Marko Jurjako Marko Submitted to Submitted U Philosophy NDER 2010 by E MPIRICAL a SSESSMENT CEU Etd Collection Most of the Tenets of Moral of of the Rationalism

CEU eTD Collection In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts in M ORAL R ATIONALISM Supervisor: Professor Christophe Heintz Christophe Professor Supervisor: Central European University European Central Department of Philosophy of Department Budapest, Hungary Marko Jurjako Marko Submitted to Submitted U Philosophy NDER 2010 By E MPIRICAL A SSESSMENT CEU eTD Collection most of the tenets of moral of of the rationalism. mosttenets undermine findings empirical that conclude I findings. empirical these on arguments my base and an give I Finally, mathematics. overview of of the relevant empirical rationality studies the that bear significancewith make on the ideas of moralontological rationalism and rationalist moral that epistemological on analogy based it of characterization own my give I claim, rationalist justificatory the of literature, philosophical in the specification, insufficient the of because moral rationalismI follow the philosophical in literature differentiating conceptual, psychological justificatory and rationalism. moral philosophical of ideas implicit and explicit the on psychology moral empirical and spell out the relevant differences between these claims. Furthermore, In this thesis I explore theABSTRACT impact and arguments that were based on recent discoveries in i CEU eTD Collection eeecs...... 45 References ...... 43 Conclusion ...... 36 rationalism Justificatory 3: Chapter hpe :Eprclmdl fmrljdmns...... 12 judgments moral of models Empirical 2: Chapter rationalism...... 6 Conceptual 1: Chapter Introduction...... 1 Figures...... iii of List Table ofContents . utfctr omtv els ...... 39 realism normative Justificatory 3.3 ...... 38 rationality full of conditions under Justification 3.2 justification...... 36 contingent of problem The 3.1 . mlctoso h miia aafrtepyhlgclrtoaim...... 29 rationalism psychological for the data empirical of the 2.5 Implications ...... 22 judgment of moral model ‘’Rawlsian’’ 2.4 ...... 19 judgment moral of model Greene’s 2.3 model...... 16 intuitionist social Haidt’s 2.2 ...... 13 dumbfounding Moral 2.1 study...... 9 (2002) Nichols’ to Objections 1.1 claims...... 2 rationalist moral Three rationalism...... 1 Moral 2.5.1 ‘Acquired sociopathy’ and psychopaths...... 32 and sociopathy’ ‘Acquired 2.5.1 analogy...... 27 linguistic strong and Weak 2.4.1 ii CEU eTD Collection Figure 4: ''Rawlsian'' model of moral judgment...... 24 moral of model ''Rawlsian'' 4: Figure judgment...... 22 moral of model 3:Greene's Figure ...... 18 judgment moral of model intuitionist 2:Social Figure ...... 13 judgment moral of model rationalist 1:The Figure L IST OF F IGURES iii CEU eTD Collection means that moral requirements are requirements of practical rationality and that validity of moral of validity that norms can bejustifiedand capacities by forour using practical reasoning. This idea basing of rationality practical of requirements are requirements moral that means moral based judgments moral reason, are practical idea of the and accordingly duties on which Moral rationalism moral of main of rationalism. the some tenets basedon them undermine and theories empirical will data I that andargue feasible, therefore not are moral ambitions of rationalism that 1739/40,Nicholsalign myself Hume 2004,Prinz with (e.g. philosophers those knowledge andits Greene modality (e.g. 2008a,Nichols 2004,Prinz moral knowledge, moral motivation, moral agency and its implications for the nature of moral gavenew a incentive in reconsidering philosophical conceptions of relation between the reason, psychologists notably,in andneuroscientists. Most work moral has influencedpsychology and interdisciplinaryinspiredbetween philosophers asignificant philosophers, and work moral on impact madeaconsiderable has processes andintuitive of importance affective (Greene & HaidtHaidt 2002, 2007). This in move scientific investigation and discovery of unconscious)neural mechanisms thatandstructures a play in role social and moral cognition understanding describing moral knowledge to andinvestigating underlying intuitive(mostly intrends moral psychology have from moved emphasizing reasoningthe inabilities judgments, moral producing in processes affective and intuitive of importance the discovering of asaconsequence of decades, couple Inlast inmetaethics. debates psychology on contemporary nature ofmoral judgment; more I will narrowly, impactexamine the in of moral trends recent the I NTRODUCTION Historically the most influentialHistorically most moralKant,was Kant 1788).Accordingthe to rationalist (1785, In my thesis I will be dealing with the issue of the origin of our moral knowledge and the 1 2006). In this2006). Iwill thesis 2006) who claim 2006) who CEU eTD Collection 4 3 made by Nichols (2004). 2 follow Joyce (2008) in calling the latterform of rationalist claim psychological rationalism. 1 do that, then she is being irrational. being is she then that, do judges shethat hasa helpto reason the in starving children Africa, andif motivated isnot to one one then Africa in children starving help to right morally is it that judges one when example, The isfor action’’ that, claim p. 64). is of (1994, a reasonfor of aconcept a moral requirement concept it, “our or asSmith puts Smith 1994), 1986, of reason(Korsgaard requirements practical are moral requirements that true conceptually is it claim, rationalist conceptual the to According Conceptual rationalism is a descriptive claim about our concepts of moral requirements. moral requirements. paribus will, agents ceteris all rational that truth psychological conceptual, morality rationality: between and connection the about claims of kinds three into unfolded be can reason practical on rests morality that idea basicrationalist that,the Becauseof morality basing on reason. ideaof of the conceptions forthcoming, all Scanlon However,1998, Smith 1994). not of samethe them would accept Parfit distinguishedmoral 1986,1996,2008, Darwall 1982,Korsgaard (e.g. philosophers In contemporary philosophy moral rationalism in some of its forms is defended by Three moral rationalist claims moral to actin reason with requirements. accordance objectivity the justify and explain to one ofenables it since moralattractive is rationality of norms on morality demands, and it also secures that every rational person can recognize the Since in such a case the agent would fail to act in a way that she believes she has a reason to act. Ceteris paribus clause encompasses various forms of irrationality (weakness of the will, depressions, etc.). depressions, will, ofthe (weakness ofirrationality forms various encompasses clause paribus Ceteris Joyce (2008) introduced thejustificatory rationalism as a separate form of moral rationalism into the distinction Nichols (2004,p.67) introduced thedistinctionbetween conceptual andempirical rationalism; however,I will 3 Hence, conceptual rationalism claims that it isit aconceptual claims that rationalism Hence, conceptual 2 4 , act in accordance with what she believes to be 1 and justificatory claim. justificatory and 2 CEU eTD Collection is a reason to perform some action. Parfit says that 23)certain that 2008, p. consideration (Korsgaard byself-reflection with recognition the facts or the with reasons to responding program notbewould is a judgment. That genuine moral why enrich rationalists conceptof the moral underlyingjudgment mightbe simulatedbya computer program; however, outputs of this claims that moral judgment is it isrationalism psychological case not the that morally. In is addition, acting victims avalanche is notjust causal. Otherwise it would havebe to conceded that, for example, a dog trained helpto respond totheavailableIn judgmentone has reaching moral amoral reason, where responding to of rational are products moral judgment. of causalantecedentthe about be asasimple claim construed cannot capacities judgments moral that claim rationalist the psychological However, 40) (Greene2008a,p. generally.’’ information in working memory, controlling impulses, and “higher executive functions’’ more manipulating capacities for “reasoning,cognitive thatunderlie processes our planning, it but are implied they have inmind, ‘rational canbecapacities’ underthe term that supposed When talking about rational capacities, philosophers usually do not specify what exactly same privileged rational status’’ in (Cited Nichols 2004,p. 69). “moral that judgmentsenjoy moral indicate convergencethink inour would that the practice we can way in same the status”, rational a privileged enjoy mathematical claims that conviction liesbehindour “a practice of inmathematical an expression view;hesays convergence that this (Joyce 2008,Nichols between2004). Smith’s analogy morality be and mathematics seenas can judgments are akind of judgments, i.e. rational they rationalare derivedfrom our capacities moral that fact empirical is an it rationalism, psychological the to According judgments. Psychological rationalism is a descriptive claim about the capacities that produce moral just awareness a causal output of cognitive processes. Cognitive processes Cognitive processes. of cognitive output acausal (Parfit forthcoming) of the normative (reason-giving) 3 CEU eTD Collection will break promise in order to gain some benefit’ is a maxim that can be tested using categorical imperative. categorical using be tested can that amaxim is benefit’ some gain to order in promise break will sake-of-this-end’’.(Korsgaard 2008,p.218) this In view will breakpromise ‘I I that made’ is not amaxim, but ‘I 5 helpful in distinguishing it from other rationalist claims, since even on conceptual or conceptual on even since claims, rationalist other from it indistinguishing helpful notare rationalvillainsirrational’’ moral (p.388).But this is are characterization transgressions; which it“moral characterizes to transgressions as aviewaccording example, (2008) For Joyce However, justificatory rationalism is not adequately characterized in philosophical literature. claim about normativethe moral status of judgments and requirements. becauseis it aconceptual not empirical claimaboutor the sources of moral judgments isbut a rationalism psychological and conceptual from be distinguished needsto rationalism Justificatory rational are criticism. rational to is susceptible act morally not does whoever andthat requirements, requirements moral that claims It requirements. moral of foundation the about claim is rationalism a justificatory Unlike normative rationalism, and conceptual psychological perception, sensation and emotion (ibid., p. 2). with are contrasted processes, capacities rational of conscious areproducts judgments moral fail and the agent will reach a judgment that it is wrong to act on that maxim. So, in these will p.of 2008, this attempt 218).Presumably, universalizing can views, (Korsgaard rational agent act any which to according policy becomeauniversal itsee could to whether revenge’ inorder revenge, universalize an to agent tries maxim‘Iwill the inordertohavemy person this kill example, For imperativein test. thinking kill whether about to a personin tohave herorder a maxim adopt has to agent the permissible, morally is action judge whethersome To self-reflection. rational is of judgment asaconsequence reached Korsgaard’s (1984, 2008) view is more faithful to original Kantianism. She thinks that moral Korsgaard explains maxims asbeing descriptions of action the the withfollowing structure ‘’to-this-act-for-the- be aware of the facts that give us this reason. (Parfit forthcoming, p. 128, first emphasis added) try to do what we have these reasons to believe, or want, or do. (…) To [w]e to respond decisive our whenreasons awareness 4 of the reason-giving facts leads us to believe,or want, or 5 and test whether it passes the categorical the itpasses whether and test fail to respond to some reason, we must CEU eTD Collection or ends. or 6 moral behavior. moral our motivations thatunderlie and knowledge moral originsthe of account into when wetake claim a plausible not is rationalism justificatory that argue will 3 I in chapter Finally, rationalism. argue that empirical evidence and explanations of empirical data counts against the psychological will chapter2I rationalism.conceptual against (2002)argumentIn Nichols’ present and discuss In the next three chapters I will examine the three rationalist claims. In chapter 1 I will can that rationalbe graspedby our capacities. using rationalism as a defense of the thesis priori thatforthcoming,(Parfit678-9, Smith p.142, 1994,p.192).So, Iwill justificatory construe moral judgments express a priori a can beknown that truths necessary express moral judgments that if wesuppose and accomplished necessary truths impartial is and demandsthat(Railton haveauthority aim over2008). This allagents non-hypothetical express judgments moral that claim the behind intuitions vindicate to desire is their rationalism moral of motivations main the of One justify. to want rationalists moral We can give more concrete characterization of justificatory rationalism if we see what claims their behavior. psychological viewitimmoralrationalist besaid that can some failingsagents exhibit rational in That is that they express categorical normative claims that apply to agents independently of their contingent goals 5 6 , universal CEU eTD Collection is what practical requirement claims (ibid.) it, that with actin and to accordance be motivated she would if is then, rightrational, some action isSmith, judge to thatshewouldmotivated if besoif she wererational. she judges Hence, that to perform some action, according to judgea reason she has to but that action, perform this to a reason has she that judges person that then right, is action some that judges someone when circumstances C, then thereis a reason for those agents to to agents for is right it “if way: following a in claim rationalist conceptual formulate may requirement is one of entailment; according to Smith, the former entails the latter. To see and thebetweenrationalist practicality the claim (Ibid.,conceptual p. 66)The relation this we andthelike.’’ will the weakness of absent least at accordingly, motivated are judgments moral make whoagents that itistruth “aconceptual practicality requirement, According the p. 39). to (ibid., moral our concepts surround be that among platitudes to the callsrequirement practicality he what and claim rationalist conceptual considers Smith that is point important most the Here example,that hesays For concepts. these surround that the platitudes andonly all will articulate concepts analysis of proper is that His idea concepts. these about have people that intuitions the preserve will that in away concepts moral analyzes C HAPTER conceptC. (Smith 1994, p. 37-38) knowledge of onlyall and the inferential and judgmental dispositions of someone who has a mastery of the correctcase just knowledge in of C* give usknowledge and only ofall platitudes surroundingthe C: thatis, dispositions constitutes aset of platitudes surrounding C. (…)Ananalysis of a concept Cintermof (…) C*is facts connecting dispositions judgmental and inferential of set whole a acquire to come C we concept a acquiring in expressed in terms of the concept C with facts of other kinds. since viewfore, (1994) tothe he Smith’s comes conceptual In examiningthe rationalism A statement of all of these various 1: C ONCEPTUAL RATIONALISM 6 Ɏ in C.’’ (ibid., p. 62) Thismeans that Ɏ in CEU eTD Collection would be a person that embodies the devil. unmotivated to act according to herjudgments, without exhibiting any rational failings. A perfect amoral rationalist 7 From the practicality requirement it follows that a rational amoralist a it that follows rational requirement From the practicality decided to test this claim. He conducted a study this astudy decidedin to test claim.Heconducted unsophisticated which philosophically moral terms in should exhibit platitude moral this applying their concepts. Nichols (2002) mastery of competent have that people normal then judgment, moral of concept our is of part judgments. So, ideathe if is that claim the psychopathsthat donot really make moral judgments conceptsurrounding our ofmoral judgmentthatexpress donot psychopaths real moral isit tocheckwhether aplatitude inorder character of folk psychopathic conception the modus tollens sois theconceptual rationalist claim.for this In arguing conclusion he usesthe because it is important to show (2004)uses Nichols since that thenby false requirement practical is claim rationalist conceptual andthe requirement between practicality the The connection judgment and it must follow from the practical requirement. This is because must it moral about be Rather secure not truth aconceptual would practical the requirement. psychopaths, sincethat about factbe just anempirical responsecannot inverted-commas the ‘ moral judgments and stay moral terms, they inunmotivatedthem whenuse ‘inverted-commas’ sense that (Smith 1994), so they express use psychopaths when to that claim actrequirement according practicality the of Proponents judgments. moral to them, it is claimedmake that moral they claims,do not distinguish They disorder. psychopathic peoplewith are we amoralists rational come to that closest life,the between right and wrong but then fail to act according to their really A rational amoralist isapersonwho delivers sincere moral judgments aboutwhat is right orwrong but stays characterize folkthe concept of morality. (Nichols 2004, p. 73) Indeed, as Smith develops it, conceptual rationalism issupposed tobe a systematized set of platitudes that [c]onceptual rationalism is, afterall, supposed tocharacterize our ordinary moral concepts intuitions.and express moral moral judgments atall.’’express securep. 67)Inorder (Ibid., to practicalthe requirement, 7 7 is not possible. In real In possible. not is CEU eTD Collection concepts. moral surround be that our conceptual one of seemsnotto platitudes the rationalist claim that practical requirementconcept of judgmentmoral psychopaths that really make judgments. moral Thisindicates also is not part of moralthe concept judgments, of moral which judgmentshowpart isitto of that notmoral of psychopathsjudgment that donotexpress concept the real rather seem andindicate results These wrong. morally is by others hurting implication that understand really not did thatmathematician at least the the that answered people the of according most hand, other the On wrong. morally is others hurting that to some people it is most dida psychopath part of subjects think study the that Resultsthe of that really understand show of the moral claims. They were presented with the following probes: story understands from really say presented the wereaskedto aperson whether undergraduates wrong? hurt ismorally not understand people.him other Does Bill others hurting really and that heis thinks thatit irrational hurt He to others. thinks thatany rational beperson would like because simply people other hurts never Bill Nonetheless, people. other hurting to reaction emotional no has he but intelligence, normal of adult an is He mathematician. a is Bill hurting others is morally wrong? but that he just doesn't care if he does things that are wrong. Does John really understand that when he has wanted to steal their money. He says that he knows that hurting others is wrong, emotional hurtingreaction to other people. Johnhashurtandindeed killed people other John isis adult apsychopathic criminal. an of intelligence,normal He buthehasno 8 CEU eTD Collection illuminate the content of our concepts and thus, cannot say whether the product of of a conceptual say product the whether and cannot thus, concepts of our content the illuminate Joyce’s other objection is that the type of study that Nichols (2002) conducted cannot in done issueorder conceptual to settlerationalism. the concerning furtherita pointbeneed butand indicatesonly studies that Nichols (2008) acknowledges to that, strong judgmentinternalism isnot part of people’s concept ofmoral judgment. This has objection claims that because of that Nichols’ argument misses its target, and that it atmost shows only that ispsychopath, for irrational by not beingmotivated judgment, moral his Joyce (2008, p.382) ask subjectsnot John,the did inhis Sincestudy Nichols whether (ibid.). practical unreason’’ of forms similar other and will the of weakness the of “influences by be impaired to connection the for room is still there but judgment, moral to connected internally still is motivation version in circumstances C, then either she is motivated to C,then ismotivated she either in circumstances However, the version that Smith endorses says: “if an agent judges that it is right for her to (Smith 61).1994, p. motivated to to motivated internalism “if an agent judges that it is right for her to to her for right is it that judges agent an “if internalism act judgmentaccordingpro-attitude that judgment. (inclination)version Inthestrong of to to conceptual truth that when one expresses morala judgment, one is motivated or atleast has some isa it internalism, (motivational) judgment to According internalism. motivation or judgment as is known what of version is a requirement practical calls (1994) Smith What judgment. moral versionSmith 2008) endorsesispractical part of (1994, of that not conceptrequirement the of show conceptual the not objectionNichols’ isrationalism. (2002)study that does first that The 1.1 Objections toNichols’ (2002) study Joyce (2008) puts forwardimportantJoyce (2008)puts two Nichols’ objections to against arguments Ɏ in C’’; thus on this version motivation is implied in moral judgment in moral implied is motivation version this on thus inC’’; 9 Ɏ in C or she is practically irrational’’; inthis in she irrational’’; C or ispractically Ɏ in circumstances C then she is she then C incircumstances simpliciter Ɏ CEU eTD Collection swimmers swimming technique by observingin them swimming, samethe wayyou discover word by asking them useto that word. the by mean they what infer can we rather but word, the with competence their describe to people ask to have not do We problem. the misconstrues swimmer champion the with analogy the that account is depend “supposed crucially on platitudes’’ 399). I (p. agree with Nichols, and Ithink in Smith’s recognize since theconceptual folkanalysis platitudes’’, their own can “expectthe to backstroke’’, ofinformation while hand we source other the themechanicsunderlyinga on about tobekey folkthe expectwouldn’t platitudes “we adequate, since not is swimmer champion people’sunderlying Nicholsuse of certain Joyce’s (2008)claims concepts. that analogy with the probing enables us doto (although in a limitedfigure way) to whatare out competenciesthe of kind this what is exactly that but intuition, that of content the with have they that dispositions expectspeakersnot articulate of them some language,wedo allinferential judgmental to and dispositions that underlie her use of some concept. ask anbad ideato ordinary toarticulatespeaker of the inferential a language judgmental and by swimmerithis himdescribe swimming (p.382), swims asking be to technique’’ can also a concept user and suggestmakeshow.’’ between a Joyce(Smith (2008) an 1994, p.38) champion analogy a swimmer and that just as “it might knowledge- our about have knowledge-that usto requires concept mastered a an of analysis be a bad way of figuring thatis requiresconcept, while have of a concept ‘’knowledge mastery of usto aknowledge-how, out how a champion with the is inferential judgmental have dispositions and certain with a concept competence to have Smith, can Accordingto a ordinary to bespeakers. truths to conceptual unobvious analysis ispart concept of ornot.our Joyce (2008,p.382)indicates thatin account Smith’s Also, I believe that the analogy can be construed in a better way; just as you discover you as just way; better in a construed be can analogy the that believe I Also, I think this that lastobjection not hold.does When intuitionswe probe of certain ordinary 10 CEU eTD Collection (1994), is inconclusive. by Smith asconceived holds, whether conceptual rationalism about discussion still platitudes, the arereally moral concerningconcepts platitudes whether proposed experimentally test shouldnot we why reason no is there though even However, concepts. certain surround that platitudes the So, Iwould,in line with Nichols, concludeprobing thatfolk’s responses is a goodway to outline investigation. the for important are that variables manipulate and isolate can observer the where people’s competencesconcept by observing how they it. Thisuse can be in conducted conditions 11 CEU eTD Collection these stages, not as a function of maturational process, but as a consequence of people’s ability to ability people’s of as a butconsequence process, maturational as afunction notof stages, these social customs and ground them. invokingimpartial anduniversal thatprinciples transcendjusticeprinciples and of (e.g. all rights) by status moral society’s assess and actions judge to start people stage sixth final, At the like. and whichthrough democratic procedures might determinepeople whatasociety to beought conventional 5 norms.justify people Atstage by socialactionsobligatory appealing to contracts the authority. At the postconventional level people start to dissociate respecting and moral norms social ideals laws, the form in obeying make they emphasis in the manifested is which social stability, with become preoccupied awhole; they perspectivesociety as the the of adopt to Atstage 4peoplestart be wellregardedbyothers. in to or bad thedesire motives and asgood people’s judge other to intendency children’s manifested gets expectations recognition these of The fulfill. to need they that members community and families their from expectations Atindividual’s self-interest. third,the conventional, level becomechildren awarethatthere are which actions could be assessed, and they start to relativize the rightness of different behaviors to from viewpoints aredifferentthere 2children torecognize stage that start fearat of punishment; morality. postconventional and conventional preconventional, postulated six stages of moral into which weredevelopment, levels: grouped three operationalized by in andpsychology Piaget (1965) especially Kohlberg Kohlberg (1969,1984). isjudgment issue.moral of reflectingreasoning some aproduct Thisidea about or was C HAPTER What isWhatabout important this issupposed moral development ideathatthe people supersede the of because rules 1children obey stage level,at preconventional at the that The ideawas The basic conception of rationalistic moral psychology is that consciously reaching a moral 2: E MPIRICAL MODELS OF MORAL JUDGMENTS 12 CEU eTD Collection circumstances make up plausible reasons why they were doing the action in question; however, in question; the weredoing action why they make reasons upplausible circumstances perform somelater ask actions weredoing and why peoplethey them.inthose Usually in to subjects have hypnotize in studies explanations been which experimenters of actions tested explanations ofbehavior supplied are that bytheir These culture. hoc constructionspost of to turn people explanations these constructing In self-reflection. accessible forconscious are not processes causal actual their because explanations causal hoc post constructing in often engage & have Studies shown they (Nisbett 1977) Wilson that when their behavior, explain people dumbfounding Moral 2.1 on which they are built and show how they undermine psychological rationalism. 2001, Hauseret2008, Haidtal. In followingthe 2008). themand Iwill sections thedata present yearsmodel.influential In recentmodels judgment moral three beenof have developed (Greene judgment. moral an inputitisbe neverreasoning, to supposedthat and adirect moral the causeof can have judgment,moral it in arole a butdelivering can only in judgmentplay as producinga role moral judgment is a causal viewsmoral rational modelaccording the rationalistdeliberation. Thus,thorough (Figure 1), to effect of consciousreason reasoning. about their In moralthat modelviews, affect and their or emotion capacity can to make progressive improvements of their However, it seems that there is strong evidence that points against this rationalist pointstraditional againstthis that evidence isit strong there seems that However, Figure1: The rationalist model ofmoraljudgment (Haidt 2001, p. 815) 13 CEU eTD Collection into which a sterilized dead cockroach had just been dipped. In each task the experimenter played experimenter the task In each dipped. been justhad cockroach dead which asterilized into for sip example,arequest several gaveto task: abehavioral juicetasks, subjects aglass apple of Haidt, Bjorklund and Murphy (cf. ibid.) explicitly test the idea of moral dumbfounding. They them. justify to inability their despite judgments Haidt calls this effect “moral dumbfounding’’, because people tend to hold on to their moral forharder additional reasons and they rarely mindschange their about initialthe evaluation. search continue to they aredefeated, reasons when people’s that reasoning.discovered They reasons for theirjudgments, which beshould a not problem if judgments are products of moral initialtheir evaluations very butquickly, thatthey have some problems with giving supporting & he carcass Bjorklundpeoplep. 196). They noticed andeatsthe cools (cf. give Haidt 2008, that rags with which cleanto her toilet; a man uses a chicken carcass formasturbation, and afterwards family eats its pet dog after a following: like the usedstories They reactions. affective thestrong elicit would that stories set of dog was killed by a car; a womanstudies Koller Haidt, and Dias ibid.) (cf. interviews conducted with people in cutswhich they a used up an Haidtold and his flagcolleges (cf. Haidt 2001) to tested thiscreate hypothesis about moral reasoning. In their notreasoning usually does judgment.a moral precede reaching causally moral that is explanation plausible most the consciousness), to (inaccessible intuitive is judgment for evaluatinggiveisjudged. standards behavior the that this process Since of moral reaching reaches a moral judgment, then that person consults her culturally available moral theories, which the same Haidt (2001) argues that moral happens reasoning works in the same way. Haidt’s general idea is that when one trieshypnotized toperform. to explain were they actions the wereperforming know whythey her not did since they false, are reasons these moral judgments. The idea is that after one 14 CEU eTD Collection Wheatley and Haidt’s (2005) study. In that study manipulateWheatley and managed people’s Haidt’s(2005)study. to Inthatstudy they intuitions Further evidence for the primacy of intuition in reaching moral judgment comes from not explain for reasons the moral theirjudgments (Haidt& Bjorklund 2008,p.198). could they that admitted they after even judgment initial their change not did subjects many since a good response. answer isnot has been In theideaof moral this confirmed, task dumbfounding incestual claimthe that sex is experimenter would the wrong, argument givewhy acounter this get not for reason pregnant.every to Similarly,in subjects wouldthat tojustify other give order wouldbe the siblings, noharm allto andthatthey necessary took inorderfor Julieprecautions there that isit stipulated would answer that experimenter the responses of this kind to However, argueto that is there inbreeding apossibility causingof or siblings. psychological tothe damage difficulty finding with agoodreason for holdingjudgment. Most their of would subjects the try to have sex, but when mostAfter reading of vignette this would subjects the it is answerthat notOkfor Julie andMark the subjects were asked to justify their answer they would experience receivedsubjects in experimentthis was following: the that vignettes the of said. thesubject One anything against and argued advocate’ a ‘devil’s love? 2001, p. 814) (Haidt, even closer to each other.decide What not to do it again. do They youkeep that night think as a special secret, whichabout makes them feel that? justbutbeMark uses a safe. makingcondom to both love,too, enjoy They butthey Was it OK for them to pills, control birth taking was already make Julie them. of for each new experience be a would itdecide that would if beinteresting fun and tried love. making Atthe they it leastvery They beach. the near a cabin in alone staying are they night One college. from vacation inFranceThey summer together on andsister. Julie arebrother are travelling andMark 15 CEU eTD Collection affections (moral intuitions), and in this in and intuitions), (moral affections disapproval.’’ (p.818). or feels approval instantly and one a social event about hears or sees “One appropriate; is judgments aesthetic and intuitions moral between analogy Humean that indicates (ibid.) Haidt In this (moralconscious final thought.respect judgments) are availableto effects or products which517), as aretypically non-argumentative, processes,construed unconscious which, only of based on “emotions and affective intuitions’’,called so “gutfeelings’’ & (Greene 2002, p. Haidt moral “quick, of product p. 814) (ibid.,as a evaluations’’, but automatic of reasoning, result (SIM) moral of judgment. According toSIM,people typically moral reach judgments not as an 2.2 Haidt’ssocial intuitionist model being judged.’’ (Ibid.) situation incidental intuitions“even use intuitions,tothe objector theseand are irrelevant when manipulations.’’ when that make study (p.1222)This judgmentsconfirmed moral people they moral severe judgments relative toparticipants whowere not exposed cleanlinessto andactivated “who made subjects cleansed physically disgust experiencing themselves after less were ofcleanliness concepts cognitive whose Subjects reverseeffect. the demonstrated al. (2008) recently et More word. Schnall target did readthe not than that ones judgments moral the severe ‘take’ or word word‘often’.the In studiesthose subjects thatfelta flash of made disgust more ‘often’. Instudy read 1 subjects six moral judgmentstories, each of includedwhich either the word the read they when disgust feel to group another and ‘take’ word the read they whenever which their moral then affected judgment. Theyhypnotized of one tofeelsubjects group disgust According SIM,people to reach moral judgments through aforementioned automatic explainIn to a socialmodel intuitionist findings,Haidt(2001)proposed order previous production 16 moral reasoning is usually “an factoex-post CEU eTD Collection reached judgments. As a whole, this model consists of 6 links: intuitively their explain or justify to demand the with confronted are they when deliberation in order to find some plausible argument of which the judgment will be a conclusion. reasoning in she will moral engage judgment, post-hoc the of forand ajustification asked when reaction be awareof intuitive the she not However, will judgment. anegativemoral will produce that disgust) of a flash (possibly reaction have she intuitive a negative will sex vignette, incestual in asdescribed with the a moral e.g. is ideawhensituation, the confronted isthat a person So, someinformationp. 817-818). activity consists of object(ibid., transformingabout given that On hand, moral other the reasoning isdefinedas intentional conscious, mental and effortful bad,like-dislike) and unconscious evaluation of social stimuli which results in moral judgment. is domain intuition moral system general why 2. That Haidt defines asquick,valenced (good- typically products of intuitive system 1, and that moral reasoning comes as a slow, effortful, terms Haidt’s of phylogenetic ontogeneticmoral and development. isjudgments proposal that are in 2 System over primacy has that system affective evaluative the constitutes 1 System slow. and serial conscious, controlled, are rule-based, dependent.includes that processes System 2 context and fast, unconscious, automatic, associative, are that processes includes 1 System 2. and system 1 system makes ajudgment: when atwork a person processing systems are two theories, there Haidt’s SIM belongs to dual process theories of human cognition. According to these false. be might judgment act aslawyers defendwho theirintuitively caringreached judgmentswithout whetherthis aftermoral people reachingis that, judgment, The metaphor judgments). a with moral reasoning process’’ (ibid.,p. 815)which justifypeople use to their (intuitive pre-ordainedconclusions According to the social part of the SIM, people most often engage in reasoned engage conscious, often most people SIM, the partof social tothe According 17 CEU eTD Collection 6. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. intuition in oneself that will conflict with the initial intuition, which then needs to be to needs then which intuition, initial the with conflict will that oneself in intuition provokeanewinto shoes canbyexperiencing one pain,etc. the sympathy,of another) The reflection linkprivate –bythinking over by things or playingrole oneself (putting (Ibid.,p. 819) rare, it happen “the can initial when intuition is weak isand processing high.’’ capacity initialown intuition. model the However, proposes thisthat is of kind causal reasoning atlink times that their peoplejudgmentThe reasoned –Haidtrecognizes canoverride just by making moral judgments can affect others’ moral judgments. The social persuasion link – members of a certain group (friends, allies, acquaintances), others. judgmentto The reasoned linkpersuasion –moral reasoning is produced to verbally justify moral ones process forof arguments thatwillsearching already-made judgment. support reasoninglinkPost-hoc is moral -after judgment made,personengages in effortful intuition). moral the of (result effortlessly linkIntuitivejudgment judgment -moral appearsin consciousness andautomatically Figure2: Social intuitionist model of moraljudgment (Haidt 2001, p. 815) 18 CEU eTD Collection first case, but that itis notpermissible push to the overweightman on the track in the second case In answering these questions most people Here againsay the question is whether it is thatpermissible to push the large man. it is permissibleyoufor tosave five is persons push to large the man in of front trolley,the thereby to him.killing flip the switch in thethis case you are standing on a footbridge, above the track, next to a large man, and thethere isonly again a runaway way trolley that will kill five people if younot do do something. However, in dilemma, footbridge the In switch. the flip to is permissible it whether is question The be killed. However, on the side track there is onea side to track. aswitch, by flipping divert trolley,the is save to five persons person only these way to who will, in the case of flipping are workinga on switch,a track and who will be surely killed if the trolley does notchange surely its course. The In the trolley dilemma there is a runaway trolley which is heading towards five people, who problems’. ‘trolley classical are used they that dilemmas The dilemmas. fMRIthey scanstosubjects onpresented thatweremakingmoral moral administered judgments studiesmachine (fMRI). In Greene imaging 2004) magnetic et al. (2001, resonance functional production moral of Greenejudgments. his constructed model on evidence gatheredby using incausal reasoningit role processes much gives to itis model, that greater usually considered Greene’s model also belongs to dual process family of models; however, unlike Haidt’s 2.3 Greene’s model of moral judgment do, contribute productionto the moralof judgments. itthough includes also links 6,puts emphasis5 and linkson 1-4, whilebut 5and 6may, rarely Haidt,According unlike to therationalistmodel,which focuses onlinks 5 and 6,SIM,even basis of consciously applying some rule. the on decide reason letting by or intuition stronger the with going by either resolved, 19 CEU eTD Collection inferior parietal lobe (cf. Greene 2008a, p. 44). and cortex dorsolateral prefrontal processes: cognitive brain hadactivity underlying greater dilemmas were judgingimpersonal medial and andsubjects who cortex, the amygdala; prefrontal the cortex, cingulate posterior the with emotion: areasassociated inbrain brain morehadactivity dilemmas moral personal on judgments delivering were who subjects confirmed; was prediction dilemmas more shouldactivity in produce brain underlying moreareas cognitive This processing. activity inbrain areasunderlying impersonal emotional whileprocessing, thinking about predicted(2001, 2004) thatthinkingpersonal about moral shouldmore dilemmas produce Based on the idea that personal dilemmas provoke more emotional responses, Greene et al. footbridge) andimpersonal (e.g.bystander) dilemmas. they subjects moral divided thatthey into twodilemmas groups:personal presented to (e.g. the emotional responsewhile trolley dilemmas supposedly are moresalient; impersonal (flipping aswitch), which does notmake in fact theybecauseinto they put anagent asituationis that more ‘up close and personal’ (pushing aman), make reasoned response moreresponse emotional footbridge prompt dilemmas that al. hypothesized (2001) Greene et more salient. That is why psychological processes underlie the responses to these dilemmas. Their answer was that and what dilemmas, these intuitions about strong have these is people why investigate to al.Greene wanted al.The question et (2001) that (seeHauseret intuitions 2008a). incompatible one personsacrificing involve cases both since dilemmas, these behind inintuitions different and strong justify order to save isit howto notobvious al.perspective, from philosophical the (Hauser et However, 2008a). more, and the slight variations of the trolley problems prompts these treat cases to differently. tendency people’s for (Greeneaccounts et that al. 2001, response p. emotional 2106) this is it and consequences, similar produce is, we propose, more emotionally salient than the thought of hitting aswitchthat will cause a trolley to to engage tendency people’s latter’s the emotions in lies in dilemma a way that footbridge the the and former dilemma does trolley the not. The between thoughtdifference of crucial pushingthe someone to his death 20 CEU eTD Collection both includeboth negative baby; emotional tokilling aquick own inresponse however one’s the twocasesof these moral personal that Greene andhypothesized his ibid.). dilemma colleagues newborn. peoplekilling Most that giverelatively answer quick wouldbe anewborn wrong (cf. infanticide On the other hand, people usually do not have trouble reaching a consensus about the (cf. 2008a, Greene p.44). need relatively long timeis andthere no consensus between people’s intuitions about this case will surely your tokill iswhetheritis Thequestion baby.die. answer ok question, this To people everyone in If you basement. the donot raise your hand will soldiers not find you, but the baby and you putahandmouth. overher Ifyou hand raise your enemy soldiers willfind you and kill with yourfellow villagershiding in form basement the soldiers. enemy Yourbaby starts to cry prediction, they presented to their subjects the subjects totheir they presented prediction, be will behavioral there responses increasedactivity inmore areas.Totestthis cognitive brain of representations be conflicting to likely is wherethere answer), more to time take that Finally Greene et al. that in predicted (2004) moral (dilemmas personal dilemmas difficult whether subjects answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’. time, in response difference significant no be will there that was prediction the So overridden. the bystander(like dilemmas moral impersonal in the hand, other the On dilemmas. personal to ‘no’ than ‘yes’ dilemma)against permittingit means this violation,would relativelyanswer which that more take to time there response emotional initial her override to have likely is most will man), overweight no an push to ok expected is thatit moral (e.g. arepermissible violations judges thatpersonal who and someone automatic, default Greene et al. (2001) also predicted and confirmed that sinceemotional emotional reactions are quick reaction which needs to be dilemma. In this dilemma teenage girl must decide whether to kill her unwanted her kill to whether decide must girl teenage dilemma this In dilemma. crying baby 21 dilemma. In wartime you find yourself find you wartime In dilemma. CEU eTD Collection %20FINAL%20DRAFT%20-%20web.pdf 9 moral judgment by using cost-benefit analyzes of the outcomes of various possible acts. competing negative emotional response (personal dilemmas), and claims that in impersonal dilemmas we reach a 8 linguistic ideas research analogy on basedwith an Dwyer theirwho (e.g. 2009,Hauser2006) 2.4 ‘’Rawlsian’’ model ofmoraljudgment crying baby causal in role moral producing judgment, and they can come into conflict. a play both they cues, activation different have They ones. cognitive and emotional judgment, Hence, in Greene’s account (see Figure 3) there are two processes underlying moral dilemma. the were answering that subjects to compared activation greater showed processes) anterior dorsolateral prefrontal parietal cortex and the withlobes inferior (associated cognitive increasedibid.,45),showed (cf. p.also the and conflict with activation, associated response cortex, which cingulate is anterior areasupposedly thebrain confirmed, the The prediction was increased activation. show will processes andwith cognitive conflict with response associated in intuitionsconflict isevident between thatthebrain they response time, areas predicted cost-benefityour in tosave favors killing this people. baby all Since analysis, order which other References to this article are from: are article this to References Greene (2008a) connects consequentionalists judgments with impersonal moral dilemmas where there is no is there where dilemmas moral impersonal with judgments consequentionalists connects (2008a) Greene Third influential Third Figure model judgment moral (see by different wasproposed 4)of authors Figure 3: Greene's model (Nado et al. 2009, p. 9) dilemma there is a conflicting more cognitive intuition based on consequentionalist http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~stich/Publications/Papers/Moral%20Judgment%20- 22 9 infanticide 8 CEU eTD Collection constitute constitute is moral the It grammar. hypothesized thatthis moral innate module works which principles of onthebasis tacit itandoperates 117), 2008a, p. etal. faculty’’ (Hauser moral of the heart the “constitutes analysis of action process This evaluation. action under andintentional accordingly structure verdictabout permissibility the delivers amoral of the isis an perceiving thatthere system which, itsappraisal after causal- anaction, computes moral intuitions and judgments (Hauser et al. 2008a,Mikhail 2008). The basic idea model of this model haveemphasis on put necessity the for adescription underlying providing computations of independent of any emotional (Dwyerprocesses 2009,Hauser2006). be to intuitions moral these consider analogy linguistic the of proponents model, Haidt’s (Hauser etal. model Rawlsianintuitionist; ishowever, 2008a,p.118)In respect this unlike “uncover some judgments of principlesthe underlyingis our of morallyand what wrong.’’ right proponents of linguisticthe analogy claim moral by probingthat agent’s judgments one may grammaticality judgments in todiscoverorder principles underlyinglanguage competence, al.2006, Hauseret analogous and 2008a), that tolinguisticin linguists study,which use faculty “operates unconsciously, quickly, and automatically’’ (Nado et al. 2009, p. 10, see Hauser up. Similarly to the language faculty, proponents of the linguistic analogy contend thatmoral for adoptingpresent moral are in that in particular rules whichthe environmentthe child grows constraints or parameters specify they (species-specific); anduniversal be innate to are thought a moral a moral faculty is by that of described principles likejust thereis alanguage faculty is that by described principles of Universal Grammar, isthere is Basic ideabehind that program andourmoral this linguisticresearch competence competence. that John Rawls made inprogram developed in the Chomskian tradition.his Inspiration for this model comes from remarks book In order to develop moreIn ordertodevelop thoroughly linguisticthe of analogy, Rawlsian the proponents A theory ofJustice A theory 23 moral grammar , about the possible analogy between our between analogy possible the about , . Principles of moral grammar moral of Principles . CEU eTD Collection morally worse than equivalent harm foreseen as the side effect of a goal. of a effect side the as foreseen harm equivalent than worse morally 12 moralthe faculty remain a mystery.’’(p. 414) 11 is not important form my discussionwhether moral knowledge is innate or not. knowledge is innate. However,I am not going to enter into the discussionwhether this argument isplausible, since it 10 grammar intuitions. It is not emotionalan easy ortask rational to formulate processes permissibility of particular is actions then not issue the whetherthejudgments spring from but orwhich even Theare thedecidebasic principles contentionwhich of moralprinciples grammarof the that proponentsconstituteshape theseemotional responses to the situation. ofmoral the linguisticfeaturessensitive to of situationthe thatcannot simply be byinvoking explained different analogy is that whenRawlsian model managedibid.)(cf. show that to when delivering moral judgments people are people judge from studying trolley problems. Most evidence that favors ideas proposed by proponents of the linguistic analogy comes grammar; for example, some version of the doctrine of double effect of moral grammar. Using these sorts of principles proponents of the linguistic analogy try to try analogy linguistic the of proponents principles of sorts these Using grammar. moral of reasoning. which then may independently reasoningof andemotional deliberate andit moral processing, generates judgment (but it does not have to) be followed by emotional reaction or deliberate For example Dwyer (2008) explicitly states that “the form and content of the principles that I claim characterize Iclaim that principles ofthe content and form “the that states explicitly (2008) Dwyer example For Cushman etCushman al. (2006,p.define the 183) principle in thefollowing way: intended harm asthemeans to a goalis Some of the proponents of the Rawlsian model use ‘poverty of the stimulus’ argument to argue that moral Figure4: ''Rawlsian'' model (Nado et al.2009, p. 10) 11 ; however, there were some proposals for the principles that could play moral coulda role in play that principles the for some were proposals there ; however, 10 Testing people with trolley dilemmas, proponents of the 24 12 can be seen can be seen as being apart CEU eTD Collection f. 4). consent must 13 to a side-track; is side-track the however,to man a loop on is and if an which overweight standing, were on the tracks. Fortunately Ned is standing next to a tracksswitch which can divertwhen the train he to go noticesnear trolley the is walking Ned scenario inone variations; important two were There scenario. that there is a runaway modelal. of Rawlsianthe 2008a,p.127)proponents on variations footbridge the devised trolley In order to test their predictions thatand “to probe the nature of is our appraisal system’’ heading(Hauser et towards five people intended action of five saving the people. that of the as dies theman a side-effect since aspermissible, willberepresented cases bystander means while his manisthe flipping in without usedasa switch wrongly consent, the the impermissible because is aspushing that action the of structure causal-intentional the represent personal-impersonal distinction, Rawlsianmodel predicts infootbridgethat casesa person will While Greene explains people’s reactions in footbridge and bystander cases by invoking the omissions’’; and (4) it derives more fine-grained representations of morally salient and actsacts relevant the of structure intentional “the computes it (3) next effects’’; bad and representations of good generate “to inorder descriptions action tothese moral principles certain it then applies causal (2) in temporal order; descriptions and and them anappropriate places action various the identifies it first(1) ofanaction: features relevant the compute that operations postulatesmoral that infaculty producing amoral judgment involves four different kinds of (2008) Mikhail example, For elicit. not might or might dilemmas these that reactions emotional account) in Greene’s (like on than rather action contemplated of the structure intentional causal- of computations the on focusing by dilemmas in trolley intuitions people’s explain Here Mikhail has in mind cases like the footbridge, in which he postulates that a person ''must infer that the agent the that infer ''must person a that postulates he which in footbridge, the like cases mind in has Mikhail Here touch to being touched andmovedthis manner in because interest ofhis self-preservation'' in (Mikhail 2008, p.91, and move the man in order to throw him onto the track in the path of the train, and the man would not 25 13 (p.87). CEU eTD Collection 14 justification for makingjustification for the distinctions in cases p. 133). (ibid.,these two If judgments were the justify to asked were subjects when since intuitive, and unconscious is mostly process this Moreover, their answersmakesit make before fine-graineddistinctions possible to a judgment.person deliversmoral a This study showsto thatthese there is (savingthefiveconsequence people). a twosignificant moral amount man means tosaveas anecessary the five killing aman and of as aby-product a good of cognitivedilemmas, processing killinga difference between the notes anditof structure actions analyzes thecausal-intentional going on,87%is thatpeople’s In theRawlsian model system expected,sinceit difference predicts appraisal the that couldcases. two inthese reactions in people’s difference be significant such a not should there account, not provideGreene’s to according therefore, becountervailed; needs to that reaction beemotional no should a there category, impersonal the fall sufficientunder of casesshould both these Since distinction. impersonal switch. Thisscenario 55%, while in the Oscar scenario 72% of subjectsdifference replied that itis permissibleflip to the is significant and it is not expected when using Greene’s personal- Hauser et al. (2008a) report the results from their cross-cultural internet study isitwhetherfor NedandOscar permissible toturn switch.the savefive manthe is would of Oscar’s trying die asaside-effect Thequestion to the people. largeisstop not enoughto trolley.the flips switch, If the Oscar trolley the wouldbe stopped,but who is aman it of there in front and the couldtrolley stop that is weight there a heavy side-track the on is that only difference the in situation, asimilar findshimself Oscar secondscenario the the overweight man would be killed, and he would be used as a means to save the five people.five people.In However, if Ned flips the switch and diverts the trolley, the trolley would stop, but it were notfor the overweightman, the trolley would justloop back to the main track and kill the They gathered their data from the Moral Sense Test: Sense Moral the from data their gathered They http://moral.whj.harvard.edu/ 26 . 14 : in Ned the CEU eTD Collection people, and to use it to explain and predict people’s behavior. people’s predict and explain itto use to and people, 16 15 Proponents of the Rawlsian model introduced a compelling argument 2.4.1 Weak and strong linguistic analogy which they on were reasoning. provide based the principle be would ableto people then these by reasoning, reachedconscious underlie ourmind-reading abilities (theory mindof seems more plausible to think of this system as being more generally connected with systems that actionsdescriptions which to no moral it toward we have reaction’’ Also, (Mallon 2008, p.146). “assign can system the descriptions; action to principles moral applies that system the structure of actions and assigns them descriptions does not have tobe specifically associated with seem to be specificfit to accommodated since notHaidt’s andGreene’s thiskindsystem does account, appraisal of toan “to emotion processor of reasoning.’’ (Ibid.,p.121)Thisdeliberate requirementcan be the moral computes the causal-intentional structure of an agent’s action’’p. 117)which (ibid., lead then can domain. that system appraisal an recognize must models other the of each The “[m]inimally, analogy system thatwhatlinguistic Hauseral.According the weak weaklinguisticthe et analogy. (2008a)call to computes informationof from are environment the that then used for reachingamoral judgment. This is the causal-intentional moral cognition one wouldhave into account to take computations the thatunderlie the extraction of account have in to acomplete order Itseemsthat responds to. which asubject to situation the judgmentmoral people often complex,through go unconscious cognitiveanalyze that processes and isresponsiblefor “then judgment’’, the either which ordoesn’t triggers trigger emotions and However, in the strong linguistic analogy appraisal system “represents our moral competence See section2.4, p. 24-27. Theory of mind is an ability to ascribe inferand mental states (desires, beliefs, intentions, etc.) of oneself or other 27 16 ). 15 that before reaching a CEU eTD Collection emotions seem to be causally necessary for reaching a moral judgment, sinceemotional judgment, amoral for be reaching causallynecessary seem emotions to in cases at leastsome that claim the to This credibility savemore. gives to in order one sacrifice to choosing welfareleadpeople, of more aggregate to that makechoices emotional processing impairedwith footbridge scenariois, patients That like control incases subjects. the the than answers consequentialist more significantly give patients these dilemma), footbridge the as trolley is hereis ‘personal’ Whatwith important problems. whenpresented that scenarios (such dilemmas standard therewerethe largemoral damage presented Amongthe class a of dilemmas. emotions) with connected area (brain cortex prefrontal ventromedial with patients to presented al. (2007) Koenigs et linguistic analogy. strong against the count that significant studies most the only present will I space of lack the of Because plausible. is analogy linguistic strong Even though Rawlsian model represents an important research program, I do not believe that Haidt’s and Greene’smodels. with is model incompatible Rawlsian analogy, linguistic strong the to according Therefore, havebraini.e.is location, (3)aparticular (the moral discrete physiologically that (p.146). organ) itmightit that is speculated and thought; toconscious which are opaque byprinciples governed are that (encapsulation) information sort of limitedthe on are performed that computations mentaldistinct subsystem involves:that (1)proper functioningin domainmorality;the of (2) (2008) interprets linguisticthe analogy as claiming specialized that moral faculty is a functionally particulardamage of139).Mallon areas breakdowns brain’’ p. the dueto to “selective (ibid., andon range moral the learnable is (ibid.,p. 120,139), of systems ittoexhibit expected a constraint which put unconscious principles works on system that anddedicated encapsulated strong linguistic likeanalogy, language faculty,moral isfaculty conceived as being aspecialized, performance of the moral faculty but do not function as part of the moral competence. In the 121) here (Hauseretal. reasoning.’’ So, p. deliberate emotions canonlyinfluencethe 2008a, 28 CEU eTD Collection 17 example, Korsgaard (2008)followingKantbelieves that reaching amoral judgmentincludes self- reaching moral a judgment. Psychological inrationalism beways. can illustrated two For into iswhichthrough onereasonsoneself conceivedasaprocess whereproduction this rational 2.5 Implications of the empirical data for the psychological rationalism moral faculty.encapsulated is (seee.g.Knobe thatthere or judgments computationally 2006)indicates discrete no andmoral judgments, intuitions fact the that canhave influence onourtheory mindof a reversed more naturally mind-readingconnected to which abilities, inform then influencemoral our are of actions structure intentional and casual the of computations that fact the Also, al. 2004). mind,Greene2002, cognition, et (Greene theory etal.of &Haidt 2001, decision-making social non-moral as such activities in other implicated also are judgment in moral implicated Neuroimaging have studies brain shown that areas underlying emotional processes and cognitive no specialized moral faculty which would be computationally Complex processes and physiologically that are involved in discrete. production of moral judgment indicate that there is judgment. inmoral impairments imply with emotions in connected thebrain sinceimpairments areas judgments, moral consequences of emotions areonly ideaagainst the that go Thesestudies processes. emotional impaired have they since is expected, which controls, the than often more significantly answers consequentialist with frontotemporal dementia frontotemporal with thatpatients showed mentionsstudy also that Greenecontrolled a (2008b, group). p.138-139) impairmentleads people to exhibit abnormal pattern of moral judgment (compared to the This impairment is also connected to impairments inemotional processing. Psychological rationalism claims thatmoral judgments are products of rational capacities, 17 , when presented with ‘personal’ moral dilemmas, tend to give to tend dilemmas, moral ‘personal’ with presented when , 29 CEU eTD Collection not causally respond to reasons to causally respond not capacities. Iwould argue for the second option, since in Parfit’s (forthcoming, p. rational of application conscious reason include to responsiveness awareness and bethat can read reason is judgment (does moral itnot involveand intuitive reaching a conscious reasoning); or a itis moral produce judgment flip that permissible switch,the wherethis responsiveness to to 20 19 18 asan canbe in intuition Rawlsian toreasons awareness andresponding construed or Haidt’s Parfit’s that suppose to implausible is it why is That causal. is it of awareness the and it to Since that reason-giving fact is not causally available (ibid.), it cannotbe the case that responding is permissible. judge act the leads herto that fact reason-giving that of awareness lives),and the savemore flippingfact will the that flip (e.g. theswitch to gives herareason that situation of the is afeature there that recognize has to first she flip switch, the to is itpermissible that judgment moral a delivers case inNed’s someone when example, For be causal. cannot judgments, possible that one’s awareness that there is a reason to flip the switch in Ned’s responding to reasons that there are for being moral (ibid., p. 128). Parfit’s claim about Parfit’s claim beingmoral p.128). for(ibid., are thatthere reasons whatwe couldwherein about rationality want, being rationally consists to awareandresponding On the other hand, according to Parfit (forthcoming, p. 156) moral judgments are judgments awareness. conscious and 1996,2008), paradigmaticrequires activity iscognitive self-reflection (Korsgaard that a consciousitis reasoning since testing postulated that the through maxims of self-reflection works and activation higher cognitive abilities, presupposes of imperative presumably categorical reflectively testing a maxim using the categorical imperative. categorical the using a maxim testing reflectively See section 3.3. See section See page 25-26. See page 4 and footnote 5. reasons in connection to moral moral reasonsin in be tojudgments connection ways:is construed can ittwo 20 , and because of that, awareness of reasons, which leads to moral 30 18 Testingmaxim through a 19 case causes one to awareness of 679) view wedo and CEU eTD Collection moral judgments, since impairments in emotional processing cause defects in moral judgment. in moral defects cause processing in emotional impairments since judgments, moral in ingredients normal be producing seem than to necessary rather ones, andemotions cognitive by moral areoften judgments produced emotional processes, Moreover, reasoning capacities. depends onfine-grained distinctions thatcanhardly be by captured using domain-general computations moral underliethat production of judgments indicate thatnormal moral cognition they do not consciously reason themselves into making those that judgments. shows which Furthermore, judgments, moral make complex they which with in accordance reasons the know rarely moral which intheories, make addition thembiased tojustify Also,their own peopleprejudices. supllied culturally from justifications extract people rationalization of process this In judgments. moreand moral thatby often ismotivated moral reasoning rationalizea need to preordained conscious indicate arenotintuitions primary that reasoningabilities of moralsources judgments, manipulation against psychologicaldumbfounding with rationalism. Moral people’s and seems undermined byempiricalwillare data.I committed main summarize the from data chapter this counts that rationalists moral to which rationalism psychological However, people if rational, will reach a judgmentas a consequence of reasoning about moral the situation. views, their to according that fact the from follows This them. for justification sufficient have judgmentsmoral has asa the that peopleconsequence claim judgmentsmoral deliver who will judgments areproducts of domain-general abilities, Korsgaard’sreasoning and viewParfit’s of In addition to being committed to a view of moral judgment according to which moral domain-general ability.reasoning inhisthat view, wereachmoral judgments through rational as deliberation, construed a kind of issuppose in itreasonsconsist might to more plausible awareness (ibid.), to and responding of faculty that rational anyspecial postulate not Parfitdoes Since inputconditions. some satisfies intuitionsmodel,because arecausal those of form stimuli that consequences environment 31 CEU eTD Collection & Tranel 2007). towards the (anger) unfair offer, reaction which emotional is economicallyof the because offer the irrational sincedecline they or less) to 3 getoffers some and things better toshare than dollars 10 to get get nothingproposer (Koenigs(e.g. offer unfair an get responders when Usually anything. gets nobody then offer the refuses responder the if split; proposed the keep can both they then offer the accepts (responder) player other the if and offer an makes player 22 21 impairmentsthese usually show noreduction in their reasoningabilities; they retain knowledge who suffer from ‘Acquired sociopathy’ is a impairmentterm that was introduced by Damasio (1994) for adult patients in ventromedial prefrontal 2.5.1 ‘Acquired sociopathy’ and psychopaths cortex area of the brain. Patients and psychopaths with people ‘acquired sociopathy’. with on made studies on arebased this claim cases for test concrete More functioning. moral enhanced rational beabilities. ascribed to cannot which indicates peoplewithexhibit that impairments which moral judgments these defective games Koenigs and (2007)showed thatventromedialTranel patients inultimatum prefrontal cortex that people with the same emotional deficits do not become more ‘rational’ and less emotional. were before the injury.were before the judgments are notaffected by emotions and that these judgments are now more rational than they these because a problem this isnot mightclaim that one Furthermore, answers. consequentialist they from moral judgmentsdecline normal exhibiting and givemore tend significantly to often judgments,patientsmoral but judgmentsare making must these beconsidereddefective, since wecansay these However, that judgments. moral for delivering all are after sufficient capacities rational that show cortex) prefrontal ventromedial (impaired deficits emotional with patients At this point, one might argue that studies, such as ones, made by Koenigs et al. (2007) with See (e.g. Greene 2008a). Greene See (e.g. Ultimatum games usually consist of two players who are given the opportunity to split the given money. One Moreover, evidence from Moreover, impairments evidence emotional from exhibitpeople with often deficits in sever 22 make more emotional and economically irrational choices compared to control groups, control to compared choices irrational economically and emotional more make 21 However, this answer isplausible, However, this answer therearesome since not indications 32 CEU eTD Collection to emotionally andcharged words sounds (Kiehl 2008). beside impairments in recognition inof emotions facial expressions, theyhave trouble in reacting “theyobservers, normal experience also subjects’’ lessintensely (Prinz pain 2006,p.32)and than not do reacttopicturescause distress psychopaths sociopathy’, orimages in that normal instrumental aggression and antisocial behaviour’’(Blair 7). Like 2003,p. people with ‘acquired “goal-directed isthe callous, for psychopaths Characteristic embarrassment. empathy, shame, morally andformoral reasons; and more importantly, lack feelings they of sympathy,remorse, acting about care not do just they but actions, their of consequences the understand they and are being dissociated from their moral emotions (ibid.). They know the rules of social behavior notdo irrationallythink2001, p.824).However, it (Haidt seems thattheir reasoning capacities have and delusions not do 2008), intelligence (Kiehl havegood who as people are characterized impairments. of emotional defective aconsequence as gets reasoning foreven practical that their capacity deficits in asaconsequencemeansemotional decision-making (Damasio of deficits 1994), which emotional arousalin indicates non-patients which response, Cipolotti conductance skin the such as 2000, p.1123), and responsivenessof people dying, mutilation, provocationsunimportant (Blair2003).When withto presented emotionally charged pictures (e.g. morallysocial disaster), salientseemingly to aggression reactive andshow overreact to tend they frustration, they tolerating “fail to situations.show autonomicembarrassment (Blair 2003).They exhibit in deficits social behavior; they have problems with responses’’ These (Blair patients& impairmentsThey show in recognizing emotional expressions connected with anger and also connected show in impairments to deficits various patients emotional these However, processing. show situations. moral hypothetical about reason can they and conventions, social and rules moral of In contrast to‘acquiredIn contrast is psychopathy sociopathy’, adevelopmental Psychopaths disorder. 33 CEU eTD Collection 25 conventional rule one will often appeal to social order or avoidance of punishment. 24 someone. In the same time, chewing gum in school will be judged as ok, if the teachersays that it is permissible. 23 moral violationsmoral prohibited lesspeople’s theymake significantly to reference welfare evenin the findexplain asked tocertain why they For example, when they are samelevel.violations atthe distinction. moral/conventional not authority dependent authority not are rules (moral authority more serious), are violations (conventional seriousness permissible), less are violations (moral in permissibility consist transgressions two these between difference include like conventional hair,and gum chewing The at school. pulling one’s transgressions with presented are containing include moral Moral vignettes transgressions acts and conventional transgressions. subjects task moral-conventional the In distinctions. moral-conventional Furthermore, Blair (cf. Nichols 2004) presented evidence that psychopaths fail to make 7) emotions “leads[children with psychopathic tendencies]toafailurein socialization.’’ (Ibid., p. inreceives (Blair reward.’’ 6) Thisimpairment 2003,p.recognizing andexperiencingcertain committing behavioursavoidlearn not to individual of does this, the “As aconsequence stimuli. unconditioned aversive that cause harm to othersexpressions make children with psychopathic tendencies unable experienceto and fear and sadness as will commitand Blair’simpairments sadexpressions. suggestion is (cf. 2003) that in emotional recognition of them if, by doing them, dysfunction amygdala causesin (Blairetof impairments al. offearful recognition 2001),which he deficitsto infunctioning of paralimbicthe of area brain the and (ibid.) especially with early connected disorder developmental isa Psychopathy impairments. emotional their of consequence Empirical evidence suggests that psychopaths also have impaired moral judgment as a Also people with autism and Downsyndrome make the distinction. Injustifying moral rules people will most often invoke concernfor the well-being others, while in justification of Forexample hitting someone (moral violation) would be judged as wrong, evenif the parents say that it is ok to hit 23 ) and the nature of justification. of nature the and ) 25 However, psychopaths are not. Rather they tend to treat all treat to tend they Rather not. are psychopaths However, 34 24 Even three year olds are able to make CEU eTD Collection 26 So, in addition to evidence from the previous sections, failure in her emotional (Nicholscapacities 2004, Prinz 2006). plausibleconclude failure to thatthe in psychopath’s reachingis a judgmentgenuine moral the and psychopathsis consistthought to in impairedpsychopath’s emotionalit isprocessing, normal between people difference biggest the victims Since was harm clear. cases wherethe to therefore, that psychological rationalism is false. psychological rationalism that therefore, rational sufficient arefor explaining not moral capacities and and judgment, understanding it isnormal Hence, moral for necessary functioning seems andunderstanding. that development that antisocial behavior is a consequence of emotional deficits and that proper emotional See section 2.5. See section 35 26 the evidence presented here suggests evidence presented the CEU eTD Collection moral contractualism is congenial since it construes justification of moral judgments as a process as judgments moral of justification construes it since iscongenial contractualism moral inus.’’ (p.193) InthatrespectScanlon’s(1998) but other people moral for dothis discourse reasoning. Theysay“people are very bad atquestioning their own assumptions and judgments, Haidt and Bjorklund (2008) especially emphasize the importance of social context for moral amoral building theory. by them justify systematically to try and have people that beliefs moral intuitive take they engagingin sociala private or Indeed,reasoning process. thisis whatphilosophers usually do; example, by constructing a post-hoc rationalization of In one’s a intuitive trivial moralway, even judgment, on Haidt’s or by account moral judgments can be rationally justified; for 3.1 The problem of contingent justification moral judgments.’’ 2008,p. (Nichols 405) of our content for the foundation is a “rational there that claims rationalism justificatory Hence, requirements. moral of objectivity and categoricity, secure way in that and abilities, reasoning domain ofapriori and necessary truths bewhich can discovered andjustified using only our Justificatory rationalism purports to explain these features by attaching the moral domain to 39). Further feature is inabilitythe settleto moral disputes by using empirical means. right, and B says that moral assessment, of character nonrelativistic that The etc. beliefs, desires, ends, contingent depend on agents not does is, the objectivity whoseauthority are judgmentsrequirements categorical moral – of character of moral judgments explaining.mentions Railton Forexample, – 38) Peter (2008, p. non-hypothetical thefollowing: “ ‘When A says There are some pervasive features of that moral domain and practice that are in need of C HAPTER 3: J USTIFICATORY RATIONALISM USTIFICATORY Ɏ -ing is notright, then at most one of A and Bis correct’ ’’ (Smith 1994, p. 36 Ɏ -ing is CEU eTD Collection idealizations of conditionsthe offull (Smith rationality 1994), orpostulating non-natural the To avoid this possibility of contingent on people’s evolution, history and aims. matter a is justifies it what since justification, contingent conduct moral of justification motivations and cultural embeddings in aperson which functions. Iwill call kindof this the reflect rather will but reality, moral objective the reflect not will on, settle to inclined are and will offer, people that reasonings and justifications that is clear it perspective this From gossiping; enhance one’s own reputation. One of mostthe ubiquitous ways totrack reputations is by in with to others manipulate and thereputationsorder must of track cooperation others one of their 2007). Also, community it (Haidt is in hypothesized that tobenefitorder from members from individuals the will with get that cooperation by benefitsother (increased fitness) isexplained this perspective From evolutionary the of community). same the when they are part people’s feeling and whichattitudes, disposes people toreach consensus onmoral issuesleast (at Human ‘ultrasociality’ makes people sensitive and naturally predisposed to be responsive toother morally. Moreover, it is an open question which justifications people can reasonably accept. havejustifyto act reason no peopleseemto would to other motivated to already actions their problem with this suggestion (that the moral rationalist wants to avoid) is that people who arenot empirical the accept.’’ (Ibid.)However, Icould them expect to grounds justify on others not to idea is that when I judge that some actionfindto “thatsimilarlyothers, principles motivated,couldreasonably not 4) So,the reject.’’ (p. is wrong, then that “action would be onein which people whoare motivatedfind “to for the principles general behavior’’ of regulation try that I could friends. (Haidt &Bjorklund 2008, p.190) engage in subtle or not-so-subtle acts of social influence to bolster the reputations of themselves theirand gossip[i]n people work outshared understandings of right andwrong, they strengthen relationships, they and contingent rational justification, moral rationalist invokes 37 CEU eTD Collection opinion then there convergence inmoral Ifis judgments. a tendencytowards moral rational the there of grounding are I that Smith believe is is by in in wrong best explained that tendency convergence assuming other more plausible and the like.’’ (Ibid.,p.188) explanations.process of moral argument’’:As “debates overI slavery,tried worker’s rights, women’s rights, democracy to show in the previous Smith gives examples of convergence in moral opinions that were that inmoral opinions of examples Smith convergence gives evidence: empirical the from explanation best the to inference an as thesis his bases Smith However, if that we wereallfullyjudgments moral and rational would converge. our then theories accomplishing unity and coherence between one’s desires and evaluative beliefs. revision Smith’sthrough thesisincludes is this where equilibrium, reflective a reach to is trying aperson which in This ofsystematic as isprocess p. 156). desires construed one process justification our (ibid., of includesa deliberation this where important is partoffull The mostcorrect rationality 156). falseno beliefs, beliefs, hasall and (2) true correctly relevant (3)deliberates (Smith 1994, p. were a fully rational agent, one would desire to (see Nichols 2008, p.404-405). 28 27 a normative reason to On On Smith’s account 3.2 Justification under conditions of full rationality views. two these consider Iwill sections following the In forthcoming). (Parfit rationality using by comprehend we that facts normative irreducibly of domain I assume that the last sentence in quote means that what best explains convergence is the rational status ofmorality status rational the is convergence explains best what that means quote in sentence last the that assume I thesis. 2 of this See chapter tendency is our convergence upon a set of extremely unobvious of extremely aset upon convergence our is tendency there will be convergencea in our desires under conditions of full rationality. For the bestexplanation of that empirical fact that moral argument tends to elicit the agreement of ourfellows gives us reason to believe that Ɏ 27 . To judge that there is a normative reason to when someone judges that it is right to to is right it that judges someone when 38 Ɏ . Full rationality includes: that the agent (1)has a priori moral truths. moral Ɏ then one judges that there is there that judges one then inter alia Ɏ is to believe that if one 28 (Smith 1994., p. 187) obtained “via “via obtained a CEU eTD Collection 29 “whose universal acceptance everyone could rationally will.’’ (Parfitforthcoming, p. 311) Where Similarly like Scanlon, Parfit tries to justify moral judgments by appealing to principles 3.3 Justificatory normative realism plausible. very isnot claim rationalist justificatory invoking by explained best is opinion moral in convergence that contention Smith’s that contend I innatetransmission, biases, social simply andpressures not by rational argumentation. Therefore and economic cultural by explained be thenplausibly would convergence Cause of this more and more homogenous in their social, moral and cultural patterns of behavior and opinion. get which such asglobalization,cooperation through anditspeople through processes, extension of benefits be by might plausibly evolutionary explained Also, invoking convergence From my such perspective a world would bemorally defective. kind. dilemma bystander of the was situation moral every so that detached were emotionally and imagine moral howour like wouldworld ifeveryone look hadintuitions only consequentialist apriority which wouldmoral makeclaimsWe about justand necessity truths empty. can of might for different, beradically reach we would and whatconvergence wecould possibly argue then what different were emotions or moral intuitions if our since claim; rationalist justificatory moral arguments because we use foundation, even could haverational in that case morality couldSmith that argue and we and emotional repertoires thatweasmembers ofasingle have species (Nichols 2008,p.405). are often responsiveexplainor future)more asaconsequence to (past plausible convergence of intuitive similarity in understanding,to them. Thiswhilemoral and indevelopment moral necessary are processes intuitive emotional and chapter, rational is true, capacities but do notit seem will to be sufficient. not secure In that light it would be However,it would not seem to be rationally defective . 39 29 CEU eTD Collection respond to reasons was toreasons forrespond bynaturalselected selection. non-causally to ability thatthis rational He evenspeculates p. 679) (Ibid., facts.’’ reason-giving being of properties affected normative the bythe respond tosuchreasonswithout causally properties. Similarly,numbers without having andtheirany causal relation with dothat questions, andtheycan Parfit claims “[a]smathematical answers to true produce can reliably that makecomputers can analogy: we the facts about computers show, we might existencethe of facts p.678). (ibid., normative be able to assumereason to wehaveno ishighly therefore unlikely, of such a correlation The occurrences coincidence. be would amassive correlation existencethis the of that then we can only assume correlation, this of explanation available no is there If facts. normative about beliefs true many is itfacts, not wecanhave so beliefs andnormative clear how betweenour natural connection epistemologicalwhich to issuch facts? can how nocausallink, knowabout there is of aware we even Parfitthis problem. It is not be by clear how justified facts judgments) can (and other moral normative judgments He considers the truths. necessary to correspond facts normative that is supposed itsince isavoided, justification of facts (ibid., By p. 676-678). introducing facts about normative these reasons, our contingency the facts is by using our rational capacities, since there is no causal connection with those non-natural reason-giving these to respond to way only The do. to reason sufficient or most the have would So, when answering a question is form paradigmatic whose facts, whether normative irreducibly somemind-independent, act is right or wrong we are looking on Parfitdepends according to choose, to reason for sufficient have would everyone What choose’. what we ‘what everyone could rationally will’ means what ‘everyone would have sufficient reason to In an attempt to show that the latter argument is not successful Parfit makes the following makes the Parfit successful is not argument latter the that show to In anattempt Massive CoincidenceArgument Massive 40 being a reason for being a : since there is no is there : since . CEU eTD Collection 32 (forthcoming, p.679), so I presume that rational abilities refer our to normal rational capacities. 31 dilemma. 30 more‘cognitive’ employingWith acost-benefitway, perhaps (Ibid.) analysis.’’ evolutionary this alarmlike notemotional be whichresponse will triggered, in a respond would allow “to people impersonal, ismore this 43) Incases violence (p. the where individual restraint.” cooperation and survival on (…)whose depends behaviorof means of the evolvedcreatures asa regulating theseresponses where violence, interpersonal of certain forms basic “to responses emotional itmore is alarmlike abstract forcapacities reasoning, likely evolved humans then that predates system affective that and ancient, more evolutionary is violence personal that fact the given that problems in trolley stated as harms, of forms on ofusas nature the would people. becontingent justification this that suppose plausibly can we because judgments, moral of status necessary history. evolutionary our on contingent is mechanism the actually govern normativefacts, because which principles responsiveness notguarantee to does isit becauseis normally. However,reliable enough, this sinceit not adaptation and functions an stimuli from environmentwhichthe causally judgment.someproduces Themechanism moral is weaker linguistic analogy) as developed an adaptation. Then,wehaveactivated inputsthat get by the (on model Rawlsian the that suppose can we morality of case In them. built we because some inputs They whichoutputs. their are reliable causally,according produce program, then to abilities. wouldbe haveto justified insome by way; general presumably using domain reasoning See section 3.3. See section Parfit claims that the ability to respond to reasons does not involve some ‘mysterious’ or‘quasi-sensory’ intuition We canagain imagine that all humans have dominantly consequentialist’s intuitions in cases footbridge like For example, Greene (2008a) accounts for the difference between personal and impersonal and personal between difference for the (2008a)accounts For example,Greene One wayin which analogythis could make senseis thefollowing: respond computers to 31 However, in that case, my claim is again that this move cannot secure the a priori and apriori secure the cannot movethis that isagain my claim case, in that However, 32 , in evolutionary terms. Crudely, the explanation is explanation the Crudely, terms. in evolutionary , 41 30 So, the output of of mechanism this output So,the CEU eTD Collection provide plausible views about the nature ofmorality viewsaboutthe provide plausible facein of anddata. the empirical theories justification. still holds, andthatParfit’sjustificatory idea of avoid cannot rationalism problemsof contingent indicates whichmassiveof facts andjudgments, thethat problem coincidence thethese truth of possibility moral rationally justifying notjudgments indicateof our does linkbetween the these the facts, normative some therewere evenif Hence, them. justify would that some reasons of fitnessmoral we our intuitions hadcould have for different find which be we would able to view of point the from Presumably, rational. if to respond must one that facts normative as status individual’sforadvantageous not indicatenecessary fitness. will However,and their this apriori claiming thatconsider theirjustification to indicate ourthe a priori and to necessaryplausible less statusseems it of then moral intuitionsnature claims. our on I am not judgments moral our of contingency the realize we are wrong; then, presumably find we could some principlejustify thatwould intuitions.irrational; So,if those equally are dilemmas both in killings that intuitions strong have could we example for different; on the contrary intuitions were imaginethatour However,we can 329). forthcoming, p. someone else(Parfit theybenefitting might of means someoneas someone kill to bewrong is it says that principle moral a else,very invoking by justified but thatrational it is not wrong they not find inbystander flippingdo wrong aswitch thebe Thisdifference dilemma. can to killand someone as a side-effectbystander dilemmas. Now,most people find pushing a manof be footbridgethe wrong, to while of benefiting footbridge in and thatpeople haveto background responses explains difference Greene the Therefore IconcludeSmith’s that andParfit’s ofjustificatory conceptions donot rationalism 42 CEU eTD Collection rationalism. butI agreedwithis is Joyce against misplaced, thatstudy ainconclusive evidence conceptual with Joyce’sNichols’ that skepticism possibility aboutthe testingof conceptual rationalist claim agreed I rationalism. conceptual empirically test cannot one andthat a strawman, was attacking prima facie that showed andrationality. Study between morality conceptual the connection about intuitions In the second chapter I reported on Nichols’ (2002) study in which he tested subjects’ rationality. of operations graspedthrough truths necessary and moral areapriori facts that suggesting facts, moral about claim substantive is a It morality. of foundations rational the about claim normative is a rationalism Justificatory andperception. with emotion are contrasted that abilities cognitive judgments products of our rational wherecapacities, higher-order these refercapacities to Psychological rationalism is a claim about the sources of moral judgments. It says thatmoral says thatit is a conceptual truth that moral requirements are requirements of practical rationality. judges that it is morally right to to right morally is it that judges rationalism is a claim about moral concepts, which says thatit is a conceptual truth that when one Conceptual rationalism and psychological rationalism are descriptive claims. Conceptual rationalism. justificatory and rationalism psychological rationalism, conceptual claims: distinct three into rationalism moral in dividing (2008) assessto ideascontainedthe moral among followedrationalists I (2004)and Nichols Joyce empirical moral psychology on thesis, conceptions and aspirations of moral rationalism. In order C ONCLUSION In this thesis my aim was to examine the impact of recent discoveries and developments in developments and discoveries recent of impact the examine to was aim my thesis this In conceptual rationalism false.is However, (2008)argued that Joyce Nichols’ study Ɏ then one judges that there is a reason to to reason a is there that judges one then 43 Ɏ . In other words it words other . In CEU eTD Collection that evolution of moral intuitions might have been different. been have might intuitions moral of evolution that fact the considering tothem, be nowif areresponding ableto we any, not would were there we responding normative empty, makes thewholeissueconsideration to facts aboutevenif since actual. This have towards aswe intuitions different tothese attitude same the have probably andwould now, asweare sameposition bein the we would different moral issues were about we respond toreason-giving, necessary and causally-inert facts, Iargue that even if our intuitions judgments, moral giving in if rational that, view (forthcoming) Parfit’s Against opinion. moral in claim.argued thatSmithis I notaplausible (1994) account explanation convergence possible of In of rationalistic the construals the last I chapter justificatory two rationalist’s criticized necessary in role producing moral judgment. rational capacities are not sufficient and intuitive (unconscious) and emotional processes play a influential three presented modelsmoral and of judgment that evidence arguedthat shows In subsequent chapter I examined the psychological rationalism. 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