Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community

Brief summary 2020 Report on the Protection of the Constitution

Facts and Trends

Brief summary 2020 Report on the Protection of the Constitution Facts and Trends

2020 REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION FACTS AND TRENDS

Table of Contents

Politically motivated crime 7

Right-wing extremism/terrorism 10

Reichsbürger and Selbstverwalter 19

Left-wing extremism 22

Islamist extremism/terrorism 29

Extremist efforts of foreigners posing a threat to security (excluding Islamist extremism) 36

Intelligence activities, espionage, cyber attacks and other activities which threaten security, carried out on behalf of a foreign power 39

Security of classified information and counter-sabotage 46

The Scientology organisation (SO) 47

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Politically motivated crime1 In 2020, the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) registered a total of 44,692 politically motivated crimes (2019: 41,177). Of these, 15,275 (or 34.2%) were propaganda offences (2019: 16,182, or 39.3%) and 3,365 (7.5%) were violent crimes (2019: 2,832, or 6.9%). Of the total number of politically motivated crimes, 32.924 (73.7%) were found to have an extremist background (2019: 31,472, or 76.4%). Of these, 2,865 (2019: 2,017) offences could not be assigned to any particular category. Key points: • The number of crimes with a right-wing extremist background rose by 5.1% in the reporting period; the number of violent crimes in this subset rose by 10.6%. Among these violent crimes, all homicide cases (two attempted and one successful, the latter of which was the result of a shooting spree in Hanau in the state of Hesse) were motivated by xenophobia. • The number of crimes with a left-wing extremist background rose by 2.8%; the number of violent crimes in this subset rose by 34.3% and included five attempted homicides. Most of these violent crimes were still targeted at the police/security authorities. Strong increases were also recorded in violent crimes against the state, its institutions and symbols, and in violent crimes in connection with “campaigns against restructuring”. • The number of crimes, including violent crimes, motivated by extremist foreign ideology fell considerably during the reporting period. This can largely be attributed to pandemic-related restrictions on large-scale events. The number of offences categorised as right-wing politically motivated crime was 23,604 (2019: 22,342). Of these, 13,659 (2019: 14,247) were propaganda offences under sections 86 and 86a of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB) and 1,092 (2019: 986) were violent crimes. As a subset of this category, 22,357 crimes (2019: 21,290) with a right- wing extremist background were recorded, among them 1,023 violent

1 Figures based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office.

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crimes (2019: 925). The number of violent crimes thus rose by a good 10% compared with the previous year, but remained below the level of 2018 (1,088). Apart from two attempted homicides, these crimes included one homicide in Hanau resulting in nine victims – not counting the shooter and his mother. In 2020, the number of right-wing violent crimes motivated by xenophobia went up by 7.3% (746 offences; 2019: 695). The number of right-wing extremist crimes motivated by antisemitism rose by 17.8% to 2,173 (2019: 1,844), while the number of violent crimes in this subset dropped by 14.3% to 48 (2019: 56). In the reporting year, 772 politically motivated offences were attributed to “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” (2019: 675), of which 599 were categorised as extremist (2019: 589). Of these, 125 were violent crimes (2019: 121), chiefly extortion (78) or resistance to law enforcement officers (30). Of the crimes attributed to “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter”, 37 were found to be motivated by antisemitism. The number of offences categorised as left-wing politically motivated crime was 10,971 (2019: 9,849), including 1,526 violent crimes (45.1% higher than in 2019: 1,052). As a subset of this category, 6,632 crimes (2019: 6,449) with a left-wing extremist background were recorded, including 1,237 (2019: 921) violent crimes. The number of left-wing extremist crimes thus rose by 2.8%, and the number of violent crimes in this subset rose by 34.3%. Of the violent left-wing extremist offences, 776 were categorised as violent crimes against the police/security authorities (2019: 467), an increase of nearly two-thirds. The number of violent offences directed at actual or supposed right-wing extremists rose to a total of 340 (2019: 297, an increase of 14.5%), and the number of violent crimes against the state, its institutions and symbols rose sharply again this year to 681, an increase of 76.9% (2019: 385). The number of violent offences related to “campaigns against restructuring”, or urban renewal, also rose significantly to 272, up 56.3% from the year before (2019: 174). About three-quarters of these offences were committed in Berlin. In 2020, 409 extremist offences were recorded in the category of politically motivated crime – religious ideology (2019: 362). Most of these offences

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(378; 2019: 314) had an Islamist background. Of the 409 offences motivated by extremist religious ideology, 33 were violent offences (2019: 41, a drop of 19.5%), including two attempted homicides and two homicides as well as 24 cases of bodily injury. Another 56 offences were recorded as preparation or support for a serious act of violence endangering state security (sections 89a to 89c and section 91 of the Criminal Code), down from 63 in 2019, and 34 were counted as membership in or support for a foreign terrorist organisation (section 129b of the Criminal Code), compared to 64 in 2019. The number of offences categorised as politically motivated crime – foreign ideology was 1,016 (2019: 1,897), including 113 violent crimes (2019: 351). Of this number, 661 had an extremist background, representing a drop by more than half (2019: 1,354). These offences were predominantly breaches of the Act Governing Private Associations (Vereinsgesetz, VereinsG) (25.6%) and criminal damage (23.3%), but also included 79 violent crimes (12.0%), a drop of 68.1% compared to 2019 (248 violent crimes). Most of these were bodily injury offences (74.7%), although one attempted homicide was also counted during the reporting year. The major decrease in the number of extremist crimes and violent offences is largely due to the coronavirus pandemic and the resulting cancellation of most large-scale events, rallies and other events with large numbers of participants.

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Right-wing extremism/terrorism By the end of 2020, the number of right-wing extremist sympathisers after subtracting multiple memberships was 33,300 (2019: 32,080). The number of right-wing extremists classed as violence-oriented rose to 13,300 (2019: 13,000).

Right-wing extremist following¹

2019 2020 Political party membership 13,330 13,250 Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party of 3,600 3,500 Germany) DIE RECHTE (The Right) 550 550 Der III. Weg (The Third Way) 580 600 Membership of other right-wing extremist 8,600 8,600 parties² Membership of groups/organisations not affiliated with or independent of political 6,600 7,800 parties³ No membership of any right-wing extremist 13,500 13,700 grouping/organisation4 Total 33,430 34,750 after subtracting multiple memberships 32,080 33,300 of which violence-oriented right-wing 13,000 13,300 extremists

1 Some of these figures are estimated and rounded off. 2 In the reporting period, this number includes members of the Junge Alternative (JA, Young Alternative) (subject of extended investigation (Verdachtsfall)) and the grouping Der Flügel (The Wing). 3 In the reporting period, this number includes some of the 1,000 right-wing extremist “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” who are organised in cross-regional groups, as well as the following intelligence targets: members of Ein Prozent e.V. (One Per Cent; subject of extended investigation), the Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland (IDB, Identitarian Movement Germany), Institut für Staatspolitik (IfS, Institute for State Policy; subject of extended investigation) and COMPACT- Magazin GmbH (COMPACT Magazine; subject of extended investigation). 4 In the reporting period, this number includes some of the 1,000 right-wing extremist “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” who do not belong to any organised group.

The total number of right-wing extremist criminal and violent offences increased by about 5% in comparison to the previous year (2019: 21,290; 2020: 22,357). Propaganda offences make up the largest share of

10 2020 REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION FACTS AND TRENDS right-wing extremist crime, at 60% (13,425), while 4.6% of crimes were violent offences. In 2020, violent right-wing extremist offences were up 10.6% (2019: 925; 2020: 1,023). Most of the violent crimes were bodily injury offences. Bodily injury offences accounted for 82.3% of total violent offences (842 bodily injury offences), which was about the same percentage as in the previous year (2019: 84.4%, 781 offences). The number of arson offences rose significantly, to 25 in 2020 from 6 in 2019, an increase of more than 300%. Right-wing extremist bodily injury offences with a xenophobic background rose by 10% (2019: 627; 2020: 690). The total number of violent xenophobic offences rose as well (2019: 695; 2020: 746, an increase of 7.3%). In 2020, two attempted homicides and one homicide were recorded, resulting in 11 deaths (2019: five attempted homicides, two homicides). The homicide case was the racist and xenophobic attack in Hanau, Hesse, on 19 February 2020. The attacker shot and killed nine people before killing his mother and himself. The choice of victims and the texts the attacker published online point to a xenophobic motive. The high level of willingness to use violence, in some cases extending to the level of right-wing terrorism, therefore remains a constant of right-wing extremism. It was once again apparent that perpetrators of the most serious violent right-wing extremist offences not only come from within established right-wing extremist structures and organisations, but can also become radicalised on the fringes or even outside of the right-wing extremist scene. During the reporting period, the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community banned a total of three right-wing extremist groups: Combat 18 Deutschland, Nordadler and Wolfs-/Sturmbrigade 44. The domestic intelligence agencies played a key role in identifying these groups and gathering the information needed to ban them. Attempts by right-wing extremists to influence public opinion were especially apparent during the reporting period in protests against the Federal Government’s measures to contain the coronavirus pandemic. Right-wing extremists took part in the public debate over the pandemic, focusing almost exclusively on government measures to protect against infection. They protested against what they considered the Federal Government’s infringement of basic rights. This was combined with

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fundamental criticism of the entire system. They also spread conspiracy theories about the pandemic. Right-wing extremists tried to link their protests against government action on the pandemic to democratic demonstrations. Unlike those supporters of democracy who expressed similar fears, right-wing extremists were not interested in a fact-based debate over the handling of the pandemic, but instead in attacking the legitimacy of government action and democratic institutions and in steering the public debate. The pandemic had considerable impacts on every kind of right-wing extremist event, from demonstrations to combat sport events and above all concerts of right-wing extremist music. In the reporting period, the Federal Government’s measures to contain the coronavirus pandemic and related restrictions had a major impact on right-wing extremist demonstrations. Although the number of rallies influenced by right-wing extremists increased by about 25% compared to the previous year, the number of participants fell below the 2019 level (2020: 14,640; 2019: 20,650). The number of demonstrations was the same as in 2018 (233). Interest in combat sports remains high among right-wing extremists. In the past, the organisation of combat sports events was increasingly professionalised, and the participation of foreign competitors and labels promoted the growth of networks of right-wing extremist combat sport enthusiasts throughout Europe. The right-wing extremist scene’s most important combat sport competition in Europe is the Kampf der Nibelungen (KdN, Battle of the Nibelungs). This year, however, the event was only streamed online, due to restrictions resulting from the pandemic and the possibility of an official ban, as was issued in 2019. Government measures meant that the event organisers had to reduce the scale of the competition considerably. Right-wing extremist music continues to play an important role in disseminating right-wing extremist ideas. It also offers a low threshold for entry into the right-wing extremist scene. In 2020, there were no larger concerts of right-wing extremist music, with hundreds or even thousands in attendance, which could have served as high-profile publicity events, like the concert and rally “Rock against excessive foreign influence” held in Themar, Thuringia, in 2017, which attracted an audience of roughly

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6,000. Already in 2019, the authorities issued stricter rules for maintaining public security and order, which made right-wing extremist festivals less attractive within the scene. Further, starting in March 2020 almost all concerts were cancelled as a result of the pandemic. The “Shield and Sword” series of concerts and rallies in Ostritz, Saxony, was also affected: both the original date and the planned fall-back date for the 2020 event had to be cancelled. The number of concerts in 2020 dropped dramatically, to 141 from 311 in 2019. This development was due to the unusual situation caused by the pandemic and is not a reliable indicator for the future of right-wing extremist concerts. Despite the pandemic and the related travel restrictions, German right- wing extremists continued to collaborate with right-wing extremists abroad. Internet networks played a special role in this regard in 2020 due to the pandemic. Two major right-wing extremist events were held early in the year – and thus before the pandemic-related restrictions: the memorial “Day of Honour” at the Városmajor Park in Budapest, Hungary, on 8 February 2020, with up to 900 people in attendance; and the “Lukov March” in Sofia, Bulgaria, on 22 February 2020, which attracted only 150 participants, in contrast to previous years, when several thousand people marched. In 2020, the Bulgarian authorities prohibited participants from marching through the streets of Sofia, so only a memorial event was held. Events like these regularly offer the right-wing extremist scene an opportunity to make new contacts and reinforce existing international networks. Antisemitism is an important element of right-wing extremist ideology across most of the spectrum. Because political leaders, the media and the majority of the population all agree that antisemitism is unacceptable, right-wing extremists – sometimes for tactical reasons, to make their utterances more palatable – often avoid making their antisemitic patterns of argument the focus of their agitation, instead slipping them into asides or marginal comments. Antisemitism is deeply entrenched in right- wing extremist parties. Their anti-Jewish attitudes and argumentation are evident in differing forms and degrees of intensity. Antisemitism continues to be an important element of ideology among violence- oriented right-wing extremists. Those internet groups which explicitly

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declare their devotion to National Socialism in a particularly provocative, sometimes anarchic way that glorifies violence, such as the Goyim Partei Deutschland (Goyim Party of Germany), especially stand out with their pronounced antisemitic ideology and propaganda. Even though right-wing extremist parties received less public attention in the reporting year, they continue to have a certain significance for the internal structure of the right-wing extremist scene despite shrinking membership numbers and poor election results. Even co-operation on elections, like that between the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party of Germany) and the party DIE RECHTE (The Right) in local elections in North Rhine-Westphalia on 13 September 2020, failed to improve electoral results, demonstrating the continuing weakness of all right-wing extremist parties in elections. NPD membership fell to about 3,500 (2019: 3,600). The open conflict over the orientation and course of the NPD does not seem to have been resolved yet. The plans for a strategic reorientation presented by party chair Frank Franz in 2019 have only partly been carried out. For example, the party publication Deutsche Stimme (DS, German voice) was redesigned as a magazine available for purchase, and a media studio was opened in Berlin. These changes are intended to enable the party to reach a wider audience and better position itself in the pre-political sphere. For example, the new media studio was used to record interviews for the YouTube channel “Nationaldemokraten” (national democrats) concerning current political issues, such as the coronavirus pandemic, affordable housing and legislation to ensure that men and women are equally represented in parliaments. With limited ability to mobilise its followers, ongoing election losses, shrinking membership and shrinking budgets, the NPD was already facing serious problems. Pressure on the party increased further when three constitutional bodies (the Federal Government, Bundesrat and the German Bundestag) submitted a petition on 19 July 2019 to the Federal Constitutional Court to exclude the NPD from public funding for political parties. Even apart from these proceedings currently under way and the possible loss of all public funding, the party is in financial trouble, but it still played an important role for the internal structure of the right-wing extremist scene in 2020.

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The coronavirus pandemic and the measures to prevent infection further limited the party’s ability to act and conduct campaigns. The NPD responded to the measures by disparaging democracy. The NPD also attempted to position itself in the pre-political sphere and gain acceptance within mainstream society by criticising the Federal Government’s measures to contain the pandemic. The NPD also responded to bans and attempted bans on displaying the flag or war flag of imperial Germany at demonstrations in some federal states by organising rallies focused on the bans. The small right-wing extremist party DIE RECHTE is made up of eight federal state associations (Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Bremen, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Saxony-Anhalt and a south- western association made up of Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland) with 16 local associations and a small number of “bases”. Some associations at local or state level are currently being established, have existed only for a few months, are inactive or are being re-established without having been formally dissolved. Other associations only exist in name and have never been active. North Rhine-Westphalia remains the party’s heartland. The membership of DIE RECHTE remained unchanged in the reporting year at 550 (2019: 550). Since 5 January 2019, Sascha Krolzig and Sven Skoda have led the party as national chairmen. In February 2018, the local court in Bielefeld, North Rhine-Westphalia, sentenced Krolzig to six months in prison for the offence of incitement to hatred and violence coinciding with the offence of insult. In 2016, he called the president of a Jewish congregation an “insolent Jew functionary”, among other things. After the Higher Regional Court of Hamm, North Rhine-Westphalia, confirmed the verdict in January 2020, Krolzig submitted a complaint to the Federal Constitutional Court which was thrown out in July 2020. The justices explained their decision by stating that the term “insolent Jew” was part of the typical vocabulary of National Socialism and incited hatred of Jews. Krolzig began serving his sentence at the Castrop-Rauxel correctional facility in North Rhine- Westphalia on 15 July 2020. DIE RECHTE entered candidates for some polling districts in local elections in North Rhine-Westphalia on 13 September 2020 and won 2,369 votes in the council elections in Dortmund (1.12% of the vote). That

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was 268 votes more than the party gained in the 2014 local elections, which allowed it to keep its seat on the Dortmund city council. The small right-wing extremist party Der III. Weg (The Third Way) was able to consolidate its organisation in 2020 despite restrictions resulting from the coronavirus pandemic. It still has more than 20 regional “bases” linked to its three associations in the federal states of Bavaria, Saxony, Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia and Rhineland-Palatinate (the last three combined in the association named West). The party continues to serve as a catch-all for members of the neo-Nazi scene, some of whom belonged to organisations that have been banned. Its membership has increased slightly as a result of its structural consolidation and expansion, and it now has more than 600 full and sponsoring members, up from 580 in 2019. As part of its efforts to create additional regional organisations, Der III. Weg opened an office in Siegen, North Rhine-Westphalia, on 6 July 2020, modelled on its office in Plauen, Saxony, as a point of contact for the public and “national forces” within the territory of its West association. With its “national patrols” and neighbourhood watch programmes, Der III. Weg attempts to style itself the “troubleshooter party” and emphasise its supposed connection to mainstream society. In the reporting year it again organised campaigns such as its “German Winter Aid” campaign in which it collected clothing for those in need, but only if they were ethnically German, which is another issue the party focuses on. To “put future election campaigns on a legally secure footing”, at a national party conference in 2019 Der III. Weg adopted changes to its statutes intended to reorganise its existing regional associations as state associations. In line with this decision, the state associations in Saxony and Bavaria were founded, as was the West association. This gradual restructuring underscored the party’s intention to campaign in state and federal parliamentary elections, thereby meeting one of the conditions necessary to preserve the party. A group within the party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany) known as Der Flügel (The Wing) was classified as a subject of extended investigation (Verdachtsfall) by the domestic intelligence agencies in 2019. On 12 March 2020, the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) declared it proven that Der Flügel was engaged in right-wing

16 2020 REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION FACTS AND TRENDS extremist activities. The AfD’s national leadership then passed a resolution calling for Der Flügel to disband, but although it did so formally, effective 30 April 2020, it was apparent that it remained active during the reporting year. The leader of Der Flügel, Björn Höcke, stated that people associated with it remained active in the AfD and had not given up their political convictions. Despite its formal disbanding, functionaries and followers of Der Flügel seek influence within the AfD to advance their political agenda. Der Flügel claims that at least 20% to 30% of AfD members have supported it since 2019. Since spring 2020, the dominant political themes have been the coronavirus pandemic and the measures taken by the governments and parliaments at federal and state level to contain it. These themes also dominated the rallies and speeches initiated by Der Flügel supporters in the second half of the year. They consistently condemned all action by the government as illegal and unconstitutional, calling it a “corona dictatorship” and comparing it to the Enabling Act (Ermächtigungsgesetz) that gave Hitler the power to enact laws without the involvement of the parliament and to override the constitution. Some members of Der Flügel, which had been formally dissolved by that time, responded vehemently to the Islamist extremist attacks in France in the autumn of 2020. They not only accused all Muslims of having a greater propensity to violence and terrorism simply by virtue of their ethnicity, religion and culture; they also defamed Muslims by saying they were entirely incompatible with other faith communities and sketched out a plan for the step-by-step expulsion of Muslims from Europe. This fundamental rejection of the practice of Islam in Germany is incompatible with the freedom of religion guaranteed by Article 4 of the Basic Law. The Junge Alternative für Deutschland (JA, Young Alternative for Germany) was founded in 2013 and is the official youth organisation of the AfD according to the party’s statutes. In January 2019, the JA was classified as a subject of extended investigation. It has 15 state associations which are divided in turn into district and local associations. Again in the reporting period, there are facts of sufficient weight indicating that the JA’s main political ideas are maintaining the ethnic purity of the German people and excluding people of other ethnicities.

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The Neue Rechte (the New Right) appears in this edition of the report for the first time. The name covers an informal network of groups, individuals and organisations, from right-wing conservative to right-wing extremist, which work together to promote their sometimes anti-liberal and anti- democratic positions in society and the political sphere. The Neue Rechte includes among others the Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland (IDB, Identitarian Movement Germany), Institut für Staatspolitik (IfS, Institute for State Policy; subject of extended investigation), COMPACT-Magazin GmbH (COMPACT Magazine; subject of extended investigation) and Ein Prozent e.V. (One Per Cent; subject of extended investigation).

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Reichsbürger and Selbstverwalter The category of “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” (literally, “citizens of the Reich” and “self-administrators”) spans a broad range of individuals and organisations with very different ideologies. This category includes individuals not affiliated with any organisation, small to very small groupings, groups active across state borders, and virtual networks. What they all have in common is their fundamental rejection of the legitimacy and sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Germany and its legal order. Many of them dispute the validity of the Basic Law. This rejection stems from different ideological positions: for some of these people, aspects of territorial and historical revisionism are central, and they invoke the past German Reich under its various forms of government and within its different borders. Taken all together, the various facets combine to form a highly ideological view of the world as driven by conspiracies. For those who share it, this view can grow from total rejection to absolute hate of the state. It is often very difficult to distinguish between “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter”. The former refer to the continued existence of some kind of “German Reich” and reject the Federal Republic of Germany. By contrast, “Selbstverwalter” feel that they do not belong to the state. They claim they can secede from the state by making a declaration to that effect and are therefore not bound by its laws. They often invoke a UN resolution which they believe allows them to administer their affairs independently of the state. They may mark the borders of their residential property with (boundary) lines, signs, coats of arms or the like to indicate the extent of their supposedly sovereign area of administration. In some cases, they may defend this area using force, especially when claiming a right of self-defence. Only a small percentage of “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” are also right-wing extremists. Areas of overlap exist in particular with regard to territorial and historical revisionism, nationalist and to some extent National Socialist thought, and antisemitism. However, the large majority of “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” display few elements of right- wing extremist ideology, if any.

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The broad ideological spectrum of “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” means they have large numbers of sympathisers. Despite its diversity of views, the entire scene should be considered hostile to the state. In 2020, the scene was thought to comprise about 20,000 persons nationwide (2019: 19,000). About 1,000 of them can be considered right-wing extremists (2019: 950). About 2,000 of them are thought to be violence-oriented. This number includes violent members of the scene as well as persons who have come to the attention of the authorities by making threats or statements approving violence and having the relevant ideological content. The number of sympathisers rose slightly compared to the previous year. This increase mainly had to do with the protests against government measures to contain the coronavirus pandemic. Many “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” actively opposed these measures, for example by becoming very involved in the various demonstrations against federal and state measures to fight the pandemic. Their ideology is usually receptive to all kinds of conspiracy theories. For some “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter”, it is no longer enough to express their opposition at “hygiene demonstrations”; they also use simple physical force, for example against police officers assigned to the demonstrations. But even apart from their behaviour at demonstrations, some of their actions are criminal. The most common of these continues to be sending large numbers of long letters to government agencies and offices. These usually contain obscure or muddled arguments or claims and questionable interpretations of the law. Statements range from simple opposition to official activity all the way to extortion, insult and coercion, sometimes accompanied by threats of violence. Activities which earn some “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” considerable revenue from others in the scene remain especially important: seminars and sales of worthless fake documents represent a significant source of income. Because of the potential threat they pose to the free and democratic basic order, “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” are increasingly the focus of government action. On 19 March 2020, the Federal Minister of

20 2020 REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION FACTS AND TRENDS the Interior, Building and Community banned the “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” organisation Geeinte deutsche Völker und Stämme (GdVuSt, united German peoples and tribes) in accordance with Article 9 (2) of the Basic Law in conjunction with section 3 of the Associations Act. This was the first organisation associated with “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” to be banned. The organisation was heavily influenced by racist and antisemitic ideology. The “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” scene has considerable potential for violence. Members of the scene have repeatedly come into conflict with public service staff. “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” continue to pose a potential threat due to their affinity for weapons. By the end of 2020, at least 880 weapons permits held by “Reichsbürger” and “Selbstverwalter” had been revoked.

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Left-wing extremism The number of left-wing extremist sympathisers (after subtracting multiple memberships) rose by 2.4% to a total of 34,300 in 2020. More than one in four of all left-wing extremists can be classed as violence-oriented.

Left-wing extremist following¹

2019 2020 Violence-oriented left-wing extremists 9,200 9,600 including: Autonomists² 7,400 7,500 Anarchists³ 900 1,200 Strictly ideological left-wing extremists 900 900 Non-violent strictly ideological left-wing 25,300 25,800 extremists and other left-wing extremists Total 34,500 35,400 after subtracting multiple memberships 33,500 34,300

1 Some of these figures are estimated and rounded off. 2 This group includes post-autonomists as well as anarchists and anti-imperialists not affiliated with any organisation. 3 This group includes anarchosyndicalists and other anarchists affiliated with an organisation.

Left-wing extremists seek to do away with the existing state and social order, and therefore the free and democratic basic order. In its place, they want to establish a communist system or an anarchist society “without rulers”, possibly with a socialist transitional phase, depending on their ideological orientation. With this in mind, issues such as “anti- fascism”, “anti-repression” or “anti-gentrification” are, depending on the circumstances, relevant but ultimately interchangeable areas of action which only serve to advance left-wing extremists’ ideological notions. Left-wing extremists are in principle also willing to use violence to achieve their ends. The number of criminal offences motivated by left-wing extremism set a new record again in 2020. In the reporting period, 6,632 offences were recorded, representing an increase of 2.8% (2019: 6,449). A troubling development in 2020 was the increase of 34.3% in the number of violent left-wing extremist offences, to 1,237 offences from 921 in 2019. Five

22 2020 REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION FACTS AND TRENDS attempted homicides (2019: 2, an increase of 150%) and 423 cases of bodily injury (2019: 355, up 19.2%) clearly show that left-wing extremists are very willing to use violence. After a big jump in the number of arson attacks in the previous year, the increase in 2020 was rather moderate (2019: 164; 2020: 173, an increase of 5.5%). But the numerous riots by left-wing extremists in 2020 resulted among other things in 321 cases of breach of public peace (2019: 72, an increase of 345.8%). The already large number of property damage offences in 2019 (3,520) grew again by 6.1% in 2020 to 3,734. This increase in left-wing extremist offences and violent offences, which in some cases was dramatic, is part of a trend that has lasted with some fluctuation for nearly 20 years. There are no signs that left-wing extremists will end their use of violence. On the contrary, certain violence-oriented groups are committing more and more serious crimes and violent offences. Some violence-oriented left-wing extremists display obvious indications of radicalisation. The high level of radicalisation among some members of the scene is also apparent from the way crimes are committed and from the groups committing them. The intensity of the violent offences has again increased further. At the same time, a few small groups set themselves apart from the rest of the violence-oriented scene by increasingly crossing apparent “red lines” based on the left-wing extremist principle that violence should only be used to achieve a purpose. These trends are especially apparent in Leipzig, Berlin and Hamburg. But in Bavaria, Bremen, North Rhine-Westphalia (Hambacher forest), Saxony- Anhalt and Thuringia too, there are signs of growing radicalisation among certain elements of the violence-oriented scene, in particular with regard to the fight for “autonomous free spaces”, opposition to urban restructuring, and the “anti-fascist fight” against (supposed) right-wing extremists. Left-wing extremist attacks are increasingly violent, professional and personal. Left-wing extremists long viewed escalating demonstrations as an expression of their desire for revolution. But in recent years, there has been an obvious shift away from the “mass militancy” of demonstrations and towards violent acts by small groups acting covertly. Their violence has shifted to the sidelines of gatherings or is entirely independent of

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these events. Their violent acts are planned and carried out very carefully by a small group in isolation from the rest of the scene. The choice of targets has also changed: attacks are shifting from the institutional to the personal level. Victims are carefully selected and attacked in a highly aggressive manner. The perpetrators are increasingly willing to risk inflicting serious bodily injury, even to the point of death, on their victims. Left-wing extremists are mainly interested in intimidation and in creating a climate of fear for their political opponents and others who disagree with them, with the aim of keeping those who are directly or indirectly affected from taking a specific action or freely expressing their opinions. These actions may include participating in events, acting on behalf of a political party or group, or disseminating political views. In other cases, serious crimes are intended to “raise the stakes” for political or economic decisions, thereby influencing decision-makers. As the crimes have become more serious, the groups committing them have changed as well. There are indications in several federal states that small groups operating clandestinely are forming within the violence- oriented left-wing extremist scene. These groups carry out their own series of crimes and isolate themselves from the rest of the scene due to their greater willingness to use violence. They also ignore the consensus that has applied within the scene until now that violence is only acceptable to achieve a certain purpose and only if it is directed against property, and that it should not harm those who are not involved. The increasingly violent actions have met with little protest from the rest of the left- wing extremist scene, which instead justifies violence as a supposedly legitimate means of “defence”. In general, the language used has become more extreme. Broad statements extending to threats of violence or even, in a few cases, subtle death threats, are tacitly tolerated. If it is not stopped, isolation from the rest of the scene and the increasingly professional, clandestine, planned and targeted action by individual groups can lead to a spiral of radicalisation and ultimately to terrorist structures. The coronavirus pandemic and the government measures to contain it also had an impact on the activities of the left-wing extremist scene, although the scene did not develop any new strategies or patterns of action in response. In the early months of the pandemic, almost all

24 2020 REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION FACTS AND TRENDS left-wing extremist events were cancelled. A large number of ideological texts related to the pandemic were published on the relevant internet platforms, accusing the “capitalist system” of spreading the virus and discussing whether the government would take advantage of the public’s acceptance of “measures restricting freedom” and whether lasting “repression” would result. The discussion followed the familiar patterns with the addition of the pandemic simply as a new point of reference. The traditional left-wing extremist areas of action, “anti- repression” and “anti-fascism”, continued to be especially relevant. On the fringes of demonstrations against coronavirus-related restrictions, violence-oriented left-wing extremists targeted and physically attacked demonstrators whom they identified as right-wing extremists. They also attacked persons providing logistical support for the demonstrations. Violence-oriented left-wing extremists regularly commit crimes and violent offences in the name of “anti-fascism” which are directed against individuals or institutions which they define as “fascist”. Along with those they identify as right-wing extremists, these left-wing extremists also target the state and its free and democratic basic order. The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany) remains in the focus of violence-oriented left-wing extremists, who describe the party as a “first-class opponent”. Left-wing extremists regularly commit crimes and violent offences in attacking AfD members and property. “Capturing” and defending “autonomous free spaces” is extremely important for autonomous left-wing extremists in particular. Autonomists do not accept the public order, so they ignore existing ownership of property and establish sites where they hope to follow their own rules for living in a community. These sites may be squats, collective “housing projects” or independently run cultural centres which they view as symbols of resistance free from government supervision, influence or “the logic of capitalist exploitation”. Every kind of state intervention is seen as an attack on their self-determination. At the same time, these “free spaces” serve violence-oriented left-wing extremists as a base for their criminal activity and “militant campaigns” and as a safe haven. As user contracts or rental agreements expire, property is sold to new owners or neighbourhoods undergo restructuring, the scene is increasingly forced to abandon its “free spaces”. In 2020, this was the case

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particularly in Berlin when the squat Liebig34 was cleared of its left-wing extremist occupants and the bar Syndikat was closed; further pressure came from searches of the squat Rigaer94 and the anarchist bookshop Kalabal!k. The threatened loss of their “free spaces” typically provokes an extremely aggressive response from violence-oriented left-wing extremists. For example, the measures referred to above were followed by arson attacks across Germany and damage to vehicles and machines of estate agents and construction companies as well as to “luxury real estate”. Such attacks are intended to “raise the price” of political or business decisions and influence those making such decisions. Those thought to be responsible are also personally threatened and police officers are attacked at demonstrations or when patrolling near property claimed by left-wing extremists. The mere presence of police, emergency personnel or journalists in the vicinity of “free spaces” repeatedly provokes violent attacks. Through their ostensible support for the climate protest movement, left-wing extremists from various parts of the scene attempt to shift democratic discourse in order to add their own ideological positions, radicalise social protest and question the legitimacy of the state and its institutions. Left-wing extremists also use alliances, amongst other things, to attempt to influence protests. The alliance Ende Gelände, which is influenced by the Interventionistische Linke (IL, Interventionalist Left), plays a key role in this regard. The clearing of the Dannenröder forest in Hesse in autumn 2020 also provided an opening for left-wing extremist attempts to influence and radicalise the protests against the clearance. As the logging began on 1 October 2020, there was an increase in criminal offences and “militant actions” in the area. Organisations of strictly ideological left-wing extremists too participated in the climate protests and aggressively exploited them as a political platform. Along with attempts to influence the ideology of the protests, another focus is making personal contact with the protesters and recruiting new members. The left-wing extremist scene is characterised by its heterogeneity, which is apparent in the differing ideologies, degrees of organisation, preferred forms of action and relationship to violence of the different currents within the scene. The left-wing extremist scene can be divided

26 2020 REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION FACTS AND TRENDS into two camps – the violence-oriented and the non-violent – based on their attitudes towards the question whether violence is a legitimate means to achieve political objectives at the present time or only in a future “revolutionary situation”. Autonomists are by far the largest group among violence-oriented left-wing extremists, numbering some 7,500. Despite their ideological, strategic and organisational differences, they all share a fundamental belief that political action should focus on individuals and their self- realisation. They reject all forms of external control and view every type of government as authoritarian, to be replaced by an order free of domination. For this reason, they differ from Marxists in that they do not strive to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat in a transitional phase. Anarchists reject the subjugation of human beings by other human beings. This includes all forms of state rule, including those within liberal democracies. There are various currents within anarchism which differ in terms of their ideology or degree of organisation. Violence- oriented anarchists who tend to oppose organisation want to attack and violently overthrow the existing democratic constitutional state now. In this respect, they are similar to some elements within the autonomist spectrum. By contrast, anarchosyndicalism is highly organised, based on the idea of taking over the means of production through trade and labour unions in various economic sectors. Syndicalist anarchists are not interested in assuming political responsibility and seeking to change society from within the existing system. Instead, they want a revolution to overthrow every form of rule, including the democratic constitutional state and its institutions. Strictly ideological left-wing extremists base their ideology and politics principally on the theories of early communist thinkers such as Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. A common element is their central goal of establishing a socialist system which would then serve as the foundation for a “classless” communist society. A small segment of this group numbering about 900 violence-oriented, strictly ideological left-wing extremists explicitly accepts the use of violence.

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The vast majority of strictly ideological left-wing extremists cannot be considered violence-oriented. These include the orthodox communist Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP, Communist Party of Germany), the strictly Maoist-Stalinist Marxistisch-Leninistische Partei Deutschlands (MLPD, Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany) and the Trotzkyist Sozialistische Gleichheitspartei (SGP, Socialist Equality Party). The DKP, MLPD and their youth organisations in particular regularly conduct major outreach efforts to contact and recruit young people. With some 11,000 members and about 50 local groups throughout Germany, Rote Hilfe e.V. (RH, Red Aid) is one of the largest and most important groupings of left-wing extremists in Germany. Its member numbers have increased greatly in the last four years (2019: 10,500; 2018: 9,200; 2017: 8,300). It describes itself as an “independent left-wing organisation providing protection and solidarity to various movements”. Its main activity is supporting left-wing extremist offenders both during criminal proceedings and when in prison. The organisation provides political and social backing and gives legal and financial support. Rote Hilfe’s actions are intended to minimise the deterrent effects of criminal proceedings and to question the legitimacy of the democratic constitutional state. Through its financial support for potential criminals and violent offenders as well as its solidarity and public relations efforts, it also contributes to cohesion across the entire left-wing extremist spectrum.

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Islamist extremism/terrorism Overall, the numbers for 2020 show a year-on-year increase in the Islamist extremist following of around 2.5% to a total of 28,715 individuals (2019: 28,020).

Following in the field of Islamist extremism/terrorism¹

Organisations 2019 2020 Salafist Groups 12,150 12,150 Islamic State (IS) Al-Qaeda Core Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQM) Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) no no hard hard Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) numbers numbers Al-Shabab Hai’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) Tanzim Hurras al-Din (THD) Hezbollah 1,050 1,250 Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya (HAMAS) 380 450 Turkish Hezbollah (TH) 400 400 Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) 430 600 Muslim Brotherhood (MB) / Deutsche Muslimische Gemeinschaft e.V. 1,350 1,450 (DMG, German Muslim Community) Tablighi Jama’at (TJ) 650 650 no no Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg e.V. hard hard (IZH, Islamic Centre Hamburg) numbers numbers Millî Görüş movement and affiliated 10,000 10,000 associations (IGMG) Furkan Gemeinschaft (Furkan Community) 350 400 Hezb-e Islami-ye Afghanistan (HIA) 100 160 Others² 1,160 1,205

1 Figures refer to Germany; they are partly estimated and rounded off. 2 Other organisations whose membership figures and figures of followers are to be taken into account as regards the Islamist extremist following.

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The threat posed by Islamist terrorism in Germany remained at a high level in 2020. During the second half of the year in particular, this threat became more concrete in the form of a dynamic threat situation after several attacks were committed in Germany and Europe. A major factor in this were incidents involving criticism of Islam such as the publication of cartoons showing the Islamic prophet Muhammad. While no complex or multiple attacks directed by terrorist groups from abroad have been committed in Germany so far, such attacks may happen at any time. Most of the attacks carried out over the last few years were lone-perpetrator attacks, which are equally significant for the objectives of terrorist groups because they can also have a strong impact. Inspired by violence-oriented propaganda or by contacts with a terrorist organisation such as Islamic State (IS), lone perpetrators mainly choose “soft” targets that are easy to attack and use weapons that are easy to obtain and handle. In 2020, Germany saw several attacks presumably committed by lone perpetrators: • In Waldkraiburg (Bavaria) in April and May 2020, several business premises owned by people of Turkish origin were damaged and an arson attack was carried out on a grocery store. A suspect arrested at a later point said that he had acted out of hatred of Turkey and out of sympathy for IS. • In August 2020, an individual driving on the A100 urban motorway in Berlin caused at least six collisions, which left six people injured. It can be assumed that the attack was motivated by Islamist extremism, apparently facilitated by the suspect’s mental health issues. • In Dresden (Saxony) in early October 2020, a knife attack was committed against two tourists, one of whom later died. The perpetrator initially managed to flee the scene unrecognised, but a suspect was arrested in late October. The attack was probably motivated by Islamist extremism. Furthermore, the attacks carried out in the neighbouring countries France and Austria also affected the situation in Germany in autumn 2020: in late September 2020, two people were attacked in front of the former Charlie Hebdo editorial office in Paris. The perpetrator of that

30 2020 REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION FACTS AND TRENDS knife attack said he had assumed that the satirical magazine was still based in the building. In a Paris suburb in mid-October 2020, the history teacher Samuel Paty was beheaded in the street after he had shown and discussed Muhammad cartoons in class. In late October 2020, a knife attack presumably motivated by Islamist extremism was committed on people in Nice Cathedral, leaving three of them dead. These attacks took place in the context of the renewed debate surrounding the (re-)publication of Muhammad cartoons: On the occasion of the beginning of the trial, in early September 2020, against suspected helpers of the attackers who had stormed the editorial office in January 2015 and killed twelve people, Charlie Hebdo had once again published the cartoons. After the attacks, the French government clearly defended freedom of speech and the display of Muhammad cartoons, sparking anti-French protests in many Islamic countries. Anti-French feeling was also expressed in the Islamist extremist scene in Germany. In the Salafist/jihadist scene, high-profile incidents involving criticism of Islam – especially if they are linked with the prophet Muhammad or with the Koran – trigger highly emotional reactions that can range from general threats to concrete calls for violence. Even Islamist extremists who are not first and foremost violence-oriented consider these incidents a provocation and react to them by interpreting them in the context of their ideological convictions and by using them to mobilise their followers. The incidents were followed by a public discussion in France and elsewhere that also centred on legalist Islamist extremism, which was raised as an issue in a number of reactions from within state and society including government officials at the highest level. This sparked strong reactions especially from among non-violent and legalist Islamist extremists. Through numerous statements in the media, Islamist extremist associations and groups condemned the display of Muhammad cartoons. While some also condemned the murder of Paty, others qualified the crime. Some of the reactions considered the incidents to be proof of an alleged generally Islamophobic attitude in Western societies and in part included explanations with antisemitic connotations. The term “Islamophobia”, which is frequently used in that context, is used to

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present a victim narrative according to which the majority society supposedly rejects Islam as a religion in its entirety. Anti-colonialist and anti-racist arguments are often used in that connection as well. On that basis, Islamist extremists claim that living the Islamic faith in conformity with the rules is only possible through a return to a purely Islamic identity – a hypothetic idea – and through isolation from all external influence. The fact that this topic has a relevant potential for mobilisation, which sometimes even stretches beyond the extremist spectrum, is proved by the demonstrations held in connection with the incidents in France. In late October 2020, for example, Islamist extremist groups held high- profile protests in front of the Brandenburg Gate not far from the French embassy in Berlin. Participants carried out activities similar to flash mobs, among other things. In the city centre of Vienna in early November 2020, an attacker shot four people dead and injured more than 20, some of them seriously. Enforcement measures were also taken in Germany against individuals suspected of having ties to the perpetrator. The attacks committed in France and Austria in autumn 2020 underline the persisting threat in Europe posed by attacks motivated by Islamist extremism. It cannot be ruled out that there might be copycat attacks in Germany, especially by lone perpetrators inspired by such attacks. Responsibility for the attack in Vienna was later claimed by IS, which shows that European countries participating in or regarded as belonging to the “anti-IS coalition” can still become targets of attacks motivated by Islamist extremism. With the propaganda spread after the attack, IS has revealed its continued interest in convincing its sympathisers of its capabilities and in thereby recruiting new followers. Over the last few years, the terrorist organisation has less often claimed responsibility for attacks carried out in Germany and Europe, and the perpetrators seldom expressed their loyalty for any specific jihadist group explicitly. At the same time, both IS and al-Qaeda including their regional branches continue to claim a leading position in the global jihad they are striving for. The Federal Republic of Germany as well as its interests and institutions worldwide thus continue to be among the

32 2020 REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION FACTS AND TRENDS direct targets of various terrorist organisations and jihadist groups, who still want to seize every available opportunity to commit terrorist attacks. The German security agencies hold intelligence indicating that more than 1,070 individuals have left Germany for Syria or Iraq out of Islamist extremist motives since 2012. Approximately one third of these individuals have returned to Germany by now. Several individuals – chiefly women and their minor children – returned to Germany in 2020 as well. Many other individuals are still imprisoned or in custody in Northern Syria or in Iraq. There is intelligence on some of them indicating that they intend to return to Germany. Last year also saw criminal convictions of individuals having returned from the jihadist conflict zones in Syria and Iraq. Many of them are currently serving sentences in German prisons. At present, the total number of final convictions against returnees is in the medium two- digit range. Dealing with Islamist extremists imprisoned in Germany, preventing Islamist extremist radicalisation in German prisons and dealing with Islamist extremists after their release from prison are special challenges for the judicial and security authorities as well as for state and non-state actors tasked with deradicalisation and reintegration. Salafism mostly provides the ideological foundation for violence- oriented jihadism. While a large part of the Salafist scene sees violence as one legitimate option among many, violence in jihadism is the principal method to achieve one’s aims. The development of the Salafist scene in recent years has been strongly influenced by the conflict in Syria and Iraq, in particular by the rise and fall of IS, but also by governmental bans. The “orientation phase” that the scene has been in over the last few years still continues, as the figures of the Salafist following – among other aspects – show: The total number of 12,150 individuals has not changed in 2020 compared with the preceding year. This stagnation has to be viewed, among other things, in the context of the social distancing rules imposed due to the coronavirus pandemic. Furthermore, successful state measures may also have resulted in an at least temporary withdrawal or inactivity of the scene. Limited public visibility of the scene’s activities continues, as does the tendency towards withdrawal into private life, which has not least been furthered by successful state measures. Overall, there is less contact between the scene’s members compared to previous years

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but at the same time has sporadic contacts to other Islamist extremist organisations. However, this partially indistinct picture must not be interpreted as a weakening of the potential threat. To a considerable degree, the Salafist scene is still the breeding ground for violence-prone jihadist networks. In 2020 too, groups were active in Germany whose Islamist terrorist objectives relate to conflicts abroad. These organisations and their followers use Germany as a safe haven and for a variety of support activities. One example of this is the Shia terrorist organisation Hezbollah, whose activities were banned by the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community in spring 2020: The banning order established that the organisation opposes the concept of international understanding because it continues to question Israel’s right to exist and calls for the violent elimination of the country. Antisemitism is an essential element of the ideology of the entire Islamist extremist spectrum. The German domestic intelligence community again identified a large number of antisemitic incidents in 2020. These incidents ranged from antisemitic speeches and sermons to anti-Jewish postings on social media and verbal or physical attacks on Jewish people. 2020 was characterised by the repercussions of the coronavirus pandemic for the Islamist extremist scene too. From spring 2020 onwards, there were reactions to the spread of the disease and to the governmental measures to contain the pandemic from within the entire Islamist extremist spectrum. Because of the temporary restrictions on public life imposed in connection with the fight against coronavirus, many of the previous targets for terrorist attacks motivated by Islamist extremism became unavailable. This does not at all mean, however, that attacks are impossible, especially when it comes to attacks committed using simple means. As a result of the pandemic, trips abroad by Islamist extremists or their return from Syria and Iraq have become more difficult or have been delayed. Because of the temporary restrictions on public life, the entire Islamist extremist scene has also shifted many of its activities to the Internet and to social media. The annual “Quds Day” demonstrations, for instance, were cancelled by

34 2020 REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION FACTS AND TRENDS the organisers in 2020 and replaced with an online “Quds Day” event held at short notice. During the first wave in spring 2020 in particular, the pandemic triggered a variety of propagandistic reactions from within the jihadist scene: there were attempts, through videos and postings, to integrate the spread of the virus into jihadist beliefs and/or to interpret it as part of a divine plan targeting “infidels”. For example, the virus was glorified as a “soldier of Allah”, allegedly more effective than any of the previous terrorist attacks. While conspiracy theories were now and then spread in connection with the coronavirus pandemic (e.g. from within the Shia extremist spectrum) and measures to contain the pandemic were criticised as a “massive curtailment of human rights”, legalist associations and groups largely complied with the preventive measures imposed by the authorities.

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Extremist efforts of foreigners posing a threat to security (excluding Islamist extremism) In 2020, the following of extremist organisations of foreigners posing a threat to security other than Islamist extremist organisations fell to a total of 28,650 individuals (2019: 28,820). This drop exclusively concerned the number of non-Turkish separatists. As before, the largest organisation in Germany in terms of numbers is the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) counting 14,500 followers (2019: 14,500).

Following of extremist organisations of foreigners (excluding Islamist extremism)¹ 2019 2020 Kurdistan Workers‘ Party (PKK) 14,500 14,500 Turkish right-wing extremists 11,000 11,000 Turkish left-wing extremists 2,550 2,550 Others² 770 600 Total 28,820 28,650

1 Figures refer to Germany; they are partly estimated and rounded off. They also include the following of banned groups. 2 Comprises the Germany-based followers of other worldwide groups that are extremist and/or pose a threat to security. This includes 100 followers of organisations with a connection to other countries for which there is sufficiently weighty factual indications of efforts that are extremist and/or pose a threat to security, which is why BfV systematically monitors the respective groups as a Verdachtsfall (subject of extended investigation to verify a suspicion).

The number of criminal and violent offences associated with extremism by foreigners fell considerably in 2020. 661 offences were registered in total, which is a decrease by 51.2% (2019: 1,354). Probably, this was above all thanks to the pandemic-related cancellation of most large-scale events, rallies and other activities attended by many people, which characterise this field like no other. Furthermore, unlike in the two preceding years, in 2020 there were no larger ground offensives by the Turkish military in the Kurdish settlement areas in Northern Syria, which had aroused strong emotions in Germany, especially among PKK followers. The public appearances of foreign extremist players having been few, there were hardly any encounters between opposing groups. Accordingly, the number of violent offences fell by 68.1% to 79 (2019: 248). Nevertheless, followers of extremist organisations of foreigners still partly show a high readiness to use violence. It therefore has to be assumed that

36 2020 REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION FACTS AND TRENDS this substantial decline in the number of criminal and violent offences will not last. Once the restrictions related to the pandemic are lifted or once incidents occur in the relevant home regions that provoke intense emotions among the followers of extremist organisations of foreigners living in Germany, the number of criminal and violent offences will probably rise again. For the very most part, the political agitation of the extremist organisations of foreigners as well as their respective level of militancy depend on the political developments in their home countries. As a rule, their followers in Germany are given politico-strategic guidelines by the organisations in their respective home countries, and they are ready to consistently put them into practice. PKK, the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C), and the right-wing extremist Ülkücü movement are of particular relevance to Germany’s internal security: PKK because of violent actions undertaken in its home region, DHKP-C with its overt commitment to armed conflict in Turkey and the Ülkücü movement due to its partly militant denial of the principle of equality. The ongoing military conflict between the Turkish military and PKK guerrilla units continues to be a dominant topic within the organisation. As a result of the tense situation in the Kurdish settlement areas in Turkey, Northern Syria and Northern Iraq, PKK still manages to mobilise its followers in Germany for demonstrations related to specific incidents and for events held every year. PKK’s activities in 2020 were significantly restricted by the governmental measures taken in connection with the coronavirus pandemic. This is why the scope of the organisation’s actions, which are usually extensive and important, narrowed sharply compared to the previous years. Although public events were limited in 2020 due to the coronavirus pandemic, the organisation is still able to mobilise individuals far beyond its own circle of followers. In 2020, no terrorist actions by DHKP-C were detected in Turkey. The organisation is currently unable to implement its agenda of “armed conflict” as intensively as in the years from 2012 to 2016. This is probably due to the increased security measures introduced in Turkey after the failed military coup in 2016. For example, the period under review again saw arrests and

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searches by Turkish security forces that were directed against DHKP-C and its supporters. The structures of DHKP-C in Germany constitute a “rear front”: they are of fundamental importance as a logistical supply base and a safe haven, and they are crucial for the “armed conflict”. In Germany the organisation tries to provoke public reactions through various propaganda activities. The scope and purpose of campaign activities in Germany are significantly determined by incidents in the relevant home countries. Because of the repercussions of the coronavirus pandemic, during the period under review, DHKP-C also had to cancel some of its propagandistically important events and rallies as well as concerts by the music band Grup Yorum associated with it. The organisation tried to maintain contact with its followers, especially via social networks. The right-wing extremist Turkish Ülkücü ideology is mainly represented in Germany by the part of the movement that is organised in associations. Keen to convey a public image of moderateness, the three large umbrella organisations cultivate their right-wing extremist ideology chiefly internally, in particular in their associations. The remaining Ülkücü followers, most of whom are not organised in any way, show their racist ideas of superiority mainly on the Internet. During public encounters with political opponents, they display their considerable potential for violence time and again. In 2020, in particular due to the pandemic-related restrictions, Turkish right-wing extremists undertook practically no public activities and participated in hardly any Turkish nationalist events in support of Turkey and of the country’s military action. Community life in the associations temporarily came to a near standstill. During that time, Ülkücü followers mostly moved their activities to the Internet. Presumably, it was mainly because of the considerable drop in the number of events that Germany saw hardly any larger clashes between opposing extremist groups from Turkey in 2020. Previously, there had repeatedly been spontaneous mutual criminal and violent offences, chiefly during demonstrations and especially between Turkish right-wing extremists not organised in associations and young PKK followers. Regardless of the improvement of the situation, which is entirely due to the pandemic, this tension will continue to pose a threat to internal security in Germany.

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Intelligence activities, espionage, cyber attacks and other activities which threaten security, carried out on behalf of a foreign power Foreign powers use their intelligence services and other means of covert activity available to them against the Federal Republic of Germany to gain protected information, exert influence and pursue their own interests. From the perspective of counter-intelligence, this complex threat is growing. Due to its role in international institutions such as its membership in NATO and the EU, Germany is a target for a wide range of political espionage. In addition to espionage targeting the political sphere and government administration, innovative businesses and research institutions are also a target for industrial espionage carried out by foreign intelligence services. Cases of state-sponsored terrorism in which foreign intelligence services or structures controlled by foreign states play a central role constitute a further serious threat. Espionage, foreign influence and state-sponsored terrorism have considerable negative effects for Germany, including violating national sovereignty, weakening Germany’s negotiating positions by leaking confidential documents in advance, and illegitimately influencing the democratic process. Violations of the law constitute an additional threat. When foreign intelligence services in Germany investigate and infiltrate opposition groups from non-EU countries, this not only creates a climate of fear but can also threaten people’s lives and health. Industrial espionage and the resulting illegal transfer of knowledge and technology also harm companies and the economy as a whole. The activities of foreign powers also include acquiring know-how and products to develop and manufacture weapons of mass destruction and delivery system technology (proliferation). Regional conflicts and armaments policy ambitions, some of which relate to outer space, drive these covert government activities which may be assisted by intelligence services. While the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Turkey remain the main countries engaged in espionage activities and in seeking to exert influence on

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Germany, Germany’s reconnaissance, counter-intelligence and cyber defence efforts are directed against all illegal intelligence activities. Such “360° processing” may uncover evidence of activities in Germany by intelligence services with which the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) otherwise has trusting co-operation based on partnership. But even in these cases, foreign intelligence services using telecommunications surveillance or human sources to engage in espionage in or against Germany cannot be tolerated. Russian espionage focuses on all fields of German policy which may affect Russia. Its intelligence-gathering activities target alliance policy in particular, along with foreign and economic policy. Russia also seeks ways to end the political and economic sanctions imposed by the EU following Russia’s incursion into Ukraine in 2014. German counter-intelligence puts special priority on preventing state- sponsored terrorism, such as assassinations possibly ordered by the Russian intelligence services. In the case of a Georgian national killed in Berlin on 23 August 2019, the Federal Public Prosecutor General believes there is sufficient objective evidence to suspect that the central government of the Russian Federation could have ordered the assassination. The Kremlin is also continuing its efforts to exert influence in Germany through various channels. Government television, radio and Internet channels intentionally disseminate narratives favourable to the Russian leadership all over the world, including Germany. Russia also uses social media, state-sponsored and private institutes (such as think tanks) and influential individuals as tools. All of these efforts are aimed at discrediting the Federal Government, polarising political discourse and undermining trust in government. Russian intelligence services make extensive use of cyber attacks. Most of the attacks that have been detected were intended to gather intelligence, i.e. conduct espionage. These cyber espionage operations aim above all to increase Russia’s domestic and foreign security, to secure strategic influence and to promote Russian military and energy exports and Russian cutting-edge technology. The information gained is sometimes also used to spread disinformation and propaganda. At times Russian

40 2020 REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION FACTS AND TRENDS intelligence services display a willingness to engage in sabotage and to manipulate data during their cyber activities. Russian cyber attacks mainly target government entities, parliaments and politicians, the military, supranational organisations, international businesses, and scientific and research institutions. Journalists, NGOs, media companies, major international banks, and anyone who criticises the government are also targeted. The scope of political espionage by China has significantly increased in recent years. China’s demand for information on supranational entities such as the EU as well as on Western alliance policy, major international events and global organisations such as the World Health Organisation is growing in tandem with China’s importance as a global player. Information on foreign governments’ political and economic positions related to the People’s Republic (such as the involvement of Chinese companies in building 5G networks or the response to the coronavirus pandemic) are essential for strategic decision-making by the Chinese leadership. Business and industry, research, technology and the military continue to be intelligence targets. The same applies to the popular movements which the Chinese authorities call the “Five Poisons”,2 fearing that they threaten national unity and the Communist Party’s monopoly on power. The regime also continues to rely on comprehensive monitoring of Chinese nationals abroad. China has intensified its efforts to buy up medium-sized German companies in the high-tech sector in order to close gaps in technology and carry out its ambitious industrial and high-tech programmes as well as its new Five-Year Plan.3 And China continues its targeted recruitment of experts for the same purposes. China’s long-term strategic foreign trade policy includes its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)4 and the fusion of civilian and military industry5 to make its own industry less dependent on foreign technology and foreign suppliers.

2 The movements which Chinese authorities call the “Five Poisons” include the independence movements of the Uyghur and Tibetan ethnic minorities, the anti-regime Falun Gong movement, the democracy movement and the movement advocating sovereignty for the island of Taiwan. The democracy movement in Hong Kong has been added to this list based on developments since summer 2019. 3 The Five-Year Plan sets the course for the centrally administered Chinese economy. The 14th Five-Year Plan applies in the People’s Republic of China from 2021 to 2025. 4 An investment programme presented by the country and party leaders in 2013 (also called the New Silk Road initiative) which encompasses global Chinese infrastructure investment. 5 “Civilian-military fusion” refers to the Chinese leadership’s desire for the mutual interpenetration of civilian industry and the arms industry.

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China continues to invest directly in various sectors, especially cutting- edge technologies and the semi-conductor industry. To carry out its strategic master plans successfully, China needs a favourable environment abroad. It aims to create such an environment by exerting social, economic and political influence. In the political sphere, China seeks to win over well-connected (active and retired) German politicians as “lobbyists” to promote Chinese interests. But it also puts direct pressure on German politicians who criticise Chinese policy. The regime also continues to rely on comprehensive monitoring of Chinese nationals abroad. Chinese citizens and Germans of Chinese origin who have close ties to the Chinese community abroad are under considerable pressure to toe the Party line, and the threat of sanctions restricts their fundamental right of free speech. In 2020, the growing use of digital technologies and remote access solutions, such as those used to work from home during the pandemic, dramatically increased the potential targets for Chinese cyber attacks on politicians and political organisations, government administration, business and industry, and the research community everywhere in the world. BfV assumes that German entities are facing greater potential threats from state-sponsored cyber attacks originating in China. Chinese intelligence services have the capacity to conduct long-term, strategic cyber espionage. They are able to carry out targeted, highly complex attacks and mount multiple global attack campaigns in parallel. In recent years, Chinese cyber attackers have become increasingly sophisticated, especially when it comes to disguising their attacks. The selection of victims in business and industry and in the political sphere clearly corresponds to the political and economic goals set by the Chinese government. In the past, Chinese hackers concentrated above all on economic targets such as major companies listed on the German stock exchange as well as highly specialised and innovative companies in the chemical, shipping and arms industries. In the meantime, a new focus on political targets by presumably Chinese hackers has become apparent, although cyber attacks on economic targets continue at the same level of intensity as before. At brief intervals, extensive campaigns of attacks on multiple

42 2020 REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION FACTS AND TRENDS government networks, foundations and political research institutions in Europe, as well as governments, political parties and high-tech producers in South-East Asia were detected. These politically motivated attacks were likely intended to gather intelligence on strategies for political action, on positions and content related to negotiations, and on the progress of policy-making. The priorities of the Iranian intelligence services are to spy on and suppress opposition movements and actors at home and abroad. In addition, the services gather political and military intelligence in Western countries. Iran sees itself as a regional power and is intent on shaping politics beyond its own borders, with a pronounced anti-Western and anti-Israeli thrust. As a result, the Iranian regime is interested in information on the future policy of the West – for example Germany‘s foreign and security policy. Iranian intelligence activities are driven by the crises and conflicts in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region. The main organisations behind these activities are the Ministry of Intelligence (VAJA,6 usually rendered as MOIS) and the Quds Force, a special intelligence unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards,7 both of which operate in Germany. Iran’s declared enemies include not only the U.S. but also the State of Israel and its representatives and prominent supporters. This may include leading representatives of organisations in the Jewish diaspora. Iranian intelligence-related organisations therefore continue to spy on (pro-) Israeli and (pro-)Jewish targets in Germany. News media reported in August 2020 that a high-ranking member of an Iranian opposition group – who is also a German citizen – was kidnapped by Iranian security operatives while travelling to Dubai. He later appeared on state-run television and confessed to having committed ostensibly terrorist acts in Iran. Iran increasingly uses such arbitrary arrests and kidnappings ordered by the intelligence services to catch prominent targets. On 23 March 2020, the Koblenz Higher Regional Court in Rhineland- Palatinate sentenced a German-Afghan national to six years and ten months in prison on charges of an especially serious case of treason. The co-accused, who was also his wife, was sentenced to imprisonment for

6 In Farsi: Vezarat-e Ettela’at-e Jomhouri-ye Eslami-ye Iran – VAJA. 7 In Farsi: Sepah Pasdaran.

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ten months for being an accessory to treason. The enforcement of her custodial sentence was suspended on probation. The convicted man worked for the Bundeswehr as a translator and cultural adviser and was found guilty of having passed on knowledge gleaned from this position to an Iranian intelligence agency. On 4 February 2021, an Iranian diplomat previously accredited in Vienna, Austria, was sentenced by a Belgian court to the maximum penalty of 20 years in prison. He was found guilty of having organised a bombing at a convention of the People’s Mujahedin Organisation of Iran (MEK) opposition group in France in 2018 on behalf of the Iranian intelligence service MOIS. He was arrested in Germany on 1 July 2018 on a European arrest warrant and subsequently extradited to Belgium. The Federal Prosecutor General at the Federal Court of Justice is also investigating the diplomat. Three others were found guilty of helping to carry out the bombing and also received long prison sentences. Iranian hackers have significantly improved their technological skills to carry out cyber operations. The main targets of their attacks are Iran’s traditional enemies, above all Saudi Arabia, Israel and the U.S. However, repeated attacks against other Western, mainly European, countries including Germany have also been detected. The primary targets were politicians and political organisations, government administration, business and industry, educational and research institutions, dissidents, and members of the opposition. In Germany, the increase in Iranian cyber activities is apparent from their greater use of German IT infrastructure. German companies have also been a repeated focus of Iranian actors. In addition, there are growing indications that Iranian groups classed as advanced persistent threats (APT) are interested in spying on dissidents, human rights activists and journalists of Iranian origin who live in Europe. Educational and research institutions such as universities are also a target of Iranian cyber attackers. Turkey’s intelligence services and security authorities, such as the National Intelligence Organisation (Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MİT) are an integral part of Turkey’s security architecture. They help the Turkish government, the president and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) implement government policy, maintain domestic security and, not least, gather information to prepare policy decisions.

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Germany remains one of the top foreign intelligence targets of the Turkish intelligence services and security authorities. The Turkish intelligence services and security authorities focus above all on organisations which Turkey classifies as extremist or terrorist. They are also very interested in intelligence concerning organisations and individuals which oppose or are thought to oppose the Turkish government. Turkey also focuses its intelligence activities on politics, industry and the military, as well as the research and high-tech sectors. These activities by the Turkish intelligence services and security authorities are accompanied by attempts to influence the Turkish community in Germany, which can also have an impact on political opinion and decision-making throughout German society. This strategy of exerting influence largely consists of pointing out supposed and actual cases of racism, Islamophobia and anti-Turkish sentiment, as well as exaggerating and emphasising problems in Germany and Europe to counter criticism of political developments in Turkey. To identify and prevent the threats described here, BfV is in close contact with its national and international partners. At the National Cyber Response Centre, the German authorities responsible for preventing cyber threats intensively share information and closely coordinate protective and preventive measures. Preventive economic security is a core task of BfV and the other German domestic intelligence services. All information and knowledge relevant for protecting companies and research institutions are shared as part of their close co-operation. Together with the responsible domestic intelligence services at state level, BfV has conducted numerous on-site events to educate individual companies and research institutions about the risks of espionage. BfV is also involved in further developing the Economic Security Initiative coordinated by the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community to prevent threats to companies and business in the real world and in cyberspace. This initiative brings together security authorities, companies and associations, and educational and research institutions to apply their combined expertise in analysing urgent security risks and developing practicable responses.

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Security of classified information and counter-sabotage Information that could endanger or damage the existence, the security or the interests of the Federation or a federal state if it became known requires special protection. Only sufficiently reliable individuals may be granted access to such information. Personnel security is responsible for ascertaining this reliability through background checks. The instruments used for this are set out in the Act on Prerequisites and Procedures for Security Clearance Checks Undertaken by the Federal Government8 (Security Clearance Check Act (Sicherheitsüberprüfungsgesetz, SÜG)). The aim of preventive personnel protection against sabotage is to ensure that no one considered a security risk is allowed to work in a security- sensitive position in a vital or defence-essential facility. The Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) is required by law to participate in federal-level security clearance checks. It is responsible for taking the measures required by law in connection with security checks on behalf of the competent bodies.9 These measures vary depending on the type of check required. In the last five years, BfV has contributed to an average of approx. 50,000 security clearance checks a year related to the security of classified information and protection against sabotage. In 2020, 7,034 simple security checks, 47,078 extended security checks and 2,420 extended security checks including security investigations were carried out in connection with the security of classified information. Another 6,695 checks were done in connection with counter-sabotage, along with 18,098 updates of security checks. This continues the trend in recent years towards more and increasingly in-depth security clearance checks.

8 Classified material is defined as sensitive facts, objects or intelligence, regardless of the forms these take, which must be kept secret in the public interest, in particular to protect the welfare of the country as a whole or of one of the federal states. 9 Whether a security clearance check is necessary is determined by the employer responsible or, if the employee in question is employed by a private enterprise, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi).

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The Scientology organisation (SO) The Scientology organisation (SO) seeks to establish a global society based on Scientology. The number of members in Germany was about 3,500 in 2020, the same as in 2019. During the reporting year, the SO was again very active online, as it was largely unable to operate its usual information stands in cities across Germany due to the coronavirus pandemic. The ideology of the Scientology Organisation (SO) is strictly based on the writings of its founder and leading figure Lafayette Ron Hubbard (1911-1986), who invented a method he called “technology”, “dianetics” and “Scientology”. This method is intended to create the perfect human, called “clear” or “non-aberrated”. People who are not “clear” are to be denied fundamental rights and human dignity. During the reporting year, the SO responded to the coronavirus pandemic in Germany with its multimedia “Stay Well” campaign, which distributed Scientology information material containing what were purportedly tips for staying healthy. The campaign was specifically intended to take advantage of the public’s fears and uncertainty in connection with the pandemic to recruit new members. In response to the pandemic in Germany, the SO sub-organisation Volunteer Ministers and its German counterpart distributed flyers nationwide. These flyers contained a QR code which supposedly provided more information about infection prevention but instead led to Scientology websites. The SO produced videos for its YouTube channel specifically tailored to the pandemic situation, with titles such as “How to keep yourself and others healthy” and “How to use isolation to prevent the spread of diseases”. These videos are intended to get viewers to visit the SO’s official homepage and the “Stay Well” campaign’s Facebook page. The SO continues its various social campaigns and operates ostensible aid organisations. These seemingly charitable organisations are not immediately recognisable as part of Scientology and are another way to recruit new members.

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Publication data

Published by Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community Alt-Moabit 140 10557 Berlin, Germany

Editorial team Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) 1B7: Central Reporting

Design and printing Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) Print and Media Centre

English translation Language Services Division, Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community Language Services, Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV)

The brief summary of the 2020 Report on the Protection of the Constitu- tion: Facts and Trends is also available on the Internet at www.verfassungsschutz.de

This brochure has been published as part of the public information efforts of the Federal Government. It is available free of charge and is not for sale. It may not be used by any political party, candidate or campaign workers during an election campaign for purposes of campaign advertising.