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The UK's Foreign Policy Approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan

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The UK's Foreign Policy Approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee The UK's foreign policy approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan Fourth Report of Session 2010–11 Volume I Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence Additional written evidence is contained in Volume II, available on the Committee website at www.parliament.uk/facom Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 9 February 2011 HC 514 Published on 2 March 2011 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £23.00 The Foreign Affairs Committee The Foreign Affairs Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and its associated agencies. Current membership Richard Ottaway (Conservative, Croydon South) (Chair) Rt Hon Bob Ainsworth (Labour, Coventry North East) Mr John Baron (Conservative, Basildon and Billericay) Rt Hon Sir Menzies Campbell (Liberal Democrats, North East Fife) Rt Hon Ann Clwyd (Labour, Cynon Valley) Mike Gapes (Labour, Ilford South) Andrew Rosindell (Conservative, Romford) Mr Frank Roy (Labour, Motherwell and Wishaw) Rt Hon Sir John Stanley (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling) Rory Stewart (Conservative, Penrith and The Border) Mr Dave Watts (Labour, St Helens North) The following Member was also a member of the Committee during the parliament: Emma Reynolds (Labour, Wolverhampton North East) Powers The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk. Publication The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including news items) are on the internet at www.parliament.uk/facom. A list of Reports of the Committee in the present Parliament is at the front of this volume. The Reports of the Committee, the formal minutes relating to that report, oral evidence taken and some or all written evidence are available in a printed volume. Additional written evidence may be published on the internet only. Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are Dr Robin James (Clerk), Mr Eliot Barrass (Second Clerk), Ms Adèle Brown (Committee Specialist), Dr Brigid Fowler (Committee Specialist), Mr Richard Dawson (Senior Committee Assistant), Jacqueline Cooksey (Committee Assistant), Mrs Catherine Close (Committee Assistant) and Mr Alex Paterson (Media Officer). Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 6394; the Committee’s email address is [email protected] The UK's foreign policy approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan 1 Contents Report Page Summary 5 Conclusions and recommendations 7 List of key abbreviations 15 1 Introduction 16 The inquiry 16 Recent developments 17 UK engagement in Afghanistan 19 Costs and spending 19 Personnel 19 UK support for Pakistan 20 PART 1: A SNAPSHOT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN 23 2 Progress after the military ‘surge’ 23 Background and context 23 The surge and civilian safety: losing hearts and minds? 24 Tactical rather than strategic success? 26 Helping or hindering the push towards political reconciliation? 28 3 The extent of Pakistan’s support for the counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan 30 Background 30 A sanctuary for Afghan insurgents 31 A selective Pakistani approach to the insurgency? 32 The West’s lack of political leverage 34 Direct US action in Pakistan 36 4 Transition to Afghan control: creating the conditions for withdrawal? 38 Progress on security transition 38 UK contribution 38 International efforts 39 Burden sharing 42 Civilian transition: bolstering the Afghan state? 42 A climate of disaffection 43 The importance of a solid local partner 44 The legacy of international disunity 45 The British contribution 46 5 Prospects for a political settlement? 50 The international context 50 The key players, their positions and roles 51 The insurgents 51 2 The UK's foreign policy approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan The role of the Afghan government 53 The US role 54 Divisions in the US position over reconciliation 55 What role for the UK? 56 Pakistan’s role 58 The wider region 60 The terms of a negotiated settlement 62 Prospects for success 63 PART 2: ASSESSING THE UK’S FOREIGN POLICY APPROACH TO AFGHANISTAN 64 6 The debate over deadlines 64 Background 64 Chronology of a changing British position 65 Why the change in policy? 67 Who made the decision on the 2015 deadline? 67 The possible consequences of announcing deadlines 69 Potential risks—the downside 69 Potential benefits—the upside 71 Helping to prevent a future escalation of the counter-insurgency campaign 73 Assessment 74 7 Assessing the suitability of the UK’s mission and goals 76 Protecting UK national security: the core mission in Afghanistan? 76 Are the UK’s goals appropriate and achievable? 78 A more stable and safer Afghanistan 78 Creating the conditions for withdrawal including capable Afghan Security Forces 81 An Afghan-led political settlement that represents all Afghan people 82 Regional political and security co-operation that supports a stable Afghanistan 83 Conclusion: the UK’s four goals and the core mission 83 8 Communicating the case effectively? 84 Communicating the campaign in Afghanistan 84 The international effort 84 Assessing the UK’s efforts 85 Communicating the campaign to British audiences 86 The national security narrative 86 Parliamentary engagement on current and future plans 87 9 Overarching issues of concern 89 Who’s driving British policy on Afghanistan? 89 The need for realistic goals and honest assessments of progress 91 Practical constraints on UK action 93 10 Learning lessons for the future 96 The UK's foreign policy approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan 3 Annex 98 Foreign Affairs Committee visit to Afghanistan and Pakistan 98 23–29 October 2010 98 Map of Afghanistan 101 Map of Pakistan 102 Map of Pakistan/Afghanistan border area 103 Formal Minutes 104 List of printed written evidence 112 Witnesses 112 List of additional written evidence 113 The UK's foreign policy approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan 5 Summary On taking office in May 2010, the Coalition Government placed Afghanistan and Pakistan at the top of its list of foreign policy priorities. As a Committee we chose to do likewise and have been inquiring into this vitally important issue since July 2010. At the very outset, we wish to pay tribute to all the British personnel, both military and civilian, who are serving in Afghanistan but in particular to those who have lost their lives in Afghanistan, and the many more who have sustained life-changing injuries as a result of the conflict there. We are mindful that some of the conclusions in this Report, because they are critical of Government policy may, by implication, be interpreted as a criticism of the men and women who are applying it in the face of extremely hazardous, hostile and difficult conditions. We wish to place on record that nothing could be further from the truth. They have our full support in tackling the challenges before them and their efforts are rightly described in so many instances as heroic. It is our hope that this Report will be received in the constructively critical manner in which it is intended, and regarded as a contribution to the wider debate which is taking place on how to improve a situation to which there are no easy solutions. The evidence presented to us suggests that despite the significant resources that have been invested in Afghanistan, and the enduring, wholehearted and admirable commitment and sacrifices of British personnel, the UK has not yet achieved its stated goals. There is also evidence to suggest that the core foreign policy justification for the UK’s continued presence in Afghanistan, namely that it is necessary in the interests of UK national security, may have been achieved some time ago, given the apparently limited strength of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Although the Government disputes this, we are seriously concerned that this fundamentally important assessment appears to be based on intelligence that has not been subject to parliamentary scrutiny. These criticisms do not mean that nothing has been achieved in the 10 years since the US- led intervention. However, at a strategic level, we seriously question whether the efforts expended towards these ends have a direct connection to the UK’s core objective, namely the national security of the UK and its allies and we also question whether the ambitious aims of the Government and the international community more widely are achievable. Ten years after its initial intervention, the international community’s involvement in Afghanistan is now being heavily influenced by an ISAF-agreed 2014 deadline, when plans to transfer security and civilian control back to Afghans are due to come into force. Yet, the security rationale behind the UK Government’s decision to announce the 2015 deadline for the unconditional withdrawal of UK combat forces remains unclear and there are a number of potential risks inherent in such an approach. We recommend that the Government clarify why the decision was taken and why it was not taken in the National Security Council. However, given that the decision to announce a deadline has now been taken and could not be reversed without causing irreparable damage to the UK’s standing 6 The UK's foreign policy approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan at home and abroad, the task must be to ensure that the 2015 deadline has the effect of focusing both Afghan and international minds on the core tasks at hand. Although the current international emphasis favours intense military pressure aimed at defeating the insurgency, it is clear that military pressure alone is not enough to bring security and stability to Afghanistan.
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