DOCSLIB.ORG

Iraq Struggles to Drive Back Sunni Militants

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Iraq Struggles to Drive Back Sunni Militants International FRIDAY, JULY 4, 2014 Ukraine president shakes up military 200 troops killed in conflict to date KIEV: Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko won parlia- conditions for a more lasting ceasefire. “anti-terrorist operation” grouping the army and other secu- ment’s approval yesterday to shake up the leadership of the The group includes a former president of Ukraine, who is rity bodies in the drive against the rebels. Though armed forces as they try to end a rebellion by pro-Russian informally representing Kiev, Moscow’s ambassador to Kiev, Poroshenko won backing on the military shake-up, a debate separatists. Parliament endorsed Colonel-General Valery and a high-ranking official from the Organization for on “decentralisation” proposals for the regions, which is part Heletey as defense minister after hearing Poroshenko Security and Cooperation in Europe. It should meet “no later of his peace plan, ran into trouble when a key coalition part- describe the 46-year-old as a man “who will work day and than July 5th with the goal of reaching an unconditional ner came out against them. night for restoring the military capability of our armed and mutually agreed sustainable ceasefire”, a document forces.” He also named a new chief of the general staff. agreed by the four ministers said. French President Francois Overnight ATTACKS Poroshenko took office last month with the country in Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel urged In overnight violence, one Ukrainian soldier was killed crisis, as two eastern regions press demands to break away Russian President Vladimir Putin yesterday to encourage the when rebels approached in a car bearing a white flag and and join Russia, following the example of Crimea earlier this separatists to reach an agreement with the Ukrainian then opened fire, a military spokesman, Oleksiy year. After months of unsuccessful attempts to quash the authorities, the French president’s office said. Dmytrashkivsky, said. The border service also said nine uprising, he wants to sharpen the army’s effectiveness while border guards were wounded in a rebel mortar attack on exploring diplomatic options to end the crisis, which has Deterring aggression their post in Luhansk region on the border with Russia. revived East-West tensions in ways reminiscent of the Cold Poroshenko, looking solemn and at times striking the Poroshenko declared a week-long ceasefire on June 20 to War. table with his hand to make a point, did not mention the give rebels the time to down weapons under an amnesty Poroshenko on Monday rejected a further extension of a Berlin talks or the agreement on a possible new ceasefire, offered in his peace plan. 10-day unilateral ceasefire in the east, where the govern- but put the emphasis instead on the need for a strong, He extended it by three days on June 27. But on ment says 200 service personnel have been killed since the reformed army to defend Ukraine. Heletey, who will replace Monday he refused to prolong it on the advice of his secu- start of the conflict, as well as hundreds of civilians and acting defense minister Mykhailo Koval, would enact rity officials who said the ceasefire had allowed rebels to rebels. In Berlin on Wednesday the foreign ministers of reforms to build an army which would deter anybody “from regroup and rearm, and had cost the lives of government Russia and Ukraine, after talks with German and French min- planning aggression” against Ukraine, he said. The new troops. Poroshenko’s decision to relaunch operations isters, supported a further meeting of a “contact group” head of the general staff, 52-year-old Lieutenant-General against the rebels won US support but harsh condemna- involving separatist leaders and aimed at trying to work out Viktor Muzhenko, was until recently a top official in the tion from Russia. —Reuters Tale of abuse and revenge behind fall of China ‘tiger’ BEIJING: When Chinese official Zhou Jianhua refused to tell Communist Party investigators he had received massive bribes, he says they beat him and forced him to drink toilet water until he confessed. As a crackdown on corruption pushed by Chinese President Xi Jinping ensnares a growing list of senior officials, Zhou’s account-in a recording obtained by AFP-offers a rare glimpse inside the ruling Party’s opaque internal disciplinary system. Lawyers say his case demon- strates how the faction-riven graft investigations can mask power struggles and are carried out with little respect for the law. “They used my relatives as hostages, and tortured me unrelentingly until I accepted the fabricated charges,” Zhou- handed a suspended death sentence earlier this year-told his lawyers in a recorded meeting. The Party’s internal justice system, known as “shuanggui”, operates without oversight from judicial authorities and has been increasingly criticized by China’s legal community. More than 15 officials have reportedly died from abuses in “shuang- gui” since 2007. Xi has vowed to take down high-ranking “tigers” as well as low-level “flies” in an anti-corruption push KARBALA: Iraqi security forces celebrate after clashes with followers of Shiite cleric Mahmoud Al-Sarkhi, in front of his introduced in response to widespread public anger over home in the Shiite holy city of Karbala. — AP endemic graft. Zhou’s case was thrust into the spotlight last month when one such tiger-the former top Communist offi- Iraq struggles to drive cial in Jiangxi province, Su Rong-was placed under investiga- tion. Zhou says his own fall came swiftly after he accused Su’s wife of corruption, and was payback from his party superior. back Sunni militants Red envelopes For years Zhou was a loyal Communist Party member and successful bureaucrat in Xinyu in Jiangxi, known for its enor- BAGHDAD: Baghdad’s forces struggled yesterday to break a military and militants have deployed lots of roadside bombs and car bombs.” mous steel plant, where he rose to become head of the city stalemate with Sunni militants, as US officials reached out to key lead- Juburi said it would be days before security forces could make a con- People’s Congress, the local legislature. Like his colleagues, ers to push for an end to political chaos in Iraq. Prime Minister Nuri Al- certed push into the city, the capital of Salaheddin province. he earned little but amassed enough money-sometimes Maliki meanwhile extended an amnesty aimed at undercutting sup- port for the militants who have overrun large areas of Iraq, after the Clashes south of Baghdad through illicit means-for his wife to travel to Britain and other new parliament’s first session ended in farce, with MPs walking out Maliki’s security spokesman also told reporters that loyalists had countries. But in 2011 Zhou began to suspect he might be instead of working on government formation. clashed with militants south of Baghdad. In an effort to break the targeted by an inquiry, and took the risky step of telling a On the ground, Iraqi forces were struggling to break a stalemate stand-off, the government has bought more than a dozen Sukhoi war- Party anti-corruption team that Su’s wife had been illegally with militants after initially wilting before the onslaught. They have planes from Russia, announcing on Tuesday that a second group of profiting from land deals in Xinyu. since performed better, albeit with limited offensive success.A police five aircraft had arrived in Iraq, implicitly as part of that deal. But the Weeks later, several of Zhou’s associates were taken into lieutenant colonel said security forces yesterday clashed with militants London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies said the police custody and he was informed that Su had ordered the near Tikrit, the hometown of Saddam Hussein, which they have been three Sukhoi Su-25 ground attack jets shown landing in Iraq in a video same team to investigate him. In January 2012 Communist unsuccessfully fighting to retake in a highly-touted operation for over released Tuesday by the defence ministry are likely from Iran, which officials detained Zhou and took him to a centre where he a week. West of the northern city of Kirkuk, meanwhile, a roadside has pledged to aid Iraq against the militants. would be held for nearly six months without any access to a bomb yesterday killed one Kurdish peshmerga fighter and wounded IISS also noted that most of Iran’s Su-25s are actually from Saddam lawyer, normal practice under “shuanggui”. “He felt that four others. The cost of the conflict has been high for Iraq’s forces, with Hussein’s air force. Defecting pilots had flown seven planes across the because he reported Su Rong’s wife, he was being targeted nearly 900 security personnel among 2,400 people killed in June, the border during the Gulf War in 1991. As calls for politicians to unite as revenge,” said Zhou Ze, one of China’s most outspoken highest figure in years, according to the United Nations. The day remained unheeded, Washington contacted Iraqi and regional players human rights lawyers, who now represents the former before, Salaheddin province’s governor, Ahmed Abdullah Juburi, said individually, with President Barack Obama calling Saudi Arabia’s King bureaucrat. —AFP security forces were “advancing slowly because all of the houses and Abdullah and Vice President Joe Biden talking to former Iraqi parlia- burned vehicles (en route to Tikrit) have been rigged with explosives, ment speaker Osama Al-Nujaifi, a prominent Sunni leader. —AFP.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • China Data Supplement
    China Data Supplement October 2008 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC ......................................................................... 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC ..................................................................... 29 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership ...................................................................... 36 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries ......................................................................... 42 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations .............................................................................................. 45 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR................................................................................................................ 54 LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR....................................................................................................................... 61 LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan .............................................................................................................................. 66 LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Studies Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 October 2008 The Main National Leadership of the
    [Show full text]
  • Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
    China Data Supplement March 2008 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC ......................................................................... 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC ..................................................................... 31 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership ...................................................................... 38 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries ......................................................................... 54 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations .............................................................................................. 56 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR ................................................................................................................ 58 LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR ....................................................................................................................... 65 LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan .............................................................................................................................. 69 LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Studies Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 March 2008 The Main National Leadership of the
    [Show full text]
  • The Mishu Phenomenon: Patron-Client Ties and Coalition-Building Tactics
    Li, China Leadership Monitor No.4 The Mishu Phenomenon: Patron-Client Ties and Coalition-Building Tactics Cheng Li China’s ongoing political succession has been filled with paradoxes. Jockeying for power among various factions has been fervent and protracted, but the power struggle has not led to a systemic crisis as it did during the reigns of Mao and Deng. While nepotism and favoritism in elite recruitment have become prevalent, educational credentials and technical expertise are also essential. Regional representation has gained importance in the selection of Central Committee members, but leaders who come from coastal regions will likely dominate the new Politburo. Regulations such as term limits and an age requirement for retirement have been implemented at various levels of the Chinese leadership, but these rules and norms will perhaps not restrain the power of Jiang Zemin, the 76-year-old “new paramount leader.” While the military’s influence on political succession has declined during the past decade, the Central Military Commission is still very powerful. Not surprisingly, these paradoxical developments have led students of Chinese politics to reach contrasting assessments of the nature of this political succession, the competence of the new leadership, and the implications of these factors for China’s future. This diversity of views is particularly evident regarding the ubiquitous role of mishu in the Chinese leadership. The term mishu, which literally means “secretary” in Chinese, refers to a range of people who differ significantly from each other in terms of the functions they fulfill, the leadership bodies they serve, and the responsibilities given to them.
    [Show full text]
  • Revolution, War and Their Consequences 16-17 March 2018
    Revolution, War and Their Consequences 16-17 March 2018 College of Europe Natolin Campus (Warsaw) 16 March 2018, Friday 10:00 am – 12:30 pm Welcome Ewa Ośniecka-Tamecka, Vice-Rector of College of Europe Opening remarks François Hollande, former President of the Republic of France Arsenii Yatsenyuk, former Prime Minister of Ukraine Sviatoslav Shevchuk, Major Archbishop of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church Short video introduction I. Discussion: International consequences of the 2014 Revolution of Dignity Introduction: Dan Fried, the State Department’s Coordinator for Sanctions Policy, former US Ambassador to Poland Adam Daniel Rotfeld, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland Borys Tarasyuk, Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Former minister of foreign affairs. Danylo Lubkivsky, former Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine Kataryna Wolczuk, Professor of East European Politics, University of Birmingham Igor Gretskiy, Professor, St. Petersburg State University 3R PROJECT College of Europe ul. Nowoursynowska 84 Phone: +48 22 54 59 401 Natolin Campus PL-02-797 Warsaw, Poland Email: [email protected] Chairperson: Professor Richard Butterwick-Pawlikowski, Professor Georges Mink, Dr Paweł Kowal 12:30 pm – 2:30 pm lunch 2:30 pm – 4:00 pm II Discussion: The annexation of Crimea – its consequences for Ukraine and Europe (International and legal aspects, Ukrainian policy towards Crimea, the Crimean Tatars) Introductory remarks: Refat Chubarov, chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar, Sławomir
    [Show full text]
  • Insights Huining on the Liaison Office
    The intriguing appointment of Luo Insights Huining on the Liaison Office In late December 2019, Luo Huining 骆惠宁 was set aside and taken down from his provincial position (Shanxi Party Secretary [2016-2019]) and instead sent, as several 65-year-old Cadres often do before their official retirement, to a commission led by the National People’s Congress (NPC). Luo, a provincial veteran (Anhui Standing Committee [1999-2003], Governor [2010-2013] and Party Secretary of Qinghai [2013-2016]), seemed then to follow in the footsteps of his Qinghai predecessor, Qiang Wei 强卫1. Replaced by Lou Yangsheng 楼阳生 – part of Xi’s Zhejiang “army”, Luo, despite being regarded as competent when it came to the anti-corruption campaign, has never shown any overt signs of siding with Xi. As such, the sudden removal of Wang Zhimin 王志民2 – now ex-director of the Hong Kong Liaison Office for the Central government, which, to be fair, was predictable3, became even more confusing when it became known that he would be replaced by Luo. Some are saying this “new” player could bring a breath of fresh air and bring new perspectives on the current state of affairs; some might see this move as either an ill-advised decision or the result of lengthy negotiations at the top – negotiations that might not have tilted in Xi’s favor. A fall from “grace” in the shadow of Zeng Qinghong Wang Zhimin’s removal, as previously stated, is almost a non-event, as Xi was (and still is) clearly dissatisfied with the way the Hong Kong - Macau affairs system 港澳系统 is dealing with the protests.
    [Show full text]
  • [Re]Viewing the Chinese Landscape: Imaging the Body [In]Visible in Shanshuihua 山水畫
    [Re]viewing the Chinese Landscape: Imaging the Body [In]visible in Shanshuihua 山水畫 Lim Chye Hong 林彩鳳 A thesis submitted to the University of New South Wales in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Chinese Studies School of Languages and Linguistics Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences The University of New South Wales Australia abstract This thesis, titled '[Re]viewing the Chinese Landscape: Imaging the Body [In]visible in Shanshuihua 山水畫,' examines shanshuihua as a 'theoretical object' through the intervention of the present. In doing so, the study uses the body as an emblem for going beyond the surface appearance of a shanshuihua. This new strategy for interpreting shanshuihua proposes a 'Chinese' way of situating bodily consciousness. Thus, this study is not about shanshuihua in a general sense. Instead, it focuses on the emergence and codification of shanshuihua in the tenth and eleventh centuries with particular emphasis on the cultural construction of landscape via the agency of the body. On one level the thesis is a comprehensive study of the ideas of the body in shanshuihua, and on another it is a review of shanshuihua through situating bodily consciousness. The approach is not an abstract search for meaning but, rather, is empirically anchored within a heuristic and phenomenological framework. This framework utilises primary and secondary sources on art history and theory, sinology, medical and intellectual history, ii Chinese philosophy, phenomenology, human geography, cultural studies, and selected landscape texts. This study argues that shanshuihua needs to be understood and read not just as an image but also as a creative transformative process that is inevitably bound up with the body.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 3 China: Xi Jinping's Administration— Proactive Policies
    Chapter 3 China: Xi Jinping’s Administration— Proactive Policies at Home and Abroad or China, 2014 was a year when initiatives of the Xi Jinping administration Fcame to the forefront. In domestic politics, it was a year of important changes, as the anti-corruption campaign continued to make itself felt, resulting, for example, in Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the Politburo Standing Committee, and Xu Caihou, former vice chairman of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Military Commission (CMC), being expelled from the party. Xi Jinping, who was already president as well as general secretary of the party, took the position of chairman of the new National Security Commission and created a number of small leading groups, part of his efforts to strengthen his structural authority. Meanwhile elements of instability grew as well, such as the number of bombings that took place in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, and the CPC is cracking down vigorously. President Xi has assertively engaged in foreign policy, leading at times to strong unilateral positions such as China’s location of oil drilling equipment in the South China Sea. China is seeking to form “a new type of major-power relations” with the United States, but China’s actions in the South China Sea and the confrontation over cyber spying make it unclear whether China will be able to achieve the kind of US-China relations it desires. President Xi is also engaging in periphery diplomacy, seeking to ensure China’s peaceful development by reinforcing its economic relations with its neighbors and calling for an Asian New Security Concept, while strengthening its criticism of the system of alliances centered on the United States.
    [Show full text]
  • The Realistic Representation, Inducing Factors and Governance Strategy of Family Corruption Qiwen Tang1, *
    Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research, volume 451 Proceedings of the 2020 5th International Conference on Humanities Science and Society Development (ICHSSD 2020) The Realistic Representation, Inducing Factors and Governance Strategy of Family Corruption Qiwen Tang1, * 1Department of Law and Politics, North China Electric Power University. Baoding, Hebei 071000，China *Corresponding author. Email: [email protected] ABSTRACT Since the 18th national congress of the communist party of China (CPC), the CPC central committee with Xi Jinping at the core of leadership has launched an anti-graft campaign with an all-inclusive and zero-tolerance attitude. Among all the corrupt behaviors, "family corruption" has undoubtedly become a typical corrupt behavior, which has bad social influence, diverse forms and distinctive characteristics. Family corruption can be divided into three modes according to the characteristics of corruption behavior, namely, common bribery mode, power shadow mode and option investment mode. The factors leading to family corruption are various. We can make a systematic analysis from four aspects: organizational system, social supervision, officials and family ethics. Through the analysis of the factors that induce family corruption, we can actually determine the corresponding governance strategies: improve the system, strengthen supervision, update the concept, and cultivate political ethics. Keywords: family corruption; realistic representation; inducing factors; governance strategy 1. INTRODUCTION 2. THE REALISTIC REPRESENTATION OF FAMILY CORRUPTION Since the 18th national congress of the communist party of China (CPC), the fight against corruption has achieved remarkable results. With the anti-corruption storm advancing, Zhou Yongkang, Ling Jihua, Su Rong, and 2.1. The behavior pattern of family corruption other groups of "big tigers" fall, and family corruption The so-called family corruption refers to the behavior that cases are increasingly surfaced.
    [Show full text]
  • For Free Distribution
    AN OVERVIEW OF PARTIES AND CANDIDATES WILL KHARKIV BECOME STORY OF A MAN WHO SPENT RUNNING FOR SEATS IN PARLIAMENT THE NEXT SEPARATIST HOTSPOT A MONTH IN CAPTIVITY IN DONBAS № 13 (79) OCTOBER 2014 WWW.UKRAINIANWEEK.COM Featuring selected content from The Economist FOR FREE DISTRIBUTION |CONTENTS BRIEFING Where Are Estonia’sF riends? A New World Order: The NATO does not know how to deal with small, confusing new rules imposed on challenges, so Russia unleashes them. If they go unpunished, the world by the Russian they set a precedent dictator create a cruel no- holds-barred game. When 27 it is in full swing, the soft Nuclear Whimper: Edward Lucas on trust and the West comfort of Western life may easily disappear forever 28 4 ECONOMICS On the Edge of Recession: The West’s sanctions are hitting POLITICS Russia’s contracting economy Back to Black: The Ukrainian Week looks at party lists and independent candidates to see how many “new faces” the 29 upcoming parliament will have A Plea for Change: Transition from oligarch economy to EU membership for Ukraine 6 The Next People’s Republic? Without “tourists” from Russia, 30 the separatist movement in Kharkiv has quickly marginalized. If Nobel-winning economistR oger Myerson: not for pro-Russian sympathies of the local authorities, it would “Many arguments against decentralisation are based hardly pose any threat at all on a misconception of what it means” 10 34 Separatism From Top Offices of Kyiv: SECURITY Separatism in Ukraine is Ex-Defence MinisterM ykhailo Koval talks about the army, predominantly
    [Show full text]
  • Essays in China's Anti-Corruption Campaign by Xi Lu a Dissertation
    Essays in China's Anti-corruption Campaign by Xi Lu A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Agricultural and Resource Economics in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Brian D. Wright, Chair Professor David Zilberman Professor Thibault Fally Professor Peter L. Lorentzen Spring 2017 Essays in China's Anti-corruption Campaign Copyright 2017 by Xi Lu 1 Abstract Essays in China's Anti-corruption Campaign by Xi Lu Doctor of Philosophy in Agricultural and Resource Economics University of California, Berkeley Professor Brian D. Wright, Chair China's unique system of hiring and promoting talented people within the state, under the supervision of the Communist Party, has been held up as an important institutional factor supporting its remarkably rapid and sustained economic growth. Jointly with Professor Peter L. Lorentzen, we explore this meritocracy argument in the context of Chinese leader Xi Jinping's ongoing anti-corruption campaign. Some question the sincerity of the campaign, arguing that it is nothing but a cover for intra-elite struggle and a purge of Xi's opponents. In the first chapter of my thesis, we use a dataset I have created to identify accused officials and map their connections. Our evidence supports the Party's claim that the crackdown is primarily a sincere effort to cut down on the widespread corruption that was undermining its efforts to develop an effective meritocratic governing system. First, we visualize the \patron- client" network of all probed officials announced by the central government and identify the core targets of the anti-corruption campaign.
    [Show full text]
  • Patronage Politics and Authoritarian Resilience in China
    THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO FRAGMENTED UNITY: PATRONAGE POLITICS AND AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE IN CHINA A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE BY JUNYAN JIANG CHICAGO, ILLINOIS AUGUST 2016 c Copyright by Junyan Jiang 2016 All Rights Reserved Contents Abstract v Acknowledgements viii List of Tables xi List of Figures xii 1 Introduction1 1.1 The Puzzle of CCP’s Resilience...........................1 1.2 Argument.......................................4 1.3 Literature.......................................6 1.4 Road map.......................................9 2 Patronage and Politics in Chinese Officialdom: Past and Present 13 2.1 The Historical Roots of Patronage Politics: The Retainer/Mufu System....... 13 2.2 Patronage Politics under the CCP........................... 17 2.3 The Micro-Level Dynamics of Patron-Client Relations............... 20 2.4 Patron-Client Relations and Behavioral Patterns: A Survey Experiment on Regime Insiders........................................ 30 2.5 Conclusion...................................... 35 3 Patronage Networks, Informal Power, and the Contingent Institutionalization of Leadership Succession in the Post-Tiananmen Era 36 3.1 Institutionalizing Leadership Succession in Autocratic Regimes: Challenges and Solutions....................................... 41 3.2 Patronage Networks and the Development of Successions Institutions in Post- Tiananmen China..................................
    [Show full text]
  • Proquest Dissertations
    University of Alberta "The Biggest Calamity that Overshadowed All Other Calamities": Recruitment of Ukrainian "Eastern Workers" for the War Economy of the Third Reich, 1941-1944 by / ^.-.> S Taras Kurylo A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of History and Classics Edmonton, Alberta Spring 2009 Library and Archives Bibliotheque et 1*1 Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada Canada Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-55416-6 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-55416-6 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library and permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, preter, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans le loan, distribute and sell theses monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, sur worldwide, for commercial or non­ support microforme, papier, electronique et/ou commercial purposes, in microform, autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in this et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. Ni thesis. Neither the thesis nor la these ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci substantial extracts from it may be ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement printed or otherwise reproduced reproduits sans son autorisation.
    [Show full text]