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Whither the Peace Process?

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Whither the Peace Process? POUCY FOCUS NEWSLETTER OF THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ISSUE NUMBER TWO W- APRIL 1986 Whither the Peace Process? The Local Leadership Option by Martin Indyk "No Palestinian moderates al- Some will argue that if only we now providing its Soviet ally with ample op- lowed." endorsed "self-determination" for the portunity for troublemaking in the That is the meaning of Yassir Ara- Palestinians, Arafat would be prepared Middle East heartland. fat's recent rejection of King Hussein's to meet our terms. But if that in fact terms for entering peace negotiations happened, we would have presided Option 2; The and the message behind the subse- over the resurrection of Arafat at King quent murder of Zafir al-Masri on the Hussein's expense; and, by bringing International Conference West Bank. Where does this leave the PLO into the process, we would Second, we could pursue that other U.S. efforts to advance the Middle have succeeded in forcing Israel out. illusion that always presents itself East peace process by involving Pales- We would in effect be placing our- when the peace process appears to tinians in negotiations with Jordan and selves at loggerheads with Israel and have reached a roadblock—the inter- Israel? Jordan, our partners in the peace pro- national conference. Some will argue cess. We would immediately have that an international conference which Option 1: Punish Hussein, achieved direct negotiations between brought the Syrians into the process the U.S. and the PLO but, in the pro- would obviate Hussein's need for the Resurrect Arafat cess, we would have destroyed the PLO. But the only conference Syria The four alternatives seem bleak. chance for direct negotiations between will attend is one in which it has the We could continue to pursue the illu- the Arabs and Israel. whip-hand. And given Syria's max- sion of a transformed Arafat. But given More importantly, our endorsement imalist position (Assad is now vowing that this is the sixth American over- of "self-determination" would be inter- to place the Golan Heights "in the cen- ture he has rejected since Jimmy preted by all parties to the conflict as ter of Syria") such a conference would Carter first tried in 1977, it is hard to support for an independent Palestinian only "increase our disappointment," as see what purpose would be served in state. But such a state would threaten Sadat was fond of warning. trying again. first Jordan and then Israel, while Continued on page 2 Hussein's Plan: Sidestepping Arafat by Robert Satloff What remains is who mil represent cent weeks, the King has publicly death may prove to be just a stumbling the Palestinian people. When a side called for Palestinians in the occupied block, not a stone wall. As ex-Gaza that can represent die Palestinian peo- territories to come forth with their mayor Rashad ash-Shawwa said after ple appears, we will be at its side. own, alternative leadership and has Masri's murder, "the idea itself which King Hussein, interviewed in al- even floated again his 1972 proposal of Masri supported, and in which many Siyasah, March 1 a United Arab Kingdom with provinces others including myself believe, has By openly challenging the leader- on both banks of the Jordan. not died." ship of Yassir Arafat, King Hussein has There is little doubt that the March Hussein's efforts to foster a more broached once again an issue that has 2 assassination of Nablus mayor Zafir amenable West Bank alternative to the been simmering beneath the surface of al-Masri, who symbolized Hussein's Arafat leadership are not new. In April Jordanian-PLO relations for more than vision of an independent leadership, 1985, he appointed a cabinet with 11 a decade—who speaks for the Pales- curtailed progress toward the creation Palestinian ministers headed by Prime tinians in Israeli-held territory. In re- of such an alternative. But Masri's Continued on page 6 w- The Local Leadership Option Continued from page 1 The only international conference treaty with Israel will remain a sepa- ceeding holds any prospect of a break- that is attractive to the U. S. is a phony rate peace. And if this is the only peace through. What then should the Reagan conference in which the Soviet Union, in the Middle East, it is unlikely to Administration do? Syria and the PLO give the speeches survive. The first requirement is to reaffirm while Israet?ii35rdanian-Palestinian Jordan also needs a peace process the basic objective of solving the Pal- delegation and the U.S. do the nego- because, like Israel, it faces a Palestin- estinian problem in a Jordanian con- tiating elsewhere. This kind of confer- ian demographic problem that threat- text, via direct negotiations between ence is unattractive to the Soviet ens Hashemite dominance. Moreover, Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian dele- Union and Syria and, given their cur- as long as the peace process focusses gation. Even if the circumstances are rent success in blocking our moves to on Jordan, the leverage of this small, not now conducive to such a solution, it promote it, they have little reason to weak and otherwise insignificant is the only objective that serves Amer- turn around now and accept it. The power is enhanced with every other ican interests as well as the interests of conference they will insist upon is one interested party. And in the absence of our partners in the peace process, Is- in which they retain a veto over the such a process, Jordan is more vulner- rael, Jordan and Egypt. bilateral negotiations. able than the others to extreme solu- The second requirement is to pre- tions that threaten to fill the vacuum. pare the ground for the pursuit of this Option 3: Benign Neglect If we cannot either solve the prob- lem of Palestinian representation or "[The U.S. must] make clear—especially to the PLO's reach agreement on the forum in which the negotiations will take place, the Arab interlocutors—that we no longer have an interest third alternative of a policy of "benign in courting the PLO leadership and no desire to have it neglect" begins to look more attrac- tive. After all, if the parties to the accept our conditions for recognition." conflict are not ready to take the risks necessary to make peace, then it is entirely possible that the Palestinian Option 4: Pressuring the objective in the future by helping to problem cannot be solved. In these King promote alternative Palestinian repre- circumstances, creative American di- sentatives from the territories capable plomacy may well be foredoomed. This leaves the fourth alternative, of replacing the paralyzed militancy Better then, the argument goes, to the "pure" Jordan option, in which and hidebound ideology of Arafat and focus on the growing power of radical King Hussein brings Palestinian repre- his henchmen. forces in the Middle East and promote sentatives from the West Bank and Such an idea is rarely greeted with stability through deterrence rather Gaza to the negotiating table with Isra- much enthusiasm at the best of times. than "solutionism." el. This has always been the ostensible For better or worse, many observers The problem with this approach is objective of the 1982 Reagan Plan and argue, Arafat represents the Palestin- that while the U.S. can live without a it is congruent with Israel's conception ians and there is no credible alter- peace process, its local allies cannot. of negotiations. The problem, how- native. The murder of Zafir al-Masri Israel needs a peace process if it is to ever, is that it imposes considerable has reinforced their argument for he reduce the immense human and eco- risks on Hussein since it would was the first credible, indigenous West^ nomic costs of war that are taking their provoke the certain opposition of the Banker to emerge in recent years. His toll on the very fabric of its society. PLO, Syria and the Soviet Union. death, and the subsequent withdrawal And it needs to find some method for Given his problems of demography (a of other mayoral candidates, appears dealing with the growing demographic majority of his subjects are Palestin- to demonstrate that when the PLO threat posed by a burgeoning Palestin- ians) and geography (a much stronger leadership fails to maintain its legit- ian population in its midst. Syria on his northern border), the imacy among the West Bank Palestin- Egypt needs a peace process be- King has been unwilling to take this ians through armed struggle or diplo- cause it cannot otherwise break out of risk. matic maneuvering, it can still retain its isolation in the Arab world, short of A Better Policy: Preparing legitimacy by violence and intimida- tearing up its peace treaty with Israel. tion. For even though Masri was ap- If there is no process, the pressure will for the Next Stage, parently murdered by Abu Nidal or the mount on the Mubarak regime to take We therefore find ourselves in a PFLP, Arafat's leadership benefited such drastic steps. Put simply, if there quandary. Activism appears to be most from the elimination of this pro- is no peace process, then the peace needed, yet none of the ways of pro- Jordanian, indigenous leader. w- The skeptics, however, overlook a between Arafat and his own lieuten- PLO. Now that we have entered a number of factors which make the ants who would prefer to make a com- "period of reflection," there is a new emergence of an alternative leader- plete break with Jordan and reconcile opportunity to pursue this alternative, ship now more possible.
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