POUCY FOCUS NEWSLETTER OF THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ISSUE NUMBER TWO W- APRIL 1986 Whither the Peace Process? The Local Leadership Option by Martin Indyk "No Palestinian moderates al- Some will argue that if only we now providing its Soviet ally with ample op- lowed." endorsed "self-determination" for the portunity for troublemaking in the That is the meaning of Yassir Ara- Palestinians, Arafat would be prepared Middle East heartland. fat's recent rejection of King Hussein's to meet our terms. But if that in fact terms for entering peace negotiations happened, we would have presided Option 2; The and the message behind the subse- over the resurrection of Arafat at King quent murder of Zafir al-Masri on the Hussein's expense; and, by bringing International Conference . Where does this leave the PLO into the process, we would Second, we could pursue that other U.S. efforts to advance the Middle have succeeded in forcing out. illusion that always presents itself East peace process by involving Pales- We would in effect be placing our- when the peace process appears to tinians in negotiations with Jordan and selves at loggerheads with Israel and have reached a roadblock—the inter- Israel? Jordan, our partners in the peace pro- national conference. Some will argue cess. We would immediately have that an international conference which Option 1: Punish Hussein, achieved direct negotiations between brought the Syrians into the process the U.S. and the PLO but, in the pro- would obviate Hussein's need for the Resurrect Arafat cess, we would have destroyed the PLO. But the only conference Syria The four alternatives seem bleak. chance for direct negotiations between will attend is one in which it has the We could continue to pursue the illu- the Arabs and Israel. whip-hand. And given Syria's max- sion of a transformed Arafat. But given More importantly, our endorsement imalist position (Assad is now vowing that this is the sixth American over- of "self-determination" would be inter- to place the Golan Heights "in the cen- ture he has rejected since Jimmy preted by all parties to the conflict as ter of Syria") such a conference would Carter first tried in 1977, it is hard to support for an independent Palestinian only "increase our disappointment," as see what purpose would be served in state. But such a state would threaten Sadat was fond of warning. trying again. first Jordan and then Israel, while Continued on page 2 Hussein's Plan: Sidestepping Arafat by Robert Satloff What remains is who mil represent cent weeks, the King has publicly death may prove to be just a stumbling the Palestinian people. When a side called for Palestinians in the occupied block, not a stone wall. As ex-Gaza that can represent die Palestinian peo- territories to come forth with their mayor Rashad ash-Shawwa said after ple appears, we will be at its side. own, alternative leadership and has Masri's murder, "the idea itself which King Hussein, interviewed in al- even floated again his 1972 proposal of Masri supported, and in which many Siyasah, March 1 a United Arab Kingdom with provinces others including myself believe, has By openly challenging the leader- on both banks of the Jordan. not died." ship of Yassir Arafat, King Hussein has There is little doubt that the March Hussein's efforts to foster a more broached once again an issue that has 2 assassination of mayor Zafir amenable West Bank alternative to the been simmering beneath the surface of al-Masri, who symbolized Hussein's Arafat leadership are not new. In April Jordanian-PLO relations for more than vision of an independent leadership, 1985, he appointed a cabinet with 11 a decade—who speaks for the Pales- curtailed progress toward the creation Palestinian ministers headed by Prime tinians in Israeli-held territory. In re- of such an alternative. But Masri's Continued on page 6 w- The Local Leadership Option Continued from page 1 The only international conference treaty with Israel will remain a sepa- ceeding holds any prospect of a break- that is attractive to the U. S. is a phony rate peace. And if this is the only peace through. What then should the Reagan conference in which the Soviet Union, in the Middle East, it is unlikely to Administration do? Syria and the PLO give the speeches survive. The first requirement is to reaffirm while Israet?ii35rdanian-Palestinian Jordan also needs a peace process the basic objective of solving the Pal- delegation and the U.S. do the nego- because, like Israel, it faces a Palestin- estinian problem in a Jordanian con- tiating elsewhere. This kind of confer- ian demographic problem that threat- text, via direct negotiations between ence is unattractive to the Soviet ens Hashemite dominance. Moreover, Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian dele- Union and Syria and, given their cur- as long as the peace process focusses gation. Even if the circumstances are rent success in blocking our moves to on Jordan, the leverage of this small, not now conducive to such a solution, it promote it, they have little reason to weak and otherwise insignificant is the only objective that serves Amer- turn around now and accept it. The power is enhanced with every other ican interests as well as the interests of conference they will insist upon is one interested party. And in the absence of our partners in the peace process, Is- in which they retain a veto over the such a process, Jordan is more vulner- rael, Jordan and . bilateral negotiations. able than the others to extreme solu- The second requirement is to pre- tions that threaten to fill the vacuum. pare the ground for the pursuit of this Option 3: Benign Neglect If we cannot either solve the prob- lem of Palestinian representation or "[The U.S. must] make clear—especially to the PLO's reach agreement on the forum in which the negotiations will take place, the Arab interlocutors—that we no longer have an interest third alternative of a policy of "benign in courting the PLO leadership and no desire to have it neglect" begins to look more attrac- tive. After all, if the parties to the accept our conditions for recognition." conflict are not ready to take the risks necessary to make peace, then it is entirely possible that the Palestinian Option 4: Pressuring the objective in the future by helping to problem cannot be solved. In these King promote alternative Palestinian repre- circumstances, creative American di- sentatives from the territories capable plomacy may well be foredoomed. This leaves the fourth alternative, of replacing the paralyzed militancy Better then, the argument goes, to the "pure" Jordan option, in which and hidebound ideology of Arafat and focus on the growing power of radical King Hussein brings Palestinian repre- his henchmen. forces in the Middle East and promote sentatives from the West Bank and Such an idea is rarely greeted with stability through deterrence rather Gaza to the negotiating table with Isra- much enthusiasm at the best of times. than "solutionism." el. This has always been the ostensible For better or worse, many observers The problem with this approach is objective of the 1982 Reagan Plan and argue, Arafat represents the Palestin- that while the U.S. can live without a it is congruent with Israel's conception ians and there is no credible alter- peace process, its local allies cannot. of negotiations. The problem, how- native. The murder of Zafir al-Masri Israel needs a peace process if it is to ever, is that it imposes considerable has reinforced their argument for he reduce the immense human and eco- risks on Hussein since it would was the first credible, indigenous West^ nomic costs of war that are taking their provoke the certain opposition of the Banker to emerge in recent years. His toll on the very fabric of its society. PLO, Syria and the Soviet Union. death, and the subsequent withdrawal And it needs to find some method for Given his problems of demography (a of other mayoral candidates, appears dealing with the growing demographic majority of his subjects are Palestin- to demonstrate that when the PLO threat posed by a burgeoning Palestin- ians) and geography (a much stronger leadership fails to maintain its legit- ian population in its midst. Syria on his northern border), the imacy among the West Bank Palestin- Egypt needs a peace process be- King has been unwilling to take this ians through armed struggle or diplo- cause it cannot otherwise break out of risk. matic maneuvering, it can still retain its isolation in the Arab world, short of A Better Policy: Preparing legitimacy by violence and intimida- tearing up its peace treaty with Israel. tion. For even though Masri was ap- If there is no process, the pressure will for the Next Stage, parently murdered by Abu Nidal or the mount on the Mubarak regime to take We therefore find ourselves in a PFLP, Arafat's leadership benefited such drastic steps. Put simply, if there quandary. Activism appears to be most from the elimination of this pro- is no peace process, then the peace needed, yet none of the ways of pro- Jordanian, indigenous leader. w-

The skeptics, however, overlook a between Arafat and his own lieuten- PLO. Now that we have entered a number of factors which make the ants who would prefer to make a com- "period of reflection," there is a new emergence of an alternative leader- plete break with Jordan and reconcile opportunity to pursue this alternative, ship now more possible. First, for with Syria. low-profile process. more than a year, the government of Israel, which controls the territories, has been laying the groundwork for this alternative leadership. "I think the question of a Jordanian option is about Israel haf^eh attempting to im- whether you strive for peace or give up and say nothing prove the standard of living in Palestin- can be done." ian towns and to provide the residents with the opportunity to run their own —Shimon Peres, Jerusalem Television, March 5 affairs. To do this, West Bank and Gaza leaders are not required to defy the PLO by entering into negotiations with In the territories, the PLO leader- Above all, our strategic objective Israel on behalf of the Palestinians. ship is finding it increasingly difficult to must be clear. We would be supporting However, by assuming responsibility compete with Jordan. Its financial re- an effort already begun by our part- for the basic functions of government sources are diminishing and avenues ners in the peace process to promote a and for economic development in the for channelling funds to its loyalists in legitimate, local Palestinian leadership territories, these local leaders are the territories are being severely re- that will over time serve as an alter- gaining control of the means to build stricted by Jordan and Israel. native to the current PLO leadership. their own legitimacy at the expense of On the inter-Arab level, the PLO Our diplomatic activities must there- the PLO leadership which is forced to leadership lacks an independent base fore be consistent with this objective. operate from outside the territories. of operations and is therefore more On the international level we would A second factor bolsters this effort dependent than ever on the support of need to avoid any actions that might to build an alternative local leadership. the Arab states. Yet it is under serious give new credibility to Yassir Arafat. King Hussein has begun to take advan- challenge by both Jordan and Syria. We would have to make clear—espe- tage of the shift in Israeli policy to build While it can still command the support cially to the PLO's Arab inter- his own influence in the territories at of , Egypt and Iraq, these locutors—that we no longer have an the expense of the PLO leadership. regimes are all preoccupied with far interest in courting the PLO leader- This is a significant departure. Al- more pressing problems of their own. ship and no desire to make conces- though he has always competed with On the international level, the PLO sions or have it accept our conditions the PLO for the allegiance of his for- leadership's support is waning. The for recognition. We would have to em- mer subjects, his efforts have been decline in Arab oil power, the revulsion bark on a serious effort to deprive Ara- desultory. Now, however, sensing the with PLO terrorism, and the image of fat of the recognition he has already weakness of the PLO, he is encourag- intransigence that has come to replace achieved among our European and Jap- ing the pro-Jordanians in the West Arafat's earlier image as a moderate anese allies. And we would have to Bank to take advantage of Israel's offer have all contributed to this process. ensure that the U.S. Consulate in east and he is providing them with some Arafat has been prevented from at- Jerusalem sent this same signal to the financial backing to do the job. tending the UN General Assembly; Palestinians it deals with. We might apparently, he is no longer even wel- also need to provide funds for the eco- Hussein's break with the PLO lead- come in Moscow. nomic development projects under- ership and his call to the residents of taken by the local leadership. But if it the territories to seek alternative does so, the U.S. must be careful to leaders are serious steps. Hussein is U-S. Policy: Promoting the avoid channeling these resources trying to prove simultaneously that the through organizations that are sympa- PLO leadership has failed the Palestin- Moderates thetic to, or dependent upon, the PLO ians on the international level and that The United States can play a helpful leadership. local leaders can at least deliver a bet- role in this process by encouraging Is- ter day-to-day existence for them. Those who remain skeptical that rael and Jordan to continue along their this "local leadership" option can work Of course, the PLO leadership will present paths. This is not a new direc- should bear in mind that the U.S. has resist these efforts to loosen its stran- tion for the Reagan Administration. spent nine years pursuing the option of glehold on the Palestinians in the ter- Secretary of State George Shultz was transforming Arafat without the ritories. But its claim to represent the first to raise the idea of "quality of slightest measure of success. If we them is now under challenge on four life" for the Palestinians in 1984. It was had spent that time trying to circum- fronts. Internally, the leadership is se- not, however, pursued with any vigor vent the PLO leadership we would verely split, not only between those because the Hussein-Arafat initiative probably not be facing an impasse to- who reside in Damascus and those diverted American attention to the day. It is not too late to try another who remain loyal to Arafat, but also pursuit yet again of a transformed way. w- 'Devolution': A Consensus by Michael Lewis On February 8, Prime Minister promote investments in the territories the assassination of Zafir al-Masri. Al- Shimon PfirfesrSnnounced his plan for has been dropped. Under Shmuel though Peres affirmed his determina- "devolution" for the West Bank and Goren, the coordinator of activities in tion to press forward with devolution in Gaza. The proposal entails a gradual the territories, Israel is now actively the aftermath of Masri's murder, suc- transfer to the Arab inhabitants of re- seeking to attract major industrial in- cess will depend on the ability and will- sponsibility for running their own mu- vestment to the territories. Finally, ingness of the Palestinians to resist a nicipal affairs, with increased authority Israel will appoint local mayors and campaign of violent intimidation by over health, education, welfare and municipal councils to replace the Israe- various factions of the PLO. The im- other services as well as over the li governors who have controlled the mediate response was for several Arab "development of water resources and major cities. Zafir al-Masri was the candidates for mayor to withdraw their the means of sustenance in the territo- first of several intended appointments names from consideration. However, ries/' Israeli administrators of Arab for the cities of Nablus, , the deputy mayor of Nablus, Hafiz Tu- towns and Israeli civil administration Hebron and al-Bireh. qan, has now assumed Masri's respon- officials would be replaced with (Israe- Neither this liberalization, nor the sibilities. li-appointed) Arab mayors and offi- cials, and Israeli control over the day- to-day lives of Palestinians in the ter- ritories would be reduced to a mini- "The murder of Zafir al-Masri . . . should not deter us mum. from pursuing the trend of appointing local Arabs to run Peres has suggested that devolution could be applied first to Gaza, where the affairs of the localities. If they want to do so, they administrative directors have already will indeed do so, and we shall encourage them." been appointed and where there is lit- tle dispute over government lands or —West Bank Administrator Shmuel Goren, water resources. Jerusalem Television, March 8

Improvements in the Quality of Life new measures announced by Peres, Devolution v. Unilateral add up to the goal of "self-determina- Peres's plan is the latest in a series tion" espoused by Palestinian nation- Autonomy of steps taken by Israel to improve the alists. The Israeli army will not be Peres's plan differs from "unilateral "quality of life" in the West Bank and withdrawn from the area for fear that autonomy," a concept first advanced in Gaza since the National Unity Govern- this would give free rein to the PLO. 1980 by Moshe Dayan. Dayan advo- ment took office in the fall of 1984. Nor will Israeli settlements or settlers cated abolition of the Israeli military Restrictions on foreign travel by West be subject to the local authorities. Nor, administration of the territories and Bank residents, as well as visits to the at least for the moment, will elections withdrawal of the army from Arab West Bank across the Jordan river be held, although Peres has said that towns to border areas and strategically bridges, have been relaxed. Cen- they might be held at an appropriate, important points. Israel however sorship of books has been virtually calmer moment. would retain its option to reinstate the eliminated and censorship of the press Peres is not proposing "devolution" military government. Dayan proposed eased. Controls on the transfer of as an ultimate solution to the status of that these steps be taken without set- money into the territories as well as the territories, but as a path around ting conditions or seeking Arab agree- tariffs on the exports of vegetables the current impasse in the peace pro- ment, because he believed that local from the West Bank to Jordan have cess. His hope is that local self-gover- leaders would refuse to negotiate any- been removed. New factories and hos- nance will hasten the emergence of an thing but full sovereignty, a demand pitals have been approved. Permission indigenous leadership in the territo- Israel could not accept. was granted for the establishment of ries which might eventually serve in A revival of the "unilateral autono- the first Arab bank in the West Bank, partnership with Jordan's King Hus- my" idea would prove controversial not but the plan has been blocked by Jor- sein in a renewed effort to forge a long- only between the partners in the Na- dan, which feared that the bank would term settlement. tional Unity Government, but within attract deposits that otherwise would It is precisely the fear on the part of each of the parties as well. The idea is go to Jordanian banks. And opposition Palestinian radicals that this strategy supported by some on the left of the to American-sponsored attempts to might succeed that no doubt motivated Labor Party, such as Gad Ya'aqobi, w- Policy in Israeli Politics

Minister of Economy and Planning, shows, he argues, that this approach ly happen in the West Bank and Gaza. but it is opposed by other Laborites, holds much greater potential than any These three are: notably Db$f$j*se Minister Rabin formal Jordan option. —to retain Israeli sovereignty over whose views are crucial. While "unilateral autonomy" is high- the territory, but to grant autonomy to Rabin is scheduled to remain in his post under the rotation agreement and 4 f thus will continue to be responsible for "[The Palestinians in the territories] are saying no to Israeli policy in the territories. The Hussein, the PLO, mayors and devolution, but what are Defense Minister opposes unilateral autonomy because he believes that the they saying 'yes' to? They are the ones who should give PLO will fillth e vacuum, forcing Israel the answers; you and I cannot answer for them." to reassume control. Rabin however does support the extension of self-rule —Shimon Peres, Jerusalem Television^ March 5 to residents of the territories, the ap- pointment of Arab mayors and the ne- ly controversial, Peres's devolution the Arab population (Likud's position); gotiation of a final settlement with plan enjoys widespread support in Is- —to reach a territorial compromise leaders from the West Bank and Gaza rael. This is the case at least in part for dividing the territories with Jordan in conjunction with Jordan. because devolution leaves unresolved (Rabin's goal); The Likud leadership also opposes the bitterly divisive issue of what —to achieve an agreement with Jor- "unilateral autonomy," asserting it comes next. Apart from extreme posi- dan over "functional compromise" or would lead to PLO control over the tions advocated at the radical fringes of shared rule of the territories (Peres's West Bank. Likud has demanded that Israeli politics (to permit the creation preference). the government adhere to a policy of of a PLO-dominated Palestinian state, Devolution precludes none of these autonomy for the population, but not at one end; or to drive the Arabs out of three options. Although Peres came in for some criticism from his political opponents, he should encounter no se- "Israel is willing to hold peace talks with a joint rious domestic political problems by proceeding on this course. And be- Palestinian-Jordanian delegation in which 'any resident cause Rabin and the Likud leadership of the West Bank or can participate . . . are agreeable, the policy can be ex- pected to continue after the rotation of without reservation.' " the National Unity Government. —Yitzhak Rabin, quoted in al-Quds, February 26

for the land—its interpretation of the the territories, at the other end), the Camp David Accords. A noteworthy mainstream is divided among three exception to the Likud consensus is broad notions of what should ultimate- MK Ehud Olmert who has supported the concept of unilateral autonomy The Washington Institute Policy Papers since Dayan first proposed it. He ques- tions the feasibility of a territorial com- ; 1. Dennis Ross—Acting with Caution: Middle East Policy Planning for the promise with Jordan, and favors a dif- Seipnd Reagan Administration ferent kind of "Jordan option" based on 2. Zeev Schiff—Israel's Eroding Edge in the Middle East Military Balance the assumption that formal negotia- tions are out of the question. He be- 3. Barry Rubin— The PLO's Intractable Foreign Policy lieves that Israel should seek behind- 4. Hirsh Goodman—Israel's Strategic Reality: The Impact of the Arms the-scenes cooperation from Jordan as Race it grants unilateral autonomy to the West Bank and Gaza, in order to 5. Robert Satloff—Domestic Stability in die Kingdom of Jordan (forthcom- create a new reality. A tradition of such ing) cooperation since 1967 has brought Copies of these papers are available from the Institute. about a quiet understanding and w- Hussein and the West Bank Continued from page 1 Seeking Credible Power of the Purse Palestinians Minister Zaid al-Rifai, himself the son At the same time, Hussein was en- of a Palestinian. Hussein specifically gaged in an equally important contest named ministers with close family ties This strategy explains why in the for economic power in the territories. to the major West Bank cities—like same month (April) as Hussein By controlling the flow of goods, mon- NablustHikfiir al-Masri (Foreign Af- launched his plan, 35 prominent Pales- ey and people across the Jordan River fairs); Jerusalem's Hazim Nuseibah tinians from the territories presented bridges, Jordan held significant lever- (Prime Ministerial Affairs); and a petition in support of Arafat and the age over the every-day lives of the Ramailah's Hanna Odeh (Finance). PLO's role as representative of the West Bankers. In April, the King be- Since then, Jordan has embarked on a Palestinian people to U.S. envoy Rich- gan to use that leverage to gain influ- carefully calibrated plan to promote an ard Murphy. Pro-Jordanians—such as ence for sympathetic Palestinian lead- independent political elite inside the Shawwa, former Jordanian defense ers. One of the Rifai government's first occupied territories. minister Anwar Nuseibah, Deputy acts was to liberalize trans-Jordan Speaker of the Jordanian Senate Hik- trade, enhance intelligence activity mat al-Masri, Bethlehem mayor Elias along the border and free up millions of Freij, Basil Kana'an and Issam Anani— Undercutting Arafat, Not dinars for Amman-approved develop- were featured prominently among the ment projects. Jordanian subsidies, 'the PLO' list of signatories that included many flowing over the bridges at an unprece- well-known Arafat supporters. To According to that plan, Hussein did dented rate—nearly $1 million per "Hussein's men"—the core of the al- not contest the PLO's position as the day—were diverted away from bed- ternative Palestinian leadership—ap- paramount symbol of Palestinian na- rock PLO-backers and funneled to pro- pearing alongside "Arafat's men" was tional aspirations. He has come to un- Jordanian cities, towns and workers' an integral part of the effort to estab- derstand that the PLO has evolved associations. lish their own nationalist credentials. over the past fifteen years from an By autumn, sub rosa coordination organization committed to "Palestinian between Amman and West Bank Pal- nationalism" into the sole repository of estinian leaders began in earnest Pal- those nationalist sentiments. Hussein estinian luminaries began a series of realized that to be a Palestinian nation- Coming Forward trips to Amman to confer with Jordan- alist one had to be seen as a supporter ian political leaders. Before the end of of "the PLO" and that no Palestinian Political moves continued through- October, a month in which Hussein can dare to be labelled "anti-PLO." His out the summer. In June, Jordan pro- suffered the twin jolts of the Achille 1985 initiative, therefore, incorporat- moted the formation of a moderate Lauro hijacking and the London joint ed the PLO as junior partner in diplo- political grouping in East Jerusalem, delegation fiasco, Zafir al-Masri re- matic efforts. Zafir al-Masri, for exam- centered around Anani, businessman portedly received the King's approval ple, assumed the municipal reins in Othman Khallak and newspaper editor of his request to be mayor of Nablus. Nablus under the banner of the PLO. But the King still sought to under- mine the current PLO leadership, " . . . the idea itself which Masri supported, and in which he saw as being more interested which many others including myself believe, has not in the long-term competition for power died/' in some future Palestinian entity than in the short-term goal of securing the —ex-Gaza Mayor Rashad ash-Shawwa, liberation of the occupied lands. Ha'aretz, March 3 Therefore, Hussein tried to drive a wedge between the PLO leadership and the West Bank rank-and-file by Mahmud abu Zuluf. In July, leading Pal- In November, Hussein started mak- promoting pragmatic leaders whose estinians with known Jordanian sympa- ing tentative moves toward an open immediate concern was the improve- thies, including Shawwa, Anani, Hik- appeal for local Palestinians to side- ment of the day-to-day lives of the local mat al-Masri and Freij, founded the step the existing PLO leadership. In a Palestinians. His tactics were to em- Party in Support of Jordanian-Palestin- November 2 speech opening parlia- ploy Jordan's still potent political and ian Joint Action. These organizations ment, he called for "drafting a general financial capital to encourage these were created to coordinate West Bank plan and detailed program for econom- men to step forward and to bolster backing for the King's diplomatic ef- ic and social development of the oc- their support among the thousands of forts and to provide a platform for his cupied territory . . ." Shawwa, Hik- Palestinians in West Bank cities. West Bank supporters. mat al-Masri and ex-Jerusalem gover- w- nor Anwar al-Khatib met with Rifai the In his February 19 speech, Hussein are also simultaneously appointed in next day, and three days later, Zafir al- effectively branded the PLO chairman Nablus, Hebron and Ramallah. Masri formally submitted to Israel his a liar and a cheat, and he called on Men like Hikmat al-Masri warned request to assume the mayoralty of Palestinians to rally around a new lead- the King of the danger in severing ties Nablus. Two weeks after the Decem- ership. On the West Bank, dozens of with the PLO leadership too quickly. In ber 2 assassination of moderate men came forward in all the major the days after Hussein's speech, Masri Ramallah notable Aziz Shehadeh, West Bank cities, submitting their implored the King "not to allow the Masri and his Chamber of Commerce candidacies for mayoral and municipal ship of Qordan-PLO] political coordi- supporters^oqkrwer the Nablus mu- council positions. Most were neither nation as based on the February 11 nicipality. quislings nor Jordanian lackeys; accord to sink and drown all passen- rather, they were representatives of gers aboard it." As Arafat reportedly the "70 percent" of West Bankers that told a group of Palestinian leaders who Parliamentary Maneuvers former Nablus mayor Bassam ash- traveled to Amman to forestall the On November 26, Jordan's parlia- Shaka'a says are "so fed up with the break with Hussein, challenging the ment became the setting for Hussein's situation that they are ready for nearly PLO on the West Bank would be next move: the first election of West any compromise." "suicidal." Bank deputies since the Six Day War. In hotly contested ballots, parliament elected four men to represent constit- "Both King Hussein and the PLO have failed. It's time uencies in Hebron, Tulkarm, Ramallah for Palestinians in the West Bank to do something for and Nablus. Parliament has since con- tinued to be a focus of Jordan's anti- themselves now. Zafir tried, and we must try also." Arafat initiative. Praising Hussein's —ex-Nabius Mayor Hamdi Kana'an, February 19 speech, Jordan's House of Representatives declared itself "the Washington Post, March 3 representatives. . . of the one Jordan- ian people on the two banks of the Kingdom." And under an election law Hussein's program of confidence- A Step-by-Step Approach just approved in Jordan, West Bank building among West Bank elites was right on track. Having jettisoned his To foster a West Bank elite indepen- representation will soon double in the dent of domination, Hussein now Kingdom's parliament. At least 30 new usual path of "quiet diplomacy" on the West Bank, the King appealed directly has to pursue the policy of confidence- deputies will be elected by their fellow building that was in force prior to Feb- parliamentarians to bring West Bank to a different breed of Palestinian lead- ers—nationalists who are realistic ruary. These are the behind-the- representation to a par with the East scenes efforts to promote a new lead- Bank. Moreover, in a move to indicate about the problems facing the West Bank and are pragmatic about the ership in an array of Palestinian fora— the Kingdom's responsibilities for all trade associations, social welfare asso- Palestinians, Hussein's cabinet is con- choice of potential solutions available to them. ciations, youth clubs, schools and uni- templating an amendment that would versities. They are the low-profile for the first time enfranchise Palestin- plans—underwriting development ians living in UNRWA refugee projects, scholarship programs, hous- camps—Palestinians that have long Hussein's Mistake ing subsidies and the establishment of comprised the PLO's hard-core con- But in calling on the Palestinians to a local bank—that could produce a stituency. openly reject the PLO leadership, the moderate, practical and efficacious Throughout this period, there were King erred by moving too soon. Ten leadership. Only after that leadership continued reports that Jordan was months—from April 1985 to February is My entrenched within the adminis- "flexing its muscles" toward the PLO 1986—was simply not enough time in trative framework of the munici- on the West Bank. Amman, for exam- which to nurture a full-fledged indige- palities—running public utilities, su- ple, was determined to funnel money nous Palestinian leadership. Although pervising work projects and parceling to pro-Jordanian development projects prospects for success looked bright in out building permits and city con- and drive the fund of the PLO-Jordan the days following the King's speech, tracts—should Hussein encourage lo- Joint Committee further into debt. Masri's murder on March 2 reminded cal mayors and city councilmen to chal- West Bankers that much was left to do lenge directly the PLO's hold on the February 19: An Open before they could strike out on their territories. Challenge own. Following the murder, all the In the end, the choice will belong to mayoral candidates withdrew their the Palestinians. But after a long-term When the Hussein-Arafat talks final- nominations. Since then, only one—al- program of investment and develop- ly broke down, the King decided to Bireh's Jamal al-Tarifi—has again ment—both political and economic— remove the subtlety from his year-long stated his willingness to become may- they may feel strong enough not only contest for power on the West Bank. or, but on the condition that mayors to make that choice but to stick by it. Masri's Murder: Who Benefits?

A curious myth has already arisen —Dec. 28: PLO Executive Com- about the life and death of Zafir al- mittee member Mahmud Abbas of- The Washington Institute Masri. fered first PLO endorsement of Masri. for Near East Policy Masri, a millionaire businessman, (Jordan Times) was assassinated outside Nablus City Fatah joined the Masri bandwagon A private, educational Hall March 2, ten weeks after he as- only after a campaign of threats and foundation supporting sumed the mayoralty of the West retribution proved fruitless. Continued scholarly research and Bank's largest city. As this story goes, opposition to his appointment after informed debate on Masri's cafSid^Ey received the hearty December 17 would have underscored U.S. interests in the Near East blessing of Yassir Arafat's Fatah wing Fatah's weakening authority on the of the PLO, with Jordan's King Hussein West Bank. In short, Arafat—who Board of Directors only reluctantly assenting to the ap- never publicly commented on the Mas- Barbi Weinberg pointment. According to a Washington ri candidacy—couldn't beat them, so President Post editorial, Masri's appointment he reluctantly joined them. Michael Stein had received Arafat's "encourage- Masri's own politics posed a direct Vice President ment" but only the "tacit approval" of threat to Arafat's. A keen student of Bernard S. White King Hussein. the dynamics of West Bank politics, Secretary/Treasurer Closer scrutiny reveals the error of Masri never criticized the almost mys- Charles Adler Shaol Pozez this version of the Masri story. First, tical aura that Arafat and the PLO Walter Stern Jordan actively encouraged Masri to maintain as symbols of Palestinian na- step forward and present himself as a tionalism. Martin Indyk nationalist yet practical alternative to But everyone knew that Masri Executive Director the Fatah leadership. Second, that stood for something else: staunch ad- leadership strongly opposed Masri's vocacy of local initiatives to improve Board of Advisors candidacy as a threat to its hegemonic the quality of life on the West Bank. He Lawrence Eagleburger hold over West Bank politics—as in- was, for example, the driving force Alexander Haig deed it was. Third, Fatah did publicly behind efforts to establish a Palestin- Jeane Kirkpatrick endorse Masri's candidacy, but only ian bank on the West Bank, a plan even Samuel Lewis after his appointment was a fait accom- opposed by Amman because it would Walter Mondale Martin Peretz pli. Consider the following chronology: siphon off millions in remittance in- Bayard Rustin —Nov. 3: Hikmat al-Masri, Zafir's come now funneled through Jordanian brother and deputy speaker of the Jor- banks. Such quality-of-life programs danian Senate, traveled to Amman to implicitly undermine Arafat's strategy meet with Prime Minister Zaid al- of stoking militant nationalist fervor by Rifai. keeping life under Israeli occupation as —Nov. 6: Zafir al-Masri filed a re- miserable as possible. quest with the Israeli civilian adminis- In the long run, Masri posed a dan- tration to assume the mayor's post in gerous threat. The PFLP or Abu Nidal Nablus may have fired the gun that killed Mas- ert; Satloff Research*Fellows —Nov. 10: Farouk Kaddoumi, PLO ri, but Arafat, Kaddoumi and Khalaf Leonard Schoen "foreign minister," warned that surely benefit from the pall of fear and Sen. Research Assistant "attempts to appoint heads and mem- intimidation his death has produced. Brooke Joseph bers of municipal councils in the oc- Administrator cupied territories. . . will be met with — Robert Satloff all types of popular resistance and total rejection." (Algiers, Voice of Palestine Radio) THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY. —Nov. 26: Israel announced its ap- 500 NORTH CAPITOL STREET, N.W., • SUITE 318 proval of Masri's mayoral request. W WASHINGTON, D.C. • 20001 • (202) 783-0226 Non-Profit —Dec. 2: Aziz Shehadeh, a leading Organization West Bank moderate, is stabbed to U.S. Postage death near his home in Ramallah. Abu PAID Washington, D.C. Nidal claims responsibility. Permit No. 1281 —Dec. 11: Arafat deputy Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) warned that "the Palestinian cannot capitulate because capitulation means death." (Baghdad, Iraqi News Agency) —Dec. 17: Masri assumed may- oralty of Nablus.