Moral Mental States: Four Methods in Metaethics
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City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 2011 Moral Mental States: Four Methods in Metaethics Christopher Alen Sula The Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/1484 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] i Moral Mental States Four Methods in Metaethics Christopher Alen Sula A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York 2011 ii © 2011 CHRISTOPHER ALEN SULA All Rights Reserved iii This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in satisfaction of the Dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. David M. Rosenthal ___________________ _____________________________________________ Date Chair of Examining Committee Iakovos Vasiliou ___________________ _____________________________________________ Date Executive Officer Catherine Wilson (advisor) . Stefan Bernard Baumrin ______ Samir Chopra , Douglas Lackey . Supervisory Committee THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iv Abstract Moral Mental States: Four Methods in Metaethics Christopher Alen Sula Advisor: Catherine Wilson Metaethics has traditionally focused on the meaning of moral statements, the referents of moral terms, and the justification of moral claims. This dissertation focuses on the thoughts in virtue of which our moral statements have their meaning and our moral claims have their content. These “moral mental states,” as I call them, are best understood as having both intentional and volitional aspects and, corresponding to each aspect, as having satisfaction conditions involving both correctness and success in action. Put simply, our moral mental states are not only responsible for changing the world; they are responsible for changing the world in better ways, rather than worse ones. Using this framework, I examine three current metaethical frameworks (moral realism, constructivism, and expressivism/quasi-realism) and assess their adequacy in accounting for both kinds of these satisfaction conditions. I argue that none of the approaches succeeds in meeting basic constraints imposed by a robust view of moral mental states and propose my own view (interactionism). On my account, we often change our moral stances once the outcomes of the plans they recommend becomes known. Taking this as its basis, interactionism holds that a moral mental state is correct or incorrect v based on the content (roughly, approval or disapproval) of the moral mental state one would hold in light of this improved information. Accordingly, the procedures for confirming moral content are similar to those for confirming scientific content: hypotheses and observations play a central role, and we must occasionally defer to other inquirers on issues that exceed our capacity for investigation. I conclude by presenting three empirical hypotheses that claim that we do, as a matter of course, have other-regarding interests and that, in a significant number of cases, our self- regarding and other-regarding interests overlap. vi Acknowledgements Like all participants in a discussion, I owe a great deal to those who have talked with me and especially those who taught me how to talk. Chief thanks are owed to my advisor, Catherine Wilson. Her comprehensive approach, gentle commentary, and fine example have all made this dissertation possible. Her abilities to engage a new problem, structure a careful response, and articulate that response clearly and elegantly—always with an eye to the historical and scientific—are unmatched. Stefan Baumrin first directed my attention toward issues in value theory. Before his tutelage, I was an uncomplicated Nietzschean; ever since, I have been appropriately puzzled about the moral life. We have talked frequently, agreed rarely, but have ever been friends and allies. David Rosenthal has been a great source of advice, rigor, and friendship for many years. His very carefully structured courses and writings instilled in me a deep conviction in naturalism and the central place of intentionality in philosophy. He has been one of my greatest teachers, and it is no overstatement to say that David changed my philosophical life. I also wish to thank my examiners, Samir Chopra and Doug Lackey, for their time and generosity in conducting the defense. Samir, in particular, has proved a vibrant and refreshing thinking partner over the past few months. I regret that we did not meet sooner, but I look forward to many fruitful discussions to come. vii I am especially thankful for colleagues who helped me work through the ideas in this dissertation. First, there were members of my dissertation workshop— James Dow, Ellen Fridland, and David Pereplyotchik—who remained patient as I first developed the ideas presented here. Jen Corns and Myrto Myopolous were helpful interlocutors over several years, and Amanda Favia and Kyle Ferguson provided invaluable comments on drafts at various stages. There are also colleagues from other fields without whose personal support I could not have finished this project. The list is long, but memorable: Anick Boyd, Gregory Donovan, Allyson Foster, Ian Foster, Eero Laine, Kim Libman, Leigh McCallen, Kate McPherson, Claudia Pisano, Jared Simard, Suzanne Tamang, and especially Jill Belli and Shawn Rice. I am also grateful to my students at Lehman College, with whom I tested many of the ideas and arguments in this dissertation. Most importantly, I owe an enormous professional and personal debt to my friend and colleague David Morrow. Through him, I was first introduced to metaethics and began to develop my own approach to the issues examined here. His keen insights and careful commentary have proved simultaneously challenging and rewarding, and I cannot imagine a finer partner throughout my years in graduate school. Finally, I owe incalculable thanks to my dear friends Sean Noyce, Katya Usvitsky, Kristin Miller, Weishun Cheung, Caitlin Healy, Shawn, Kate, Amanda, and, most of all, Abbi Leman. viii Contents 1. Situating Morals in a World of Minds......................................................................1 1.1. Moral Mental States.................................................................................................................................................7 1.1.1. Mental Attitude.................................................................................................................................................7 1.1.2. Moral Content.................................................................................................................................................12 1.1.3. Further Issues ..................................................................................................................................................15 1.1.3.1. Moral Reality............................................................................................................................................16 1.1.3.2. Moral Action ............................................................................................................................................19 1.1.3.3. Moral Discourse....................................................................................................................................21 1.2. Conclusion.....................................................................................................................................................................25 2. Moral Mental States............................................................................................... 26 2.1. Individuating Moral Mental States..........................................................................................................28 2.1.1. Substantive Accounts...............................................................................................................................28 2.1.2. Mongrel/Cluster Accounts ...................................................................................................................38 2.1.3. Functional Accounts..................................................................................................................................40 2.1.3.1. Why Moral Mental States are Not Sensations...........................................................43 2.1.3.2. Why Moral Mental States are Not (Always) Qualitative States ...................46 2.2. Moral Mental States as Intentional States........................................................................................49 2.2.1. Intentional Inexistence ...........................................................................................................................50 2.2.2. Directions of Fit I: Mind-to-World Satisfaction Conditions....................................53 ix 2.3. Moral Mental States as Volitional States............................................................................................56 2.3.1. Directions of Fit II: World-to-Mind Satisfaction Conditions ..................................63 2.3.2. Practical Reason and the Consistency of Volitions........................................................67 2.4. The