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Brief Summary 2020 Report on the Protection of the Constitution

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Brief Summary 2020 Report on the Protection of the Constitution Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community Brief summary 2020 Report on the Protection of the Constitution Facts and Trends Brief summary 2020 Report on the Protection of the Constitution Facts and Trends 2020 REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION FACTS AND TRENDS Table of Contents Politically motivated crime 7 Right-wing extremism/terrorism 10 Reichsbürger and Selbstverwalter 19 Left-wing extremism 22 Islamist extremism/terrorism 29 Extremist efforts of foreigners posing a threat to security (excluding Islamist extremism) 36 Intelligence activities, espionage, cyber attacks and other activities which threaten security, carried out on behalf of a foreign power 39 Security of classified information and counter-sabotage 46 The Scientology organisation (SO) 47 5 2020 REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION FACTS AND TRENDS 6 2020 REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION FACTS AND TRENDS Politically motivated crime1 In 2020, the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) registered a total of 44,692 politically motivated crimes (2019: 41,177). Of these, 15,275 (or 34.2%) were propaganda offences (2019: 16,182, or 39.3%) and 3,365 (7.5%) were violent crimes (2019: 2,832, or 6.9%). Of the total number of politically motivated crimes, 32.924 (73.7%) were found to have an extremist background (2019: 31,472, or 76.4%). Of these, 2,865 (2019: 2,017) offences could not be assigned to any particular category. Key points: • The number of crimes with a right-wing extremist background rose by 5.1% in the reporting period; the number of violent crimes in this subset rose by 10.6%. Among these violent crimes, all homicide cases (two attempted and one successful, the latter of which was the result of a shooting spree in Hanau in the state of Hesse) were motivated by xenophobia. • The number of crimes with a left-wing extremist background rose by 2.8%; the number of violent crimes in this subset rose by 34.3% and included five attempted homicides. Most of these violent crimes were still targeted at the police/security authorities. Strong increases were also recorded in violent crimes against the state, its institutions and symbols, and in violent crimes in connection with “campaigns against restructuring”. • The number of crimes, including violent crimes, motivated by extremist foreign ideology fell considerably during the reporting period. This can largely be attributed to pandemic-related restrictions on large-scale events. The number of offences categorised as right-wing politically motivated crime was 23,604 (2019: 22,342). Of these, 13,659 (2019: 14,247) were propaganda offences under sections 86 and 86a of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB) and 1,092 (2019: 986) were violent crimes. As a subset of this category, 22,357 crimes (2019: 21,290) with a right- wing extremist background were recorded, among them 1,023 violent 1 Figures based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office. 7 2020 REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION FACTS AND TRENDS crimes (2019: 925). The number of violent crimes thus rose by a good 10% compared with the previous year, but remained below the level of 2018 (1,088). Apart from two attempted homicides, these crimes included one homicide in Hanau resulting in nine victims – not counting the shooter and his mother. In 2020, the number of right-wing violent crimes motivated by xenophobia went up by 7.3% (746 offences; 2019: 695). The number of right-wing extremist crimes motivated by antisemitism rose by 17.8% to 2,173 (2019: 1,844), while the number of violent crimes in this subset dropped by 14.3% to 48 (2019: 56). In the reporting year, 772 politically motivated offences were attributed to “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” (2019: 675), of which 599 were categorised as extremist (2019: 589). Of these, 125 were violent crimes (2019: 121), chiefly extortion (78) or resistance to law enforcement officers (30). Of the crimes attributed to “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter”, 37 were found to be motivated by antisemitism. The number of offences categorised as left-wing politically motivated crime was 10,971 (2019: 9,849), including 1,526 violent crimes (45.1% higher than in 2019: 1,052). As a subset of this category, 6,632 crimes (2019: 6,449) with a left-wing extremist background were recorded, including 1,237 (2019: 921) violent crimes. The number of left-wing extremist crimes thus rose by 2.8%, and the number of violent crimes in this subset rose by 34.3%. Of the violent left-wing extremist offences, 776 were categorised as violent crimes against the police/security authorities (2019: 467), an increase of nearly two-thirds. The number of violent offences directed at actual or supposed right-wing extremists rose to a total of 340 (2019: 297, an increase of 14.5%), and the number of violent crimes against the state, its institutions and symbols rose sharply again this year to 681, an increase of 76.9% (2019: 385). The number of violent offences related to “campaigns against restructuring”, or urban renewal, also rose significantly to 272, up 56.3% from the year before (2019: 174). About three-quarters of these offences were committed in Berlin. In 2020, 409 extremist offences were recorded in the category of politically motivated crime – religious ideology (2019: 362). Most of these offences 8 2020 REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION FACTS AND TRENDS (378; 2019: 314) had an Islamist background. Of the 409 offences motivated by extremist religious ideology, 33 were violent offences (2019: 41, a drop of 19.5%), including two attempted homicides and two homicides as well as 24 cases of bodily injury. Another 56 offences were recorded as preparation or support for a serious act of violence endangering state security (sections 89a to 89c and section 91 of the Criminal Code), down from 63 in 2019, and 34 were counted as membership in or support for a foreign terrorist organisation (section 129b of the Criminal Code), compared to 64 in 2019. The number of offences categorised as politically motivated crime – foreign ideology was 1,016 (2019: 1,897), including 113 violent crimes (2019: 351). Of this number, 661 had an extremist background, representing a drop by more than half (2019: 1,354). These offences were predominantly breaches of the Act Governing Private Associations (Vereinsgesetz, VereinsG) (25.6%) and criminal damage (23.3%), but also included 79 violent crimes (12.0%), a drop of 68.1% compared to 2019 (248 violent crimes). Most of these were bodily injury offences (74.7%), although one attempted homicide was also counted during the reporting year. The major decrease in the number of extremist crimes and violent offences is largely due to the coronavirus pandemic and the resulting cancellation of most large-scale events, rallies and other events with large numbers of participants. 9 2020 REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION FACTS AND TRENDS Right-wing extremism/terrorism By the end of 2020, the number of right-wing extremist sympathisers after subtracting multiple memberships was 33,300 (2019: 32,080). The number of right-wing extremists classed as violence-oriented rose to 13,300 (2019: 13,000). Right-wing extremist following¹ 2019 2020 Political party membership 13,330 13,250 Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party of 3,600 3,500 Germany) DIE RECHTE (The Right) 550 550 Der III. Weg (The Third Way) 580 600 Membership of other right-wing extremist 8,600 8,600 parties² Membership of groups/organisations not affiliated with or independent of political 6,600 7,800 parties³ No membership of any right-wing extremist 13,500 13,700 grouping/organisation4 Total 33,430 34,750 after subtracting multiple memberships 32,080 33,300 of which violence-oriented right-wing 13,000 13,300 extremists 1 Some of these figures are estimated and rounded off. 2 In the reporting period, this number includes members of the Junge Alternative (JA, Young Alternative) (subject of extended investigation (Verdachtsfall)) and the grouping Der Flügel (The Wing). 3 In the reporting period, this number includes some of the 1,000 right-wing extremist “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” who are organised in cross-regional groups, as well as the following intelligence targets: members of Ein Prozent e.V. (One Per Cent; subject of extended investigation), the Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland (IDB, Identitarian Movement Germany), Institut für Staatspolitik (IfS, Institute for State Policy; subject of extended investigation) and COMPACT- Magazin GmbH (COMPACT Magazine; subject of extended investigation). 4 In the reporting period, this number includes some of the 1,000 right-wing extremist “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” who do not belong to any organised group. The total number of right-wing extremist criminal and violent offences increased by about 5% in comparison to the previous year (2019: 21,290; 2020: 22,357). Propaganda offences make up the largest share of 10 2020 REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION FACTS AND TRENDS right-wing extremist crime, at 60% (13,425), while 4.6% of crimes were violent offences. In 2020, violent right-wing extremist offences were up 10.6% (2019: 925; 2020: 1,023). Most of the violent crimes were bodily injury offences. Bodily injury offences accounted for 82.3% of total violent offences (842 bodily injury offences), which was about the same percentage as in the previous year (2019: 84.4%, 781 offences). The number of arson offences rose significantly, to 25 in 2020 from 6 in 2019, an increase of more than 300%. Right-wing extremist bodily injury offences with a xenophobic background rose by 10% (2019: 627; 2020: 690). The total number of violent xenophobic offences rose as well (2019: 695; 2020: 746, an increase of 7.3%).
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