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Top > Countermeasures for 2011 Tohoku - Pacific Ocean Earthquake Press Conference by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Saturday, March 26 at 04:18pm, 2011 [Provisional Translation] JAPANESE Opening Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: I am sorry to have kept you all waiting. I have an announcement about the appointment of a Special Advisor to the Prime Minister. House of Representatives member Sumio Mabuchi was today named Special Advisor to the Prime Minister in charge of issues related to damage caused by the 2011 Tohoku ? Pacific Ocean Earthquake and the incident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant following a request by Special Advisor Manabu Terada to step down from the position. The Prime Minister accepted Mr. Terada's letter of resignation and Mr. Mabuchi received the letter of appointment from the Prime Minister moments ago. That is all from me for now. Q&As REPORTER: I am Kuribayashi from the Yomiuri Shimbun. Regarding the change in personnel, what is the reason behind the choice of Mr. Mabuchi? How did you decide that he was an appropriate person to take charge of the response to the nuclear incident and earthquake? CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: Actually the Prime Minister wanted Special Advisor Goshi Hosono to take up these responsibilities as he is already working in the Headquarters set up by Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) to respond to the situation at the power plant. However, given the enormous range of work that must be done, Special Advisor Hosono requested that the structure currently in place should be strengthened. The Prime Minister judged that, given the wealth of experience possessed by Mr. Mabuchi, he would be a good choice to work with Special Advisor Hosono on the accident at the power plant. Looking at the current situation and work that needs to be done, Mr. Mabuchi's experience as a former Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism is sure to be a valuable asset for the mid-term response to the earthquake, although this will depend on the situation at the power plant. I have heard that these are the reasons he was chosen for the job. REPORTER: So for the time being will Mr. Mabuchi be focusing on the incidents at the power plant then? CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: Yes. I think this is what he will work on first. REPORTER: I am Sato of the Asahi Shimbun. First Yoshito Sengoku and now Sumio Mabuchi ? how do you respond to criticisms that the Government is only calling up the ministers who were censured? CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: I of course understand that there must be many opinions about these selections but I believe that we must focus on strengthening our capability to respond to the earthquake and nuclear incident, and that this means calling up the most appropriate persons for each job. REPORTER: I am Koketsu of Jiji Press. During the last Cabinet reshuffle, the Prime Minister said that he had selected the best people possible for each position. Does that still hold true for this kind of situation? CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: I believe that a similar question has been asked before. The immense disaster and nuclear incidents are really unlike anything we have seen before. We did not imagine such incidents during the last Cabinet reshuffle. At that time before these disasters had occurred, we formed the best possible group to tackle the new projects we wanted to work on. I think it is only natural that the best group to deal with the current issues and the issues we faced then would be different. REPORTER: I am Sato from Asahi Shimbun. My question concerns the radiation exposure incident at the power plant. TEPCO has announced that they confirmed large amounts of radiation around the plant before work began. Did the Government also know about the large concentration of radiation in the water around the plant from before? CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: Nothing in the least was reported to me or the Prime Minister's Office about it. REPORTER: I am Murakami from the Sankei Shimbun. What do you think about the way TEPCO handled this, considering that they didn't report to you about it? CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: In any event, in order to secure the safety of those working at the plant under such incredibly dangerous conditions and in order to reduce the effect and damage this incident causes, it is vital that the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) and other organizations in charge of the matter receive accurate and speedy reports of all available information. If information is not reported, the Government cannot give appropriate instructions and those working at the plant and the people of the nation will grow uneasy. The Government has been making requests to TEPCO that they be more strict about disclosing information and provide us with complete reports on everything that happens. REPORTER: I would like to ask the question again ? what is your opinion of the job TEPCO is doing, especially considering their predilection to hide information? CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: I do not believe that it is the role of the Government to evaluate matters like that. I think that more than anything, in order for the Government to make an appropriate response to this incident, in order to alleviate the concerns of the public and avoid the sewing of distrust in TEPCO, we must make sure that all the information is released to the public. This incident has made me realize that I must give even firmer instructions on this point. REPORTER: I am Kuribayashi of the Yomiuri Shimbun. Radioactive materials at levels exceeding normal values were detected in vegetables produced in Ibaraki Prefecture and sold in Nagoya. Furthermore, more items are now being found to contain radioactive elements. With this problem growing in scope, do you think the Government should redouble its efforts to respond to this issue moving forward? What points do you want the people to be careful about and how do you expect them to behave? What messages does the Government intend to send to the people? CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: I have received a number of reports from various places that some foods have been found to contain radioactive materials at levels exceeding normal values. This is extremely unfortunate. The standard levels for radiation currently upheld by the Government are very conservative and have been established in such a way to ensure absolute safety. As the standard levels are extremely precautious, even if foods that exceed these limits are consumed, there is no possibility that they will affect human health. However, once we detect an excess level of radioactivity in food items, as was the case for spinach and milk, we must act to prohibit the shipping of the items at a very early stage, so that they won't be consumed by people for an extended period of time. Therefore, even if some food items on the shelf right now contain radioactive materials exceeding the standard values, this will not affect human health. I want the people to thoroughly understand this point. I want the people to understand that we are taking precautionary actions such as the prohibition of shipping for the sake of safety, so that these items are not consumed for an extended period of time. REPORTER: I am Kurashiki of the Asahi Shimbun. You announced that Mr. Mabuchi has been appointed as Special Advisor in charge of the nuclear incident. With two weeks having now passed since the earthquake, does his appointment indicate that the issue will take longer to be resolved than initially expected? Please tell us the current outlook about the nuclear incident. CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: As the situation remains unpredictable, I think I should refrain from making statements based on assumptions. The current situation is that at least we are working to prevent the incident from getting any worse. Electricity to the plant has been restored and it is now possible to inject pure water into the reactors. My view is that we are making steps toward a fundamental improvement at the plant, but since it is too early to be optimistic, I think at the current stage I am not in a position to make a detailed prediction. Still, in order to stabilize the situation at the power plant, and in order to maintain that state for a long period of time, there is no doubt that a considerable number of steps, preparations, and operation will be required. That is why Mr. Mabuchi has been asked to become involved, in addition to the work already being done be Special Advisor Hosono. His involvement will create a structure to handle the enormous amount of work needed to conclude the issue. REPORTER: In relation to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, radioactive iodine 1,250 times higher than normal levels has been detected in seawater flowing through the sewer system south of the plant. I would thus like to ask once again what the current condition of the power plant is. Also, what sort of effect do you think the radiation will have on marine life? CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: As for the situation at the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant, as I said a moment ago, there is no question that we have prevented the situation from getting worse. This has come about thanks to work, such as the water- spraying operations, carried out under extremely difficult conditions by fire fighters and the SDF. That said, even though we have restored power to the plant, there are still instruments we need to use in order to understand the entire situation which have not yet been completely restored to their former functionality.
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