Strategic Communication Programme

FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? Perceptions and habits of youth in eight European countries 02 FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? 03

EDITORS content ⊲ Katarína Klingová Research Fellow GLOBSEC Policy Institute About 04 ⊲ Dominika Hajdu Junior Research Fellow Partners 05 GLOBSEC Policy Institute Introduction 07

GLOBSEC Policy Institute and the US State Key findings 08 Department assume no responsibility for facts or opinions expressed in this publication or their subsequent use. Sole responsibility lies with the Country reports – Western Balkans partners, responsible for collecting the data and delivering the reports to the editors who processed ⊲ Bosnia and Herzegovina 12 the submissions into this report. ⊲ Macedonia 16 Financially supported by the US State Department. ⊲ Montenegro 20 ⊲ Serbia © GLOBSEC 24

GLOBSEC Policy Institute Bratislava, Slovakia Country reports – Visegrad Four ⊲ Czechia 28 October 2018 ⊲ Hungary 32 ⊲ Poland 36 ⊲ Slovakia 40

Focus group participants 44

Usage of social media among participants 46 04 FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? 05

ABOUT PARTNERS

This publication was compiled as a part of the project “Countering disinformation in the V4 and the Balkan ALFA Centar region: Mapping needs, building capacity, and generating civic activism” that aims to: ALPHA Centre Montenegro 1. increase communication and outreach capacities of civil society organisations that focus on countering disinformation, supporting media literacy or increasing public awareness on crucial topics leading to a more active civil society; Asociace pro mezinárodní otázky 2. increase media literacy and/or awareness of disinformation among the youth in the region through Association for International Affairs empowerment of civil society organisations and active involvement of young people by entertaining Czechia and engaging online communication activities.

Therefore, it provides a unique combination of data and insights from the region that enables the reader to understand more deeply the dynamics of disinformation and civil society organisations scene in the region, Centar za politološka istraživanja Filozofskog fakulteta as well as the behaviour of young people on the internet, and social media specifically. Such a combination Bosnia and Herzegovina of data will facilitate both any future communication activities towards youth in the region, as well as more precise and targeted support of civil society organisations. Moreover, the publication emphasises the need for a diversified country-specific approach from the perspective of potential donors who should take into consideration different dynamics and complexities of the region. Euro-Atlantic Council of Macedonia Macedonia

METHODOLOGY Fondacija Centar za međunarodne I bezbednosne poslove The publication is a product of the research conducted by partner organisations in eight countries: International and Security Affairs Centre Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Serbia, and Slovakia. The results and findings of this report were gathered using several sources and research Serbia techniques. The sections covering the disinformation scene and existing countermeasures are based on data gathered by each country partner through a) desk research and b) interviews with at least three civil society organisations active in a relevant field from each country concerned. Fundacja Centrum Analiz Propagandy i Dezinformacji Center for Propaganda and Disinformation Analysis The qualitative data presented in “youth and internet” sections were gathered through focus group Poland discussions conducted with students between 18 and 24 years. In each country, partner organisations organised 4 focus groups of around 8 participants, approximately 2 hours long led by an expert moderator. The discussions were based on a consistent set of questions, the sociodemographic details can be found in the Annex of this report. GLOBSEC Slovakia Having in mind inconsistencies in definitions of “young people”, this publication uses “youth” when referring to the age group of 18-24. The quotes in the publication are direct statements of the focus group participants. ● Political Capital Institute Hungary

Research and analysis conducted by the partner organisations. Written and edited by: Dominika Hajdu and Katarína Klingová 06 FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? 07

INTRODUCTION

The boundaries between the “online” and “offline” world have blurred for great numbers of people who actively use the internet on a daily basis. This is especially the case for young people – being raised with cell-phones in their hands, social media platforms and technology have become an integral part of their daily lives. When hunting virtual Pokémons in parks and streets, having online Avatars or attempting to take selfies with sharks or at the top of skyscrapers, young people have been pushing the limits of possibilities and blurring the lines between reality and the online environment.

Having one account on social media is not enough, since each platform has its specific purpose. YouTube for music, entertainment or learning; Facebook for being in the loop on what events are happening around; Instagram for checking what a friend was doing during the day.

We live in the information world. Internet access equals the access to information – access to a multitude of sources and opinions, and to communities and people living all around the world. How does the constant flow of an unprecedented amount of information influence the young? Do younger generations have enough knowledge and the will to consume information? Do young people consume information, or are they being consumed by the data? Who is the master and who is the pawn?

Our research shows that young people realise that they are targets, and they are often tired of being constantly under information-attack. Thanks to many awareness-raising campaigns on disinformation and hoaxes, they also realise that all the information they see and consume must not necessarily be either true or accurate. And that contributes to their annoyance and disgust towards information sources in general. As a result, the distrust and scepticism of the young towards everything and everyone increases considerably.

This distrust is not only reflected in their online behaviour but also in key decisions that shape political and social development of countries. As in every era, great challenges lie ahead of us in terms of information consumption and intergenerational communication. This research seeks to shed some more light onto both. Having collected unique qualitative data from focus groups discussions in eight European countries, we try to contribute another piece of the puzzle to understand complexities in the lives and thinking of today’s youth and its impact upon the political and social realities of our societies. ● 08 FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? 09

that ignoring disinformation reduced their reach. While seeing how easily false news can be spread Disinformation KEY FINDINGS on social media, the participants declared not to narratives overlap perceive social media platforms as a trustful source of information. Therefore, some admitted to being Narratives supporting anti-immigration, anti- Awareness was mainly demonstrated by young purposely cutting the time they spend on these European Union, anti-NATO; anti-multiculturalism General distrust peoples’ claims to double- or even triple-check platforms to limit their exposure to such content. and Western “decadence” are commonly spread in in the media information before deciding whether something all 8 countries analysed. Disinformation narratives is true of false. Similarly, mindfulness of clickbait attempt to influence the geo-political orientation of Most of the young people in 8 countries analysed headlines and avoiding stories with sketchy titles Different levels these countries and to stir distrust of NATO and the seem not to trust the media. They also claim to was also mentioned. The spread of intentionally of media literacy: EU. Furthermore, disinformation narratives utilise be always double-checking information before misleading or biased information was not self-perception vs. reality social-economic, historical or ethnic divisions and they believe a particular story to be true. When automatically connected, in the minds of young vulnerabilities of societies. Therefore, in Poland, searching for information, the young prefer and people, to foreign subversive efforts by external A significant difference between the young anti-Ukrainian narratives are possible to observe: use predominantly online sources – websites, actors. On the contrary, disinformation and “fake participants from 8 countries was observed in in Serbia, nationalistic and narratives supporting news applications or social media platforms over news” were predominantly perceived solely in their media literacy and understanding of how Orthodox values and culture are dominant traditional media as TV, radio or newspapers. News terms of actors seeking economic profit. In many information can be manipulated. A negative outlier and influential; in Bosnia and Herzegovina, apps were a popular source of information for the countries though, the young are acquainted with among the countries were the young people disinformation narratives exploit on ethnic divisions young in a number of countries. information manipulation and propaganda from from Bosnia and Herzegovina, who thought and inherent distrust among the ethnic groups. political representatives. This was noted especially that videos or images give more credibility to Domestic media mostly in Hungary, Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and information than a text vulnerable to manipulative Herzegovina. interpretations. While the spread of disinformation The internet is perceived as biased and via textual content is indeed easily achievable, the youngsters’ best friend under political influence In addition, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ethnicity image modifications and video adjustments to plays an important role in the perception of spread false or manipulated information is similarly Young people in all countries admitted spending While a lack of trust in the media was a common whether particular media is perceived as objective common, with many examples to be found online. several hours per day online. Google as a search conviction for young people in all countries, and trust-worthy. It was also the only country where This notion was pointed out by young Serbs, who engine and Facebook, Facebook Messenger, it is possible to observe some differences in hate speech was raised as a common issue lacking declared that modified videos are the hardest to Instagram and YouTube as social media platforms the perceptions between domestic and foreign effective counter-measures. verify and clearly identify whether they portray serve both as an important source of information media. In general, the young were aware of political accurate information. and a space for social interaction to dominate the attempts to control domestic media and, thus, tended market of young minds in the countries analysed. to have more trust towards media with foreign “You can tell one story in very different ways. It matters where Activity and presence on these platforms are linked ownership, which, in their eyes, decreases the Friends and family to all aspects of their lives – their work, school, but you put the emphasis as it can possibility of being biased towards certain political as strong opinion-shapers also serve as a hobby. Accounts on several social parties or governments. The Czech Republic was alter your narrative.” media platforms were thus a natural means for the the only country in which the public broadcaster Friends and family members seem to play interviewed young to stay in touch with their peers, was perceived as very credible and independent. an important role in information verification. while the preferences of social media platforms The foreign media was seen sceptically only by Distrust in the system The respondents often claimed that if they did changed with age and type of content young young Poles who doubted their ability to report leads to passivity not know whether to trust a particular piece of people shared online. While social media were still accurately about domestic situation in their country. information, they relied on the opinions of their mentioned as an important source of information, Another finding is that young respondents lack friends/peers or family members. In all countries, the young generally claimed not to trust these interest in actively participating to make a difference Aware of disinformation information shared or commented on by friends platforms. in building up their societies. In some countries, was considered a respectable source for young but not fully we observed inherent distrust of media or politics. people. Often, they admitted they started paying Young people were most interested in content understanding its scope This distrust often leads the young to search for attention or attributing relevance to a piece of that is funny and connected to their interests. “alternative” news sources or explanations of news only after seeing that it had been shared The most common topics of interest mentioned are While the young in all countries were aware political situations offered by disinformation outlets. by their friends. In addition, the young people in lifestyle, entertainment, sports, music and art. Many, of information manipulation activities and the Serbia declared to follow comments and online however, also claimed to be using online sources to intentional spread of disinformation, not all of them The young respondents generally claimed not discussions to understand public perception. educate themselves and get practical tips. clearly and fully understand the scope of these to actively report disinformation on social media. activities’ impacts. What is more, Macedonian participants argued 10 FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? 11

participants in the discussions considered to that, the platform was often regarded as more young Serbs declared to have up to 3 Instagram Decline of Facebook Facebook to be obsolete and criticised it for being private where one can control what and whom to profiles with each having a different audience and rise of Messenger “over-advertised” in terms of having too many ads see relatively easily. purpose. Young Slovaks especially liked the short appearing on the wall as posts, as well as in the expiration time of Instagram Stories, which they Facebook has been among the most widespread videos. As a consequence, many young people in The perception of Instagram was, however, not often use to publish most intimate information social media platforms among the young since all countries characterized themselves as “passive” unified across the countries analysed. Czech and moments. its enormous boost in popularity in early 2010’s. actors on this social media platform, or are respondents were not favourable to it, because, However, the discussions showed a decline of considering to leave it completely. according to their perception, its options and usage among younger respondents due to several usability for multiple purposes were too limited. Fun and education factors. “I do not use Facebook because On the other hand, young Macedonians preferred with YouTube it has too many advertisements Instagram to Facebook due to its simplicity. Facebook was mostly named as one of the primary Young Hungarians thought of it as a more private While music and entertainment are predominant sources of information about events, organisations and things which do not interest me are constantly appearing.” and intimate social media platform. In Bosnia reasons why young people watch YouTube, this and current issues. For many, it is considered and Herzegovina and Macedonia, having an platform plays an important role in self-education in a necessity – the young use it as a tool for the Instagram account was perceived as a hobby. Some all countries analysed. ● exchange of information connected with their REFRESHING AND school or work, and use it as a platform for study PRIVATE INSTAGRAM groups. However, the young claimed either not When communicating to youth… to – or very rarely – share content on Facebook, although claiming they receive information from Instagram was generally the first choice among ⊲ Do not use clickbait-style titles their friends who post and share content. This is younger high school students. Many prefer ⊲ Get the “active” users on board; shared content by peers is more trusted than ads a paradox, since the young claimed to often rely Instagram to Facebook due to its simplicity and ⊲ Make use of trusted opinion-makers & authorities to spread the message on information shared by their active friends, yet clarity compared to the latter’s complicated ⊲ Be aware of local sensitivities and political developments that young people follow few admit to ever posting or sharing content. algorithms and commercialisation. Instagram was ⊲ On the other hand, do not over-politicise; the young often feel tired of omnipresent political This further confirms the importance of friends often considered refreshing and innovative, and content and value the private, hobby-like and intimate space on their social media and family in opinion-shaping and information praised for its less politicised nature reflected in ⊲ Make them feel included, make them feel like an important part of the society, or engage them consumption. the topics that young people actively follow and seek out. In all countries, Instagram’s top topics in solving a problem – younger generations often feel left out were mostly connected to lifestyle and everyday ⊲ Do not be patronising “We have usually one friend life of public personalities and friends. Related who regularly shares [information] on Facebook.”

Facebook Messenger was identified as the number one platform for the communication and exchange of information. Moreover, many participants stated they preferred to share news directly to friends through Messenger rather than posting things online on their walls. In fact, in some countries, Messenger was named as the most used social media platform.

Increased commercialisation of Facebook and the lack of transparency of its algorithms have significantly decreased the trust of the respondents towards this platform. Increasingly negative perceptions by young people towards Facebook were observed: being aware of “information bubbles” and the negative echo-chambers it can create, they are consciously – and increasingly – limiting their time spent on Facebook. Many 12 FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? 13

politically neutral nor independent and must COUNTRY REPORTS: WESTERN BALKANS ⊲ Older focus group participants – university provide support to political representatives if they students – expressed symptomatic want to be successful or survive. distrust towards media, especially BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA news websites. When asked about the last source used, the participants remembered the format (video or ⊲ Facebook was predominantly favoured an image) rather than the content of any specific by university students, while younger source of information. Format was considered COUNTRY SUMMARY participants were more inclined to be a very important element contributing to to Instagram. Youth in % Internet Internet penetration trustworthiness of the information. The respondents Population (16-24) penetration among youth ⊲ Having an Instagram account was prefer information being delivered in a form of 3,531,159 (2013)1 13% 61.5% 98.2% perceived rather as a hobby. a visual content, because, according to their perception, videos or images give more credibility to information than a text, which can provide manipulative interpretations. ⊲ Press Council Bosnia and Herzegovina, a self- Consumption of DISINFORMATION regulatory institution for print and online media, and trust in media LANDSCAPE attempts to stop the spread of false news, hate “Video gives credibility speech and propaganda in the public space. Respondents claimed to consume information to information.” There are number of internet portals spreading primarily from digital sources, including local news disinformation narratives and unverified information portals. in the country.2 A complex situation linked to YOUTH Social media consumption different nationalities and ethnicities increases the AND INTERNET “If the news portal is local, vulnerability of citizens to believe disinformation While young people in Bosnia and Herzegovina there is a smaller possibility stated they use various social media platforms, and hoaxes. All ethnic groups have their own for spreading disinformation.” media that they use as a source of information, with Facebook was dominant among older participants, each tending to use and build-upon certain biased MAIN FOCUS being perceived as more comprehensive. The use Television is still considered as relevant, however, narratives. GROUPS' FINDINGS of Facebook was connected to all aspects of it is watched predominantly for entertainment their lives – studying, personal connections and ⊲ Young people in Bosnia and Herzegovina purposes rather than for information. Although Spread of false or unverified information is quite following personal interests. While most of the (B&H) seem to have a low level of media the respondents claimed to watch TV programs a common phenomenon also among popular public participants would read news that their friends literacy and thus tend to be vulnerable to in similar languages from neighbouring countries, media, some of which are: BH diaspora, Avaz, CEC, commented on, or recommended, they themselves information manipulation and propaganda. they do not follow other international media. Flash, Radio Saravejo, RTRS, Slobodna Bosna, proclaimed to very rarely share or post content and FTV. ⊲ Hate speech was identified as on Facebook. College participants prefer using a serious and vastly unregulated Al Jazeera and N1 were mentioned several times Facebook’s social dimension of event promotion as trustworthy. However, ethnic divisions have an Among the most common topics covered by these issue in the country. or exchange of information related to their studies, impact on media consumption habits. Dominant however, younger participants considered it to be are: attempts to discredit political representatives ⊲ Participants thought that videos or photos news portals depended on the regions that the outdated and “out of fashion”. or political parties, narratives about security were more credible, because information participants came from: matters including paramilitary troops, terrorist cells provided in a text was more easily ⊲ For students from Sarajevo – Klix.ba On the other hand, Instagram was perceived as or planned attacks, narratives supporting ethnic manipulated. and Dnevni avaz, divisions, and conspiracy theories. much more innovative and refreshing, though, ⊲ The perception of trustworthiness and ⊲ For students form Banja Luka – Booka some students found Instagram as superficial. objectivity of particular media was specific ⊲ For students form Tuzla – Slon and Klix The participants mainly use the platform as a hobby Counter-disinfo activities to each ethnic group and also depended ⊲ For students from Mostar – 24sata and Večernji.ba and during their leisure time. It was also much more and initiatives on a level of hate speech a portal allows popular among female participants. to be published in the form of comments According to participants, news portals in B&H ⊲ The website Raskrinkavanje.ba gathers, under their articles. were completely biased in their selection of covered analyses and creates reports on the spread of stories and in the way they process and publish “Instagram is much more ⊲ Young people often considered local misinformation in the country. Its main goal is information. Online portals, according to them, innovative and adds something online portals as credible and relevant to stop the public spread of propaganda and have editorial policies based on sensationalism new every month.” sources of information. disinformation. without real investigation. Media were thus neither 14 FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? 15

Some participants admitted they had more than Perception of “fake news” one profile, particularly on Instagram. The reason is to have one “fake” profile to follow attractive men Most of the participants seemed to understand and women without revealing their real identity and the implications of spreading disinformation, without showing their friends whom they follow. attempts to influence public opinion, and economic Few participants also claimed to follow local political benefits and incentives of such actions. Besides representatives on Instagram, which would be very predominantly negative attitudes towards fake or unlikely on Facebook, mostly for similar reasons as unverified news, due to a low level of media literacy, above. YouTube was used both for entertainment they showed attributes making them vulnerable to and to acquire new practical skills. covert disinformation operations.

Influencers All the participants thought the best way to fight disinformation was to ignore them in order to reduce The discussions did not indicate any common their outreach and thus their capacity to influence influencers who participants of all focus groups people. However, some of the participants related would follow. In general, the respondents follow the fake news only to the political sphere – considering accounts of sportsmen, fashion bloggers, gamers them as a tool for discrediting political opponents or comedians. The inconsistency is primarily and reaching their goals. linked to the country’s structure and divisions – with each nation having a different language, they The passive stance of the participants towards also consume different media and follow different false information or propaganda was clearly channels and people. visible during the discussions. Despite claiming to encounter disinformation on a daily basis, they did Very popular among the young on YouTube were: not consider the issue important. ● ⊲ MECA Cazin ⊲ Luka KT ⊲ OMCO (Omer Nadarević) ⊲ Braco Gajić ⊲ CeriX ⊲ Maya Berović, a Bosnian singer ⊲ DirtBike Lunatic

RECOMMENDATIONS – COMMUNICATING WITH YOUTH ⊲ Take into consideration ethnic divides of the population and thus the inherent information bias and narratives that exist among these. ⊲ Lack of media literacy – while the young students thought that they were aware of problems concerning disinformation, their low level or a complete lack of media literacy made them vulnerable towards information manipulation. ⊲ Hate speech is an overarching problem and lacks regulations in B&H. Participants were sceptical of those news portals that enable and use hate speech in their comment sections to attract readers. 16 FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? 17

also observed that the content of the Macedonian COUNTRY REPORTS: WESTERN BALKANS YOUTH portals did not correspond to their age and AND INTERNET cognitive abilities.

MACEDONIA “The [mainstream Macedonian] MAIN FOCUS portals are designed for GROUPS' FINDINGS uneducated people who can COUNTRY SUMMARY ⊲ The most used social media platform easily be manipulated.” Youth in % Internet Internet penetration among the respondents is Instagram, Population (15-24) penetration among young people followed by YouTube and Messenger. Some respondents tend to trust foreign sources such as BBC and CNN over the domestic ones. 2.02 million (2002) 15.8% 73.6% 97.7% ⊲ The area of study usually determines They often believed that domestic media relies the topics of interest and the general Social media network share too much on sensationalism and iteration when usage of social media. producing news, which discredits these portals in Facebook (46%) ⊲ Twitter (10%) ⊲ Instagram (6%; 80% below 25)3 ⊲ A majority uses Instagram multiple times the eyes of the young. TV Channels Telma, 24 Vesti a day either for posting or watching and Alsat, and Macedonian portals libertas.mk and stories and exploring. fokus.mk were identified as the most trustful. from right-wing American sites. In a country where ⊲ YouTube was considered as a primary DISINFORMATION the average monthly salary is some 372 Euros, platform for education and self- Social media consumption LANDSCAPE it became a very attractive source of income for 5 improvement. these young people. According to a study in 2017, 95% of young people The lack of action and debates about the topic ⊲ Facebook remains one of the most aged 18-24 actively use social networks.7 Most of suggest a lack of interest and knowledge about Counter-disinfo activities popular platforms for obtaining news the respondents in focus groups confirmed this the complexity of the problem both among the and information and a primary platform finding while claiming to spend more than two policymakers and state institutions, together with and initiatives for exploring events. hours on social media a day. a reluctance of relevant stakeholders to cooperate. The concepts of fake news, disinformation and Currently, the media and online communities are ⊲ Respondents generally claimed not to As regards the purpose, the majority of the media falsehoods are thus relatively new and quite the only actors that play a crucial role in countering trust Macedonian sources while usually participants said they mostly used Instagram for unfamiliar for Macedonian citizens. disinformation in Macedonia. Except for a few consulting multiple sources before awareness-raising activities predominantly calling reaching a conclusion. entertainment, Messenger for communication, Facebook for group membership and obtaining A study focused on whether the media in the for fact-checking, no larger campaigns have been news and information (the latter primarily applies country provide objective information showed implemented so far. Those that were directed at to university students), and YouTube for education 50% of respondents claiming that the journalists the general public lacked constructive strategy to Consumption of and entertainment. The educational component express personal views and comments in the news. reach a wider audience despite being transmitted and trust in media of YouTube was praised by all participants. The same study showed 35% of the respondents through mass media. Also, there are neither cooperative efforts nor joint strategies among the For instance, the students from the Military stating that the media do not provide enough Focus groups respondents claimed to prefer media, official state institutions, NGO sector, and Academy uttered that they regularly use YouTube objective information, compared to 18% considering using internet and social media as sources of other relevant stakeholders. for training and education since their area of study the media to be objective and 47% with no opinion information rather than TV or printed magazines, 4 requires them to watch trainings relevant for their on the issue. which are used more for leisure-related activities One of the campaigns on countering disinforma- future profession. such as beauty and health or sports. Digital media tion is a project implemented by Metamorphosis Disinformation websites are present in Macedo- is seen as practical and functional due to quick and Foundation – Media Fact-Checking Service nian online space (for example javno.mk). However, easy access to a diversity of information. The most “YоuTubе does not allow many Component.6 Additionally, the Council of Media the country, in particularly its city Veles, had made visited websites among the participants were the false news because it has good Ethics of Macedonia operates a Complaints a significant contribution to the spread of disinfor- portals focused primarily on entertainment such algorithms with a capacity Commission established to deal with cases accused mation and hyper partisan stories during the US as femina.mk, crnobelo.com, kafepauza.mk, tocka. to suppress these news.” of publishing false and unverified information. presidential campaign in 2016. City of Veles became com.mk and kajgana.com. a hub and a place where over a hundred pro-Trump Almost all respondents agreed that various types websites were registered. Young Macedonians High school students were rarely interested in of content were able to attract their attention. were earning thousands of Euros for disseminating portals that they considered too political, irrelevant Nevertheless, most of the high school students sensationalist and fake stories, usually plagiarised and covering insignificant topics. The participants declared to use Facebook to receive information. 18 FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? 19

However, they said they rarely share any content Perception of “fake news” themselves. If they shared anything, it was usually RECOMMENDATIONS – COMMUNICATING WITH YOUTH limited to YouTube videos, music, sometimes The youth claimed to be aware of the existence ⊲ Use simple and understandable language to provide up-front and explicit messages. photos and pictures connected to charity. of disinformation and the repercussions of using social media platforms for spreading false news for ⊲ Always use local language (preferably also languages of ethnic groups to be equally targeted) “On Facebook, many pages propaganda. Political portals were often identified considering the cultural differences. as outlets prone to spreading false stories and began as relevant media and ⊲ Use social media extensively by embedding eye-catching promotional content, interesting disinformation simply because they are tilted continued as shock news.” enough to attract their attention – young inclined toward audio-visual content and visually towards or operating under the control of a political packed product. party. One such portal mentioned was Plus Info. Almost half of the participants articulated ⊲ Since Instagram was the most frequently used social media platform by the youth in Macedonia, preference for Instagram simply because the The participants expressed a number of concerns it should be a primary tool for communication with young people during a campaign. majority of their friends were using it. Instagram was and criticisms regarding the lack of objectivity and used both for posting (photos or videos), watching ⊲ Motivation is the most important principle – encouraging words, explanation of the benefits of professionalism in the media, making it susceptible stories, and exploring through the ‘explore’ tool. participation and fostering brainstorming and creativity could significantly reinforce a campaign. for spreading false news. Participants commented Its preference over Facebook was mostly linked to that the struggle against disinformation should ⊲ It can be also beneficial to rely ongames with fun content that will be easy and tempting to solve. its simplicity and visual attractiveness. Facebook include a larger campaign for fact-checking and This will show the youth they have the capabilities and encourage them to take further part was often regarded as boring and obsolete media literacy. The students also raised concerns in other activities. especially by the high school students. Many about the predominance of disinformation and participants criticised the advertisement policy on cited a lack of investigative journalism as one of Facebook underlining that such policy deters them the reasons. The oversaturation of digital content from spending more time on it. was also noted as a problem creating difficulties in recognising false stories. The click-bait era and Influencers the sensationalism in creating news content was similarly considered as one of the major issues that One of the most influential persons on Macedonian can boost fake news. social media, as confirmed by the study, is Ina Mnogufina. Her short tweets were considered as entertaining and realistic and perfectly reflecting “A filter is needed, not censorship" Macedonian reality. was one of the positions expressed by one respondent speaking about Others mentioned by the participants: the possible measures to prevent ⊲ Political figures – especially Nikola Dimitrov, disinformation going viral.” the current Minister of Foreign Affairs ⊲ Sportsmen – Kiril Lazarov, Dejan Pecakovski Another respondent stressed that the state or Novak Đoković apparatus must not be a filter of information mostly ⊲ Entertainers – Tamara Todevska, Lila Filipovska due to human inclination towards corruption. ⊲ Bloggers – Zorannah (Zorana Jovanović) He emphasised that government interference should be side-lined and instead, competition And favourite YouTubers: should be allowed to resolve the issue. ⊲ Philip deFranco ⊲ Paul Joseph Watson “It is difficult to find a neutral ⊲ Steven Crowder ⊲ Casey Neistat medium because one medium ⊲ Joe Rogan belongs to one political party and ⊲ Inanna Sarkis the other medium is controlled ⊲ Lele Pons by another political party and you need to find some balance of that information by yourself.” 20 FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? 21

by social media, which translates into the usage COUNTRY REPORTS: WESTERN BALKANS YOUTH of YouTube instead of TV to mostly watch music AND INTERNET videos and documentary channels, and Facebook and Instagram both for fun and consumption of MONTENEGRO information. MAIN FOCUS GROUPS' FINDINGS “We have all information COUNTRY SUMMARY ⊲ The most popular social media among on social media.” Population Youth in % (15-24) Internet penetration the interviewed were Facebook and Instagram. These served as the most The respondents identified the following 620 thousand (2011) 14% 70% (2016 est.) common source of information. outlets as the main sources of information: ⊲ vijesti.me ⊲ YouTube is used especially for movies ⊲ quora.com and music, small number of students ⊲ NE U NATO -anti-NATO group, mainly using the ⊲ marca.com regarded the platform as a potential DISINFORMATION narrative of NATO membership imposing a threat ⊲ Balkans.aljazeera.net source of information. LANDSCAPE of a terrorist attack on Montenegro, which, among ⊲ Snapchat other causes, will destroy tourism ⊲ Most of the interviewed declared ⊲ Facebook Due to the country’s historical ties to Serbia, pro- they do not watch TV, do not listen Serbian narratives arguing for closer ties, or, further, Portals with a significant bias: to radio stations and do not read When inquired specifically about credibility, unification, are widely spread in the country. Coming daily newspapers. the university students claimed to adhere to both from several Montenegrin as well as Serbia- ⊲ Vijesti.me – strong anti-government rhetoric; science and sources which provide “a lot of other ⊲ Books and papers are, as stated by based outlets consumed in the country (e.g. Fakti, supporting certain political parties in a pre-election sources, links and facts”, while the high school the participants, mostly read online too. Srbin.info or Vaseljenska.com), the media spreading period; against sending troops to Afghanistan; students’ answers demonstrated a lower degree of such messages are often used to promote anti- supporters of Montenegrin Orthodox Church ⊲ The respondents were not really awareness by identifying video materials as adding NATO and pro-Russian sentiments as well. interested in political topics and issues. credibility to sources. ⊲ Dan.co.me – daily newspaper defending the One of the most popular pro-Russian outlets is IN4S. position of Serbs in Montenegro and selling Social media consumption net, close to the party Democratic Front (right-wing a narrative of Montenegro united with Serbia Consumption of opposition alliance) established to, by the words and trust in media Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, Viber and of its founder Raicevic, protect the interests of the Counter-disinfo activities YouTube are being used the most often. The growth Serbs and respond to “aggressive US propaganda of messaging comes as an extra layer on top of social 8 and campaigns A generally high level of distrust towards the that is spreading through the Montenegrin media”. networking rather than a replacement. In other As its popularity has moved the outlet to the media, especially on the internet, was expressed by The success of civil society actors’ activities the respondents. The underlying drivers of mistrust words, the majority of students who claimed to be category of the mainstream media, the articles and using a messaging application for news also used messages tend to be taken over by smaller outlets. often depends on their nature, as the government in media among the youth were related to deep- possesses mechanisms and tools to limit the impact rooted political polarisation and strong belief in at least one social network for the same purpose. The same person also happens to be the head of NGOs spreading anti-NATO sentiments. of the opinions that it considers unsuitable. mainstream media bias. They claimed to recognise that many sources can be “fake”, which means As stated above, Facebook and Instagram are the ⊲ ALFA Centar – communication and awareness- they rather tend to incline towards their relatives most popular platforms used both for information Outlet Sedmica.me launched by a Montenegrin and amusement purposes – consuming and journalist, has gained popularity among the Serb raising activities on NATO membership, face-to- as a source of information. This, however, was face meetings and events in rural areas. quite paradoxical to findings in a different question, sharing news, sharing pictures and communicating community as well as among the supporters of with friends at the same time. Several high school the Democratic Front party because it features during which they confirmed that relatives and ⊲ ATA Montenegro concentrates on fighting friends indeed provide an important but not as students emphasised that “Facebook is not a news interviews with many Serbian and Russian public organization, and thus nothing originating from personas.9 disinformation and narratives linked to Russian trustful source of information. Respondents added influence in Montenegro, especially through they often used the internet to verify the opinions there should be considered as news.” They also statements, reports and high-level meetings and or information heard at home or at school. reported to rarely post content on Facebook and if Facebook pages spreading disinformation: they do, it is not mostly funny clips or sport videos. ⊲ VAKCINE – zašto im kažemo NE? – anti-vaccine events movement Nevertheless, the Montenegrin respondents preferred internet sources over traditional media. The latter has been, to a large extent, replaced 22 FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? 23

Influencers multiple sources to see the variety of opinions and thus prevent being fooled by mis- or dis-information When asked about trustful authorities, the majority was present among the participants, although it is of the answers replied “no one” or “people I know difficult to assess to what extent the young practice well”, which further confirms a deep-rooted what they preach. tendency to distrust the media. The respondents mainly identified three kinds of Nevertheless, the most followed are actors, “fake news” outlets: musicians, politicians and sportsmen, such as Novak Đoković, Rihanna, Brad Pitt, Jim Carrey, ⊲ Firstly, they referred to disinformation websites Beyoncé or Cristiano Ronaldo, whom they mostly developed to look similar to a widely known and follow on Instagram. recognised news site (common before the 2016 US election). These, according to the participants, On YouTube, several channels were are easy to spot and can be regarded as rather mentioned as watched regularly: funny attempts to mislead. ⊲ Lea Stanković (Serbia) ⊲ Cody Ko ⊲ Secondly, several high school students regarded ⊲ Liza Koshy tabloids as spreading false stories, mostly in ⊲ Lux27 (local) terms of publishing unverified or untrue content ⊲ Dolan Twins about their favourites. ⊲ Philip DeFranco ⊲ Desi Perkins ⊲ Thirdly, they also identified established US outlets, ⊲ Jenna Marbles namely CNN, New York Times or Washington Post as portals spreading false news. According to Perception of “fake news” several students, these supposedly often adjust the meaning of a message according to their Many students recognised that fake news could preferences by taking a real story and cutting it be dangerous, especially to the parts of society that into snippets to shape it within a particular frame. are easy to influence and do not evaluate sources critically. The respondents often expressed distrust Subsequently, the young emphasised that the towards the mainstream media due to their constant best way to deal with disinformation and outlets push of their own agenda not necessarily reflecting spreading false information is by exposing their the truth. The awareness of a need to check tactics and encouraging people to boycott. ●

RECOMMENDATIONS – COMMUNICATING WITH YOUTH ⊲ Make them feel included – engage them in solving a problem, make them feel as an important part of society – young people often feel left out. ⊲ Motivate them with a prize – it is quite difficult to get the youth’s attention without receiving something in return. ⊲ Define a target group – the interests of high school and university students differ. While high school students tend to be more interested in collective activity (solving a problem or quiz in a group), the university students get motivated by more elaborate and challenging competitions. ⊲ Develop ways to distinguish between credible and non-credible sources – the tendency to not trust any source is a dangerous gamble in the long term. Therefore, efforts should be made to increase the youth’s capacity to distinguish, acknowledge and use credible sources. 24 FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? 25

Most trustworthy media outlets, though the COUNTRY REPORTS: WESTERN BALKANS ⊲ In general, the respondents were more content would be still checked and compared with inclined to trust information they received other sources, were: via social networks from people whom ⊲ N1 (CNN affiliate for the Western Balkans) SERBIA they trust. ⊲ Danas ⊲ Politika ⊲ The most popular mainstream media on ⊲ Blic the internet picked out were the ones ⊲ Vecernje Novosti COUNTRY SUMMARY easily accessible via phone applications such as Blic, Danas, N1, B92 and tabloids Population Youth in % (15-24) Internet penetration When asked about the content, most of the such as Alo and Telegraf. 7,186,862 (2011)10 11.26%11 72.2% (2017)12 participants expressed disinterest towards ⊲ The most popular social media platform domestic or political news, due to a high level identified was Instagram. The participants of pro-government bias of domestic media and stated that YouTube usually attracts public broadcasters. Young Serbs claimed to be DISINFORMATION Counter-disinfo activities younger generations while Facebook highly aware of information manipulation activities. and campaigns became problematic because of its They were skeptical of content with sensational titles LANDSCAPE increasingly complicated functions, and claimed to often double- or even triple-check ⊲ Raskrinkavanje.rs portal, established by Krik, commercialization and the presence the information. However, they also admitted to be In Serbia, it is possible to observe two streams labels information and stories spread online of an older population. attentive to people’s reactions on social networks of how disinformation and propaganda are spread based on their truthfulness, or their proximity to and by following the discussions and comments to in the country – a pro-governmental and a pro- ⊲ Young Serbs were skeptical of content being completely false. understand the public perception better. Russian track. Government and people close to the using sensational titles as well as of highest political representatives control media and influencers using their popularity for ⊲ Novi Sad School of Journalism developed website Young Serbian respondents voiced their spread particular narratives and false information promotion of products. Fake News Tragac (fakenews.rs) – Fake news concern about the objectivity of RTS (usually about the opposition, civil society, the European ⊲ For everyday communication, the most trail, to educate students of journalism, journalists central informative broadcast – Dnevnik), which, Union, the United States, as well as Russia. popular platform identified was Messenger, and people in media sector, to raise awareness they claimed, as a public broadcaster should not The pro-Kremlin propaganda utilizes this media followed by WhatsApp and Viber. about the impact and threats of disinformation withhold information detrimental to, or dangerous environment for further promotion of its narratives. and to build up a community of individuals who ⊲ The youth as a group is not uniform; for, the political elite, but instead should inform the Consequently, the actions of those trying to counter would counter it. there were differences between rural citizens about mishaps of politicians. They tend disinformation in terms of visibility and outreach are and urban areas, as well as between to trust domestic outlets more than the ones with significantly limited and face significant obstacles. various academic backgrounds. foreign owners. However, they were also inclined YOUTH to receive and trust information from social media ⊲ Most popular pro-Kremlin disinformation web- shared by the people they trust. sites: Sputnik Srbija, Kremlin.rs, Vostok.rs, and AND INTERNET srb.news-front.info Consumption of “We will rather watch something ⊲ Disinformation outlets spreading nationalistic, and trust in media pro-Orthodox and pro-Kremlin narratives: vido­ MAIN FOCUS or look at a picture if it is shared vdan.org, Srbin.info, Srbija dana, Republika.rs, GROUPS' FINDINGS Young respondents tend to consume information by a friend than if it shows up Kurir, Telegraf primarily from digital, web-based sources easily in a form of commercial.” ⊲ Tabloids spreading disinformation interlinked ⊲ Serbian respondents predominantly accessible on their phones. Television, print media consume information from the Internet with printed media: Informer, Alo, Srpski Telegraf, and radio were perceived as biased and withholding Social media consumption Pravda, Srbija Danas, Pink.rs and rarely receive information from information detrimental to, or dangerous for, ⊲ Mainstream media Tanjug, Politika, and Radio- traditional mainstream media as TV, the political elite. A high distrust of media and In general, the respondents claimed to be active Television of Serbia transmit fake news coming Radio and newspapers. information online was expressed among the on the most widespread social media platforms from press and online portals and legitimize them. ⊲ The young claimed to be aware of the young Serbian participants who claimed to vet and – Instagram, Facebook, Messenger, YouTube or ⊲ Social media groups spreading disinformation: biased media landscape and expressed double-check information they consumed. The most Viber, with Instagram winning the popularity. What profiles of extremist groups such as Srbska cast, high levels of distrust in the information. detrimental factor to them was the accessibility of is more, the participants from Belgrade declared Ponosim se sto sam Srbin, Facebook pages of If interested in any news, they declared to news via phone apps, ownership of the media as to have up to 3 Instagram profiles – one general the abovementioned webpages. be double-checking it with other sources. well as whether information was shared by people for everyone, one closed for inner circle of friends whom they trusted. All students claimed to search (allowed to see more intimate content) and one for news on Google. business or artistic one. 26 FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? 27

Popularity of Facebook is, according to the find- On YouTube, the respondents admitted to regularly “Both the government the same issue, but, on the other hand, also check ings, on a decline since "parents’” generation follow gamers, experimental channels, extreme and the opposition have their the reactions of others – e.g. online comments or and older people have become more active here. sports, reviews or funny content: channels for sharing information. reactions of family members. Moreover, the piece Furthermore, extensive commercialization, its com- ⊲ Aca Informacija If they share the same information should not have a sensational title. plex algorithms and constant new features make ⊲ Hodoljub the participants feel less in control, in comparison ⊲ Dejan Tiago-Stanković in a same or similar way, Interestingly, all participants of focus groups to “simpler” Instagram. University students claimed ⊲ PewDiePie it is probably true.” admitted they had once believed information that to rarely, if ever, share something on Facebook, ⊲ Nixa Zizu had turned out to be false. They stated to mostly with most of them calling themselves “observers” ⊲ Mudja (Muđa) Students claimed to be rather skeptical of discover a lie by talking to other people or checking on the platform. ⊲ Zorannah (Zorana Jovanović) domestic media content. When determining it on the internet. The hardest content to contest ⊲ Marija Žeželj whether to believe a particular story or not, they, on and verify for students are usually edited video The participants admitted they watched YouTube ⊲ Vice one hand, check whether any other sources cover recordings in the news. ● on a daily basis, although the most popular domestic ⊲ Testosteeron Test Automobila YouTube channels of video bloggers focus on ⊲ Yasserstain elementary/high school students. YouTube is thus ⊲ Dinja (Sandra Silađev) primarily used to listen to music. RECOMMENDATIONS – COMMUNICATING WITH YOUTH Participants in Belgrade said that they followed ⊲ Focus of campaign on manipulation of domestic media with invented stories – due to “Only kids and young those who tend to question everyday trends. a complicated domestic situation and low awareness about Russian disinformation among the people below 18 years watch Conspiracy theories is what seems to attract their youth, we suggest not to focus on Russian disinformation activities. domestic YouTubers.” attention, and influential people on the Internet are very much talking about them. The Focus Group ⊲ Instagram should be the main campaign tool for the age group of 18-25 years. However, (FG) from Niš named Aca Informacija as one of the the campaign should be comprehensive and flexible enough to cover other social networks Influencers most influential (sport) bloggers in Serbia. Students as well. from the third FG also followed domestic YouTubers ⊲ Memes are the most shared element on social networks besides videos. Participants in Belgrade were generally skeptical like Nixa Zizu and Mudja. Usual platforms where the of the so-called influencers, who use their young respondents claimed to follow these public ⊲ While there are noticeable differences between youth in terms of educational background and popularity to promote products in way that does personas were Instagram and YouTube. geography, non-academic and rural youth will be the hardest demographic to reach since they not always reflect the true characteristics of the tend to be reluctant to engage in anything that can be regarded as “political”, and, moreover, product. However, more than half of the students have a larger tendency to believe in the pro-Russian anti-Western narratives. declared to believe Zoran Kesić, a well-known Perception of “fake news” ⊲ Utilization of gender stereotypes – the predominant online interest of men lies in “cars Serbian television host and comedian, who is one In general, Serbian students concluded that and women”, while a vast majority of females are interested in “fashion and beauty products”. of the main critics of the current regime. younger and older people tend to believe in fake Utilizing these differences might be a useful tool to attract the attention also among the more news more because they are not aware of the passive groups of youth. “Influencers and their marketing frequency of publication of false and deceiving is predictable and not amusing ⊲ No logos or affiliations – (our) logos will automatically signify pro-Western bias which will most information. For the participants, the production and likely have a negative connotation to the most susceptible segments of population. at all, even if they tend dissemination of misleading or false information to organize ‘giveaways’.” is what defines the domestic situation in Serbia, since supposedly all politicians spread particular All students mentioned following mainstream narratives and biased (dis)information favouring public personalities, sportsmen and musicians their cause. False information is frequently used in on numerous social media platforms, such as: Serbia to trigger feelings of disappointment, anger ⊲ Novak Đoković and resistance. Students noted that disinformation ⊲ Ana Ivanović could have serious consequences, as people ⊲ Zoran Kesić more and more do not believe in information ⊲ Ivan Ivanović they receive. ⊲ Jovan Memedović ⊲ Boris Malagurski ⊲ Mašan Lekić ⊲ Rambo Amadeus ⊲ Seka Aleksić 28 FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? 29

they expect clear identification of sources, clear COUNTRY REPORTS: VISEGRAD FOUR YOUTH recognition of an author, consistency and facts AND INTERNET without any subjective opinion. Czechia Czech TV and Czech News Agency were MAIN FOCUS perceived as the most credible and independent GROUPS' FINDINGS media outlets as these two are not privately owned. Public media in the country was considered as COUNTRY SUMMARY ⊲ Every respondent seemed to have created independent of political influence. The participants Population Youth in % (16-24) Internet penetration among youth his/her own criteria when “measuring” were aware of media ownership structures and the value of information received while 10 578 820 (2016)13 9.6% 97%14 assumed that “when the media is owned by students tend to trust information sources someone, it is normal, they write him in a better Social media network usage close to their own perception of reality. way or they just exclude mentioning him.” Facebook 77% ⊲ YouTube 65% ⊲ Facebook Messenger 47% ⊲ An author was stated as a crucial factor WhatsApp 24% ⊲ Instagram 16% ⊲ Twitter 11%15 in evaluating a source of information. Sources mentioned as the most trustworthy: Trust in and authority of an author was ⊲ Public Broadcaster – Czech TV, Czech TV 24, directly connected to the positive/ Czech Radio negative evaluation of a story by ⊲ Czech News Agency DISINFORMATION Counter-disinfo activities the respondents. ⊲ Idnes.cz and campaigns ⊲ Respekt LANDSCAPE ⊲ The young perceived public TV and radio ⊲ Hospodářské noviny (Economic Newspaper) ⊲ Zvolsi.info (Choose your info) – campaign of broadcasters as very credible. ⊲ Aktualne.cz Czechia has several dozens of websites with students from the Masaryk University promoting thousands of followers spreading disinformation, ⊲ The respondents admitted they could be information and media literacy with particular hoaxes and particular narratives. Disinformation persuaded to accept information which Social media consumption focus on social media (Facebook especially). outlets also have a quite significant impact on even goes against their personal beliefs, shaping the public debate in the country. They enjoy however, in such cases, an authority Young Czechs have accounts on numerous social ⊲ Weeks of media education’ annually organized popularity on social networks and their narratives (respected person) and sufficient number media platforms like Facebook, Instagram, Twitter by People in Need, aims at enhancing the media and disinformation are often adopted by certain of relevant arguments must be applied. and YouTube. Other social networks are rather literacy of young people in the Czech Republic politicians and high-level state representatives. ⊲ Young Czechs seem to be aware of neglected by the current young generation. and promoting of critical thinking. The most influential Czech disinformation outlet disinformation spread online, including Parlamentnilisty.cz has over 800 000 readers per on social media. Social media were not Facebook is the most important and the most ⊲ A Czech version of the Ukrainian web site month and is the 8th most influential ‘information’ perceived as trustworthy nor a good used social platform in the Czech Republic, despite StopFake.org, produced by the Association for web portal in the country. With few exceptions source of information. being perceived as biased and supporting the International Affairs (AMO). (e.g. Parlamentni listy, AC-24), the ownership creation of “social and information bubbles” by and funding of these disinformation portals are the respondents. According to them, Facebook ⊲ Research and activities of the Prague Security anonymous and impossible to find. Disinformation provided a good overview of interesting activities Studies Institute, namely České volby v éře narratives are often taken over and spread by Consumption of and events and helps them stay oriented in dezinformací project (“Czech elections in the era various far-right extremist groups/political parties. and trust in media one’s “social bubble”. However, they did not of disinformation”). consider the platform to be a relevant source ⊲ Most popular disinformation websites: Truth was understood by the participants as any for information, as it is increasingly based on ⊲ Kremlin Watch – weekly reports on disinformation parlamentnilisty.cz, aeronet.cz, AC24.cz, information that is strictly objective, generally algorithms they do not understand. As a result, trends and narratives spread in the Czech Republic protiproud.cz, prvnizpravy.cz, known and there are no sources informing about they claimed to regularly cross-check it with other produced by the think tank, European Values. novarepublika.cz, cz.sputniknews.com anything opposite. In general, students expected sources. Therefore, older participants stated they international sources, rather than domestic, to be were trying to limit their time spent on Facebook. ⊲ FakeHacks Ackee Hackaton ⊲ Disinformation/propaganda social media pages: more objective when reporting about the situation At the same time, students strongly believed that AC-24, Parlamentni listy, Sputnik Czech Republic, in the Czech Republic. the majority of people use Facebook as the only ⊲ Media platform Manipulatori.cz (Manipulators.cz) Protiproud, Czech Free Press, EuroZprávy.CZ, information source. Consequently, according to supporting independent, open thinking in order Friends of Russia in the Czech Republic, Students claimed to be looking for facts and their perception, the opinions of such people to open a critical debate about social and political and many more analysing information predominantly while studying can be easily influenced by a properly targeted events in the context of the Czech Republic. in school. From trustworthy sources of information, campaign. 30 FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? 31

“Not many people know this Influencers and consider it to be normal, RECOMMENDATIONS – COMMUNICATING WITH YOUTH Students seemed not to be easily influenced by but the content is created ⊲ Know your target audience – there will always be a difference between students from grammar anyone while having their own strong opinions. to keep you interested. school and in vocational trainings and university students, or between students in primary and However, provided with strong and solid argu- It does not correspond secondary education. The more the information fits in the behavioural patterns of the target group, ments, they claimed to be open to change. “Idols” with a normal state of things.” the higher acceptance can be expected. and strong opinion makers who the respondents trust are: ⊲ Identify credible icons – trusted opinion makers or public personas who could be the voice of According to the participants, a successful post ⊲ Martin Veselovský (DVTV) the campaign. must have three things – “shocking” (surprising, ⊲ Jindřich Šídlo (Seznam Zprávy) ⊲ C redibility of the message – credible article/information should not have an emotional background, extreme, relevant to the reader) titles, interesting ⊲ Petr Honzejk (Hospodářské noviny or subjective interpretation of facts. The information should be logically structured, in an ideal image/video and must be shared by people they – Economic Newspaper) case, it should encompass arguments in favour and against the topic so that the recipient can know and trust. However, the respondents also ⊲ Alexandr Mitrofanov (Novinky.cz/Právo) agreed that they are rather passive consumers who create his or her own view. rarely post anything online. With YouTube being popular among the young, ⊲ Do not forget to use all attributes of credibility – always add the name of author, do not use the most viewed Czech video on YouTube came pictures from archives, rather try to use pictures capturing the situation. When possible, try to Instagram was not as popular as Facebook among from Kovy (YouTuber Karel Kovář) with 7 815 500 include direct quotes and statements. the participants, who perceive it as a social platform views. Other popular YouTubers are: with limited potential. Instagram was seen as even ⊲ Proper communication channels – a campaign would have to go “through” the social media ⊲ Erik Meldik (professional YouTuber) filters and breach the “information bubble” the young are living in. more demanding in terms of time consumption and, with the outreach of 2,643,48216 therefore, requires much stricter filtering. For the ⊲ Jiří Král (professional YouTuber) same reason, students also claimed not to usually with the outreach of 1,737,110 follow the Instastories. ⊲ Zuzka Light (fitness YouTuber) with the outreach of 1,729,537 “You have to limit the activity on Instagram, otherwise Perception of “fake news” you can do nothing else than checking what is new.” While the participants of focus groups were aware of disinformation and fake news, the concept is still Twitter was perceived as a very credible source not fully and clearly understood. Some students of information by the young. Twitter in the Czech differentiated between “entertaining” and “harmful” Republic is a widely popular social media platform fake news, but the distinct identification of harmful among journalists who utilise it for breaking news. impact was not generally clear-cut. The participants compared Twitter to a kind of online Czech News Agency or Reuters. “When you have some “fake news”, for some group YouTube is a popular social platform for enter- of people it might be funny but tainment and educational purposes with video for some who do not have a sense bloggers and YouTubers enjoying a high level of of humour, it is dangerous.” popularity in the country. However, the respond- ents agreed that those did not really constitute the point of interest for the high school or university The respondents, however, believed that dis- students. YouTubers are, according to the partici- information and propaganda were a large-scale pants, mostly favoured by younger age groups of problem and recognised that some are purposely 10 – 16 years old. Nevertheless, one of the most created and disseminated in order to manipulate influential and respected Czech YouTubers is Kovy certain groups of people. ● who also attempts to educate and raise awareness on important societal issues to younger genera- tions. 32 FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? 33

Most commonly used sources named by the COUNTRY REPORTS: VISEGRAD FOUR YOUTH interviewees were either rather friendly towards or AND INTERNET critical of the government: ⊲ Index.hu (critical) HUNGARY ⊲ HVG (critical) MAIN FOCUS ⊲ Origo (close ties to the government) GROUPS' FINDINGS ⊲ 444.hu (critical) ⊲ some local papers COUNTRY SUMMARY ⊲ The respondents stated they primarily Youth in % Internet Internet penetration consume information from social media, Those watching TV also named the two biggest Population (16-24) penetration among youth but they do not trust these platforms. commercial channels: RTL Klub (critical) and TV2 9.8 million (2016) 10.1% (2017)17 88% 89% ⊲ Trust in peers as news sources was rather (close ties to the government). strong – especially younger participants Social media network usage tended to rely more on their peers. When asked about the content, most of the participants expressed disinterest towards political Facebook 81% ⊲ YouTube 71% ⊲ Facebook Messenger 58% ⊲ Young Hungarians said they have 18 news, due to the omnipresence of politics in their Instagram 20% ⊲ Google Plus 13% ⊲ Twitter 13% a general awareness of biases life. Still, many of them considered Facebook as in the media landscape. Most of their number one news source despite being the participants agreed there is no aware of its unwanted influence on their news objective journalism in Hungary and Counter-disinfo activities consumption habits. They appeared to be aware DISINFORMATION all outlets are biased to some extent. LANDSCAPE and initiatives of how social media is being manipulated through ⊲ The participants considered themselves algorithms and how Hungarian mainstream media ⊲ Fake news hunter by Átlátszó.hu, a crowdsourced to be “fake-proof”. Respondents believed The political environment, a centralised nature of is under the control of different political forces. independent media watchdog – the most that, unlike older generations, they can public institutions (especially education, which is relevant for youth, due to its youth-friendly format detect fake news and distinguish the truth also over-politicised) and a lack of media pluralism “Politics is everywhere, and approach. However, the initiative has not much better, as they are growing up in strongly contribute to the outreach and presence of I’m thinking of leaving managed to reach a big audience yet. the online information environment. government narratives spread by pro-governmental Facebook because institutions. Consequently, the actions of those ⊲ The respondents were aware of social ⊲ Urbalegends.hu – organic and independent de- of the news saturation.” trying to counter disinformation in terms of visibility media’s side-effects such as echo bunking page and outreach are significantly limited. chambers, fake news and filter bubbles. One of the main differences between the younger ⊲ Tényleg.hu (really.hu) – a debunking page focus- ⊲ The interviewees primarily used Facebook and older participants was that the younger tended ⊲ Most popular disinformation websites: ing on historical misconceptions, ran by an active and Messenger for chatting; Instagram to rely more on their peers as a news source. hidfo.ru, avilagtitkai.com, magyarkozosseg.net, history teacher was ranked as the second most used The high school students claimed to communicate vilagfigyelo.com, Orosz hírek. platform and it was considered as more via Facebook Messenger most of the time and ⊲ Ténytár.blog.hu – a blog debunking political mis- private and intimate. thus share the news there instead of on their ⊲ Pro-government websites spreading information with independent critiques of govern- Facebook wall. disinformation: 888.hu, pestisracok.hu, ment magyaridok.hu, Origo.hu, Echo TV, TV2. Consumption of “Previous generations wasted ⊲ Factcheck.hu – a governmental propaganda ⊲ Disinformation/propaganda social media groups: and trust in media their time in front of the TV. page “debunking” the critics of the government Kiállunk Oroszország mellett, MIKSZ, Facebook They ate and drank in front of it. (used primarily by governmental actors) pages of the abovementioned webpages The respondents claimed they consumed infor- Our generation does not watch mation primarily from digital sources. Television, TV but the older ones still ⊲ Work of Political Capital on Russian influence print media and radio were barely mentioned do it a lot. When they were – analytical materials, workshops for decision- or completely absent from their answers when younger TV was exposing makers, influencers and journalists, public evaluating potential sources of information. events, interviews for the media and trainings for them to a lot of rubbish as well The most detrimental factor to them was time; and they wasted their time too. journalists therefore, they prefer easy-to-understand news pieces that one can read within 5 minutes rather Just like we do in front of our than longer articles. computers and phones.” 34 FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? 35

The credibility of a news source was rated Instagram, the second most used social media, ⊲ Puszi, Erzsi! (Gergely Homonnay) – a cat, Erzsi, students were also able to name the best-known depending on who posted it on Facebook: they has lately become even more popular as one of communicates about everyday issues, news, disinformation outlets operating in Hungary and usually unfollow those who are posting too often. the telecommunication companies offers unlimited and political events in a critical way. argued that FB friends sharing news from these However, those who post less and share similar Instagram access, in certain cases. The respondents pages are considered completely unreliable. Very opinions on key political issues were considered considered it a more intimate and inspirational Accounts with the biggest outreach and impact: few of the participants in general (mostly older more credible. platform, however, high-school students criticised ones) associated fake news with political events. it for portraying a false, distorted picture of many ⊲ Tibi Atya’s Facebok page – a virtual-only influencer, Only one mentioned Russian disinformation and High school participants from Pécs differed the users’ lives that discourages them from using it. playing the role of an alcoholic priest constantly the US election in the context of fake news. most from the other three groups as many of them posting mostly non-political fun content, such as preferred tabloids and sport news over political YouTube was not considered very popular among memes or videos etc. The participants considered the fake competitions news. They also named “Kasza Tibi’s” Facebook the participants. They mostly use it for listening to the worst and most dangerous forms of fake news page as a source of information (one of the most music and watching video-blogs (vlogs). ⊲ Tibor Kasza’s Facebook page – a singer, TV ce- types. They believed that older generations are popular pages in Hungary run by a celebrity/ lebrity, “influencer” posting different types of much more likely to share fake content because influencer, Tibor Kasza). He regularly shares pro- Influencers content, being paid to share articles from one of of not growing up in this information environment, governmental narratives as he has an agreement pro-government propaganda outlets. contrary to the youngsters. A 17-year-old summa- with the government-friendly tabloid “Lokál”. While Overall, the focus group participants claimed rised this phenomenon as follows: the focus group with Budaörs high school students they did not trust anyone except their family, close ⊲ Mindenegyben blog – the biggest and probably was composed of students with middle-upper friends and a few news portals. Although they the oldest fake news blog, listing all kinds of trivial “I think it is much easier for us content; it is not entirely a political fake news class family background, this was not the case for considered their close friends the most trusted to decide on what is credible the Pécs focus group. sources of information, they are more critical of page, rather it focuses on more classical health and food related matters.19 and what is not, i.e. what can their Facebook friends. Overall, they admitted they we simply skip while scrolling, rather trust those they either know personally or Social media consumption while my father might struggle consider credible due to their past and opinions. Perception of “fake news” Many focus group participants noted the echo Most of the influential people they named come with this (…) We grew into this. (…) chamber effect as a negative repercussion of the from YouTube’s entertainment scene. In general, respondents were able to detect I think we have a special ability social media. In their news feed, they experience business-driven disinformation attempts but were to make distinction between true a lack of opposing views. They claimed to only Many vloggers were perceived as credible pub- unaware of politically motivated disinformation and or false information. All right, see information, which is in accordance with their lic personas because they achieved the popularity fake news. When asked about the reasons behind there might be a few things which political views and general interests. without any help and without serving any political spreading disinformation, many argued that profit- even we cannot recognise but in interests. This makes them credible messengers in making interests are driving these tendencies – that general I think we are good at this.” Youngsters said they primarily use Facebook and the eyes of the interviewed youth. The most trusted is why click-bait titles are so popular. The university Facebook Messenger. Although Facebook remains influencers: the most popular, participants claimed that they use Messenger for communication rather than scrolling ⊲ Csaba Magyarósi (YouTuber) – focuses on through Facebook’s news feed. phones, travelling, food and women. RECOMMENDATIONS – COMMUNICATING WITH YOUTH ⊲ C ommunicate through social media using credible messengers such as YouTubers – Although ⊲ TheVR – a duo vlogging about games, vloggers usually share fun content, most of them are feeding in political and social questions “It is a bit over-hyped technology, and everyday issues. that the youth is 0-24h and are considered as credible messengers as they are “average citizens” who became popular present on social media.” thanks to their own efforts. There are quite a few vloggers open to sensitive political content who ⊲ PamKutya – two brothers who became famous could potentially be approached as part of a cooperation. after making the Hungarian parody of Despacito. Many of the participants claimed they are on ⊲ C ontent should not include overly strong political narratives, as the young are tired of it. Facebook for only 10-15 minutes a day, as the ⊲ Gergely Szirmai (YouTuber HollywoodNewsAgen- It should be funny, engaging, and somehow related to their lives – Without touching upon experience has been destroyed by ads, especially cy) – focuses on movies and his own impressions. sensitive and contested political issues, it would be good to highlight that fake news can be used in videos. They remarked that they usually do not for manipulating voting behaviour and political decisions and that it is not only a tool to steal share content on Facebook unless they could help ⊲ Péter Dancsó – one of the first vloggers, uninformed users’ money through fake quiz games and gain advertising revenues through click- someone, e.g. with looking for accommodation. talks about and makes fun of movies. bait titles. Although many consider themselves resilient and well-informed about disinformation, Closed Facebook groups were considered a good it is unknown if they actually are. Another way of approaching the issue could be a scam based on platform, where they claimed they feel more ⊲ Róbert Puzsér – a contested drama-seeking the GLOBSEC campaign in Slovakia, which could prove they might not be as immune as they think. confident sharing political content and debating. personality regularly present in all types of media. 36 FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? 37

⊲ Center for European Policy Analysis – US think- Consumption of COUNTRY REPORTS: VISEGRAD FOUR tank with an office in Warsaw – its StratCom and trust in media programme monitors and exposes Russian disinformation activities, in particular countries of The internet is the most popular medium among Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland. POLAND young people in Poland. 99% of Polish citizens aged between 16-24 years are regular Internet 25 YOUTH users. The respondents believed that the internet COUNTRY SUMMARY sources were more trustworthy, although they AND INTERNET could not say why. The participants also expressed Population Youth in % (15-24) Internet penetration the opinion that information or news repeated by 31 million (2011) 13.6% 78.1%20 others, especially on a massive scale, generally MAIN FOCUS means that the information is true. Social media network usage GROUPS' FINDINGS Facebook 73% ⊲ YouTube 71% ⊲ Facebook Messenger 44% “If something is repeated by WhatsApp 19% ⊲ Twitter 17% ⊲ Google+ 13%21 ⊲ The internet was the most popular source of information for the respondents due everyone it means it is true.” to the flexibility and freedom it provides. YouTube, and the biggest and most The second most popular medium mentioned DISINFORMATION Counter-disinfo activities popular online media outlets such as during the discussions was radio, both in its and initiatives onet.pl, interia.pl and wp.pl, were listed traditional and online form. Students mostly listen LANDSCAPE as the most trustful sources. to commercial and entertainment stations such as: There are several NGOs, journalists, online ⊲ RMF Maxxx Due to a lack of experts on disinformation issues in ⊲ Although Polish respondents stated communities and individuals focusing on countering ⊲ Eska the country, the research and data on sources and they rarely watch TV, they have a good disinformation in Poland although there were no ⊲ VOX FM actors is still limited and incomplete. Nevertheless, knowledge of television content as their campaigns specifically dedicated to the issue in ⊲ Radio ZET there is a recognition of both the disinformation families often watch them. the past two years. Several entities concentrate efforts coming from external actors with the aim to on awareness-raising activities, primarily by using ⊲ While students have mainly superficial in- Watching TV is rare, although the respondents destabilise, as well as of the use of propaganda- media (both traditional and online), i.e. monitoring formation about the situation in Poland and had good knowledge about news programs in like narratives from the Polish representatives to information space and reporting on disinformation/ in the world, most of them were interested Polish TV, which they claimed to watch sometimes achieve their own political goals. The external propaganda activities. in local news (news about their city and/or in the evening. They recognised the differences disinformation efforts are internally fostered region). For this purpose, they proclaimed in political worldviews of the public and private by organisations and movements promoting Current projects in Poland: to use both local printed and online media. channels, especially being aware of the public pro-Russian, anti-Ukrainian or general anti- broadcaster’s pro-governmental narratives. establishment narratives. According to the study in ⊲ Following news systematically and ⊲ Polish version of StopFake.org project. While recognising these divisions also in other late 201622, Kresy.pl and “Ukrainiec NIE jest moim periodically was perceived as too time- media sources, they stay rather sceptical towards bratem” (A Ukrainian is not my brother) are among consuming, therefore, the respondents ⊲ Stowarzyszenie Demagog – project demagogl.org. journalists in general due to their subjectivity. the most influential outlets spreading pro-Russian follow news outlets only when interested pl fact-checking political representatives’ speech- The participants claimed to closely watch the narratives on Facebook.23 in a specific issue or topic. es and statements together with workshops for authors of the articles and commentaries – they high school students – Akademia Fact-Checkingu ⊲ The participants trusted sources they felt declared not to trust the outlets without information The following five online outlets have been they knew well, including their friends on authorship. Surprisingly, a lesser degree of identified as disinformation with the highest reach ⊲ Fundacja Bezpieczna Cyberprzestrzeń (Cyber- whom they consider credible and know trust had been expressed towards foreign media, by the study in mid-201724: security Foundation) with its InfoOps research they would never lie to them. or local media funded by foreign entities. ⊲ zmianynaziemi.pl project focusing on the issues of manipulation of ⊲ dzienniknarodowy.pl the Polish information sphere. ⊲ The respondents did not trust Facebook ⊲ alexjones.pl and influencers because they were aware “The media say what people ⊲ Wolna-polska.pl ⊲ CAPD (Center for Propaganda and Disinformation of the sponsored content. However, one want to hear.” ⊲ Pch24.pl Analysis) – NGO focusing on a structured and the other hand, they stated to trust influenc- analytical approach to the challenges linked to ers “whom they know well” and whom they Although printed media are consumed information and psychological warfare, including have followed for a long time, even if they exceptionally, the participants often mentioned through cooperation with media and other NGOs promote some products on their channels. reading regional both printed and online outlets. in the country. However, all of the interviewed had problems 38 FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? 39

identifying their favourite websites, especially Influencers Most popular on Facebook: Perception of “fake news” information outlets. They emphasised that they did ⊲ SA Wardęga 1.62M followers not use blogs and websites to receive information. In general, the closer the personalities are to young ⊲ Abstrachuje.TV 1.25M followers The participants declared they were able to The participants claimed to mostly look for peoples’, the more trustful they were considered. ⊲ Maffashion (Julia Kuczyńska) 907K followers distinguish between disinformation and truthful information only when interested in a specific Facebook was generally not considered a trusted information, unlike the older generations who, issue instead of following the news regularly. source among the participants, because of Partnering Polish CSOs working with young people according to the interviewed, lack critical thinking As a consequence, their knowledge of world extensive sponsored content. The same applies for further identified the following accounts as the and media literacy. However, when it comes to events or domestic issues in Poland is limited and influencers, who are, according to the respondents, most consumed by the young: understanding the terms, there is a general lack rather “accidental”. They admitted to mostly receive mostly paid by sponsors. While they admitted ⊲ Littlemooonster96 (Angelika Mucha) of knowledge about the context. The respondents information from Facebook, also via notifications, the possibility of following such influencers, ⊲ Arlena Witt – English teacher on YouTube only identified fake news with lies – further YouTube and Instagram. The interviewed also the participants were very much aware of the ⊲ Jarosław Kuźniar – Instagram influencer awareness of motivations was missing. Moreover, mentioned groups and pages on Facebook, product placement on their channels and accounts. ⊲ Polimaty – educational YouTube channel the majority could not explain the meaning of either including the pages of different media outlets. ⊲ Krzysztof Gonciarz – vlogger on YouTube disinformation or influence, with the exception of Related to that, the discussions proved that ⊲ SciFun – educational YouTube channel Ukrainian students who were familiar with, and “First reaction is always friends and families are among the strongest could name, examples of Russian disinformation emotional, only then you start influencers whom the respondents trust and who “Everyone has their truth and about Ukraine and its subversive influence on verifying information.” help them decide what sources to use. However, what is the truth no one knows.” Ukrainian society. ● this perception of authority decreased among the young participants with the increasing age of their Social media consumption family members. While the opinions on whether to trust friends were divided, all acknowledged RECOMMENDATIONS – COMMUNICATING WITH YOUTH Facebook, Instagram and YouTube were noted to read and consume what their friends shared ⊲  – Since young people use social media mostly to follow their friends and as the most popular social media, followed by Match their interests or recommended on social platforms. private interests, it is difficult to reach them with our message. The solution would be to convey Snapchat and Facebook Messenger. Facebook it through a group that matches their interests, i.e. schools’ pages and groups on Facebook or their is primarily used to follow school groups and The participants also proclaimed to distance favourite channels on Instagram. personal communication with friends. Respondents themselves from public figures (actors or musicians) claimed to rarely watch videos on their walls, who present their political views publicly. They ⊲ Involve schools – Due to a lack of trust in media, communication with students might be more only when shared by friends, mostly in a private believed that such people should not openly effective if we involve other active “influencers” of students into the contest and campaign, which message. Similarly, they rarely share anything on proclaim opinions linked to internal politics as they will require active involvement of the schools and universities in the process. their personal walls. have a strong influence on their large followers- ⊲ Teamwork – Consider the participation of teams instead of individuals, which might make base. the students more motivated. Instagram is mostly used to follow their friends and topics of their personal interest, such as lifestyle, The respondents claimed to mostly follow public ⊲ Consider involvement of Ukrainian students at the Polish universities as they have more knowl- cooking, travels and sports. persons, including athletes, football players, fitness edge and experience in Russian disinformation and influence. trainers, celebrities, fashion and lifestyle bloggers, The purpose of YouTube was primarily linked to and musicians, mostly on Instagram and YouTube, listening to music, as well as to receiving practical not Facebook. and useful information (for example “how to” guides), sometimes also from the comments below According to the ranking “Blogosfera i social the videos. media 2017”26 the most popular people on Facebook and Instagram in 2017 were the following: “Truth depends Robert Lewandowski, Wojciech Szczęsny, Anna on political views.” Lewandowska, Kuba Błaszczykowski, Suchar Codzienny, Ewa Chodakowska, Tom Swoon, Łukasz The participants noted that Snapchat is mostly Piszczek, Sylwester Adam Wardęga, Martyna used both to follow and geo-locate friends. When Wojciechowska, Kamil Bednarek, Joanna Krupa, they seek to do something or go somewhere Angelika Mucha, Marita Surma, Julia Kuczyńska, particular, Snapchat helps them to look for friends Joanna Kuchta. nearby. 40 FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? 41

⊲ Konspiratori.sk – a database of media outlets COUNTRY REPORTS: VISEGRAD FOUR spreading disinformation, propaganda and lies. ⊲ Trustworthiness of media is an important factor taken into consideration before ⊲ Most of the mainstream media and online outlets a story or information is read/consumed SLOVAKIA such as sme.sk, dennik.sk or aktuality.sk have by the respondents. designated sections debunking disinformation. ⊲ Active public engagement of the young, especially on Facebook, is quite rare. ⊲ Blbeconline.sk (Schmuck online) – website col- COUNTRY SUMMARY Posting extensively without ‘reasonable’ lecting posts, comments from Facebook pages content was noted as an undesirable Population Youth in % (15-24) Internet penetration spreading disinformation and providing an over- practice. 5,397,036 13.8% 96% (2007)27 view of trends of the most shared disinformation on Facebook.31 ⊲ The respondents admitted to sometimes Social media network usage looking for alternative media because they distrust mainstream media and seek Facebook 73% ⊲ YouTube 64% ⊲ Facebook Messenger 45% ⊲ Facebook pages as “Die” (Zomri), “Disinformation to get a “balance” of views. Instagram 18% ⊲ Pokec 14% ⊲ Google Plus 14%28 and hoaxes” (Dezinformácie a hoaxy), “Why are people crazy” (Prečo ľuďom hrabe) or “I’ll eat even Social media network share of the youth a chair-lift” (Zjem aj vlek, which is a parody on the Facebook 90%, followed by Snapchat and Instagram29 famous propaganda outlet Zem a vek) debunking Consumption of and making fun of propaganda and disinformation. and trust in media ⊲ The Strategic Communication Program of Disinformation narratives are often taken up The respondents declared they consume GLOBSEC Policy Institute – conducts unique DISINFORMATION and spread by various far-right extremist groups/ information primarily from web-based sources. public opinion polls via GLOBSEC Trends and LANDSCAPE political parties. Moreover, due to linguistic and Television, print media and radio were noted as analytical materials, E-learning courses on Media cultural proximity, it is also possible to observe barely used, and if so, most students follow media and Disinformation, awareness-raising campaign According to a website called konspiratori.sk, a free flow of disinformation narratives between that have both offline and online presence. The main with Slovak video bloggers, cooperation with there are around 120 different disinformation individual Czech and Slovak outlets. source of news identified by most of the students influencers and journalists, organization of public websites30 currently operating in Slovakia. Most was simply ‘Facebook’. Many participants declared debates and international conferences. articles featuring disinformation and propaganda ⊲ Most popular and influential disinformation that they started paying attention to a piece of content are spread covertly, mixed with regular websites are: hlavnespravy.sk, zemavek.sk, news only after seeing that it had been shared by articles and press releases taken from the formal infovojna.sk, slobodnyvysielac.sk. YOUTH several people or pages. Thus, the young rely on Slovak news agencies. their peers as a news source. AND INTERNET ⊲ Disinformation/propaganda social media groups: A warning sign in recent months has been Som Slovak a som na to hrdy…, Marian Kotleba The most detrimental factor to the respondents increasingly positive and in some cases even za predsedu vlády SR, Slobodný vysielač, Sila was the value of objectivity, which was identified defensive attitudes by various political and state pravdy, Milujeme Rusko, GINN Press and many MAIN FOCUS as an important characteristic of the media they representatives towards these outlets, which more. GROUPS' FINDINGS follow. Participants did not necessarily expect all increases their credibility and puts them on the the content to be unbiased, but the media must ⊲ An overwhelming majority stated they same level as mainstream or investigative media. provide a clear distinction between news reporting rely on online resources and media. A continuous tendency of political representatives Counter-disinfo activities and commentary or opinion pieces. Participants The respondents rarely use traditional is the attempt to influence the public service expect clear identification of used sources, direct and initiatives media as TV, radio or newspapers broadcaster. Recently, new management made quotes from the people involved and/or experts, as a source of information. executive decisions to cancel or reorganise shows ⊲ Demagog.sk – fact-checking of political discussions and copyright/authorship citations under photos and investigative broadcasts, triggering personnel conducted by the Slovak Governance Institute. ⊲ Podcasts are getting increasingly popular from trustworthy sources of information. They were changes in key positions. Ever since, over – both for entertainment and as a source also aware of click-bait tactics. 60 journalists signed a petition calling attention ⊲ Slovak daily Dennik N prepared an educational of information. to inappropriate working conditions. Some of manual Lies and Conspiracies for teachers and ⊲ The respondents admitted to often start In addition, young people also claimed to evaluate the testimonies of journalists working for the students of high schools explaining the mecha- paying attention to a piece of news only trustworthiness based who or what page shared public service broadcaster revealed attempts from nisms of manipulation used by disinformation if they see that it had been shared by the information. Other indicators are bad grammar, the management to push forward and broadcast media outlets and the related risks. their friends. excessively long sentences, pictures and videos as various disinformation narratives. well as captions that do not correspond with the text. 42 FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? 43

Most commonly used news sources named were: Influencers also stated they follow. Other reasons included “They are just too dumb to see ⊲ sme.sk confirmation bias, attempts to go beyond one- that it’s a complete nonsense.” ⊲ hnonline.sk Students were generally reluctant to name people sided reporting, distrust of conventional media, ⊲ dennikn.sk they ‘trusted’. Despite following certain influencers, difficulties of some to evaluate the truthfulness of While the young claimed to have encountered ⊲ aktuality.sk they claimed to always try to look up more sources information amid an excess of information, as well disinformation spread online, most of them chose ⊲ local news online portals of information and eventually make their own mind. as geopolitical and ideological battles funded not to engage in fights on the Internet unless they While Zuzana Kovačic-Hanzelová was mentioned by governments. feel a personal connection to the post. ● Social media consumption as one of the most trustworthy public persons, the others were John Oliver, or populist politicians The respondents named numerous social media Igor Matovič and Boris Kollár. platforms where they are active. They considered RECOMMENDATIONS – COMMUNICATING WITH YOUTH Facebook to be an absolute necessity for the When it comes to favourite online personalities, ⊲ Make them feel included – engage the young in solving a problem, make them feel like an young, since they use it as a working tool for the discussion did not bring big conclusive results important and equal part of society. learning about assignments, facilitating group work as everybody had their own specific areas of ⊲ Do not be patronising – in general, people do not want to be called stupid. and finding out about events. However, the vast interest which they follow online. People mentioned majority of the participants claimed that they either were, for example, favourite streamers (a person ⊲ Distrust in media is a huge problem – young people are becoming more and more reluctant to post rarely or do not post on Facebook at all. streaming video games live for an audience), search for the truth, they do not believe in or trust anything. politicians, actors or athletes such as: Posting extensively without ‘reasonable’ content ⊲ Instagram , not YouTube, should be the main campaign tool for the age group of 18-25 years. was even labelled as an undesirable practice, ⊲ Sajfa something common among “grandparents”. While ⊲ Moma students fear spamming others and hence being ⊲ Eliška Hudcová (Time to Fit Instagram page) perceived as annoying, there were also concerns ⊲ Samo Marec about privacy. Sharing posts among friends via ⊲ Andrej Kiska Messenger was thus increasingly common. ⊲ Kamil Aujeský (Marketing Backstage) ⊲ Late night comedians Most the of the participants claimed to use Instagram, which they perceive as less political, YouTube channels named as the most watched: serious and commercialized than Facebook while ⊲ Pewdiepie focusing more on lifestyle and the everyday lives ⊲ Zrebný and Frlajs of personalities and friends. Instagram stories were ⊲ Moma especially praised as a tool and the most liked ⊲ Sajfa feature, where people post with less self-censorship, knowing that stories disappear in 24 hours and Perception of “fake news” thus provide the most intimate and immediate information. This platform was viewed by many Slovak students were aware of hoaxes, fake social respondents as ‘less serious’, citing that they can media accounts and fake comments under articles even post a picture “in a pyjama”. or disinformation websites active in Slovakia. The participants mostly expressed their disbelief The participants noted they used YouTube on over how “anyone could fall for it”, but eventually, a daily basis predominantly for music, educational many confirmed to have some friends or family purposes or fun. Very few claimed to follow members who follow and regularly share YouTubers – this is perceived as a phenomenon disinformation. The discussions and perceptions of younger generations in early teenage years. about this topic can acquire a patronizing manner If someone admitted watching YouTubers, it was hinting at stark divisions in society and class usually framed as a guilty pleasure, “just to unwind”. undertones. Generally, participants prefer videos that show something beyond a personal life of the vlogger. The declared reason why students sought Sajfa’s work was provided as an example, as his ‘alternative’ news sources comes back to their videos now also cover his travels. attempt to escape ‘the black and white reporting’ of traditional mainstream media, which they 44 FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? 45

FOCUS GROUPS PARTICIPANTS

Number of Age Number of Age Schools Gender Schools Gender participants range participants range Bosnia and Herzegovina Montenegro ⊲ Secondary Mixed Chemistry School in Tuzla 32 18-26 16 M ⊲ Gymnasium „Stojan Cerovic“ in Nikšić 39 19-23 20 M ⊲ Secondary Economic School in Banja Luka 16 F ⊲ Gymnasium „Panto Mališić“ in Berane 19 F ⊲ University of Mostar ⊲ University of Montenegro ⊲ University of Sarajevo ⊲ Mediterranean University Czechia Poland ⊲ Střední odborné učiliště elektrotechnické 29 18-24 17 M ⊲ Zespół Szkół Ponadgimnazjalnych in Zamość (high school) 27 18-24 18 M ⊲ Pilsen VOŠ a SPŠE Pilsen 12 F ⊲ Maria Curie-Skłodowska University 9 F ⊲ Střední průmyslová škola stavební, Pilsen ⊲ University of Łódź ⊲ SPSD, Pilsen ⊲ Liceum Ogólnokształcące in Suwałki (high school) ⊲ Gymnázium Luďka Pika Masarykovo gymnázium, Pilsen Serbia ⊲ Gymnázium Na Vítězné Pláni, Prague ⊲ Gymnázium Litoměřická, Prague ⊲ 3rd Belgrade Grammar School (gymnasium) 10th Belgrade 41 18-24 23 M ⊲ Gymnázium Nad Štolou, Prague Grammar School „Mihajlo Pupin“ 18 F ⊲ Gymnázium Arabská, Prague ⊲ Philological Grammar School ⊲ Vysoká škola chemicko-technologická, Prague ⊲ Zemun Grammar School ⊲ Czech technical university, Prague ⊲ University of Niš ⊲ Charles University, Prague ⊲ „Borislav Mihajlovic Mihiz“ High School ⊲ University of West Bohemia, Pilsen ⊲ Belgrade university ⊲ University of Economics, Prague Slovakia ⊲ Florida State University, Prague ⊲ Bilingual high school Sučany 35 18-24 13 M Hungary ⊲ Technical University in Zvolen 22 F ⊲ Budapest University of Technology and Economics 38 17-30 21 M ⊲ High school Nové Zámky ⊲ Eötvös Loránd University 17 F ⊲ Comenius University ⊲ High school in Budaörs ⊲ 9 different high schools ⊲ University of Pécs Macedonia ⊲ High School „Orce Nikolov“ 34 16-24 12 M ⊲ Military Academy „Gen. Mihajlo Apostolski“ 22 F ⊲ FON University ⊲ International Balkan University ⊲ University of Southeast Europe ⊲ Saints Cyril and Metodius University High School „Dimitrija Cupovski“ Veles 46 FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? FROM ONLINE BATTLEFIELD TO LOSS OF TRUST? 47

1 “POPIS STANOVNIŠTVA, KUĆANSTAVA I STANOVA U BOSNI 19 Zsolt Hanula, “Kádár-kori nosztalgia hajtja a magyar internetet”, Index.hu, I HERCEGOVINI, 2013”, June 2016, http://www.popis.gov.ba/popis2013/doc/ May 12, 2017, https://index.hu/tech/2017/05/12/kadar-kori_nosztalgia_ USAGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA RezultatiPopisa_HR.pdf hajtja_a_magyar_internetet/ 2 A list of those websites as well as specific examples of false information 20 Internet World Stats, “Poland”, 2018, https://www.internetworldstats.com/ they disseminated is being monitored and is available at https:// europa.htm#pl raskrinkavanje.ba/high-risk-mediji. 21 Reuters Institute, “Digital News Report 2018: Poland”, 2018, http://www. 3 http://www.stat.gov.mk/pdf/2017/8.1.17.33.pdf digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2018/poland-2018/; Social media network AMONG PARTICIPANTS 4 Society.mk, “Истражување за ставовите на граѓаните за медиумите”, share of young Poles aged 16-24 years: Facebook (85,5% of total individuals SlideShare, June 9, 2017, https://www.slideshare.net/vladimirp/ss-77366114 in this age group use it at least once a day); YouTube 49,1%; Snapchat 17,3%; 5 Samanth Subramanian, “Inside the Macedonian Fake-News Complex”, Instagram 16,4%; WhatsApp 8,2%; Twitter 1,8%. More information available The Wired, Feb 15, 2017, https://www.wired.com/2017/02/veles-macedonia- at: Universalmccann.pl, “Wave 9: Polak zapatrzony w Facebooka”, n/a, http:// fake-news/ www.universalmccann.pl/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,detail,0&cntnt01arti 6 http://factchecking.mk/ cleid=68&cntnt01returnid=141 BA CZ HU MK ME PL RS SK 7 Society.mk, “Истражувања”, June 2016, http://proverkanafakti.mk/ 22 Centre for International Relations, “INFORMATION WARFARE IN istrazuvanja/ THE INTERNET – RAPORT CSM 06.2017”, June 2017, http://www.csm.org. Number of 8 Dusica Tomovic, “Pro-Russian Montenegrins Publish New Anti-Western pl/pl/blog-sub3/117-wyroznione-publikacje/3438-information-warfare-in-the- 32 29 38 34 39 27 41 35 Media”, Balkan Insight, October 18, 2017, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/ internet-raport-csm-06-2017 participants article/pro-russian-montenegrins-publish-new-anti-western-media-10-17-2017 23 For more comprehensive information on pro-Russian disinformation 9 Ibid. websites in Poland please read the whole study available at: http://www. 23 29 38 30 35 24 33 33 10 Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, “Попис 2011”, July 27, 2016, csm.org.pl/pl/blog-sub3/117-wyroznione-publikacje/3438-information- Facebook http://popis2011.stat.rs/ warfare-in-the-internet-raport-csm-06-2017 Messenger (71%) (100%) (100%) (88%) (89%) (88%) (80%) (94%) 11 Index Mundi, does not include the population of Kosovo (July 2017 est.), 24 https://www.stopfake.org/content/uploads/2017/07/Information-warfare-in- “Serbia Demographics Profile 2018” https://www.indexmundi.com/serbia/ the-Internet_report_19.07-2.pdf 21 29 35 27 35 24 33 31 demographics_profile.html 25 Universalmccann.pl, “Wave 9: Polak zapatrzony w Facebooka”, n/a, http:// Facebook 12 Internet World Stats, “Serbia”, https://www.internetworldstats.com/europa2. www.universalmccann.pl/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,detail,0&cntnt01arti (65%) (100%) (92%) (79%) (89%) (88%) (80%) (88%) htm#rs cleid=68&cntnt01returnid=141 13 Český statistický úřad, “Věková struktura obyvatel – pětileté věkové 26 in EN “Blogosphere and social media 2017” prepared by Jason Hunt in 25 27 27 33 36 21 38 32 skupiny”, December 2016, https://vdb.czso.cz/vdbvo2/faces/cs/index. cooperation with Polish media and social media agencies, December 2017, Youtube jsf?page=vystup-objekt&z=T&f=TABULKA&pvo=DEMD003&katalog=30845& http://jasonhunt.pl/JasonHunt-ranking-2017.pdf) (78%) (93%) (71%) (97%) (92%) (77%) (93%) (91%) str=v1525&c=v3~2__RP2016MP12DP31#w= 27 Eurostat, “Being young in Europe today – digital world”, December 2017, 14 Český statistický úřad, “Informační společnost v číslech 2017”, 2017, https:// http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Being_young_ 28 17 20 34 30 13 33 26 www.czso.cz/documents/10180/46014808/061004-17_S.pdf/b9a0a83e-7a6f- in_Europe_today_-_digital_world Instagram 4613-b1df-33fe8b5d1a8e?version=1.1 28 Reuters Institute, “Digital News Report 2018: Slovakia”, 2018, http://www. (87%) (59%) (52%) (100%) (76%) (48%) (80%) (74%) 15 Reuters Institute, “Digital News Report 2018: The Czech Republic”, 2018, digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2018/slovakia-2018/ http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2018/czech-republic-2018/ 29 No specific data provided. Source: https://www.pcrevue.sk/a/PRIESKUM- 6 5 10 11 10 6 Snapchat 1 1 16 The number represents the total number of fans and followers on -Facebook--Snapchat--Instagram--Poradie-oblubenosti-socialnych-sieti- (18%) (13%) (29%) (28%) (37%) (17%) Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube. For more information please see mladych-Slovakov http://77.forbes.cz/ 30 Number of disinformation outlets in July 2018 17 Hungarian Central Statistical Office, “Magyarország népességének száma 31 The webpage is currently undergoing some reconstruction due to new 1 3 3 19 2 Twitter 4 2 – nemek és életkor szerint, január 1”, 2017, https://www.ksh.hu/interaktiv/ policies applied by Facebook. (3%) (7%) (8%) (49%) (7%) korfak/orszag.html 18 Reuters Institute, “Digital News Report 2018: Hungary”, 2018, http://www. digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2018/hungary-2018/

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