MORAL OBJECTIVITY and the PSYCHOLOGY of MOTIVATION by Jude Ndubuisi Edeh a DISSERTATION Submitted in Partial Fulfilment Of
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Philosophy MORAL OBJECTIVITY AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MOTIVATION By Jude Ndubuisi Edeh A DISSERTATION Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Dr.phil) University of Münster Münster, Germany 2017 Dekan:Prof. Dr. Thomas Großbölting Erstgutachter: PD. Dr. Michael Kühler Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Reinold Schmücker Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 04.10.2018 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am immensely grateful to Michael Kühler and Reinold Schmücker, my supervisors, for their generosity with their time, energy and support. It’s not always a given that you find people who are both interested in your project and believe you can handle it, especially at its budding stage. I benefited tremendously from your constructive criticisms and helpful comments, without which the completion of this project would not have been successful. I owe, in addition, a significant debt of gratitude to Nadine Elzein for supervising this project during my research stay at the King’s College, University of London. Nadine, your enthusiasm, philosophical insight and suggestions are invaluable. I owe special thanks also to Lukas Meyer for hosting me in August 2015 at the Institute of Philosophy, University of Graz. This project would not have been possible without the friendship, support, and insight of a good many people. In particular, I owe a significant debt of gratitude to: Nnaemeka’s family, Anthony Anih’s family, Anthony C. Ajah, Uzoma Emenogu, Vitus Egwu. I will always remain indebted to my family for their undying care and love. I would never have made it this far without your encouragement and support. ii ABSTRACT This dissertation provides a solution to the tension of specifying and reconciling the relationship between moral judgement and motivation. I defend motivational externalism against realist motivational internalism, the view that moral belief is not only a genuine belief, but also, it necessarily motivates. I argue that by making moral motivation analytically dependent on moral judgement, the realist internalist removes the moral person from the landscape of moral agency. Precisely, the conceptual intuition on which realist internalism rests is insufficient. For it saddles the burden of explaining away, for example, the crucial roles of agents’ desires, self, traits and identity in moral motivation. To fill this gap, I develop a realist externalist account of moral motivation. My core argument is that motives for acting on moral judgements are based on independent desires, and the desire for being faithful to the moral-self is one of them. Given that morality has two aspects, namely theoretical feature and practical feature, I proceed by arguing that noncognitivism; precisely moral expressivism fails to capture our intuition about the theoretical feature of morality as well as moral objectivity. Then, I characterize and defend the version of moral realism relevant for the purposes of this work. Having taken a metaethical standpoint, I spend the rest of the dissertation addressing the practical feature of morality. First, I argue that the phenomenon of moral indifference threatens the motivational efficacy claim of robust internalism. In addition, I contend that Smith’s Arguments from Rationalism and Practicality Requirement do not give us sufficient grounds to abandon motivational externalism. Second, I argue that motivational externalism has better resources for analysing the psychology of moral motivation. To defend motivational externalism, (1) I provide a conceptual framework; and (2) drawing on Harry Frankfurt’s “Second-Order Volitions” and Augusto Blasi’s “Moral-Self”, I propose an externalist account of a widespread connection between moral judgement and motivation. On this view, motivation is based on moral identity. I argue that moral care, moral-self and moral desires are essential to moral motivation. Moral motivation does not stem directly from moral judgements; rather from an independent desire, namely, a moral desire for realizing the moral values we care about, that is, the desire to be faithful to one’s moral-self. Finally, I argue that externalism is not condemned to explaining the motivation of virtuous persons in terms of desire de dicto as Smith alleges. In fact, it is possible, on the externalist construal, to account for a reliable connection between moral judgement and motivation in terms of de re desires. iii Moral Objectivity and the Psychology of Motivation Die Objektivität der Moral und die psychologische Frage nach der Motivation zu moralischem Handeln Zusammenfassung Die Arbeit widmet sich einer zentralen und umstrittenen Frage innerhalb der Metaethik und Moralpsychologie: Wie kann die Vorstellung, dass unsere moralischen Urteile wahrheitsfähige Aussagen darstellen, mit dem Anspruch vereinbart werden, dass diese Urteile uns zugleich zu einem entsprechenden Handeln zu motivieren vermögen? Um dieses Spannungsverhältnis zwischen moralischem Urteil und Motivation aufzulösen, verteidige ich eine externalistische Variante moralischer Motivation gegenüber einem motivationalen Internalismus. Die Analyse der Motivation zu moralischem Handeln erfolgt zwar in beiden Fällen auf der Basis eines moralischen Realismus, d.h. der Vorstellung, dass moralische Urteile wahrheitsfähig sind. Im kritischen Durchgang durch einschlägige internalistische Positionen argumentiere ich jedoch dafür, dass diese nicht überzeugend zeigen können, wie wahrheitsfähige moralische Urteile uns zugleich zu einem entsprechenden Handeln zu motivieren vermögen. Der Kern meiner Kritik besteht darin, dass der realistische Internalismus die Bedeutung der Person in der Analyse moralischer Motivation verkennt, d.h. die Bedeutung der Rolle von Wünschen und eines praktischen Selbstverständnisses, d.h. der Identität des Akteurs. Bezieht man dies hingegen mit ein, so ergibt sich ein realistischer Externalismus mit Blick auf die Motivationskraft moralischer Urteile. Diese bleiben also auf den von ihnen unabhängigen Wunsch des Akteurs angewiesen, sich in einem umfassenden Sinne als moralische Person zu verstehen und diesem Selbstverständnis im Handeln treu bleiben zu wollen. Erst vermittelt durch ein solches praktisches Selbstverständnis vermögen uns moralische Urteile folglich zu einem moralischen Handeln zu motivieren. iv CONTENT Chapter One: The Problem of Moral Motivation 1 Chapter Two: Noncognitivism 37 Chapter Three: Moral Realism 95 Chapter Four: Motivational Internalism 139 Chapter Five: The Moral Problem: Smith’s Solutions? 178 Chapter Six: Objections against Externalism and Replies 221 Chapter Seven: A Defence of Externalist Moral Motivation 250 Conclusion 293 References 296 v CONTENT Acknowledgments ii Abstract iii Zusammenfassung iv CHAPTER 1: THE PROBLEM OF MORAL MOTIVATION 1.0. Introduction 1 1.1. Theoretical Feature of Morality 3 1.2. Practical Feature of Morality 7 1.3. Olivia’s Case is Metaethical 8 1.4. From the Mind to Moral Psychology 11 1.5. Tension 17 PART ONE: Moral Objectivity CHAPTER 2: NONCOGNITIVISM 2.0. Introduction 24 2.1. Moral Knowledge and Scepticism 26 2.2. Moral Expressivism 32 Emotivism Ayer’s Emotivism Stevenson’s Emotivism Moral Disagreement Hybrid Expressivism and Mind-Independency 2.3. Conclusion 59 CHAPTER 3: MORAL REALISM 3.0. Introduction 61 3.1. What is Moral Realism? 61 vi 3.2. Not Morally Realistic Enough 63 3.3. Moral Objectivity qua Mind-Independency 68 Weak Moral Mind-Independency Robust Moral Mind-Independency 3.4. One Castle, Two Towers: Naturalism and Non-Naturalism 78 Moral Naturalism Reductive Naturalism Non-Reductive Naturalism 3.5. Conclusion 85 PART TWO: Psychology of moral motivation CHAPTER 4: MOTIVATIONAL INTERNALISM 4.0. Introduction 88 4.1. Motivational Internalism 91 4.2. From Judgement to Judgement Internalism 96 4.3. Internality and Conceptuality 101 4.4. Robust Realist Motivational Internalism 103 4.5. Olivia’s Case: An Argument against Robust Internalism 104 4.6. Explaining Olivia’s Behaviour 107 4.7. Conclusion 111 CHAPTER 5: THE MORAL PROBLEM: SMITH’S SOLUTION? 5.0. Introduction 112 5.1. Moral Rationalism 115 5.2. Smith’s Notion of Normative Reason 116 5.3. Smith’s Argument from Rationalism 120 5.4. Philippa Foot: Argument against Categorical Imperatives 126 vii 5.5. Smith’s Argument from Practicality Requirement 130 5.6. The Fetishist Argument 132 5.7. Conclusion 138 CHAPTER 6: OBJECTIONS AGAINST EXTERNALISM AND REPLIES 6.0. Introduction 139 6.1. Objection from Moral Intuition 139 6.2. Objection from Action-Guiding and Motive-Giving 144 6.3. Objection from Off-Colour Moral Terms Usage 146 6.4. Objection from Amoralism 152 CHAPTER 7: A Defence OF EXTERNALIST MORAL MOTIVATION 7.0. Introduction 157 7.1. Framework for Externalist Motivation 159 7.2. Personal Identity as Moral Identity 163 7.3. Moral Identity 168 The Kantian- Kohlbergian Perspective Blasian Perspective 7.4. Moral Identity-Based Motivation 171 Moral-Self Care and Moral Motivation 7.5. Motivational Externalism and Widespread Motivation 177 7.6. Moral Fetishization: When Moral Desire becomes Bad 179 7.7. Conclusion 183 CONCLUSION 184 References 186 viii Chapter 1 The Problem of Moral Motivation “I’m good! Why, then be moral? Do you mean, I’ve reasons to? I see it not, I don’t see why I’ve to be moral. I’m good!” Culled from Olivia, unpublished Poem 1.0. Introduction There is a belief about the practical implications of moral thoughts and language: an idea based on our moral intuition. It is believed that morality has two basic features, namely, the theoretical and practical features (Brink 1989; Smith