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Social Education 73(6), pp 287–293 ©2009 National Council for the Social Studies The Other September 11: Teaching about the 1973 Overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende

Katy Benedetto, Alexandra Lamb, and Robert Cohen

eptember 11, 2001, is a day most American high school students remember. the U.S almost always uses the rhetoric They may not fully grasp the events that took place, the reasons behind the of democracy to defend its international Sterrorist attacks on the United States, or their implications, but they remember. role, there are times when it has actu- They were children when this national trauma occurred—and they saw those unfor- ally sabotaged democratic governments gettable television images of the World Trade Center exploding and the Pentagon abroad in instances when those govern- aflame. Every fall they see somber commemorations of the September 11 attacks ments challenge U.S. economic interests and the tragic loss of life left in their wake. But what few of our students—or other and geo-political goals. Such was the case Americans—know is that long before 2001, September 11 has been a tragic histori- in Allende’s Chile in 1973. Teachers cal anniversary in Latin America because it was the day that Chile’s democratically who take on this fascinating case study elected president, Salvador Allende, was overthrown and died in a bloody coup in face the challenging task of conveying 1973. The coup marked the start of a dismal era for Chilean democracy because it led how the U.S. could have undermined to more than a decade of military rule by Augusto Pinochet, whose brutal dictator- Chilean democracy given the historical ship (1973–1990) consolidated itself via crimes against humanity—the disappearance, tradition of valuing freedom, democ- torture, and murder of thousands of dissidents. racy, and self-determination. It forces our students to consider whether a demo- At first glance, the U.S. and Chilean 1973, the U.S. took part in perpetrating cratic frame makes sense in assessing U.S. September 11ths seem most impressive the terror, having helped to destabilize policy towards Latin America during for what they have in common, which the Allende government and covertly the Cold War, and whether the radical is, quite simply, terror: buildings were supported a military coup that resulted critique of the U.S. as an imperialist or destroyed and civilians were killed in in one of the most brutal dictatorships neo-colonial power actually has merit the terrorist attacks on New York and in the Western Hemisphere. Dorfman in helping to explain the Nixon admin- Washington in 2001, and a violent and warns: “Beware the plague of amnesia, istration’s Chilean policy. Examining bloody coup was followed by the instal- America…. Have … you forgotten the this important moment can help stu- lation of a dictator who ruled by terror in Democratic Chile? Demonized, desta- dents empathize with other nations that Chile in 1973. But there is an important bilized by your government in 1973? … have experienced tragedies, and become difference between the two tragedies, a Misruled for seventeen years by a dicta- more acutely aware of the meaning of difference that Chilean novelist, play- tor you helped install?” 1 democracy in the face of such wild con- wright, and human rights activist Ariel Teaching about Chile’s September 11 tradictions. When situations like these Dorfman urges Americans to reflect offers us an opportunity to present our are studied and debated in classrooms, upon. The difference is that while in students with the complexity and con- students practice being active and criti- 2001 America was the victim of terror, in tradictions of U.S foreign policy. While cal citizens in an increasingly complex

O c t o b e r 2009 287 world and can better participate in ongo- ing debates regarding the at times violent repercussions of U.S. foreign policy.2 This article and the teaching sugges- tions that follow aim to provide a bet- ter understanding of Chile’s September 11 by examining relevant literature, a primary source document, and essays by some of the event’s witnesses (e.g., writings by Ariel Dorfman). We offer a teaching activity centering on one of the most revealing historical sources on the U.S. role in Allende’s Chile, a declassi- fied five-point memorandum written to President Richard Nixon on November 17, 1970, by his national security advisor, Former Secretary of State Henry Henry Kissinger. It outlines covert mea- Kissinger (L) and General Augusto sures that the U.S. government planned to Pinochet (C) stand with two unidentified use to undermine and subvert Allende’s men in this undated file photo. presidency, illuminating the breadth of (Reuters/STR New) American influence abroad and directly implicating the U.S. government in some that the U.S. was “protecting freedom” in that does not respect the sovereignty of of the chaotic events that wracked Chile Chile because freedom was defined in smaller nations. This topic and our teach- in the early 1970s, which destabilized Cold War terms.3 In those terms, Allende ing suggestions are part of a conversation the Allende government and paved the was seen not as a democratically-elected about U.S. foreign policy at large, as it is way for the rise of Pinochet. The covert, president whose government commanded essential for students to gain a perspective even conspiratorial, nature of Nixon and respect, but as a dangerously radical on their country’s controversial role as a Kissinger’s actions leading up to the coup socialist whose opposition to American global power. The study of the September is highly engrossing, leaving students to corporate dominance of the Chilean 11 coup in Chile and the U.S.’s role offers follow and question what happened with economy constituted a threat to U.S. an opportunity to explore difficult and the same rapt attention they might pay to economic interests and free enterprise. emotional subject matter through primary a true crime story. Nixon also saw undermining Allende as and secondary sources, utilizing the skills Our experience teaching about the a way of preventing Chile from aligning of understanding, questioning, unpacking, fall of Allende and using the declas- with the Soviet Union, the major anti- and reevaluating the American historical sified Kissinger memorandum in an capitalist superpower. In that way too, narrative. American Studies class at New York the U.S. involvement could be seen as City’s Stuyvesant High School demon- an act in the service of freedom. But all strated the impact that these complex of our students grappled with the ques- Nixon, Kissinger, and issues can have on students. This study tion of whether such economic interests the Cold War of the memorandum was a way to pro- and geo-political goals justified a U.S. mote student engagement with primary plot to undermine a president who had Nothing important can come from source analysis. The follow-up discus- been democratically elected by his own the South. History has never been sion of United States covert activities and people. produced in the South. The axis of interventions in Latin America led to a Such questions loan themselves to a history starts in Moscow, goes to heated classroom debate about American debate as lively as the important task of Bonn, crosses over to Washington foreign policy and the government’s obli- evaluating the proper role for the United and then goes to Tokyo. What hap- gations to the public regarding the dis- States as an international superpower, pens in the South is of no impor- closure of information about such events. probing the line between national self- tance. Some students were appalled by U.S. interest and imperialism, capitalist inter- subversion of the Chilean democratic ests and democratic ideals. They also —Kissinger, speaking to process, while others were impressed force us to acquaint ourselves with anti- Chilean Foreign Minister by the Nixon administration’s justifica- Americanism, and why the United States Gabriel Valdés4 tion for undermining Allende, asserting is often seen abroad as an arrogant bully

S o c i a l Ed u c a t i o n 288 These remarks by Kissinger to Chile’s into a “red sandwich.” 8 In support of Or were they merely serving the selfish foreign minister in 1969 exemplify the his belligerently anti-Allende policies, interests of such corporations as ITT, Nixon administration’s outlook on Latin Kissinger noted “I don’t see why we Pepsico, Kennecott Copper Corporation, America. Nixon’s troubled history with need to stand by and watch a country Anaconda Copper Mining Company, this region dates back to the Eisenhower go Communist due to the irresponsibil- Firestone Tire and Rubber, Bank of years. In 1958, Nixon, while conduct- ity of its own people.” 9 This was a view America, Ralston Purina, and Dow ing a goodwill tour of South America as that paved the way for U.S. violations of Chemical?11 The natural inquiry that Eisenhower’s vice president, confronted Chilean sovereignty. follows regards Chile’s rights in this mat- demonstrators expressing hostility and ter. Allende believed that some of these anti-American sentiment. The outcry Towards September 11, 1973 companies were exploiting the Chilean was most notable in Venezuela, where What took place in Chile on September people and lands for their own profit. he was spit upon, attacked with rocks, 11, 1973, was the culmination of three In 1968, studies showed that the 28.3 and had his car nearly overturned by years of covert and overt U.S. activities percent of the Chilean people earning a mob. The idea that Latin Americans aimed at bringing down Allende and his the least amount of money received 4.8 might have legitimate grievances escaped Popular Unity government. Allende was percent of the national income, while Nixon, and instead he believed that they deemed a threat by Nixon and Kissinger the 2 percent of the population earn- were “primitive, easily led, and lacking (though not by the State Department’s ing the most received 45.9 percent of in the ability to govern themselves.” 5 Latin American experts) because of the income.12 Allende ran for the presi- Kissinger gave every indication that his socialist leanings, close friendship dency in 1958, 1964, and finally with he considered the area inconsequen- with Fidel Castro, and plan to force out success in 1970, on a platform advocating tial and its people ignorant. He and American businesses that controlled land reform, nationalization of major Nixon dealt with challenges from Latin many of the country’s leading industries. industries (especially copper), closer America in a heavy-handed manner that Cold War tensions of the time caused relations with socialist and communist contrasted with the careful meticulous Nixon to fear that if Allende came into countries, and progressive redistribution way that they approached negotiations power, Chile would become another of income. The question becomes: If a with stronger nations such as China and Cuba, and a satellite of the Soviet Union. Chilean political leader such as Allende the Soviet Union. As Latin American Prompted by multinational corporation opts for socialistic reforms in order to expert Stephen Kinzer observed, when International Telephone and Telegraph promote greater economic equity, does Nixon and Kissinger encountered prob- (ITT) and other American and Chilean the U.S. have the right to stop him in lems “from weak, vulnerable nations like business leaders, the U.S. government in order to preserve the profit margins of Chile, they reacted with blind emotion 1970 embarked on a covert “spoiling cam- the American companies with interests rather than the cool long-term interest paign” to block Allende’s election. With there? The United States thought so that guided their approach to Moscow a budget of $135,000, later increased to during that period, and helped provide and Beijing.” 6 $390,000, the CIA spread anti-Allende funding to anti-Allende politicians who Although Cold War tensions abated propaganda in the form of posters, newly defeated him in each of the elections thanks to the policy of détente that took opened news agencies, and the creation prior to 1970. How, we finally asked hold by the end of the Nixon era, issues or support of anti-communist civic action our students, would Americans react if of national security related to Cold War groups. Regarding Allende, Richard a foreign power helped to bankroll U.S. geo-politics were continually important Nixon privately remarked, “We’re going politicians and swayed American elec- to the Nixon administration. Kissinger to him.” 10 tions in their favor? popularized the notion that Americans Many essential questions are raised Despite the U.S.’s best efforts, Allende did not need to focus on the possibility by the study of the Chilean intervention. was elected by a plurality on September of an all out war provoked by the Soviet The first is the degree to which big busi- 4, 1970. The CIA proceeded to launch Union, but instead on more limited or ness special interests should be allowed an even more extensive operation to oust local conflicts in peripheral areas.7 Chile to impact U.S. foreign policy. Some major him, initially through legal and diplo- was one of these peripheral aspects of the American companies stood to lose eco- matic means (known as Track 1), but Cold War, which still needed watching nomically if Allende pushed them out increasingly by attempting to foment a over to prevent Latin America from fall- of Chile—even if he compensated them military coup (Track 2). They continued ing to communism. Nixon later stated that for their losses—and so they effectively their earlier propaganda campaign, but he had heeded warnings from advisors lobbied Nixon to oppose Allende. Were raised the stakes by subsidizing oppo- (including businessmen with interests in Nixon and Kissinger truly acting in U.S. sition newspapers, labor unions, and Chile) that socialist regimes in Cuba and national interests by waging economic political parties, blocking international Chile would turn all of Latin America and political warfare against Allende? loans, denying spare parts to industries,

O c t o b e r 2009 289 Teaching Suggestions

1. Focus or Preview Activity the class into pairs to discuss the document. Each pair should: Open the class to a discussion about September 11, 2001, and what they remember about that day. Allow the class time to explore • List forms that each “principal element” could take. their feelings, ask questions, and discuss how what happened has shaped the United States since. Begin a discussion about violence • List ways in which each action will impact Chile and its and terrorism in general, and ask if they can think of any other people. events that were as shattering as this one. They may suggest Pearl Harbor, acts of terrorism in the Middle East, and military coups Have students report back to class and debate the strengths in Asia or Latin America. and weaknesses of the plan. Explain to students that you are going to read about another 9/11. Divide the class into groups. Each group should imagine that Ask if they know what you are referring to, and provide background they are a part of the Chilean government’s cabinet, and reading information regarding the military coup in Chile in 1973 through this document right after it was written. They must make a list of the use of data, maps, and other visual aids. Have students take ways to counteract and prevent each of the measures to subvert turns reading aloud Ariel Dorfman’s chapter, “The Last September their government. They will then compose a memorandum in the 11.” Ask the following questions about the article: same format as the American document based on their ideas. Continue with a class discussion imagining how the American • Dorfman compares the tragic events of September 11, 2001, people would have reacted if the document had been leaked in in the U.S. with the tragedy of Allende’s overthrow in Chile 1970. Ask students to discuss and weigh the reactions of different on September 11, 1973. Why does he make this comparison? groups. How would Nixon’s supporters have reacted? How would In what ways does it seem valid? Are there ways in which Nixon’s opposition have reacted? this comparison seems problematic? 3.Presidential Doctrines • How was the U.S. role in Chile’s September 11 different than Divide the class into groups of 4–5. Assign each group a different its role in the September 11, 2001, tragedy? presidential doctrine to research, (e.g., the Monroe doctrine, the Nixon doctrine, the Carter doctrine, and the Bush doctrine) and • What does Dorfman mean when he refers (on page 41) to literature about each doctrine’s application in Latin America. Each “America’s famous exceptionalism”? Why is he so critical of group should answer the following questions: exceptionalism? Why does he want the U.S. to stop thinking about itself this way? • What attitude toward foreign countries does this doctrine reflect? • Dorfman argued shortly after September 11, 2001, that “a crisis of this magnitude can lead to renewal or destruction, • Why do you think that the president held this view? it can be used for good or for evil, for aggression or for rec- onciliation, for vengeance or for justice, for the militarization • Give an example of how this doctrine was applied in Latin of a society or its humanization.” Have any of his predictions America. come true since then? How? • Do you think that the doctrine was fair? Why or why not? Follow up the reading with a journal writing activity making com- parisons between the two 9/11s and eliciting empathy about the Jigsaw the students and have them compare their answers. One universal experience of violence. member of each group reports back to class.

2. Document Analysis 4. Comparative Research Activity Provide students with a copy of the featured memorandum Split the class into groups and have them research different Latin between Kissinger and Nixon. As a class, review the significance American countries where U.S. intervention led to regime change of the following terms and names: Covert Action, Committee of (e.g., Guatemala, Cuba, Nicaragua). Ask students to create docu- 40, Marxist/non-Marxist, contingency budget, Kissinger, Nixon, mentaries based on their research that draw comparisons to the Allende, classified/unclassified. Explain the background and moti- coup in Chile. Students can film and edit a documentary or create vation of the covert action program. Elicit a discussion about a website or podcast showing what they have learned. Students the plan and whether the U.S. was justified in its actions in Chile. should present their work to the class. Discuss American interests, ideologies, and fears of the time. Divide

S o c i a l Ed u c a t i o n 290 and paying for and sparking a nationwide paign had badly damaged Chile’s econ- relevant CIA documents that implicated trucker’s strike that all but paralyzed the omy and undermined the Allende regime. the U.S. government and Pinochet in the economy.13 A later U.S. Senate investiga- The plotters, moreover, might never have coup. The Chilean and American people tion estimated that Washington spent gone ahead with the military assault had can come to terms with the events of the $8 million overall on its destabilization not the Nixon administration made it so other September 11, and begin to recover campaign in Chile, $3 million of which clear that it “would not look with disfavor” from their mutual tragedies of unpro- was spent in 1972 alone. if a coup would occur. A 1975 U.S. con- voked terror. In one of the most chilling aspects of gressional report concluded that Nixon Pinochet emerged as a cruel dicta- the Track 2 campaign, Allende’s com- administration officials “may not have tor, taking power immediately after the mander-in-chief of the army, General always succeeded in walking the thin line coup, and maintaining that power via Rene Schneider, was assassinated. A between monitoring indigenous coup the execution of over 3,200 people, the strict constitutionalist, Schneider had plotting and actually stimulating it.”16 A incarceration of at least 80,000 Chileans been a key obstacle to the covert U.S. private conversation between Nixon and without trials, and the torture of 30,000.18 plan to use the Chilean military to pre- Kissinger the week after the coup leaves After finally falling from power, Pinochet vent Allende’s election, since he, much no doubt that they took pride in having faced some 300 criminal charges, the like George Washington, believed that helped to foster the coup. Here Kissinger most serious of which were human rights in a democracy civilian rule, not mili- lamented that the liberal American press violations, but which also included tax tary might, ought to prevail. While the was “bleeding” instead of “celebrat- evasion and embezzlement. He was able CIA had arranged for his kidnapping ing” the overthrow of what he saw as to avoid trial on the charges after the rather than his murder, those “men of Chile’s communist government. “In the Chilean Supreme Court, in 2002, judged violence” it had selected to deal with the Eisenhower period we would be heroes,” him medically unfit for reasons of age- “Schneider problem” ended up—after two Nixon responded. “Well we didn’t as related dementia. Kissinger’s indifference botched abduction attempts—shooting you know—our hands don’t show on this to Pinochet’s brutality becomes evident him fatally, an attack expedited by U.S. one though”; and Kissinger agreed that in light of his remarks during a secret June weapons and money sent by diplomatic they “didn’t do [the coup]” but “helped 1976 meeting with the Chilean dictator pouch.14 them—created the conditions as great as documented in a recently released report As part of the Track 2 campaign, the possible” to pave the way for the coup. about human rights abuses in Chile. CIA cultivated contacts in the Chilean “That is right,” replied Nixon.17 Kissinger remarked, “My evaluation military among the soldiers who would The events in Chile on September is that you are a victim of all left-wing ultimately overthrow Allende, most 11, 1973, shattered the once democratic groups around the world and that your notably the disloyal army commander, and peaceful traditions of the Chilean greatest sin was that you overthrew a gov- Augusto Pinochet. On September people and government. Today only half ernment that was going Communist.”19 11, the Pinochet-led military sur- of all Chileans were alive on that day Below is an excerpt from Ariel rounded the presidential palace with in 1973, but what happened has never Dorfman’s Chile: The Other September tanks, armored cars, riflemen and jet left the national psyche. Accounts of the 11 about his feelings towards both those fighters. When they demanded that storming of the presidential palace, the tragic days. His comparison of the two Allende either resign or surrender, he assassinations and kidnappings, and the September 11ths can serve as a preview refused the ultimatum, and they pro- targeting and killing of leftists all over the reading to put students in the shoes of a ceeded to storm the palace, resulting in country, are now numerous. Yet Pinochet, Chilean witness and victim of the 1973 Allende‘s death—apparently by suicide. who followed the coup with a 17-year coup: In the days that followed, Pinochet dictatorship, repressed discussion of was installed as president, and all of this conspiracy against democracy in …What I recognize is something Chile’s democratic institutions were Chile. The U.S. government prevented deeper, a parallel suffering, a dissolved. Allende’s policies and pro- the world from knowing the full story similar pain, a commensurate grams were dismantled, and a wholly of its role for many years by keeping its disorientation, echoing what we “free-market” economy was reestab- documents on the coup secret and clas- lived through in Chile as of that lished, much to the satisfaction of the sified. The story of the overthrow of a September 11. Its most extraordi- U.S. multinational companies that had democratically-elected president and the nary incarnation—I still cannot been affected by his tenure.15 coup that ended with him dead from a believe what I am witnessing—is While it was Chilean soldiers, not bullet wound to the head, and the U.S. that on the screen I see hundreds Americans, who stormed the presiden- role in these tragic events can now be told of relatives wandering the streets tial palace, the coup was only possible with more certainty because in 2000 the of New York, clutching the photos because the U.S. destabilization cam- Clinton administration finally released of their sons, fathers, wives, lov-

O c t o b e r 2009 291 ers, daughters, begging for infor- missing. And I also recognize and what people like me would mut- mation, asking if they are alive repeat that sensation of extreme ter to themselves during the 1973 or dead, the whole United States unreality that invariably accom- military coup and the days that forced to look into the abyss of panies great disasters caused by followed…. And words reiterated what it means to be desaparecido human iniquity, so much more unceasingly, 28 years ago and now [disappeared], with no certainty difficult to cope with than natural again in the year 2001: “We have or funeral possible for those catastrophes. Over and over again lost our innocence. The world beloved men and women who are I hear phrases that remind me of will never be the same.” 20

A classroom discussion of U.S. involve- Memo from Henry Kissinger to Richard Nixon, November 25, 1970.* ment in regime change can spark an intense debate about what it means to be an American, and the impact of U.S. foreign policy. Teaching students about American involvement in the Chilean coup raises essential questions that allow them to grapple with the conflicting mis- sion of the United States to be both a democratic nation and a capitalist one. Within the United States these politi- cal and economic roles may be seen as complementing one another, offering citizens the opportunity to be economi- cally and socially free of government intervention. Outside of its borders, however, they can conflict dramatically, as they did in Chile. U.S. covert actions saved American business interests, but at the expense of Chilean democracy— it was trampled by a dictator that the United States, helped to install. While Pinochet’s interests were very much in line with American capitalistic invest- ments, his violent and oppressive 17-year regime was in fact at odds with America’s tradition of constitutional rights. When teaching about Chile, teachers should ask: if the American involvement in the Chilean coup was an effort to protect American values and interests abroad, does having a violent dictator in power achieve these goals?

Classified Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon The extent to which the United States intervened in the political and military affairs of Chile is revealed in the many U.S. government documents that have since been declassified.21 We chose the memorandum written by Kissinger in 1970 to President Nixon, because it illu- *Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet Files: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability minates the American involvement in (New York: The New Press, 2003), 125. S o c i a l Ed u c a t i o n 292 Chile, which set the stage for the 1973 thought that no defensive tactic could addresses NCSS Thematic Standard Global coup. The memorandum outlines tactics work since it was so difficult for a weaker Connections, which suggests that teachers “guide learner analysis of the relationships and tensions the American government planned to nation such as Chile to stand up to the between national sovereignty and global interests in employ to “weaken the Allende coalition,” massive political, economic, and military such matters as territorial disputes, economic devel- opment, nuclear and other weapons deployment, use including using media outlets to accentu- might of America as a superpower. of natural resources, and human rights concerns.” ate the voices of opposition parties and We then changed the conversation and National Council for the Social Studies, National Standards for Social Studies Teachers (Washington, strengthening relationships with the asked students to hypothesize American DC: NCSS, 1997), www.socialstudies.org. Chilean military. The memo illuminates public reactions had the memorandum 3. Eric Foner, The Story of American Freedom (New the lengths to which the United States been leaked to news media in 1970. The York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998), 249-274. 4. Seymour Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the was willing to go to protect its interests in students were able to empathize with Nixon White House (New York: Summit Books, Chile, and allows students a direct look both Nixon supporters and foes. They 1983), 263. into the ideas and tactics Washington theorized that his supporters would 5. Lubna Z. Qureshi. Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile (Lanham, Md: applied there. accept the covert action as a method of Lexington Books, 2009), 3. The Allende coup is likely to engage protecting the American people from 6. Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: America’s Century of students and allow them to delve into the the threat of international communism. Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2006), 199. complexities of American foreign policy, Students explained that the opposition 7. Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in as well as to explore the tension between would have viewed this memo as a threat Power (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), democracy and capitalism. Some teach- as well, but a threat to American values 49. 8. Ibid, 233. ing suggestions are included in the box of democracy and free speech. 9. Hersh, 265. on page 290. In an extended lesson on A larger conversation ensued about 10. Kinzer, 183. the subject that we taught at Stuyvesant the role of the American government in 11. Ibid., 186. High School in New York City, we found the affairs of other nations and the con- 12. Hersh, 259. 13. The leading American corporations active in Chile that the use of guiding questions to get flicting needs to support both capitalistic set out on a “quiet” destabilization plan of their own, students thinking about this controversy interests of the American economy and closing offices, delaying payments, slowing deliveries was key to its success. We began with a the more egalitarian interests of democ- and denying credit. 14. Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, 236; discussion of Ariel Dorfman’s essay “The racy. This discussion produced conflict- Christopher Hitchens, The Trial of Henry Kissinger Last September 11” and asked students ing opinions within the classroom as to (London: Verso, 2001), 66. to draw parallels between September 11, who gets to decide these major issues of 15. Ariel Dorfman, et al., Chile: The Other September 11. An Anthology of Reflections on the 1973 Coup 2001, and September 11, 1973. They American foreign policy. The question (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 2006), 95-96. identified both events as “watershed that naturally arose was: should the 16. U.S. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations. Covert Action in Chile: 1963-1973. 94th moments in national history” in which American people be privy to these con- Cong., 1st sess., 18 December 1975, 28. each nation’s “sense of national identity versations or should elected officials keep 17. Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, 511- was shattered.” We then segued into a his- these actions hidden from public view? 512. torical discussion of our featured docu- The class was divided on this question. 18. National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, authorized by Chilean President Patricio Aylwin, ment, the memorandum sent to President We also asked students to examine the 1991. Truth Commissions Digital Collection, United Nixon from Kissinger on November 25th consequences of American participation States Institute of Peace; National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture Report, autho- 1970. We asked students to read the docu- in the overthrow of foreign governments, rized by president Ricardo Lagos, 2004-2005. www. ment, discuss it briefly with their peers, such as in Chile, Guatemala, Vietnam, comisiontortura.cl/03_cap_ii.pdf. and develop a set of counter-tactics that and Iran. The structure and content 19. Hitchens, 70. 20. Dorfman et al., Chile: The Other Sept. 11, 2–3 Allende’s cabinet members might have of the lesson allowed students to draw 21. On the most recently released evidence of Nixon used if they had seen the document when their own conclusions about the cost and plotting to oust Allende, see “Memos Show Nixon’s it was written. benefits of the interventions for both the Bid to Enlist Brazil in Coup,” New York Times, Aug, 16, 2009. In the discussion that followed, two American people and the citizens of these distinct tactics emerged. The students’ foreign nations. Katy Benedetto received her masters degree first suggestion was to implement a public in social studies education at New York Univer- sity (NYU) and is currently teaching ninth-grade Notes campaign to build support for Allende global studies at the Brooklyn Lab School in New through the growth of national sentiment 1. Ariel Dorfman, Other Septembers, Many Americas: Selected Provocations, 1980-2004 (New York: Seven York. Alexandra Lamb received her undergradu- and worldwide sympathy. Their second Stories Press, 2004), 12. ate degree from Bowdoin College, her masters in approach was harsher; they suggested a 2. The theme of American foreign policy and interven- social studies education at NYU, and is currently purge of the military and the media, an tions abroad is consistent with various NCSS stan- teaching ninth-grade social studies in New York dards. It directly correlates to NCSS Thematic City. Robert Cohen is a professor of social stud- increase in government control of the Standard Power, Authority, and Governance, which ies and history at NYU and the author of Free- media, and a strengthening of alliances encourages teachers to “guide learners to explain and dom’s Orator: Mario Savio and the Radical Legacy evaluate how governments attempt to achieve their of the 1960s (Oxford Univ. Press, 2009). with surrounding countries. A few others stated ideas at home and abroad.” In addition, it

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