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Ecords of the War Department's I Operations Division, 1942-1945

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Ecords of the War Department's I Operations Division, 1942-1945 A Guide to the Microfilm Edition of World War II Research Collections ecords of the War Department's i Operations Division, 1942-1945 Part 1. World War II Operations Series C. Top Secret Files University Publications of America A Guide to ike Microfilm Edition of World War II Research Collections Records of the War Department's Operations Division, 1942-1945 Part 1. World War II Operations Series C. Top Secret Files Guide compiled by Blair D. Hydrick A microfilm project of UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS OF AMERICA An Imprint of CIS 4520 East-West Highway • Bethesda, MD 20814-3389 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Records of the War Department's Operations Division, 1942-1945. Part 1, World War II operations [microform]. microfilm reels. • (World War II research collections) Accompanied by printed reel guide, compiled by Blair D. Hydrick. Includes index. Contents: ser. A. European and Mediterranean theaters • ser. B. Pacific theater • ser. C. top secret files. ISBN 1-55655-273-4 (ser. C: microfilm) 1. World War, 1939-1945•Campaigns•Sources. 2. United States. War Dept. Operations Division•Archives. I. Hydrick, Blair D. II. University Publications of America (Firm). IE. Series. [D743] 940.54'2•dc20 93-1467 CIP Copyright 1993 by University Publications of America. All rights reserved. ISBN 1-55655-273-4. TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction v Note on Sources ix Editorial Note ix Abbreviations x Reel Index 1942-1944 Reell 1 Reel 2 1 Reel 3 2 Reel 4 2 Reel5 3 Reel 6 : 3 Reel? 4 ReelS 5 Reel 9 5 Reel 10 6 Reel 11 6 Reel 12 7 Reel 13 7 Reel 14 8 Reel 15 8 Reel 16 9 Reel 17 9 Reel 18 10 1945 Reel 19 11 Reel 20 12 Reel 21 12 Reel 22 13 Reel 23 14 Reel 24 14 Reel 25 15 Reel 26 16 Subject Index 19 m INTRODUCTION High Command: The Operations Division of the War Department General Staff In 1946 the question originally posed to me was assistance than was afforded to many of his subordinate what the U.S. Army had done right and what it had commanders. His staff was the War Department General done wrong in World War II. I was told that Dwight Staff, an organization whose history and traditions had D. Eisenhower, then a five-star general chief of staff of the made it quite different from the kind of staff that the U.S. army, wanted to know. The task for me was an "inquiry" in Army had developed to assist commanders of tactical units a real sense because no one knew except in very general in the field. terms what the record would reveal. Not only was it oriented toward the Zone of Interior, The "record," as I found it, consisted of the official where its prime duty was the preparation of "necessary document files of the whole War Department and the rec- plans for recruiting, mobilizing, supplying, equipping, and ollections of army officers who had helped write and com- training the Army," but as a result of that orientation the pile the documents. They covered all the major aspects of general staff came to accept a procedural tradition limiting high-level military planning in World War II and the re- its right to interfere with the actual performance of duties sponsibilities of various agencies, particularly of the Op- by other army and navy agencies within the United States. erations Division of the War Department General Staff While it was supposed to "supervise" the execution of (OPD), in formulating strategic plans and decisions. "plans and policies," this third staff function tended to be General George Marshall, Chief of Staff, and his Assis- inhibited by strong emphasis on refraining from interven- tant Chief of Staff, Operations, General John Hull agreed tion in the work of so-called "operating" agencies that that the OPD was a unique army institution, that it had carried on army activities in the Zone of Interior. In short, been phenomenally powerful and successful, and that few the general staff was designed to help the chief of staff people even in the army knew exactly what it was and formulate decisions, to a lesser extent to disseminate them, what it had done. The preparation of a scholarly history and scarcely at all to observe that they were carried out in would be extremely valuable. detail. U.S. Army staff work in tactical units was carried on in In the first three months after the entry of the United accordance with well-established doctrine. The exercise of States in World War II, the War Department worked out command, following this doctrine, has as its chief function and adopted a basic reorganization. The responsibilities of the issuance of orders that gear the actions of every ele- the War Plans Division (WPD) of the War Department ment in a military unit into an organic, coordinated effort. General Staff were broadened to include the strategic di- Effectiveness in command, it is understood, requires rection of army operations. The 9 March 1942 reorganiza- three things. First, the commander must be able to make tion thus provided a legal basis whereby WPD could ex- an intelligence appraisal of the specific situations that the ploit the high, central position of the War Department various parts of his command are facing. Second, he must General Staff. Henceforth WPD, renamed the OPD, be- formulate clear-cut decisions reflecting this appraisal. came the Washington command post. Third, he must assure himself that decisions reached are Its new duties were similar to those of a general staff in speedily and clearly conveyed to subordinates, and that the forward echelon of a field headquarters. OPD per- subordinates act accordingly. formed the full, triple staff function, formulating decisions, In the years when the menace of war was coming closer disseminating them, and observing the actions taken in and closer to the United States•1939,1940, and 1941• conformity with them. Continuing the old WPD task of the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army tried to control the ex- general strategic planning, particularly in committees of panding military establishment with less adequate staff the national (joint) and international (combined) command Introduction system, OPD was uniquely equipped with the information Americans, who had been poised between peace and war necessary for the staff formulation of decisions on behalf for some time, into wanting to "get even" with the Japa- of the chief of staff. nese. Since neither the army nor the navy had focused on From the beginning of 1942, the chief of staff had a Hawaii as a target, they were unprepared. The extensive staff that had army-wide responsibilities coextensive with damage crippled the U.S. Pacific Fleet and seriously com- his own. It was organized to issue orders and see that they promised the army and navy for wartime operations in the were carried out. Since OPD was the headquarters of this Pacific. staff, the official document files tell the story of General The U.S. Congress in its volumes, Hearings before the Marshall's overall army command throughout World Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Warll. Attack, 1945-1946, published a great deal of material in- cluding the War Department documents in the WPD files. Sources The testimony of War Department officers and the pro- In writing what I called the life history of a staff in ceedings and reports of earlier investigations revealed the Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, I extent of the disaster. The hearings before the congres- was privileged to use the files of the War Department that sional committee and exhibits submitted were published in covered not only the everyday decisions necessary to man- thirty-nine parts. The committee summarized its evidence age a military staff at home and abroad but also the poli- and conclusion in a one-volume report. cies made at the highest level of U.S. political and strate- One carefully phrased OPD message (No. 472) sent to gic negotiations in wartime. Pearl Harbor on 27 November 1941 accurately reflected In addition to the section entitled "Bibliographical Note the current diplomatic-military situation prior to the attack. and Guide to Footnotes," I wish to note that primary sources It bore the heading "Far Eastern Situation" and was read to were extensive and fell into five general categories: General Marshall, who signed it. It stated: 1. communications Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to 2. OPD drafts of communications all practical purposes with only the barest 3. OPD studies possibilities that the Japanese Government might 4. memorandum for the record and other come back and offer to continue. Japanese future informal notes of record action unpredictable but hostile action possible at 5. miscellaneous formal and informal papers any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be This is a rich collection. None of these sources should avoided the United States desires that Japan be disregarded about a certain subject. Even a penciled commit the first overt act. This policy should not, note on the margin of a study may make the only state- repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a ment to be found on a given topic, and these were numer- course of action that might jeopardize your ous, often providing very important information. Drafts of defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are papers may reveal authorship of various parts of a finished directed to undertake such reconnaissance and document that bears no personal signatures. Texts of lec- other measures as you deem necessary but these tures, even though not delivered, may be good summaries measures should be carried out so as not, repeat of actual opinions.
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