The NGO Safety Office Issue: 12 October 16th to 31st 2008

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale-

Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2-5 The winter related downturn Total AOG Initiated Attacks per Month - 2008 5-7 Northern Region in AOG attacks has contin- (Close Range + Indirect Fire + Suicide Attacks) Western Region 7 ued, though when taken into 700 634 context, still accounts for a 600 602 Eastern Region 8-10 571 25% increase over this period 500 509 last year and is even 15% 463 472 Southern Region 10-12 400 higher than the July peak of 318 ANSO Info Page 13 300 301 2007. Attacks remain most 218 200 189 consistent in the East and 100 most analysts agree that 2008 YOU NEED TO KNOW 0 will be a more shallow down- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT turn than previous years. • Deterioration in the secu- rity of While both incidents com- ments of OEF. This will Developments in Herat drew manded a lot of media at- likely result in more ag- • Prevailing abduction/ attention this period with tention they did not in fact gressive operations in cur- kidnapping threat ongoing demonstrations present any actual change in rent conflict areas with • Decline in overall NGO forcing a possible restructur- the security context of Ka- little to no change in soft security incidents although ing of the ANP in response bul which, in our opinion, areas. The first phase of getting more severe to deteriorating security. has been easily accessible the “new” plan was While well known criminal (and indeed accessed) by launched Nov 1st. • Major changes in IMF an- gangs to the South-East of AOG for at least 2 years. nounced Armed criminality, impli- the city can be taken as the NGO related incidents cated in the second set of most direct cause of instabil- also turned down this pe- ANSO is supported by murders, is perennial in the ity the involvement of politi- riod in line with the over- city as it is in all high den- cal factions with an interest all incident deflation. sity urban areas. in instability is also consid- However with an RCIED ered likely. Governors have ANSO advises NGO to strike, two abductions of been successfully removed work with the knowledge international and the inter- from office in a number of that AOG are present in the national murder in Kabul other provinces through city and that well connected included in the list there is similar means of interference criminals act with impunity. a growing concern about by other forces. the seriousness of the inci- Also this period the antici- dents NGO are involved Security in the capital Kabul pated amendments to the in. has been under particular IMF chain of command ANSO has noted that the scrutiny this period with the were (discreetly) announced volume of NGO incidents daylight murder of an NGO with US Gen. McKiernan attributable to AOG has international worker in being placed in charge of grown phenomenally in Karte-Char and two private USFOR-A a unified com- the last 12 months. sector foreign workers in mand comprising ISAF, Share-Naw area. CSTC-A and some ele- THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 21 35 This Report Period 1 30 In Kabul city, there were two high 25 profile incidents this period di- reinforcing the AOG/ACG nexus 20 rectly involving internationals. often discussed by analysts. 15 10 The first was the murder of a The incident was inline with a more generally deteriorating envi- 5 female NGO worker on Oct 20th 0 in the Karte-Char area by armed ronment in which NGO have JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT men on a motorcycle. found themselves more frequently the subject of AOG attacks and AOG ACG AOG took responsibility for the interests. murder and claimed as a motive The rescue of two high profile abductees along However when viewed in the con- that she was involved in with the related arrest of several suspected per- text of other recent events—12 ‘spreading Christianity’, a com- petrators will likely not diminish the overall October abduction of an interna- ment which gained some traction threat. in media circles despite her NGO tional journalist near Qargha The second major incident—the 25 October having a policy against such. Lake; 16 October abduction of bank executive’s son in Karta Se killing of two international DHL staff by a Given that there have been no & 19 October abduction of the guard who then shot himself—appears related arrests in this case there is little brother in-law of former King to an internal matter and not linked to a wider scope for further comment how- Mohammad Zahir Shahin Karte threat to NGO or the international community ever it is considered likely that Char (both now freed by security other than to demonstrate the violent tenden- AOG did indeed sanction the forces); higher than usual amount cies of armed criminality. murder but that it was undertaken of reports of suspected surveil- NGO are advised to operate under the as- by local criminal groups further lance of NGO and internation- sumption that AOG are present in the city and als— the AOG and ACG threat that some armed criminal groups can operate KEY THREATS & CONCERNS in Kabul should be considered with relative impunity. !"Increasing threat environment for especially high right now, with Perceptions of your agencies motives, activities internationals areas in the western/south- and connections should take an enhanced pri- !"Kidnapping/Abduction western side of the city of particu- ority in security planning. lar concern.

WARDAK NGO Incidents WARDAK Year to Date 7 60 50 Wardak, with the exception of the This Report Period 0 Bihsud districts, should be consid- 40 ered off-limits for NGO. The of the Kabul-Kandahar highway 30 20

main road from Kabul is reported (used by security forces and logis- 10

to be heavily monitored—likely tic convoys) and its proximity to 0 starting in Kabul and Ghazni— the equally AOG saturated prov- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT giving AOG/ACGs ample oppor- inces of Logar and Ghazni. But tunity to communicate to teams in Chak, Nirkh, Jalrez, Day Mirda, AOG ACG Wardak and prepare for vehicles and Jaghatu are all also reported DAC this past week. travelling through the province. to be heavily infiltrated with The Bihsud areas are still largely left alone by Saydabad logs the most incidents AOG. In Maydan Shahr, the gov- AOG and controlled by the local Hazaras, who largely due to the long intersection ernment and security forces main- tain a tenuous control of security maintain some level of security. However, the KEY THREATS & CONCERNS and the district is subject to fre- security situation in these areas could change !"Attacks against DAC quent attacks, most recently evi- should AOG take an interest in controlling the !"Kidnapping/Abduction denced by a rocket attack on the districts. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents PARWAN PARWAN Year to Date 5 10 This Report Period 0 After a relatively low but consis- 8 During the last few months, IED tent (6-7 AOG incidents) per 6 attacks along the main road to month from April through to Sep- 4 tember, so far in October there Bamyan significantly impacted the 2 have been no AOG incidents in NGO community. While there was only one incident directly in- 0 Parwan. This reduction may be JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT attributable to an active security volving an NGO vehicle, the rela- presence and a reduced AOG tively high number of attacks on AOG ACG presence as the weather cools. this key route coupled with the strategic and psychological value recent months. That being said the route of its control have made it risky through Parwan to Bamyan should still be con- for NGO travel. With the last sidered high risk for NGO travel, even if the KEY THREATS & CONCERNS recorded IED incident on 25 Sep- likelihood of an attack is minimal. In addition, !"AOG presence in Ghorband and tember and this month’s drop off the presence of internationals in areas outside Kohi Safi in AOG incidents, the threat of of Chaharikar is likely to attract negative atten- !"IED along Chaharikar-Bamyan IED attack in Ghorband and tion, so employing international staff in opera- main route Sheik Ali appears reduced from tions outside Chaharikar is not recommended.

NGO Incidents BAMYAN

BAMYAN Year to Date 2 10 This Report Period 0 Travel to/from Bamyan should be 8 considered risky, and NGO are ters threatening people who co- 6 advised to avoid operations in operate with the government were 4 distributed in Shibar. Also, on 16 Kahmard and Shibar due to a 2 known AOG presence. October, a small IED exploded in the bazaar area of Bamyan Centre. 0 This month there were four more JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT The use of an IED, regardless of AOG incidents for a total of 14 size, in an area normally consid- this year, compared to one for all AOG ACG ered safe is not a good sign. How- of last year. For the second re- ever, the motive and intended NGO, which have operated with few security porting period in a row, night let- target are still unknown, and one concerns. KEY THREATS & CONCERNS incident doesn’t suggest a trend. While the criminal threat to NGO is low, there !"IED While the overall number of is the potential for armed robbery, especially !"Banditry AOG incidents in Bamyan re- on highways. However, so far this year there !"AOG presence within Shibar & mains relatively low, the increase has only been one criminal incident directly Khamard in incidents is notable and may impacting NGO. portent future problems for

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..” THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents LOGAR LOGAR Year to Date 7 30 This Report Period 0 Logar is heavily infiltrated by 25 AOG and should be considered of an AOG checkpoint in the Po- 20 too risky for NGO operations. rak area of . All roads in 15 While Baraki Bark, Puli Alam, Logar should be assumed to be 10 Chark, and Khawar are likely to monitored. Surveillance and track- 5 ing of vehicles should be consid- 0 be completely under AOG con- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT trol, Muhammad Agha, Azra, and ered especially active on the main Khushi are probably nearly so. road through the province from AOG ACG Kabul to Gardez. NGO travelling As has been common since the on this road can be highly vulner- experienced in the summer. This suggests that summer, there was another report able to hijacking, abduction, or AOG have been nearly as active, but that attack. NGO operations and/or profiles have been KEY THREATS & CONCERNS While there have been no recent reduced. This past week, however, did see a !"Armed & IED attacks along main slight drop in activity, possibly signalling that routes incidents involving NGO, overall AOG numbers are starting to reduce for the !"AOG freedom of movement incident levels so far this month are only slightly lower than those winter.

NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 2 20 This Report Period 0 Tagab, Alasay, Nijrab remain the 15 each). Overall, AOG incidents primary areas of concern in 10 Kapisa. AOG reportedly have have dropped significantly re- substantial freedom of movement cently; with five incidents re- 5 corded so far this month, a level night and day in these districts. 0 The Nijrab and Tagab Districts that is almost half of those reports JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT have the highest incident fre- last month and a third of those quency. However, Alasay is re- recorded in the summer months. AOG ACG ported to be unstable, with the Likely contributing factors for this lack of incidents reflective of a are a reduced AOG presence (as the winter) and that the overall condition is limited security presence rather AOG members leave for the win- still volatile. than a dearth of AOG. ter months), an increased security Security incident reports are limited from other presence, and the killing of several So far in this reporting period (northwest) districts, reportedly due a general important AOG commanders by only Tagab and Nijrab have re- opposition to AOG by the local populations. security forces since July. For corded AOG incidents (two However, anecdotal reporting suggests an oc- NGO, while this reduced pres- casional and, in some cases, intimidating AOG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ence could increase security for presence in these areas, thus suggesting the !"Collateral damage from clashes travel and operations, the situa- need for NGO to exercise caution and main- !"AOG presence tion should be considered tempo- tain a low profile. rary (possibly for the duration of

NGO Incidents NO GRAPH AVAILABLE PANJSHIR Year to Date 0 This Report Period 0 Panjshir remains the quietest and safest province in the Central Re- four reported police actions, all related to the discovery of, or arrests related to, gion with only one criminal and small amounts of illegal weapons or munitions. one AOG incident recorded so far The low number of reported incidents may be partially attributed to the insular po- this year. litical nature of the area but the primary reasons remain the province’s relative pros- Beyond that, throughout the perity, tribal homogeneity, and the population’s ability to effectively deter AOG and whole year there have been only self govern. THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents DAYKONDI DAYKUNDI Year to Date 3 10

This Report Period 0 8 Reporting from the province re- mains limited and incidents are AOG have reportedly moved into 6 sporadically reported. What infor- the area intent on intimidating the 4 local population. In the eastern mation is available suggests in- 2 creased AOG activity recently. In district of Miramor, AOG report- edly attacked an ANP patrol on 0 general, the south is recognized as JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT being heavily infiltrated with the border in the area between AOG, with Kajran and Gizrab and Ajristan Dis- AOG ACG prone to clashes. This period saw trict of . signs of AOG movement in cen- AOG movement is more limited holders. This was possibly evidenced this pe- tral and eastern districts. In northern districts of Daykundi riod by the actions of a local warlord. Com- Sharistan an AOG estimated at 40 and the area is considered much mander Sedaqat (who was responsible for the safer than the south. However, July abduction of two French NGO workers) KEY THREATS & CONCERNS even “safe” areas can be unpre- was reportedly conducting vehicle searches in !"Minimal security presence dictable and subject to sudden Nili. While the context for the searches is un- !"Growing instability changes in the political environ- known, it could be indicative of general law- ment or whims of local power lessness.

NGO Incidents KUNDUZ KUNDUZ Year to Date 12

This Report Period 0 20 Kunduz continues to be defined by pockets of high AOG activity ronment through presence- 15 interspersed amongst more low establishing activity (patrol groups 10 and propaganda), IED and suicide risk areas. The areas of highest 5 attacks against IMF, SAF attacks risk are Chahar Darra and Dashti 0 Archi districts. In both areas against ANP, and threats against JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT AOGs influence the security envi- elements associated with the inter- national presence. A significant AOG ACG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS suicide attack took place in Cha- har Darra targeting IMF and leav- wise molested during this reporting period, a !"Suicide attack ing 2 IMF and 5 local children UN staff member in Chapa Darra did receive a !"Attacks against IMF dead. While NGOs have not threat directing him not to work for that or- !"Threats against IO staff been directly threatened or other- ganisation.

NGO Incidents

BALKH Year to Date 8 20 This Report Period 0 Chaharbulak and Chimtal have 15 remained the main areas of con- ally in Balkh District rockets were cern in Balkh, with both having fired at a high school. Attacks 10 recently seen a rash of night let- against elders and prominent indi- 5 ters aimed at encouraging people viduals have continued and are likely the result of factional con- 0 to not work with GoA. Addition- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT flicts although the direct impetus KEY THREATS & CONCERNS for each attack was usually a more AOG ACG immediate local dispute. Al- !"Perceived cooperation between NGO/GoA though there are pockets of AOG has instead underlined the need for pursuing !"Factional Conflicts sentiment in Balkh, this has not solid acceptance strategies and appraising their !"ACG activity yet translated into a high degree of feasibility at the level of each project site. threat against NGOs’ staff and THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

NGO Incidents FARYAB FARYAB Year to Date 1 This Report Period 1 10 The first NGO-related incident of 8 the year in Faryab involved the Faryab (Bilchiragh) and it appears 6 commandeering of an NGO vehi- that NGO acceptance strategies 4 cle by AOG members. The NGO led to the NGO staff not being 2 harmed. Further investigation 0 vehicle stumbled upon the scene JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT of an AOG attack on the police revealed that the AOG members chief of neighboring Gurziwan were inclined to kill the NGO AOG ACG District and was commandeered staff who stumbled upon the as a means of escape, leaving the scene of the attack in order to egy. eliminate witnesses, but instead NGO staff unharmed. This com- The western districts remain unstable with decided to spare them and only pound incident is significant for threats from AOG activity in the form of at- take their vehicle because the two reasons; it occurred in a nor- tacks on ANP and IEDs. An attempt was AOG elements were familiar with mally quiet eastern district of made on the life of the Andkhoy chief of po- and supportive of the NGO’s lice which was a follow up to another attack on work in the area. This explana- the same individual two days before in Balkh KEY THREATS & CONCERNS tion should not be taken to signify Province. The distance between the two inci- !"ACG activity in northern districts a shift in AOG attitudes towards dents reveals that both ACG and AOG net- !"AOG activity in Qaysar, Almar & NGOs but rather a single instance works in the north are capable of planning and Pashtun Kot Districts of a successful acceptance strat- coordination across large swathes of territory.

NGO Incidents JAWZJAN JAWZJAN Year to Date 9 10 This Report Period 2 The recent pattern of threats 8 against NGOs, specifically in situation has now changed in that 6 Aqcha and Mardian districts, has an NGO appears to have been 4 escalated to the point where the directly targeted in an RCIED 2 blast and another NGO staff 0 lives of NGO staff were directly JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT threatened during this reporting member working in a different period. Previously, threats had organization received a threat ex- AOG ACG been vague and the attack on an horting him to quit his job. The NGO in Aqcha appears to have IED attack was successful on the stood, NGOs are advised to take the following been designed more to get atten- second try; a day before the attack precautions in the area: restriction of non- tion than to actually cause injury another RCIED had been found essential movement in Aqcha and Mardian and damage to property. That close by and successfully disposed districts, frequent alternations of routes taken of by an IMF EOD team. The in that area, and review of staff and staffing KEY THREATS & CONCERNS direct nature of this attack repre- policies—if the IED was in fact targeted it !"Increasing AOG activity in Aqcha sents a significant shift from the could only have been so with inside informa- & Mardian Districts usual pattern of incidents caused tion from staff members. NGOs should also !"Threats against NGO by ACGs or motivated by political be advised that this applies only to Mardian !"IED interests. Although the full nature and Aqcha districts at the present time. of the threat is not yet under- THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

NGO Incidents BAGHLAN Year to Date 1

This Report Period 0 14 A significant attack in Puli 12 target for headline-grabbing at- 10 Khumri city served as a reminder 8 to Baghlan’s strategic importance. tacks 6 4 A BBIED exploded in the police The discovery of two RCIEDs in 2 HQ leaving a large number of has underlined the 0 IMF and ANP dead or wounded. growth in AOG activity there as JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT

The fact that Baghlan contains well as Baghlani Jadid. Addition- AOG ACG both the most accessible north- ally, reports emerged of a specific south route in Afghanistan and a kidnapping threat against foreign- rence appears to be an indicator of AOG senti- hosts a few areas with high AOG ers working for NGOs. Different ment, which is consistent with other recent sympathies makes it an attractive but similar reports of this threat activity in the area. NGOs operating in Bagh- were made for both Puli Hisar lani Jadid, Nahrin, and Puli Hisar should seri- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS and Baghlani Jadid but could not ously consider the impact of local and regional !"IED activity in Baghlani Jadid & be confirmed and were not con- AOG activities on their acceptance and Nahrin sistent with actual NGO activity whether acceptance itself is a sufficient strategy !"Increased AOG presence in multi- in either locale. While the report to allow operation in the affected areas. could not be confirmed, its recur-

NGO Incidents GHOR GHOR Year to Date 4

This Report Period 0 10

Although reporting from Ghor is 8 limited the main threats continue rounding road travel in the prov- ince and local groupings (exact 6 to be criminal activity and fac- 4 tional disputes. Several instances nature unknown) continued to engage in armed clashes in Chagh- 2 of highway robbery were reported 0 during this reporting period, high- chiran. Unknown individuals also JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT lighting the lack of security sur- attacked a voter registration site and burned it to the ground, the AOG ACG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS first such attack in either the West !"Factional conflicts or North. The isolated nature of of wider AOG effort and if future occurrences !"ACG activity the attack means that it is not yet will occur. possible to judge whether it is part

NGO Incidents BADGHIS BADGHIS Year to Date 1 This Report Period 0 Badghis remains largely stable 20 with the exception of the Ghor- where attacks (via SAF and IED) 15 mach and Murghab districts on IMF and ANSF remain com- 10 mon. Tensions surrounding the 5 provincial governor have subsided KEY THREATS & CONCERNS 0 for the moment and have not led JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT !"Attacks against IMF & ANSF to further demonstrations. !"AOG activity in Ghormach & AOG ACG Murghab Districts THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

NGO Incidents KHOST KHOST Year to Date 7 40 This Report Period 0

With fewer AOG related security 30 incidents than the preceding re- was conducted against the Tere porting period, Khost has never- Zayi District Centre on 16 Octo- 20 ber. An AOG threat against edu- theless witnessed a broad range of 10 activity in the latter half of Octo- cation facilities has been evi- denced by the killings of at least 0 ber. JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT two teachers while travelling to Several IED incidents occurred, their schools in different parts of with detonations against ANP and AOG ACG the province, and a third, cur- NDS vehicles in the province, and rently unattributed, killing may people abducted, including three international an unsuccessful BBIED attack also be considered. staff contracted to a national radio station. KEY THREATS & CONCERNS As in the earlier part of the The risk posed by indirect fire was demon- !"Indirect fire month, abductions by AOG have strated when AOG attacked an IMF location !"Abduction/Kidnapping continued, and two separate inci- with rockets on 23 October and IMF return dents in Tani saw a total of seven fire is reported to have injured two civilians.

NGO Incidents KUNAR KUNAR Year to Date 4 100 This Report Period 1 90 80 As is usual Kunar has accounted 70 been used, and a mortar attack 60 for over 40% of security incidents 50 recorded in the Eastern Region against a Border Police check- 40 point in Nawa on 27 October was 30 during this reporting period. Ac- 20 followed by an exchange of small 10 tivity has again been concentrated 0 in the Pech Valley and the district arms fire that lasted two hours. JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT of Mano Gai, with several inci- The return to a significant use of dents also occurring on the route indirect fire presents another col- AOG ACG North-East to Asadabad. The vast lateral damage risk to any working majority of incidents continue to in or travelling through the prov- Reports of new AOG movement in two of the be direct fire attacks against IMF/ ince. province’s districts indicate that the high GoA installations, but unlike the AOG attacks against those in- tempo of security incidents will continue and first half of October, AOG have volved in road construction pro- may increase in border areas. One group re- made frequent use of rocket and jects continue, with gunfire di- cently introduced onto the area is understood mortar fire against their targets. rected against projects in Chawkay to have the abduction of NGO staff as a spe- On several occasions upwards of on two occasions and, most nota- cific objective. ten mortar rounds or rockets have bly, a large group of construction Those using the -Asadabad road workers being abducted from should continue to monitor developments and KEY THREATS & CONCERNS their project site in Mano Gai on account for the range of incidents that occur !"Abduction/kidnapping 26 October. Several of those ab- regularly in the province in their contingency !"Collateral damage from indirect ducted, including two Pakistani planning process. fire attacks nationals, are still unaccounted for. THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

NGO Incidents NURISTAN

NURISTAN Year to Date 5 15 This Report Period 0 13 AOG in Nuristan continue to 11 attack security forces on a regular location in Kamdesh give an indi- 9 and frequent basis. Incident re- cation of the tempo of activity in 7 parts of the province. The only 5 porting from the province is less 3 comprehensive than other parts other reported security incident in 1 Nuristan involved AOG over- -1 of the region but three AOG at- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT tacks between 17-19 October powering ANP guards at Wama against the same security force District Centre and making off AOG ACG with a quantity of arms and am- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS munition. Matal and those working in remote areas !"AOG movements in northern and Reports of AOG movement in should be aware of the increased risk posed by central districts the province include the introduc- any new AOG and security force activity. tion of a sizeable group into Bargi

NGO Incidents PAKTYA

PAKTYA Year to Date 1 40 This Report Period 0 AOG activity has increased in 30 an ANP checkpoint in the Zaow Paktya during this reporting pe- 20 riod with 10 reported incidents, area of Zurmat. As in other recent half of which occurred in the reporting periods, there has been 10 little reported IED activity, al- southern district of Zurmat. Five 0 incidents were rocket or mortar though signs that AOG are at- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT attacks against security force in- tempting to increase IED use in- stallations, one of which involved clude a detonation of a device in AOG ACG 10 rockets being directed against the Ibrahim Khel area of Zurmat that injured 3 ANP members, and The risk of abduction is ever present in the KEY THREATS & CONCERNS the engagement by IMF aircraft of province, and following the destruction of his !"Increasing use of IED an AOG attempting to place an vehicle, the civilian driver of an IMF supply !"Collateral damage risk IED in the Gorgi area of the same vehicle was taken by AOG in Ahmadabad Dis- !"Abduction/kidnapping district. trict on 26 October and is still unaccounted for.

NGO Incidents NANGAHAR NANGARHAR Year to Date 7

This Report Period 0 40 Nangarhar continues to see a 35 range of AOG and criminal activ- tinue and explicit threats against 30 the voter registration process have 25 ity across the province. Criminal 20 activity has included two reported been made. There have also been 15 direct threats made against UN 10 abductions, one of which was of a 5 doctor from her residence in Jala- staff based in Jalalabad and this 0 labad city. Reports of AOG should also be understood by JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT movement and infiltration, par- NGO staff working in the prov- AOG ACG ticularly in southern districts, con- ince. As in other recent reports, AOG incidents was an ANP find of a significant quantity of IED materials on 21 October. A KEY THREATS & CONCERNS activity has seen significant use and attempted use of IEDs on further ANP find, this time of a large number !"Clashes in southern districts main roads and roads leading to of mortar rounds in Surkh Rod on 25 October, !"IED along main routes/city cen- shows that the risk of indirect fire must always tre's district centres with 6 IED related incidents taking place in the sec- be considered by those working in the prov- !"Abduction/kidnapping ond half of October. One of these ince. THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents LAGHMAN LAGHMAN Year to Date 3 20 This Report Period 0 The latter part of the reporting 15 period has been dominated by a also declared and other smaller series of public demonstrations demonstrations held across the 10 province. against the killing of bus passen- 5 gers, many of whom were from With this background the low 0 Laghman, which occurred in Kan- number of AOG related security JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT dahar on 16 Oct 2008. At the larg- incidents in the province is per- est gathering, in Mehtarlam on 22 haps to be expected, with only 4 AOG ACG October, GoA officials made being reported across Laghman. statements to the effect that those Most of these were short direct should continue to be aware of AOG activity residents in Laghman should en- fire attacks against security force levels along the Alishing valley north of Route courage any relatives serving in positions, but recent threats 1. Those using Route 1 between Kabul- AOG to return home or risk see- against telephone companies were Jalalabad have seen improved security in this ing their homes destroyed by followed up with the destruction reporting period, with one late night attack on GoA. A period of mourning was of one of their vehicles in Alishing an ANP position and a reported increased de- on 22 October. ployment of ANP along the route. The risk of disruption is however always present and the KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Despite the low number of inci- situation along the route outside the province !"Ongoing AOG infiltration dents, AOG activities and prepa- will often be less stable. !"IED in Alishing Valley rations are believed to be continu- ing and those working in the area

NGO Incidents NIMROZ NIMROZ Year to Date 1 20 This Report Period 0 The attack against the Chakhansur 15 While this attack was ultimately District Centre on the 25th of 10 October marks one of the very unsuccessful the resources utilised few such large scale actions un- were considerably less than in 5 other similar attacks within other dertaken by AOG within this 0 province during 2008. In general provinces of the SR suggesting JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT AOG actions have been limited to that the AOG presence within smaller scale attacks and suicide this district, as well as the rest of AOG ACG attacks against security force the province, remains well below checkpoints and/or GoA officials. the southern average. common in the population centre of Zaranj While surprisingly consistent, the City. Though the limited amount of AOG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS AOG presence has remained lim- activity reported may be more the result of the !"Suicide attack threat within Zaranj ited, and most offensive actions limited number of security forces operating !"Attacks against ANSF have occurred in the isolated rural throughout the province than a reflection of areas with suicide attacks more the ground reality.. THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR KANDAHAR Year to Date 12 100 This Report Period 0 80

There has been a consistent and 60 significant drop in AOG activity Typical activity patterns identified 40 level within Kandahar over the in previous years indicate that past few months. While this can AOG elements engage in a final 20 peak of operations in November/ 0 be partially attributed to the nor- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT mal seasonal downswing in activ- early December before the onset of winter. ity experienced during this time AOG ACG period, it may also be the result of There was also an AOG kidnap- the large scale actions in ping/abduction threat against in- neighbouring Helmand recently ternational staff of an develop- international staff this year is more likely due which drew resources and man- ment organisation working on a to the limited number of them operating in the power from various portions of specific project in the vicinity of province, and the significant security measures the SR, including Kandahar. Kandahar City. While this threat implemented during their activities. was likely mitigated by the fore- NGO planning for short term visits are still warning of the staff involved, it advised to adhere to strict security protocols KEY THREATS & CONCERNS brought to the fore the ongoing during both the planning and implementation !"Rural saturation by AOG threat of this against all interna- of such trips in order to minimise the risks !"Ongoing military operations tionals operating within the prov- inherent with operating in both Kandahar spe- !"Kidnapping/abduction threat ince. The fact that there have cifically and the Southern Region in general. been very few incidents involving

NGO Incidents ZABUL ZABUL Year to Date 3 This Report Period 0 40

As noted in previous reports, the 30 district of Shah Joy continues to The recent threat issued by AOG be a focal point for AOG activi- elements in the province advising 20 ties within the province. Recent telecommunication companies to 10 cease their services mirrors similar reports indicate further infiltration 0 into the area with a large force threats issued earlier this year JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT entering intent of carrying out throughout the SR. Unlike the attacks against IMF and ANSF earlier threats, present reporting AOG ACG elements. indicates that this recent threat resulted in limited compliance, as this fact, as well as the considerable freedom of well as punitive action on the part movement and action enjoyed by AOG in this of AOG. Having noted this, province, NGO should plan for future cellular KEY THREATS & CONCERNS AOG have previously demon- communications disruptions and as such en- !"Possible cellular service disrup- strated a singular will to ensure sure that their staff have access to secondary tions compliance, destroying numerous and tertiary communication methods. Options !"Instability along Hwy 1 facilities throughout Helmand, available to organizations include satellite !"IED Kandahar, and Ghazni. Taking phones, internet, and VHF. THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents HELMAND HELMAND Year to Date 0 70 This Report Period 0 60 Operations have recently restarted 50 in the districts of Nawa and Nad appear that despite the significant 40 Ali in response to the reemer- number of casualties inflicted 30 against them during past opera- 20 gence of a considerable AOG 10 force in the area. It should be tions (and during the assault 0 noted that the previous operation against Lashkar Gah City) they JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT in these areas had just recently still maintain considerable re- ceased after successfully sources and manpower through- AOG ACG “clearing” both districts of AOG. out suggesting that the tempo of This clearly indicates that AOG in their operations will not decrease tinues percolate in the background, with two the province continue to remain (beyond the standard seasonal separate instances in Nad Ali counting for as fluid in their areas of operations swings) significantly in the mid to many as 30 civilian deaths. While these figures as well as enjoy significant free- long term. As such, NGO are are notoriously difficult to confirm, and are dom of movement. It would also advised to view all rural areas further confused by AOG messages inflating within Helmand as high risk and the casualty figures (as part of an ongoing in- restrict their movements and ac- formation operations campaign to decrease KEY THREATS & CONCERNS tivities to within Lashkar Gah public support for the GoA and ISAF), it !"AOG saturation of rural areas City. nonetheless poses the possibility of decreased !" AOG focus on Lashkar Gah City Related to the above operations, public acceptance for the international com- !"Suicide attacks the issue of civilian casualties con- munity in general.

NGO Incidents GHAZNI G HAZNI Year to Date 3 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT 80 This Report Period 1 The abduction of 2 INGO inter- 60 national staff members from Dis- ceived several warnings to cease its activities due to the perceived trict 2, Ghazni City on the 23rd of 40 October highlights the ongoing “inappropriate” nature of its pro- prevalence of this threat within grams. 20 the province. They were taken It is worth noting that all 3 NGO 0 from their office, during daylight direct incidents recorded in 2008 hours (from a location in close have been kidnappings, including AOG ACG proximity to ANP HQ) by a a previous occurrence involving group of armed and masked men. the same office (2 national staff) sult of the aforementioned dissatisfaction re- Prior to this occurrence, this spe- in June and a kidnapping affecting garding their programming). Whether this cific office had previously re- a separate organisation in May. erosion in local acceptance was the result of real or perceived grievances, or AOG agitation, The details surrounding this re- it nonetheless highlights the need for regular KEY THREATS & CONCERNS cent event suggests that the event reviews of local acceptance levels regarding !"Kidnapping/Abduction not only occurred after a period service delivery. Early identification of such of observation and targeting, but !"Instability along Hwy 1 issues could prevent the possible escalation that there may have been an ele- !"AOG influence of rural areas into action of voiced dissatisfaction. ment of local complicity (as a re- THE AFGHANISTAN NGO OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

CONTACT ANSO

CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) MISSING ANSO is hosted by Deutsche Welthungerhilfe Blake Kehler - [email protected] - 0799 323 792 Hedayatullah - [email protected] - 0799 322 116 This report ANSO could not provide NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR) analysis for the prov- Scott Bohlinger - [email protected] - 0799 404 617 inces of: Firoz Fahez - [email protected] - 0799 408 252 To Register with ANSO !" Badakshan contact: EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) [email protected] !" Takhar Chris Hansen - [email protected] - 0799 248 362 !" Samangan Khisrow Shohar - [email protected] - 0798 778 014 !" Sar-e-Pul ANSO is managed by an NGO SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR) !" Herat Board. If you have any Vacant - N/A - N/A !" Farah feedback, good or bad, let Mohammadi - [email protected] - 0700 300 730 !" Uruzgan them know on: !" Paktika [email protected] WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT) Kulvinder Brar- [email protected] - 0799 322 192 This is because we ANSO ACRONYMS Najma Fazly - [email protected] - 0799 446 820 do not know enough about the area to IMF-International Military COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) comment on the sig- Forces / AOG-Armed Oppo- Nic Lee - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 nificance of the inci- sition Groups / GOA- Nathan Ronaldson - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 dents occurring Government of Afghanistan Chona Bollos - [email protected] - 0797-093-073 / ACG-Armed Criminal Groups / ANA-Afghan Na- tional Army / ANP-Afghan National Police / IED- THE ANSO MANDATE Improvised Exploding De- Scope of Services, P.1, 2008 vice / AEF-Afghan Eradica- tion Forces / RPG-Rocket Propelled Grenade / IDF- The community of NGOs has established ANSO in recognition of their interdependence and shared Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / responsibility towards security management. VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro- They have acknowledged that ANSO is important in maintaining the impartiality, independence vised Exploding Device / PRP-Previous Reporting and political neutrality of NGOs by allowing them to be free from dependence upon security informa- Period / ANBP-Afghan Na- tion originating from political or military sources. tional Border Police / SAF- They have also recognized the need to avoid association with the military in the complex Afghani- Small Arms Fire / NDS- stan environment and have therefore perceived a valuable role for ANSO in protecting NGO from National Directorate of Se- direct contact with the military. curity (intelligence) / PSC- Private Security Company / The community recognizes that the success of ANSO in fulfilling these functions is dependant upon DC-District Centre the willingness of NGOs to cooperate with one another in the area of security management and to support ANSO in delivering these objectives. In so forming ANSO then, the NGO community has accepted the inherent obligation to contribute and participate for the effective management of their own security.