and Western Europe in the long 1970s

Pavel Szobi

(European University Institute)

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to define the positions of Czechoslovakia towards the cooperation, (more specifically in trade and business) with Western Europe on the example of the relations with the European Economic Community in the 1970s. To define the base of its approach towards foreign trade, cooperation agreements, licences or direct investments, the first part of the paper will define the institutions and elites responsible for the foreign policy in the period of the normalization process. The case study in the second part of the paper will deal with the Czechoslovak economic foreign interests in relation to the EEC. It is not my quest to offer an overall analysis of the ČSSR-EEC relations. At this point, it is rather meant to be a contribution to the recent state of knowledge, based on an extensive research in Czech and Slovak archival materials.

Ideology of normalization and the national factor after 1968

Czech historian Jan Rychlík summed up quite aptly the general situation in Czechoslovakia after 1968, „The normalization elite theoretically still based its legitimacy on the grounds of the ‘Victorious February’ in 1948, but in reality it based its power on the effects of the Soviet occupation, and was therefore illegitimate in the public’s understanding. At the same time, the absolute majority of the population considered even in this period the basic socio-economic changes, which had commenced in Czechoslovakia after 1948, to be permanent. Almost nobody really doubted the centrally planned economy or the nationalization of the production means or even considered the possibility of their privatisation. We could state that the majority of people had objections against the system but they did not have any clear idea how Czechoslovakia should look like.”1 The problem was that not even the political elite had any real idea about the future of Czechoslovakia. The main ideology was based on the refusal of the reforms of 1968, nothing more.

1 RYCHLÍK, Jan, Normalizační podoba československé federace, in: MARUŠIAK, Juraj, KMEŤ, Normbert, Slovensko a režim normalizácie, Prešov 2003, p. 8. The ideology of both Czechoslovak nation from the interwar Czechoslovakia as well as the long-term Antonín Novotný´s strategy of “blending two nations into one” were dead. Nobody doubted the existence of two different nations within Czechoslovakia, despite the fact, that in the communist democratic centralism, the real functioning of federal and republican/national institutions came under the decisions of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and Communist Party of . What was the hatch in it? As it was the case in the Soviet Union, the federalization of Czechoslovakia did not build two regular states with independent governments which would build a functional union due to mutual interests together. This can be seen on the example of the party organization. While the government positions were strictly divided between the two republics and it was clearly decided which competences can be executed by the republics and by the federal government, this division is less clear on the party level, which was in reality the decisive element of the communist dictatorship. In the sense of the mentioned democratic centralism, lower stages of the party were obliged to respect the opinions of its higher levels. In the USSR, the communist parties of Belarus, Ukraine or Kazakhstan were only local executive units of the mighty Communist Party of the Soviet Union. But Russia itself lacked any national party. It lacked it because it did not need it - the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was the actual Russian Party. This system was transplanted to Czechoslovakia. A national party of Slovakia was accepted as a national communist party, but was supposed to play only the role of a local executive body of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which, again, was de facto the Czech National Communist Party.2 But if historians finish the analysis there, they can be mistaken. The Slovak communists were the core element in the Slovak National Uprising in 1944 and their heroic activity in the fight against the Germans gave them a power boost which they partially preserved. This can be regarded as one of the reasons why the democratic centralism could be bypassed not only by the Slovak government officials who were heads of a formally independent republic within the federation, but even to the heads of the Communist Party of Slovakia. A possibly more independent manoeuvring space was also enabled by the fact that the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Gustáv Husák was Slovak and until April 1969 First Secretary of the Communist Party of Slovakia. Besides, he was the one who led the government committee for the federalization of Czechoslovakia in 1968.3

2 In the koncept of the Czechoslovak federation in 1968, the creation of Communist Party of Czech Lands and Moravia was anticipated, but this never happened. 3 His actions and motives in politics are subjects of intensive research both in and Slovakia. See Michálek, Slavomír, Londák, Miroslav, Gustáv Husák: moc politiky, politik moci, Bratislva 2013. Czech and Slovak elites in the foreign trade and Czechoslovak normalization

The introduction of the normalization process, which was the term used to stabilize the political and security situation after the Warsaw Pact invasion in 1968, is connected to the issue of the exchange of party membership cards – a series of committee hearings on all levels of the organization hierarchy which led to the firing of 30 % of the party members.4 This is generally a known and relatively well analysed process. But it is important to see that the biggest penalties for the support of the 1968 reforms were executed in the Czech part of the federation. In Czech state institutions, as well as in academia and state enterprises, the free positions were often filled by the “second league” of less experienced, but loyal party members. Among good Czech professionals who were able to perform the continuation of the complex issues of foreign trade and international relations, were the Federal Prime Minister Lubomír Štrougal, Federal Minister of Finance Leopold Lér, Federal Minister of Technology and Innovation Ladislav Šupka, Federal Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Jaroslav Jakubec or the Chairman of the Czechoslovak State Bank Stanislav Potáč.

In Slovakia, the normalization process and sacking of elites was much less harsh than in the Czech Lands. Although many highly situated politicians were fired and banned from the party, there are no cases of people who would be urged to have a manual job as was often the case in the Czech Socialist Republic. In academia, people were downgraded, but in many cases not completely fired, instead of that they were transferred to low profile research institutes. The soft approach against “weak elements” in the party, state institutions and enterprises led to the creation of a numerous Slovak elite which grew strongly not only in Slovakia but filled the vacant places from the purges in the Czech part of the federation.5

A specific role in the Slovak political elites was played by the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Slovakia Jozef Lenárt. Documents about his activities in the 1970s and 1980s on his post show that he had little interest in politics itself. He dealt overall with economic issues while trying to modernize the capital of Slovakia with technological innovations, including those from the West. As Slovak historian Richard Pavlovič states, „he did deal with ideological issues as little as necessary (…) and was a

4 MAŇÁK, Jiří, Čistky v Komunistické straně Československa v letech 1969-1970, Praha 1997, p. 42. 5 RYCHLÍK, Jan, Normalizační podoba československé federace, in: MARUŠIAK, Juraj, KMEŤ, Normbert, Slovensko a režim normalizácie, Prešov 2003, p. 46. regular technocrat“.6 The same counts for the Prime Minister of Slovakia Peter Colotka, a professor of law and survivor of the normalization purge, as he was an ally of the Federal Prime Minister Lubomír Štrougal, who together with the approval of Gustáv Husák saved him from being sacked after Colotka actively supported the 1968 reforms. On the level of the federal government, another Slovak, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Bohuslav Chňoupek was often a direct negotiator with West European countries. The foreign trade and relations to supranational organizations like EEC or EFTA were co-orchestrated by the Federal Deputy Prime Minister Rudolf Rohlíček who came from West Slovakia. Negotiations with foreign business partners were often directly negotiated by a prototype of a modern educated state manager, Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade Andrej Barčák. Investment plans were managed on several industrial projects in Slovakia by Pavol Hrivnák who changed several republican and federal ministerial functions during the 1970s and 1980s.7 Another „opener“ towards the West was Ladislav Martinák, a long lasting mayor of Bratislava. The role of Bratislava as Slovak capital was obvious, starting with the construction of new Slovak government buildings, infrastructure like the monumental new bridge over the Danube river leading to the enormous new residential district of Petržalka, as well as cultural and sport facilities and hotels, concluding with the megalomanic plan to build a subway system similar to the one in . Martinák overlooked the construction of the new capital of the Slovak Socialist Republic after the federalization of Czechoslovakia. He actively supported business deals with foreign partners who often came from the neighbouring Vienna.

Czechoslovak institutions responsible for the development of business relations with Western Europe

Although the political power base of individuals was an important element to press suggestions for deals with foreign governments and business partners, the individuals were limited by the nominal power of the institutions which were responsible for the deals on the bureaucratic level. The decisive institutions in the normalization period can be divided into three stages which are synoptically shown in the following chart:

6 PAVLOVIČ, Richard, Jozef Lenárt a normalizácia na Slovensku, in: Jan Mervart, Veronika Středová a.o., České, slovenské a československé dějiny 20. Století IV, Ústí nad Orlicí 2009, pp. 204-205. 7 His activities as investment manager were highly appreciated by Peter Colotka. COLOTKA, Peter, Vo víre času, Bratislava 2015, pp. 227-228. Business level Republican level Federal level • state enterprise • Ministry of a respective industrial field • Federal Ministry of Technology and Innovation • concern of enterprises, trust (production • Ministry of Finance • Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade economic unit) • Presidium of the governement of the Czech • Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs • organizations of foreign trade Socialist Republic/Slovak Socialist Republc • State Bank of Czechoslovakia

secretaries of the CC of the Presidium of CC of the Communist Communist Party of Party of Czechoslovkia Czechoslovakia/Slovakia (informative)

Czchoslovak Academy of Science, Slovak Academic of Science, university deparmnets and research institutes with reports on suggested collabration, industrial efficiency, financial revenues

During the first two stages, academic institutions played a role in the decision making in the managements of the enterprises and secretaries of both communist parties on the republican level. Big trusts had mostly their own research institutes which were able to deliver the necessary qualitative analysis. The other option was a paid analysis in official research institutes of the Czechoslovak Academy of Science or the Slovak Academic Science, as well as departments of universities, such as the Czech Technical University in Prague, University of Chemistry and Technology in Prague, University of Economics in Prague, University of Economics in Bratislava a.o. In the third stage, the professional analysis was generally not questioned.

Republican ministries had relatively broad competences in approving the requests of enterprises for cooperation or trade agreements with West European partners. The decisions of industrial ministries needed to be overlooked by the Ministry of Finance which was in charge of budgetary questions for the republic. During this process, the responsible secretaries of the regional committees and eventually of the Central Committee of the CPS/CPC were informed about the development with the authorisation request. In the final stage, the federal ministries of foreign affairs, foreign trade, as well as technology and innovation approved the deals and orchestrated the negotiations of the organizations of foreign trade with foreign partners. Bigger projects or strategic partnerships with the need of high amounts of financial investment were further discussed on the level of the Presidium of the federal government in which the State Bank of Czechoslovakia could approve or postpone the project, depending on its foreign currency policies. It is important to understand that the bank was the only institution which was effectively in charge of foreign currencies and did not share its powers with ministries or planning committees like in some other socialist countries. In specific cases, the State Planning Commission was consulted individually.

At this final stage, the highest level of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was informed about the process with a short note. The archival documents show that in most cases, the Presidium did not discuss these notes, unless it had political connotations or an economic impact on a national level (such as automobile industry). In these cases, the projects were often explained and defended by those members of Presidium who were dealing with the issue on of the lower levels.

Ideological aftermath of 1968 in economic planning and foreign trade

The ideological effects of the Soviet invasion in 1968 are not very clear if we try to take statistical data regarding the total amount of traded goods into account. On the other hand, they can be recognizable especially on the microeconomic level. The Czechoslovak export of workforce and construction can serve more than well: In 1967, several squadrons of TATRA trucks, drivers and workers were sent from Czechoslovakia to West Berlin to work on new pavements. The arrangement was good for both sides, the West Berlin administration got a cheap and easily movable (instead of West German companies and workers) workforce and the Czechoslovak companies desirable payments in free exchangeable currencies. The starting normalization in autumn 1968 meant an end to this kind of deals. Although economically perspective, the deals with West Berlin were seen as ideologically inacceptable and were gradually shut down. Another case seems to have had even more evident economic effects; in 1968, Slovak communists had ambitious plans to combine Czechoslovak industrial efforts with a foreign investor to build a new automobile factory in Slovakia. As known, the conservative approach in later years changed this plan.8

Without any doubt, the retreat from major reforms meant changes for rules in foreign trade itself. Within the frame of the reforms, state enterprises were supposed to become more independent in their attempts to get business partners abroad. This was halted by the National Economic Committee during its work on the so called Improvement of the planning system. The officials of the State Bank expressed the need to “support a healthy enterprise patriotism, tradition of the enterprise name and Czechoslovak production brand, a feeling of loyalty to the

8 Slovenský národný archív (SNA), f. Predsedníctvo ÚV KSS, škatuľa 1217. company...”9 All enterprises were obliged to exercise foreign trade only via the organizations of foreign trade again. This made the communication between the foreign client and Czechoslovak producer more difficult; it prolonged negotiations and led to a smaller competitiveness of Czechoslovak enterprises on the West European market. This policy partially changed only in 1980 when state enterprises were allowed to execute foreign trade transactions up to 10 million Czechoslovak crowns (app. 1 million West German Mark) without the necessity to notify the organizations of foreign trade.10 The change in thinking was caused by the worsening terms-of-trade and competitive actions of other members of the COMECON on the West European market. The State Bank criticized it and noted a gradually deteriorating privileged export position of the ČSSR within the COMECON. By the end of the 1970s, the Czechoslovak participation on the world trade per capita put it on the 18th position, while Bulgaria had number 15 and East Germany number 16.11

Czechoslovakia and the EEC in the 1970s

At this point, the paper will concentrate on the issue of the European Economic Community which heavily affected the foreign trade possibilities of Czechoslovakia. What was the opinion of Czechoslovak diplomats about the future of the West European integration? In the end of the 1960s, Czechoslovak diplomacy followed the line of the COMECON executive committee declaration from 1962 not to establish official contacts to the institutions of the common market, although each country interpreted this declaration in a different way.12 Although Czechoslovakia was prepared to take the initiative and support a common COMECON policy toward the EEC if the other organization members agreed to such a step, it continued to exercise its economic policies on a bilateral level with individual West European countries.13 In the meantime, Czechoslovak international relations and foreign trade specialists followed the West European integration with great interest. This was the case on

9 Návrh tezí k výkladu únorového zasedání ÚV KSČ, in: Archiv ČNB, f. SBČS, krabice KSČ 1971-1972. 10 PRŮCHA, Václav a .o., Hospodářské a sociální dějiny Československa,II. díl, Brno 2009, p. 855. I tis interesting that ganges i the Czechoslovak planning economy after 1968 were never indicated with the word „reform“,the most advanced changes were always hidden behind the term „improvement of the planning process“, „Package of measures“ or „alternate planning“. See See Stání plánovací komise, Zpráva k návrhu státního plánu hospodářského a sociálního rozvoje ČSSR na rok 1982, in: Archiv České národní banky (AČNB), SBČS, kr. KGMF, KSČ, Koncepce banky 1981. 11 Státní plánovací komise, Hlavní úkoly 7. Pětiletého plánu, a jejich zabezpečení in: AČNB, SBČS, kr. Investice, KGMF, KSČ – Národohospodářská komise ÚV KSČ, Kovy drahé 1982. 12 Príprava koncepcie aktívnej čs. zahraničnej politiky voči EHS – výsledky konzultácií so socialistickými krajinami, approximate datation end of November 1967, in: Archiv Ministerstva zahraničních věcí (AMZV), f. OMEO 1966-1970, kr. 18. 13 Príprava koncepcie aktívnej čs. zahraničnej politiky voči EHS – výsledky konzultácií so socialistickými krajinami, approximate datation end of November 1967, AMZV, f. OMEO 1966-1970, kr. 18. the political, as well as on the academic level. In May 1967, the University of Economics in Prague organized an international colloquium “Actual situation and perspectives for the EEC development” which was attended by two EEC officials, the director of the cabinet of the Vice President of the Commission Sicco Mansholt and a functionary of the Eurostat.14

With the acceleration of East-West trade relations in the second half of the 1960s, Czechoslovak politicians feared the implementation of the common tariff policy of the EEC. But not all Czechoslovak export specialists considered the EEC common tariff policy to be a problem. The enterprise of foreign trade Strojimport considered tariffs to be only a marginal element of the final price of machinery products for the customers in EEC countries. The real problem was the competition with other COMECON countries to access the Western markets and the slow efficiency in the relations between foreign trade organizations and production factories regarding a fitting offer for Western costumers.15 The common tariffs did not scare the exporters of natural resources, especially of coal, either. The general knowledge was that the EEC countries needed East European natural resources and would not implement high tariffs on them anyway.16 A more considerable issue were the tariffs for glass, textile or steel production in which Czechoslovak products would be less competitive against West German or Italian goods.17

On 13-16 August 1968, during a group meeting of COMECON specialists on capitalist countries in Moscow, the delegations from Czechoslovakia and Hungary thought it was necessary to create at least some sort of relations with the Commission but this idea was completely denied by the other delegates.18 This was one of several indicators of independent approach of Czechoslovakia in international affairs which was severely disabled in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion. In fact, during the 1970s, Czechoslovak diplomacy kept an exaggerated obedience to the Soviets even then when Kremlin considered Czechoslovakia to be a loyal vassal again. The servility of the Czechoslovak diplomats went so far that when the Czechoslovak delegation suggested putting into the joint declaration of the 1976 Warsaw Pact political council meeting that the peace efforts in the détente were the explicit contribution of

14 Kolokvium o vývoji a perspektivách EHS, 26. mája 1967, in: AMZV, f. OMEO 1966-1970, kr. 18. 15 Informace k material o důsledcích Západoevropské integrace, 15. listopadu 1967, in: AMZV, f. OMEO 1966- 1970, kr. 18. 16 Informace k material o důsledcích Západoevropské integrace, 15. listopadu 1967, in: AMZV, f. OMEO 1966- 1970, kr. 18. 17 Informace k material o důsledcích Západoevropské integrace, 15. listopadu 1967, in: AMZV, f. OMEO 1966- 1970, kr. 18. 18 Zpráva o služební cestě do Moskvy uskutečněné ve dnech 12.-17. srpna 1968, 19. Srpna 1968, in: AMZV, f. OMEO 1966-1970, kr. 18. the CPSU and of Leonid Brezhnev personally, the Soviet delegate Nikolai Rodionov smashed it as improper.19

The EEC in the reports of Czechoslovak diplomats in

The Czechoslovak chargé d’affaires in Brussels František Rajman wrote in his report to Prague in 1970 that political union of the EEC would be a very difficult plan with accepting new members who have not reached the high degree of economic integration already developed by the older members of the Community.20 But although the future integration of the Community was observed sceptically, Czechoslovak officials gradually took the organization more and more seriously which is proven by the growing number of reports regarding the EEC in the archival documents of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This claim can be supported by the fact that a relatively highly situated party official Vladimír Koucký became the ambassador of Czechoslovakia to for quite a long period of 1970-1978. The gradually growing importance of EEC issues led Koucký in 1975 even to the decision to require a further employee for the embassy in Brussels who would be responsible only for the matters of the Community.21

During his years in service, Koucký created good relations with officials from the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. One of them was the Director of the Political Section of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Andre Forthomme. In his meetings with Koucký, he was quite open about his opinions regarding relations with East European regimes. In a meeting on 20 November 1970, he mentioned the confusion of European politicians about the interest to enhance the economic trade and other relations among European countries which had been expressed by the socialist regimes at the reunion of the European Economic Committee earlier that month. He made clear to Koucký that if the only interest of the socialist countries was to discuss the doubts or sense of the Common market, the Belgians would not have any interest in such discussions at all. They were fully satisfied with EEC in its recent form and its further evolution.22 Koucký generally answered that the latest development in the EEC created a

19 BÍLÝ, Matěj, ČSSR a krach détente. Nástin československé politiky v rámci Varšavské politiky v druhé polovině 70. let, in: Tomáš Hradecký, Pavel Horák, Pavel Boštík, Slovenské a československé dějiny 20. Století IX, Ústí nad Orlicí 2014, p. 418. 20 Davignonův výbor. Politická zpráva č. 15, in: AMZV, f. TO Belgie 1970-1974, kr. 1. 21 Předběžné hodnocení práce ZÚ Brusel v roce 1975, 29. října 1975, in: AMZV, f. TO-T Belgie 1975-1979, kr. 1. 22 Záznam o návštěvě velvyslance s. Kouckého u pana Forthomma na belgickém MZV dne 20. 11. 1970, in: AMZV, f. TO Belgie 1970-1974, kr. 1. problem for economic relations with other European countries which would need to be discussed and solved, eventually at the European security and cooperation conference.

Koucký was also regularly meeting Étienne Davignon who was the Director General of the Belgian Minsitry of Foreing Affairs in the early 1970s. Over a lunch on 3 May 1972, they had an animated discussion about the relations of the EEC towards the socialist countries. Davignon stated that it did not have any sense for the EEC to insist on its recognition by East European countries because it would mean that the organization was depending on it or would be inferior without it. It was furthermore important that the socialist regimes would stop with the public notions about the EEC being only a NATO agency. Koucký on the other hand argued that it was the EEC and the ultimatums of the “Europe” agency towards socialist countries regarding the EEC common foreign policy which were not helping to improve the climate in mutual relations.23 He claimed that the West Europeans underestimated the importance of the COMECON and were too much overconfident with the improvements within the EEC. Davignon responded, ironically, as it seems from the record of the conversation, that he was not aware of the fact that COMECON already behaved as a speaker of its members and acted on their behalf. If it would become the fact, it would be most interesting.24

The Czechoslovak embassy in Brussels maintained relatively intensive relations with EEC insiders like the long time socialist member of the Lucien Radoux which Ambassador Koucký used to get some information about the future trade policies of the EEC members toward the socialist countries after 1 January 1975, as the COMECON countries were not able to get any official information about it. Radoux responded that he was not aware about details but he was wondering why Czechoslovak authorities, in contrary to other socialist governments, did not have at least technical contacts with the EEC officials. Radoux named Romanians and Poles as good examples – thanks to unofficial technical contacts, there would be certainly some sort of a deal possible. Koucký, as he wrote in his own report, reacted in a very cold way.25 But even a highly situated West German diplomat who helped to negotiate the establishment of official diplomatic relations between Bonn and Prague, Jürgen von Alten, suggested that Czechoslovakia should have these contacts. He used the example of

23 Oběd soudruha Kocukého s generálním ředitelem MZV vikomtem Davignonem. Záznam z rozhovoru č. 18, 4. května 1972, in: AMZV, f. TO Belgie 1970-1974, kr. 1. 24 Oběd soudruha Kocukého s generálním ředitelem MZV vikomtem Davignonem. Záznam z rozhovoru č. 18, 4. května 1972, in: AMZV, f. TO Belgie 1970-1974, kr. 1. 25 Oběd s. velvyslance Kouckého s poslancem PSB L. Radouxem. Záznam z rozhovoru č. 37, 6. prosince 1972, in: AMZV, f. TO Belgie 1970-1974, kr. 1. the USSR embassy council Gnevashev and his meetings with the FRG ambassador to EEC. Von Alten even offered his assistance with creating such contacts.26

One of the important new contacts for the Czechoslovak diplomats was the deputy of the general director of the EC department for external relations Wolfgang Ernst. He was used to deal with the East Europeans and told Ambassador Koucký during their first accidental meeting at the Japanese Embassy in September 1972 that he was happy to finally meet a Czechoslovak official in Brussels. He stated that “the ČSSR in one of the few socialist countries not maintaining regular technical relations with the EEC Commission. Just in the last week, several diplomats from socialist countries visited our department; I can remember an official from the Polish and Romanian embassies”.27 He proposed to establish casual relations and talks. He mentioned that the problems of official relations of the EEC towards the East European countries have not been dealt with at the highest level yet, as more actual problems of socialist countries had to be solved, especially the imports of agricultural goods to the EEC market.28 The proposal of Ernst led to an informal lunch meeting in May 1974 with the first secretary of the Czechoslovak embassy Jan Stehno which seemed to have almost a conspiratorial character. Ernst commenced the meeting with the statement that in the times of détente, it was important to maintain personal contacts and exchange of ideas to solve individual questions of the whole process. He expressed his surprise that recently, all socialist countries maintained contacts with the EC except of Czechoslovakia and Albania. The way how Ernst lured Czechoslovaks into the creation of some relations with the EC reminds one of a secret police practice, „The mentioned meetings do not bind the participants to anything and are not understood in any way by the Commission as the recognition of the EC.“29 But his initiative brought a success – the unofficial reunions with EEC officials started to be a regular part of the work at the embassy in Brussels. After a meeting with the head of the EC department for socialist countries Friedrich Klein in March 1974, the charge d’affaires Choma

26Setkání s rady ZÚ NSR v Bruselu. Záznam z rozhovoru č. 23, 28. února 1974, in: AMZV, f. TO Belgie 1970- 1974, kr. 1. 27 Záznam o seznámení se zástupcem generálního ředitele odboru mezinárodních vztahů Komise EHS prof. Wolfgangem Ernestem dne 29.3.1973. Záznam z rozhovoru č. 15, 30. března 1973, in: AMZV, f. TO Belgie 1970-1974, kr. 1. 28 Záznam o seznámení se zástupcem generálního ředitele odboru mezinárodních vztahů Komise EHS prof. Wolfgangem Ernestem dne 29.3.1973. Záznam z rozhovoru č. 15, 30. března 1973, in: AMZV, f. TO Belgie 1970-1974, kr. 1; EUI Interviews Colections, Interview with Wolfgang Ernst, p. 20, Historical Archive sof the European Union /online, last visit 30 October 2017/, archives.eui.eu/en/files/transcript/15182.pdf. Further about the EEC protection against cheap agricultural imports from socialist countries see KANSIKAS, Suvi, Acknowliding economic realities. The CMEA policy change vis-à-vis the European Community, 1970-1973, Euroepan Review of History 21, 2014, nu. 2, p. 314. 29 Setkání s vedoucími pracovníky ředitelství pro mezinárodní záležitosti Komise EHS. Záznam rozhovoru č. 31, 18. května 1973, in: AMZV, f. TO Belgie 1970-1974, kr. 1. wrote in his report to Prague, “Our meetings with Mr. Klein show so far, as well as the experience of our friends in Brussels, that the European Commission does not avoid the contacts with embassies of socialist countries. Since approximately the last two years, these relations have become fully ordinary, while considered by both sides being of a strictly technical nature”.30 But the relatively regular and long meetings woke some suspicions in Prague. Both the Party secretary for international relations Antonín Vavruš, as well as the Presidium of the federal government, expressed worries that the diplomats in Brussels went too far – their interest could make the impression that ČSSR was gradually tending into recognizing the EEC and the Commission. For future communication, they were asked to be more cautious.31

ČSSR-EEC relations and foreign trade

The first meeting of a COMECON official with an EC representative, the well known encounter of Nikolaj Faddeev with Ivan Nørgaad in August 1973, did not mean a fundamental milestone on any sides of the Iron Curtain. As an official of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said to Ambassador Koucký, „Faddeev did not really say anything during his sounding visit in Copenhagen“. It is interesting that Koucký did not disagree but argued that Feddaev said enough to send the ball to the other side of the court. Eventually, both agreed that the main problem of the possible establishment of official relations were the extreme opinions about the EEC and COMECON: some thought that both organisations were basically the same and could agree on anything, while others argued that they were completely different and no agreement could be ever arranged between them.32

But more than the establishment of official relations in this period, Czechoslovak diplomats were eager to find out what would be the approach of the EEC countries toward a further liberalization of trade regarding the import contingents from the socialist states after January 1 1975. After this date, EEC countries were expected not to negotiate bilateral agreements anymore. The embassy in Brussels was surprised by the answer which in a March 1974 meeting with John Maslen from the resort of the European commissioner for socialist

30 Setkání s pracovníky Komise EHS. Záznam č. 30, 15. března 1974, in: AMZV, f. TO Belgie 1970-1974, kr. 1. 31 Informace pro soudruha ministra k dopisu ministra zahraničního obchodu s. ing. Barčáka z 18.4.1974, in: AMZV, f. TO Belgie 1970-1974, kr. 1. 32 Návštěva s. Kouckého u generálního ředitele politické správy belgického MZV vikomta Davignona. Záznam z rozhovoru č. 70, 13. září 1973, in: AMZV, f. TO Belgie 1970-1974, kr. 1. countries who said that “if there will be a situation without any agreements the mutual trade relations will generally develop in unchanged amount”.33

Another issue, of which Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries were afraid, was the introduction of common cooperation policy of the EEC towards third countries, which was discussed in the half of the 1970s. The cooperation agreements of Czechoslovakia with West European countries accelerated later than those of other COMECON members but became an important part of the deals with countries like West Germany or France. Czechoslovak diplomats in Brussels calmed down the government; their opinion was that the cooperation agreements with COMECON state enterprises were extremely lucrative for private enterprises of individual West European countries too, especially due to several big industry projects in the USSR and Poland, so there would be little interest to move forward to a common European policy in this matter, as it could hamper the already existing cooperation or those ones in negotiation.34

The increase of trade and especially the increase of exports to West European countries were not hampered only by the common tariff, common trade and threatening common cooperation policies of the EEC, but also because of independent and often competitive approaches among the members of the COMECON. Czechoslovak diplomats complained especially about Bulgaria, “The common interests of the COMECON countries are damaged by the concessions of individual members, such as Bulgaria which accepted, in our opinion not quite prudently, an automatic prolonging of the 1973 /contingent – PS/ protocol for the year 1974.”35 In later years, the Czechoslovak diplomats often criticized predominantly the Romanian colleagues; the mistrust against the Romanians seemed to be the strongest in 1979 when a mixed commission of EEC and Romania was considered to be created.36

The problem of contingents remained a great issue in following years as well. Czechoslovak diplomats complained about Belgian and Dutch little import contingents for the years 1975 and 1976 which were the result of decisions of the Commission and were not in accordance with the high volumes of imports to Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries. The Commission officials blamed the continuing economic crisis in the EEC member states for the

33 Setkání s pracovníky Komise EHS. Záznam č. 30, 15. března 1974, in: AMZV, f. TO Belgie 1970-1974, kr. 1. 34 Záznam z pracovní porady „ekonomické skupiny“ OBO členských zemí RVHP dne 23. Října 1975 v Bruselu na OBO MLR, in: AMZV, f. TO-T Belgie 1975-1979, kr. 1. 35 Náměty ke konzultacím mezi naším a belgickým MZV 7.-8.5. 1974, 27. Dubna 1973, in: AMZV, f. TO Belgie 1970-1974, kr. 1. 36 Záznam z porady diplomatických pracovníků konané na ZÚ Brusel 12.2.1979, in: AMZV, f. TO-T Belgie 1975-1979, kr. 2. small contingents.37 Czechoslovak diplomats warned that their country has other potential partners for fair trade conditions, such as Japan.38 The caution of COMECON countries grew also regarding the EEC limits for the imports of metallurgic products which were important for the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia or East Germany. East Germans eventually reported the first denial to offload a ship with 2.000 tons of metallurgic materials on the border of Belgium in January 1978.39 The situation escalated also for Czechoslovakia and in September the Commission exercised an unusually strong pressure on Prague on the issue of metallurgic, but also textile and glass products. The Czechoslovak officials tried to emphasize the fact that Czechoslovakia was a founding member of GATT and as such should be automatically accommodated with the most favoured nation clause.40 The Czechoslovak request to consider higher contingents for the imports of these products to EEC countries was not only completely denied, but antidumping proceedings were applied for the imports of Czechoslovak light bulbs and Czechoslovak companies were criticized for the lack of respect regarding the prices of metallurgic goods. A big shock for the exporters was the refusal of certificates for Czech hops, a traditional and mostly high quality export article of Czechoslovakia.41 It was one of the few exclusive agricultural products of Czechoslovakia which would be exported to West European countries. At the same time, the overall small importance of agricultural exports seemed to be the cause of little interest of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade to commence specific talks regarding agricultural exports in 1979, unlike all other socialist countries except the Soviet Union.42 Czechoslovakia, on other hand, negotiated individually the problems of metallurgic exports and used the GATT platform in April 1978 to sign an auto-limiting sector agreement regarding the trade with metallurgic goods with the EEC. This agreement was the very first official document signed between the

ČSSR and the EEC which brought the issue of official recognizing closer. But although another sectoral agreement regarding the textile exports to the EEC market was signed in 1982, the official diplomatic relations were established only in September 1988.

37 Setkání s p. Friedrichem Kleinem, ředitelem odboru 3. Zemí /ZSS/ Komise EHS 11. prosince 1975. Záznam z rozhovoru č. 175, 18. prosince 1975, in: AMZV, f. TO-T Belgie 1975-1979, kr. 1. 38 Setkání s p. Friedrichem Kleinem, ředitelem odboru 3. Zemí /ZSS/ Komise EHS 11. prosince 1975. Záznam z rozhovoru č. 175, 18. prosince 1975, in: AMZV, f. TO-T Belgie 1975-1979, kr. 1. 39 Zápis z jednání obchodních radů RVHP, 7. února 1978, in: AMZV, f. TO-T Belgie 1975-1979, kr. 1. 40 In the archival douments regarding negotiations with West European partners, this argument appears repatidly. See for example Záznam z pracovní porady „ekonomické skupiny“ OBO členských zemí RVHP dne 23. Října 1975 v Bruselu na OBO MLR, in: AMZV, f. TO-T Belgie 1975-1979, kr. 1. 41 Záznam z porady diplomatických pracovníků konané na ZÚ Brusel dne 18.9.1978, in: AMZV, f. TO-T Belgie 1975-1979, kr. 2. 42 Záznam z porady diplomatických pracovníků konané na ZÚ Brusel 15.10.1979, in: AMZV, f. TO-T Belgie 1975-1979, kr. 2. Conclusion

As shown in the paper, the development of elites in the 1970s was not a simple process, as the political purges after 1968 passed off in a much more moderate way in Slovakia. As a result, Slovak elites filled many vacant slots in state management and governments areas. The economic development of Czechoslovakia was also planned as a development of two nations in which Slovakia was meant to catch up with industry modernization but also with the construction of its capital Bratislava.

Archival documents prove that on the microeconomic level, the beginning of the normalization process stopped some perspective projects with West European partners. At the same time, the new elites tried to introduce cooperation and licence agreements with private enterprises from capitalist countries and to boost the Czechoslovak exports. The case study about the ČSSR-EEC relations show that this was becoming increasingly difficult, as the European Commission gradually controlled the EEC tariff and trade policy. Naming an experienced diplomat and relatively highly situated party official Václav Koucký an ambassador for Belgium for long eight years proves that Czechoslovakia took the EEC problem seriously. For Prague, the main problems in the relations with the Community were restrictions in the metallurgic, glass and textile industries. These problems led to the introduction of unofficial, so called technical contacts with EC officials and eventually, to the signature of sectoral agreements for Czechoslovak exports of metallurgic and textile goods to the EEC market. Although this did not mean an official recognition of the Community by the ČSSR, it was recognized de facto long before the official establishment of diplomatic relations in 1988.