forth 121 candidates of which 79 were elected. Military officers of all ranks were allowed to campaign for office, develop political platforms, advance political agendas and hold elected office while remaining on active duty. (Meyer 1991/92:15) For the first time 25 of the military officers elected to office were chosen by public and private organizations. (Editorial 1989) In some cases this meant that military officers were competing against other military officers. A number of junior and middle-rank officers challenged the senior officers in races and won. (Meyer
1991/92:16) Military candidates in the 1989 election yielded a total 3.5 percent of the representatives. (Nechaev 1989) This increased and spKt political participation was institutionalized in two organizations of officer deputies; Schit, the younger reform-
154 minded officers who allied themselves with the progressive factions such as Democratic
Russia, and Soyuz, which formed alliances with conservative-nationalist groups like
Rossiya, the Russian Popular Front and the Liberal Democratic Party headed by Baburin,
Skurlatov and Zhironovskii respectively. (Maim 1989) In 1991 three high-ranking military ofScers campaigned as candidates in the Presidential election: General Makashov ran as
President and Rutskoi and Gromov both ran as vice-presidential candidates.
4.4. STORIES OF THE 1991 COUP AND THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY
In August of 1991, the splits emerging within the military oflBcer corps, over whether the military had an internal role as protector of order and territorial unity, became critical and obvious. The August 1991 coup was a turning point in the development of
Soviet civil-military relations as it marked the military’s first direct intervention into internal politics. While there is now evidence that there was significant involvement of high-ranking officers in the planning and implementation of the coup, this was not primarily a military putsch. The main impetus to intervene came fi-om the KGB and the
Interior Ministry allied with conservative groups in the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union.(Lepingwell 1992: 562)
On August 19, 1991 the State Committee for National Salvation announced that
Gorbachev had been replaced by Gannadi Yanayev. A sbc-month state of emergency was announced. Gorbachev was put under house arrest at his vacation home in the Crimea and orders were given to storm the White House where Yeltsin was closeted, taking the
President of the Russian Federation dead or aHve.(Sta^ 1996: 7)- Support in the military oflBcer corps for this action was mixed. The list of military oflBcers who participated in
155 either the planning or the execution of coup orders are believed to include; Presidential
Advisor Marshal Akhromeyev, Defense Minister Yazov, Deputy Defense Minister and
Ground Forces Commander Varennikov, Deputy Defense Minister Achalov, and commanders of many of the motorized rifle division of the army including Colonel General
Makashov Commander of the Volga-Ural Motorized Division. (Brusstar 1995: 28; Staar
1996: 3-10) Others, such as the commanders of the Baltic and Moscow military districts, actively supported the coup.(Meyer 1991/92:30) While it is clear that only a small number of military oflBcers were active in the coup attempt, only a minority were willing to actively oppose it either. Only Air Force Commander General Shaposhnikov and
Paratroop Commander Colonel General Grachev initially took a firm stand against the
National Salvation Committee. (Lepingwell 1992) The rest of the oflBcer corps seemed to be waiting to see who would emerge victorious. Many military and civilian analysts argue that there was a significant minority who were sympathetic to the cause. On the other hand, as the stories fi'om the pre-coup period would predict, the majority of military oflBcers continued to maintain that they had no role in political struggles for power, particularly if they thought they were going “against the people.” (Brusstar 1995: 28;
Lepingwell 1992; Meyer 1991/92)
This split in the oflBcer corps, whose effect has been explored by so many scholars studying the post-Soviet era, can be traced to diflferent stories about the civil-military relationship and the internal role of the military. The coup and the stories produced to explain it illustrate a fundamental paradox. Both sides usedfhe perceived relationship of unity between the people and the military as a reason to act, and both thought that they
156 were fulfilling their role as it had been defined earlier, however their definitions are in
contradiction with each other. The two groups can be divided based upon several criteria.
Each side had a different perception of the nature of their responsibilities, and they differed
in their perceptions of the legitimacy and strength of the both political leadership and state
institutions, including the legitimacy of the constitution. Finally, the two groups differed
in background and service affiliation. This produced two very different stories and two
different behavioral choices.
4.4.1. Story of Non-Participation (Figure 4.6)
What led Shaposhnikov and Grachev to stand with the current leadership and against the putsch? How did they perceive their internal role and the authority of the state? The story of opposition to the Committee of National Salvation reveals that, faced with the August 19, 1991 coup attempt, these military officers defined their role as the support of the constitutional regime and the government representatives chosen according to its rules. They saw the participation in the putsch as a call for the military to go against the constitution and thus against the people. This view was paralleled by those officers who initially adopted the wait and see strategy and ultimately sided against the coup.
“Their shift to the opposition seems to be prompted by the failure of attempts by the State
Committee for National Salvation to persuade the public that it was a legitimate institution.” (Lepingwell 1992:563) This stress on the defense of the constitutional order is a new twist on their role in internal security. Internal security is now ensured not by the rule of a political leadership supported by mfiitary force, but by the rule of law. They have put their faith in the law and the people not in the leaders.
157 Meanwhile Shaposhnikov and Grachev characterized those who did answer this
call as morally corrupt old ideologues, members of the government and party structures
and military leaders from the army political organizations. The relationship of union
between the military and the people continued in this story is again preserved by isolating
and marginalizing a harmful minority. This time, however, the minority is not in society,
but in the government, the party and the military itself Their choice has been made.
Rather than follow a questionable leadership, they argue that it is their responsibility to aid
the people, the forces and democracy and progress, and the constitutional order.
(Shaposhnikov 1992; Shaposhnikov 1991) “The military is charged with serving the people, implementing the constitution and defending the Fatherland. The basic substance of the internal function of the Armed Forces is support of the constitutional regime, the government representatives legally selected by the people, and to prevent armed mass opposition.”(Smimov 1991) “The overwhelming majority of the servicemen and officers had the presence of mind, devotion to their military oath and loyalty to the constitution and the people and they did not follow the putschists’ orders. The army did not go against its people.” (Shaposhnikov 1992) Their behavior, they argued, vindicated the idea that the military and the people were indeed united, setting aside, hopefully permanently, the emerging tension which they had experienced and described in the 1989-1991 period leading up to the coup.
The lesson of the coup, according to this story, harkens back to the baseline of the military’s internal role and relationship to the state and society. When the military, the people and the state are united there is strength. Those who go against the people are
158 bound to fail. This is a reiteration of the old distribution of policy responsibility which advocates a professional military with no appreciable increase in domestic political intervention, a reiteration of Figure 4.4 that argues that the military has an external role only. In other words, the military must not take on any new internal functions. ‘The army must in no circumstances be mixed up in political matters and it must never be used against unarmed people. When armed formations stand against the will of the people and their democratic organs then they must be stopped....Putsch attempts are bound to fail and the August 1991 coup has been a lesson to officers who might have been tempted by political adventures. We must get rid of any putsch sympathizers within the army
(emphasis added) in order to consolidate respect for the armed forces.”(Shaposhnikov
1991) This reiteration of the basic story structure altered in 1989 and illustrated in Figure
4.4 is not coincidental. The group of predominantly Air Force and Navy high-ranking military officers that followed Shaposhnikov and Grachev’s example^ include the authors of that previous story. All of these officers were rewarded with military leadership posts and, in many cases, promotions in rank.
4.4.2. Cause of Putsch 1991; Why It Was Necessary to Participate (Figure 4.7)
Why did some military officers participate against their government in 1991?
What story did they hold about their internal role and relationship to the state and society?
An analysis of press statements by those military officers who participated with the putsch leaders against Gorbachev and his political allies demonstrates that they did so because
^ These include: Air Force General and Vice President Rutskoi, Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces General Yuri Maksimov, Colonel General Kobets, Paratrooper General Lebed. (Dunlop 1993)
159 they saw the political and social environment as being one of legal and constitutional
anarchy. “Inevitably we (the future members of the Committee for National Salvation)
came to the conclusion that the guilt must lie with the President in as much as he had
distanced himself from the Party and abandoned the Army to misfortune.”(Yazov 1991a)
“As the central government became increasingly unable to exercise authority, the military
began to view itself as the last powerful centralizing force in the nation.” (Lepingwell
1992: 561) In their published appeal to the people, the coup leaders argued; “there have
emerged extremist forces which have adopted a course toward the liquidation of the
Soviet Union, the collapse of the state and the seizure of power at any price.” (GKChP
1991) They felt that the country was in chaos, their mistrust in the existing political
leadership had grown and their concern for societal unity was high, due to the impending
union treaty and successful Baltic separatists demands. “There is a lack of responsible
political leadership and the unity of the people is under threat.”(Pozdnyakov 1992)
“Actions of political adventurers have resulted in more than a million refugees throughout the country.’’(GKChP 1991) In these circumstances, the military’s goal is to guarantee the
stability and security of the state and thus to participate in the restoration of goverrunent order. “Declining legitimacy apparently led the military leadership to believe that public resistance to military intervention would be minimal. (Lepingwell 1992: 561) A successful restoration of order was needed in their view to guarantee the unity of the people and to strengthen the status of the Soviet Union as a Great Power. (Novozhilov 1991) This is the story of a weakened state and a military officer corps which perceives that state behavior
160 and weakness pose a direct threat to its role and responsibilities as defender of the state against internal and external threats.
Who are the authors of this story? An analysis of their backgrounds (found in
Appendix D at the end of this volume) reveals that they are predominantly Ground Forces
Commanders, leading either motorized rifle or tank brigades. Many of them are also
World War II veterans. Finally, many of them were actively opposed to the withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe or came to be opposed to the direction national security policy was going later. (Allison 1993:5-7 based upon an analysis of the writings of
Achalov, Yazov and the Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security during this period) Interestingly, in my interviews with military officers in Moscow in the winter of 1996, it was suggested to me that even some of the military leadership who had previously felt positively about the withdrawal fl-om Eastern Europe and had seen it as a continuation o f a successful previous policy which they themselves had suggested to
Gorbachev, felt that the policy must be stopped before it threatened the internal integrity of the state. One interviewee suggested that General Akhromeyev’s suicide was fueled by guilt that he himself through his support of the imperial withdrawal had brought about the dissolution o f the state that he felt was sure to follow once the coup attempt failed.
(Savelyev 1996)
4.S. STORIES OF OCTOBER 1993: CHOOSING BETWEEN BRANCHES OF
THE GOVERNMENT
The final stage in the emergence of the Russian post-imperial state occurred in
October 1993. In the events surrounding the October 1993 power struggle between the
161 executive and legislative branches of government, military officers were again challenged to reexamine their role within society and within the government. On September 21, 1993
Yeltsin announced in a Presidential decree that he was dissolving the Parliament. This decree set in motion a deepening of the divisions in the military officer corps. The
Defense Ministry leadership expressed public support for the President while other officers, including General Rutskoi, Colonel General Makashov, Lieutenant General
Tarasov, and members of an opposition officer group Soyuz Offitserev declared their support for the Parliament and Khasbulatov.(Staar 1996; 12) The rebels led by Speaker
Khasbulatov refused to leave the White House arguing that Yeltsin’s action was illegal.
There were about 24 officers who actively joined the White House defenders. Still more officers are believed to have been sympathetic to Rutskoi and the opposition. Included in this list are; Air Forces Commander Petr Deynekin, Deputy Defense Minister Mironov,
Chief of General Staff Kolesnikov, Deputy Defense Minister Gromov, and General Forces
Commander Semenov. Several sources have cited these generals as having maintained contact with the White House or working to undermine Yeltsin's dissolution during the crisis. (Although the Defense Ministry has denied that they were engaged in anything but attempts to maintain contact and defuse the situation.) (Brusstar 1995:27-29)
Initially, the Defense Ministry’s support of Yelstin did not extend to a willingness to actively oppose the Supreme Soviet. This is illustrated by the fact that on October 3,
* These included; Colonel General Achalov, Army General Barranikov, Colonel General Dunaiev, Colonel General Makashov, reserve Air Force Major General Rutskoi, Lieutenant General Tarasov, Lieutenant Colonel Terekhov, and Lieutenant General Trushin. (Staar 1996: 13)
162 1993 when riots broke out in Moscow and Yeltsin ordered the Defense Ministry forces to
attack the White House, virtually the entire high command, including Grachev himself
resisted the order, unanimously resolving to observe complete neutrality.(Staar 1996: 1)
Yeltsin's account indicates that he came very close to losing control and perhaps losing
power on the night of October 3-4, 1993. “The army, numbering two and a half million
people could not produce even a thousand soldiers.” (Yeltsin 1994: 383-384) On the
third of October, demonstrators sympathetic to the opposition broke through a police cordon around the White House and stormed the nearby Mayor's office. With commandeered vehicles they then turned to an attack on Ostankino. Yeltsin called
Grachev and received his assurance that army troops were on their way to liberate
Ostankino (the television tower taken by the rebels in order to broadcast their appeals) fi'om opposition siege. The next day, tanks were used against the White House and
Yeltsin emerged victorious.(Brusstar 1995: 24)*
For the most part, the same military officers who supported Yeltsin in his showdown with the Committee for National Salvation also supported him two years later.
Many of the military officers who supported the putsch attempt either directly or in spirit, also supported the opposition forces in the Parliament.® However, the goals which each espoused had shifted. As this section will explore, it was now the opposition group which
* See also (Galeotti 1993) for a list of the specific units which participated in the action against the White House.
®Former Deputy Defense Minister Achalov was appointed “Defense Minister of Russia” by the Supreme Soviet. Makashov was appointed shadow Deputy Minister of Defense. (Staar 1996: 9)
163 spoke of their role as the supporters of the constitutional regime, while the oflBcers who
supported Yeltsin argued that their role was to support stability, avoid bloodshed and uphold the spirit of the law. Once again, the key differences between the two groups were their perceptions of the legitimacy of a branch of the government (the Congress of
People’s Deputies) and the strength of civilian institutions.
4.5.1. Pro-Yeltsin (Figure 4.8 “October 1993 Why participated on Yeltsin’s side”)
What led the Defense Ministry and most military oflBcers to support Yeltsin and ultimately to play a decisive role in the conflict? In analyzing the distribution of policy responsibility, or the goal which these military oflBcers held for their organization, it is remarkable that for those who spoke in support of the military’s action against the White
House, there is a clear continuity from the stories told about the 1991 coup: In their stories the military supports the side which it sees as representing the people’s choice.
“The military must preserve the people’s choice only when no other possibility is available.
However, given an outburst of antisocial forces and no actual force capable of guaranteeing the state’s stability and supporting the implementation of the people’s decisions, it should be the armed forces which take it upon themselves for a certain time, let us say a transitional period.” (Kirshin 1993) “The armed forces can only be used when attempts are made to use force to overthrow the constitutional system, and also when illegal armed formations are being created.”(Manilov 1993) Thus, according to this group of oflBcers, the role of the military is to support the President and the Ministries in their fight against the old constitutional order. Military oflBcers are charged with upholding the spirit, not the letter of the law. This goal is seen as appropriate because the President has
164 the support of the people. The relationships between the actors have shifted. Since these
military oflBcers still value their union with the people, they have no alternative but to
support their choice. The Supreme Soviet is portrayed as having lost the support of the
majority of society by standing up for the constitution without considering the interests of
those for whom the constitution was created. The opposition has exaggerated the degree
to which it represents the people’s will. By overestimating this they have become a
sinister force. (Shaposhnikov 1995; 274-278)
Thus, in choosing to ultimately follow the President’s orders and take military
action against the opposition in the White House, the military was making a choice to
support a general principle, not a particular person. In addition, in deciding to engage in
limited military action, they were making a calculation that going against the minority was
less gruesome than attempting to fight the majority of the people. In this way, they saved
Russia fi'om civil war. They thought that they were the only force within Russia capable
of doing this. “Our society has not yet realized that the military and especially the Air
Force, saved Russia from civil war. The leaders have at last understood that the only thing that guarantees power is the army. The myth that on the 3 October the President saved the freedom-loving people had evaporated by December 12th. The army saved the
President not out o f a great love for him, but because they did not want to participate in a blood bath.” (Podkolzin 1994) This characterization of the power of the state, the military and society is compatible with a perception of a weakened state. The political leadership is forced to rely on the militwy to prevent catastrophe. ThesemHitary oflBcers see themselves as a stronger force than other state or civilian institutions.
165 If we look at this story to determine the way in which these militaries officers
envision the distribution of policy responsibility, we see that they seem to continue to
define their role in terms of their pre-1989 baseline. However, this baseline goal has been
gradually modified in the post-imperial period to reflect a growing emphasis on the
importance of the legitimacy of the state or regime whose internal and external security
they are defending. As long as the state is perceived as the people’s choice, the military
will refi'ain fi’om any political or military action (or inaction) that would undermine it and
will support it if their participation is absolutely necessary. However, it is clear that the
military is a reluctant participant in this scenario. They feel that as part of the expectations
of the distribution of policy responsibility within the state, politicians should be able to conduct political debate without bringing society to the brink of civil war. "The military
still feels bitterness because it was forced to help solve the problems created by this political confi-ontation."(Brusstar 1995:30 fi'om remarks by Grachev reported in Interfax
April 7, 1994) This bitterness and unresolved conflict over the appropriate use of the military has led to an increase in political activity even by these military officers who support the Yeltsin regime. The participation of military officers as candidates in the 1995
Parliamentary elections is a concrete example of this behavior. Military officers were even asked by Defense Minister Grachev to run as candidates for the party supporting Yeltsin,
Nash Dom Rossiya. (Goltz 1995)
4.5.2. Anti-Yeltsin (Figure 4.9)
What was the^ story of those who made the opposite choice? Those that chose to support the legislative branch also did so after making a calculation about the legitimacy
166 of each side’s claim. Unlike in 1991, the military oflBcers of the opposition group now argued that the role of the military was to defend the constitution and ensure respect for the law. “Soyuz OflBtserov, as people who had taken an oath to respect the constitution, the law and themselves, personally stood in defense of Soviet power in the form of its highest organ, the Supreme Soviet”(Movchan 1994) The Supreme Soviet was the legitimate and constitutional organ of the people. The President was seen as incompetent and anti-populace. “Yeltsin, the enemy, had broken the Constitution and we had every right to protest this within legal boundaries and, if the Supreme Soviet demanded, in accord with the orders of our commanders, we would have taken up arms to defend the constitution and the supreme legal power. But things did not happen as we expected. We could not change the course of history. We could only show by example how others should act."(Terekhov 1994)
The distribution of policy responsibility between the military and the state was perceived by these oflBcers to be in dispute. While they saw their role as the defense of the constitution and the people, the Yeltsin government (including the Minister of Defense
Grachev) was acting as if the appropriate function of the military was the defense of those in power. The goal of those in the executive branch was to preserve the security of the current political leadership but not the country as a whole. Those in power were looking for people who would fulfill any order and in key moments would preserve the security of the regime. (Editorial 1994; Savelyev 1996; Tsarev 1996) Instead, the military oflBcers of the radical opposition that tell this story argued that the actions needed in the short term
167 were the dismissal of the President and, when this became impossible, the rebuilding of the opposition movement.
While the state was clearly weakened by the political struggle between the branches of government and by an incompetent President, the military and the opposition forces as a whole were also weak and divided.(AchaIov 1995) As have many scholars of the post-Soviet period, these military oflBcers wondered aloud in recounting this story;
“Why didn’t the military go with us? Why did it go against us, its own protectors?” The answer is that along with a perception of a weak state, there was also a recognition that the experience of losing their empire and its aftermath on military morale and resources has left a weak military as well. “The military was not a united organization that could act with one will. Demoralization had reached such a stage that people were not able to make decisions, from the commanders down to the lowest ranks. I believe the majority of officers supported our position psychologically, in their soul, but that did not translate into being able to be mobilized.”(Terekhov 1994)
4.5.3 Post-October 1993; Cooptation of the Military Through Mediocre
Commanders (Figure 4.10)
The final chapter of the opposition’s story concerns just this demoralization of the military. Who is to blame for the fact that the military has been weakened and what should be done about it? This story begins where this chapter concludes, with the military’s split participation in the August 1991 coup and the October 1993 events. Some military oflBcers are now aligned wifii the politicaf leadership whHc others see the current leaders as detrimental to the interests of both the military and society as a whole. The
168 goals of each group are now in direct contradiction with each other. The opposition military oflBcers continue to see their role as both external, maintaining Russia as a ‘Great
Power’, and internal, defending the constitution. However, these goals are in direct contradiction with the current leadership and those military oflBcers aligned with it. Those in power are more interested in maintaining power than they are in exercising their power in the interest of the country as a whole. This is specifically illustrated by their actions.
After both August 1991 and October 1993, there was a massive housecleaning of those oflBcer who were not in accord with the current leadership’s politics. Many superior oflBcers were purged. Yeltsin then rewarded loyal military oflBcers willing to go against their own people with new titles and privileges. As a result, not only is the political leadership mediocre, but so is the current military leadership. Minister of Defense
Grachev is specifically cited in this story as an example of this phenomenon. (Editorial
1994; Savelyev 1996; Tsarev 1996)
An analysis of not only the radical nationalist officers of Soyuz, but those officers cited as being sympathetic to the Parliament in 1993 reveals that again, the opposition story is told by Army officers, specifically Ground Troops commanders with experience either in Afghanistan, Eastern Europe or the Baltic Republics at the time of their secession. This final story is revealing because it ties into a general sense that officers expressed in interviews of cronyism and a struggle for resources in which Grachev and his
Air Force colleagues were winning. Not only did Ground Force oflBcers and their men suflfer significantly during the withdrawal process, but they also disproportionately lost the
169 battle for influence in government. Instead, they perceive that their commanders, those promoted instead of them, are mediocre political stooges.
The response advocated in this story to perceptions of this incompetence and corruption is increased political participation. At its most extreme form, these officers advocate the formation of a political organization, an Officers’ Assembly. This organization would guarantee officers a place to talk about their professional problems, form and express their opinion on the situation in the armed forces, and have an impact on the process taking place in the armed forces. This forum is needed because individual officers can not speak their mind without the risk of being expelled fi’om the army without an apartment and a means to survive. The lesson of this story is that only a grassroots political mobilization of the officer corps can save Russia and allow it to escape from this catastrophic situation. (Editorial 1994)
4.6 CHAPTER CONCLUSION:
What did Soviet/Russian military officers think they should do (if anything) about the radical changes that they have witnessed and described in the previous chapter? What was the impact on the civil military relationship of the changes that occurred within the state? Does the loss of their imperial mission and the sense of civilian incompetence and state instability that military officers described as its legacy result in a renegotiation of the civil-military contract in the post-imperial period? Has the relationship between society, the military, and the state changed?
In this chapter I have examined evidence that b e ^ s to address these questions. In
Chapter One I derived the second hypothesis of this study: When there are contested
170 definitions o f the appropriate distribution o f policy responsibility between the state and the military and when military officers see state institutions as weak, they will advocate an increase in their level o f domestic political participation. In this chapter, I have shown that there was indeed a pattern of disagreement on the appropriate role and goals for the military within the post-imperial Russian state and society. In the 1989-1991 period there is a growing protest to the use of the military in internal displays of force. This is partially based upon a sense of estrangement from society which the military ofiBcers feel is accentuated by the unreasonable and unpopular demands of the regime for their use in ethnic hot spots within the country. In addition there is a conflict between military expectations of state rewards for their loyal service and the actual behavior of the state. As the next chapter will discuss in more detail, the state is perceived as defaulting on their side of this contract.
Disagreement on the nature of the civil-military contract was not just between the state and the military, but also between portions of the military. While military oflBcers agreed that they should continue to be united with the people and to preserve the integrity and stability of legitimate government structures, they disagreed about what this actually meant for their relationship to the existing state structures and political leadership and ultimately for their concrete behavior. This disagreement seems to be partly based upon the particular service aflBliation of the oflBcers. Senior Ground Force commanders with experience in Afghanistan, the withdrawal from Eastern Europe or the secessionist challenge in the Baltics were the most outspoken critics of the regime. T h ^ were more likely to have supported the putsch in 1991 and to be sympathetic to Rutskoi and
171 Khasbulatov’s defense of the Parliament in 1993. By contrast, middle-ranking and senior
Air Force commanders are disproportionately represented in the pro-regime forces which have, at least until now, been less willing to participate in any political behavior which directly challenges the legitimacy of the government.
Finally, regardless of the difference in nuance in the definitions military officers held of their internal role, there was agreement that the state structures and leadership were weak. There was growing evidence of threats to the state’s existence from within society. The 1993 version of the Russian Federation’s official military doctrine is the first document to directly address the principle sources of these threats. The list of threats to the Russian state, society and government in the 1993 doctrinal statement includes: aggressive nationalist and religious intolerance; the suppression of the rights, freedoms, and lawful interests of Russian citizens in foreign states; armed actions by nationalist, separatist and other organizations aimed at destabilizing the internal situation or violating
Russia’s integrity; attempts to forcibly overthrow the constitutional system or disrupt the working of state structures; the creation of unlawful armed formations; the growth of organized crime and large-scale smuggling which imperils the citizenry and the society; the lack of definition of several structures of the state border and uncertain definitions of the legal status of Russian military forces abroad. (Document 1993) As this chapter has shown, the military saw itself as the only force capable of meeting these challenges to the integrity and security of the state. This perception was reinforced by the events of October r993.
172 Finally, there was a perception of a weakening of the moral authority of the
government and, for some, a sense of legal and social anarchy. Military officers saw their
organization as the healthiest part of society. As a result, they advocated new patterns of
political participation. Over time, even military ofiBcers in the pro-govemment group
began to advocate new legislation to prevent their arbitrary use. The military should be
the people's instrument. The 1993 Strategic Doctrine includes the following clause;
“Utilization of the Armed Forces in support of individual groups of people, parties or
political associations is not permitted. (Document 1991)
"The use of the Army against the interests of the people leads to serious consequences., e.g. Afghanistan....Therefore, it is necessary to legally strengthen the decision-making mechanism for the use of the Armed Forces outside the confines of the state. For example we should require coordination between representatives of the organs of power. Secondly, personal responsibility for the decision to use force is obligatory. The army should serve the people through their democratically-elected representative organs and not the interests of political parties and individual layers of society. We should consider public opinion when making command decisions.. .There should be a parliamentary delegate in large formations and units through whom local organs can resolve various problems, especially in regard to large-scale force mobilizations. Parliamentary delegates will conduct parliamentary work in large formations and units." (Kirshin 1993:6-10)
When this model is compared to the baseline relationship which the military held with the
Communist party in the past, the similarities are striking. Should the military exchange
one type of political officer for another?
The Russian armed forces also began to exercise a larger role in the formation of defense policy. There has been wide speculation that this new definition of their role in combating internal threats was codified into the 1993 doctrine in return for the participation of the pro-Yeltsin officers in storming the White House and represents the
173 victory of one faction within the military. In fact, by rushing this version of the military
doctrine into law only a month before Russia’s first fi’ee parliamentary elections, these
military ofiBcers may have been attempting to tie the hands of the future government.
(Dick 1994)
As a result of these changes, military ofiBcers in the post-imperial period
recommend self-reform, and consolidation of their political and legislative power to
struggle against what they perceived as a growing anti-military sentiment within society.
While the degree of political participation envisioned varied both in terms of the scope of
the issues which military ofiBcers now advocated and the means which they championed to
address them, all military ofiBcers were dissatisfied with the old role of bureaucratic
politics within the executive branch alone. Military officers described their situation as one
of “a certain isolation, an independence of military interests and an absence of
corresponding social or state structures prepared to stand up for those interests...Today
the Army and Navy are being put in a situation where it seems that they must fight for
things which go without saying. And some politicians continue to rubber stamp one after
another, premature decisions on military issues which have not been fully
weighed."(Kirshin 1993) A survey conducted by Izvestiya between December 1993 and
March 1994 of ofiBcers in the Moscow and North Caucasus district asked the question whether in the foreseeable future the army would be involved in politics. 41% answered that the military would take part in resolving individual conflicts, 16% said the military would assume leadership of the state and only 23% said the army would stay out politics altogether. (Golovkov 1995)
174 Many Russian military officers advocated Parliamentary positions as a means to bring about change while others saw reform as a way to avoid military participation in politics. “If politicians are not knowledgeable about the condition of things in the military, then they can not correctly manage them, they are not capable of protecting us against unjust accusations and it is unlikely that things will change for the better.” (Rodionov
1995) By 1993, thousands of military offices were serving in parliaments throughout
Russia. (Dudnik 1993) Military candidates were also fielded by every major party in the
December 1995 parliamentary elections and ran in the 1996 presidential elections.^ (Goltz
1995; Gross-Hassman 1995)
In the next chapter 1 will examine the effect of the political struggle for resources within the officer corps on the direction of organizational reform in the post-imperial period. How have the new stories been reflected in proposals for organizational reform in an environment of post-imperial organizational decline? What are the key issues around which the debates have centered and how are they affected by the divisions which have emerged between groups of officers concerning the way in which they understood both their external and their internal roles in the post-imperial period?
’Viktor Chernomyrdin allied himself with General Rokhlin. Retired General Lebed was a candidate of Yuri Skokov’s Congress of Russian Communities. General Gromov supported Ivan Rybkin and General Varrenikov was invited to join the Russian Communist Party leadership.
175 Initiating Event: Birth and Maintenance of the Soviet State
Relationship Between Actors: Goal(s): 1)Indivisible unity between army Protection of the Soviet State and people from Internal and External Threats 2) Army as instrument of government and people.
Actions: I) The state and society support the military in the advancement of battle readiness by furnishing the latest technology and weapons. 2} The military participates in local and socio-political governance and the molding of Soviet citizens. 3) Officers give themselves fully to their sacred duty
Consequence: The Security o f the State is Assured Socialism’s Development is Facilitated
Figure 4.1 : Baseline Story of the Military’s Internal Role
176 Initiating Event: Emergence of Internal Threats to State Security
Relationship of Actors Goal(s): 1)indivisible unity o f army and Protection o f the State people from Internal and External Threats 2) army as instrument of people and state but can be used against those who threaten citizens' constitutional rights and security 3) Emergence of a subgroup that threatens unity, security and rights o f citizens
Actions Advocated: The Army must be ready to fulfill its internal function and stand with weapons against a segment of the society. The actual activities o f the military depend upon the location and degree of threat to the achievements of socialism
Lessons o f the Past: 1. In Poland in 1980 when the military forces fulfilled their internal role and formed a Military Council of National Salvation, stability was guaranteed. 2. In Czechoslovakia in 1968 when the military and the state took no measures against counter-revolutionaries, the country approached civil war.
Figure 4.2: An Internal Role is Necessary
177 Initiating Event: Emergence of nationalist separatists, challenge to role of military and state
Relationship between actors: Goal(s): The unity l^tween society, Protection of the State from External Threats military and the state is being destabilized by schisms in society, nationalists have drawn supporters among the people
Actions: 1) People have registered their dissatisfaction with some aspects of the socialist system. 2) Politicians have used military units to maintain societal order
Consequence: 1. Callosal Damage to die Prestige of the Army and to its unity with the people. These have combined to decrease battle readiness 2. Threats to State security have not been eliminated. Politicians have used popular dissatisfriction by the anti-Soviet element to further their own political goals.
Action Advocated/Lesson: The use of the army against its own people is extremely undesirable. We must use internal troops instead.
Figure 4.3: External Role Only
178 Initiating Event: Attacks on unity between military and people
Goal(s): Protection o f the State from Internal and External Threats
Relationship between actors: 1) Media is trying to present military as something foreign, opposition to society, as closed to dalogue 2) cultural intelligentsia and mafia each see military as their competition in society 3) old guard attempting to use military to stop change 4. Separatists and nationalists see soldiers as occupiers 5. Army is healthiest part of society
Action Taken: 1) assaults on ofBcers and their Amilies 2) attempts to incite conscripts to evade service, attempts to foster hatred and scorn for military ritual and traditions
Actions advocated for military: 1. Increase efforts in struggle for hearts and minds of society. 2) find points of contact with reasonable àib-section of society and educate it. 3) resist division o f military into national units 4) self-reform from bottom up 5) end passivity of Defense Ministry in consolidating the power of Military deputies in Congress of People’s Deputies
Figure 4.4 Break in Belonging, 1990-91
179 Initiating Event: The Weakening of the Moral Authority of the Government
Relationship Between Actors: Goal(s): 1)The military is the tool o f the Guarantee the Security of the government and of the people State and o f the People 2) Executive must seek accord for military use from the Legislative organs because when military force is used without a popular mandate, the people blame the military
Actions Advocated: Development o f a legal mechanism to prevent the voluntaristic use of the army by defensive elites I Consequence: The People can rest assured that the army will not go against them and has no internal function
Figure 4.5: Are leaders Infallible? A Break in State-military Unity
180 Initiating Event: August 19-21 coup attempt I I Relationship with Actors: Goal(s): 1)kqr organizers came from Party Maintain order and security, support the and military command leadership constitutional regime and the government 2) M PA favored the coup as well representatives elected according to its rules as some officers and protect it from armed mass opposition 3)The rest o f the army as well as Putschists wanted to use military to go against the people were unit^ against the constitution and help them with their take old ideologues m over 4) th e military as a political institution is an element of both I the political system and the Actions: society 1) ideologues assigned the dirties role to the military, that o f intimidating the populace. 2) the putschists selected the most morally corrupt people from the top down in their planned military actions 3)the overwhelming majority of servicemen did not take up arms against the people. Instead they aided the people. It was the Russian people who opposed the putsch with the aid o f the military.
Consequence: 1.Coup attempt friiled, its participants were discredited. 2.The forces o f democracy and progress earned a victory
Lesson: 1.the stereotype that the people and the army are united is really true, the army is not a monster aimed against them. 2. Military must under no circumstances be mixed up in political matters or be used against unarmed people. Those officers who engage in such political adventures are bound to Ail.
Figure 4.6: Story of Non-Participation, Opposition to Coup 1991
181 Initiating Event: Legal and Constitutional Anarchy Begun by Perestroika 1 I Relationship Between Actors: Goal(s); 1)country in chaos Guarantee Stability and 2) lack o f responsible political Security of Soviet State leadership 3) threat to the unity of the people through pseudo sovereignty
Actions: Participation in the restoration of government order, usually in a crueler form than before.
Consequence/Lesson: As a result of the putsch we could guarantee the unity o f all people and strengthen the status of the Soviet Union as a Great Power. We need strong govenunent leadership to ensure state security
Figure 4.7: Why it Was Necessary to Participate in Putsch
182 Initiating Event' Presidential decree dissol^ng Parliament
Relationship Between Actors; Goal(s): 1)A nuyority of the population To support the President, the Ministries and felt that Yeltsin had to act with the spirit o f the law decisive steps to end dual power. 2)The Supreme Soviet provoked society by overestimating the degree to which it represented the people’s will and thus overestimating its capability They stood up for the law without considering the interests of those for whom it was made. They represented something sinister
Actions: 1)The military initially resisted the orders to attack the White House and to go against the people at their demonstration o f power at Ostankino The army numbering .5 million could not produce 1,000 defenders. 2) When the stand-off entered a new phase and reached its logical conclusion, some military tanks were assembled and fired against the White House.
Consequences: The military saved the President, not out o f love for him but,because they did not want to participate in a blood bath. The military saved Russia finm civil war. But it partidpated without enthusiasm.
Lesson: The Only thing that guarantees power is the army. The army feels bitterness that it was forced to solve a political confiontation. Politidans should not lead sodety to such a point. However, where there is a force capable of destabilizing the situation and leaving death and destruction in its path, then only the milhary can end H.
Figure 4.8: October 1993; Why participated against White House (on Yeltsin’s side)
183 Tnitinting Event; Presidential decree dissolving Parliament
Relationship Between Actors: Goal(s): 1)an unending rivalry between the To defend the constitution and respect the law branches of government 2) deep deformations in sodety, the military is not valued 3) military demoralized and divided 4)President is incompetent and anti-populace
Actions: 1} Announced support of the Supreme Soviet 2) All ofScers in the White House acted courageously, the small group of officers that shot at us was not representative o f military opinion/behavior. N ot one single entire division supported Yeltsin 1 Consequences: 1)We could not stem or diange the course of history. In this action we lost 2 power structures; the legislative and judidary. 2) Yeltsin consolidated his victory by liquidating the opposition to him in the military and by using Western money to campaign for a new constitution. ; '
Action Advocated: dismissal of anti-populace, anti-Russian Yeltsin govt., unite and coordinate officers into Soyuz orgtiL, form an opposition block in the Duma, display the b e t s o f corruption and criminal negligence in the Ministries and Departments, esp. Grachev and his so- called Generals. The Supreme Soviet &Hed because the opposition forces were divided. We need to rd>uild a great Russia together.
Figure 4.9 October 1993; Why participated against Yeltsin
184 Initiating Event: Military participation in October 93 events I Relationship Between Actors: Goal(s): Military divided: some aligned To defend the constitution and respect the law with political leadership, others Maintain Russia as a great Power see current leaders as detrimental Those in Power have goal of rewarding those to military and societal interests who will preserve the security of the current political leadership, not the country as a whole. I Actions: 1) After both August 1991 and October 1993 there has been a massive housecieaning of those who are not in accord with the current leadership's politics. Many o f the best officer were purged and dilettantes were promoted. 2) Yeltsin has increasingly bought off the military with new titles and privileges in return for shooting at their own people. T
Action Advocated: 1)increase the moral character and professionalism of the highest leadership 2)increase battle readiness of Armed Forces 3) create a forum i^ ere officers can air their professional problems and express their opinion on the process o f military reform without the fear o f being expelled from the military without an apartment or the means to survive.
Figure 4.10; Cooptation of Military Through Promotion o f Mediocre Commanders
185 CHAPTERS
POST-IMPERIAL RUSSIAN MILITARY STRUCTURES, DYNAMICS, AND REFORMS
5.1 CHAPTER OVERVIEW:
In this chapter I will be arguing that the Soviet military can be characterized as an
organization in decline. The first stage of this decline can be attributed to decisions by the
Soviet leadership to reduce Soviet conventional force size as well as the preeminent role
of the Soviet military in Eastern European security. As reviewed in Chapter One, this
initial stage of organizational decline is characterized by a decrease in the organization’s
ability to successfully operate within its environment due to a dramatic environmental
change. Such radical organizational environmental changes may include policy reforms, the emergence of vacuums of power within the leadership of the constituency which they
serve, or changes in the distribution of power within the international system more generally. As a result of these environmental changes, the organization enters the second stage of decline, in which its resources are reduced. (Cameron, Sutton, and Whetton
1988:5-7) By examining the radical decrease in resources available to the military in the post-imperial period and linking it to the loss of the Soviet and then Russian empires, this
186 section asserts that post-imperial militaries are organizations facing an organizational
crisis, or organizations in decline. This assertion is tested in Hypothesis 3: Post-imperial
militaries perceive a discontinuous loss o f material resources and professional prestige
as a consequence o f the loss o f their external and internal empires.
After showing that the Russian military did experience an abrupt decline in their
resources and prestige, the remaining sections of this chapter examine the concrete effects
of this decline. The second section examines the consequences of organizational decline
for Russian military decision-making structures and processes. In this section I argue that
the Russian post-imperial military is characterized by a fragmented pluralism and an
increase in interest-group based calculations. The existence of conflicting divisions within the post-imperial military organization stands in direct contradiction to the literature on crisis decision making or organizations under threat. Organizations and decision-making groups facing a threat to the status quo have been hypothesized by some scholars to evidence constriction of decision-making group, restriction of information processing, and centralization of authority. (Hermann 1963; Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton 1981: for a review of the literature on threat rigidity effects in organization) This constriction and centralization is often accompanied by pressures toward uniformity and consensus within the group or organization. (Janis 1972) Therefore, there is something distinct about the loss of empire for a military organization which produces fragmentation and conflict rather than centralization and consensus. This section will test Hypothesis 4: M ilitaries which experience the loss o f an external and internal empire are characterized by fragmented organizational structures and interest-group based struggles between organizational
187 fa ctio n s. Fragmentation will be demonstrated by the emergence of rival organizational
decision-making structures, large scale personnel turn-over, and fights between sub
groups over resource allocations. (Tushman 1988: indicates these variables as important
indicators of fi’agmentation)
The third section explores the effect of the loss of Eastern Europe and the post
imperial decline on the reforms advocated by military officers. In this section I argue that
the fragmentation of the military extends to the diagnosis of the consequences of the loss
of empire and the reforms advocated to respond to it. Work by Cameron and Zammuto
(1988) indicates that a key dichotomy in managing organizational decline is the
perceptions of the type of environmental change which has occurred. This produces two
related hypotheses which are tested in this section. Hypothesis 5: When military officers perceive a decrease in overall demandfo r the military in the post-imperial society
(change in niche size) they are likely to encourage reactive defense o f their organizational structure and role. Hypothesis 6: When military officers see the change as substantive (change in niche shape rather than in overall demand) they are likely to advocate radical reform and experimental domain substitution. The post-imperial
Russian military is shown to be engaged in a struggle between these two approaches to reform; domain defense and experimental domain substitution.
In the final section, I discuss the origins of this conflict by examining branch differences. Militaries, even under ideal conditions, are not monolithic organizations.
Instead, in large organizations group sub-cultures exist which are a combination of beliefs, values, myths and norms.(Vertzberger 1990). Service branches within the military will
188 have different subcultures and material interests shaped by and shaping differences in their
function within the organization. (Jahowitz 1959.) This section will test Hypothesis 7:
Service, rank and generational variables all serve as important basesfor variation in
both the interpretation o f the challenges facing the post-imperial military and the policy
responses advocated by post-imperial military officers. I have alluded to the importance
of rank and generational differences in Soviet and Russian officers’ responses to the loss
of empire in the preceding two chapters. In this final section I argue that important
service differences also exist. Soviet/Russian Naval oflScers, Strategic Rocket Forces
commanders, and artillery and tank officers are primarily engaged in a battle to preserve
their domains while Paratroopers and Air Force officers are advocates of a new force structure and emphasis which they perceive will favor their interests.
5.2. POST-IMPERIAL MILITARIES ARE ORGANIZATIONS IN DECLINE
In the first section of the chapter, I will be making the case for the existence in the
Soviet and Russian military of the two-staged process of decline described in the overview of the organizational literature above. Organizations in decline must first experience a significant change in their operating environment. In order to illustrate that there was an important environmental change in 1989,1 will first present a brief overview of the modest military reforms undertaken from 1987-early 1989. I will then review the announcement of a major policy shift by Gorbachev and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1989, the unilateral withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe. Finally in this section I will make the case that following this major change in the environment in which the Soviet military was operating, Soviet military officers experienced the second stage of organizational
189 decline, a dram atic reduction in the organization’s budget and a significant decrease in the
prestige of their organization.
5.2,1 Baseline Organizational Reforms Before 1989; Restructuring in the Eariy
Gorbachev Years
The beginning of military reform under Gorbachev should be considered to be
1987 when a new militmy doctrine emphasizing a defensive orientation was adopted.
(Kalyuzhnyi 1991) In addition to the new doctrine of “defensive sufficiency,” there were
steps taken to apply Gorbachev’s program of glasnost and perestroika to the Soviet
military. The military press in 1987 and 1988 was full of articles on the need for increased
personal responsibility and initiative. (Akhromeyev 1988; Danileoko 1987; Lobov 1989;
Sokolov 1987) For example, military officers were charged with “acting with more
initiative, taking public opinion into account, and becoming more-efficient...” (Danilenko
1987) They were also urged to develop democracy within the military. “The time has come for everyone to think and decide.”(Op cite)
In addition to individual accountability, military units were now expected to improve their combat readiness and maintain military discipline. (Krivosheev 1988;
Sokolov 1987) This improvement in performance was tied to an improvement in training and a continued commitment to keeping up with-the technological advances in arms and equipment. “A resolute course has been adopted of ..bringing troop and naval forces training conditions as close as possible to real combat conditions...We need realism in appraising the standard of combat readiness, training, and discipline attained and a creative search for new approaches to the achievement of a real increase in military skill.” (Lushev
190 1987) “It is of crucial importance that the arms and the equipment supplied to the Army and Navy be effective and of high quality, so that the defense objectives can be met with a smaller number of weapons.” Finally, Akhromeyev also pointed to the need to “improve the command system by increasing its survival capacity, and automating telecommunications”. (Akhromeyev 1988)
While these changes were certainly perceived as an important reform in the military, compared to the changes that were to come, they were not radical. The military continued to perform the same missions, to retain its organizational structure and to receive funding to support research and development, training, salaries and military construction. Even when they heard of forthcoming reductions in the number of Armed
Forces, the initial response was to assume that they would not constitute a major change either in the military’s role in Europe or in the military’s overall budget. This type of response can be seen in the reaction of Tsarkov, the commander o f Moscow’s Air Defense forces. “My attitude toward the forthcoming reductions in the Armed Force is that this is a correct decision. First, this will improve the international situation, second it will show the entire world that we are rectifying the imbalance in conventional troops that has emerged in Europe. Third, this means considerable savings in state hinds. The cuts will allow us to improve the quality of conscription. We must retain primarily young cadres.
We will retire first all of those who have served out their tenure and me entitled to a pension.” (Tsarkov 1989) Inherent in his argument is the assumption that cuts in spending in one area, salaries to older ofiBcers, can be transferred to spending on better conscription
191 and younger ofiBcers. Finally, this can be done essentially at no real cost to the military
since the older ofiBcers are entitled to pensions.
5.2.2. Indicators of Rapid Environmental Change and Organizational Decline
5.2.2.1. Environmental Change
In December of 1988, appearing at the Forty-third Session of the United Nations
General Assembly, General Secretary Gorbachev announced that in the next two years the
USSR would decrease troop size by 500,000 as well as reducing their conventional
weapons levels. “By 1990 we expect the total number of troops to decline Bom
4,258,000 to about 3,760,000.” (Lobov 1989) These unilateral cuts were accompanied by
a pledge to shift to a defensive military posture. (Yazov 19S9a) This was Allowed in
October 1989 by the announcement that the USSR “has no moral or political right to intervene in the events happening in Eastern Europe,” a radical departure from former
Warsaw Pact policy. The troop size was cut again in 1992 when Article 12 of the
Supreme Soviet Law on Defense proclaimed that the membership of the Armed Forces during peacetime could not exceed 1 percent of the population. The Supreme Soviet charged the Defense Ministry with coming up for a plan to reduce troop levels before
December 31, 1994. (Tsarev 1996)
In addition to decreases in troops stationed in Europe, the 1988 announcement included the promise of arms reductions. “We must create security not building up but by reducing arms.” (Yazov 1989b) The cutbacks were immediate and dramatic. The production of highly enriched uranium for military purposes was discontinued. In 1989-90 two reactors for the production of weapons-grade plutonium were closed down. The
192 Defense Ministry promised that 40% of the volume of defense industry production would be converted to civiliaa output in 1989 and that this was to be increased to 60% by 1995.
(Yazov 1989a) In the period from 1989-1994 a 20% reduction in the volume of arms production was previewed. However in 1990-1991 alone, spending on military weapons was cut by 19.5 %. Production of tanks was cut by 10,000, artillery systems by 8,500 and military planes by 820. This period coincided with the withdrawal of troops and equipment from Eastern Europe. (Deineg 1990) The cuts in weapons and battle technology were only exacerbated by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the loss of
Russia’s internal empire. The most advanced equipment was stationed in the border republics and thus lost to the Russian military. 70% of the equipment Russia inherited with the collapse of the Soviet Union was obsolete. (Holcomb 1993)
5.2.2.2. The Declining Post-Imperial Military Budget
As the organizational decline literature would predict, these dramatic environmental changes were accompanied by dramatic decreases in the military’s resources. The years 1989 and 1990 were the first years in which the military budget was reduced in real terms. TheofiBcial 1989 military budget was 77,294.2 million rubles or 9% of GNP (Editorial 1990; Holloway 1989/90; 10). However, in 1989 Nikolai Ryzhkov, chairman of the Council of \finisters, announced that the government planned to reduce the proportion of GNP spent on defense by 1.5-2 times by 1995. (Holloway 1989/90)
There was an immediate reduction in defense construction (upkeep of military installations) of 28.4 billion rubles (Deineg 1990). In addition, unoflBcial expenses and privileges available to the military were curtailed. For example, the Moscow housing
193 authority stopped its policy of allocating 65,000 meters of Moscow apartment space to the
Ministry of Defense just at the time that more ofiBcers were returning to Russia from
Eastern Europe. ^Æakarenko 1990)
The ofiBcial 1990 budget was 70,975.8 million rubles, an 8% cut from 1989.
(Editorial 1990; Holloway 1989/90:10) However, some militaiy oflScers argued that the real cuts were much larger. (Deineg 1990) This discrepancy can be attributed to the many hidden military expenses that were not included in the ofiBcial budget, ‘^eal military spending has been estimated by some as 200 billion rubles. By saying we spend only 71 billion rubles on defense we do the military a disservice, but how do we make the transition to open reporting with a public against any additional spending?” (Makarenko
1990) These hidden subsidies often included local executive and parliamentary material and financial allocations to the military. In 1990 there was 19.2% less of this local money for military construction than in 1989. This was accompamed by a 15% cut in Union military construction. (Makarenko 1990) 1989 levels were already too low to be able to do any significant preservation or repair on military facilities.
By 1992 the reductions were so dramatic that all ability of the military to engage in significant spending on anything but survival of its personnel-and bare-bones upkeep was abandoned. In addition, the 1992 military budget was significantly affected by the rapid rate of inflation. Stepashin, Chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet
Committee on Defense and Security, articulated the following three main areas of military spending: ‘The first is the social protection of servicemen, both of ofiBcers and of draftees. The second is resolving pensions for veterans. Third, it is necessary to prevent
194 the possibility of the miiitaiy-industriai complex being destroyed. There must be serious reductions in the purchases of armaments and equipment. But we must pay the wages of workers of enterprises of the military-industrial complex, even if they will not be producing anything.”(Stepashm 1991)
In the period of 1993-1995 the military budget entered a period of free-fall and great uncertainty. Although comparisons are impossible due to rampant inflation, the decrease in the military budget was as much as 150- 200% in 1993-1995. By 1993,
Deputy Minister of Defense Kokoshin armounced that the N/Gnistry of Defense had a 400 billion ruble deficit in procurement funding and the military industrial complex was in danger of disintegrating. In 1994 the Defense Department asked for 87 trillion rubles
(about 45 billion dollars) They received 40 trillion which was more than the internal police received but half of what they felt their real needs were. In actuality, due to inflation, this allocation was only worth 6.5 billion dollars, or 14% of what they had originally requested in real spending terms. (Rogov 1994) In addition to uncertainty due to rapid inflation, military branches were unable to predict their budget since money was allocated by quarter or even shorter. (Holcomb 1993) Finally, the full sum allocated, even deflated after inflation, was not paid out. “In this past year we have only achieved 53% of what was allocated to us legally. This not only destabilizes the conditions in the Armed
Forces but also leads to economic loss for society because of debts that the Ministry has to factories and utilities. In the last few months we have been getting only enough money to cover s^aries but not to meet other expenses or gods. How are we supposed to feed the soldiers, build apartments or treat them medically? I think we can only reduce spending
195 on the military after we have taken certain measures toward military reform.”(Vorob'ev
1994)
By 1995 the budgetary process in Russia had completely collapsed and the
situation since has only worsened. The projected 1995 military budget was 45 trillion
rubles, or 1.5 times less than what the defense department claims were its real
expenses. (Rogov 1994) The 1996 budget figures reflect a significant drop in spending
fi-om 1995 because the growth in spending falls behind the rate of inflation by 1.5-2 times.
(Editorial 1995b) “There will be less and less money available to purchase modem
weaponry. If trends continue we will spend only 10% of the budget on new weapons in
2000 and only 5% in 2005.” (Plotnikov 1995) In addition, rmlitary officers argue that their
costs are increasing as they are being asked to do additional tasks with the money they are
allocated. ‘Tt will cost us 1.8 trillion rubles just to guarantee the trmrsition of our
servicemen to new jobs. In order to withdraw troops from Eastern Europe and the former republics of the USSR, Russia has had to allocate important material resources to relocate and rehouse the troops.” Finally, “the conflict in Chechnya has required all of our financial resources and we have not received any additional budget allocations to offset this cost.”
(Kolesnikov 1995)
5.2 2.3. Rapidly Declining Professional Prestige
Finally, in this second stage of organizational decline, there was a significant drop in the prestige which military oflScers perceived their profession commanded. This is most concretely reflected in falling wages for oflScers and an increase in the number of officers returning fi-om the external and internal empires to find that they had no apartments.
196 Complaints about the lowered prestige, wages and living conditions began in 1989
(Roundtable 1989: Colonel V. Danilov) By 1990 there were 10,000 homeless officers. By
1994 200,000 officers did not have homes. “This has led to demoralization and the basis for recruitment of officers as ‘soldiers’ of the Russian mafia.” -(Rogov 1994)
Salaries for officers and servicemen were not in balance with average salaries in the country. (Editorial 1990; Makarenko 1990) In 1990 the Soviet Union spent 19,323 million rubles, 26% of the budget, as opposed to 57% in the US on salaries. US officers and generals were paid 6-8 times more than their Soviet counterparts. “The social situation of servicemen their salaries, housing, etc is at a critical situation. All of this speaks to the fall in prestige of service in the Armed Forces. This in turn negatively affects the quality-of work and military readiness of the Army and Navy.” (Deineg 1990) The situation only worsened by 1994, when military ofiBcers’ salaries were comparable to those o f metro attendants or construction workers. In addition, as with the budget overall, officers’ salaries were severely and negatively affected by the rate of inflation. In January 1994, officers salaries were $189 in U.S. dollars, by July they had fallen to $117. The situation was corrected in July to raise their salaries to $163 but th ^ were down to $80 in the middle of October and despite several more correctives had fallen to $89 and were projected to fall to about $50 by June of 1995.(Editorial 1995a) It should not be surprising therefore that post-imperial military officers felt that they experienced a dramatic decrease in their compensation and prestige. This estimation was shared by society. In a 1996 poll only 2% of graduating high school seniors polled on their preferred future careers cited a
197 desire to become a military officer. This was down from 6-8% in 1989, a three to four
hundred percent decrease. (Kondrashev 1996)
5.2.2.4. Conclusion/Summary:
In this section I have shown that the post-imperial Soviet military was indeed an
organization in decline. In 1989, with the announcement o f the withdrawal from Eastern
Europe, the military experienced the beginning of a series of dramatic changes in its
operating environment which initiated the second stage of organizational decline.
Following the aimouncement of withdrawal from Eastern Europe and then from the
republics of the former Soviet Union, the Soviet/Russian military experienced a dramatic
reduction in both the military’s resources and prestige in the years immediately following
the loss of its external and internal empires. Finally, this decline was exacerbated by the
subsequent withdrawal from the former Soviet republics and the war with Chechnya.
Indeed, by 1993 the military’s-budgetary process had completely collapsed and
organizational prestige was at a record low. The analysis affirms Hypothesis 3: Post-
imperial militaries perceive a discontinuous loss o f material resources and professional prestige as a consequence o f the loss o f their external and internal empires.
5.3. ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS/ CHANGES IN DECISION-MAKING
STRUCTURES
What are the consequences of the organizational decline described above for the
decision-making structures and processes of post-imperial militaries? This section will
examine Hypothesis 4: M ilitaries which experience the loss o f an external and internal empire are characterized by fragmented organizational structures and interest-group
198 based struggles between organizationalfactions Fragmentation will be demonstrated by the emergence of rival organizational decision-making structures, large scale personnel turn-over, and fights between sub-groups over resource allocations. In order to test this hypotheses I will first briefly describe the organizational structure of the Soviet military as a baseline for comparison. Then I wiU turn to an examination of the evidence in the post imperial period of signs of organizational fi’agmentation and conflict. Evidence of increased organizational centralization and consensus in the post-imperial period would disconfirm the hypothesis.
Note that since this is a study of the post-imperial Russian military I will not be discussing the complicated and short-lived emergence of a unified C.I.S. military command. The real relevancy of a C I S. military structure is confined to the brief period between December 1991, and May 1992. In December 1991 at the first C.I.S. summit there was an agreement reached that the strategic armed forces would be placed under a single command subordinate to a council of heads of the member states. But the original
Russian intention to make the Russian forces operationally subordinate to the main command of the C.I.S. forces was eliminated when Grachev was appointed Russian
Defense Minister and influence shifted from the C.I.S. to Russia. By May 1992, the
Russian General Staff had coopted most of the personnel of the former Soviet general stafl^ leaving no personnel for a C.I.S. staff as originally envisioned. (Allison 1993)
199 5.3.1 Baseline Soviet Decision-Making Structures; the Chain of Command Before
the Loss of Empire
In the Soviet Union the military command structure was divided into three major
decision-making bodies; the Defense Council, the Main Mditary Council (“Kollegiya”) of
the Ministry of Defense, and the General Staff. These three agencies collectively were
characterized overlapping membership and duties. Just like other institutions in the
Soviet party-state apparatus, they were not constrained by a division of powers, or checks
and balances, but instead by a system of party appointments and loyalties. The Defense
Council was the main civilian-military joint coordinating committee. This Council had very broad powers including the ability to reform the entire structure of the Soviet armed forces or to change personnel at whim. (Scott 1984) However, while the Defense Council was clearly an important institution in policy selection, much of the real option formation and implementation was left to the other two military organs. (Rice 1987; describes this system as a ‘loose coupling” between Party directives and military behavior) This chapter will be primarily concerned with the relationship between the Ministry of Defense and the
General Staff, the two leadership organs within the Soviet military organization.
The Ministry of Defense of the USSR, led by the Minister of Defense, was the main military organ for defense policy and implementation in the Soviet Union. It was officially charged with the formulation of plans for the development of military operations, conscription and staflBng and mobilization, and also directed military research and development programs.(Jones 1985) The main decision making organ of the Ministry of
Defense was the Main Military Council. This Council was chaired by the Minister of
2 0 0 Defense. Other members of the Council included the three First Deputy Ministers of
Defense (one of which was Chief of the General StaS), the Chief of the Main Political
Administration, and the CINC (Commander in Chief) of each of the branches of the
Soviet military as well as the Warsaw Pact joint forces. In peacetime, the council was
charged with the whole spectrum of problems and issues associated with the leadership of
the Armed Forces and the strategy guiding their use. In wartime, this Council was
replaced by the Stavka, or the Supreme Command. The membership of the Stavka was
secret but it was presumed to be smaüer and at the discretion of the Commander in Chief
of the Armed Forces (the CP SU General Secretary. )(Defense 1976-1980; Defense 1983;
Scott 1984)
In the Soviet period, the General Staff was a sub-unit within the Defense Ministry,
subordinate to the Minister of Defense and the Main Military Council, or Stavka in wartime (see Figure 5.1 Organization of the Soviet Armed Forces.) The General Staff was considered by some analysts as the personal staff of the Defense Minister. (Jones
1985) However, hr was also the largest of the three bodies with the broadest organizational mandate. The five military services reported first to theUhief of the General Staff. ‘The
Ministry of Defense directs the Armed Forces through the General Staff "(Tyushkevich
1978) The General Staff trained aU-of the staff ofiBcers and fixture commanders of the
Soviet Union. Standard Soviet training of ofiBcers included three years of Frunze
Academy for Ground or Air Forces, or the Navy staff college, plus 2.5 years at the
Voroshilov Academy of the General Staff. Graduates of this five-year program assumed the principal General Staff and Senior field command positions. (Garthoff 1989: fi’om
2 0 1 Voroshilov lectures) In addition, the General Staff was charged with the basic strategic
planning for the Armed Forces.(Scott 1984) It organized the deployment of the Armed
Forces, conducted preparations of the military and controlled them during the conduct of
war. (Garthoff 1989) Finally, ^he Generd Staff was considered the academic center of the
H i^ Command. The General Staff had an important role in fostering debates over the
future of Soviet military doctrine. (Akhromeyev 1988) In the pre-imperial period the
existence of a powerful sub-unit of the NCnistry with overlapping responsibilities and a
claim to superior expertise was not problematic, however, as I will argue in the next
section, this organizational structure became contentious in the post-imperial period as
competing groups of officers used the orgæiizatîons as a way to develop rival loci of
power.
5.3.2. Signs of Organizational Fragmentation and Conflict
1. Personnel turnover
There have been two important dynamics characterizing staffing in the post
imperial Soviet/Russian military. First, there were significant purges/voluntary retirements
at the senior level in the post-putsch period up until the creation of the Russian military.
(Deynekin 1991) In 1992 there was a wave of voluntary retirement at twice the rate that they were being replaced. When Yeltsin issued the declaration on the creation of the
Russian armed forces on May 7, 1992, he sanctioned a partial generational change in the commanding cadre. The generals of the Warsaw Pact were on their way out, making room for men of Grachev’s generation, the generation who served in the war in
Afghanistan, dubbed the “Afghansy.” (Calka 1993) As a result of this generational change
2 0 2 as well as voluntary retirements, by 1994 there was a reduction of 20% in the staffing of top officers. Some specialities were especially hard hit. For example, there were only
36%of the pre-imperial officer corps in the Ground Artillery Commanders. (Editorial
1995a)
The second important phenomenon has been the weakening of the junior officer corps. As reform has occurred in the military, the officer corps has gotten younger and less experienced. 50% of all officers are under the age of 30. (Popov 1995) While this could be seen as a sign of organizational renewal, there are indications that it is exactly the opposite. Of the young officers just finishing school the most capable and visionary have been trying to figure out how they c%i avoid the five-year service requirement and enter the civilian sector where their opportunities and compensation are greater.(Editorial
1995a; Plotnikov 1995) The current military leadership is also sacrificing a lot of intelligent junior officers with ideas for organizational rejuvenation in order to avoid dissension with their senior commanders. (Kusnetsov 1995) “As a result of poor planning in reforming the military, we have a weak class of young officers unable to organize in battle and not smart enough to lead even a small group of soldiers.” (Rodionov 1995b)
5.3.2.2. Rival Decision Making Structures: The Fight between the General Staff and
Department of Defense for Influence.
Beginning in 1990, a struggle emerged in the Soviet military press between two groups of officers over the appropriate locus for military reform and organizational decision-making. Calls for clarifying the division of responsibilities and eliminating redundancies in the distribution of responsibilities within the military were merely
203 platforms for establishing either the General Staff or Ministry of Defense as the preeminent
military structure in the post-imperial era. One of the consequences of this ongoing
struggle between rival decision-making structures in the military was the overall
weakening of the military as an organization and a decrease in the possibility of
implanenting a coherent strategy for the military.
In 1990 the General Staf^ once subordinated to the Nfinistry of Defense, began to
make a play for independence and supremacy. For example. Lieutenant General Karpov,
head of command for the General Staff commented; “We need to reorganize the organs of
command, especially the central apparatus. This requires better specification of the tasks and fimctions of all o f its structures. We should now liquidate any sources of parallelism in the work of the branches and thereby reduce numbers.” (Roundtable 1990) Ivanov, a senior professor at the General Staff Academy, followed up this call with a specific distribution of policy responsibility. Under his proposal the General Staff would be charged with planning for the use of the military, and with commanding the Strategic
Forces, the high-readiness forces, the educational forces, the Republic Forces, the Civil
Defense Forces and the organs of local management. The basing of general purpose troops (Ground Forces) would also be determined by the General Staff. The General Staff would develop these plans for the use of forces and the President would approve them.
While the functions o f the Defense Ministry were not specifically elaborated, by process of elimination they seem very limited in scope. Ivanov proposed the formation of a committee of 100-150 people, serving a fixed term of 5 years, who would be responsible for the administration of weapons orders and the supervision of the quality of equipment
204 and its distribution. This Committee would work under the direct supervision of the
Defense Minister with the close cooperation o f the General Staff. (Ivanov 1990)
By contrast, the 1990 military doctrine contained a more generous view of the fimctions of the Ministry of Defense. In the reform project published in July 1990 the
Ministry of Defense is proclaimed as the leadership of the Armed Forces, responsible for its battle and mobilization readiness. In this version, it is the Ministry that develops and presents to the President plans for the use of the armed forces and the development of weapons programs. They, not a committee o f civilians, are responsible for; procurement and quality control, the democratization of relations in the military, changes in the military education and any changes in the draft. They are also responsible for ensuring that servicemen have adequate material conditions.(EditoriaI 1990)
At the end of 1991, following the post-putsch shake-up of military personnel.
General Vladimir Lobov, recently appointed as head of the General Staff raised the stakes in the struggle for General Staff autonomy. He proposed eliminating the emerging split between the General Staff and Defense Ministry by turning the Defense Ministry into a civilian organ. This proposal was supported by Army General Kobets and General
Volkogonov. (Kobets 1992) “At the union level we should have a civilian Defense hCnistry to complement the General Staff and to exercise mutual control over one another.’’(Lobov 1991a) The civilian Defense Ministry would be charged with military economics, and equipment and arms orders. The Ministry would engage in training young people for military service, deliver the conscripts and handle veteran’s problems. They would be in charge of mobilization and demobilization and infrastmcture. In other words,
205 the Defense Ministry would be the administrative apparatus, leaving the General Staff the
military functions of combat training and combat readiness. Under this system the General
Staff would be directly subordinate to the President and would be the institution to which
all military institutions were subordinate. (Lobov 1991a)
In this first round of the fight over the status of the General Stafi^ Lobov lost. In
December, 1991 fie was dismissed. He explained it tfius. “In all of my activity as chief of
the General Staff I have taken every possible measure to ensure that the constantly
changing political situation is reflected in the fate of the Armed Forces and does not cause
them to disintegrate spontaneously with disastrous consequences. Given the conditions of
the obvious disintegration of our state and its armed fixces, political circumstances are
changing rapidly and dictate changes in the disposition of the leading cadres. People who
have their own principled positions on questions of vital importance are becoming
undesirable.” (Lobov 1991b) Shaposhnikov, in explaining Lobov’s dismissal, argued that
his proposal was an attempt to split the military into two parallel stmctures. This was
characterized by Shaposhnikov, Grachev and much of the Afghansy as “unproductive and risky since it could lead to the withdrawal of the General Staff and the Armed Forces from the supervision of the Defense Ministry.’’(Shaposhnikov 1991a) Instead, Shaposhnikov and Grachev won a unified Ministry of Defense and the position of General Staff was weakened significantly. Its chief had no access to political decision makers except through the Minister. The only concession to those backing a civilian Defense Ministry was the appointment of Kokoshin as First Deputy Minister of Defense. (Kipp 1992)
206 The next battle between military ofBcers in the General StaflF and the Ministry of
Defense was over Russian military doctrine. In May 1992 the General Staff published its ideas for the doctrine in Voennaya Mysl (Committee 1992) In this document they continued to assert that the Staff should be directly subordinate to the President (as
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.) The Security Council, headed by the Russian
President, was to be the main military-political organ exercising overall direction of
Russia's military policy, force structuring and economic support for defense. The Ministry of Defense was charged with developing and implementing military, military technical and cadres policy, financial and logistical support and other administrative tasks. (Committee
1992; Lopuxhov 1992; Rutskoi 1992b) Under this division of responsibility, the General
Staff would retain control over the details of the implementation of policy and a near monopoly over defense questions.(Dick 1992)
From the time that the General Staff version was published in May, 1992 until the time that a doctrine was adopted in October, 1993 several other drafts emerged to challenge it. Among these was a draft sponsored by Grachev and his staff at the Ministry of Defense. A 1993 Draft doctrine was passed on Nov 2 and it was signed by Yeltsin as
Decree 1833. This version was given precedence over that of the Security Council itself, partially in repayment for Grachev’s service in supporting Yeltsin in October, 1993. (Dick
1994: citing an article in Segodnya of November 9, 1993.) The fact that the 1993 doctrine version stresses internal threats for the first time is a consequence of the fact that the
Department of Defense again won an organizational battle over the General Staff. (The
207 General Staff in the 1992 version of the Russian military doctrine identified external
threats as the key sources of potential conflict.)
In January 1995, there was a final episode in the struggle between the General
Staff and the \finistry of Defense. Nezavisimava Gazeta reported a Presidential
announcement on the removal of the General Staff fi-om the structure of the Defense
Ministry. The decision to separate the General Staff was unexpected even by the Head of
the General Staff, Kolesnikov. Under this plan the General Staff would direct Armed
Forces operations as well as the Strategic Nuclear Forces. The General Staff seemed to
have won the right ta an independent role as adviser to the President.(Kolesnikov 1994)
This victory was recognized by Defense Minister Grachev who, on hearing of the news,
was said to be close to prostrate. Without the General Staff under his authority he goes from being an influential figure to one of nominal stature. What accounted for this final
step in the institutionalization of rival centers of decision-making in the military? One answer is that the division of the military serves the interests of the Yeltsin government because it weakens the military’s ability to act against the government. “By removing the
General Staff from the Defense Ministry Yeltsin is believed to be able to neutralize any internal or external threat to the security of the current regime.” (Korotchenko 1995)
5.3.2.3 Conclusion: The Effects of Structural Fragmentation and Conflict
In this section 1 have shown that the organizational decision-making structure and organizational dynamics in the post-imperial period were characterized by fi-agmented pluralism and interest-group based calculations rather than by a more rigid and centralizing response to dramatic threats. Ironically, calls for centralization and unity were used by
208 segments of the oflRcer corps to further their own political and organizational agendas.
Instead of constriction of control and increased organizational cohesiveness, the primary
organizational dynamics in the post-imperial Russian military were large-scale persormel
turn-over, and the emergence of rival decision-making structures within the organization
which served as a conduit for fights between sub-groups over resource allocations and
policy influence.
While this struggle between rival centers of power may have been seen as
beneficial to the stability and security of the Yeltsin government, it was clearly deleterious
for the military itself. Rival decision-making structures meant that there was no single
organizational structure Tesponsible for reform. “The President is commander in chief of
the Army but what'is the command structure for these forces?” (Xhomchenko 1995)
“We as officers knew that there was a lack of direction... It has become clear that there Is
not a single system of command that is responsible for the complete defense of the
country... We have long been undergoing a pseudo-reform that has resulted in the radical
lowering of the prestige of the General Staff and the Defense Minister. Neither the
President nor the military leadership have accepted responsibility for the state of the
country’s defense or for its reform. We have not a single fully staffed unit. Our budget is
so low we can not meet our minimal needs. We have neither the resources nor the staff to
plan military maneuvers. Who briefs the President on military problems?”(Rodionov
1995a)
This lack of clear responsibility has not only sidelined reforms but has contributed to the poor military performance in Chechnya. “The Chechen conflict sheds light on the
209 preparedness of the military to fulfill the tasks needed of it and shows that previous experiments in reform have not strengthened our military security.” (Rodionov 1995a)
Finally, as the regular military has been weakened, other military organizations have arisen to rival the armed forces in number financial resources and political influence. “As we have decreased the Army and Navy we have increased the membership in the internal forces.”(Xhomchenko 1995)
As this section has shown, interest-groups become important vehicles for fighting to protect turf and resource allocations. Not all of these organizational sub-groups were equally successful and not all were equally affected or threatened by the changes. This has an important effect not only on the decision-making structure of the post-imperial military, but also on the direction of military policy reforms. The p o lic y implications of a fi-agmented military will be explored more completely in the next sections of this chapter.
5.4. GENERAL ORIENTATION OF REFORMS
What is the effect of post-imperial decline on the reform policies advocated by military ofBcers? In this section of the chapter I will turn from an examination of organizational decision-making structures to an analysis of the direction of military policy advocated by the leadership of the Soviet and Russian military after 1989.1 will be examining evidence for the hypothesis that the way in which military officers describe the nature and degree of decline explains the reforms they advocate. Hypothesis 5: When militcay officers perceive a decrease in overall demandfo r the military in the post imperial society (change in niche size) they are likely to encottrage reactive defense o f their organizational structure and role. Hypothesis 6: When military officers see the
2 1 0 change as substantive (change in niche shape rather than in overall demand) they are likely to advocate radical reform and experimental domain substitution. As I will show in this section, these innovations tend to take the form of new technologies or more cost- efficient and streamlined organizational structures.
This section will be concerned with the overall diagnosis of change and the direction which Soviet/Russian military policy took in the period from 1990-1995. In order to understand the degree to which these policies represented reforms, we must briefly examine the force deployment and military strategy of the Soviet military before the withdrawal from Eastern Europe. Accordingly, I will begin with a discussion o f pre-1989
Soviet military policy. I will then turn to an examination of the changes which were proposed by Soviet and Russian military leaders in the post-imperial period in order to determine if there is a link between their diagnosis of the nature of their new environment and the reforms they advocated.
5.4.1 The Soviet Armed Forces Before 1989 (Figure 5.1)
The general orientation of the Soviet Armed Forces in the 1980s was characterized by three main components; doctrine, troop deployment and weapons emphasis. The
Soviet doctrine and training had an emphasis on the offensive, or seizing the strategic initiative at the outbreak of a war through surprise attacks and the massive mobilization of both first-echelon forces and reserves. This was important because it was supposed that the entry of the enemy’s allies into the war would rapidly expand the dimensions of the conflict.(Garthoff 1989: Voroshilov lectures p. 82) The first strategic echelon consisted of
2 1 1 Soviet, Polish, Czechoslovakian, Hungarian and German units. The second strategic echelon was stationed primarily in the Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltics. (Holcomb 1992)
Within the armed forces there was an emphasis on strategic nuclear forces and tank units. The Nuclear Rocket Forces, and strategic nuclear forces more broadly, were seen as “the decisive means of the conduct of war.” (Garthoff 1989: Voroshilov lectures)
The tank troops were considered the main strike force of the Ground Forces and the category of troops best adapted to the rapid and mobile operations necessary to combat weapons of mass destruction. Air power was only used to cover the Ground Forces and their rear installations against enemy air attacks. (Ivanevskiy 1985)
In the late 1980s, with the transition to a defensive doctrine, there was a moderate restructuring of forces. Intermediate range nuclear weapons were eliminated. The
Western, Eastern and Southern Forces were reconfigured to be defensive by increasing the number of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapon systems, and improving the means for placing minefields. (Chernyshev 1989; Yazov 1989b) Finally, in the late 1980s Division
#87 was created. This was intended to be an experienced joint-forces unit. Later, a portion of this unit was designated as defensive, the rest was called a counter-offensive strike force. But the saturation of tanks being withdrawn fi’om Afghanistan and then
Eastern Europe and added to these units drastically reduced their mobility. This experiment led to failure. Since then the structure of this joint forces division has not been significantly altered. By 1991 it was recognized that further reforms were urgently needed. (Kalyuzhnyi 1991)
2 1 2 5.4.2. Soviet Reforms; Reacting to the Loss of External Empire
In the interim period between the withdrawal from Eastern Europe and the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the Soviet officers corps was split on their diagnosis of the
changes and their proposals for military reform. Soviet officers portrayed the
consequences ofthewithdrawal from Eastern Europe in one o f three ways leading them
to advocate either; reactive defense, domain substitution or some combination o f the two.
5.4.2.1. Reactive Defense
One group of officers responded to the loss of Eastern Europe by arguing that the changes did not represent a reduction in the need for the military, or at least for its core functions. “NATO has broken the strategic balance in its favor and could attack from any border of the USSR. We need to deploy Soviet forces on the border of the USSR. To do this we need sufficient time and a large military expenditure. We need to protect nuclear forces, arsenals, factories, aerodromes, major industrial centers and be prepared to fight an electronic fire war.” (Korotchenko 1991) While they did recognize a reduction in their resources they argued that these reductions ignored the fact that external security threats still existed, niche size in real terms had not changed. “We were wrong to unilaterally disarm and alter the parity between the Soviet Union and NATO.
Furthermore, 1 myself doubt that lowering the quantity of people and means of waging war will not lessen the capability and quality of the army.” (Lyutov 1991)
The reform proposals emerging from this diagnosis of the withdrawal bear a striking resemblance to the pre-withdrawal doctrine and force structure. Ivanov proposes an Armed Forces consisting of 3 contingents, differing from each other in their degree of
213 readiness, function and administrative reporting structure. The first level would be troops
on a constant readiness alert. These would include nuclear rocket and submarine forces,
anti-aircraft defenses, a portion of military aviation, and a portion of the Navy. The
second contingent would be the majority of the forces. It would consist of reserves able
to be mobilized in war-time. The third contingent would be training and alternative
service. The length of time of service in a training/educational unit would be 6 months,
after which they enter either the first or second contingents or into alternative service in the republic units.^vanov 1990) This reform proposal fits the operational definition put forward in Chapter Two of domain defense or consolidation; cm attempt to prevent the core domain from bemg abolished, characterized by an argument that the organization ought to be maintained at status quo levels.
5.4.2.2. The Middle Point: Reactive Defense and Domain Substitution
The second approach to the loss of Eastern Europe recognized the changes which had occurred but argued that these changes, while engendering new tasks for the military, did not change the overall demand for military services or the old tasks which the military performed. In terms of the volume o f demand for the military, this group agreed with those who argued that the niche size in real terms was unchanged. However, niche shape had been modified to include new tasks. “Military reform must study the new course in internal politics, the transformation o f society and the reorganization of all aspects of society. These all require the all-around fundamental restructuring of the whole system of defense, not just the Army and Navy. We need concrete measures that compensate for the quantitative decrease in new resources. We need to find a way to turn these negative
214 developments into a path for meeting new tasks without any new resources at our
disposal. The problem currently is that military policy should not be oriented only toward
positive trends in military-political forces. We must be ready to defend our country
against many different possible aggressors.” (Gareev 1991) This approach could be
considered an amcdg,cmx>fdomain d^ense and some moderate experimental domain
substitution, or the diversification o f organizational activities.
S.4.2.3. Domain Substitution/Experimentation
For many officers, however, there was a recognition that a significant change in
the environment h a d taken place. This realization was accompanied by an
acknowledgment that reforms in military doctrine and command structures were needed.
“There have been small steps taken in the last few years, but they have not been integrated
into a larger strategy of military reform. Life demands more decisive steps to guarantee
the nation’s security and to improve the system of defense. In the 1960s reform was
needed because of military-technical and strategic factors involved in the development of
nuclear weapons. Now we are undertaking them due to international relations, socio
political and economic motives. We must increase the effectiveness of defense and bring it
into line with the situation and the tasks required of us.” (Roundtable 1990; Major-
General Yuri Kirshin) “Radical changes in the military-political situation in the world, the
adoption of a new Soviet military doctrine, the beginning of a reduction in the number of
military forces, all of this requires military reform in order to bring the military forces into line with the level of military threat.’’(Kalyuzhnyi 1991) These oflScers acknowledged a
215 decrease in the demand (niche size) for military services due to the real reduction in
external threats to the Soviet state.
However, the Soviet military in the post-imperial period faced new threats which
required a new organizational mission and structure. “While the threat of East-West
conflict has been eliminated, there is an increased threat of conflict in local/regional wars.
In these circumstances our government needs a strong, mobfle multinational part-
voluntary professional, part-draft military which corresponds with the reasonable needs
for suflBcient defense against agression or the development o f unfavorable conditions in
the environment.’’(Editorial 1990) The diagnosis of a change in niche shape as well as
size produces a reform strategy that fits the definition in Chapter Two of domain
substitution/creation-, the replacement of old organizational activities with new tasks, or
the diversification of organizational activities.
The reform strategies of this final group of ofBcers emphasize a more radical
reform in the structure and use of forces. For example, one proposal envisions two stages
of reform. Up to 1994 they will reduce nuclear and conventional weapons and complete the withdrawal fi'om Eastern Europe. In addition, they propose the formation of a
strategic group of forces to repel aggression. In the second stage, they envisioned completing the process of forming strategic forces on the territory of the USSR, and reorganizing the central command apparatus. (Editorial 1990) A related proposal suggests the following directions for reform; develop the command structure, increase fire power, increase the mobility, tenacity and striking capabilities of weapons of mass destruction, strengthen operating and tactical independence of units, guarantee the possibility of being
216 able to conduct all types of battles, and economize on the number of troops needed.
(Markovskii 1991) The reduction in troops increases the importance of mobilization both
in peacetime and wartime. “When we compare our structures with those of NATO countries we see that they have a more simple structure with 2-3 times less structural subdivisions, while their strategic operations-level is the same or even higher.” (Meleshin
1991) Finally they recognized the need to develop new types of military technology in order for the forces to be able to carry out their military tasks. (Markovskii 1991) These proposals fit the hypothesis that experimental domain substitution wiU be associated with reforms which emphasize the use of new technologies and more cost-efficient and streamlined organizational structures.
One of the more radical proposals to emerge during this period argued for a shift fi'om a draft military to a paid professional volunteer force. This proposal was also made with the recognition that, in response to an overall decrease in threats to Soviet security, the social environment had changed. (Roundtable 1990: Ret. Lt General V.V.
Serebryannikov) ‘Tt is clear that the population believes that although an army is needed, the army that has existed must be changed. We need to play the music the customer wants. The people pay in blood and rubles and snobism about their attitudes and thought is unwarranted. Eventually we will need to respond to their desire to end the draft and have a professional army. We can already make some changes although we are not ready to make the full transformation. Those branches of service that are especially rigorous
(serving on a ship for long periods) should be made paid and voluntary. It would be much
217 better to have a different army but battle ready/capable than to resist and have an lower level of battle readiness.” (Vasilev 1990)
5.4.3. A Brief Flirtation with a New Warsaw Pact Structure; Reactive Defense of the
CIS.
In a parallel development to the analysis presented in Chapter Three, while the withdrawal from Eastern Europe split the ofScer corps into domain defenders and reformers, the anticipated collapse of the Soviet Union and the loss of the other republics seemed to produce a more uniform initial reaction among the officer corps, even anxmg those who were considered reform-minded. The majority o f the reactions and reform proposals cotild be classifieds reactive defense rather than experimental r^orm. ‘The events of the last months and days have shown that the process of the dissolution of the structure of the former Soviet Union is impossible to stop. But the unity of the military is essential. The infrastructure of the military has been created by history, tested by life, and has endured the experience of war. We must retain the centralization of the leadership and one military space within the previous borders.” (Editorial 1992) Russian military officers proposed that old Warsaw Pact structures serve as the model for the future
Commonwealth of Independent States’ joint armed forces. “I predict that a real C I S.
Joint Armed Forces will be established and that this structure will be reminiscent of the
Warsaw Pact. The Russian command bodies will be the chief commissariat (Glavkomat) of the services. (Rutskoi 1992a) “Russia should secure a system of collective defense in the CIS. that parallels that of the former Warsaw Pact. This means that the sovereign governments should act together and, as much as possible, preserve the elements of the
218 former USSR’s system of defense.” (Rodionov 1992) “There has to be a joint staff in the
C.I.S. high command which will include representatives of all the C.I.S. countries-
something along the lines of the former Warsaw Pact General Forces Staff.” (Kobets
1992)
The lone voice for reform, as mentioned in section 5.3.2 on organizational conflict,
was silenced by a forced retirement. General Lobov argued at the end of 1991 that there
was a change in niche size and shape which required a new organizational structure. “The
government can no longer provide for the Armed Forces’ needs by the old conventional
methods that were too much of a burden on people. At the same time there have been
radical changes in the foreign military-political situation, the I.N.F. treaty, end of Warsaw
Pact, chemical weapons treaty and START. In order to carry out these tasks we need a
comparatively small professional army, plentifully supplied with the most modem, high-
quality military equipment.’’(Lobov 1991a)
5.4.4. Russian Reforms
In March of 1992, after witnessing the unwillingness of the former Soviet republics to form a new Warsaw-Pact model joint force within the former Soviet space. President
Yeltsin created the Russian military. These Russian armed forces were essentially the
Soviet armed forces minus whatever had been privatized by the republics. With the acknowledgment of the defeat of any real C.I.S. joint military structure, the debate between domain defense and experimental reform began anew. While it was clear that some reform was advocated by everyone, the degree and type of reforms were
219 dramatically différent. Furthermore, these differences were associated with different
portrayals of the nature of the post-imperial environment for the Russian military.
5.4.4.1. Domain Defense
As I discussed in section two, in 1992 the General Staff published a draft proposal
for Russia’s military doctrine. In this document there was an active denial that the post
imperial Russian military faced a reduction in the demand for its services (niche size). The
document cites multiple sources of external danger to the Russian state. These include;
“the persistent aim of some states to dominate the world or regions of it and their
persistence in regarding force as a means to resolve disputes, the Jiasing o f powerful
military groupings near Russia's borders, the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of
mass destruction and international terrorism, and the exertion of political and economic
pressure and military blackmail against Russia.”(Committee 1992) The authors of this
document are the same former domain-defensive, conservative Soviet generals. They still
see Russia as a world class power and fail to recognize domestic fiscal and ethnic realities
which might result in a reduction of their niche size. (Dick 1992)
In its draft military doctrine the Russia High Command still pays considerable
attention to a scenario in which a large-scale conventional war might arise fi'om the
escalation of a local conflict. (Committee 1992; Gareev 1992) The military must reform
itself to achieve the following goals: the ability to still mobilize great numbers if necessary, the development of the force and means for territorial defense, the creation and deployment of a small strategic force and a first-line strategic reserve, and the creation and deployment of a strategic rear force and the technology to guarantee the defense of the
2 2 0 strategic troops. (Abolins 1992) The doctrine, therefore, suggests that the military should
include several components. First there should be a limited number of theater forces in
permanent combat readiness and in forward positions to repel local aggression. This will
be accomplished by stationing some troops in the newly independent republics in the same
way as Soviet forces were stationed forward in Eastern Europe. (Dick 1992) Secondly,
they envision a rapid-reaction force capable of being deployed to any region to assist the
permanent readiness troops to repel a moderate threat. Finally, strategic reserves would
be formed during wartime to conduct large-scale operations.(Allison 1993 ) Thus, war
would be fought in two phases: In the first there would be air and anti-air forces, air
mobile and naval forces . In the second phase ground forces, under powerful air cover,
would engage in combat. (Committee 1992)
With the exception o f the creation of a rapid reaction force, whose composition is
as yet undefined by this group, this proposal appears to be a continuation of the major
elements of the pre-1989 period, including the emphasis on the massive mobilization of a
first and second strategic echelon and the continued use of air power only as cover for ground force operations. Evidence that this group is engaging in reactive defense rather than innovative reform can be found in the following example of their rhetoric: ‘The adoption of the Russian military doctrine has stimulated a new round of interest in commencing military reform. The main tasks of the armed forces have not radically changed, however there is a new need for a mobile force able to be rapidly deployed in any direction. This problem will not be solved without some reorganization of the stmcture of the military... We should reorganize the structure of the military to be in keeping with its
2 2 1 tasks/goals as defined by the state’s doctrine, but retain as much as possible the existing
infrastructure in order to keep reducing the amount spent on defense without sacrificing
combat capability/readiness.... We should institute gradual change, studying the effects of
each step. Experience shows that the more radical the change, the more likely there will
be unexpected and unintended side-effects. (Demedyuk 1994)
5.4.4 2. Domain Substitution
The response of the Defense Minister and some of the senior officer corps has
been more characteristic o f a recognition that the Russian military can only emerge as a
strong organization in post-imperial Russia if it recognizes new realities. These realities
include a reduced demand for traditional/core services such as the defense of Russia from
massive foreign attacks and instead a new role or niche for the Russian military. One of the most important new tasks articulated for post-imperial Russia is peacekeeping and local low intensity conflicts. “Russia’s main task will be to prevent the outbreak of local conflicts and wars.” (Rutskoi 1992b) “Up until now we did not include local low intensity conflicts in our military doctrine. In the new doctrine Russia must look much more at how to conduct low intensity local wars and military actions to restore stability within the country.’’(Rodionov 1992)
Recognition of this change in niche shape has been accompanied by specific reform proposals. In the first stage, 1993-1994, the Defense Ministry has proposed reducing and reforming the troops, and withdrawing all Russian troops within the boundaries of the
Russian territory. As they did before the loss of the Soviet Union, these reformers also advocate a switch to a mixed manpower system. In the second stage of reform, 1995-
2 2 2 2000 these officers advocate a gradual reduction and reorganization of the command and control of military districts and even the branch structure of the armed forces . The reorganized troops should include a numerically small force of rapid reaction troops- airmobile regiments, brigades and divisions on permanent standby, a secondary force of airmobile reinforcement troops equipped with heavy weapons and capable of swift redeployment to support the rapkl reaction troops and finally the strategic reserves, formed fi'om reserve troops in periods of dœger and during aggression.(Grachev 1992a;
Rutskoi 1992b)
Russians have established a clear requirement in their doctrine that peacekeepers should be professionally trained soldiers. Steps at professionalism have already been taken. Soldiers participating in the Dniestr conflict, for example, are contracted for S,000 rubles a month or^bc times the normal monthly wage and the 201st Motorized Rifle
Division in Tajikistan is slated to become the first Russian division to be completely professional. General Grachev has stated that beginning in 1993, Russia will train dedicated peacekeepers in low intensity combat and internal security training. (Greene
1993)
By the year 2000 the Russian military has projected a force of only 1.5 million.
“We are making a transition from a multi-million man army to a small mobile and sufficiently strong Armed Forces for Russia’s defense. This requires technological and structural change within the Armed Forces. It also requires greater individual responsibility and skill. A single tank regiment or other unit may stop a local conflict from escalating.” (Rodionov 1995b) In order to improve skill and morale in the post-imperial
223 military, the November, 1993 doctrine reaffirms the goal of a mixed conscript-volunteer force. In 1993, 105,000 men and women were employed as contract military personnel.
The doctrine includes a target number of 30 percent of all enlisted and NCO personnel on contract by 1995 and 50% by 2000. (Document 1993)
There has even been talk of reducing the number of men in uniform to below the
1.5 million mark. “The Russian military should become purely professional and small in number, no more than 1 million people, not 1.5 as stipulated by the Law on Defense.”
(Holcomb 1993) Clearly we do not need sudi a large force and it is preventing us from being able to pay officers more. The draft is an artifact of the epoch of total war. (Rogov
1994) With reasonable use of existing budget resources in the next several years, we could resolve the problem of decreasing the management structure to a reasonable level to support a 1 million man professional army. (Dokuchaev 1994)
In accordance with this vision of a smaller military operating in a high-tech, spatially vast and maneuver-dominated post-imperial environment, some Russian officers are articulating new priorities in developing and procuring arms and hardware. Priority is placed on strategic arms, air defense, long distance military transport, tactical aviation, high precision multiple rocket launchers, intelligence gathering systems, radio-electronic warfare and high mobility hardened systems for directing battle and commanding troops,
(Ivanov 1992: citing a statement by Grachev; Rutskoi 1992b)
5,4.5. Conclusion
In summary, there has been a division within the post-imperial Soviet and Russian military leadership over the appropriate strategy of reform for the armed forces. This
224 conflict can be characterized as a struggle between domain defense and experimentation.
Conservatives want to build on the existing infrastructure and organization left from the
Soviet military. Grachev and his allies are arguing instead for a dramatic departure from the old model, building upon small elite formations as the core of the future Russian army.
The differences in reforms advocated by each group are plausibly traced to their portrayal of the changes which they have experienced since the loss of the Eastern European and
Soviet empires. How can we characterize the rival groups and reform packages within the organization? What demographic or professional jfectors explain this split in the ofiBcer corps? In the next section I will argue that a large part of the variance can be explained by dividing officers according to service or branch affiliation. The situation seems to be volatile enough that the future of Russian military reform may depend upon the particular personalities in leadership positions, their service affiliations and the political alliances they have made.
5.5. BRANCH DIFFERENCES
In this chapter I have been arguing that the process of losing an external and internal empire and the subsequent perception which most military officers held of a weakened post-imperial state, as described in Chapters Three and Four, reflects an organizational crisis. However, not all sub-groups within the Soviet/Russian military described the crisis and its impact identically. We would expect service affiliation to affect the way officers respond to changes in their environment, due to differing subcultures and socialization (Janowitz 1959; Vertzberger 1990) as well as more concrete differences in anticipated or real resource distribution inequalities between branches. Branch competition
225 is not exclusive to post-imperial militaries. There is wide evidence, for example, of competition for resources and influence between the various branches of the Soviet military. (Meyer ) As far back as the 1950s there was a struggle between the Air Force and the Strategic Rocket Forces over the nature of the intercontinental bomber program.
In the same period, the Soviet Ground Forces temporarily lost influence in favor of the
Strategic Rocket Forces and the Strategic Air Defense forces. (Krushchev 1977; Zisk
1993) Finally, CIA estimates of the relative percentages of the Soviet militaiy budget lend additional support to^the existence of a push and pull for resources in the pre withdrawal period. (Agency 1980)
This section will argue that the loss of empire is a particular dramatic change that affects service branches unequally. Some military services see the loss of empire as an opportunity to finally achieve their goals, while others see it as a threat which reduces their ability to attain those goals. Hypothesis 7: Service, rank and generational variables all serve as important basesfo r variation in both the interpretation o f the challenges facing the post-imperial military and the policy responses advocated by post-imperial military officers. Whereas Chapters Three and Four discussed the importance of generation and rank on the way in which ofBcers understood the loss of empire, this chapter focuses primarily on the importance of service affiliation in explaining their policy preferences.
5«.5,I,-Nayy
The Soviet Navy was perhaps hardest hit by the loss of the former Soviet republics. In the Soviet period, the basis of the Navy’s strike power was its nuclear
226 powered submarines armed with long range inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs.)
‘These submarines combine a great strike force, high mobility, low vulnerability, and the
ability to wage combat operations on a global scale aimed at destroying important enemy,
land-based installations. Surface ships remain the Navy’s most important component for assuring border security.” (Editorial 1985) With the loss of Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Navy lost most of its^major ports. “Once the Warsaw
Pact controlled 3/5 of the Baltic Sea and NATO controlled 1/5. Now Russia controls 1/5 or less and NATO more than 4/5ths. After the withdrawal of the Navy from the Baltic states its base has become Kronstadt and Balteesk. The Navy has one by one narrowed its material assets and left a part of itself and its strength within the lost territory.” (Gromak
1994: citing Admiral Kasantov)
As a consequence of this experience, senior naval officers, uniformly describe the post-imperial period as representing a decrease in the amount of resources available to the navy and in the demand for naval defense (niche size). This decrease exists not only in absolute terms, but is disproportionately affecting the Navy. “Currently the Navy has suffered disproportionate cuts compared to other services. These cuts have included up to
50% of our manpower and ships. However, we will need money just to maintain the aging force we have. 100 of the atomic subs and 300 battle ships are going to need to be retired at the end of the 1990s. We also need money to complete the withdrawal from the
Baltics from the Crimea and from Azerbaijan. Instead we are facing yet another 50% cut in the budget we requested. For the first time in 60 years no new ships will be commissioned. (Pauk 1992) “The Navy faces many serious problems. There is a decrease
227 in the construction of new ships, the volume of repairs has also decreased. This means that we have serious problems using our existing ships, especially the nuclear powered ships. This has seriously destroyed the balance between the Navy and other forces and tom apart years of industrial cooperation.”(Kryazhev 1994)
The reaction of senior naval officers to the changes they have endured in the past few years can be characterized as a bitter defense of their role in the security of post imperial Russia. This defense has taken several forms. Officers have exhorted the leadership of the military and the state to preserve the status of Russia as a naval superpower. “We can not guard Russia’s commercial or security interests without a strong Navy. We need forces in the North, Black and Caspian seas and a Pacific Ocean
Fleet. A flotilla, as some suggest, is not sufficient in either the Black or Baltic Seas. We need to keep our Russian bases in Liepac (Latvia) and Paldiski (Estonia).” (Pauk 1992)
Some naval officers have even argued that the environmental changes meant a greater need for the core activities o f the Navy. “With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the international situation changed, the role of regional centers of power grew. For instance in the Asia-Pacific rim there are four centers of power, China, Japan, Russia and the USA.
The role of the Navy in this and other regions has grown. We must do something to avoid having our Navy turn into the navy of a banana republic. We need to rectify the dangerous imbalance between the services which currently exists.” (Kryazhev 1994)
However, in both cases actual reform policy proposals have been minimal. My interviews with retired Soviet/Russian naval officers indicated that they were basically engaged in an
228 effort to survive the cuts they were experiencing, hoping that the fiscal and political
situation would soon improve.
5.5.2. Strategic Forces (Strategic Rocket Forces and Air Pefense)
The situation in the strategic forces has perhaps been the least tumultuous in the post-imperial period. The loss of Eastern Europe only increased the importance of maintaining a credible Soviet strategic deterrent. However, the strategic rocket forces were not immune to a decrease in overall demand for their services. The 1990 Soviet military doctrine continued the strategic arms reductions that had been announced by
Gorbachev and negotiated with the West. This 1990 document envisioned a 50% reduction in strategic nuclear forces between 1996-2000. Anti-aircraft troops would be reduced by 18-20% but would remain on high alert. (Editorial 1990) By 1993, the Russian military doctrine had abandoned the previous “no first use” pledge in regard to nuclear weapons. This departure fi-om declaratory policy was widely regarded as a signal of increased reliance on nuclear weapons now that Russia has lost the massive conventional capabilities it had in the 1980s. Russian officials even warned that nuclear weapons would be used not only in response to a nuclear attack but also an attack on high priority targets using conventional weapons.(Document 1993) “The Strategic Rocket Forces are the guarantee of the security of the Russian government, its pride and the basis of its strength.
Despite the dissolution of the Soviet Union, its system of command continues to function and it is located within Russian national territory. The Strategic Rocket Forces have become a national force. The President of the Russian Federation has the right to order their use.” (Kolesnikov 1994)
229 However, the recognition that the Strategic Nuclear Rocket Forces remained a priority did not make them immune to budget problems. By 1994, the oflRcer corps was complaining of under-funding and under-staffing. “Even though the Strategic Nuclear
Rocket Forces is one of the most powerful branches, it only requires 5-6% of the defense budget. But the budget allocations we have received are not suflRcient. We are receiving only about 30% of the minimum necessary to maintain the forces. Our officers are the gold reserves of the forces but our biggest problem is under-staflRng especially at the lower ranks.” (Sergeev 1994)
The fate of the Air Defense Forces (VPVO) has been less stable. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's air defenses became problematic since they were largely located in the former first strategic echelon of the USSR.(Gareev 1992) Grachev has lamented that "Russia inherited only ruins and debris. "(Grachev 1992b).“We can no longer fulfill our role in the anti-aircraft defense of Russia. We send 300 airplanes to be repaired and get back 100, there are fuel shortages. Our units are only staffed at 50-60%.
(Prudnikov 1995) It was not certain how many of the republics with key command posts and early warning facilities would join in a unified air defense system with Russia.
In the face o f this decline in both their ability to perform and their resource allocations, the VPVO officers also began to engage in reactive defense. There has been a proposal to join the Air Defense Troops with space-based defense systems into a new branch. But this has elicited protest fi-om those in the Air Defense. (Prudnikov 1995)
“Our non-traditional branches are the Strategic Rocket forces and Air Defense troops.
Both branches need to be independent because of the rapid nature of battle in their
230 spheres, the size of Russia and the location of Russia on the European continent, surrounded by well-armed militaries with their own interests in the area. In the new
Russian doctrine we are charged with repelling aggression. This clearly requires a nuclear deterrent, and air defense troops. Thus we should not eliminate either of these two branches. That kind of radical change, liquidating one or two independent branches of the military will only lead to a long-term and significant decrease in the battle readiness of the military. Limiting the number of branches of the military would not only liquidate the strategic command, but would also eliminate the whole command system which we have expended enormous resources to create. It would require enormous resources to create a new system of automized command. It is not an effective way to reduce the military budget.” (Demedyuk 1994)
5.5.3. Ground Forces
For the majority of senior ofBcers in the Russian Ground Forces, the primary diagnosis of the post-imperial environment was also a reduction in niche size. This may be due to the fact that the post-imperial era Russian Ground Force Commanders had much to lose from a downsizing of military size and resources. They represented the majority of the troops in the Soviet military before 1989. “Artillery alone was 1/4 of all those serving in the military. When reductions started, it quickly became understaffed. When we lost the Foreign Soviet Republics we lost 4 of the six artillery oflBcer academies (they were in
Ukraine and Georgia.)” (Dimidyuk 1994) “Military reform as spoken by politicians has meant a drastic reduction in the budget. We do not have enough specialists in the T-80 tank which has become the basic tank for our unit after having pulled them out of
231 Germany. All o f the technology taken out of Germany has been left out in open fields. We are risking further expense if we continue to let this equipment rust.” (Popov 1995)
Their dissatisfaction with a perceived reduction in the demand for military services overall, and their services in particular, has led them to a strategy o îdomain defense. For example. Colonel General Semenov, Commander in Chief of the Ground Forces, explicitly and publicly criticized the reform strategy described by Grachev in the previous section.
(Holcomb 1993) Senior Ground Forces ofiBcers have continued to affirm the preeminent role of the Ground Forces in the post-imperial Soviet and Russian military. ‘The basis of continental military forces are the ground troops. Their main task is to repel aggression.’’(Markovskii 1991) In the fight over the future branch and unit structure of the Russian armed forces. Ground Force oflBcers have advocated a military composed of three categories; general-purpose forces including Ground Forces, frontal aviation, the majority of the Air Defense Forces, special forces and a general-purpose rear; mobile forces (assault-brigade type); and national guard, border and internal forces. (Danilevich
1992)(see Figure 5.2) Early reform proposals coming the Soviet Ground Forces command have centered around creating smaller building blocks of ground force brigades and divisions in order to respond to a need for greater flexibility and mobility in combat. “In my opinion the ground forces in a battle area should be assembled by a block system of motorized rifle and (tank) battalions, artillery divisions, etc. This allows for self- sufficiency in the case of significant losses. (Markovskii 1991) “We can divide the military into 12-15 battalions including reserves and mobile units, 10-12 artillery divisions, and 6-8 anti-aircraft divisions. We can then make mixed groupings out of these independent
232 blocks.” (Chichkan 1991) The overall size of these groupings was still much larger than the small professional military described by reformers in the previous section.
At the end of November 1992, Defense Minister Grachev announced the creation of a mobile force as an inter-branch grouping. Russia now faced the fact that military districts such as Moscow and the northern Caucasus were the front line and are rather poorly equipped to perform this function. Instead of just rearming these districts and making them the new first and second strategic echelons, Grachev advocated the development of mobile forces based in the interior, such as the Volga and Ural Military
Districts. Having these troops in the interior made them less vulnerable to surprise attack and able to defend any incursion into Russian territory. (Holcomb 1992) This announcement was interpreted in two very different ways by Ground Force officers.
Artillery and tank ofScers continued to see the creation of the mobile forces as a response to a reduction in overall demand for military services in the post-imperial era. “This is not just a political struggle it is a pragmatic solution to a lack of military readiness in undermanned units. By reorganizing them into mobile inter-service units they can be brought up to combat readiness with fewer units overall.”(Vladykin 1992)
Reform proposals emerging from this diagnosis attempted to shape the idea of a mobile force to maintain Ground Force preeminence and preserve the existing ground forces units. “We must have a mobile force that could be quickly deployed to any region or territory within Russia or the C.I.S. Its function will be to put out military fires, but it could also be used for peacekeeping. It should be a multi-purpose force which could also be used to repel aggression in a large-scale war. It should be a new type of unit
233 integrating the maneuverability and mobility of the Air Force with the strike and fire power of the motorized rifle and tank divisions, the fire power of the rocket artillery and the battle capability of the Marines."(Vorob'ev 1993) An attempt was made by advocates of this version of the mobile forces merely to reshuflfie the cards, putting in all of the existing Ground Force units into this new structure. “These light mobile forces would be drawn from the remnants of the 104th Airborne division (ABD) withdrawn fi’om
Azerbaijan to the Volga, the 7th ABD withdrawn from Lithuania to the North Caucasus, elements of the 98th withdrawn from Ukraine to Moscow and two ABDs plus three airborne brigades originally stationed in Moscow and Petersburg. These last units would be supplemented by forces withdrawn fi-om Russian groups of forces abroad. The Air force would contribute: 3 anti-aircraft rocket brigades, a spetznaz brigade, 12 helicopter units, the ability for satellite communication, 5 each of fighter aircraft and bomber units, 2 battle aircraft units, and 7 military transport air divisions the Navy would contribute: 6 battalions of naval infantry, 2 battalions of naval landing troops.” (Vladykin 1992) This view of the mobile forces continues the pre-imperial military view of the role of the military and its necessary structure. These Mobile Forces would serve as a strategic reserve in a massive war. The cost of this plan however is a great reduction in the very mobility which military leaders said they were seeking. (Holcomb 1992)
The branch structure advocated by those Ground Forces officers engaged in reactive defense forecasted three new commands for the year 2000: Strategic Deterrent
Forces consisting of the Air and Sea-based as well as strategic nuclear forces; the Mobile
Forces, consisting of Airborne Divisions, mechanized divisions, independent Anti-aircraft
234 divisions. Military Transport divisions and regiments, and naval infantry and warships; and
Territorial Commands based upon military districts consisting of Ground Forces’ armies.
Air Force operational-level air armies, air defense armies, fleets and whatever other organizational elements they may need. (Dokuchaev 1992; Nikolaev 1993) In this plan the
Ground Forces were to be divided into Mobile Forces and Territorial Forces. The
Territorial Forces would receive more o f the conscripts and will train the reservists, while the Mobile Forces would receive more o f the professional military ofiBcers. (Holcomb
1992) (See Figure 5.2)
Paratroopers, however, saw the changes in the post-imperial period as engendering a new role and new benefits for their branch. They argued that the nature of modem warfare had fundamentally changed. “New functions of the military have arisen including, peacekeeping/making and ethnic separation missions within the C.I.S. and in areas of inter-etlmic conflict with UN operations. The mobile forces should be able to guarantee defense against any level of conflict and should be able to prevent its escalation.”
(Editorial 1992) If our new role is to act as a peacekeeping force then we need to institute a program of education and training, to fulfill this. We have begun to study this in earnest.
(Golovnev 1994)
Their plan for Russia’s mobile forces proposed small but powerfiil groupings of troops and forces ready for immediate use wherever a threat arose. They would consist of troops on permanent readiness, capable o f acting effectively in local conflicts; rapid reaction forces; and strategic reserves. (Ivanov 1992) This reform proposal had fewer than half as many ground units, contained no aircraft in the basic forces (those with the
235 highest level of readiness of 1-3 days) and a smaller amount of aircraft in the reinforcement forces (those with a readiness of 3-7 days) than the Vladykin proposal described above. Transport planes, fighter-bombers, and ground attack aircraft would be used to support the mobile forces. (Holcomb 1992) Paratroopers (the VDV) were expected to be the backbone o f these mobile forces and were disproportionately advocating this “realistic” plan for Russia’s mobile forces. Paratroopers as elite units had already fared relatively well in the post-imperial period. “We are currently at 85% capacity higher than any other service. In 1993-1994 in the withdrawal from the Near
Abroad 80% of paratrooper officers elected to continue service to the Russian
Federation.” (Podkolzin 1995)
5.5.4. Air Force
Within the Air Force senior officer corps, there was also a split in the way in which officers interpreted the direction of changes in the post-imperial environment. Some Air
Force officers allied themselves with reformers in the Ground Forces, in particular the
Paratroopers, to stress the creation of mobile forces as the first priority for scarce defense department allocations. A second group of Air Force officers offered an alternative to mobile ground forces, an independent Air Force branch which would be equipped for the high-technology and space-based warfare of the future. Both of these reactions, however emanated from a general agreement within the Air Force that there has been a change not only in niche shape but also in niche size. Both groups of Air Force officers recognize a decrease in the overall demand for military activity and in the military budget for troop maintenance and research and development. In addition, both groups sensed a
236 change in the type of services which would be required of them in post-imperial Russia.
Priority is being accorded therefore to high-technology branches o f the armed forces with significantly reduced force levels and radically restructured ground formations.
(Rossiskaya Gazeta April 8, 1992) In this environment the Air Force is unique, in that both groups of Air Force officers saw an opportunity to redirect resources toward their branch. The split emerged in the diagnosis of the best way to capture scarce resources.
For those Air Force officers that made an alliance with Paratroopers there was a great deal of support from the Ministry of Defense and Minister of Defense Grachev. As I discussed in the previous section on Russian reforms, Grachev, himself a former paratrooper, advocated the replacement of tank-heavy ground forces with airborne troops which would be highly mobile to meet threats wherever they may appear. This required the transport capability of the Air Force.(AUison 1993) ‘The Air Force is an important source of maneuverability. In the past our operations theory was incompletely formed and we were not mobile enough.”.(Shaposhnikov 1991b) However, it also preserves the supportive and dependent role of the Air Force.(Holcomb 1992) “Most helicopters should be part of the Ground Forces in peacetime, helping with equipping and readiness and in war strengthening the mobility of the first echelon. (Chichkan 1991) Figure 5.3 presents the structure fo r the Russian Armed Forces forecast for the year 2000favored by
Grachev and supported by a portion o f the senior air force command in 1992. (Holcomb
1992) Specific priorities advocated by this faction of Air Force officers include modernizing battle and transport planes, reforming command structures in accordance
237 with the proposed branch structure, and improving conditions on air bases.(Shaposhnikov
1991b)
The biggest obstacle to implementing this reform policy seems to be the lack of
infrastructure and resources to provide the amount of airlift necessary .(Goltz 1996a)
Russia has lost large numbers of MiG-29 fighters, and the majority of military transport
planes to Ukraine and Belarus.(AUison 1993) Russia lost 200 late model transport aircraft
(IL-76s) and retains only 300-400 H-76s. (Efanov 1993) According to the old Soviet
norms it would take 200 fl-76s to airlift only one of the five Russian airborne
divisions. (GarthofiT 1989) In addition. Colonel General Efanov has stated that a large
portion of the Russian transport fleet is overworked from the withdrawal of military units
from Poland, Germany, and the Baltics and from regular flights hauling cargo for military
and government agencies. They are greatly in need of repairs but due to spare parts
shortages this often means engine overhauls rather than replacements. (Efanov 1993)
The gamble that these Air Force oflScers have made, that an alliance with Grachev and the
paratroopers would yield them new air mobile aircraft technology, has so far not been
beneficial. As late as Winter 1996 senior ofiBcers in the General Stafif were complaining
about a lack of material support for these reforms. (Goltz 1996a; Goltz 1996b)
A second group of senior Air Force ofiBcers offered a competing vision of the
future post-imperial Russian military. This group argued; “Ground Forces may no longer be necessary to achieve victory. In the very near future armies will be able to strike
objects in the ground from space. In such wars there will be no rear and the meaning of victory must be redefined since ground troops may never be engaged to occupy enemy
238 territory.” (Slipchenko 1991) “The change of emphasis in armed combat into air and
aerospace, especially in the beginning period of the war, is becoming more evident.
Operations and battles are clearly acquiring a three-dimensional character, with
widespread use of electronic warfare and high-precision weapons. The role of the Air
Forces will steadily grow... This requires centralized control of mr assets. We need an Air
Force that can conduct independent operations as well as support the ground troops.”
(Korol'kov 1992)
This vision of a fundamentally new rote for the Air Force as a result of the
emergence of a new niche was accompanied by significant proposals for reforms in
spending priorities. “The Air Force.is behind in electronic warfare capabilities.”
(Makarenko 1990) “We need to improve our military technological base. We still are
behind the US in radio-electronics, tied to the quality of military aviation. In this period of
scientific technological revolution, weapons age very quickly and need to be replaced
more often.” (Deineg 1990) “I am seriously doubtful that with a defensive doctrine and
defensive strategy the government can protect its interests. Instead we need to place
emphasis on the integration of methods of electronic and high-precision bombs that are
primarily based in the Air Force and the Navy. We should not keep looking to the past
and expecting the next battle to be like that” (Eroxhin 1991) (Rudyuk 1991: presents a similar argument)
Finally, as hypothesized, ofiBcers which articulated this vision of a new niche, a fundamental change in the tasks facing the Russian military in the post-imperial environment, favored a radical reorganization of the command and branch structure of the
239 Russian military. As Figure 5.4 indicates, their proposal argued that the number of armed
forces services in the-post-knperial period should be-reduced from five to three; general-
purpose Ground Forces directly subordinate to the Commander in Chief and the Russian
Federation Ministry o f Defense, Air Forces including sfrategic nuclear forces, and a Navy.
(Gareev 1992) “The Air Force is one of the most effective and maneuverable branches of
the Russian armed forces and should be organizationally distinct from the aviation under
the Supreme High Command and the tactical and military transport aviation. In today’s circumstances it is necessary to build armed forces from positions of high mobility,
protectability and survivability based upon the latest advances in military technical science and high professionalism of servicemen. Strategic defense must be constructed in such a way that it does not hinder troop maneuverability, so that strategic boundaries constitute a powerful shield reinforced by highly mobile aviation, missile airmobile and naval rapid reaction forces.”(Rutskoi 1992b) Even key Western analysts supported this direction for
Russian military reform arguing that; “aircraft- delivered tactical nuclear weapons may become the technical substitute for the strategic buffer zone that Eastern Europe was intended to provide. It may also be the only realistic substitute for conventional firepower and air power as force structures shrink.” (Meyer 1991/92: 38) The integration of the
Strategic Nuclear Forces into the Air Force would represent a significant shift in organizational structure and place a large amount of resources and responsibility in the hands of an independent Air Force.
However, like its rival, this reform program faces significant difficulties.
Specifically, Russian military budgets have not included enough resources for research to
240 develop the high-tech systems that this plan requires. (Allison 1993: 3) “We have only
received 30% of the money we need. This has implications for aviation technology
purchases, weapons and material reserves and battle readiness. It also threatens Russia’s aviation industry.” (D ^ ek m 1995b) “Becaise of the lack of necessary materials, we have lost experienced pilots in difficult weather conditions and in the conduct of military missions in Chechnya.” {Deynekin 1995a)
In summary, in addition to competing against territorial-based ground forces, the
Russian Air Force is split between competing against the mobile forces as the key to
Russia’s conventional military power and joining forces with its proponents to capture whatever new resources will be allocated to them. -(Holcomb 1992). However, the
Mobile forces do not integrate air power as much as they compete with it for the starring role in the new force structure. The proposed mobile forces in Figure 5.2, with their own command, represent a threat to a unified Air Force since air power will be divided horizontally among the separate service branches of the Air Force, the Space Missile
Defense, Space Forces and the Ground Forces with Air Defense. Furthermore Russian aerospace power will be fi’agmented between the Russian Strategic Deterrent Forces
Command, the Russian Mobile Forces Command and the various Territorial Commands.
(Holcomb 1992) This fi"agmentation has, until now, kept Russian aerospace power fi-om mounting much of a challenge to the Ground Forces.
5.5.5. Conclusion;
In the previous section, analysis of the overall reform strategies for the Soviet and
Russian armed forces revealed a battle between conservatives, or domain defenders and
241 innovators or domain substitutors. By examining the reforms advocated by each branch
in the armed forces in this section, we have been able to trace the roots o f this conflict.
OfiBcers from the Navy, the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Air Defense Troops and the
traditional components of the Ground Forces (artillery, tank and motorized rifle ^visions)
share a common diagnosis of the post-imperial environment as one in which their niche
size is threatened. Their reform strategies fit the pattern of reactive defense or protection
of their traditional functions and status within the armed forces. They have advocated a
retention of the traditional Soviet emphasis on an offensive doctrine and a force structure
which emphasizes the ability for massive and rapid mobilization of first and second
echelon units in order to fight a large-scale confihct.
By contrast, a coalition of innovators emerged in post-imperial Russia, advocating
a new command and branch structure and the substitution of small professional elite units
to meet what they perceived as a new niche for the military in assuring Russia’s defense.
Whether they favored a mobile force or an independent space-based high technology Air
Force, these innovators stressed a streamlined organization, and the use of new
technologies. Not surprisingly, the branches which advocated these fundamental changes
were the ones which stood to gain the most from a shake-up in the organization. These
innovators included the Paratroop units of the Ground Forces and two competing groups
within the Air Force.
5.6. CHAPTER CONCLUSION
In the introduction to this chapter I argued that an analysis o f the Soviet and
Russian military could benefit from a consideration of the ways in which it could be
242 characterized as an organization in decline. As I have shown, the Soviet and Russian military has indeed witnessed the two stages of decline, a radical change in its operating environment precipitated by the withdrawal from Eastern Europe and the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the subsequent reduction of organizational resources and prestige.
Furthermore, after a survey of the military budget, and indicators of professional prestige and material compensation, I was able to corroborate the hypothesis that this decline was radical or discontinuous, beginning shortly after the announcement to begin the withdrawal from Eastern Europe and accelerating as the Soviet Union collapsed.
Secondly I have shown that the Soviet military in the post-imperial period was characterized by fragmentation and conflict between organizational factions as predicted by the organizational decline literature rather than the centralization and consensus that crisis is posited to foster. The post-imperial Soviet and Russian military is fragmented along service, rank and generational cleavages. It is divided both organizationally and substantively on the appropriate organizational role and structure for the military in the post-imperial era. Furthermore, this division is predicated upon differences in the perceptions of the type of environmental change which has occurred. In this chapter I have presented strong evidence of the link between differing diagnoses of the post imperial environment and the substantive reforms advocated by military ofiBcers. The post imperial Russian military is split between two approaches to reform; domain defense and experimental domain substitution. OfiBcers who saw the demand for the military as either unchanged or constricted were much more likely to advocate domain defense or tactics to maintain the budget and organizational structure at status quo. By contrast, a group of
243 ofiBcers emerged who saw the changes as a combination of constriction and
transformation. For these ofiBcers, reform could serve personal and sub-organizational
interests. Although the overall demand for military service may be declining, their
fortunes could improve. However Paratroopers and Air Force ofiBcers, both innovators
in the post-imperial Russian military, put forward two very different reform proposals. It
is this lack of consensus on reform, coupled with an absence of leadership in military reform which was unforeseen by the organizational decline literature, a literature based upon research in the competitive world of businesses operating in a market. The decline in the Soviet/Russian military has been so dramatic that the organizational decline literature seems unsatisfactory for the later years of the case study. By 1993 the Russian military was not an organization in decline, it was an organization in chaos and prolonged collapse. As I argued in the above analysis, by 1993 the budgetary process had collapsed,, military prestige had plummeted, and the organization was divided among rival military groups, with no organizational consensus on the appropriate reforms needed either within the organizational structure or in its deployment. This type of prolonged oollapse is unforeseen in the organizational decline literature. This literature is largely based upon an assumption o f competitive market dynamics in which firms which were unable to engkieo- an organizational tura-around would be eliminated. The military, however, is a very different type of organization, not fully susceptible to market competition but also unable independently to determine its budget or the demand for its services. A professional military is the tool of the state. This means that, particularly in times of organizational crisis, its fate depends upon its ability to 244 elicit the leadership and resources of the state. From 1993 onward, Russian military ofiBcers were painfully aware of a lack of needed political will or political leadership. Within the ofiBcer corps there is a general lustration and cynicism about the possibilities for either rebuilding the old military or creating a new military for post- imperial Russia. Military ofiBcers repeatedly cited two factors in the lack of any progress; a lack of political leadership and a weak economic base. .‘There has been no real military reform. The political leadership has refrained from interfering in the military sphere and has left it to the military leadership to reform itself. In place of reform the Defense Ministry has tried above-all to preserve its structure and its budget, reducing only the minimum that is required o f it. As a result, Russia now has an enormous number of incomplete and unprepared units and divisions.” (Rogov 1994) “There is no one who is responsible for military reform. But we as military men have been saying this for a long time. I guess it took a crisis to put it in the faces of the civilian leadership. We have long had pseudo-reform with the effect of reducing the status of the Ministry of Defense. There has been poor information. Neither the President nor the military leadership have accepted responsibility for the state of country’s defense or for its reform. Instead the Ministry of Defense has become the Ministry of the Army and Navy and their commanders, competing against other Ministries. The commanders are having to spend all of their energy on surviving in the marketplace. (Rodionov 1995a) “There have been no important decisions taken on military reform or reorganization and there will not be any. The linchpin to reforming the military is financial, economic and material. We need a stable economy for effective reform.” (Volkogonov 1994) ‘Tor military reform we need 245 resources, and not an insubstantial sum. Either we find the resources do this in order to later really reduce the amount spent on defense, or we reduce the amount spent on defense without reforming the Armed Forces, a path that would lead to reduced battle capability. We can not solve the problem of guaranteeing the security of Russia at current levels of spending. That says it-all.” (Vorob'ev 1994) As a result of stagnation in defense policy the Russian military is increasingly showing signs of organizational collapse. “Without the money and the legal protection we have little possibility of a paid military and the prestige of the military decreases. Unfortunately, these are problems that we can not solve ourselves.” (Kolesnikov 1994) By the end of 1995, it was clear that the principle o f a contract army was suffering a set back. The Ministry of Defense aimounced.that there would be a cut in the number of contract soldiers by 1/3. From the Ground Forces alone this means the loss o f80,000 recruits. (Kondrashev 1996) “Many combined units are virtually unable to carry out their daily activities and units and ships on alert duty as part of the strategic triad are on the verge of losing their combat readiness. We will not be able to guarantee peacekeeping functions in the Dniestr region, Tajikistan, Abhazia and Yugoslavia or the protection of the Russian border. Maintaining forces in the Chechen Republic in a state of battle readiness will also become an insoluble problem.” (Poroskov 1995) The result of a prolonged organizational collapse attributed ta a lack of political will and economic support and divisions within the military over resource allocations and decision making power, has been the increasing politicization of individual military ofiBcers. This is in keeping with a study by (Levine 1982) of decline in large cities in 246 which he found wide-scale decentralization and politicization of branches of the city government, blocking any effective tum-around strategies. This politicization is also in keeping with the analysis of the renegotiation of civil-military relations in the post-imperial period in Chapter 4. “OfiBcers in other militaries are members of the middle class. A hungry ofiBcer with a gun in his hand is dang^ous even in times of stability. Before the military led the people, now it follows it in terms of technolo^ and resources.” (Xhodarenok 1995) “The army has ceased to be an instnanent of government politics. There is no governmental mechanism for civilian control over the military. Neither the President, the Parliament, nor the Security Council has real control. Russia has rejected the idea of a civilian defense minister. The Parliament has no say in naming key Defense Ministry officials or Wgh generals under the new constitution. The ability of the Parliament and its committees to control the military budget is minimal They have not received full information on defense expenses and income from arms sales. They have thus responded by allocating money to defense when they feel like it and in return, the Defense Ministry spends the money on whatever they think is necessary. (Rogov 1994) In response to this situation, many individual military officers have either sought to align themselves with individual political leaders or have sought political office themselves. 247 M INISTRY OF DEFENSE I GENERAL STAFF SOVIET ARMED FORCES J. T Strategic Forces General Purpose Forces T 1 1 Strategic Strategic Strategic Ground Rocket Nuclear Nuclear Forces Forces Air Forces Naval Forces Space Space Missile Forces Defense FIGURE 5.1 ORGANIZATION OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES (GarthofF 1989; Scott 1984: p. 143) 248 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE Ï Strategic Deterrence Forces Mobile Forces Territorial Commands -Strategic Rocket Forces -Airborne Forces - Air-Based Strategic -Mechanized Division -Ground Forces Nuclear Forces -Independent Air Force -Operational -Sea-Based Strategic Regiments Air Army Nuclear Forces -Marines -Air Defense Troops -Space Forces -Air Transport Division -Miscellaneous -Special Forces (Spetsnaz) -Warships -General Purpose Reserves HGURE 5.2: PROSPECTIVE STRUCTURE OF RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES (Danilevich 1992; Holcomb 1992) 249 MINISTER OF DEFENSE I Strategic Rocket Forces Ground Troops Mobile Forces Air Defense Navy Troops (VPVO) Paratroops and Air Force FIGURE 5.3: AIR FORCE ALLIANCE WITH PARATROOPERS (Holcomb 1992) 250 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE Ground Forces Navy Air Force — T I T -Reserves Regular Forces -Air Defense Troops -National -Strategic Nuclear Forces Guard FIGURE 5.4 AIR FORCE AS INDEPENDENT HIGH-TECH BRANCH (Gareev 1992; Shein 1992) 251 CHAPTER 6 UNDERSTANDING THE LOSS OF INDOCHINA AND ALGERIA; THE POST-IMPERIAL STORIES OF FRENCH MILITARY OFHCERS 6.1 INTRODUCTION/CHAPTER OVERVIEW This chapter begins with an examination of how French military officers described what happened to them in the prolonged period of withdrawal from both the external colony of Indochina and the internal ‘department’ of Algeria from 1945-1962. How did this successive loss of territory, and imperial influence change the way in which officers understood their role in providing state security against external attack? In order to examine the degree and nature of change in their external role, I will begin with a brief description of the role conceptions that French military officers had before the withdrawal. Once I have provided the outlines of this basic external role conception, this chapter will begin to test Hypothesis One : When a military experiences the loss of its state's empire, officers willformulate a new story that justifies the change in its status. This new story will motivate new patterns o f civil-military relations in the post-imperial era. I will test this hypothesis by examining whether there are changes from the baseline or pre intervention story as a result of two stages in the loss of their empire: the withdrawal from 252 Indochina and the Algerian War. Were the stories, in other words, new? By tracing their stories across these three key events, I will be able to describe the different patterns in the ways in which military ofiBcers understood the particular processes of losing the external and internal empire that they had pledged to defend. Did their stories recognize and justify the change in their status? Finally, did th ^ motivate new patterns in civil-military relations? What lessons did they argue should be drawm from the events. Finally, what are the similarities and differences between the French and Russian stories? The second main theme of this chapter will be an examination of what French military ofiBcers thought the implications of the government decisions to withdraw from the empire were for the civil-military relationship. In the literature review and previous case studies chapters, 1 have argued that all states with professionalized militaries have to negotiate an arrangement with the military in which each side agrees to a particular division of responsibilities and rewards. It has also been shown that military officers become more active in domestic politics if and when they feel that their corporate identity is threatened or that their institutional needs are no longer met. This activity is only tempered if civilian institutions are seen as strong and legitimate. This has led to the second hypothesis on post-imperial militaries. Hypothesis Two: When there are contested definitions o f the appropriate distribution o fpolicy responsibility between the state and the military and when military officers see state institutions as weak, they will advocate an increase in their level o f domestic political participation. This increased level of participation will be examined both in terms of what they advocate in their writings and also the types of activities military ofiBcers chose to engage in. 253 In order to test this hypothesis in this case study, I will explore the evolution of the way in which military officers defined their role-within the state fi'om the imperial to the post-imperial period. Does the loss of their imperial mission and the sense of civilian incompetence and state instability that military officers described as its legacy result in new military definitions of the nature of the civil-military contract in the post-imperial period? Did their perception of boffi the existing and the preferred relationship between society, the military, and the state changed? The analysis will start by examining the baseline story o f the civil-military relationship in pre-WorW War H France. The rest of the chapter will be devoted to an examination of how officers’ stories of their internal role changed as a result of three pivotal events; the 195^ revolt which brought down the fourth Republic, the 1960 Week of the Barricades revolt in Algiers and the 1961 military putsch attempt. At each of these stages in the emergence of the post-imperial state, military officers ivere challenged to reexamine their organization’s role within society and within the regime. Did their choices mirror those of Russian military officers? if so in what ways? In testing each of these research hypotheses, this chapter uses a slightly different type of data than the previous chapters on Russia. The bulk of the data for this French case study was collected from the excellent English and French-language secondary sources on the 1945-1962 period. The data also include a few primary sources such as transcripts from the military court trials of renegade officers and memoirs fi’om military officers written about the decolonization period. Thus, these chapters represent somewhat of a compromise. Because of the nature of these sources, for certain variables there was 254 less information than I would have liked. In some sections I have made a note to that effect. Finally, because of the limited availability of direct statements by most military officers, I have at times relied quite heavily on the statements of General de Gaulle as a military officer. However, it is clem’ that de Gaulle, even before he assumed office as President of the Fifth republic, was not a prototypical military officer. 6.2. STORIES ABOUT THE EXTERNAL EMPIRE AND THE WITHDRAWAL How did French military officers define what happened to them in the period from 1945- 1962, as the French military fought against the Independence of both their external and internal empire and finally withdrew? How did this loss of territory and imperial influence change the way in which officers understood the external security role of the French military and the relationship which the French métropole had with the colonies? In order to isolate any changes in the way French officers defined their external role, I will begin this section of the chapter with a measurement of the views of French officers about their relationship to the colonies in the immediate post-war period, before the beginning of the wars of decolonization or the reality of military withdrawal. Once I have established the baseline, I will trace the evidence for a change in the stories officers tell about the empire and their security role as a result of two stages of the loss of their empire; the withdrawal from Indochina, their external colony, and the independence and withdrawal from the internal colony of Algeria, a former French department. By following the stories officers told across these two key events, I will be able to describe the patterns in the ways in which military officers understood the dramatic changes in their operational tasks and organizational mission, what they thought that 255 meant for the imperial relationship and the lessons they argued should be drawn from their experiences. Thus, this section will test Hypothesis One of this study: When a military experiences the loss o f its state's empire, officers willformulate a new story that justifies the change in their status. This new story will motivate new patterns in civil-military relations in the post-imperial era. 6.2.1. Establishing a Baseline (Figure 6.1) What was the story that French military ofiBcers and political elites told of the relationship between France and its colonies after World War Two?* What implications did this story have for the way in which these elites governed the colonies and insured their security? A review ofthe secondary sources used in this analysis reveals that political elites and military ofiBcers shared the same basic perceptions of the colonial relationship. The story begins with the conviction that the French military is serving lofty goals, dedicated to more than the mere territorial security and stable political administration of the colonies. Instead, France was dedicated to the task o f‘leading the peoples of its colonies to liberty, self-governance and the democratic administration of their own affairs.” (Martel 1994: 262) This mission is reflected in statements and documents during this period addressing the relationship between the colonies and the métropole. In these statements there are several common themes. * Analysis of secondary source material reveals no significant differences between the civilian and military stories of the imperial relationship and the military’s goals. Thus this section is based upon a combination of civilian and military views and relies upon de Gaulle’s statements as both a military ofiBcer and a political figure. 256 The French community of colonies and the métropole was seen as important to the reestablishment of French pride and status in the world. This is reflected in de Gaulle’s statement: “It is by its empire that-Free France will day by day re-become France.”(Lacouture 1993: p.238 quoting from De Gaulle, Discours et Messages volume 1, 1940-1946 Paris: Plon, 1970) De Gaulle saw the overseas extensions of France as assets that allowed France to take action and command respect. However, not all French colonies were equal in important or independence. The French colonies were divided into: “départements d’outre-mer” (Algeria and 4 old colonies), “territoires d’outre-mer” (black Aflica and the Malagasy colonies), "“etats- associes (Indochina- Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos), “territoires associes” (U.N. mandates in Togo and Cameroon) and protectorats (Tunisia and Morocco). (Martin 1981: 18) The second theme that emerges in an analysis of the relationships described by French oflBcers and political eûtes is atension between seeing the colonies as equal juridically, part of the French community, and yet maintaining a special and superior role for France in the community. The 1946{Constitution of the Fourth Republic stated that France and the people of the colonies were a union founded on an equality of rights and obligations without distinction for race or religion. The Union was composed of nations and peoples that share and coordinate their resources and their efforts in order to develop their respective civilizations, to increase their well-being and to assure their security. All members of the community were proclaimed equal without regard to racial or religious distinctions. (Martel 1994: 262) However, this equality had its limits. There was legal equality with the métropole but no possibility of sovereignty. The Fourth Republic 257 rejected autonomy and independence outside of the ‘French Community.’ So, in practice, the distribution of power between the members of the community and the métropole was heavily weighted toward French superiority. Finally, this hierarchy within the French community was based upon unequal sacrifice and yet common collaboration, fiiendship and equality among members of the community. The colonies were portrayed as being grateful for the great sacrifices which the French métropole had made on their behalf. “France, at great sacrifice to itself and without any outside aid has, over the years, introduced progress and civilization in regions of the world which did not know it... These territories that we have tied to our destiny have remained faithful to our cause.” (Lacouture 1993: 245 fi-om Discours et Messages, p.508) However, there was also an acknowledgment that in the recent war the colonies had fought alongside the métropole against the Axis powers. “France will be able to retain its present spirit of generosity and nobility and the right of sovereignty over Indochina if it can remember the pride and loyalty of the Indochinese people to their own resistance against Japan and Siam as well as their loyalty to the French community.” (Lacouture 1993: 238, quoting fi'om De Gaulle Mémoires de Guerre volume 2, Paris: Plon 1959 pp.608-609) The combination of equality and superiority was reflected in the actions which French military officers and elites advocated for the immediate post-War period. These included, for example, the reestablishment of the empire but also did not preclude renegotiating the colonial relationship. ‘Trance is certain to regain intact all which belongs to it, but it is also certain that after all of the experiences of the war, the organizational 258 form of France in the world will not he the same.” (Lacouture 1993:240 Statement by de Gaulle July, 1944) This was reflected in a specific recognition that: “We must extend new political legislation and a new federal organization to the Indochinese which gives the institutions the mark of their own traditions. Ultimately Indochina will have access to all of the functions of state.” (Lacouture 1993: 238, quoting fi'om De Gaulle Mémoires de Guerre volume 2, Paris: Plon 1959 pp.608-609) But even when forced to admit the inevitability of independence for its former colonies, France could not grant unconditional independence. (Martin 1981: 16-17) An analysis of the pre-withdrawal story of France and her colonies ends with a lesson about the importance of this community to France’s place in the world. ‘Throughout the history of the Fourth Republic, beneath the invective of political division, one finds a shared anguish at the passing of national greatness, a shared humiliation of a century of defeats, a shared nationalistic determination that France must maintain her independence in a hostile world- all brought to rest on the conviction that the colonies, and especially Algeria, would remain French.” (Smith 1974:220-221) 6.2.2. Indochjna; Loss of the External Empire Before WWn was even over, the seeds of a challenge to the previous relationship between France and Indochina were sown. During the war, Indochina had been under the jurisdiction of the French Vichy administration. In 1941 the Vietminh (League for the Independence of Vietnam) was formed. It was headed by Ho Chi Minh, founder of the Communist Party of Indochina. On March 9, 1945 Japanese troops overthrew the French Vichy administration in Indochina. Ho extended his control over the Tonkin countryside 259 and then with the Japanese surrender took control of the whole northern province. On September 2, 1945 in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Free French troops landed in the south on September 23, 1945 and moved north reestablishing control over Hanoi after heavy fighting with the Vietminh forces. This was the beginning of the French war in Indochina. The Vietminh retreated to the countryside while the French held the cities. France meanwhile hesitated to concede independence to a non-communist Vietnamese government and did so in name only in 1949. When it then became clear that self- determination might result in a communist government, France escalated and refused to consider a withdrawal. During the conflict the French relied heavily on pro-French Indochinese. Only 175,000 French troops fought, including Afiicans and Foreign Legionnaires. In July, 1954 the war ended at the Geneva negotiations with an armistice and a partition of the country at the 17th parallel. (Ambler 1966; 153-156; Martel 1994: 289-290) How did the military view this series of events and the ultimate withdrawal? How did the experience change the story they told of their external role? 6.2.2.1 ■ The Minority View: Withdrawal as an Inevitable and Positive Step (Figure 6.2) Initially the military was split over the appropriate goal for the military and the state in Indochina. A minority of French officers saw withdrawal and Indochinese self- determination as necessary and even desirable. The major elements of their story were not significantly different from the baseline story described above. By withdrawing from Indochina, France was continuing its policy of equality and voluntary union and moving towards its goal of progress and democracy in Indochina. This is exemplified in the 260 remarks of General Phillipe Leclerc, Commander of the French forces in Indochina, who wrote on April 30, 1946; “Negotiations and Agreements are necessary; it is no longer a question of the hour of imposing ourselves by force on masses who desire evolution and change."(Ambler 1966: 209 quoting Leclerc's report of April 30, 1946) Leclerc's comments mirror the Russian story in favor of withdrawal, recognizing that a new situation had taken shape in the world and that changes in the relationship between the métropole and the Indochinese might be necessary and even positive. The reduction of forces and their relocation back to the métropole would be a reasonable response to the new situation, the goals of the military and the relationships o f friendship and equality which had always existed. Vietnamese independence and a gradual withdrawal o f French forces was thus based upon faith in the support and gratitude of the Indochinese people and their ability to establish a non-Conununist democracy in Indochina that would still be within the French sphere of influence. Appealing to the Vietnamese people to join with the French against the Vietminh General Lattre in an address to Saigon high school students commented; “If you are communists join the Vietminh, but if you are patriots fight for your country. This war is yours. I have come to fight for your independence not to limit it .Our greatest desire is to see Vietnamese soldiers, the more numerous join us and throw your weight into the balance in a combat for your country.” (Martel 1994: 306) 6 2.2.2. The Majority View: Withdrawal as Abandonment (Figure 6.3) The majority of French officers, however favored retention of Indochina as a colony, seeing any change in its status as abandonment of a previously successful colonial 261 strategy. This orientation came to dominate the officer corps as the war in Indochina escalated and the threat of a communist, anti-French Indochina increased. The new story that oflBcers told to justify their opposition to French withdrawal in Indochina begins with a very different understanding of the nature of the conflict. The war in Indochina was not portrayed as a colonial war but an East-West conflict, the Western civilization against the communist world. (Ely 1964; 13) “The war in Indochina was conducted according to the superior interests of the country, its mission and its role in the world... It serves a sane global strategy...Southeast Asia, the Middle East and continental Europe are the key strategic areas in the Cold War. Indochina is the last Western stronghold against China as well as the Indian world.” (Ely 1961: 150-151 in section written in 1954 “Pourquoi L’Indochine?”) Despite the high stakes of the conflict, military officers felt that they were receiving very little support from a divided nation at home. For example, towards the end of Indochinese war the government refiised to send any more conscripts, due to lack of political support by the populace. The French officers were left like mercenaries to fight a war that was not supported by the population (see editorial in Message no. 7 February 1955, p. 1) The goal of the Indochinese war, therefore, was not only to maintain a non- Communist Indochina but also to “save France despite herself.” This role as a savior was possible because officers argued that the “real country” was behind them. (Ambler 1966: 366) In their writings officers distinguished between the regime they disdained and the nation they served. “It is unfortunately with the “legal country”- that is to say with the oligarchies which dispute the power and profits of the regime- tha t we must deal. It is the 262 “legal country” which is not only revealing itself to be incapable of arousing within the nation the reactions necessary for salvation, but which also forbids them from being bom spontaneously.” (Navarre 1956; 334) The “real country” though misled by the regime was “profoundly healthy.” These elements of the story served as a justification for seeing the withdrawal as a mistake by an incompetent government. Finally as predicted in Hypothesis One, this distinction contributed to a mental split between the regime and the people and a condemnation of the government which motivated new patterns of civil-military relations in the post-imperial era. “A legal government might well be illegitimate and an illegal authority legitimate.”(Debres 1957: 197) Successive defeats, civilian indifference, leadership mistakes and a general feeling of being ignored and scorned characterized military morale during this period. For some military ofiBcers, like for instance General Navarre, a weak and vacillating French government was to blame for the withdrawal. (Ambler 1966: 104-105) This attitude is illustrated in an editorial by another military oflBcer in 1956; “There is a complete bankruptcy on the part of the government leaders in the definition of war goals, the elaboration of a general policy adapted to these goals, in the supply of the means necessary for battle and in the formation of opinion.” (Ambler 1966: 215 quoting from editorial in 1956 Message des Forces Armeesl These French military oflBcers felt both abandoned by their government and guilty of abandoning the Vietnamese. This double abandonment is an important theme in the 263 French military literature and press editorials of the period. ■ Acknowledging this sentiment General Ely, one of the most respected French officers of the time asks the rhetorical question 'Is it necessary that peace in Indochina will necessarily be accompanied by a total abandonment that would render our sacrifices useless? (Ely 1961: p. 160, 1954 essay “Pourquoi l’Indochine?”) He then argued that France was not abandoning Indochina since; “Familial ties are not broken when children leave a family to marry...Vietnam will keep its ties to France since it can not totally separate itself without losing all of the benefits of the civilization we brought them, that has impregnated their nation. We leave behind our schools, our culture, our spiritual influence, and the most precious, our fiiendships.” (Ely 1961: 160-161, 1954 essay “Pourquoi l’Indochine?”) 6.2.2.3. Conclusion: The split in the officer corps over the events in Vietnam bears a striking resemblance to the dialogue which occurred between Soviet military officers over the withdrawal fi-om Eastern Europe. The difference between the two groups is that the split was not tested with a prolonged and demoralizing war. Because of the war, the second story, the new and less optimistic view of the external role, came to dominate the officer corps. The choice to withdraw was seen to stand in direct contradiction to their goal of defense of global security and French power, and to the previous strategies they employed to achieve it. These officers saw .any change in the status of Indochina as “ See Captain X “La Crise Morale du Corps des Officers,” Message des Forces Armees no 12 (Feb. 1956); “L’Algérie et la volonté vaniere” Message des Forces Armees no 42 April 1960 and “Le Mal Jaune” Le Courriere de la Nation no 5 (August 14, 1958), p. 20. 264 abandonment of a previously successful strategy and they saw the peace treaty, after a lack of political support during the war, as proof of civilian incompetence and lack of military consultation. As in the Russian case, this initiated a distancing of the military officers corps from the state it served. Finally, the withdrawal was psychologically debilitating to many officers who felt guilty of not living up to their higher role as defenders of those Vietnamese who had trusted them and their cause. This guilt would only be exacerbated in Algeria. “Charged for ten years with accepting in its flesh the responsibility for political errors, tossed about at the mercy of events which were easily foreseeable but in which one pretended not to believe, badly adapted to badly defined missions, fighting all of that time with more abnegation than faith, the Army, ignored in Indochina, humiliated in Morocco and Tunisia, will it be able to stand another forfeiture?” (Ambler 1966: 216 quoting Message des Forces Armees editorial of August 1956) Due to the split between old and new stories at beginning of the decolonization from Indochina, Hypothesis One was not initially confirmed. However, as the withdrawal continued, a new story did indeed come to dominate among the military officer corps. As described above, this new story had significant implications for the nature of civil-military relations. As in the Soviet case, the existence of a new post-imperial story was only strengthened with the loss of the internal empire. 6.2.3. Algeria: the Internal Empire Algeria had been French since the 1830s. It constituted three ‘departments’ in the French Republic. Over 1 million European settlers lived in Algeria. This status quo was challenged in March 1954, just a few months before the end of the Indochina conflict, 265 when a group of young rebels encouraged by Nasser of Egypt broke away from the conflict-ridden Algerian nationalist movement to form the FLN (National Liberation Front) and its military component the ALN (National Liberation Army.) On November I, 1954 the first real violence erupted. Seventy terrorist attacks were launched in Algerian cities. This was the beginning of the Algerian War for France. 500,000 troops, including draftees, were sent to fight against the FLN. In the 8 years of combat France lost only 9,000 men while rebel fatalities were estimated at 141,000. As will be discussed in the next section of this chapter, in 1956 the Fourth Republic fell over the question of Algeria. General Charles de Gaulle was called to power and supported by a military which believed that he supported maintaining Algeria as a part of France. Only two years later De Gaulle began to make gradual moves towards Algerian independence. On July 13, 1958 he acknowledged a separate Algerian personality (from de Gaulle, Discours, vol 3 pp. 25) In October, 1958 he distinguished between the Algerian and French communities in Algeria (Discours, p.48-49) On Jan 30, 1959 he conceded that the destiny of Algeria belonged to the Algerians. (Discours. 78) On March 25, 1959 he elaborated that Algeria’s destiny was still linked to France’s but that a “new personality” was envisioned for Algeria. On September 16, 1959 he outlined three solutions to Algeria secession, francisation (assimilation/integration), or association (‘cooperation’) in which Algerians would govern themselves but remain in association with France. However, de Gaulle scorned secession as unreasonable since it would lead to “appalling misery, fiightfiil political chaos, generalized slaughter and the ultimate bellicose dictatorship of the communists” (Discours p. 121) Nevertheless, only a little over a year 266 later, after a week of street demonstrations to avert the loss of Algeria was overturned by the will of the majority, he proclaimed a commitment to the creation of an Algerian republic with its own institutions, government and laws. (Discours, p.275) He followed this up with an aimouncement of a referendum on Algerian self-determination. On January 8, 1961 the referendum was endorsed by 75% of those voting in France and 70% in Algeria. This last step was the stimulus for the 1961 military putsch attempt. (Kolodziej 1974: 458-461) The putsch unsuccessful, the war ended in 1962 when it became apparent to de Gaulle and the majority of Frenchmen that the only alternative to Algerian independence was to continue the war indefinitely. (Ambler 1966) 6.2.3.1. 1956-1958: Unanimous Opposition to Withdrawal (Figure 6.4) The period between 1956 and 1958 saw the greatest degree of consensus within the French officer corps about the role of the French military in Algeria and the relationship of Algeria and Algerians to France. Officers who had served in Indochina were transferred to Algeria, carrying the legacy of their recent experience of conflict and withdrawal. Thus, officers shared the goal of a commitment to the status quo. ‘Trom the corporate interests of the military community, the oflBcer derived a strong attachment to the empire built by his military forebears (though not to the economic and social status quo there) and a fear of further humiliation and permanent decline in military status should the overseas France be lost. All of these sentiments came to focus on the defense of French Algeria...” (Ambler 1966: 299) ‘Ideological conceptions and party dogmas don’t amount to much once you have faced up to this imperative task. Algeria has got to remain French. The real interests of the natives themselves require it, those of the Europeans of 267 Algeria and of France and the French Union dictate it. With a National Union government and trusting in our magnificent army this objective will be attained.” (Servan-Schreiber 1958: 204 Letter fi-om Company Sergeant-Major ‘Peisson’) This early story about the struggle for the fate of Algeria mirrors baseline themes of a tension between superiority and equality. The position of the military officers that participated in bringing down the Fourth Republic was that Algeria was forever French and that the Moslem population was equal and could expect social and economic progress as part of France. (Girardet 1962:138) ‘To expunge the dishonor of its military defeats the army had to find a transcendent goal. In creating such a goal, military leaders took flight from reality. They pretended that the army was not fighting for the special privileges of the ‘European’ minority. They pretended that the Moslem majority hated and feared the FLN, loved France and wished to see it side with France’s army.” (Fumiss 1964: 288- 289) “We accept this war because we love the population for which we are fighting...we sincerely believe in fraternization, but in true fraternization.” (Fumiss 1964: quoting from Edgar Pisain “Un Officier Parle” Revue de Paris. November 1960, p. 121) “In the last twelve years by the suffering and sacrifices it has endured, the country and the mihtary has forged an ideal of grandeur and faith in our destiny. This was expressed in the cries of the French -Muslim fraternity, a human fraternity. This is the renewal of the original civilizing mission of France, refusing the easy solution of abandoning Algeria, instead taking the more difficult and generous route of maintaining Algeria in the French community.” (Ely 1961: 185-186 writing on the events of 1958) 268 In order to maintain elements of the baseline story, officers had to draw a distinction between the majority of the Moslem population, which they continued to portray as friendly and grateful for the French military presence, and the minority of rebels. The essential task of the army in Algeria was portrayed as winning over or winning back the support of the majority of the Moslem population which they saw as insecure, hesitant, vacillating and concerned for their future. (Girardet 1962:138) This is illustrated in the appendix to Servan- Schreiber’s memoirs of serving as an officer in Algeria during this period. One of his fellow officers in responding to his account states, “My daily contacts with the Moslem people of Algeria have always given me the impression that they are profoundly attached to France. The present policy offers them ‘rights’ which they don’t care a damn about, whereas sound elementary reforms- for example raising the standard of living, agrarian reform and, above all, abolition of excessive privileges of the big settlers would soon restore peace and a brotherly Franco-Moslem coexistence.” (Servan-Schreiber 1958: 204-205, letter from Quarter-Master Sergeant) Le Bled, the military newspaper in Algiers, repeatedly featured stories of French victories, French determination and reforms, and the rallying of Moslems to the side of the French. (Ambler 1966: 220) In contrast to the majority of the population, which was seen as advocating fraternization and integration, in this story the F.L.N. was portrayed as extremists which posed a danger to the Algerian people and had to be stopped. Servan-Schreiber describes how his commanding officer called Algerian fellanghas ‘Viets’: “for him and for many of his fellow regular officers who had served in Indochina it was the shortest and clearest 269 way of preventing ambiguity.” (Servan-Schreiber 1958: 19) These extremists were portrayed in the local Algerian military newspaper as pawns of the Egyptian dictatorship. (Ambler 1966: 220) As predicted by Hypothesis One, in a continuation of the new set of relationships with the government and society and the goals described above, ofiBcers during this period opposed any action that would result in the disintegration of the territorial integrity of France. Any vagueness about France’s will to maintain her sovereignty was portrayed as undercutting the efforts of the military. “It is evident that in Paris an attempt is being made to discredit the army in order to more easily reach an agreement with the F.L.N.; it is an old tactic which I have known since Indochina. Now it must be known that the army will no longer permit the intriguers to betray France. Algeria will remain French, I assure you.” (Femiot 1958: 49 quoting General Massu, commander of the Tenth Paratroop Division on December 1957) This led to the assertion by officers that those Algerians who remained loyal to the French military and French colonial government would never be abandoned. (Girardet 1962:138) “Let them know that France will never abandon them...’’(Ambler 1966: 289 quoting 1958 Algiers Committee for Public Safety under General Massu’s signature. This was reiterated by de Gaulle himself in 1958.) However, even during this period, a great diversity of opinion existed in the military about the specific nature of the administrative arrangement which ought to unite Algeria with France. Some were in favor of complete assimilation while others recognized an Algerian personality endowed with its own institutions. (Girardet 1962:139) “The destiny of Algeria will be based simultaneously on its personality and on its close solidarity 270 with the French métropole...Long live Algeria and France...” (Lacouture 1993:251 quoting from Lettres. Notes et Carnets May 1958-December I960 Paris, Plon, 1985, p.31; De Gaulle’s letter to General Salan June 19, 1958) “If you agree that what is happening is a pan-Islamic plot engineered by the enemies of France and imposed upon the Algerian people by terror, then you are seen as good man. Your fellow Frenchmen who have loved, worked, and died in this country for several generations can count on you as a friend. However, if you stick to the idea that the real roots of revolt lie in popular resentment and the only way of ending it is by treating the people as human beings and seeking contact with them, then you are a dreamer. You are a threat to the immediate concrete future of the French position in Algeria...Objectively both positions are possible and therein lies the drama...the only means of maintaining for a few more years the position of the French residents as it is now is force. Any other method, if it is to have some chance of founding a durable future for France, will automatically lead to the modification of the present forms of colonization and this transformation will be very painful for some people...’’(Servan-Schreiber 1958: 123- 124) This split on the specific actions officers advocated was the basis for a much larger schism in the officer corps as the inevitability of a withdrawal from Algeria grew. 6.2.3.2. 1958-1961: Splits in the Stories as the Military Faces Imminent Withdrawal After de Gaulle’s announcement in 1958 that Algeria had its own personality and ultimately its own destiny, there was a division in the military officers corps over two possible roles for the military. The first role was to cushion the transition to a new relationship by enforcing a certain order on both sides during a difficult period, acting as umpire. The second was the protection of the status quo by continuing the war with any means necessary. (Servan-Schreiber 1958:124) This split had very real behavioral implications. Officers who advocated a continuation of the French Algeria policy, even in the face of a government decision to negotiate a withdrawal, were sympathetic to and 271 participated in the 1961 military putsch attempt. Officers who accepted the new role and embraced de Gaulle’s solutions ultimately benefitted in the post-imperial period. Option One: Status Quo (Figure 6.5) The story told by officers who continued to support a French Algeria begins with a reiteration of the goal of the military to maintain French territorial integrity. Among the first statements of the 1961 putsch leaders was the following; “You have before you Generals Challe, Jouhaud, and Zeller. On May 13th the French army gave a solenm pledge to keep Algeria under French sovereignty. We have come today to renew that pledge in the name of the Army.” (Fauvet 1961: 117) The French military officers saw themselves as “lonely defenders of France against her enemies both domestic and foreign.” National salvation was now a military responsibility. (Ambler 1966: 278- 279) While the goals remained unchanged, the relationships that these French military officers described between the military, the Algerian people, the French people and the French state had undergone a marked change. The myth that the majority of Moslems were united with the Algerian army was shattered in 1959 when De Gaulle offered them a choice of their national destiny and the majority chose secession. Their choice was explained away by some officers as the result of confusion and the inability of the population to handle choices. “When in Algeria a Moslem chooses a chief and thereby a destiny, he doesn’t understand very well- and it is the same for cultivated Moslems- that having made a choice, he is then asked to make a choice that is somewhat different.” (Azeau 1961: 6-7 General Challe quoted at the trial) “Algeria is still a country in the middle ages where people like to be commanded. The first condition of their loyalty is to 272 proclaim that we will not leave. The second is to show our will. Justice is maladapted to these circumstances. The army has to wield immediate justice. . ." (Bromberger 1960: 14 Massu in Jan interview with German journalist) In a parallel to the opposition to withdrawal in Indochina, military officers opposed to withdrawal from Algeria blamed the ineptitude of the government. “De Gaulle has squandered everything won on May 13 th (1956), including the policy of fraternization. His policy of self-determination is bankrupt. His refusal to allow integration, to allow the army to conduct its campaign with Algerians for a French Algeria is a catastrophe. It shows the fellanghas that we expect them to win....The officers are troubled. Exposing their men just to give Moslems the right to vote for their independence seems to them an aberration.” (Bromberger 1960: 17-18 Massu in Jan interview with German journalist) General Massu saw himself as the father of a new Algeria, an Algeria where real assimilation would envelop the Moslems within its strong grip. He even adopted two Moslem orphans. (Bromberger 1960:25) Finally and ironically, French officers abandoned the belief in a silent and peaceful majority that was on their side. Instead, they began to consider all natives as rebels until proven otherwise. This led them to conduct operations against the population that were viewed by many civilians in the métropole as gruesome and gratuitous. Furthermore, these operations were inconsistent with their espoused goal, which was to convince the Algerian population that the French army was there to protect them.(Ambler 1966: 164) As predicted by Hypothesis One, the new story which emphasized a commitment to retaining France’s territorial integrity, even in the face of government incompetence 273 which was causing the withdrawal, led oflBcers to advocate new patterns in civil-military relations, as active rejection of withdrawal. “The Army will never accept negotiations. That would be to dishonor itself, to dishonor its comrades who died in Indochina and Algeria. Do you think I was beaten for five years in Indochina, that I watched my comrades and my superiors fall around me in order to capitulate, in order to treated as an equal with the FLN when we are the stronger forces?” (Dufresnoy 1961) As will be explored in the next section, rather than accept withdrawal many of the officers which held this story participated in a 1961 putsch which attempted to regain control of Algeria’s policy. Throughout the military trials after the unsuccessful 1961 putsch, a dominant theme emerged to justify these actions. The army officers argued that like the Indochinese in the baseline story, officers had made a sacred pledge to protect the Moslem Algerians who had cooperated. Many had already learned this lesson from their sense of abandoning cooperators in Vietnam. General Andre Petit in his statement before sentencing for the 1961 putsch remarked; “No one has the power to divert the army from its natural vocation, to make it an army of abandonment.” (Cottaz 1961; 28) “The army swore to all men of goodwill to protect their property, their families, their future. Would it suffer the shame tomorrow o f breaking its pledge? Could it, without denying itself, abandon those whom it has compromised, who risk death and torture for themselves and their families because they associated with our task?” (Ambler 1966: 290 quoting March 1961 Message editorial no. 48, pp. 1-2) Many military officers, both those who participated and those who did not saw the choice as a clash between honor and discipline. (Ambler 1966: cites 274 General Valluy who framed this explicitly in two articles in Review des Deux Mondes June 15, 1961 pp.582-592 and 1961 pp.577-94) General de Pouilly, commander of the Oran district in Algeria, was one of the commanders to stand firmly against the putsch. But he testified in defense of the mutineers; “I chose a direction completely différent from that of General Salan. I chose discipline. I chose as well to share with my fellow citizens and the French nation the shame of abandonment...History will tell perhaps that their crime is less serious than ours.” (Salan 1962) The 1961 putsch may not have been as much motivated by an attempt to overthrow de Gaulle as it was to avenge a guilty conscience. The officers felt that military honor could only be safeguarded through a final desperate act. (Ambler 1966: 291-92) ‘T am profoundly sad at what has happened, but I feel today relieved of all of that weight of shame and guilt which has been building up inside for 2 years.” (Cottaz 1961:28 General Andre Petit at his own trial) Option Two: Negotiate (Figure 6.6) The story which President de Gaulle and the military officers who supported him told began with a very different understanding o f the relationship between France’s goals and the appropriate actions to meet them.^ De Gaulle argued that the appropriate goal for French security should be the achievement of “independence, security, and greatness” It was this goal, he argued that in the past had necessitated a strong French colonial presence. Now however, France would no longer fight the tide of history in the Third ^ Later sections of this chapter and the next one will describe the nature of the coalition which de Gaulle formed within the military. While in the minority among officers stationed in Algeria, there was an emerging coalition of officers who did favor negotiation and withdrawal from Algeria. 275 World. France could serve the same objectives as those served by colonialism (grandeur, security, economic gain, and a sense of a universal mission) as champion of national independence and self-determination in a changing world. This had the added benefit of global approval.(Kolodziej 1974:447) In order to meet these overarching goals, France had to sacrifice its commitment to retaining Algeria against its will. “It is possible that one day the integration of Algeria with France will be possible, but this day has not come since it would involve killing over 1,000 adversaries month...We find ourselves before an active and intact insurrection which has already lasted more than four years even though we have had more men in Algeria than Napoleon used to conquer Europe...The only acceptable course is to end the war and allow Algeria its own personality.” (Lacouture 1993:252 quoting from Letters Notes et Carnets, p. 184 de Gaulle letter to General Ely January 17, 1959 ) "It is a fact that decolonization is in our interest and therefore is our political strategy. Our grand national ambition will be the source of our power and influence... These territories cost us much more than they bring us. Our resources and skills would be much better used at home than with them... The order of the day is disengagement.” (Lacouture 1993:254-255 quoting fi'om Discours et Messages volume 3 pp. 291-292, April -September, 1961) Even in this new story, however, old elements remain. An illustration of the continuing tension between superiority and equality in France’s relationship with its former internal colony can be found in de Gaulle’s explanation of the May 1961 Evian accords with the FLN on Algerian independence. De Gaulle argued that these accords were appropriate for two reasons; self-determination was inevitable, and France’s grant of 276 Algerian independence was meritorious and civilizing. In the text of the accord it stated; “The relations between the two countries will be founded in mutual respect of their independence and on reciprocal exchange of the benefits and interests of the two parties.” (Kolodziej 1974:459) Finally, de Gaulle’s solution was to champion national independence as a way to achieve French prestige. This included military independence in NATO. This solution was accompanied by increasing military strength not only for self-defense but also for ensuring a role for France in world politics especially with the non-aligned nations. “Under the Fifth Republic, therefore, the same means, an independent national defense, was to serve in achieving both security and prestige priorities.” (Martin 1981: 23) The lesson of de Gaulle’s story for the French military officer corps was clear. By 1960 the economy had almost completely recovered fi'om WWI and WWII and faced the real possibility of a thaw in East-West tensions. But in Algeria not only had the battle on the ground not been successful in maintaining it as French, France was increasingly the target of international criticism and faced the possibility of economic penalties. “The preservation of colonial integrity now symbolized by the Algerian War, had become detrimental to the very function it had been designed to fulfill- the prestige of the country. Neither the colonial hegemony ideal nor the actions undertaken in its pursuit could continue to be a source of prestige.” (Martin 1981: 20-21) 6.2.3.3 Conclusion: An analysis of the stories military officers told of the internal decolonization process in Algeria reveals similarities with the two phases of Soviet/Russian internal 277 decolonization; the dissolution of Soviet Union and the Chechen separatist challenge to the Russian Federation. Like the early responses of Soviet/Russian military officers to the collapse of the Soviet Union, initially there is a unity in the stories and actions advocated by officers in Algeria, the goal an “Algérie Française.” This agreement is shattered, however, in the later stages with some officers changing their views of the effect of a continued commitment to the status quo on the overall goal of national security and prestige. Faced with increasing evidence that their fight was unpopular and unlikely to quickly result in victory, groups of both French and Russian military officers made the argument that resisting internal decolonization was detrimental to organizational and national prestige. Thus in both cases there was an emerging split in the stories and actions recommended by different sections of the officer corps. One major difference between the cases, however, was that at no time was there a question of Algeria retaining a portion of the French military in the same way as the former Soviet Republics claimed portions of the Soviet military, a major trauma associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union. This, coupled with the leadership of de Gaulle, may have allowed for a quicker redefinition of the French military’s external role. 6.2.4. Conclusion on Loss of Empire; In this section I have been examining the evidence for the Hypothesis One: When a military experiences the loss o f its state's empire, officers willformulate a new story that justifies the change in its status. This new story will motivate new patterns o f civil- military relations in the post-imperial era. To what degree did the stories French military officers told of their external role change from the baseline view presented in the beginning 278 of this section? Over time there do seem to have been significant changes in the stories some military ofiRcers told of their organizational goals, relationships and the appropriate actions they should take as a result of the loss of their empire. From the Indochina period onward, French military ofiBcers increasingly articulated a story about the role of the military in its former empire. This story included an acceptance of withdrawal as the logical finale to previous French civilizing efiforts. The withdrawal did result in a new relationship between the French métropole and its former colonies. France no longer needed the colonies for prestige and security. In fact its prestige and security were being hurt by holding onto unwilling populations. This, however, did not mean an end to the relationship between France and its former colonies. Also important was the emergence of a recognition that organizational needs could be more completely addressed by a withdrawal than a lingering presence in Algeria. The French military needed to look out for its own institution at a time when the people did not seem to support it. This is not the full picture, however. Interestingly, this analysis has also shown that for some oflBcers there was very little change in the major elements of the stories they told. These French military oflBcers continued to see the role of the French military as being dedicated to a higher ideal than mere state security. This included a commitment to those who had trusted in them to bring about true democracy and racial integration in their internal colonies. These officers continued to see the former colonies as important to reestablishing French pride and status in the world. They also include a view of the relationship between the French métropole and the people of the colonies that reinforces the baseline tension between seeing the people as juridically equal and yet dependent upon 279 the French. Thus, for a group of military officers, withdrawal was unacceptable. “A decade and a half of humiliating defeat and retreat in the colonies built up in many officers’ minds the conviction that military status and self-esteem were inseparable from the cause of Algérie Française.” French military indiscipline and revolt in Algeria are understandable not so much in terms of a “breakdown of professionalism” as in terms of an impassioned defense o f military power, status and self esteem.” (Ambler 1966:372) The fact that withdrawal was being forced upon them caused this group of officers to reevaluate their relationship with the French state. This réévaluation took the form of new stories which preserved some old elements of the colonial vision. Evidence for Hypothesis One, therefore is somewhat mixed. French military officers did formulate several stories that justified the change in status. However, in many ways it was a combination of old elements of the baseline story (regarding the relationship to the colonies) along with new elements of the post-imperial story (regarding the relationship between the military, society and the state) and the new goals of internal security which motivated new patterns of military behavior in the post-imperial period. In the next section I will examine more explicitly what effect both these continuities and the changes had upon the relationship between the French state, French society and the French military. 6.3. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: STORIES ABOUT THE MILITARY’S INTERNAL ROLE What did French military officers think they should do (if anything) about the radical changes which they witnessed and described as a result of the withdrawal from their external and then internal empires? What happened to the civil-military contract as a 280 result of the loss of empire? Just as I have done in Chapter Four, this section will provide evidence for my argument that one common effect of the loss o f an empire on a nation's military ofiBcer corps is their increased acceptance of political participation to achieve their goals. The content and degree of political participation, however, will depend upon the particular way in which these individuals have understood the reasons for and impact of their loss. Thus, in this section I will examine evidence for Hypothesis 2: When there are contested definitions o f the appropriate distribution o f policy responsibility between the state and the military and when military officers see state institutions as weak, they will advocate an increase in their level o f domestic participation. I will test Hypothesis Two by examining how military ofBcers defined their role within the state and society from the imperial to the post-imperial period. Was a loss of imperial mission and sense of civilian incompetence coupled with greater acceptance of political participation either in the greater scope of the issues which were now addressed by military ofiBcers or the means which they advocated to address them? Just as in the previous section, in order to isolate the effect of the loss of empire on the civil-military relationship, we first must establish the nature of the civil-military relationship before the decolonization began. After examining this baseline, the rest of the chapter will be devoted to an examination of how French military oflBcers’ internal role conceptions altered as the result of four events: the outbreak o f war in Indochina 1956- 1958; the collapse of the Fourth Republic in May, 1958; the Week of the Barricades revolt in Algiers January, 1960; and the April, 1961 putsch attempt At each of these stages the 281 military was faced with a behavioral choice that required a reexamination of their role within society and their relationship to the sitting government. 6.3.1. Establishing a Baseline (Figure 6.7) How can we characterize the relationship between the military, the state, and society before the decolonization period? What are the major elements of the baseline story which we can use to analyze changes?* The story begins with the goal which French military oflBcers espoused for their organization in the period before World War Two. These goals included not just the external defense of the French state against external threats, but also shaping the national system of values through national conscription. One of the four main missions of the military was to continue the inculcation of values of patriotism and national service in the younger generations. “The military was the guide and tutor and the source of moral and intellectual regeneration.” Conscription was also seen as a bridge to society preserving a sense of oneness rather than isolation between the military and society. (Martin 1981: 150-151) “The army believed it epitomized the best national virtues. It simultaneously believed it represented the nation . It accepted the proposition that military failures were the consequence of political and social defects. Therefore the army was driven to the conclusion that French society must be reshaped.” (Funriss 1964: 2) * As in the baseline measure of their colonial role, the analysis of secondary sources for this case study did not reveal any discord between the military and civilians or within the military with respect to the baseline story on the nature of civil-military relations in the pre-withdrawal period. 282 In all other respects, however, the French Army was not a force in domestic politics. Most oflScers believed that only “apoliticisme” could protect the honor, eflBciency, and unity of the French army. (Ambler 1966; Cohen 1994: 41; Girardet 1962) From 1815-1939 the French Army was characterized as the “Great Mute”. Major Ebener, a military instructor at Saint Cyr at the beginning of 20th Century articulated this relationship in stating; “The loyalty and devotion of the army to the legal government must be absolute. 1 defy a military man to find another formula which will permit him as surely to safeguard his honor.” (Girardet 1953) Thus, there was civilian control over a basically obedient and non-political oflBcer corps. Despite rapid turn-over in the type of government (monarchs, emperors and presidents) fi'om Napoleon on there was no military coup and no active military support of the ousted regime. “If the Army’s record was not altogether as pure as some recent scholars have suggested, it was nonetheless impressively clean in view of the variety of regimes which officers were called upon to save.” (Ambler 1966: 16) Shifts in political power took place between segments of the bourgeoisie. No attempt was made to call in the army to intervene against the other. ‘Tn fact the gravest error of the French military leadership in the inter-war years appears to be its passiveness, or failure to demand the modernization of its equipment and the strengthening of its professional officer corps.” (Ambler 1966: 7) During this period, the distribution of policy responsibility was clear. In its own sphere of expertise the military was granted significant latitude. From the 1920s on, relations between the political authorities and the army were governed by a basic unwritten rule: the army did not get involved in politics and in exchange the government 283 did not interfere in the running of military affairs except through budget allocations... Intimidated by the uniform and little versed in military affairs, political leaders, with few exceptions, willingly left all decisions in questions of defense up to military leaders.” (Cohen 1994: 41) In addition, colonial service served as a safety valve against military intervention in politics, since the colonies provided an opportunity for ambition, daring, independent action, power and glory. (Ambler 1966: 47-48) This distribution of responsibility granted the military a great deal of influence over foreign and defense policy. 6.3.2. Decolonization and Civil-military Relations; Indochina (Figure 6.8) How did the war in Indochina and the decision to withdraw the military change the stories military officers told of the civil-military relationship? Is there any evidence of a challenge to the distribution of policy responsibility or the perception of government legitimacy? The defeat at Dien Bien Phu from March 13 through May 7, 1954, followed by the cease-fire armistice on July 21, 1954, signals the beginning of the actual withdrawal from Indochina. (Martel 1994: 314) However, for many officers Dien Bien Phu was merely the last straw in an emerging picture of civilian incompetence and interference in military affairs. The military men fighting in Indochina placed the responsibility for the humiliation they felt on the lack of a coherent governmental policy, lack of comprehension of what was necessary to fight the war, or lack of will to supply it. The government was blamed for never having supplied the expeditionary force with the necessary technology, the necessary manpower, or the necessary war material. ‘There existed a feeling of betrayal by the government and also a feeling of abandonment by the nation.” (Girardet 1962: 125) In agreement with senior military officers like General Ely 284 and General Navarre, General de Gaulle himself (on the outside of the government) attributed both the domestic and foreign policy failures of the Fourth Republic to the weakness of France’s governing institutions. (Kolodziej 1974: 33) When the decolonization wars went badly, ofiBcers tended to blame the failures upon treason in the métropole and weakness and immobility in the government of the Fourth Republic. For some military ofiBcers like for instance General Navarre, a weak and vacillating French government was to blame for the withdrawal. (Ambler 1966: 170) ‘The real reasons for the defeat in Indochina are political...The first reason fi’om which all others follow is the lack of a policy...They could only evolve solutions fi’om day to day which were rendered useless by events.”(Navarre 1956: 319-321) Treason was documented in a series of leaks of military secrets by civilians which were called the “affairs des fuites” in 1953. In military circles they were taken as proof of treason from within and of a lack of governmental vigor fi’om those responsible for repressing them. (Ambler 1966: 109) The military’s relationship to society was also undergoing a réévaluation during this period. The military felt that they received little recognition for their defense of the empire. Instead, most of the civilian population seemed to be characterizing Indochina as the ‘dirty war.’ During the war in Indochina there was widespread anti-war propaganda as well as the sabotage of weapons and the fi-ee circulation of military secrets by Communist and Progressist party members and deputies. A representative of the officers’ group Veterans of Indochina commented; “now we know that a French army on no natter what territory it fights, will always be stabbed in the back.’’(Navarre 1956: quoted with approval on p. 114) 285 As a result of these changes, military ofiBcers begin to advocate political solutions. France’s government was characterized by one disgruntled ofiBcer as “quacks and charletons” who, if the ailing nation was to be cured, would have to make way for a “great surgeon.” (In other words de Gaulle) (Navarre 1956: 335) In the meantime, one segment of the political spectrum, the political nationalist Right seemed eager to join forces with the military, bringing factions of the French army into politics. The end result of the growing politicization of the military was that by 1956 many military ofiBcers were ready to participate in the very political process of expediting the downfall of the Fourth Republic and the installation of a military ofiBcer from the center-right of the political spectrum and one who favored the retention of Algeria at the helm of a new Fifth Republic government. 6.3.3. Early Algeria; 1956-1958(Figure 6.9) The period of the Algerian War under the command of the Fourth Republic presents a continuing evolution in the disillusionment of military ofiBcers with the weakness of the state and their growing impatience with a passive domestic political role. Military ofiBcers in Algeria during this period argue that their role included not only the maintenance of the external security of France against the Soviet/Communist threat embodied in the FLN rebels but also the assurance of the internal security of the Algerian population, since no one else was protecting the victim from the murderer. “Legality is bad when it no longer protects the victim from the murderer... Either France and the French will die in legality or they will save themselves with new laws.” (Ambler 1966: 173 quoted from “Morale de la Guerre and Morale de I’Armee” no 21 April 1957 and “La 286 Guerre Subversives a la Lumière des Experiences d’Algérie” no 27 February 1958 both unsigned articles in Message des Forces Armees) Chief of Staff General Andre Zeller saw the army as the “bulwark against communism, a rare embodiment of patriotism, courage and discipline sacrifice and solidarity- an example and guide for the nation.”(Ambler 1966: 115 quoting from Zeller, “Ordre du Jour No. 1" Revue Militaire d’information 296 July 1958 p. 97) However, the military felt badly adapted to the mission of pacification it was given and resentful of the weakness of the Fourth Republic which seemed to compromise their efforts. (Servan-Schreiber 1958) “We have the disarming impression that all action has henceforth become vain because it is sabotaged by a political system which is incapable of awakening the national consciousness and gives itself up to unreal games at a time when the country is in danger of foundering.” (Ambler 1966: p. 215 quoting from a captain writing on February 1956 in Algeria published in the Message des Forces Armees) The response that the majority of military officers advocated and implemented during this period was increased domestic political administration of Algeria. Air Force General Chassin (later a plotter against the regime) wrote an article discussing the Eastern Roman Empire in decline and proposing a remedy/lesson for the present. “Whatever the extent of disorder and internal anarchy, all can be saved so long as one disposes of a solid and sufBciently national army capable of effecting the necessary rectification in reestablishing order and authority.’’(Ambler 1966: quoting from Revue de Defense Nationale October 1956 pp. 1189-99) ‘Tearing that at this hour and for a long time yet nothing positive can come from Paris, the army is driven to finding itself the roads to total 287 victory, and not only to military victory which is now within its grasp. As an instrument of times of crisis, the army has the duty to compensate at all echelons in Algeria for a wavering authority.” (Ambler 1966: 216 quoting from November 1957 Message editorial) However, the military (particularly the Paratroopers) only assumed an internal police role when they felt there was no other viable alternative. “Civil authorities were incapable of assuring the functioning of the judicial system and the collection of political intelligence and found it convenient to have these sordid jobs done by soldiers, remaining free to accuse them of cruelty.” (Ambler 1966: 227 quoting from March 1957 editorial in Message des Forces Armees “D’AIgerie: Une Opinion sur le Moral des Ofiiciers”) Over time military officers also began to call for the overthrow of the Fourth Republic. 6.3.4. May 13.1958 and Bevond Those calls were answered at a ceremony on May 13, 1958 in Algiers commemorating the dead in the recent Battle of Algiers. At that ceremony Generals Salan, Jouhaud, Allard, Massu and Admiral Auboyneau briefly addressed the crowd and were greeted with cries of “Army to power” and “Massu to power.” Unprompted, several hundred demonstrators in the crowd launched an attack on the nearest symbol of the French Government, the Government General Building. Military complicity allowed the demonstrators to successfully take over the building. The security police and a few paratroopers who were guarding the building barely resisted the demonstrators. The demonstrators even used a Paratroop truck to smash the front gate and take over the building. Complicity turned to military leadership when General Massu arrived, berated the demonstrators and then agreed to preside over the Committee of Public Safety. As 288 head of the Committee he drafted a cable to Paris in collaboration with Colonels Trinquier, Ducasse, Thomazo, and Captains Engels, Marion and Renauld. (de Serigny 1958; 164-168; Femiot 1958: 33-36) The following is the text of telegram sent to Paris by Massu: “Report creation of a Civil and Military Committee of Public Safety in Algiers, presided over by myself General Massu, because gravity situation and absolute necessity maintenance order and this to avoid all spilling blood, demand creation in Paris of a government of Public Safety, alone capable of retaining Algeria integral part of métropole. The current crisis shows that the political parties are profoundly divided on the Algerian question. The press is leading us to think that the abandonment of Algeria is foreseen by the diplomatic processes and negotiations on a cease fire which have been initiated. I remind you that I can support no other cease fire than one which invites the rebels to put down their arms and return to a renovated Franco-Moslem community...The French Army is troubled by its responsibility to those who fought with us and risk death...We are concerned for the French population which feels abandoned and the French Muslims, more numerous every day, who put their confidence in France believing our repeated promises that we will never abandon them...The French army is unanimous in considering the abandonment of our national patrimony an outrage. This could only be met by a reaction of despair. . .! ask you to remind the President of the Republic of our anguish, an anguish that can only be erased by a government firmly resolved to maintain the French flag in Algeria.” (Ambler 1966: 244 quoting from Le Monde May 15, 1958; Bromberger 1959: 137-138) This text demonstrates the degree to which the coup was a direct response to the impending loss of Algeria. On May 15, 1958 De Gaulle formally announced his availability and pledged that Algeria must remain under French control. The Parliament and its President Pflimlin refused until the final hour to resign, feeling that they were the legal force standing against illegality. (Bromberger 1959: 287) However by June 2, 1958 the National Assembly charged de Gaulle with formulating a new constitution and ruling by administrative decree until a new regime could be formed. On Sept 28, 1958 a referendum was held, yielding 289 overwhelming support for the new constitution. Finally, in January, 1959 de Gaulle was elected president of the new Fifth Republic. (Kolodziej 1974:453-455) Thus, May 13, 1958 was the official entry of the French military as an institution into the internal politics of the French state. There was almost complete unanimity among the officer corps in rejecting what they perceived as a disintegrating and socially unpopular Fourth Republic. (Girardet 1962)^ However, even so, they joined a revolt already in progress initiated by the settler population. 6.3.4.1. Data Analysis (Figure 6.10) What was the story military officers told to justify their increased political participation and even leadership in bringing down the state they had pledged to serve? General Massu who became President of the Insurrectionary Committee of Public Safety explained his behavior thus: ‘T was not in on any army plot. I boarded a moving train, if I may put it that way, and I tried to reach the locomotive to prevent it from going to catastrophe.” (de Serigny 1958: 87) Massu, in a telephone conversation with Ely, argued thus: “Yes we have constituted a Committee of National Salvation. It is not a coup d’Etat... It is to affirm before the Parliament the desire of Algeria to remain French . I could not do otherwise. We would have had to fire on the crowd. Would you have given the order to shoot? No! So I was left with the only option of talking with them.” (Bromberger 1959: 189) Massu commented on the 1958 revolt that the military only * Supporters of the Fourth republic in the military were few but they included General Jacquot commander in chief of the French Forces in Germany and General Morliere military governor of Paris. (Bromberger, 1959: 252) Hostility towards the Fourth Republic was greatest among young officers- captains, majors and colonels who organized the European settlers during the battle of Algiers. (Ambler, 1966: 248) 290 wanted to prevent the abandonment of Algeria and the decadence of France through “fatal and thoughtless action by irresponsible governments.” (de Serigny 1958; 137-138) By supporting the revolt the military was siding with the people, who were unstoppable against the state which was weak. “You can’t imagine the strength of the movement. It is impossible to resist it.” (Femiot 1958: 78 quoting Salan) “Yesterday if we had wanted to stop the crowd there would not be a National Salvation Committee today but instead many dead.” (Femiot 1958:35 quoting Massu) “The msh of the Algiers crowds toward the Government General building was intended to express refusal to continue to accept successive capitulations, the abandonment which appeared unavoidable, the acceleration of French decadence through fatal and thoughtless action of irresponsible governments subject to the haggling and incompetence of the party politicians who made up the Parliament.”(de Serigny 1958: 137 Massu speaking on the May events in retrospect) There was a feeling that the state and society were on the brink of civil war. (Femiot 1958: 158) After the May 13, 1958 events an editorial in Message claimed that, because of the government’s failure to defend the nation, the army had only to restore a “saving authority.” “If this role was played by the Army last May it was incontestably because she was more aware (than other public bodies) of the gravity of the situation.’’(Ambler 1966: 216 quoting from L. L. “Du Role Politique de I’Armee,” Message no.31 (October 1958)) “The role of the army has been to maintain order according to the highest discipline, to avoid a schism between the métropole and Algeria 291 and to channel the enthusiasm toward the good of France in general and Algeria in particular. The army has served as a force of renewal. (Ely 1961: 179) In the Spring of 1958 the Fourth Republic was divided within itself, lacking authority in the nation and helpless to control its subordinates in Algiers to whom it had delegated great power. Had there been clear consistent and vigorous civilian leadership from 1946 onward, even from 1954 onward- the army could have been held in check, even by a government intent upon independence for the colonies. (Ambler 1966: 230) The great majority of ofiScers would not have joined a revolt against the government if they had not sensed a general disaffection of civilians as well as military officers toward “le système.” A national opinion poll taken in August, 1958 asked whether the military’s role on May 13th had been useful or harmful. 55% of all respondents answered useful, 17% harmful 13% neither and 15% had no opinion. (Ambler 1966: 248-249) General Paul Ely, allaying the fears of those who feared more military interventions in French politics, argued; “The army always remains in its place with a strong government and when it knows it is being commanded.” (Ambler 1966: 251 quoting from Revue Militaire d’information no 297, 1958) Ely proclaimed that in taking action in 1958 that was in accordance with the desires of the population, “The isolation of the army from the métropole is over.” (Ely 1961: 186) Military officers’ stories described a situation in which the previous division of policy responsibility was contested. Captains, Lieutenants and Sergeants in Algeria were asked to do it all under the Fourth Republic. They were policemen, bakers, doctors, security guards for children going to school, judges, dentists, even irrigation designers. In response military officers wondered; “Since the army does all of the work why isn’t it in 292 power? What good does the Parliament do deliberating in a void while we administer, heal, fight and distribute work to the fellanghas?” (Bromberger 1959: 125) In this study I have hypothesized that when there are contested definitions of policy responsibility and when military ofiScers see state institutions as weak, they will advocate an increase in their level of domestic political participation. Indeed, the events of May 1958 and the military responses to them do show this hypothesized pattern. The result of a perception of a weak Fourth Republic and contested roles for the military in Algeriawas the increased politicization of the military officer corps. The Fourth Republic was left with no military supporters, no defenders of its legitimacy and no officers advocating remaining mute. Even the Secretary of Defense General Ely resigned rather than defend the Republic against the overwhelmingly popular revolt. Members from all of the branches of the military; Army, Navy and Air Force officers all sought to bring down the Fourth Republic. Once the initial civilian revolt occurred, military officers both in Algeria and in the métropole became active in convincing the sitting government to resign and in consolidating support for General de Gaulle as its successor. In Algeria, after May 13, the naval commander in Algiers Admiral Auboyneau and Air Commander Jouhaud accompanied Army General Salan at all local ceremonies and Air Force officers were active members in the revolutionary Committees of Public Safety, (de Serigny 1958: 140- 141) GauUist forces won control of the rebellion with the help of a civilian, Leon Delbeque, head of a Defense Ministry delegation in Algiers assisted by military officers Major Pujet and Captain Lamouliatte. Delbeque canvassed and organized military officers preparing them for de Gaulle’s political ascension. (Bromberger 1959: 105-114) 293 Some military officers were even prepared to use force to overthrow the Fourth Republic if Prime Minister Pflimlin and his cabinet did not resign willingly. “Operation Resurrection” was such a plan for an armored and paratroop assault on Paris. (Ambler 1966:244-245; Bromberger 1959:232; Femiot 1958:45; Martel 1994: 296) Operation Resurrection was to be led by General Micquel of Toulouse in coordination with Generals Salan and Massu in Algiers. Two regiments of paratroopers would come from Algiers to reinforce the meager military force left in the métropole. A large force was to be recruited as well from the internal police force- the Republican Guard was almost unanimous in their support of toppling the Fourth Republic. The risk of civil war was estimated by Micquel as negligible. The operation was intended as a psychological one- to break the morale of the government and convince them to resign without having to use force. The military had no intention of taking power. Since the goals of the army never included military rule the military acted more as a pressure group attempting to influence government policy. (Girardet 1962:141) It acted to exert pressure on the government to legally swear in de Gaulle. This was justifiable to the army since they believed he would already be in power if the country had its say. (Bromberger 1959: 302-311) De Gaulle never sanctioned this plan and it was never needed. 6.3.4.2 Conclusion: Beginning in 1958 with its call to de Gaulle to assume power, the military exhibited a seemingly sudden réévaluation of its passivity. “The army tended to form its own opinions on a number of important contemporary problems, thereby refusing to continue its traditional role as an inert passive mechanism.” There was a “social crisis” in 294 the army of the Fourth Republic, and a fundamental change of attitude. “Although the army as a whole does not appear at present to question the obedience it owes to the new state, this is essentially a reflected obedience... The army acted as if on the political plane it had a kind of veto power. It considered itself authorized to use this veto on a government decision that might directly negate what the army believed to be the requirements of national destiny. The army would be disloyal to itself to its mission and to its duties if it allowed the denunciation of French sovereignty in Algerian departments.” (Girardet 1962:142-143) In an attempt to regain control over the military and return the civil-military relationship to its previous baseline arrangement, upon assuming power de Gaulle immediately ordered the military out of the Committees of Public Safety and also transferred key officers out of Algiers including General Salan who was replaced by General Challe. For most of the military 1958 marked both the beginning and the end of their domestic political activities. As predicted by Hypothesis Two, when de Gaulle assumed power in 1958 and was perceived by the majority of military officers as the leader of a strong and popularly supported Fifth Republic, the Air Force and the Navy and most of the Ground Forces basically remained loyal, and resisted the later calls to action of civilian and military officers in Algiers. (Ambler 1966: 338-339) Interestingly, they resisted these calls despite the fact that many continued to contest the internal mission in Algeria and the external security role de Gaulle assigned them. This suggests that military perceptions of the strength and legitimacy o f state mstitutions are more important than contested definitions of policy responsibility in determining the level of domestic political 295 participation advocated by military ofiBcers. However, not ail ofiBcers supported de Gaulle. In fact, opposition to de Gaulle began quite quickly in other segments of the military. This opposition was founded on the belief that de Gaulle’s government was illegitimate since he was selected based upon his promise of a French Algeria. 6.3.5. January 24.1960 Week of Barricades In November of I960 de Gaulle issued a call for negotiations with the F.L.N. leading to a cease-fire. He also promised a self-determination referendum completely free and open to all Algerians (Ambler 1966: 251-252.) These announcements were greeted coolly by ofiBcers from the paratroop and political action sections of the military. General Challe publicly stated in response to the announcement of the referendum, “We will continue to work for the most French solution.” (de Serigny 1961) Colonel Jean Gardes chief of the Fifth Bureau (bureau for psychological action) persuaded General Challe to select representatives from all of the army corps zones and sectors to campaign for French Algeria. (Bromberger 1960: 295-296) General Massu lashed back at de Gaulle in a statement to a German news reporter saying that perhaps the army had made a mistake supporting him in 1958.(Bocca 1968: 23-24) ‘T don’t know if de Gaulle has a clear vision of the future. If he does, it is surely not ours. De Gaulle does not understand the Moslems. If we continue on the path we are on we will be considered as weak... We no longer understand his politics. His plan for the whole of French Africa will lead, sooner or later, to the self-determination of the entire community. De Gaulle does not know the extent of the virulent opposition that exists within the army. We will have to « how him so that he understands. The first question to be asked is when a successor to de Gaulle will 296 arrive..The army has strength. If it has not shown it so far, the occasion has not presented itself. But in a certain situation the army would establish its power.” (Bromberger 1960: 34-35) After making these statements. General Massu was recalled back to Paris. The events of January 1960 were essentially a response to the end of de Gaulle’s equivocation on Algeria as well as to the recall of the very popular General Massu. The demonstrators sought to intervene before any cease-fire negotiations were opened. On January 24, 1960 a second revolt was launched to topple the government in Paris. Right wing groups had been stockpiling weapons for a new attempt to get the Fifth Republic to change its policies. Two groups, led by civilians Pierre Lagaillarde and Joseph Ortiz had maintained contact with the army through Colonel Gardes and Colonel Argoud. The activists planned to take the public buildings and hold them with barricades. No blood would be shed. It was assumed by these groups that the army would refuse to assault the barricades. Then either de Gaulle would renounce his politics and return to his agreements of May, 1958 or he wouldn’t and there would be an assault in Paris by tank and army units on the government buildings, sending de Gaulle back into retirement. (Bromberger 1960: 68-70) The government in Algiers had been anticipating the demonstration and had prepared a plan for coordinated action to defend the Government General building by the Mobile Guards (a metropolitan police force) and the first REP and First Colonial Paratroops units. The paratroopers, however, were purposefully delayed in their arrival. When the revolt went poorly the military expected the demonstrators to retreat for the next battle but they refused. (Bromberger 1960) Thus, by the time the paratroopers 297 arrived, the demonstrators and police had fired on each other and the police had retreated back into the Government General building. 14 security guards were dead and 24 wounded. Meanwhile, the armed demonstrators had erected barricades in the street. (Bocca 1968: 27-29) In the middle of the week Prime Minister Michel Debre was sent to Algeria with orders to isolate the insurgents, and return the situation in the streets to normal as soon as possible, using force if necessary. OfiBcers in a late-night meeting with Debre stated their categorical rejection of a military assault on the barricades since that would mean firing on Frenchmen. (Bromberger 1960: 265-280) The Week of the Barricades ended when de Gaulle addressed the army and the nation on January 29, 1960. "The guilty ones should know everywhere and know clearly that I will not go back on my word (promising self-determination.) To concede this point and under such conditions would be to bum all the trumps we still have in Algeria so that France would be nothing more than a toy boat let loose on a sea of adventures.’’(Bocca 1968:33 quoting de Gaulle’s television address) “No soldier may associate himself at any time, even passively, with the rebellion without committing a grave mistake...What would the French army become but an anarchic and derisive pack of feudal groupings if they started to attach conditions to their loyalty?” (Ambler 1966: 258 quoting De Gaulle from Le Monde January 31, 1960, p.3) Shortly after the address, telegrams began to arrive from unit commanders professing the military’s loyalty to the government. After a week in which de Gaulle refused any concessions, the paratroop commanders withdrew their tacit support of the demonstrators, obeyed orders to disperse them, and the rebellion dissolved. 298 (Bocca 1968: 27-29) Up against a strong and popular President, the military was hesitant and divided, allowing de Gaulle to ultimately retain political control. 6.3.5.1 Data Analysis: (Figure 6.11) What was the story told by those ofiBcers who either actively supported the putsch or refused to fire on the demonstrators? How does this story compare with either the baseline story or the story that emerged in 1958? First, military ofiBcers continued to espouse the goal of maintaining the integrity and security of France through a French Algeria. “Sign a paper saying we are fighting for French Algeria and I’ll tear the barricades apart with my bare hands.” (Bocca 1968: 29 quoting Colonel Dufour:) In their attempt to meet this goal, military ofiBcers increasingly expressed the sentiment that they were not being consulted. This general feeling became very strong when the ofiBcers were asked by Debre to fire upon the demonstrators in their barricades. “It would be good if the head of the government would listen to the advice of the Generals and the heads of the units before transmitting orders that we will have to carry out.’’(Bromberger 1960: 282 quoting General Challe) As in 1958, there was the perception that the state was illegitimate. Many of the ofiBcers argued that the demonstrators represented the majority of the Algerian people and that this majority no longer had confidence in the government. “Mr. Prime Minister, the people confronting you are absolutely determined men. It is impossible for the military to shoot. You can not fire on Frenchmen who are shouting “Long live Algeria.” If you gave me such an order I would not carry it out and I would order jny subordinates lo disobey. The people confi-onting you, for reasons it is not my business to judge, no longer have any 299 confidence in the government. That includes both Europeans and Moslems. Unfortunately, for some months past, they no longer have any confidence in the person of head of state. This is the end of 15 years of lies and of one disavowal after another...’’(Bocca 1968:30; Bromberger 1960: 284-285 quoting Colonel Argoud ) As a result of feeling unconsulted and doubting the legitimacy of the government, military officers rejected an internal role for the military in supporting order and government control over an unhappy population. ‘Tn order to avoid a mutiny it would be better to avoid giving the order to fire.” (Bromberger I960: 283 quoting General Dudognon) T have toured the barricades. It is war in the streets. In such a war we would lose one out of every two men-700-800 dead. I will not give this order. You can recall me if you wish.” (Bromberger 1960: 283 quoting General Gracieux) “We do not want to be mixed up in a police operation , we leave such operations to the Mobile troops.” (Bromberger 1960:284: quoting Colonel Broizat) Even Marshal Juin in Paris said to de Gaulle: “there are other ways than force to obtain an abandonment of the barricades... If you give the order to shoot I will take a public position against you. You do not have the right to give such an order.” (Bromberger 1960: 294) Other officers went even further in their political participation by actively supporting the rebellion. Nfilitary units in Algiers provided both the weapons and most of the recruits for the rebellion, as well as psychological encouragement. Colonel Joseph Broizat, at the trial for his part in the 1960 uprising of settlers in Algiers, justified these activities as the only possible response of a professional officer. ‘Tf we officers became 300 interested in the political problem, it was not because of a taste for politicking; it was because of the demands of our professional duty."(Ambler 1966: 149) However, not all officers became mobilized against de Gaulle’s government. Outside of the capital Algiers the generals and their subordinates remained loyal to de Gaulle. “Clearly despite the government’s self-determination policy the mood of most elements within the ofiBcer corps was not revolutionary.’’ (Ambler 1966: 256) Unfortunately, very little data is available on the stories that supported the majority’s choice to follow de Gaulle. However, other analysts writing on this period have argued that, in contrast to the previous attempt to bring down the government, this time military ofiBcers recognized that the revolt faced a strong and publicly popular leader with enough self-assurance to face down the revolt. 6.3.5.2 Conclusion: Faced with a decision about whether to support or militarily oppose the rebellion, the military split. Military ofiBcers disagreed about whether the military had an internal role as protector of order and territorial integrity. As in the Russian case study, it would appear that a key factor in determining the response of both groups of military ofiBcers was the perception of the legitimacy of the government and the strength of civilian institutions. The military supported the side which it thought represented the peoples’ choice. Those who ultimately supported de Gaulle did so because going against the minority was less gruesome than fighting the majority of the métropole. In addition, many of the ofiBcers who chose not to participate or to withdraw their participation in the revolt did so because they felt that loyalty to the government was the only way to preserve 301 military unity and prestige. General Andre Zeller is said to have remarked during the revolt. “The army is powerless if it is not supported by a part of public opinion.” (Bromberger 1960: 303) Predictably, those officers who had encouraged the insurrection were removed from their posts. They included psychological action and paratroop colonels such as Colonel Jean Gardes, Colonel Antoine Argoud, Massu’s chief of staff. Colonel Joseph Broizat and Colonel Dufour (Ambler 1966: 256.) However the group of officers that supported the Week of the Barricades revolt continued to play an important role in shaping the fate of the military and the reaction of officers to the now increasingly inevitable withdrawal from Algeria. The officers who did actively support the 1960 revolt were also instrumental in the last attempt by military officers to resist the withdrawal, the 1961 military putsch attempt. 6.3.6. April 22.1961 putsch On January 8, 1961 the promised referendum on Algerian independence took place. Shortly before the referendum, public statements were made against independence by Marshal Juin, General Valluy and General Zeller, as well as 16 other retired Generals. (Fauvet 1961: 40-42) On April 22, 1961, as a last effort to stop upcoming talks with the F.L.N. and a reaction to the January referendum on Algeria, a small group of military officers staged a palace revolution in Algiers with the aid of the First Foreign Paratroop Regiment. Of the three attempts to shape Algerian policy this was the only purely military revolt led by military officers, many of them in exile due to their participation in the events of 1960, returning to Algeria in secret. The leaders of the putsch included; Colonels 302 Argoud, Gardes, Broizat, Lacheroy and Goddard and Generals Zeller, Jouhaud, Salan and Challe. This was a group of ofiBcers which came primarily fi'om the Army and fi'equently fi'om the Paratroopers. (Bromberger 1960; 13) On April 22, 1961 the leadership of the coup gave orders to paratroop units to arrest government officials, loyal generals and police chiefs. OfiBcers sympathetic to the putsch occupied the police stations, the post office and government bureaus in Algiers. From their position in the captured Government General Building, General Challe then issued the following announcement on behalf of the leadership of the putsch: “The High Command reserves the right to extend its action to the métropole and reconstitute a constitutional and republican order which has been gravely compromised by a government whose illegality is obvious to the eyes of the nation.” (Fauvet 1961: 117) De Gaulle issued an immediate call to the French population to support his government. To the dismay of its leaders, the putsch received only limited support from the military stationed in Algeria. Colonel Goddard had assumed command of the Algiers troops. The bulk of the support came fi'om the Paratroopers, the First R.E. P, the Second R.E.P., the 18th and 14th paratroop divisions, and the 8th Marine parachutist units. The Foreign Legion, Navy and other Marine divisions did not participate, neither did the Army garrisons at Oran and Constantine. Initially few soldiers directly supported the putsch, though few moved against it either. Challe’s attempt to recruit local commanders were largely unsuccessful. General Gambiez, Com mander in Chief of French forces in Algeria, General Vezinet Commander of the Algiers Army corps, and General Saint Millier, commander of the Tenth Paratroop Division all remained loyal to de Gaulle. Overall two 303 out of three of the corps commanders remained firmly loyal. (Azeau 1961 ; 142) For example. General Gouraud had promised to join the revolt but had begun to have second thoughts and waited to see who would prevail. (Ambler 1966; Bocca 1968: 59-62) The coup attempt quickly collapsed. The officers corps was divided and conscripts refused the orders of the mutineers. Some conscripts even arrested their commanding officers. (Azeau 1961: 168-196; Fauvet 1961: 104-112, 131-139) “The four generals did not take into account that the military, partly purged and often demoralized, had the desire to be less and less implicated in police and political actions.”(Fauvet 1961:64) Four days after the announcement of their intentions, the revolt collapsed. General Challe, upon learning of a plan by General Salan for a show of force saw a choice between a bloody battle among parts of the army or his own surrender. (Fauvet 1961:236-238) Challe surrendered on April 25. Most of the other participants fled and joined the underground OAS, the European secret terror organization that continued to fight for a French Algeria. (Bocca 1968: 63) That night the regiments retreated from Algiers. 6.3.6.1 Pro-Putsch (Figure 6.12) The 1961 putsch split the army into putschists, a few staunch loyalists and a mass of hesitant officers. Is there any difference in the stories which these groups tell about the civil-military relationship? In what ways is the story told by the putschists a continuation of the pattern of redefinition of the relationship described in the previous two sections? Military oflBcers who supported and led the putsch continued to see the role of the military as defender of societal and territorial unity, and guarantor of France’s status as a world power. In even more dramatic ways than before these officers separated the nation which 304 they still continued to serve from the government which they now viewed as illegitimate. For example, in denying the right of the specially constituted tribunal to try Salan after the putsch attempt, Salan’s lawyer le Coroller said, “Listen to the voice of the Fatherland. Don’t yield to the intolerable pressures of the State.” (Salan 1962) The Army-Nation duo, had become a menage a trois, with the “Power” (the word used for de Gaulle by all of his opponents) as the third member. This “Power” had betrayed both the Army and the Nation and had won a Pyrrhic victory in the process. (Fumiss 1964: 40 quoting from general Jean Valluy, “Le Nouveau Duo Armee-Nation” Revue de Deux Mondes October 15, 1962 pp. 484-485) According to this story, the states’ claims to legitimacy were weak. In 1961 there was a repetition of earlier claims that government policy was misdirected and dangerous, formed by “bumbling fools back home who don’t understand the way things are.”(Fumiss 1964:77) The logical conclusion then was that officers had the duty to bring the facts to the attention of the métropole. Thus, it was felt among officers that “the Army and its supporters had better qualifications to define the policy of France than did the political authorities in Paris... the one objective of the army, to keep Algeria French, was consistent with the national interest of France.” (Fumiss 1964:78-79) As a consequence of this view of the relationship between the state, the military, and society, this group of military officers defined subversion as support of the government’s policy of negotiation. Overt defiance and threats to the existing political leadership were the only legitimate responses. The defense attorney for Challe and Zeller (Arrighi) at the trial argued that they were engaged in a legal revolt within the bounds of political authority since they were 305 protecting France and Europe and seeking to eradicate the F.L.N.. (Fumiss 1964: 36) Speaking in August 1960 at the Association of Combatants of French Union, General Salan argued : “It is not the prerogative of any authority to decide upon the abandonment of a portion of the territory where France exercises sovereignty. No one has this right; no one has received such a mandate from the country...” (Fumiss 1964: 35) This was also a story which contested the division of policy responsibility between the state and the military. OfiBcers were increasingly being asked by the de Gaulle government to be political organizers and propagandists. “Never had statesmen gone so far in the abandon of their prerogatives as during the Algerian war. Never had they so completely unloaded their responsibilities onto the military.” (Cohen 1994: 46) When brought to trial for his participation in the military revolt of 1961 Captain Estoup of the First Foreign Legion Paratroop Regiment replied: ‘T was never taught at Saint Cyr (military academy) to organize the provisioning of fruits and vegetables for a city like Algiers. On January 2, 19571 received the order to do so. I was never taught at Saint Cyr to do the work of a police inspector. In Febmary 1959 and in September and October 1 received the order to do so....I was never taught at Saint Cyr to disperse insurgent citizens by political means. In February I9601 received the order to do so. I was never taught at Saint Cyr to defy my comrades or my leaders.” (Cottaz 1961) As a result, “It is difficult to imagine a more thoroughly politicized army, even though military activists comprised only a minority of the total officer corps.” Officers involved the army in all aspects of the policy-making process including serving as deputies. (Fumiss 1964: 3) “It appears that we 306 are playing politics too much, as if it were possible to do so. After all, de Gaulle made me Prefect.” (Fauvet 1961:25 Massu at the Barricades Trial) In summary, officers telling this story saw the political and social environment as anarchic, their mistrust of the existing political leadership had grown and their concern for societal unity was high. This is the story of an illegitimate and misguided state and a military that perceived that state behavior and weakness posed a direct threat to its role and responsibilities as defender of the state against external and internal threats. To many officers it seemed that in order to fulfill their original mission of protecting national territorial integrity and security, an officer was allowed and perhaps even obliged to exert political pressure on a misguided leadership. (Ambler 1966: 184) The army believed the existence of a French Algeria to be vital to the preservation of the nation as they had defined it. “Convinced that the army’s political work in Algeria was insufficient so long as the French population and the French government seemed unwilling to maintain French Algeria at all costs, spokesmen for a growing military faction began pleading that the army should now play a new leading role within France herself. This new political role arose in part from a widespread belief that the French population was defeatist and polluted by communist and progressist propaganda. The army was left as the sole guardian of the nation.”(Ambler 1966: 194) Who told this story? The leadership and supporters of the 1961 putsch were primarily Paratroop and Army officers. The Air Force accounted for 15/73 officers convicted in the putsch. This is 20%, or about proportional to their relative strength in the armed forces. However, most Air Force officers followed General Clause and 307 Fourquet rather than General Challe, General Nicot (deputy Chief of Staff in the Air Force) or Pierre-Marie Bigot regional commander. Those who did follow the putschists were either French Algerian (“pieds noirs”) themselves, or had been members of the Air Force paratroop commando unit. General Challe was supreme commander of the French forces in Algeria, most land forces- from December 1958 to April 1960. General Jouhaud was bom in Algeria and was commander of French aviation there in 1958 (Ambler 1966: 135-1136, 338-339) The Navy had a very minor role in the Algerian War. As a consequence, the only naval officer to become politically active against de Gaulle was Naval Lieutenant Pierre Guillaume who had previously served as commander of a paratroop-commando unit in Algeria and had lost a brother who was a paratrooper to combat. (Ambler 1966: 339-339) 6.3.6.2. Alternative Story: Why the Putsch Failed (Figure 6.13) What story did most of the Air Force, Navy and non-putsch army officers tell about their organizational roles and their relationship to the state and society? An analysis of the scholarship on the 1961 putsch attempt reveals the outlines of their story. Officers who stood by de Gaulle defined their role as the support o f the Fifth Republic and viewed the putsch as a call to go against the people. It had become clear that the majority of the French population was willing to sacrifice territorial integrity (granting independence to Algeria) in order to end the war. This was proven by the results of the January 8, 1961 referendum. (Ambler 1966: 190) De Gaulle himself, as charismatic leader, had succeeded in establishing the legitimacy of his own personal government to a degree unknown tmder the Fourth Republic. In addition, these men saw that mutiny now meant civil war and a 308 split within the anny.(Ambler 1966: 368) By refusing to participate in the putsch they argued that the military and the people were united again and the military could set aside, hopefully permanently, the tension which they had experienced in the early period of decolonization. 6.4. CHAPTER CONCLUSION Through a review of critical turning points in the relationship between the state and the French military, this section has been exploring the evidence for a post-imperial effect on civil-military relations, as measured through the stories told by French military officers. In Hypothesis Two, I postulated that when there are contested definitions o f the distribution o f policy responsibility between the state and the military and when military officers see state institutions as weak, they will advocate an increase in their level o f domestic political participation. In the last analysis, French military behavior since 1958 appears to support the theory that firm well-rooted governmental authority buttressed by a general belief within the civilian population in the legitimacy of the existing government is the strongest single deterrent to military disobedience and revolt. ‘The French experience from 1945 to 1962 lends added weight to the theory that military intervention in politics is closely related to the degree of legitimacy of existing political institutions; ie. the strength and breadth of the national political consensus which supports them.” (Ambler 1966: 367). Those military officers who were the strongest supporters and participants in military action against the state saw the state as weak and disputed the distribution of policy responsibility between the military and civilian institutions. Once de Gaulle ascended to the Presidency of the Fifth Republic however, those officers were in 309 the minority and, although they tried to topple de Gaulle, they were ultimately unsuccessful. However, this does not mean that the majority of post-imperial military oflBcers were not more politically involved than their pre-World War II predecessors. The experience of imperial withdrawal and the interpretation that military officers had of its implications for the effectiveness of the state and the role of the post-imperial military produced a spectrum of increased military participation, a legacy of political activity in the military which posed a potential problem to the Fifth Republic. “De Gaulle carried the day in his specific Algerian policy not because the professional officer corps accepted either the desirability of that policy or the right of the executive to make decisions binding on the military, but because the army could not and would not mobilize sufficient force to topple de Gaulle as it had toppled the Fourth republic. Officers tried persuasion, blackmail, defiance and intimidation on various parts of the decision-making system; they encouraged, actively and passively, some of their cohorts and many civilians to go further in the application of this pressure. But they drew back from open, full-scale commitment to a revolution.” (Fumiss 1964: 292-293) A whole new spectrum of political activity emerged as a result of the potential withdrawal from Indochina and Algeria. At the lowest level of the spectrum was neutrality. This was followed by opposition or reluctance to obey particular directives. Other officers were openly sympathetic to civilian revolts, opening up the area around the barricades in 1960 for shipments of food and joking with the rebels in their barricades. Finally there were varying degrees of assistance or collaboration in the revolts of 1958 and 1960 and the putsch of 1961. This ranged from inspiring agitation among veterans 310 and groups and reserve officers to actual leadership in the military revolt.(Fumiss 1964; 99) Political organs for French military officers became important avenues for political participation during the Algerian period. These included; veteran’s organizations such as the Association of Combatants of the French Union, the National Union of Reserve Officers, and the Center for Defense Studies; created by members of the Union of Reserve Officers to redirect the union along the correct political path. All of these organizations lobbied for French Algeria and served as a forum to lobby against the Fifth Republic and de Gaulle. (Fumiss 1964; 30) Something had to be done to renegotiate the civil-military conflict. The next section will explore how de Gaulle and his allies within the military succeeded in reorienting the military and reorganizing its stmcture. 311 Initiating Event; The End o f Worid War II and the V id y Govonment' Reestablishing France T 1 Relationship Between Actors: Goal(s): 1) French Community is a Union 1) Territorial Security o f France and Stable Founded Upon Equality to Administration o f the Colonies Aclueve Common Goals. 2) Leading people to liberty democracy and 2) Colonies are Grateful to self-governance France and Faithful to “Our Cause” 3) France has sacrificed in order to introduce progress and dwlization to the Community I Actions: 1) Reestablishment, o f French Pride and Status in the World 2) Rejection o f Autonomy and Independence fisr Members o f the French Community who wish to leave, but acceptance o f a ren%otiation o f the rdatronship. I Lesson: France at great sacrifice to itsdf and without ' outside aid has, over years, introduced progress and chdlization in r%ions in the world which did not know it These territories that we have tied to our destiny have remained âithfiil to our cause. Oesson of past sacrifice) Figure 6.1 : Baseline Story of the French Military’s External Role 312 Wtiadng Event: Indocbinese Separatist/ Nationalist Forces Gain Strength 1 1 Rdationsbip Between Actors: Goal(s): 1) French Community is a 1) Territorial Security o f France and Stable Voluntary Union Based Upon Administration o f the Colonies Common Needs and Interests. 2) Leading people to liberty democracy and 2) The Indochinese People self-governance Support US and are Grateful for Our Sacrifices Actions Advocated: 1) N%otiations and Agreements to Reflect the Mass Desire for Change 2) Force is not a Usable Option against the Majority o f the People, Should Begin a WhhdraW .. I Consequence: The Indochinese People Can and Should Establish a Non-Communist Democracy (Still Within the French Sphere o f Influence) Figure 6.2: \^thdrawal as an Inevitable and Positive Step 313 Initiating Event; Indochinese Separatist/ Nationalist Forces Gain Strength I L Relationship Between Actors: Goal(s): 1) The Mlitary Has Supporters in Defend Western Civilization Against the Indochina. Communist World 2) There is an Increased Threat of an Anti-French Indochina 3)Little Visible Support at Home, but the Real Country is Behind Them 4)Incompetent Government ZL Actions Advocated: Oppose Withdrawal I Consequence: 1)Save France (and the Western World) Despite Herself 2) Avoid the Abandonment of Indochinese People to the Communists Figure 6.3: Withdrawal as Abandonment 314 Initiating Event: Emergence of Algerian Separatists Beginning of Violence I L Relationship Between Actors: Goal(s): 1) The Arab Majority Hates and Defense of French Algeria Fears the FLN and loves France Establishing True Fraternization, and French Army. They are just French-Muslim Fraternity insecure, hesitant and concerned for their future. 2) FLN rebels are minority extremists and pawns o f the Egyptians Actions Advocated: 1. Take the DifiScult and Generous Route and Maintain Algeria in the French Community 2. Win Back the Support o f Moslem majority through reforms (various reforms proposed) 3. Oppose any action that would appear to question our commitment to Algeria. I Lesson: France will Never Abandon Those that Remain Loyal to Her Figure 6.4: Unanimous Opposition to Withdrawal 1956-1958 315 Initiating Event: 1958 de Gaulle Announcement o f Separate Algerian Personality and Destiny L Relationship Between Actors: Goal(s): 1) Algerian Moslems are 1) Maintain French Territorial Integrity confused and unable to handle 2) National Salvation Against Domestic and choices. They need to be Foreign Enemies commanded. 3) Win Over Population and Protect Supporters 2) All natives are rebels until proven otherwise. 3) Government is inept and tying our hands. Actions Taken: 1.1959 Majority o f Moslems Chose Secession in a referendum 2. Counter-Terrorist Military operations Conducted Against the Population 3. 1961 Putsch Attempt by NCnority of Military OfiScers. Actions Advocated; 1. Proclaim That We Will not Leave 2) Show Our Will, Wielding Force if Necessary T Lesson: Military Honor Prevents Abandonment of Algerian and Necessitates Opposition to Government Policies of Withdrawal Figure 6.5: 1958-1961 Status Quo 316 Initiating Event: 1958 de Gaulle Announcement of Separate Algerian Personality and Destiny L Relationship Between Actors: 1) The World is Changing Goal(s); 2) Global Public Opinion is Anti- Achievement of Independence, Security and Colonial. Grandeur for France 3) The FLN has strong support (retention of Algeria would be costly) 4) France can continue to cooperate with and civilize Algeria from a&r. % Actions Advocated; Disengagement, Negotiation of Algerian Independence 1 Lesson; The Preservation o f Colonial Integrity now Symbolized by the Algerian War, had become detrimental to the very goal it once served, the prestige of the country. Figure 6.6: 1958-1961 Negotiation 317 Initiating Event: Maintenance o f the French State Î E Relationship Between Actors: Goal(s): 1) Army Epitomizes the Best Achievement of Independence, Security and National \%tues and Represents Grandeur for France the Nation. (Unity of Military and Society exists through Conscription.) 2) Army is “Great Mute” Loyal and Devoted to the Legal Government % Actions Advocated: Apoliticisme to protect military honor, efiBciency and unity I Consequence: Great Nfilitary Influence over Foreign and Defense Policy Civilian Control Over Military Behavior at Home Figure 6.7: Baseline Internal Role of French Military 318 Initiating Event: War in Indochina and Government Decision to Withdraw I Relationship Between Actors: 1) Government Institutional GoaI(s): Weakness, Civilian Incompetence 1) External Defense of France Caused the Withdrawal 2) \^ctory for West over Communism 2) Military was Betrayed by the Government and Abandoned by the Nation who saw it as a “Dirty War^’ 1 Actions Advocated: 1) Curing the Ailing Nation. 2) Alliance with Nationalist Right Î Lesson; Now we know that a French Army on no matter what territory it rights will always be stabbed in the back. Figure 6.8: Decolonization and Civil-Military Relations: Indochina 319 Initiating Event; Beginning o f Algerian Separatist War 2 Relationship Between Actors: 1) Emergence of Sub-group that Threatens People’s Security and Goal(s): Security o f the State External and Internal Security o f France 2) The State is Weak and the “Protecting the Victim from the Murderer” Nation is Asleep. 3) The Military is the Bulwark Against Communism and an Example and Guide for the Nation Actions Advocated: 1) Increase Political Administration by Military of Algeria 2) Reestablish Order and AuthorityI Lesson: The Army has the Duty to Compensate at all Echelons in Algeria for Wavering Authority. Figure 6.9: Early Algeria 320 Initiating Event: Civilian Revolt in Algiers n Relationship Between Actors: 1) The People (in revolt) are Unstoppable (a Moving Train) Goal(s): 2) State and Society are on the Prevent Abandonment of Algeria Brink of Civil War 3) Fourth Republic is Weak and Does not Have Popular Support. 4) The Military is the Local Government Actions Taken: 1) Took Leadership of Committee for National Salvation and Committees for Public Safety 2) Actively Lobbied for de Gaulle’s Installation 3) Developed and Prepared “Operation Resurrection” Figure 6.10: May 13, 1958 321 Initiating Event: Announcement o f Negotiations with FLN 1 Relationship Between Actors: 1) Military OflBcers are not Being Consulted by Government They Goal(s): Helped Put in Power. Work for the “Most French Solution' 2) Demonstrators Represent the Majority of Algerian People. They no longer have confidence in the government. 3) de Gaulle Has Support of Majority in Métropole. Actions Taken: 1) Refusal o f Orders to Fire on Rebellion 2) Various Levels of Fraternization with Settlers Engaged in Rebellion. 3) Ultimately Stood Down Dispersing Demonstrators on Orders From De Gaulle 1 Lesson: The Army is Powerless if it is Not Supported by a Part of Public Opinion. Loyalty to the Government is the Only Way to Preserve Military Unity and Prestige. Figure 6 .11: Week of Barricades 322 Initiating Event: Scheduled Independence Talks with FLN J. Relationship Between Actors: 1) The Nation is Separate &om the State. The State has Betrayed Goal(s): both the Nation and the h#itary Defend Societal and Territorial Unity of France 2) The Government are Bumbling Guarantee France’s Status as a World Power Fools, Policy is Misdirected and Dangerous 3) Military Alone Understands the Situation in Algeria and Must Educate the People. 4) French Populations has been polluted by Communist and Progressist Propaganda. Actions Advocated: Overt Defiance (Coup) If Necessary. To Support the Negotiations with the FLN would be to Subvert France’s National Interest. 1 Lesson: The Army is the Sole Guardian of the Nation Figure 6.12: Pro-Putsch 323 Initiating Event: Scheduled Independence Talks with FLN I Relationship Between Actors: 1) The Majority of French People Favor Algerian Independence and Goal(s): Support de Gaulle. (State is Defend Societal and Territorial Unity of France Legitimate) from Internal and External Threats 2) Mutiny means Civil War and a Split \^thin the Military Actions Advocated: Refusal to Participate in Putsch I Lesson: The People and Army are United Again Figure 6.13: Why Putsch Failed 324 CHAPTER? FRENCH POST-IMPERIAL MILITARY FRAGMENTATION AND REFORM 7.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW Can we think of the French military as an organization in decline? While the fate of the French military as an organization in the immediate post-imperial period was not as catastrophic as in the Russian case described earlier, the first section of this chapter will argue that in important ways the French military was facing a similar threat to its prestige and a reduced demand for the organization after 1962. Thus I will test Hypothesis 3: Post imperial militaries perceive a radical decrease in their material resources and organizational prestige as a result o f the loss o f their external and internal empires. After showing that the French military did experience a significant, if not abrupt, decline in their resources and prestige, the remaining sections of this chapter examine the concrete effects of this decline. The second section examines the consequences of organizational decline for the degree of unity which existed in the French military officers corps. In this section I argue that, as a consequence of the withdrawal from Indochina and Algeria, the French post-imperial military was characterized by a fragmented pluralism and an increase in interest-group based calculations. Thus, despite their significant differences, (discussed in Chapter 2) both the French and the Russian cases suggest that there is something 325 distinct about the loss of empire for a military organization which produces fragmentation and conflict rather than centralization and consensus. This section will test Hypothesis 4: Militaries which experience the loss o f an external and internal empire are characterized by fragmented organizational structures and interest-group based struggles between organizational factions. Fragmentation will be demonstrated by the emergence of rival organizational decision-making structures, large scale personnel turn-over, and fights between sub-groups over resource allocations. (Tushman 1988: indicates these variables as important indicators of fragmentation) The third section explores the effect of the loss of Indochina and Algeria on the reforms advocated by military officers. In this section I argue that the fragmentation of the military extends to the diagnosis of the consequences of the loss of empire and the reforms advocated to respond to it. A key dichotomy in managing organizational decline is the perceptions of the type of environmental change which has occurred.(Cameron and Zammuto 1988) This produces two related hypotheses which are tested in this section. Hypothesis 5: When military officers perceive a decrease in overall demand for the military in the post-imperial society (change in niche size) they are likely to encourage reactive defense o f their organizational structure and role. Hypothesis 6: When military officers see the change as substantive (change in niche shape rather than in overall demand) they are likely to advocate radical reform and experimental domain substitution. The post-imperial French military is shown to be engaged in a struggle between these two approaches to reform; domain defense and experimental domain 326 substitution. This debate is decided for them by the imposition of a solution by General de Gaulle in the early 1960s. In the final section, I discuss the origins of this conflict and the differing reactions to de Gaulle’s reforms by examining which groups within the military see the post-imperial environment as an opportunity and which see it as a threat. Militaries, even under ideal conditions, are not monolithic organizations. Instead, in large organizations group sub cultures exist which are a combination of beliefs, values, myths and norms.(Vertzberger 1990). Service branches within the military will have different subcultures and material interests shaped by and shaping differences in their function within the organization. (Janowitz 1959) In addition, given their different experiences and career expectations, rank differences play an important role in the dynamics of sub-group reactions to the post imperial environment. This section will test Hypothesis 7: Service, rank and generational variables all serve as important bases fo r variation in both the interpretation o f the challenges facing the post-imperial military and the policy responses advocated by post imperial military officers. In the previous chapter, I alluded to the importance of these differences in the differing responses of French military officers to the loss of empire. In this final section I will examine some organizational variables that might account for these differences. Initial evidence suggests, for instance, that Army and elite Paratrooper and Foreign Legion officers were primarily engaged in a battle to preserve their domains while Air Force and Navy officers were advocates of a new force structure and emphasis which they perceived would favor their interests. 327 7.2. AN ORGANIZATION IN DECLINE?: INDICATORS OF RAPID ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL DECLINE Can the French military in the decolonization period be characterized as an organization in decline? If so, what is the catalyst of this decline and what are its organizational symptoms? The initial stage of organizational decline is characterized by a decrease in the organization’s ability to successfully operate within its environment due to a dramatic change in the environment. Such radical organizational environmental changes may include policy reforms, the emergence of vacuums of power within the leadership of the constituency which they serve, or changes in the distribution of power within the international system more generally. As a result of these environmental changes, the organization enters the second stage of decline, in which its resources are reduced. (Cameron, Sutton, and Whetton 1988:5-7) In order to answer these questions in the French case study I will first examine whether, like the Soviet military, the French officers experienced a significant decline in their material resources and organizational prestige and secondly whether this decline can be traced to the decision to withdraw from either Indochina or Algeria. Thus, I will present the mixed evidence for Hypothesis 3: Post imperial militaries are organizations which experience/perceive an abrupt decline in material resources and organizational prestige rather than gradual cutbacks. 7.2.1 Budget In the period from 1945-1962 the French military did experience a significant decrease in military expenditures. However, the decline was more gradual than in the Soviet/Russian case and harder to separate from a more general post-World War 11 328 decline. In the immediate post-World War Two period, priority was first placed on rebuilding the economy before rearming the military beyond the minimum necessary. During the Second World War the portion of the total budget spent on the military was artificially high at 40.7%. By 1949, this had fallen to 20.6% and fell to 18.3% by 1950. (Martel 1994; 259-260, 273) There is some evidence of a post-imperial decline, however. While the budget was gradually declining through the period the largest single decreases were in the period fi"om 1952 to 1954 when the budget decreased fi*om 11.8 % GNP to 7.5%, a 30% decrease, with the end o f the Indochinese conflict, and 1956-1958 when the budget went fi"om 7.4% of GNP to 6.1%, an additional 20% cut. Between 1954 and 1962, when the bulk of the decolonization was occurring, the military budget decreased by 40% falling to only 4.9% of GNP. (Martin 1981: 56) Within this trend of steady decline there were erratic years for the military budget. In 1951 the trend was reversed with a guarantee of 7.6% of GNP for the next four years. The last four years of the Fourth Republic saw spending at a slightly lower level. (Martel 1994: 273) Soon after de Gaulle’s coming to power, the government began to reforming the budgetary process for national defense spending. In order to avoid the erratic budgets of the Fourth Republic they enforced party discipline on budget votes . In this way the leaders of the Fifth Republic worked both to promote the stabilization of military spending over five-year planning periods and to fix a ceiling on military expenditures that still allowed the government to move in the direction of the reforms discussed in the next section. (Martin 1981: 53-56) 329 7.2.2. Prestige The prestige of the French military also experienced a significant decline during the 1945-1962 but this decline had also begun earlier, even before the end of WWII with questions about the military’s role in the Vichy collaboration government. However, during the withdrawal fi’om Indochina and Algeria the prestige of the French officer dropped fi’om an already depressed level in 1945 (due to Vichy cooperation) to a position of radical social scorn. For fear of civilian animosity, officers chose not to wear their uniforms on the street. Even at the prestigious Ecole de Guerre in Paris, officers fi-equently changed into civilian clothes before returning home at night. (Ambler 1966: 100-101) Applicants to Saint Cyr went from 2,452 applicants in 1939 to 587 in 1951 and 360 in 1954. By 1958 almost half of these applications were fi'om young men in military families (up fi’om 40% in 1956.) This is an indication of the withdrawal of the military into its own private sphere and its sense of alienation fi’om civilian society. (Girardet 1962: footnote 23 p. 147) Conscription, which had served as a way for the military to mold public patriotism through compulsory military service, was fundamentally altered when in January 7, 1959 an ordinance was passed which reduced the service obligation to 16 months active duty and 3.5 years active reserve. Also, for the first time, a legal status was created for conscientious objectors. (Martin 1981: 119-133) 7.2.3. Salaries Military salaries also underwent a dramatic decline, begun in the post-War period and exacerbated after the withdrawal firom Indochina. In 1947 and 1948 officers were brought within a general salary plan for civil servants which indexed them at a lower base 330 salary level. In 1945 a newly-promoted lieutenant colonel earned a base pay of 185,000 francs, slightly higher than the 165,000 salary of the starting university professor. By 1950 the professor was earning more; 759,000 francs (due to inflation) compared to the colonel’s salary of 620,000 francs. By 1954 when the military was pulling out of Indochina, Rene Pleven, Minister of Defense, argued that these pay scales were “very unfavorable to the cadre of the army.” Over time the discrepancy between military and civilian salaries widened even further. In 1960, the professor made 18,338 New Francs while the lieutenant colonel made 13,666. This gap was not limited to the middle ranks. In 1960 a customs collector was earning 18,338 New Francs, while a major was earning 14,834 New Francs.(Ambler 1966; 96-97) Compared to his counterparts in foreign militaries, the French military officer was even more impoverished. The 95,000 francs per month paid to a French major was only 1/3 of what an American major received and well below the equivalent of 120,000 francs paid to a British major. Two captains remarked in 1959 that they were no better paid than British second lieutenants. (Girardet 1962:127) One important caveat to this was the fact that military officers earned significantly more for service in the colonies. Military allowances in Algeria in 1960 doubled an officers’ pay, even further incentive to keep the internal colony and a further decline with its loss. (Ambler 1966: 98) 7.2.4 Housing Finally, there was an acute housing shortage for officers and their families during the period of imperial withdrawal. When an officer returned for a brief tour in the métropole, he could not find affordable housing he could live in with his family. In 1956 331 the Ministry of Defense estimated that 62,000 professional commissioned officers and NCOs in the 3 military services were in sub-standard housing, mostly hotel rooms. Other estimates by a journalist were closer to 52,000. Thirty to forty percent of ofiBcers had to live separately firom their families. (Planchais 1958; 18) Even when ofBcers were given housing under the government’s “Moderate Housing Plan” their accommodations were far inferior to those of their contemporaries who had chosen civilian careers. This led to a feeling that the officer was suddenly materially second-class, leading them to express concern for the moral climate of a society that would allow this to happen. (Ambler 1966: 99) “As for me I have no false shame in denouncing our mediocre material conditions as an essential cause of the crisis which the army is undergoing. Of course there are other causes of the crisis: if however, the betterment of the standard of living of the military cadre is not a sufficient condition for resolving it, it is incontestably a necessary condition. Gentlemen, you desire a faithful and obedient army? Pay it!”(Ambler 1966: 100 quoting unsigned article in Message no 42 April I960) 7.2.5 Conclusion; Can the French military in the period fi"om 1945-1962 be considered as organization in decline? In this section I have presented evidence that during this period the military experienced a significant change in the operational indicators of organizational decline; budgets, prestige, housing and salary of French military officers. The French military of this time-period was a military in decline. However, while dramatic, the decline was more prolonged than in the Russian case and less easily 332 attributed solely to the decolonization of their external and internal empires. I have presented data that show that the post-imperial decline in budget, prestige and quality of life occurred on top of an already existing trend of post-World War II decreases. The more gradual and multi-causal nature of this decline, along with the absence of a collapse in the state’s financial situation in the post-imperial era (as the Russian military experienced) may account for some of the differences in the fates of the post-imperial French and Russian militaries. 7.3. INDICATORS OF POST-IMPERIAL ORGANIZATIONAL FRAGMENTATION Overall, the French military of 1945-1962 was an organization in decline. In this section I will explore the consequences of this organizational decline for French military decision-making structures and organizational dynamics? What evidence exists to support Hypothesis 4: When there is a perception o f an abrupt decline in military resources and prestige as a function o f the loss of empire, the organizational behavior ofpost-imperial militaries will be characterized by fragmented pluralism and interest- group based calculations! As I argued in the Chapter One, the literature on organizational decline points to the importance of internal conflict within declining organizations. This internal conflict is manifested as fights between sub-groups over resource allocations, large-scale personnel turn-over, and the emergence of rival decision-making structures within the organization. In the next section I will examine each of these variables for evidence of organizational Augmentation in the post-imperial period. 333 7.3.1 Personnel Turn-over There were significant purges of French military officers in the post-imperial period for political as well as pragmatic reasons. Due to the withdrawal fi-om the former colonies and the downsizing of the military, over 1,000 officers were released fi"om active duty against their will. These retirements were predominantly fi-om the Army rather than the Navy or Air Force. In 1958 “General de Gaulle replaced the officers who brought him to power with others whom he knew were more loyal to him personally, rather than to the French Algerian myth he seemed to represent.” (Bocca 1968: 23) Key officers that were retired or transferred to smaller posts in Europe included: General Raoul Salan, Air Commander in Algeria Edmond Jouhard, General Paul Allard commander of the Algiers army who became Commander in Chief of French forces in Germany, Colonel Roland Vaudrey, one time President of Committee for Public Safety in Algiers, Colonels Lacheroy and Goussaud of the Fifth Bureau, and Colonel Trinquier whose paratroopers had been at the Government General building. The only key figure from 1958 left in Algeria was Colonel Yves Goddard who had become Director of Security for all of Algeria. The second critical period of turn-over was in 1961 after the putsch attempt. On June 7, 1961 De Gaulle made use of his emergency powers to create a special leave status for officers. The Algerian policy of General de Gaulle drove 1,800 officers from the military between January 1960 and November 1961. (Cottaz 1961: 323) Of these 534 officers and 574 noncoms were involuntarily retired (Ambler 1966: footnote 138, p. 273 based upon an article in Le Monde October 13, 1961) This number can be compared to 20 or less retirements in each of the three preceding years. (Ambler 1966: quoting from 334 Jean Louis Gaillard, “Les Soldats Perdus” La Nef no. 19 (October 1962-January 1963, pp. 116-124)) 7.3.2. Rival Organizational Structures What evidence exists for the emergence of rival decision-making structures in the post-imperial French military? In order to be able to establish the emergence of a new fragmented organizational structure, an understanding of the pre-existing situation is useful. Unfortunately, it is impossible to establish a credible baseline for the French defense policymaking structure, since from 1946 to 1958 it was changed 15 times. (Martel 1994:272) What is clear, however, is that the period between 1958 and 1962 saw the emergence of rival decision making structures. The Constitution of 1958 and the Ordinance of 1959 created a new organizational structure which was in place until 1962. In this structure, illustrated in Figure 7.1, the Prime Minister had a great deal of responsibility over the direction of defense policy. While de Gaulle defined the broad lines of policy, Debre as Prime Minister was the executor. He supervised the General Staff for National Defense and his military Chief of Staff gave instructions to the field commanders. Thus there was a direct line of authority from the President to the Premier to the military leaders. By contrast, the Minister of Armed Forces and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces were reduced to advice, and coordination. (Fumiss 1964: 131; Martel 1994; 360- 366) However, during this period the formal organizational structure ceased to provide clues to the actual hierarchy of power and influence within the military “In the scale of who could command how many to do what, colonels at times outranked generals, 335 lieutenants instructed majors, and privates emerged on the top of the heap.. What emerged was an army out of the Middle Ages, a changing patchwork o f feudal fiefs. Each fief was held by personal loyalties..limited temporary cooperation among fiefs was negotiated on the same principle.” (Fumiss 1964: 116) While the myth within the military was one of unity, the reality was fi-agmentation. Each political engagement (1958, 1960, 1961) left clusters of officers bound together by their political choices and standing against those who made different choices. (Fumiss 1964: 103-104, 119) Unlike the Soviet case, however, this period of organizational fi-agmentation did not leave much of a legacy for the formal structure of the French military in the post imperial period. In July 1962 the formal chain of command was revised again. On the surface, the reforms appeared to entail a proliferation of potentially competing decision making stmctures, as illustrated in Figure 7.2. The General Staff was replaced with the General Secretariat which prepared studies for the Committee of Defense and implemented their decisions. The General Secretary supervised “a small state.” The Secretariat was assisted by the Institute of Advanced Studies o f National Defense and the Committee of Scientific Action for Defense. He had responsibility for ideas, proposals coordination and regulation and was also in charge of arms and military exports and the direction of defense research. (Martel 1994: 370) Likewise, the Minister of Defense (Pierre Messmer) was raised in responsibility. Messmer was responsible for the order and instmctions given to the Armed Forces in accordance with the Prime Ministers’ general directives. Under him, and reporting to him were the Administrative Secretary General and the Committee of the General Staffs of the 3 services, as well as the Chief of Staff of 336 the Armed Forces. The Chief of Staff was charged with military preparations and deployments as well as overseeing officer education. The Armed Forces Minister had authority over all of the services, prepared the armed forces for war, and provided for their operational needs in accordance with the Premier’s directives. (France 1964: 7 see for organizational chart; Fumiss 1964: 131-145 also see Le Monde July 12, 13, 14, 1962; Martel 1994: 367-72) According to the formal organizational chart, therefore, there were opportunities for a post-imperial struggle between the Defense Nfinister and the General Secretariat. However, these men did not significantly compete due to the preeminence of the President, his interest, authority and expertise in the area of defense and their personal loyalty to him. Each of them had been appointed to their position based upon their behavior in the 1961 coup attempt. De Gaulle named the government ministers. They held office at his discretion. There was no tolerance or accommodation to opposition points of view. (Fumiss 1964: 293) De Gaulle’s position was strengthened even further when in September, 1962 he announced a referendum on the direct election of the President. He threatened resignation if the referendum was not overwhelmingly in his favor. Once victorious he convinced Debre to resign as Premier replacing a man who had an independent political base and a previous political career with a neophyte. “Under Debre there was a semblance of duality in the French executive power. With Pompidou even the semblance disappeared.” (Fumiss 1964: 129 quoting from the New York Times April 16, 1962) 337 7.3.3. Conclusion As predicted in Hypothesis 4, fragmented pluralism and interest-group based calculations characterized the late phase of the withdrawal from the internal empire in Algeria. This was seen in the large-scale turnover of personnel and the emergence of personal fiefdoms in Algeria and in the métropole. However unlike Russia where this fragmentation and struggle for resources has continued, by 1962 de Gaulle had asserted his control over the fragmented military, rewarding those interest-groups and individuals who supported him and his vision for the new French military. This contrasts with the lack of responsibility in the Russian case, either within the military organization or at the executive level and suggests that post-imperial militaries are only characterized by intense fragmentation and interest-group based struggles in the absence of firm civilian intervention. The last sections of this chapter will explore the organizational and policy implications of this initial fragmentation and then the reassertion of control over the future of France’s post-imperial military. 7.4. GENERAL ORIENTATION OF REFORMS What is the impact of the withdrawal from Indochina and Algeria on the reform policies advocated by French military ofBcers? What is their diagnosis of the appropriate direction for French military policy? What changes, if any, do officers advocate to meet the new security environment? In this section of the chapter I will be examining evidence for the general hypothesis that the way in which military officers describe the degree and nature of the decline explains the reforms they advocate. More specifically, 1 will be testing two related hypotheses: Hypothesis 5: When military officers perceive a decrease 338 in overall demand for the military in the post-imperial society (change in niche size) they are likely to engage in reactive defense o f their organizational structure and in rigid behaviors. Hypothesis 6: When military officers see the change as substantive (change in niche shape rather than in overall demand) they are likely to advocate radical reform or experimental domain substitution, mainly in the form o f new technologies or more cost-efficient and streamlined organizational structures. 7.4,1. Imperial Military Reform; The French Armed Forces From 1945-1961 From 1946-1961, the French military was charged with 2 missions, participating in the Western alliance on the Eastern front of Europe in collaboration with their alliance partners, and acting as a police force for the colonial empire. This set up a division between ofBcers whose careers were made in Europe and those who served in the colonies. However, due to the immediacy of the threat in the colonies and an ambivalence toward the ability of the conventional NATO forces to resist a Soviet invasion, the emphasis in this period was on the colonial forces. Defense Minister Guillamat told the National Assembly in November 1959; “The first mission falling to the military establishment is the Algerian mission.”(Fumiss 1964; 222) Officers in Algeria, many of whom had served in Indochina, saw a substantive change in the type of activities required of them relative to the military requirements of the first half of the decade. According to this new view of the security environment, the classical battle was no longer seen as the only means to gain control of territory or even of apolitical regime. “The French military became an anti-subversive force deeply committed to countering large-scale powerful nationalist rebellions on Indochinese and 339 Algerian soil.” (Martin 1981; 35-36) The most probable war was a localized jungle war. (Ambler 1966; 310) “The colonels who commanded paratroop units in Algeria did not need the capability to fight an atomic war complete with large-scale air support, artillery and tanks. Instead they needed officers who could march with their troops, could parachute with them, and could plan and implement their decisions on the spot. The generals only got in the way.” (Bromberger 1959) This new view of a changed niche shape was accompanied by suggestions for radical reform o f the deployment and use of military units, support for Hypothesis 6 (and paralleling the mobile unit concept of the post-imperial Russian period.) In his account of his military reserve service in the Algerian War, Servan-Schreiber quotes fi*om a memorandum for reforms drawn up by his superior Colonel ‘Galland.’ Galland is said to be aware that the army brass were unlikely to pay attention to his memo. ‘Imagine asking generals to chop up their magnificently organized, armored, powerful units which are to them objects of such pride and signs of importance, into slices of salami to be scattered across the countryside.” (Servan-Schreiber 1958) This reform was based upon a new doctrine of war, the doctrine of “Guerre Revolutionaire” (Revolutionary War.) In the February-March 1957, a special issue of Revue Militaire d’information was devoted entirely to a discussion of this new doctrine. In 1957, courses in psychological instruction were instituted in all military schools. The Fifth Division of the Tenth Military District also created a corps of itinerant officers as advisors on psychological action.(Girardet 1962; 132-137) 340 On the surface, then, the evidence seems to fit Hypothesis 6 very nicely. What is interesting to note, however, is that although there is indeed a sense that the role of the military as an organization needs to change due to changes in the environment, if one looks at this retrospectively the perceived change in niche shape is not as dramatic as it would appear. OfiBcers who advocated the doctrine of Guerre Revolutionaire were still operating out of a sense of an imperial mission. “The doctrine of revolutionary war defines the military missions of France within a general interpretation of the international situation. It is within the framework of an ideological crusade (against communism) that this doctrine tends, explicitly or implicitly to pinpoint and justify the action of the French army.” (Girardet 1962:132) Likewise, as I wiU explore below, relative to the changes that were proposed in the post-imperial period, the creation of mobile ground force and paratroop units was not a radical change. It still maintained the preeminence of those services in order to secure and hold territory. In fact, many argue that the success of this doctrine prevented the French military from modernizing. This colonial role preferentially favored a less modem force. Victory did not depend upon the level of technology employed. In fact, at times sophisticated equipment was a disadvantage. This led to a quasi- alienation to technological change. “Before 1962 the primary French military emphasis was on anti-guerilla warfare which did not involve ultra-modem military hardware. .. Without the Indochinese and Algerian Wars, modernization would have spread gradually, thereby easing a transition which promised to be more difiBcult in the 1960s.” (Ambler 1966: 297-298) 341 In a sense therefore, if one compares it to what is to come, the statements of French ofiScers in Algeria appear closer to reactive defense than domain substitution. 7.4.2. Post-Imperial Military Reform: Between 1959 and 1961 de Gaulle delivered a series of speeches on his intended direction for French post-imperial military reform. The three key speeches were a November 3, 1959 speech at the War College; a June 28, 1961 speech at Verdun, and a November 11, 1961 speech in Strasbourg. In these speeches he proposed the termination of current overseas missions and a transition toward a technological and nuclear modernization o f the military through electronic precision technology and atomic deterrence strategy. (Martin 1981: 66) The development of a nuclear “force de frappe” accelerated a shifting of emphasis away from those colonial states whose utility to France had diminished. This allowed France to increasingly claim an independent strategic posture. (Kolodziej 1974: 51) ‘Tt is the nuclear tool, at the moment delivered from airplanes, (until a missile guidance system can be developed) that will become the decisive weapon not the classic forces. The nuclear weapon will play an essential role in the preservation of our national territories while the conventional forces will serve an auxiliary role.” (Martel 1994: 353 quoting Marshal Juin) The direction of reform was clear. “No matter what their initial motivations and military education, more and more officers would find their careers dependent on positions in modernized units, while age as well as distaste for the ‘nouvelle vague’ would remove at the other end of the hierarchy the senior officers whose experience had been centered in colonial warfare.” (Fumiss 1964:213) 342 With the military out of Algeria, its primary mission would become defense of the métropole. This was divided into external defense, performed by troops stationed in Germany and along the borders, and the operational defense of France herself. The final mission for the army was intervention outside Europe. This overseas role was limited, involving relatively few men, scarcely any outside the métropole, and little material. The army’s mission overseas was largely limited to four French départements; Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique and Reunion, totaling 1 million people. In the short term, there would also be a continuing role in Algeria. (Fumiss 1964:224-241) The proposed change in the functions of the military was accompanied by structural reforms to the military organization and its branches. On January 7, 1959 de Gaulle announced his intention to reorganize the national defense structure into a Strategic Nuclear Force, Force of Maneuver and Force of Operational Defense with an affiliated Security Force. These become operational in 1962. The Strategic Nuclear Forces were charged with the ability to launch nuclear counter-strikes against an aggressor. The forces of maneuver were charged with defending the borders and participating in the defense of Europe through operations outside of France. The Forces of Operational Defense, including the aerial defense forces, the gendarmerie and the aero-naval forces, were given the function of defending and protecting the nation and its institutions and military bases internally. Finally these same forces of Operational Defense were expected to be able to intervene overseas to protect French or allied territories. Originally these new force structures were conceived as inter-service functional structures. (Martin 1981: 39-40) 343 However, the reality was that the new hierarchy of forces represented a new hierarchy of branch services. The Strategic Nuclear Forces were composed of Strategic Air Command (CAS) and the Territorial Air Defense (DAT). The Forces of Maneuver were composed of 6 divisions from the Army (5 mechanized, motorized brigades and 1 airborne unit), 2 tactical air commands from the Air Force and nearly all of the Navy’s two fleets. (Mediterranean and Atlantic). The Forces for Operational Defense of the Territory were composed of the rest of the Army; one alpine brigade consisting of light infantry armored reconnaissance and antitank force, and 100 regiments one from every Department as well as the General Reserve units, 12 light support squadrons from the Air Force, and some submarines, anti-submarine patrol vessels and minesweepers from the navy. These Operational Defense forces were envisioned as potential commando units if guerilla tactics were needed. (France 1964: 13-14) This hierarchy of fiinctions was accompanied by a change in budget priorities favoring the strategic high technology forces over the ground forces. This was a change from the colonial period of 1945-1962 when routine allocations constituted more than 60% of the total military budget. Priority in defense spending was placed on personnel expenditures due to the nature of warfare in Indochina and Algeria. ‘The military establishment was an army of men rather than equipment.” (Martin 1981: 57-58) After 1960, with the adoption of an emphasis on nuclear deterrence, spending was shifted to equipment. The nuclear program received one-quarter of the capital expenditures. (Martin 1981: 69) Furthermore the balance between capital and ordinary expenditures shifted dramatically. In the one-year period between 1962 and 1963 ordinary expenditures went 344 from 67.6% of the military budget to 57.8%, likewise capital expenditures increased from 32.4% to 42.2%. This was all taking place within a decreasing military budget. 7.4.3. Conclusion What is the impact of the withdrawal from Indochina and Algeria on the reform policies advocated by French military ofiBcers? What is their diagnosis of the appropriate direction for French military policy? What changes, if any, do ofiBcers advocate to meet the new security environment? In this section I have presented evidence that initially a portion of the ofiBcer corps responded to the decolonization wars with the doctrine of Guerre Révolutionnaire, a policy which on the surface appeared to be an innovative response to the changes (predicted by Hypothesis 6), but in fact more closely resembled domain defense, or an attempt to prevent their core domain from being abolished. Thus there is evidence early in the period of decolonization to support Hypothesis 5: When military officers perceive a decrease in overall demand for the military in the post imperial society (change in niche size) they are likely to engage in reactive defense of their organizational structure and in rigid behaviors. Further evidence to support Hypothesis 5 can be found in the reactions of a large portion of the military to the reforms outlined by de Gaulle in 1960 and summarized above. Initial evidence suggests that as an institution the majority of military ofiBcers rejected the bomb, engaging in reactive defense of what they saw as a reduced role for them in post-imperial France. France is the only nuclear power to have forced nuclear weapons upon an essentially unreceptive military. They viewed it as ill-suited to colonial conflicts.“How is the atom bomb going to help us pacify Algeria?” Demanded General 345 Jouhaud in 1958. (Jouhaud 1958) Many saw in it the proof that France sought a withdrawal to the mainland and a defense concentrated solely on the European continent. (Fauvet 1961; 231) “The French military entered the nuclear age crab-like, constrained and forced to adapt itself to the organization that de Gaulle imposed upon it.” (Cohen 1994: 50-51) However, given the rivalries that already existed in the colonial period between European and colonial ofiBcers, between branches, and between generations of ofiBcers, it seems unlikely that this is the full picture. In the next section I will present evidence that a portion of the military approved of de Gaulle’s reform policies and the reorientation of the French military to a high-technology independent regional power. They saw the reforms as a substantive change in the role of the military rather than a change in the demand for its services. As Hypothesis 6 predicts this group advocated radical reform or experimental domain substitution, mainly in the form of new technologies or more cost-efiBcient and streamlined organizational structures. 7.5. DIVISIONS WITHIN THE MILITARY ABOUT TBDC POST-IMPERIAL ENVIRONMENT AND REFORM In the previous sections of this chapter I have been arguing that the process of losing an external and internal empire engendered an organizational crisis for the French military. However, it would be a mistake to simply end the analysis at the organizational level. This crisis was not described or experienced uniformly across all sub-sections of the organization and therefore the organizational response to the experience of the loss of empire was not uniform. In this section I will explore the major cleavages which existed 346 within the French military organization. I will be examining the evidence for Hypothesis 7: Service, rcmk and generational variables all serve as important bases for variation both in the interpretation of the challengesfacing the post-imperial military and the policy responses o f thatfragment or group. 7.5.1. Army From 1945-1960 the French military establishment was dominated by a huge land force whose preponderance in the defense establishment generated inter-service dissatisfaction on the part of the technologically-deprived Air Force and Navy. (Martin 1981: 38) As indicated in the previous section, the reforms armounced as early as 1959 threatened the privileged position of the Army. As colonial warfare ended, officers feared that the emphasis on nuclear confrontations would require a thorough shake-up in the organizational structure of the Army. The service as a whole would no longer enjoy the near-monopoly of national attention and some of its units might even receive lower priority than sections of the Air Force or Navy.” (Fumiss 1964: 121) In the new organizational structure of 1962 the Navy and Air Force tended to perform most of the strategic and tactical level missions and the Army performed strictly conventional missions for which it received far fewer resources. (Martin 1981: 44) By 1962, because the defense budget was fixed, all increases in nuclear spending were taken from the non-nuclear budget (the Army budget preponderantly) In addition, any unforeseen costs or miscalculations in the cost of the nuclear program were taken from the Army budget, yielding an unpredictability in their allocations.(see Figure 7.3: Defense Budget by Service) (Martin 1981: 71-73) 347 In addition to budget cuts, the Army faced the largest troop cuts of the three services. (See Figure 7.4; Fluctuations in Army, Air Force and Navy Manpower ) In 1962 and 1963 one-third of Army manpower was cut. Within the Army, the cuts were unequally distributed. Infantry was cut 42.9%, artillery 36.8% and armored and cavalry units 33.8%. These reductions were seen as prerequisites to the modernization process. Finally, Defense Minister Messmer announced that by 1965 units in Germany would be re equipped but any further transformation would have to be delayed until at least the second 5-year period. (Fumiss 1964: 188 quoting from Messmer, “The French Military Establishment of Tomorrow” Le Monde January 25, 1963) Thus, it is clear that the Ground Forces perceived the loss of their role in Indochina and Algeria as a drastic reduction in the demand for their services, or niche size. “In contrast to the other two services, the Ground Forces, by fighting de Gaulle, were fighting to preserve their prestige, their vested interest and many thought their very reason for existence.” (Fumiss 1964: 121) The reaction by army ofiBcers was one of reactive defense. For example, an unsigned article criticizing de Gaulle’s policy toward the modernization of ground forces appeared in Armee published under the supervision of the Ground Forces command. The article argued that while 8 billion francs was going toward Ground Forces over half would have to go towards paying, housing, and outfitting ofiBcers and troops. The 3.5 billion fi-ancs that remained would not come near buying even the little that the government had promised the Army. “The number of mechanized divisions that we can equip will almost certainly come closer to five than to ten, and the other forces we are supplying will have to content themselves with whatever equipment now in our 348 supply dumps is still operational.” (Fumiss 1964; quoting from article reported in Le Monde August 11, 1962) In response to this reduction, the Army attempted to reorganize its divisions to optimize the use of its conventional equipment, creating smaller regiments. (Martin 1981: 76) 7.5.2. Army Elite Troops; Paratroopers and Foreign Legionnaires Within the Army branch there was one special division which played a particularly important role in the decolonization process. One of the important cleavages in the colonial French military was between elite troops, especially the paratroopers, and the rest of the military. The paratroopers as the specialized highly-mobile units were relied upon in Indochina and especially Algeria to conduct search and destroy missions against the guerillas. They were supplemented by the Foreign Legion which was called in when any serious combat was expected. The paratroopers were only a numerically small proportion of the units stationed in Algeria but they were a very important part of the conflict. The paratroops and the Foreign Legion made up only 3 and 5% of all of the troops in Algeria. The regular infantry were 46% the Armored divisions 10%, the Air Force 6%, Navy 3%,and police 3%. (Ambler 1966: 346) In addition to their combat roles, the 1961 putsch was heavily dependent upon paratroop support. Of a total of 57 ofiBcers found guilty in the putsch, 26 were paratroop officers. These figures do not include generals since they have no permanent service affiliation. (Ambler 1966: 355-357; Cottaz 1961; Fauvet 1961: 259-60) The politicization of the military and the 1961 military putsch was supported by the paratroopers who could expect a loss of status if the military moved to a more high 349 technology (nuclear) emphasis. Paratroopers perceived the proposed reforms as a shift from warriors to technicians or managers. (Ambler 1966:297; Azeau 1961: 83)* ‘Termination of the Algerian War posed a serious threat to their (the paratroopers’) status and way of life. Independence for Algeria, the last of the colonial battlegrounds,” would mean the end of fighting as well as the inevitable eclipse of the ‘para’ legend. In this sense, at the very least the paratrooper was not completely indifferent to war goals.” (Ambler 1966: 355) As discussed in the previous section, this fear was not completely unfounded. Under the post-imperial reforms the paratroops were regrouped into formations designed for overseas service in an emergency and territorial defense against aggression, in other words they were assigned to the lowest functional units within the new structure. (Fumiss 1964: 150 see also Le Monde October 13, 20 and December 1-3, 12, 1962) The other special category of army forces, the Foreign Legion also perceived the loss of empire as a significant decrease in their niche size. In view of the law forbidding the employment of the Foreign Legion in the métropole, there was considerable fear among Legionnaires that they would be homeless.(Fauvet 1961: 134) In fact, however, this was not the case. Foreign Legion units were established in the Sahara, Corsica, Madagascar, French Guyana and in Southern France. (Ambler 1966: fit 97) After the failed coup the Foreign Legion units which had rallied to Challe were split and their ofiBcers were reassigned. Recruiting stations were temporarily shut down and enlistments *See also Francois Gromier “Une Conception Archaique”in Cahiers de la Republique no 28 (November -December 1960) pp 15-30 and Jean Planchais “Crise de Modernisme dans r Armee” Revue Française de Sociologie H, no 2 (April -June 1961) 118-123. 350 were refused. The Legion was made into a sub-ordinate element in other formations. (Fumiss 1964: 149 see Also Paul Hofi&nan ‘Taps for the Foreign Legion?” New York Times Magazine January 21, 19962 and Le Monde June 22, August 21, October 11, 28, 29 1962) 7.5.3. Air Force The Air Force was in a very different position than the Army during the colonial period and thus perceived the change in French security priorities differently. The French Air Force was under-funded during the colonial period. From 1950-1960 the Air Force received 23% of the military budget compared to 33% in the US and Great Britain. Air technology was so outdated that in 1955 the National Assembly Economic Commission questioned the advisability of continuing France’s aerial participation in NATO’s defense network. (Martin 1981: 61-62) However, while the Army was tied down in Algeria, Air Force officers participated in the early stages of the nuclear program under the Fourth Republic. Unlike their Army counterparts, many Air Force officers regarded the development of a nuclear force favorably. (Martin 1981: 45-46) After 1960, the Air Force was given an essential role in French post-imperial defense due to several inherent characteristics; mobility, speed and flexibility of power projection capabilities, reconnaissance capability, and precision in delivering high-tech weapons in a hostile combat environment. (Martel 1994: 461) Thus the Air Force was the primary benefactor of the new nuclear policy of the early 1960s and the biggest advocates of domain substitution. The Mirage IV, as part of the Air Strategic Forces, was the bomber airplane program which received the highest priority. The first Mirage IV flew 351 June 17, 1959 and the first atomic bomb was exploded February 13, I960. (Martel 1994: 456) Domain substitution was accompanied by a new streamlined organizational structure. The Air Force adapted its structure to fit its new independent and privileged role. Four operational commands were created: within the strategic forces there was the Air Strategic Command (FAS) and the Air Tactical Command (FATAC), in the Forces of Maneuver were the Air Defense Forces (CAFDA) and in both the Forces of Maneuver and available for overseas interventions was the Air Transport Command (COTAM) (Martel 1994) 7.5.4. Navy In the period before 1960 the Navy was also severely under-budgeted. It accounted for only 15-18% of all military expenditures. Compared to the American and British fleets the structure of the French Navy was very traditional. From 1958-1963 the total tonnage of the Navy declined by 31%. (Martin 1981: 63-64) After 1962, however, in absolute values the amount of capital spending allocated to the Navy, the smallest of the three services was almost equal to the amount allocated to the Army, the largest of the three services. (Martin 1981: 75) Tension developed however between the Air Force and the Navy over who would, be the primary recipient of the technology and resources of the nuclear program." ^ See Admiral Cabanier, 'T e Sous Marin Nucleare Français” Revue de Defense Nationale #22 (December 1960) 595-605; Rear Admiral Lepotier “La Stratégie Sous-Glaciere” RDN #16 December 1960 1931-48; Lepotier, “La Force de Dissuasion Sous-Marine” RDN #18 1962, 1666-82; Capitaine de Corvette Salzedo “Les Moyens d’Une Force de Dissuasion” RDN #18 1962 82-90; Air Force response Andre Martin “L’Armee de L’Air dans le Contexte Nucléaire” RDN #20 1964 1499-1577. 352 For the first time in many years the French Navy faced the possibility of a permanent and critical mission in national defense, namely that of supplying a considerable portion of the nuclear deterrent force. This meant that the Navy could acquire enhanced prestige and increased material resources. However there was a price. With the new emphasis on nuclear powered missile submarines, other items in the naval budget like surface ships suffered. (Fumiss 1964) The surface navy still strived to help France exert an international political presence through globally pre-positioned forces. (Martel 1994: 490) Although there were many naval ofiBcers who favored the new emphasis and new role for the navy, technological difiBculties for naval atomic weaponry and propulsion systems prevented the navy from immediately undertaking a nuclear program. (Martin 1981: 46) 7.5.5. Generational Divisions By the mid 1950s it was the common belief among field-grade officers that most French Generals were incompetent, self-interested, corrupted by political intrigue and imprisoned by “le système.” (Ambler 1966: 342) This was compounded by an over abundance of ofiBcers in the highest grades, leaving no room for promotion of excellence fi"om below. The middle ofiBcer corps (captain, major and lieutenant colonel) who entered the ofiBcer corps just prior to WWn, when application to Saint Cyr were particularly numerous, were blocked fi’om promotion to positions of high status or respectability. (Girardet 1964: 79-83, 127) World War H, Indochina and the Algerian conflict had created a generation of ofiBcers for whom the values of obedience were visibly less important than they had been for their elders. These young ofiBcers had borne the 353 principal weight of the fighting, where the very violence of the fight had given them exceptional initiative and had forced them to assume uncommon responsibilities. It was these young captains and commanders who most strongly expressed their feelings of anger and humiliation. However, it was not only the government, the regime and the institutions that they held responsible, but also the high command, the “unwieldiness and sclerosis of the military apparatus.. The structure of military society...” (Girardet 1962:126) In the mess halls of Algeria there was a ubiquitous refrain; “The Generals are damn fools.” (Servan-Schreiber 1958: 59-63) In addition to a feeling of incompetence, middle-level officers felt abandoned. “Unfortunately the government tends to appoint to top positions within the military hierarchy persons who accept too many things without protesting and leave their subordinates to manage for themselves.” (Cottaz 1961: p 58, Colonel La Chappelle) Finally, there was a disconnect between rank and battle experience and responsibility. (Martel 1994: 317) The average army ofiBcer in 1958 in the middle grades (entering just before WWII) had spent at least one 30 month tour in Indochina and 2-4 years in Algeria. (Ambler 1966: 105) Younger combat officers began to feel that they were bearing the brunt of the sacrifice. There was a clear division between most of the generals and most of those who had been field commanders in Indochina and Algeria- the captains, majors and colonels. Nicole Pierre writing about the support for Algérie Française in the military analyzed the split thus: “With us are 90% of all of the subordinate officers^ 50% of the field grade officers and 5% of the generals.’’(Girardet 1964: 166 fh 18 quoting “Qu’est-ce Qui Paralyse Encore T Armee d’Algérie?” in La Nation Française 354 August 20, 1958) Thus, it is not surprising that military disobedience and revolt in 1958 and 1961 drew much of its impetus from able ofiBcers in these middle grades. 7.6. CHAPTER CONCLUSION: In the introduction to this chapter I argued that an analysis of the French military could benefit from a consideration of the ways in which it could be characterized as an organization in decline. As I have shown, the French military did indeed witness a decrease in the sphere of its responsibilities precipitated by the withdrawal from Indochina and Algeria and a subsequent reduction of organizational resources and prestige. However, this decline was not as radical in scope or in time-span as the decline and then budgetary collapse experienced by the Russian military. Once de Gaulle assumed power in 1958, budgets were at least predictable. In fact, budgets, power and prestige actually increased for some of the services after 1962. Thus, the French case provides only mixed confirmation of Hypothesis 3: Post-imperial militaries perceive a radical decrease in their material resources and organizational prestige as a result o f the loss o f their external and internal empires. The loss, while significant, can only be partially attributable to the loss of empire, since it followed so closely upon the post-World War Two restructuring of the French military. Nevertheless, as predicted by the organizational decline literature and Hypothesis 4, the French military, at least in the period following the loss of its external empire and during the Algerian war, was characterized by fragmentation and conflict between organizational factions rather than the centralization and consensus that a general crisis is posited to foster. While the myth within the military was one of unity, the reality was 355 fragmentation. Each political engagement (1958, 1960, 1961) left clusters of officers bound together by their political choices and standing against those who made different choices. During this period, the formal organizational structure ceased to provide clues to the actual hierarchy o f power and influence within the military. What emerged was an army out of the Middle Ages, a changing patchwork of feudal fiefs. Each fief was held by personal loyalties. Limited temporary cooperation among coalitions was negotiated on the same principle. Because of the very real consequences of their choices officers who chose the wrong patrons were eliminated fi"om the military organization, resulting in high degrees of personnel turnover. In addition, some officers chose to leave rather than adapt to the new environment. Finally, as Hypothesis Seven posited, the post-imperial French military was fi-agmented along service, rank and generational cleavages. It was divided both organizationally and substantively on the appropriate organizational role and structure for the military in the post-imperial era. Furthermore, as predicted by Hypotheses Five and Six, this division was predicated upon differences in the perceptions of the type of environmental change which had occurred. In this chapter I have presented strong evidence of the link between differing diagnoses of the post-imperial environment and the substantive reforms advocated by military officers. The post-imperial French military was split between two approaches to reform; domain defense and experimental domain substitution. Officers who saw the demand for the military as either unchanged or constricted were much more likely to advocate domain defense or tactics to maintain the budget and organizational structure at status quo levels. By contrast, a coalition of very 356 junior and very senior air force and navy oflBcers emerged who saw that the changes de Gaulle implemented could serve personal and sub-organizational interests. They were able to embrace a significant reform of the military because, unlike the Russian case, these officers had a strong and charismatic civilian (but former General) as their leader and partner in military reform. Because of the firm intervention by de Gaulle into the debate about the direction of the post-imperial French military, by the mid to late 1960s the French military was no longer an organization in decline. It had successfully negotiated the transition to a new organizational structure and new roles and missions. While a fiinge group of retired disgruntled Paratroop and Army officers continued to try to mount a terrorist resistance to the de Gaulle government through the OAS, any significant threat to the civil-military relationship had passed and the military settled back into a subordinate role to the state. In times of organizational crisis, the fate of a military depends upon its ability to elicit the leadership and resources of the state. Unlike in the Russian case where there had been a seeming lack of needed political will or civilian political leadership on reform, France was spared a prolonged organizational collapse and the increasing politicization of individual military officers. This seems to suggest the importance of a variable which has not been systematically captured in the hypotheses, the nature of the post-imperial environment itself. 357 PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC I I PRIME MINISTER DEFENSE MINISTER GENERAL STAFF CHIEF OF STAFF OF — ARMED FORCES FIELD COMMANDERS Figure 7.1; Defense Policy-Making Structure 1958-1962 358 PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC PRIME MINISTER COMMITTEE OF DEFENSE MINISTER OF DEFENSE GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE T -INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED CHIEFS OF 3 SERVICES CHIEF OF STAFF OF STUDIES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE -ARMY, -NAVY. AR\ED FORCES AIR FORCE -COMMITTEE FOR SCIENTIFIC ACTION FOR DEFENSE Figure 7.2: 1962 Defense Policy Structure 359 Common Year Services Army N avy Air Force Overseas Total 1946* 52.8 65.8 12.2 11.9 8.3 151.0 1947 15.5 86.9 36.6 42.8 21.1 203.5 1948 41.0 106.4 50.0 55.0 30.7 283.1 1949 42.7 113.6 56.7 60.5 39.3 312.8 1950 51.5 116.0 64.2 78.9 105.5 416.1 1951 69.5 193.1 100.0 147.1 297.7 807.4 1952 97.8 318.0 149.8 284.2 406.2 1,256.0 1953 91.3 353.3 167.7 306.4 371.0 1,289.7 1954 119.9 328.8 178.4 280.5 289.9 1,197.5 1955 111.4 377.2 172.8 285.0 138.6 1,085.0 1956 129.6 605.8 189.3 386.8 83.0 1,394.5 1957 146.2 640.2 200.7 412.8 66.7 1,466.6 1958 170.9 638.9 194.4 390.5 84.2 1,478.9 1959 202.4 697.8 218.1 422.4 91.9 1,632.0 1960" 2.150 7,106 2,224 4,317 923 16,720 1961 2,184 7,576 2,403 4.728 956 17,847 1962 2.661 7,384 2,601 4,934 930 18,510 1963 3.203 6,650 2.667 5,295 795 18,610 1964 3,873 6,631 2,638 6,044 — 19,186 1965 4,346 6,225 2,788 6,177 19,536 1966 4,731 6,418 3,623 5,702 20,474 1967 4,951 6,718 4,060 6,200 21,929 1468 5.582 7,302 5.038 6.372 24,294 Figure 7.3; Defense Budget by Service (Martin 1981: Appendix) 360 asoooo aooooo 750000 700000 550000 600000 500000 450 000 400 000 350000 300 000 180 000 170 000 160 000 150000 140 000 130 000 120 000 110 000 100 00 0 Atr Fore* 000 000 000 N iv y 000 000 1050 1955 1960 1965 Figure 7.4: Fluctuations in Army, Air Force, and Navy Manpower (Martin 1981: 96) 361 CHAPTERS CONCLUSION 8.1 CHAPTER OVERVIEW: We can now return to the questions which launched this research. How did military oflRcers in France and Russia respond to the loss of both an internal and external empire? What were the behavioral strategies cuivocated hy military officers to respond to this change? What were the effects of the loss of empire and state territorial integrity on the organizational structure and intra-organizational dynamics of each military? What were the political consequences of these behavioral and structural responses? Do military organizations from otherwise very different states share a common imperial legacy which colors the nature of both the civil-military relationship and the national security policy debates taking place in the post-imperial era? Scholars who study the Russian military have been puzzled by the lack of a unified military response to the progressively worsening conditions officers face in the New Russia. This lack of unified action seems particularly puzzling given the General Staff system of the Russian military, a system by which all Russian officers of the high command are trained in the same institution in order to forge a common identity. 362 However, the lack of unity in the current Russian military is only puzzling if we consider the Russian military in isolation, as a unique post-communist military. It is predictable if we consider it as an instance of a post-imperial military. An increase in the level of internal political participation and a fragmented military characterized by intense intra-organizational conflict are symptoms which can be directly attributed to splits in the way in which military oflBcers from diflferent generations and service branches characterize the loss of their external and internal empires. These splits are not unique to the Russian case, they are an example of a more generalizable phenomenon, a post-imperial syndrome. Without an understanding o f this general cross-national phenomenon through a comparative case study with other states which have had similar experiences (such as France 1945-1962), scholars of the Soviet and post-Soviet military, security studies and civil-military relations miss the opportunity to learn from the past or to contribute to an understanding of future challenges facing other declining militaries. In this final chapter I will first summarize the lessons that we can learn from comparing the Russian case to the historical experience of France. I will conclude this section with a discussion of the implications of these substantive findings for scholarship in the areas of civil-military relations, political psychology and organizational decision-making. I will then turn to a discussion of what the comparison indicates we can expect as future challenges facing the Russian military. Finally, I will end the chapter with a discussion of some interesting and unresolved questions from the current study which suggest possible directions for future research. 363 8.2 LESSONS FROM THE CROSS-CASE COMPARISON WITH FRANCE (Figure 8.1) In the previous case study chapters I have presented data that show striking parallels between France and Russia (two otherwise very different countries) in three important variables. These variables, which I have collectively termed a post-imperial syndrome, include: 1) a split in the particular stories French and Russian military officers told to understand the loss of their external and internal empires, 2) differing recommendations and behavior in internal politics, and finally, 3) differing reforms military officers advocated for their organization in the post-imperial period. The split in post imperial militaries appears to be largely attributable to branch/service and generational differences. The loss of empire privileges certain branches and generations within the military over others. Officers from different branches and generations/ranks tell different stories about the loss of empire. These stories then lead to differing recommendations for the division of policy responsibility in the civil-military relationship and divergent preferences for organizational reform in the post-imperial period. In the following section 1 will examine trends in each of the three components of the post-imperial military syndrome separately. 1 will then discuss the evidence for the importance of branch and generational factors in mitigating the impact of the loss of empire on military officers and military organizations. 8.2.1. Stories about the Loss of Empire In both France and the Soviet Union there were striking commonalities in the predominant story military officers told before the loss of empire about the relationship 364 between the colonies, the métropole and the military. In both cases, by helping to protect and administer the colonies the military was serving lofty goals. The imperial military was introducing progress and civilization and ultimately leading the colonies to liberty. This meant, on a more practical level, that the relationship with the colonies was characterized by a tension between equality and superiority. There was a juridical fiction that the colonies and métropole were equal, part of a community of nations that cooperated with each other. However, there was also a historical reality of “unequal sacrifice” by the métropole for the colonies. Because of this special responsibility and superior role, the colonies were seen by the officers from the métropole as important to the establishment of national pride and status in the world. How, then, did military officers in each case react to the decision by the state to withdraw from the external colonies? As 1 have shown, there was a split reaction within each military. One group of military officers portrayed the withdrawal as necessary and even desirable. It was a reasonable response to a changed situation, and even a demonstration that they had achieved the goal of leading the colonies to liberty and self- sufficiency. These officers expressed faith in the continuation of the relationship of friendship and equality which had before necessitated their presence. The other part of the military saw the withdrawal as abandonment of their mission and the people in the colonies which they were protecting. The inadvisable decision to withdraw was taken due to government ignorance and incompetence, particularly in the realm of security/military issues. While the officers argued that they had been abandoned by their government, they insisted that the real country was behind them (despite the lack 365 of tan^ble evidence to support this.) This distinction between an incompetent government which disappointed them and a people who supported them had implications for the type of action they deemed necessary in the post-imperial period. In France, this split between the oflBcer corps first occurred in the debate over the potential withdrawal from Indochina after World War II. Initially, oflBcers could be found articulating both stories. But once the military was engaged in a prolonged war the less optimistic view of the withdrawal came to dominate the oflBcer corps. The choice to withdraw was ultimately seen by most oflBcers in Indochina as being in direct contradiction to the military’s goal of defense of global security and French power and to the previous strategies they employed to achieve it. These oflBcers saw any change in the status of Indochina as abandonment of a previously successful strategy and they saw the peace treaty, after a lack of political support during the war, as proof of civilian incompetence and lack of military consultation. Finally, the withdrawal was psychologically debilitating to many oflBcers who felt guilty of not living up to their higher role as defenders of those Vietnamese who had tmsted them and their cause. This guilt would only be exacerbated in Algeria. In Russia, a similar split occurred within the Soviet military force as it faced the decision by Gorbachev to begin withdrawing troops and equipment fi-om Eastern Europe. A portion of the military oflBcer corps (the reformers) saw the withdrawal as a way to consolidate military force in areas where it was really needed and as a recognition that Europe was no longer a threat. Furthermore, they argued that the Russian military could claim responsibility for this new climate. However, another group of oflBcers (the future 366 coup supporters) saw the withdrawal as evidence of Gorbachev’s incompetence and as diametrically opposed to Russia’s national security and role. They also articulated the theme of being abandoned and some even questioned the abandonment of their Eastern European allies. Thus the split in the officer corps over the events in Indochina bears a striking resemblance to the dialogue which occurred between Soviet military ofiBcers over the withdrawal from Eastern Europe. The difference between the two cases is that in the Russian case the split was not tested with a prolonged and demoralizing war of external decolonization. How do reactions of military officers to the subsequent loss of their internal empire compare with the picture painted above? In contrast to the initial splits in the officer corps responding to the loss of their external empire, military officers in both France and Russia initially uniformly opposed the loss of either French Algeria or a unified military under the Soviet Union or even the C I S. In both cases the officers justified their commitment to the status quo by insisting that they owed it to the other republics/Algeria to do the harder thing and stay together. They also argued that the silent majority of the people favored their position while the rebels were being sponsored by foreign governments. Any vagueness about the status of the internal empire was portrayed as undercutting the efforts of the military and was thus dangerous. The reaction of some members of both militaries to what they perceived as vagueness or permissiveness was to back largely civilian putsch attempts to prevent the loss of their internal colonies (France 1958, 1960 and Soviet Union 1991) 367 However once the initial threat-constriction response had passed and it became clear that they did not have the majority on their side, officers again split into groups. (In France this is associated with the later Algerian war period and in Russia it is associated with the period from 1993 through the war in Chechnya) Faced with increasing evidence that their fight was unpopular and unlikely to result in a quick victory, some French and Russian officers argued that resisting internal decolonization was detrimental to organizational and national prestige. Other officers insisted that the war must be successfully fought in favor of retaining the territory in order to “save Russia/France from herself.” In France this phase ended with a military putsch attempt in 1961 to prevent Algeria from becoming independent. As of yet no portion of the Russian military has launched a similar putsch perhaps because, in an ironic twist, it was the state that argued for continuing the war in Chechnya against the wishes of a portion of the officer corps . Thus, the overall trend across the time period from the beginning of the loss of their external empire to the real loss of their internal empire is similar in both of the cases described in this study. The loss of an internal empire initially delays the emergence of differences in how military officers portray the loss of empire, but ultimately merely exacerbates the trends which were started in the officer corps as a result of the loss of the external colonies. The experience of decolonization produces splits in the officer corps over whether the withdrawal is necessary and advisable and who is responsible for it occurring. One group sees the withdrawal as necessary and even desirable, a reasonable response to a changed situation a way to achieve other important goals and even a continuation of previous policies. They argue that they continue to have the support of 368 the people behind them. The other major group of officers, predominantly Ground Forces and Paratroop ofiBcers, see the withdrawal as an abandonment of their mission and the result of government incompetence. These officers also feel abandoned by their government. This feeds into widespread portrayal of government ignorance and incompetence, particularly in the realm of security issues, and leads ofiBcers to separate themselves from the government. Chechnya provides an interesting twist on this however with both groups of oflBcers, those who favored an end to war in Chechnya and those who argued that the war in Chechnya required greater governmental support, accusing the government of incompetence. The first hypothesis guiding this research was Hypothesis One: When a military experiences the loss o f its state's empire, officers willformutate a new story that justifies the change in their status. This new story will motivate new patterns in civil-military relations in the post-imperial era. A comparison across the case studies and across the time periods within each case suggests that only some oflBcers formulate a new story. Over time, a significant group of ofiBcers see the choices of the government as incompetent and dangerous. It is those officers and that story (the second and more pessimistic story) that motivates new patterns of civil-military relations in the post-imperial era as officers attempt to side with the people against the state. 8.2.2. The Civil-Military Relationship and Post-Imperial Military Political Participation In both the French and Soviet cases, the military held a «milar view of its role in the state prior to the decolonization period. Both militaries were considered to have a very 369 limited but important role within the state. Through universal military conscription, each military was given the responsibility to mold the national system of values and instill patriotism. In addition, each military was also given great latitude and influence in its own sphere of expertise. Both governments willingly left most decisions on questions of defense up to the military leadership.* In all other domestic political debates, however, the military was not involved. Although the term was coined for the French military, the Soviet military during this period was also the “great mute” in domestic politics. How did the civil-military relationship get challenged as a result of the loss of each state’s external and internal empire? What is the case evidence for Hypothesis Two: When there are contested definitions o f appropriate policy responsibility between the state and the military and when military officers see state institutions as weak, they will advocate an increase in their level o f domestic political participation! During the period of decolonization in each case study, the military officers telling the pessimistic story about the loss of empire also felt that their relationship to both society and the state was undergoing a réévaluation period. The military’s role as a school for values was threatened by what they perceived as a loss of recognition and respect from the population for their defense of the empire. Abandoned by most of the political spectrum, military officers in both countries were courted by the nationalist right which brought factions of oflBcers into domestic politics through the formation of interest-groups and the emergence of military oflBcers as parliamentarians. Furthermore, the military’s latitude in national 1 This is confirmed by studies of the structure of national security policy decision making in the Soviet Union during the 1980s. See, for example (Rice, 1987). 370 security issues was severely challenged by a feeling that they had not been consulted on the choice to withdraw from either Indochina or Eastern Europe. They described government policy as incoherent and characterized by a lack of comprehension about the material means necessary for the policy’s implementation. For these military officers a weak government was to blame for the withdrawal. The former civil-military relationship was even more significantly reassessed with the loss of the internal empire. The internal decolonization engendered a split in the officer corps over whether the military’s role should be expanded to include the internal security o f the population against the separatist rebels, or even the pacification of these rebels. There was significant reluctance in the officer corps to shooting against civilians, particularly in defense of a questionable government. Many Soviet officers balked both at the orders in 1991 by the Committee for National Salvation to fire against Yeltsin supporters in the White House and at Yeltsin’s orders two years later to shoot at the rebellious Parliament in the White House. French officers in Algeria faced a similar quandary when they were asked to put down the 1960 revolt and replied “\'ou can not fire on French men shouting long live French Algeria.” Military officers in both cases were resentful that they were not consulted before being put in this difficult situation. Military officers in both post-imperial states felt badly adapted to an internal role and resentful of the weakness of the government which would require that of them. In France in May 1958, and June 1960 and in the Soviet Union in 1991, and Russian in 1993 officers argued that the state and society were on the brink of civil war. Officers decided which side to support based upon a reading of popular sentiment. For example in France 371 in 1958, by supporting the revolt, the military was siding with the people, who were unstoppable against the state which was weak. It has been argued by military officers and scholars alike that the great majority of French officers would not have joined a revolt against the government if they had not sensed a general disaffection of civilians as well as military officers toward “le système.” When de Gaulle assumed power in 1958 and was perceived by the majority of military officers as the leader of a strong and popularly supported Fifth Republic, the Air Force and the Navy and most of the Ground Forces basically remained loyal, and resisted the later calls to action of civilian and military officers in Algiers. Interestingly, they resisted these calls despite the fact that many continued to contest the internal mission in Algeria and the external security role de Gaulle assigned to them. In Russia choices were made based upon perceptions of the legitimacy of the constitution and the government vis- a-vis the people. Officers who stood by Yeltsin in 1993 defined their role as the support of the democratically-elected President and viewed the parliamentary revolt as a call to go against the people. But what about those officers who did not see the government as a legitimate representative of the people? For the segment of the officer corps who portrayed the withdrawal in its most pessimistic terms there was a growing impatience with a passive domestic political role. In Algeria this impatience was manifested in increased domestic political administration of the internal colony attempting to secede. “As an instrument of times of crisis, the army has the duty to compensate at all echelons in Algeria for a wavering authority.” (Ambler 1966: 216 quoting from November 1957 Message editorial) For an active minority of the officers in 372 both cases, the end result of the growing politicization of the military was that officers were ready to participate in the very political process of expediting the downfall of the sitting government and the installation of a government which favored the retention of the internal empire. Military officers who were the strongest supporters and participants in military action against the state saw the state as weak and disputed the distribution of policy responsibility between the military and civilian institutions. They separated the nation which they continued to serve from the government they viewed as illegitimate. The government had betrayed both the army and the nation. Retention of the internal empire was essential to the preservation of the nation as they had defined it. In summary, the evidence from both cases supports Hypothesis 2: When there are contested definitions o f the appropriate distribution o fpolicy responsibility between the state and the military and when military officers see state institutions as weak, they will advocate an increase in their level of domestic participation! There is indeed a significant segment of the officer corps in each case which does indeed portray the government as weak and even illegitimate. This is the same segment of the officer corps that advocates higher levels of domestic political participation. A weak government was to blame for the withdrawal and is to blame for them having to take on an internal role. However, the degree of perceived weakness is variable across time in the two cases and across segments of the military officer corps. In both cases significant political choices by officers were justified by an assessment of who was on the side of the people, or which party was legitimate. In France this meant that many officers became depoliticized with the arrival of de Gaulle who was seen as a legitimate and popular leader. In Russia the 373 process has taken longer as the emergence of a strong, popularly-supported government has not yet been completed. Thus, in Russia the majority of officers are more actively involved in the political process and domestic policy debate. This suggests a corollary Hypothesis 2: military perceptions of the strength and legitimacy of state institutions are more important than contested definitions o f policy responsibility in determining the level of domestic political participation advocated by military officers. The perception of a weakened state as the result of the loss of empire engenders an essentially "reflected obedience. Military officers considered themselves authorized to ignore commands from a government when the commanded action might directly negate what they believed to be the requirements of national destiny and the preferences of the people. This reflected obedience produced a spectrum o f political activity in the post imperial militaries of France and Russian that ranged from neutrality to opposition, or reluctance to obey certain directives, to open sympathy of civilian opposition, to lobbying within society and serving in positions of authority as military officers, and finally to varying degrees of assistance or collaboration in revolts against the government. 8.2.3. Post-Imperial Military Reform; Splits over the Direction of the Post-Imperial Military Budget and Structure In Chapter One of this study I posited that there is something distinct about the loss of empire that produces fragmentation and conflict within post-imperial military organizations. Post-imperial militaries are a case of a more general phenomenon; they are organizations in decline facing the challenges that such organizations commonly face. As 2 This term comes from the analysis of (Girardet, 1964) on the French post-imperial military. 374 organizations in declined I hypothesized in Hypothesis 3: Post-imperial militaries experience a radical decrease in their material resources and organizational prestige as a result o f the loss o f their external and internal empires. While there was mixed evidence on the dramatic nature of post-imperial decline, there was sufficient evidence that both militaries faced declining budgets and prestige in the immediate post-colonial period. French budgets did go down by 40% and the Russian military budget entered a period of exponential cuts and finally a free-fall. Officers’ salaries in both militaries also radically decreased in the post-imperial period. This scarce resource environment produced an important dynamic within each military organization; As predicted by Hypothesis 4, interest-group based struggles between organizational factions over the distribution of declining resources did indeed emerge. Hypothesis 4 states: Militaries which experience the loss o f an external and internal empire are characterized by fragmented organizational structures and interest- group based struggles between organizational factions. The existence of these factions can be captured through an examination of the degree to which rival decision-making structures emerged, the extent of personnel turnover and debates over the direction of organizational reform. What evidence of fragmentation and organizational conflict exists across the two cases examined in this study? In the Russian case from 1990 onward, a struggle emerged between two sub-groups of officers with different bases of power in the security structure. Officers sought to split the military into two parallel structures, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. Each group argued for greater decisional latitude and control over 375 the military organization, each sought direct reporting channels to the President. At the time of the end of the analysis in 1995 the General Staff seemed to have won the right to serve as an independent advisor to the President. Yeltsin removed the General Staff from imder the supervision of the Defense Ministry, giving weight and an institutionalized role to the rival group. Accompanying the institutional jockeying for position between different officer groups was a large-scale turn-over in personnel disproportionately eliminating certain types of ofScers. In 1992 there was a wave of voluntary retirement at twice the rate that they were being replaced. The generals of the Warsaw Pact were on their way out, making room for men of Grachev’s generation, the generation who served in the war Afghanistan, dubbed the “Afghansy.” By 1994 there was a reduction of 20% in the staffing of top officers. Some specialities were especially hard hit. For example, there were only 36% of the pre-imperial officer corps in the Ground Artillery Commanders. Thus, as predicted by Hypothesis 4, the Russian military experienced both organizational fragmentation and interest-group based struggles in the post-imperial period rather than centralization, constriction of decision authority and group-think.. In France the period of internal decolonization was also characterized by the proliferation of rival decision-making structures. During the later stages of the Algerian war, the formal organizational structure ceased to provide clues to the actual hierarchy of power and influence within the military. Instead, the military was characterized by a “changing patchwork of feudal fiefs. Each fief was held by personal loyalties , limited temporary cooperation among fiefs was negotiated on the same principle.” (Fumiss 1964: 376 116) Each political engagement (1958, 1960, 1961) left clusters of officers bound together by their political choices and standing against those who made different choices. There were significant purges of French military officers in the post-imperial period for political as well as pragmatic reasons. Due to the withdrawal fi’om the former colonies and the downsizing of the military, over 1,000 officers were released fi-om active duty against their will. These retirements were predominantly from the Army rather than the Navy or Air Force. Unlike Russia in 1995, however, this period of organizational fi-agmentation did not leave much of a legacy for the informal structure of the French military in the post-imperial period. Even though the formal organizational chart in France, provided opportunities for a post-imperial struggle between the Defense Minister and the General Secretariat, these men did not significantly compete due to the preeminence of the President, his interest, authority and expertise in the area of defense and their personal loyalty to him. The differences between the two cases suggests an amendment to Hypothesis 4: Post-imperial militaries only manifest significant degrees of organizational fragmentation and conflict when they are operating in an anarchic environment. The French case suggests that post-imperial militaries are only characterized by intense fi-agmentation and interest-group based struggles in the absence of firm civilian intervention. When post-imperial militaries are faced with strong civilian leadership they experience an organizational tum-around. The final sign of organizational fragmentation in the post-imperial period is the finding across the two cases that both military organizations were engaged in a debate 377 over post-imperial military organizational reform characterized by a fight between reactive defense and experimental domain substitution. Conservatives in both organizations wanted to build on the existing infrastructure and organization left fi"om the imperial military. Othçrs, such as Grachev and his allies in Russia, for example, argued instead for a dramatic departure fi*om the old model, building upon small elite formations as the core of the future Russian army. Hypotheses Five and Six predicted that the basis of this debate would be the degree to which officers perceived a change in niche size (change in the demand for military services in general) versus niche shape (change in the mix of services/military missions needed.) Hypothesis 5: When military officers perceive a decrease in overall demand for the military in the post-imperial society (change in niche size) they are likely to engage in reactive defense o f their organizational structure and in rigid behaviors. Hypothesis 6: When military officers see the change as substantive (change in niche shape rather than in overall demand) they are likely to advocate radical reform or experimental domain substitution, mainly in the form o f new technologies or more cost- efficient and streamlined organizational structures. Both imperial militaries were characterized by a huge land force whose preponderance in the defense establishment was a source of resentment for the other services. As predicted by Hypothesis 5, the Ground Forces, facing the biggest potential reduction in the need for their services, reacted with domain defense. In both cases, reform proposals coming the Ground Forces centered around creating smaller building blocks of ground brigades and divisions in order to respond to a need for greater flexibility 378 and mobility in combat. They continued, however, to argue for the status quo emphasis on a ground war. At the other end of the spectrum in both cases was the Air Force. In keeping with Hypothesis Six, Air Force officers in both France and Russia portrayed the post-imperial period as a time to capitalize on the new needs of post-imperial security, needs which the Air Force was uniquely able to meet. In France the Air Force benefitted the earliest and the most from the shift to an independent nuclear “force de frappe.” In Russia the Air Force has been tom between arguing for a similar high- technology role for the Air force in assuring security, primarily through high-precision air attacks, and allying with the Paratroopers, who have articulated a vision for Russia of mobile regional forces capable of peacekeeping in the region. This last vision of mobile forces in the new Russia on the surface seems to also fit Hypothesis Sbc, experimental substitution as a response to a changed niche shape. However, a comparison between France and Russia reveals that perhaps reactive defense and experimental domain substitution is a relative concept. Officers in Algeria, many of whom had served in Indochina, saw a substantive change in the type of activities required of them relative to the military requirements of the first half of the decade. According to this new view of the security environment, the classical battle was no longer seen as the only means to gain control of territory or even of a political regime. “The French military became an anti-subversive force deeply committed to countering large-scale powerful nationalist rebellions on Indochinese and Algerian soil.” (Martin 1981: 35-36) The most probable war was a localized jungle war. (Ambler 1966: 310) ‘The colonels who 379 commanded paratroop units in Algeria did not need the capability to fight an atomic war complete with large-scale air support, artillery and tanks. Instead they needed officers who could march with their troops, parachute with them and who could plan and implement their decisions on the spot. The generals only got in the way.” (Bromberger 1959) However, relative to the shift in security priorities that occurred with the advent of the force de frappe in the early 1960s, the creation of mobile ground force and paratroop units was not a radical change. It still maintained the preeminence of those services in order to secure and hold territory. In fact, many argue that the success of this doctrine prevented the French military from modernizing. This colonial role preferentially favored a less modem force. Victory did not depend upon the level of technology employed. In fact, at times sophisticated equipment was a disadvantage. This led to a quasi- alienation to technological change. In a sense therefore, if one compares it to what is to come, the statements of French officers in Algeria appear closer to reactive defense than domain substitution, supporting Hypothesis Five rather than Hypothesis Sbc. Finally, as predicted in Hypothesis Seven, the experience of withdrawal from empire favors certain branches and ranks of officers and thus is interpreted differently by them. Hypothesis 7: Service, rank and generational variables all serve as important bases for variation both in the interpretation o f the challenges facing the post-imperial military and the policy responses of that fragment or group. If we look at France as the case in which the financial resources and civilian leadership allowed for a maturation of the post-imperial reorientation of the military, we see that France experienced structural reforms to the military organization and its branches. A new hierarchy of forces emerged 380 accompanied by a change in budget priorities. The post-imperial period in France favored the strategic high technology forces over the ground forces. France is the only nuclear power to have forced nuclear weapons upon an essentially unreceptive military. But some groups were very receptive. It would also appear that diflferent stages of imperial withdrawal favor diflferent groups. In the early period of withdrawal, when the country is still primarily committed to a role in the empire, a mobile forces concept predominates and the Paratroopers benefit. Thus, Paratroop dominance may be a sign o f a military still decolonizing. Without political intercession in the post-imperial period Paratroopers will seek to continue the privileged position they have gained in the withdrawal fi"om empire. They stand in opposition to those who favor technology. Since technology costs money the post imperial military without financial support and leadership will favor Paratroopers’ non technical fixes, the macho roles in the previous empire. By contrast, in the mature period of decolonization those post-imperial states with resources and leadership will favor new technologies and professional technicians. This will lead to a shift toward the technological services, the Air Force and the Navy. The final stage will also favor junior officers could retool themselves as managers and senior officers who can retire. It should thus not be a coincidence that in France it was the middle level officers, who felt they were bearing the brunt of the sacrifice in the colonial wars and were ill-equipped for success in the new French military, that fueled the 1961 military revolt. 381 8.2.4. Conclusion and Implications for Theory-Building: A fragmented Russian military is to be expected. In a post-imperial military there are splits between how military officers understand the loss o f empire, and splits in how they believe it should be addressed both in terms of their domestic political role and the type of reforms they argue their organization should undertake. Despite the many differences in the two countries, these splits follow the same basic pattern both in France and in Russia (until the complete collapse of the Russian budget), they are post-imperial splits. Furthermore these splits are based upon a fundamental difference in what the loss of empire will mean for the branch and generational groups to which officers belong. Certain groups stand to gain from a withdrawal from empire while others stand to lose. The winners include the Air Force and Navy, and the most adaptable group, the junior officers within these branches. Losers include the Ground Forces (and the Foreign Legion) and ultimately the paratroopers? Anticipating this loss and blaming it on the government, the losers are the same groups who will engage in the highest levels of political participation in order to avoid save the empire. Until now I have focused on how the content of stories changes across time and across groups of officers, but interesting changes also occur in the structure of the stories told across the cases. Work on story formation in political psychology has been primarily laboratory studies of how subjects construct a story at one point in time to understand conditions and make decisions. In fact, once stories have been formed they are posited to be enduring structures that stfryects use to filter incoming evidence. This dissertation has examined how subjects alter stories when they face such a radical change over time that 382 they may feel forced to do so. A significant group of officers in each case study when facing radical change in their operating environment enlarge the scope of their persona and organizational goals even further than the lofty goals of the imperial baseline story. The goal of the military becomes global; defending Western society against communism or promoting world peace. At the same time another group of ofiBcers facing the same changes severely contract the scope of their goals, limiting them to individual or organizational survival. The second element which changes in the post-imperial stories are the nature of the relationships officers describe between the military, the state and society. As the world changes, military officers initially make modifications in their stories to try to retain the baseline relationship of unity between these three groups. In order to continue to assert this union, officers in both militaries increasingly create division in the categories of state and society. Within the state and society they describe a marginal group of extremists which opposes the military and its goals, while they assert that the majority, the true nation and government support them and their cause. This trend of sub-dividing these groups and marginalizing the opposition continues even when there is increasing evidence to the contrary. At the end of the process when the baseline relationships are simply untenable, military officers are forced to choose one of the elements of the baseline relationship and sacrifice the other. They are either unified with the people against the state or with the state against those who oppose secession. The last element of the story to change is the actual actions advocated in the stories. Only when both relationships and goals have been significantly transformed do military officers change the actions they consider appropriate. Since not all of the stories are so significantly different from the 383 baseline, not all groups of officers significantly change their behavior. These are the less politicized post-imperial military officers. The second area of theoretical interest is the existence of a whole new spectrum of political activity by the officer corps in both states as a result of the withdrawal from external and internal empires. Most of the points on this spectrum are not explored or expected by the civil-military relations literature. Professional militaries under subjective control are not expected to be involved in domestic politics and militaries under subjective control are expected to coup when the rewards are no longer there for passivity. Instead post-imperial military officers chose a number of options, not all of which equally threaten the regime but all of which have political implications. At the lowest level of the spectrum was neutrality. This was followed by opposition or reluctance to obey particular directives, including the use of internal force in support of the government. Other officers were openly sympathetic to the civilian revolts. There were varying degrees of assistance or collaboration in the overthrow of the sitting government. This ranged from inspiring agitation among veterans groups and retired officers to actual leadership in a putsch attempt. Finally, officers in the post-imperial period organized important avenues for political participation. These included officers’ organizations such as the Association of Combatants of the French Union or Soyuz Offitserov in Russia. Officers also became more integral to the domestic electoral competition some allying with right wing civilians such as Lagaillarde and Ortiz in Algeria, and Zhironovskiy in Russia. Finally, the lack of a unified response organizational response to the threats embodied in a loss of empire, budget and prestige also contradicts one of the long 384 accepted hypotheses in the psychological literature on group decision-making in crisis, that an external threat draws group members together and increases group cohesiveness and “groupthink”, or pressures toward uniformity in issue diagnosis and behavior during crisis.(Janis 1972; Sherif 1953) this prompts a reexamination of the relationship between small group and organizational responses to crisis. 8.3. LOOKING AHEAD: THE RUSSIAN IVOLITARY IN THE FUTURE Is Russia now stuck in the end of the Algerian War? The Russian case study parallels the French only until the imposition of a GauUist reform solution on the French military. As I argued above, it appears that in the early period of withdrawal, when the country is still primarily committed to an important military role in its empire, a mobile forces concept predominates and paratroopers benefit. This seems to be the current situation in the Russia. Russian strategic doctrine still heavily emphasizes the importance of mobile forces to be deployed in hot spots in the former C.I.S. In commenting on the 1993 Russian strategic doctrine (which remains the current operating standard), other scholars of the Russian military have argued that there is a growing insistence on the right to ignore the sovereignty of now independent former-Soviet republics and to intervene in the C.I.S. where it suits Russia’s interests. ‘The Army and perhaps the government and people of Russia simply do not accept that such states are truly independent and do not treat them as such.” (Dick 1994) Russia believes that it has a special right to a commonwealth in which it has preeminent influence but the world community is no longer tolerant of this, the world is “no longer tolerant of a great power dictating the terms of its surrender, even in the short term.” (De Nevers 1994) 385 Thus the dominance of the mobile forces concept and the preeminence of Paratroopers in positions of power (such as Grachev and Lebed) is a sign of a military still decolonizing. As France has shown, without political intercession in the post-imperial period, paratroopers will seek to continue the privileged position they have gained in the withdrawal. They stand in opposition to those who favor technology. Since technology costs money, the post-imperial military without financial support and leadership will favor Paratrooper’s non-technical fixes. However, in the mature period of decolonization those post-imperial states with resources and leadership will favor new technologies and professional technicians. This will lead to a shift toward the more technological services, the air force and the navy. The Russian military ground forces and paratroopers have not yet launched a purely military revolt protesting the loss of their internal empire. Perhaps this is because they do not yet feel that it is lost. What does this mean, for the future when Russia ultimately turns away from policing the former internal colonies? Does the Russian state face a potential coup from the paratroopers when and/or if they are finally eliminated from their position of dominance? This may already be a threat as Russia, strapped for cash and facing an expanding NATO, has turned to General Sergeev, head of the Strategic Rocket Forces, as its interim Minister of Defense. In the meantime, the Russian state faces another potential threat. The current government has weak authority within its own Russian Federation. If the state turns to its military, as the Soviet state once did, to perform routine governing tasks such as tax collection and local administration, will the Yeltsin government, like France in Algeria, be 386 helpless to control its subordinates in the regions. Will Russian officers like their French predecessors wonder. “Since the army does all of the work why isn’t it in power? What good does the Parliament do deliberating in a void while we administer, heal, fight and distribute work to the fellanghas?” (Bromberger 1959: 125) 8.4. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH This dissertation has been devoted to an examination of evidence that similar dynamics occur in otherwise very different post-imperial states. The previous section summarized many of the similarities between the cases that support an optimistic appraisal of the possibility that a post-imperial military syndrome in civil-military relations and organizational reform does indeed exist. One potential direction for this research program is an examination of the explanations for differences in the degree of change in organizational structures and officer’s stories that occurred between the two cases. In important respects these two cases have experienced common histories and yet their fates, as much as they are known, have been different. There are several important questions which these differences leave unresolved. One of the most obvious differences between post-imperial France and Russia is that Russia has not experienced a second coup led purely by a faction of the military to oppose the loss of its internal empire. There has been no parallel to the 1961 failed military putsch in Algiers. 1 have argued that one of the main reasons why such a putsch has not occurred is that the tables were somewhat turned in Chechnya. It was the state which argued for the continuation of the war, while a sizable portion of its military officer corps favored a withdrawal and autonomy for Chechnya. This prompts the question: Are 387 all post-imperial militaries characterized by a large group of discontent military officers that seek to keep the empire, even at the cost of a military putsch? One way to answer this question is to examine cases such as Chechnya in which a large segment of officers favored withdrawal from the empire and stood against a recalcitrant state. One such case is Portugal in which, in the 1970s, the military launched a coup in order to dismantle the Portuguese empire. Secondly, if indeed as the case evidence from Hypothesis 2 suggests, the legitimacy of the government is more important than the actual nature of the new post imperial roles, then perhaps the post-imperial military syndrome as described here is really a study of weakened states that undergo a loss of empire. (See Figure 8.1 Hypothesis 2) Some states have lost empires and not been weakened internally. Other states, such as France, have been weakened internally but recovered, (see Figure 8.1 Hypothesis 4) In addition, since the evidence is mixed regarding the necessity of dramatic declines in the material conditions of post-imperial militaries (see Figure 8.1 Hypothesis 3), not all post imperial militaries may be organizations in decline. Some post-imperial militaries at least on the surface have experienced a relatively peaceful transition for the military. Two such post-imperial states which deserve further investigation are the Netherlands and Belgium. In both cases, there is a general sense that the military did not topple the government, or make too much of fuss about reorienting their forces. They generally accepting their roles within Europe and NATO. All of the above additional cases, however are situations in which the military experienced an external decolonization but did not have to face giving up large portions of 388 their homeland. Examining these cases may help to answer whether the post-imperial syndrome as I have discussed it here is limited to cases of double decolonization. Also important is the question of how different the French and Russian experiences are from cases, such as Israel in which the military is faced with giving up territory at a pace which some may feel is too rapid and without adequate security guarantees. This leads to the larger question of the difference between post-imperial organizational decline and organizational decline attributable to other causes. Is post imperial organizational decline different from the U.S. military in the post-Vietnam era or the current downsizing occurring in the U.S. military? One way to answer this question is to examine explanations for the differences in the results for Hypothesis One regarding the strength of different interpretations of withdrawal across time, (see Figure 8 .1) What role does violence or conflict play in the interpretation of the withdrawal process? What role does the degree of unpopularity of the military’s action play in encouraging splits in the officer corps? An examination of the U.S. action in Vietnam, isolating when and whether there was the same split in stories of military officers, might help to answer some of these questions. Obviously additional case studies, such as ones suggested above, are needed in order to more fully develop and test the concept of a post-imperial syndrome, to increase the internal validity of this study’s findings and to determine the robustness of its propositions in several additional contexts. Additional cases would expand the generalizability, and the explanatory and predictive value of the construct of a post imperial syndrome and would help explain important differences in the case results 389 reported in Figure 8.1. However, in addition to supplementing the two case studies in this dissertation with additional cases, more time is needed in order to sort out the ultimate fate of the post-imperial Russian military. In this dissertation I have made certain predictions about the direction of the Russian military, predictions which could be fruitfully tested in about five years. In five years will the Russian military have entered a different stage in the post-imperial period, favoring different groups within the military? Without civilian intercession in the post-imperial period, Russian Paratroopers will seek to continue their privileged position in the military structure and will continue to advocate a mobile forces concept that allows a high degree of military involvement in the former Soviet republics. However, if Russia has strong civilian leadership and resources, nuclear and aviation technology is expected to prevail, allowing the military to move in the direction of a technologically-based regional military presence. These are testable propositions. To what degree is a “de Gaulle-like reform” possible or likely in post imperial Russia? If a strong civilian government emerges in Russia which continues to advocate mobile forces, then perhaps de Gaulle’s solution was idiosyncratic or the product of particular environmental forces present in the 1960s but absent in the 1990s. The Russian case is not over and so, neither too, is this research program. Finally, this research has broken new ground methodologically by taking insights derived in the laboratory setting, on how people understand and represent problems, and applying them to real world policy participants. This research took as its starting point that people create stories to understand change. The data analyzed fw this research found that military officers did indeed communicate using stories. A future step in the real-world 390 modification and testing in the area of cognitive science and problem representations is to formally test the prevalence of stories as the dominant mode of problem representation. Rival models or types of problem representations include Bayesian probability models or ledger (cost-benefit analysis) models.^ Both of these models assume representations are revised according to new information while the story model assumes that information is first interpreted in a way which fits with the existing story an individual or group holds. The same data sources could be reexamined and re-coded for the frequency with which ofiBcers used rival models of problem representation to persuade others and make decisions in the post-imperial period. A final future direction for this research is to further examine the ways in which story structures are modified across time in order to continue to preserve the story for as long as possible. The results summarized earlier in this chapter about the modifications of story structures indicated that goals were either greatly expanded or significantly contracted and that ofiBcers engaged in a division and marginalization of sub-groups in order to maintain the possibility of previous relationships. There are interesting preliminary results and could be refined and tested by examining the changing structure of stories told by other foreign policy groups (such as officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in both France and Russia during the same tumultuous period of external and internal decolonization. 3 Sylvan, Haddad and Diascro (1995) define and test these models against the story model in an experiment on foreign policy decision-making processes. 391 Hypothesis Russia/Soviet Union France 1. When a Militaiy 1) Emergence of 2 New 1) Emergence of 2 New Experiences the Loss of Stories to Explain Change Stories to Explain Change Empire, Officers Will with Implications for Post- with Implications for Post- Formulate a New Story Imperial Civil-Military Imperial Civil-Military That Justifies the Change in Rdations: Split Between Relations: Split Between Status. This New Story Withdrawal as Necessary Withdrawal as Necessary Will Motivate New & Desirable and & Desirable and Patterns in Civil-Military Withdrawal as Withdrawal as Relations in the Post- Abandonment & Abandonment & Imperial Era Incompetent Choice Incompetent Choice 2) DifiTering Strength o f 2)Dififering Strength of Stories Across Time; split Stories Across Hme; split exists initially, collapses in emerges in Indochina but favor of story against quickly collapses in 6vor withdrawal with dissolution o f story against withdrawal o f Soviet Union (A when war becomes peaceful revolution) and prolonged and unpopular, reemerges with war in split reemerges in Algeria Chechnya when war becomes prolonged and unpopular. 2. When There are 1) A significant segment o f 1) A significant segment o f Contested Definitions of officer corps blames officer corps blames Appropriate Policy withdrawal on weak withdrawal on weak Responsibility Between the government government State and the Military and 2) There are contested 2) There are contested When Militaiy Officers see definitions of policy definitions o f policy State Institutions as Weak, responsibility: debate over reponsibility: debate over They Will Advocate an military's internal role military’s internal role Increase in Their Level of 3) Military officers chose 3) Military officers chose Domestic Political behavior based upon behavior based upon Participation perceived Intimacy of perceivqd legitimacy of government in people’s government in people’s eyes. Military officers go eyes. Military officers resist against people if state is putsch since de Gaulle is seen as legitimate. seen as legitimate. 4) Officers more active 4) Majority o f officers across the spectrum of active in domestic politics domestic political behavior, only until arrival o f de exercise veto over some Gaulle, then depoliticized. government orders. Figure 8.1 Summary o f Hypotheses and Case Results 392 Figure 8.1 (continued) 3. Post-Imperial Militaries 1) Dramatic decrease in 1) Declining Military Experience a Radical military budget beginning Budgets Across 1945-1962 Decrease in Their Material with 1990-1991 period totaling 40% overall Resources and 2) Dramatic decrease in cut in budget. But decline Organizational Prestige as salary, prestige and housing more targeted in post a Result of the Loss of in post-imperial period imperial period. R& Dfor their External and Internal Air Force and Nuclear Empires program gets more money. Manpower budget radically decreased for Ground Forces. 2) Decrease in Salary and Prestige of Officers during decolonization 4. Militaries which 1) Emergence o f Rival 1) Initial Proliferation of Experience the Loss of an Decision-Making Rival Decision-Making External and Internal Structures in Post-Imperial Structures which continue Empire are Characterized Period (Ministry of on paper but cease with the by Fragmented Defense and General Staff) assertion of de Gaulle’s Organizational Structures 2) Large-Scale Turnover in authority and vision for and Interest-Group Based Personnel, purging military Struggles Between particular groups 2) Large-Scale Turnover in Organizational Factions Personnel, purging particular groups 5. When military officers Ground Forces perceived 1)Ground Forces perceived perceive a decrease in the greatest reduction in the greatest reduction in overall demand for the need for their services and need for their services and military in the post-imperial reacted to defend the reacted to defend the society (change in niche importance of their core importance of their core size) they are likely to functions; capability for functions; capability for engage in reactive defense large-scale ground combat, large-scale ground combat. o f their organizational (disproportionately 2) Paratroopers at end of structure and in rigid supported the 1991 coup) Algerian War feared a behaviors. future decrease in demand for their functions and reacted with domain defense (and ultimately disproportionately supported 1961 putsch) 393 Figure 8.1 (continued) 6. When military officers Air Force Split Between De Gaulle articulated see the change as Mobile Forces and High- vision o f a "Force de substantive (change in Technology as Future Frappe” as New Niches for niche shape rather than in Orientation o f Branch French Military. Air Force overall demand) they are based upon differing and Navy embraced it and likely to advocate radical assessments of the change were instmmental in early reform o r experimental in niche shape or new program development domain substitution, mainly security demands. in the form o f new technologies or more cost- efficient and streamlined organizational structures. 7. Service, rank and Senior Ground Forces Early Post-Imperial Period generational variables all officers lost most benefited the Paratroopers serve as important bases dramatically and tended to in Algeria with a Mobile for variation both in the hold pessimistic story of Forces Concept. interpretation of the withdrawal and to support Mature Post-Imperial challenges facing the post higher involvement in Period Favored strategic imperial military and the domestic politics. All other high-technology forces ad policy responses o f that groups are still uncertain. junior officers with fragment or group. Air Force and Paratroopers flexibility. Middle-level have until now held more ground forces and optimistic story and been paratroop officers lost out supportive o f Government. and reacted with putsch 394 BIBLIOGRAPHY Abolins, ret. Colonel General V. Ya. 1992. "Perevod Vooruzhenykh Sil s Mimovo na Voennoe Polozhenie". Voemaya Mysl 11:23-25. Achalov, Colonel General V. 1990. 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Test: Are there changes from the baseline or pre-intervention story about the imperial relationship, across time that can be plausibly linked to the imperial withdrawal? One common effect of the loss of an empire on a nation's military officer corps is their increased acceptance of political participation to achieve their goals. The content and degree of political participation, however, will depend upon the particular way in which these individuals have understood the reasons for and impact of their loss. • Hypothesis 2: When there are contested definitions of the appropriate distribution of policy responsibility between the state and the military and when military officers see state institutions as weak, they will advocate an increase in their level of domestic participation. Test: How do military officers define their role within the state and society from the imperial to the post-imperial period? Is a loss of imperial mission and sense of civilian incompetence coupled with greater acceptance of political participation either in the greater scope of the issues which military officers now addressed by military officers or the means which they advocate to address them? Post-imperial militaries are organizations in decline. • Hypothesis 3: Post-imperial militaries perceive a radical decrease in their material resources and organizational prestige as a result of the loss of their external and internal empires. Test: Was there a period of radical decrease in the resources available to the military in the post-imperial period? Is this (chronologically) firiiedto the loss of their extend and internal empires? 421 • Hypothesis 4: Militaries which experience the loss of an external and internal empire are characterized by fragmented organizational structures and interest- group based struggles between organizational factions. Test; Are there fights between sub-groups over resource allocations, large-scale personnel turn-over, and the emergence of rival decision-making structures within the organization? There is a link between stories about the loss of empire and its organizational consequences and reform strategies. Officers’ definitions of the nature of the change they face in the post-imperial period become a critical variable for determining their policy preferences. • Hypothesis 5: When military officers perceive a decrease in overall demand for the military in the post-imperial society (change in niche size) they are likely to engage in reactive defense of their organizational structure and in rigid behaviors. • Hypothesis 6: When military officers see the change as substantive (change in niche shape rather than in overall demand) they are likely to advocate radical reform or experimental domain substitution, mainly in the form of new technologies or more cost-efficient and streamlined organizational structures. Diagnosis of the impact of the loss of empire will not be uniform across all sub-sections of the organization. • Hypothesis 7: Service, rank and generational variables all serve as important bases for variation both in the interpretation of the challenges facing the post-imperial military and the policy responses of that fragment or group. 422 APPENDIX B: STORY CODING SHEET Speaker/author: Source/cite: Who does Speaker speak for: Inferred Target for Communication: Initiating event: WHAT is (s)he trying to explain? Who are the KEY ACTORS in the event? What is the GOAL of the speaker and of other actors? (Pre-reasons for characters’ actions) What is the posited RELATIONSHIP between actors? (pre-reasons) Psychological State of actors/ internal response? (How do they feel?, EMOTIONAL CUES) (reasons for characters actions) What ACTIONS were already TAKEN since event?(results/consequences) What ACTIONS are ADVOCATED? (Results/consequences) LESSON LEARNED: 423 APPENDIX C INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 1. Personal history questions: • career path, important people in their career 2. Description of tasks facing military in 1989 and Today • Who do you feel had an impact on the direction the military took in the pre Gorbachev years?, in 1989/1990? Today? • Do you feel you have any say in the policy process? Did you have any sense of a say before 1989? • What do you think are the major missions which the military has been asked to accomplish pre-perestroika, during perestroika and now? Do you think these expectations are reasonable? • Are there changes you would like to see occur in the roles given to the military? • What do you think is the best way to bring about change (within the General Staff, Defense Ministry chaimels, running for ofiBce, voting for military officers) • What do you think about those who have chosen to ______(opposite of their choice, ie within the system or not, overtly political or not) • Has the nature of the military’s participation in daily policy creation changed? Is this a gradual change or was there a particular time when this changed? 424 3. Structural reform; • What part of the military do you feel you represent and follow? • In this part of the military what reforms have been implemented within the organization to respond to the changes that have occurred since the Soviet period? • What reforms are being debated? • Picking 2-3 reforms to discuss ask follow ups like: -was this a change in; the staffing structure, resource allocation, the processes and procedures of decision-making? -why did the change come about? (Try to elicit factors like economic changes, territorial changes, political system changes, the power of a particular sub-group, vs fi'eedom for organization to implement a change that they wanted for a while) - who saw this as a positive change? -did it have widespread support within the officer corps? -was it successful? 425 APPENDIX D; ORGANIZATIONAL CODING SHEET Speaker/author; Source/cite: Organizational/Branch Afiiliation On SU/ CIS/ Russian military organization? Evidence of Objective/Subjective Decline in organizational resources: Evidence of Objective/Subjective Decline in Organizational Prestige: Signs of Internal Fragmentation/Personnel Conflict: Perception of Environmental Change Continuous or Discontinuous: Perception of Impact on Organization of Change - Change in Amount of Activity vs New Role Substance of Reforms advocated if any: Examples of : perception of threat/confusion domain defense vs domain substitution reactive/experimental 426 APPENDIX E: BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FOR RUSSIAN MILITARY OFHCER CORPS (Bronskaya, 1994; Krotov, 1992) Marshall of the Soviet Union Sergey Federovich Akhromeyev Bom 1923 Lost father at 6 was dekulakized and left poor and hungry, entered military 1940 was in mechanized artillery division in WWn, was in battle for Leningrad in the united rifle battalion, then in motorized rifle and tank brigades After the war became commander of a tank brigade, then division General StaflF 1967 1983 named Marshall of Soviet Union and hero of the Soviet Union 1984-1988 head of General Staff and Deputy Minister of Defense was elected deputy to the People’s Soviet in 1984 and 1989 August 24,1991 he was found dead in his oflBce. The official version is suicide. Captain Anatoliy Alekseev 1972 Leningrad Naval Engineering school. Served 12 years in Pacific Fleet Named Captain Third Rank for his defense of the White House in 1991 May 1992 Shaposhnikov reversed the decree and he ceased being captain first rank. Named Head o f Committee on Servicemen and their Families. 1990 elected Deputy There he was the President of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Commission on Traumatic Stress in servicemen. He has been actively opposed by the group Soldiers’ Mothers and the leader of the organization “Schit”, Urazhtsev, who demanded las resignation as Head of the Comimttee on Servicemen. He was replaced by Russian People’s Deputy Urazhtsev himself. Colonel Viktor Imantovich Alksnis Symbolic figure for a whole direction/idea Latvian bom in Siberia in 1950, father was head of Air Force in 31 died in purges in 38 1957 the Alksnis family went to Riga. Victor went to the Air Force academy there renamed for his father. He became a specialist in radio engineering, became senior inspector in Riga of MIG-29 forces 1989 became people’s deputy to USSR the peak of his political career was November 16, 1990 when at a session of the Supreme Soviet he demanded that the President bring order to the country in 30 days. His main goals was to preserve the integrity of the Soviet Union, distançai himself fi’om the radical ideological separatists 1991 became spokesman for a group of deputies called Soyuz, began to advocate 427 reconstructing the superpower by more radical means. He supported the August putsch attempt and continued to advocate attempts, the battle had not been lost yet. Together with radical journalist Aleksandr Nevzorov he heads the Russian freedom movement “Nashi” the same division that took part in the action at the Vilnius television center in 1991. He has continued to call for the recreation of the Soviet Union and the rejection of the capitalization of the economy. Was decidedly against the creation of Russian military force as the end of both Russia and the Soviet Union. Recently he is rarely quoted, rarely seen but we have not seen the last of him. October 1992 became a member of the organizing committee of the Front for National Salvation, an organization forbidden by Yeltsin Colonel General Matvey Prokopyevish Burlakov bom 1935 57 finished military school 68 Frunze 77 General Staff first service was as commander of a rifle platoon 83-88 Commander of troops in Baikal area then was sent to Hungary to command the Southern Group of Forces in their last months there. He quickly grasped and participated in the difficult talks on withdrawal. 1990 sent to take over command of Western forces in Germany formed Mir trading company and benefitted from withdrawal by the commercialization/sale of resources in the West Commander in Chief of Army and Navy Admiral Vladimir Nikolaevich Chemavin bom 1928 in Ukraine to a Russian family 1951 Leningrad high naval academy and then immediately went into General Staff which he finished in 1969 mine torpedo man in submarine 1974 became head of North fleet 1981 head of naval staff 1983 admiral 1985 became deputy minister of defense and Chief of Navy Once was a deputy to the USSR from the ground forces city of Lenkorani in Azerbaijan After the dissolution of the Soviet Union Chemavin had an ambiguous role. The navy was to cease to exist without the government but they did not divide the boats or the sailors. 1991, He became the main commander of the Navy of the C I S. In 1992 he was named by Alksnis and Umalatov as the next President of the USSR, Chemavin disavowed contact with the group, but that seems unlikely. Air Forces Commander Colonel-General Petr Stepanovich Deynekin Bom 1937, Rostov 428 1969 Air Force Academy Gagarin 1982 General Staff aviator since 1957 1990-91 deputy chief of Air Force 1991 named Chief of Air Force and Deputy minister of Defense Feb 1992 Chief of C I S. Air Force Sept 1992 also Chief of Russian Air Force Popular «long soldiers, patriotic about Air Force, not interested in politics Popular also am o^ mtlkary indus^al cof^lex since in his first 6 month he spent 18 billion rubles on aviation productkm. General Pavel Grachev bom 1948 trained at paratrooper school 1969 named Commander of parachute division 1978 Frunze Afghanistan 1981-83 as member of 354 parachute division, he was deputy commander and then commander 1985 again in Afghanistan as commander of a division 1988 entered General Staff academy 1990-91 deputy commander of airborne troops Januaiy 1991 Commander of Air Force (Lebed was deputy Minister) 1991 went over to Yeltsin’s side named Deputy nrinister of D^ense after coup, selected by Shaposhnikov 1992 named first Russian Minister of D ^ n se and given title of General He is now considered much more conservative than Shaposhnikov Colonel General Boris Gromov bom 1943 in Saratov general command school began as commander of a rifle brigade 1972 Frunze 1980-1982 served in Afghanistan became head of a motorized rifle division 1984 General Staff 1985-1986 served in Afghanistan Commander of army in Belorus 1987-89 commander of Army in Afghanistan, it is thought that under him the war was conducted in a more responsible way, with fewer casualties, presided over withdrawal in 88-89.thought to be in favor of a tough line, order in the country in favor of communism December 1990 deputy Minister of Intemal Affairs under Pugo Part of delegation to conduct talks to normalize conditions in Latvia, was a speaker at a protest 429 June 1991 Ran in Presidential elections in Russia Ryzhkov/Gromov, came in second ambiguous role during the putsch but ultimately refiised to take part Sept 1992 Deputy Defense Minister under Grachev (a. surprise choice) General Constantine Ivanovich Kobets 1986 worked to end fire at Chernobyl 1987-1991 Head USSR Armed Forces Troops, Deputy head of General Staff 1990 elected People’s Deputy Jan 31, 1991 Supreme Soviet Presidium of the RSFSR named him head of Supreme Soviet committee on Russian defense supervised Lopatin. He was friends with Yazov and sympathetic to Yeltsin. This friendship with Yazov ended when Yazov supported the putsch and he did not. Many consider that democratization of the military was furthered by his efforts. Given his General title for opposition to the putsch. He has said that the division of the rmlkary mto camps was a tragedy and that no one really won. Chief of General Staff Mikhail Petrovich Kolesnikov considered a General Staff man to the core bom in 1939 served as a tank commander 1983 finished General Staff 1987 General Staff Department Head, Vice-Commander of Southern Forces 1990 Head of Main Staff^ Deputy Chief of Army 1991 Deputy Chief of General Staff He is considered to be apolitical Lieutenant General Aleksandr Ivanovich Lebed. 94 (?) Bom 1950 in Novocherkass. Both father and grandfather served in war, but he was the first professional soldier in the family. In 1962 he witnessed security troops opening fire on workers demonstrating protesting wage cuts. 70 were killed. 1973 finished Air Force command school. 1973-1981 commanded a platoon while still in school, chosen as commander among his classmates 1981-1982 was in Afghanistan, commanded an air battalion, convinced him Soviet Union was about to crumble under the weight of its own deceptions 1982-1985 Frunze Commander of an elite Tula paratroop division 1986-1991 deployed in many of the ethnic hot spots 1991 received general title 1991 refused to follow coup orders, put his tanks, and soldiers at Yeltsin’s disposal and with one of his airborne divisions he guarded the White House. This was a decisive factor 430 in preventing the storing of the White House and the arrest of Yeltsin. Since June 1992 commander of 14th army in Predniestr. He restored order there and made the soldiers feel needed and wanted, championed ethnic Russian cause. Member of the “Kedr” movement. Congress of Russian communities remained aloof in 1993 Aowdown 1995 was driven from the ara^ after his otAspokai condemnation of Defense Minister Grachev (had previously directly refused orders to step down and withdraw 14th army). General Vladimir Lobov 1954 entered service as artillery ofiBcer, entered Frunze 1967 and General Staff 1979 commander o f infantry battalion commander o f motorized rifle division From 1985 onward known as a proponent of change from the old, of a progressive military doctrine thought only nuclear parity was necessary, not troops on eh ground (saw w/d as economically advantageous) Head of Frunze Commander of Central Asian military district, had to send troops in Alma Ata Head of Staff of Warsaw Pact forces, 1989 -Deputy Minister of defense in August 1991 after putsch, reward for refusing to follow orders -Head of General Staff (October-December, 1991) wanted to remake General Staff on US model as central organ for direct management of forces. During time as head he created Strategic Reserves^ initiated preparations for transition to a paid army, decreased military service to 18 months, took steps to improve social guarantees. He was forced out in 1991 for having this view. Vladimir Nikolaevich Lopatin Bom 1960 served in military since 1977 in Air Force engineering and repair and then in the space and rocket program. 1990 elected People’s Deputy with a democratic position and named deputy President of Russian Federation Committee on Security and Cooperation between DOD and KGB Believed to represent the younger generation of officers in reform process. In September 1991 because of his service in defending the White House, he had his rank increased by two levels but he renounced this promotion publicly in April 1992. Army General P.G. Lushev 1941 entered service 1954 academy of armored forces 1966 General Staff 19&5 commander of Soviet forces in Germany 1986 Deputy Defense Minister, main commander of Warsaw Pact forces 1991 his name was mentioned in a Parliamentary Committee on the breach of laws (buying 431 immovable assets at a reduced price) removed from post April 29, 1991 General A M. Makashov bom 1938 to a cavalier ofiBcer Frunze then General Staff Commander of reconnaissance division Head of reconnaissance of a tank division Served in Caucasus Kiev, Urals and Western Forces 1988 was in Armenia given the function of controlling the political situation 1991 ran as for Russian Federation presidency with Marxist economist Sergeev as Vice President against Gorbachev’s policies of rushed and hasty withdrawal from Eastern Europe and Yeltsin’s economic radicalism. Wanted borders to be those of 1945. Only won 4% of vote. August 1991, actively supported the putsch, tried to mobilize reserves after unsuccessful he was sent into early retirement 1992 part of the Central Committee of the Front for National Salvation Deputy Defense Minister Mironov Bora 1943 to military family Wearing uniform from 12 (in military school) 73 Frunze 79 Commander of a division that was among first to be sent to Afghanistan 84 General Staff Academy 91 Baltic Forces Commander 92 Deputy Defense Minister in charge of personnel General Igor Nikolaevich Rodionov bora 1936 1989 named head of General Staff Academy Deputy from Georgia 1989 commanded attack against Tblisi d^nonsfrators in 1989 by army and KGB troops that killed 20 and wounded 130; This incident was investigated by a Parhamentary commission. Aleksandr V. Rutskoi bora 1947, son of officer in Railroad troops, his father was tankist who went all the way to Berlin in WWII Gagarin Air Force Academy Served in Germany 1984 charged with forming and commanding a division with new aviation technology 1985-1986and 1988Flew missions in Afghanistan and was twice severely wounded. Saw everything from 1985on as a slide down from superpower status (perestroika is genuine disintegration) 432 1988 named hero of Soviet Union 1989 ran for first political office, became a member of the Supreme Soviet where he was President of the Group Of Deputies “Communists for Democracy”, did not resign his commission 1990 General Staff Academy Had his own People’s Party “fi"ee Russia, 80 deputies in his parliamentary faction as well as economic ties to the Fund of Social development” Was considered fiiendly with Yeltsin, was chosen as second on the ticket in the Presidential elections Spring 1991, although he never ceased criticizing his politics 1991 was one of the heroes who did not take part in the putsch, helped lead defense of White House although agreed more with Communist positions and wanted to preserve the unity of the Soviet Union 1992 became main, leader of the opposition to Yeltsin evea though was Vice President (on executive C oa»^ee of recreated. Russian Communist Party) joined with Khasbulatov in October J993-, Announced that he was now President. He was arrested and put in prison. Lt General Viktor Nikolaevich Samsonov bom 1941 Served as a Commander in Pacific Fleet 1972 Frunze named head of a motorized rifle division then staff commander for a tank division 1990 named Commander of Leningrad Forces Somewhat mixed performance during the August 1991 events He was sympathetic to the coup leaders but refused to order his troops in Leningrad to go against the demonstrators. However, he did give orders to not let people’s Deputies into Marinsky Square. Nonetheless, he was proclaimed by Mayor Sobchak as a hero. 1991 named head of general Staff to succeed Lobov in December one day before Belovezh Accords were signed ( a political act/favor?) and then named to CIS joint command (never has served in the General Staff) General Forces Commander Colonel General Vladimir Magomedovich Semenov bom 1940 General Staff Academy 1990 Commanded Baikal Forces Marshall Yevgenii Ivanovich Shaposhnikov bom 1942, Rostov Father died in the War, (nephew of a famous Tsarist officer, who became head of General Staff 43-45) 1963 finished military school in Xharkov served as a pilot, senior pilot, rose quickly through Air Force ranks Became head of Odessa region 433 1984 General Staff 1987 commanded air Force stationed in Germany 1988 deputy chief of Air Force 1990 Chief of Air Force 1991 announced August 23 that the Air Force would not help the putsch. After putsch became Minister of Defense and served as that only until end of USSR December. He was named chief of C.I.S. United Forces Is considered the consummate professional military men, has no interest in entering politics Colonel General Nikolai I. Shlyaga Deputy Minister of Defense and head of the Main Political Directorate befwe the putscli, lost his position after the-new Defense Mmister Sbaposhmkov eliminated the role^ef the party organizations in the military Stanislas Terekhov One of the founders of Soyuz OfiBtserov, arrested during October 1993 events and charged with the death of one Moscow woman. An extreme nationalist and member of the opposition to Yeltsin. General of the Armv Deputy Defense Minister Valentin Ivanovich Varenmkov Bom 1923, Frunze 1954, General Staff 1967 during WWII commander of an artillery division 1960 became commander of motorized rifle division 71-73 head commander of troops in Germany 79-84 deputy head of General Staff, was in Afghanistan during that period 1989-91 main commander of ground forces, deputy Minister of Defense In military circles he was famous for being a big supporter of technological development He was a deputy in many Supreme Soviets including 1989 in an election with multiple candidates at the beginning of perestroika He supported a tough line with neighboring republics, represented the interests of the Supreme Soviet in Aprfl 1991 negotiations witk Latvia. Among the deputies he stood for preserving communism and the USSR, for returning to a plarmed economy, and for restoring order. He was arrested as one of the organizers of the August 1991 coup Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitrii Timt^evich Yazov bom 1923 in Omsk 1942 finished infantry school fought in WWn at Leningrad 1956 Frunze 1967 General Staff Far East Commander When Gorbachev was in Stavropol Yazov was Commander of the Motorized Rifle 434 Division, he supported Gorbachev in Communist Party Meetings and their families became friends Jan 1987 Head of General Staff Leadership Department, Deputy Minister of Defense May 1987 Minister of Defense Yazov has always supported the difficult course, asked Gorbachev to end manifestations of nationalism and extremism At a closed Session of the Supreme Soviet July 17 together with internal Minister Pugo and KGB head Kruchkov he spoke of the necessity of extraordinary measures to end the destruction pf the country. When the Supreme Soviet did not agree on August 18 he joined the putschists. He was perhaps the only democrat among the putschists. Arrested. 435