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Advanced Conventional Weapons

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Advanced Conventional Weapons Serving U.S. Warfighters Accomplishments Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Over the past decade, LLNL teams have shown how emerging technologies, (LLNL) supports the Department of advanced simulations, and new manufacturing capabilities can be coupled into a Energy/National Nuclear Security tightly integrated, holistic development cycle to produce advanced conventional Administration’s enduring mission in weapons that rapidly and precisely meet warfighter needs. At the same time, this stockpile stewardship to ensure the safety, development cycle reduces costs, production schedules, and acquisition risks. security, and reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons. The world-class scientific As one flagship example, LLNL partnered with the U.S. Air Force to develop and field and technological capabilities needed the BLU-129/B 500-pound bomb in less than 18 months, in response to a Joint Urgent for stockpile stewardship are also being Operational Need calling for enhanced lethality on targets while providing highly used to enable development of advanced circumscribed effects that protect nearby noncombatants and friendly forces.This conventional (non-nuclear) weapons for accomplishment demonstrated the ability of an LLNL-DOD-industry team to greatly Department of Defense (DOD) customers. streamline the design-build-test cycle through the disciplined use of well-validated simulations and models, in the process breaking down classical cost and schedule LLNL works closely with DOD military paradigms. and civilian researchers to stay at the forefront of future conventional weapon Other accomplishments include: capabilities. LLNL scientists and engineers Supported the third production run of the BLU-129/B low-collateral-damage leverage the nation’s investments in high- bomb, and expansion of the bomb to applications beyond the originally specified performance computing and expertise capability. in materials science and engineering, high explosives, systems engineering, and modeling and simulation as well as Development and deployment of the GBU-39A/B Small Diameter Bomb “Focused its wide range of experimental facilities. Lethality Munition,” which furnishes unique and valuable warfighting capability. These resources enable the rapid development of new munitions that are Extensive warhead development and testing in support of the Conventional helping to reshape the modern battlefield Strike Missile, Conventional Prompt Global Strike, and Conventional Prompt through enhanced military effectiveness. Strike projects, which have paved the way to multiple ongoing DOD hypersonic weapons systems programs. LLNL offers the full spectrum of munitions development activities, from warhead Developed new insensitive high explosives that maintain or improve energetic design concepts, modeling and simulation performance while providing greatly enhanced munitions safety. of weapon effects and aerodynamics, to novel high-explosive formulations coupled Although much of LLNL’s most important work in conventional weapons remains with testing at the High Explosives classified, there are many significant efforts underway in which LLNL—working Applications Facility (HEAF) and larger- closely with its DOE, DOD, and industry partners—continues to develop extremely scale testing conducted at our remote powerful yet highly precise (and affordable) weapon capabilities. Site 300. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Scientific Underpinnings The Future The underpinnings of LLNL’s role in research and development for conventional DOD continues to seek advanced non- weapons derive from decades of experience designing and sustaining the nuclear nuclear weapon capabilities that reduce deterrent. Nuclear weapons are very complex systems that present numerous scientific development costs, while shrinking the challenges in such fields as materials science, physics, chemistry, and high explosives. time to field new operational capabilities. Livermore researchers are also demonstrating smarter, more cost-effective pathways of Building on the Laboratory’s extensive designing, testing, and qualifying advanced conventional weapon systems. experience in weapon payloads and delivery systems, including Conventional LLNL’s high-performance computers provide “virtual” test beds, enabling scientists and Prompt Global Strike and related research engineers to examine weapon design options to better predict and optimize military efforts, LLNL is intimately involved in effectiveness. Computer simulations also realistically model weapon effects on target a number of national programs that environments where experiments would be too difficult, dangerous, or expensive. are developing hypersonic weapons to Simulations are used to converge design options into a single innovative weapon counter rapidly evolving threats. LLNL’s system design that is ready for the battlefield more quickly than previously possible. advanced modeling, simulation, and Additionally, LLNL provides the following world-class capabilities: experimental tools are being used to LLNL is the NNSA Center of Excellence for the research, development, synthesis, develop precision warheads can be scaled formulation, and characterization of explosives. The High Explosives Applications in size and mass to address a wide range Facility (HEAF) encompasses all aspects of energetic materials R&D. of military targets LLNL’s continued R&D of novel energetic The ability to conduct research at HEAF and LLNL’s Site 300 is demonstrating materials is being applied to other how novel high explosives offer greater military effectiveness and safety with no DOD mission needs, including new gun degradation of performance. propellants, bombs designed to penetrate hardened or deeply buried targets, and LLNL materials scientists study and provide expertise on properties and behavior of high-speed explosive projectiles. complex composite materials and ceramics that are of interest to DOD for a variety of weapons and delivery systems. Livermore researchers are at the forefront of advanced manufacturing capabilities Principal Sponsorship (e.g., additive manufacturing or 3D printing), which are being used to tailor materials properties for weapons applications. Additive manufacturing is making DOD, including Office of the Secretary possible new high explosives with advanced properties. of Defense (OSD), military departments, combatant commands, Joint Staff, and other support agencies, as well as U.S. LLNL’s ability to quickly assemble teams of experts in diverse science and defense-supporting industries. engineering fields such as high explosives, aerodynamics, materials science, system engineering, and supercomputing simulation is key to our successful engagement for meeting warfighter needs. LLNL-MI-772643 This work performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344. April 23, 2019 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
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