Czechoslovakia and Western Europe in the Long 1970S

Czechoslovakia and Western Europe in the long 1970s Pavel Szobi (European University Institute) Introduction The aim of this paper is to define the positions of Czechoslovakia towards the cooperation, (more specifically in trade and business) with Western Europe on the example of the relations with the European Economic Community in the 1970s. To define the base of its approach towards foreign trade, cooperation agreements, licences or direct investments, the first part of the paper will define the institutions and elites responsible for the foreign policy in the period of the normalization process. The case study in the second part of the paper will deal with the Czechoslovak economic foreign interests in relation to the EEC. It is not my quest to offer an overall analysis of the ČSSR-EEC relations. At this point, it is rather meant to be a contribution to the recent state of knowledge, based on an extensive research in Czech and Slovak archival materials. Ideology of normalization and the national factor after 1968 Czech historian Jan Rychlík summed up quite aptly the general situation in Czechoslovakia after 1968, „The normalization elite theoretically still based its legitimacy on the grounds of the ‘Victorious February’ in 1948, but in reality it based its power on the effects of the Soviet occupation, and was therefore illegitimate in the public’s understanding. At the same time, the absolute majority of the population considered even in this period the basic socio-economic changes, which had commenced in Czechoslovakia after 1948, to be permanent. Almost nobody really doubted the centrally planned economy or the nationalization of the production means or even considered the possibility of their privatisation. We could state that the majority of people had objections against the system but they did not have any clear idea how Czechoslovakia should look like.”1 The problem was that not even the political elite had any real idea about the future of Czechoslovakia. The main ideology was based on the refusal of the reforms of 1968, nothing more. 1 RYCHLÍK, Jan, Normalizační podoba československé federace, in: MARUŠIAK, Juraj, KMEŤ, Normbert, Slovensko a režim normalizácie, Prešov 2003, p. 8. The ideology of both Czechoslovak nation from the interwar Czechoslovakia as well as the long-term Antonín Novotný´s strategy of “blending two nations into one” were dead. Nobody doubted the existence of two different nations within Czechoslovakia, despite the fact, that in the communist democratic centralism, the real functioning of federal and republican/national institutions came under the decisions of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and Communist Party of Slovakia. What was the hatch in it? As it was the case in the Soviet Union, the federalization of Czechoslovakia did not build two regular states with independent governments which would build a functional union due to mutual interests together. This can be seen on the example of the party organization. While the government positions were strictly divided between the two republics and it was clearly decided which competences can be executed by the republics and by the federal government, this division is less clear on the party level, which was in reality the decisive element of the communist dictatorship. In the sense of the mentioned democratic centralism, lower stages of the party were obliged to respect the opinions of its higher levels. In the USSR, the communist parties of Belarus, Ukraine or Kazakhstan were only local executive units of the mighty Communist Party of the Soviet Union. But Russia itself lacked any national party. It lacked it because it did not need it - the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was the actual Russian Party. This system was transplanted to Czechoslovakia. A national party of Slovakia was accepted as a national communist party, but was supposed to play only the role of a local executive body of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which, again, was de facto the Czech National Communist Party.2 But if historians finish the analysis there, they can be mistaken. The Slovak communists were the core element in the Slovak National Uprising in 1944 and their heroic activity in the fight against the Germans gave them a power boost which they partially preserved. This can be regarded as one of the reasons why the democratic centralism could be bypassed not only by the Slovak government officials who were heads of a formally independent republic within the federation, but even to the heads of the Communist Party of Slovakia. A possibly more independent manoeuvring space was also enabled by the fact that the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Gustáv Husák was Slovak and until April 1969 First Secretary of the Communist Party of Slovakia. Besides, he was the one who led the government committee for the federalization of Czechoslovakia in 1968.3 2 In the koncept of the Czechoslovak federation in 1968, the creation of Communist Party of Czech Lands and Moravia was anticipated, but this never happened. 3 His actions and motives in politics are subjects of intensive research both in Czech Republic and Slovakia. See Michálek, Slavomír, Londák, Miroslav, Gustáv Husák: moc politiky, politik moci, Bratislva 2013. Czech and Slovak elites in the foreign trade and Czechoslovak normalization The introduction of the normalization process, which was the term used to stabilize the political and security situation after the Warsaw Pact invasion in 1968, is connected to the issue of the exchange of party membership cards – a series of committee hearings on all levels of the organization hierarchy which led to the firing of 30 % of the party members.4 This is generally a known and relatively well analysed process. But it is important to see that the biggest penalties for the support of the 1968 reforms were executed in the Czech part of the federation. In Czech state institutions, as well as in academia and state enterprises, the free positions were often filled by the “second league” of less experienced, but loyal party members. Among good Czech professionals who were able to perform the continuation of the complex issues of foreign trade and international relations, were the Federal Prime Minister Lubomír Štrougal, Federal Minister of Finance Leopold Lér, Federal Minister of Technology and Innovation Ladislav Šupka, Federal Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Jaroslav Jakubec or the Chairman of the Czechoslovak State Bank Stanislav Potáč. In Slovakia, the normalization process and sacking of elites was much less harsh than in the Czech Lands. Although many highly situated politicians were fired and banned from the party, there are no cases of people who would be urged to have a manual job as was often the case in the Czech Socialist Republic. In academia, people were downgraded, but in many cases not completely fired, instead of that they were transferred to low profile research institutes. The soft approach against “weak elements” in the party, state institutions and enterprises led to the creation of a numerous Slovak elite which grew strongly not only in Slovakia but filled the vacant places from the purges in the Czech part of the federation.5 A specific role in the Slovak political elites was played by the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Slovakia Jozef Lenárt. Documents about his activities in the 1970s and 1980s on his post show that he had little interest in politics itself. He dealt overall with economic issues while trying to modernize the capital of Slovakia Bratislava with technological innovations, including those from the West. As Slovak historian Richard Pavlovič states, „he did deal with ideological issues as little as necessary (…) and was a 4 MAŇÁK, Jiří, Čistky v Komunistické straně Československa v letech 1969-1970, Praha 1997, p. 42. 5 RYCHLÍK, Jan, Normalizační podoba československé federace, in: MARUŠIAK, Juraj, KMEŤ, Normbert, Slovensko a režim normalizácie, Prešov 2003, p. 46. regular technocrat“.6 The same counts for the Prime Minister of Slovakia Peter Colotka, a professor of law and survivor of the normalization purge, as he was an ally of the Federal Prime Minister Lubomír Štrougal, who together with the approval of Gustáv Husák saved him from being sacked after Colotka actively supported the 1968 reforms. On the level of the federal government, another Slovak, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Bohuslav Chňoupek was often a direct negotiator with West European countries. The foreign trade and relations to supranational organizations like EEC or EFTA were co-orchestrated by the Federal Deputy Prime Minister Rudolf Rohlíček who came from West Slovakia. Negotiations with foreign business partners were often directly negotiated by a prototype of a modern educated state manager, Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade Andrej Barčák. Investment plans were managed on several industrial projects in Slovakia by Pavol Hrivnák who changed several republican and federal ministerial functions during the 1970s and 1980s.7 Another „opener“ towards the West was Ladislav Martinák, a long lasting mayor of Bratislava. The role of Bratislava as Slovak capital was obvious, starting with the construction of new Slovak government buildings, infrastructure like the monumental new bridge over the Danube river leading to the enormous new residential district of Petržalka, as well as cultural and sport facilities and hotels, concluding with the megalomanic plan to build a subway system similar to the one in Prague. Martinák overlooked the construction of the new capital of the Slovak Socialist Republic after the federalization of Czechoslovakia. He actively supported business deals with foreign partners who often came from the neighbouring Vienna. Czechoslovak institutions responsible for the development of business relations with Western Europe Although the political power base of individuals was an important element to press suggestions for deals with foreign governments and business partners, the individuals were limited by the nominal power of the institutions which were responsible for the deals on the bureaucratic level.

Load more