The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 12 OctoBer 16th to 31st 2008 ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale- Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2-5 The winter related downturn Total AOG Initiated Attacks per Month - 2008 5-7 Northern Region in AOG attacks has contin- (Close Range + Indirect Fire + Suicide Attacks) Western Region 7 ued, though when taken into 700 634 context, still accounts for a 600 602 Eastern Region 8-10 571 25% increase over this period 500 509 last year and is even 15% 463 472 Southern Region 10-12 400 higher than the July peak of 318 ANSO Info Page 13 300 301 2007. Attacks remain most 218 200 189 consistent in the East and 100 most analysts agree that 2008 YOU NEED TO KNOW 0 will be a more shallow down- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT turn than previous years. • Deterioration in the secu- rity of Herat Province While both incidents com- ments of OEF. This will Developments in Herat drew manded a lot of media at- likely result in more ag- • Prevailing abduction/ attention this period with tention they did not in fact gressive operations in cur- kidnapping threat ongoing demonstrations present any actual change in rent conflict areas with • Decline in overall NGO forcing a possible restructur- the security context of Ka- little to no change in soft security incidents although ing of the ANP in response bul which, in our opinion, areas. The first phase of getting more severe to deteriorating security. has been easily accessible the “new” plan was While well known criminal (and indeed accessed) by launched Nov 1st. • Major changes in IMF an- gangs to the South-East of AOG for at least 2 years. nounced Armed criminality, impli- the city can be taken as the NGO related incidents cated in the second set of most direct cause of instabil- also turned down this pe- ANSO is supported by murders, is perennial in the ity the involvement of politi- riod in line with the over- city as it is in all high den- cal factions with an interest all incident deflation. sity urban areas. in instability is also consid- However with an RCIED ered likely. Governors have ANSO advises NGO to strike, two abductions of been successfully removed work with the knowledge international and the inter- from office in a number of that AOG are present in the national murder in Kabul other provinces through city and that well connected included in the list there is similar means of interference criminals act with impunity. a growing concern about by other forces. the seriousness of the inci- Also this period the antici- dents NGO are involved Security in the capital Kabul pated amendments to the in. has been under particular IMF chain of command ANSO has noted that the scrutiny this period with the were (discreetly) announced volume of NGO incidents daylight murder of an NGO with US Gen. McKiernan attributable to AOG has international worker in being placed in charge of grown phenomenally in Karte-Char and two private USFOR-A a unified com- the last 12 months. sector foreign workers in mand comprising ISAF, Share-Naw area. CSTC-A and some ele- THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 21 35 This Report Period 1 30 In Kabul city, there were two high 25 profile incidents this period di- reinforcing the AOG/ACG nexus 20 rectly involving internationals. often discussed by analysts. 15 10 The first was the murder of a The incident was inline with a more generally deteriorating envi- 5 female NGO worker on Oct 20th 0 in the Karte-Char area by armed ronment in which NGO have JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT men on a motorcycle. found themselves more frequently the subject of AOG attacks and AOG ACG AOG took responsibility for the interests. murder and claimed as a motive The rescue of two high profile abductees along However when viewed in the con- that she was involved in with the related arrest of several suspected per- text of other recent events—12 ‘spreading Christianity’, a com- petrators will likely not diminish the overall October abduction of an interna- ment which gained some traction threat. in media circles despite her NGO tional journalist near Qargha The second major incident—the 25 October having a policy against such. Lake; 16 October abduction of bank executive’s son in Karta Se killing of two international DHL staff by a Given that there have been no & 19 October abduction of the guard who then shot himself—appears related arrests in this case there is little brother in-law of former King to an internal matter and not linked to a wider scope for further comment how- Mohammad Zahir Shahin Karte threat to NGO or the international community ever it is considered likely that Char (both now freed by security other than to demonstrate the violent tenden- AOG did indeed sanction the forces); higher than usual amount cies of armed criminality. murder but that it was undertaken of reports of suspected surveil- NGO are advised to operate under the as- by local criminal groups further lance of NGO and internation- sumption that AOG are present in the city and als— the AOG and ACG threat that some armed criminal groups can operate KEY THREATS & CONCERNS in Kabul should be considered with relative impunity. !"Increasing threat environment for especially high right now, with Perceptions of your agencies motives, activities internationals areas in the western/south- and connections should take an enhanced pri- !"Kidnapping/Abduction western side of the city of particu- ority in security planning. lar concern. WARDAK NGO Incidents WARDAK Year to Date 7 60 50 Wardak, with the exception of the This Report Period 0 Bihsud districts, should be consid- 40 ered off-limits for NGO. The of the Kabul-Kandahar highway 30 20 main road from Kabul is reported (used by security forces and logis- 10 to be heavily monitored—likely tic convoys) and its proximity to 0 starting in Kabul and Ghazni— the equally AOG saturated prov- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT giving AOG/ACGs ample oppor- inces of Logar and Ghazni. But tunity to communicate to teams in Chak, Nirkh, Jalrez, Day Mirda, AOG ACG Wardak and prepare for vehicles and Jaghatu are all also reported DAC this past week. travelling through the province. to be heavily infiltrated with The Bihsud areas are still largely left alone by Saydabad logs the most incidents AOG. In Maydan Shahr, the gov- AOG and controlled by the local Hazaras, who largely due to the long intersection ernment and security forces main- tain a tenuous control of security maintain some level of security. However, the KEY THREATS & CONCERNS and the district is subject to fre- security situation in these areas could change !"Attacks against DAC quent attacks, most recently evi- should AOG take an interest in controlling the !"Kidnapping/Abduction denced by a rocket attack on the districts. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3 NGO Incidents PARWAN PARWAN Year to Date 5 10 This Report Period 0 After a relatively low but consis- 8 During the last few months, IED tent (6-7 AOG incidents) per 6 attacks along the main road to month from April through to Sep- 4 tember, so far in October there Bamyan significantly impacted the 2 have been no AOG incidents in NGO community. While there was only one incident directly in- 0 Parwan. This reduction may be JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT attributable to an active security volving an NGO vehicle, the rela- presence and a reduced AOG tively high number of attacks on AOG ACG presence as the weather cools. this key route coupled with the strategic and psychological value recent months. That being said the route of its control have made it risky through Parwan to Bamyan should still be con- for NGO travel. With the last sidered high risk for NGO travel, even if the KEY THREATS & CONCERNS recorded IED incident on 25 Sep- likelihood of an attack is minimal. In addition, !"AOG presence in Ghorband and tember and this month’s drop off the presence of internationals in areas outside Kohi Safi in AOG incidents, the threat of of Chaharikar is likely to attract negative atten- !"IED along Chaharikar-Bamyan IED attack in Ghorband and tion, so employing international staff in opera- main route Sheik Ali appears reduced from tions outside Chaharikar is not recommended. NGO Incidents BAMYAN BAMYAN Year to Date 2 10 This Report Period 0 Travel to/from Bamyan should be 8 considered risky, and NGO are ters threatening people who co- 6 advised to avoid operations in operate with the government were 4 distributed in Shibar. Also, on 16 Kahmard and Shibar due to a 2 known AOG presence. October, a small IED exploded in the bazaar area of Bamyan Centre. 0 This month there were four more JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT The use of an IED, regardless of AOG incidents for a total of 14 size, in an area normally consid- this year, compared to one for all AOG ACG ered safe is not a good sign. How- of last year. For the second re- ever, the motive and intended NGO, which have operated with few security porting period in a row, night let- target are still unknown, and one concerns.