University of Alberta

"The Biggest Calamity that Overshadowed All Other Calamities": Recruitment of Ukrainian "Eastern Workers" for the War Economy of the Third Reich, 1941-1944

by / ^.-.> S

Taras Kurylo

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of History and Classics

Edmonton, Alberta Spring 2009 Library and Archives Bibliotheque et 1*1 Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada Canada

Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-55416-6 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-55416-6

NOTICE: AVIS:

The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library and permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, preter, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans le loan, distribute and sell theses monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, sur worldwide, for commercial or non­ support microforme, papier, electronique et/ou commercial purposes, in microform, autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats.

The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in this et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. Ni thesis. Neither the thesis nor la these ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci substantial extracts from it may be ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement printed or otherwise reproduced reproduits sans son autorisation. without the author's permission.

In compliance with the Canadian Conformement a la loi canadienne sur la Privacy Act some supporting forms protection de la vie privee, quelques may have been removed from this formulaires secondaires ont ete enleves de thesis. cette these.

While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans in the document page count, their la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu removal does not represent any loss manquant. of content from the thesis.

•+• Canada Abstract

The thesis examines the recruitment of "Eastern workers" in Ukraine from the last months of 1941, when it began, to the very end of the Nazi occupation in

1943-44.

Chapter I approaches the recruitment as a process. It examines the bureaucratic mechanism of the recruitment of forced labor, its planning and execution on the local level as well as various regulations, ranging from registration and restriction of movement, which were supposed to limit the evasion of the labor duty and shipment of workers to Germany, to the all-out age- based draft in 1943.

Chapter II explores the recruitment more as a part of the history of mentality. It analyzes the German propaganda campaign to entice volunteers or, in the latter period, to dissuade the evasion, as well as the Ukrainians' responses to the recruitment. And Chapter III examines the brutalization of the recruitment and the practices of popular evasion.

The thesis demonstrates that the recruitment became the single most important event that turned the population against German rule. It became one of the chief factors leading to the growing perception of the Soviet regime by pre-

1939 Soviet Ukrainians as the "lesser evil." In the long run it led to popular identification with the Soviet regime and acceptance of its narrative of the war. It facilitated the overshadowing of earlier Soviet brutalities in collective memory. Acknowledgements

The completion of this thesis would not have been possible without the help of

various individuals and institutions. Drs. John-Paul Himka and Dennis Sweeney

offered many valuable comments during my work on the thesis. I worked as a research-assistant to Dr. Himka during my trip to Ukraine in the fall of 2003,

which provided me with funds to visit various Ukrainian archives. The Harvard

Ukrainian Research Institute granted me stipends to attend its 2004 and 2005

summer schools, which gave me the opportunity to study the rich archival and

library collections at Widener Library of Harvard University pertinent to my

research. The Department of History and Classics at the University of Alberta

awarded me the Ivan Lysyak Rudnytsky Memorial Doctoral Fellowship for the » 2005-06 academic year, which covered my tuition fees and enabled another research trip to Ukraine. And what was of the crucial importance to me, Dr.

Zenon E. Kohut, the director of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies,

offered me the employment at the Institute since the fall of 2002, which allowed

me to meet my living expenses and pay tuition fees. I therefore extend my

sincerest gratitude to the above-mentioned individuals and institutes. Table of Contents:

Introduction 1

Chapter I: The Werbung Mechanism 22

Chapter II: "Like in the Old Days in Shanghai": German

Propaganda and Popular Response to the Werbung 96

Chapter III: The Brutalization of the Werbung: Resistance,

Avoidance and Accommodation 164

Epilogue and Conclusions 228

Bibliography 237 Introduction

The Nazi use of foreign forced labor represents the biggest case of this kind since the ban on the intercontinental slave trade at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In August 1944, near the end of the war, there were officially over 7.6 million foreign laborers in Germany, representing about one-fourth of the total labor force —1.9 million POWs and 5.7 million civilian workers, half of whom (2.7 million) were Soviet citizens, Ostarbeiter - "Eastern workers" in the official Nazi discourse. Of this number, according to Alexander Dallin,

Ukrainians constituted around three-quarters -2.2 million.1 The Ukrainian

Ostarbeiter, like other eastern Slavs, found themselves on the next to lowest rank of the National-Socialist racial hierarchy, only higher than Jews, Gypsies and asocials, and they were treated worse than Western European POWs.

The deportations for the forced labor in Germany became one of the most important episodes of the German occupation of Ukraine. The sheer scale and brutality of the deportation, together with the rough treatment of the forced laborers in "Greater Germany," epitomized Nazi rule in the popular perception.

1 I excluded from this number 78,000 residents of the Baltic states, who were not categorized as the Ostarbeiter. Ulrich Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers: Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany under the Third Reich (Cambridge, 1997), p. 1; Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia (1941-1945): A Study of Occupation Policies (Boulder, Co., 1981), p. 452 (table).

1 Dubbed Werbung ('recruitment') in the official discourse, it was one of the most important reasons for the growth of hostility towards the new rulers. The

Germans' "recruitment" efforts graphically and continuously underlined the brutality of the Nazi occupation regime and the degraded status of Untermenschen

(sub-humans), a racial category assigned to the "Eastern nations" in the "new

Europe."

In this thesis I will examine the Werbung campaign in Ukraine from the last months of 1941, when it began, to the very end of the Nazi occupation in

1943-44. Initially, it was characterized by a certain degree of voluntarity. The flow of volunteers decreased once information about the conditions of the lives of

Ostarbeiter leaked to Ukraine. In late March 1942 the Nazis embarked on a program of coercive recruitment to meet the ever-increasing quotas.

The forced recruitment lasted to the very end of the German occupation and affected almost everyone - someone from almost every family, was either deported to Germany or lived with the fear of being deported. It came to define people's everyday lives during the occupation. The Werbung became the only measure of the German authorities that brought about mass evasion and resistance for a protracted period of time, fostering the feeling of collective solidarity. Thus the Werbung became the single most important event turning the population against German rule. It became one of the chief factors leading to the growing perception of the Soviet regime by pre-193 9 Soviet Ukrainians as the "lesser evil." In the long run it led to popular identification with the Soviet regime and

2 acceptance of its narrative of the war. It facilitated the overshadowing of earlier

Soviet brutalities in collective memory.

Chapter I approaches the Werbung as a process. It examines the bureaucratic mechanism of the recruitment of forced labor, its planning and execution on the local level as well as various regulations, ranging from registration and restriction of movement, which were supposed to limit the evasion of the labor duty and shipment of workers to Germany, to the all-out age- based draft in 1943. The western part of the Soviet Union was the last territory seized by the Third Reich and therefore staffed by the 'worst of the worst' of the

German bureaucracy. Despite being riddled with corruption, inefficiency, incompetence, institutional in-fighting, lack of knowledge of the Ukrainian or

Russian languages, and a shortage of personnel, the German bureaucratic machinery proved its efficiency in those matters that it perceived as central to the

Nazis' ideological tenets (the Holocaust) or the conduct of the war. The latter was the case with the Werbung after the appointment of Sauckel in March 1942.

Chapter II explores the Werbung more as a part of the history of mentality.

It analyzes the German propaganda campaign to entice volunteers or, in the latter period, to dissuade the evasion, as well as the Ukrainians' responses to the recruitment. At first, German propagandists achieved a certain success, but very soon their efforts were ridiculed. Rumors true and false became a main source of information, which originated from Ostarbeiter letters or stories recounted by sick returnees and were often exacerbated by the growing distrust of and antagonism towards the Nazi rulers. A wide variety of reasons motivated the behavior of the

3 initial volunteeries and the even larger number of those who complied with the recruitment. On an individual level voluntarity and compulsion often coexisted in the decision-making process. As information about the treatment of the

Ostarbeiter was becoming more available, the population began to contemplate the Werbung with horror.

Chapter III examines the brutalization of the Werbung and the practices of popular evasion. Despite Nazi brutality, or one might say because of it, the

Werbung provoked a wide spectrum of evasion, ranging from run-of-the-mill hiding, avoidance of public meetings and places, mass escape, forgery of documents, bribery, etc., to more desperate acts of self-mutilation and self- infection. Flight to forests to join partisans was frequent as well, but it was largely limited to the wooded northern part of Ukraine, where Soviet and Ukrainian nationalist guerrillas operated from the last months of 1942.

Both the conduct of the Werbung and popular responses to it coexisted synchronously. The application of new forms of coercion and violence led to new forms of evasion, which in turn redefined the use of violence, usually radicalizing it. This led to more overt or desperate acts of evasion, if it was not broken by the sheer application of force. The Werbung became the only measure of the occupation authorities that resulted in large-scale resistance and involved a sense of collective solidarity. Thus, it became a key factor in defining the popular perception of the Soviet-German war.

The thesis will deal with the territory of Soviet Ukraine under the German civilian {Reichskommissariat Ukraine) and military administrations. It does not

4 include Galicia, which, as a former Austrian territory, became a separate district in Frank's General-Government and was supposed to become the territory of the

Reich. The Nazi regime carried out a much more moderate policy towards the

Galician Ukrainians than towards Ukrainians further east, preferring them to

Poles. No other fact better illustrates the difference in the treatment of the

Galician Ukrainians versus other Ukrainians than this one: while in the

Reichskommissariat Ukrainians were being prevented from attending anything higher than four-year primary schools, in Galicia they were offered scholarships to study in German universities. And more relevant to our study, the term

"Ostarbeiter" did not apply to Galician workers in Germany, who were treated much better than other Ukrainians. The Ukrainian Central Committee and other

Ukrainian organizations legally operated to raise funds, take care and provide support for Galician workers and their families at home.2 No such organization was allowed for other Ukrainians. Also, the Werbung in Galicia was relatively more benign. Forced recruitment began only in spring 1943, and the number of volunteers amounted to around 50 percent.

It is important to familiarize the reader with the administrative division of

Nazi-ruled Ukraine, which is mentioned throughout the thesis.

2 See A. Lysenko, "Blagotvoritel'noe dvizhenie na territorii Zapadnoi Ukrainy v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voiny," in Bernd Bonwetsch and S. Posokhov (eds.), Epokha. Kul 'tury. Liudi (istoriia povsednevnosti i kul 'turnaia istoriia Germanii i Sovetskogo Soiuza. 1920- 1950-e gody) [Materialy mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii (Khar'kov, sentiabr'2003] (Kharkiv, 2004), pp. 179-81. Tetiana Lapan, Verbuvannia i deportatsiia naselennia Ukrainy do Nimechchyny ta umovy ioho pratsi ipobutu u nevoli (1939-1945) [dissertation] (Lviv, 2005).

5 Reichskommissariat Ukraine consisted of five (or six) Generalbezirk (general districts) headed by Generalkommissar, which were an approximate equivalent of

Gau in Nazi Germany. They were subdivided into Gebietskommissariat (district commissariat) headed by Gebietskommissar, which usually included several pre­ war Soviet raions (districts). The major cities had Stadtskommissariat along with the Ukrainian city government. Administration in areas under military control

(Kharkiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv oblasts (regions), and the Donbas) was organized through Kommandatura.

The Ukrainian administration was only allowed on the lowest level. It consisted of a government (uprava) in the city and raion uprava in the countryside, which matched Soviet raions. Village authorities consisted of a rural uprava and its chief, the elder.

***

There is no comprehensive monograph on the Nazi "recruitment" program of the Ukrainian Ostarbeiter, which is surprising considering the importance of this issue in the occupation policy of Nazi Germany and in the Ukrainian wartime experience. The work that comes closest to this definition is The Victims of Two

Dictatorships by the Russian researcher Pavel Polian.4 His book, however, concentrates on the conditions of the Soviet Ostarbeiter in Germany and their repatriation after the war. Karel Berkhoff s chapter "Deportations and Forced

Pavel Polian, Zhertvy dvukh diktatur: zhizn', trud, unizhenie i smert' sovetskikh voennoplennykh i ostarbaiterov na chuzhbine i na rodine (Moscow, 2002).

6 Migrations" in his Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi

Rule is perhaps the best study on the Werbung that has been attempted to date.

Berkhoff uses a large variety of sources from Kyiv-based archives and previously published works.5 However, it deals only with areas under civil German administration and, as a chapter, only has a limited scope.

Three classic monographs, Edward Homze's Foreign Labor in Nazi

Germany, Hans Pfahlmann's Foreign Workers and POWs in the German War

Economy and Ulrich Herbert's Hitler's Foreign Workers, cover the overall process of foreign labor deployment in the Third Reich and provide a valuable overview of the recruitment of Ukrainian "Eastern workers."6 They describe the high-level planning and execution of the campaign, concentrating on Sauckel's efforts to bring millions of foreign workers to Germany. The Werbung forms only the backdrop of their narratives of foreign employment in the Reich.

Until recently, the historiography of the German occupation of the Soviet

Union was predominantly concerned with the occupation policy in the upper echelons of power. The seminal work of Alexander Dallin, German Rule in

Russia, analyzes the Werbung by and large from the point of view of the quarrels among the various Nazi institutions that were involved in the process, especially

Karel C. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 253-75. See my review of his book in Canadian Slavonic Papers Vol. XLIX, nos. 1-2 (March-June 2007), pp. 124-26. Edward Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany (Princeton, N.J., 1967); Ulrich Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers; Hans Pfahlmann, Fremdarbeiter und Kriegsgefangene in der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1939-1945 (Darmstadt, 1968).

7 the power struggle between.the head of the Ostministerium Alfred Rosenberg and the Reichskommissar of Ukraine Erich Koch. Gerald Reitlinger's The House

Built on Sand basically follows the same paradigm.8

The Ostarbeiter question received considerable attention from German historians in the 1990s and 2000s. This was prompted by the question of reparations by the German government to former "Eastern workers," which emerged in 1994. A large number of works by German researchers focused on the deployment of foreign labor in various German regions.9 Some publications

7 Dallin, German Rule in Russia (1941-1945). Gerald Reitlinger, The House Built on Sand: Conflicts of German Policy in Russia, 1939-1945 (London, 1960). Bernhild Vogel, "Wir waren fast noch Kinder": Die Ostarbeiter vom Rammelsberg (Goslar, 2003); Marcus Meyer, "... uns 100 Zivilauslander umgehend zu beschaffen. " Zwangsarbeit bei dem Bremer Stadtwerken, 1939-1945 (Bremen, 2002); Robert Bohn (et al., eds.), Der "Auslandereinsatz " in Flensburg, 1939-1945 (Bielefeld, 2002); Bernhard Gelderblom, "Am schlimmsten waren das Heimweh und der Hunger": Briefe nach sechzig Jahren Zwangsarbeit in und um Hameln, 1939-1945 (Holzminden, 2004); Roland Schlenker, "Ihre Arbeitskraft ist auf das scharfste anzuspannen": Zwangsarbeiter und Zwangsarbeiterlager in Gelsenkirchen, 1940-1945 (Essen, 2003); Clemens von Looz-Corswarem (ed.), Zwangsarbeit in Dusseldorf: "Auslandereinsatz" wdhrend des Zweiten Weltkrieges in einer rheinischen Grofistadt (Essen, 2002); Janet Anschutz and Irmtraud Heike, Feinde im eigenen Land: Zwangsarbeit in Hannover im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Bielefeld, 2000); Siegfried Schonborn, Kriegsgefangene und Fremdarbeiter in unserer Heimat, 1939-1945 (Freigericht, 1990); Hans-Jiirgen Kahle, "Verschleppt nach Cuxhaven": Zwangsarbeiter und Kriegsgefangene in Cuxhaven, Land Hadeln, und dem Kreis Wesermiinde in der NS-Zeit (Cuxhaven, 1995); Anja Kuhn and Thomas WeiB, Zwangsarbeit in Hattingen (Essen, 2003).

8 include recollections of "Eastern workers." Two studies on female Ostarbeiter, one by Gisela Schwarze and the other by Tamara Frankenberger, are noteworthy.'' Markus Eikel is one of a handful of scholars who have focused on the recruitment, introducing new archival sources to the field. German scholars have also studied the Werbung in Belarus, providing a comparative framework with the situation in Ukraine.

Zwangsarbeit in Berlin, 1940-1945: Erinnerungsberichte aus Polen, der Ukraine und Weifirufiland (Erfurt, 2000); Gisela Schwarze, Die Sprache der Opfer: Briefzeugnisse aus Rufiland und der Ukraine zur Zwangsarbeit als Quelle der Geschichtsschreibung (Essen, 2005); Constanze Werner (ed.), Kiew- Munchen-Kiew: Schicksale ukrainische Zwangsarbeiter (Munich, 2000). Tamara Frankenberger, Wir waren wie Vieh: Lebensgeschichtliche Erinnerungen ehemaliger sowjetischer Zwangsarbeiterinnen (Minister, 1997); Gisela Schwarze, Kinder die nicht zahlten: Ostarbeiterinnen und ihre Kinder im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Essen, 1997). 12 This article appeared in German: Markus Eikel, '"Weil die Menschen fehlen': Die deutschen Zwangarbeitsrekrutierungen und -deportationen in den besetzten Gebieten der Ukraine 1941-1944," in Zeitschrift fur Geschichtwissenschqft no. 5 (2005), pp. 405-34, and in Ukrainian: Markus Eikel, "Cherez brak liudei...": nimets'ka polityka naboru robochoi syly ta prymusovi deportatsii robitnykiv iz okupovanykh oblastei Ukrainy 1941-1944," in Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal no. 6 (November- December 2005), pp. 139-60. 13 Babette Quinkert, "Terror und Propaganda. Die 'Ostarbeiteranwerbung' im Generalkommissariat Weiflruthenien," in Zeitschrift fur Geschichtwissenschaft no. 47 (1999), pp. 700-21; Christian Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde: die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in Weifirussland 1941 bis 1944 (Hamburg, 1999).

9 Ukrainian diaspora scholars have generally overlooked the Werbung,

despite the fact that many thousands of "Eastern workers" remained in the West

and many of them immigrated to North America. Their interest in World War II

was focused on questions pertaining to national consciousness and the struggle for

Ukrainian independence. Episodic information on our topic can be found in some

of these publications.14 Wolodymyr Kosyk's highly partisan The Third Reich and

Ukraine is one such work. It introduced some new German documents to the

field. Another noteworthy work of this kind is Struggle for an Independent

Ukraine edited by Mykhailo Marunchak.16

In the Soviet Union, hundreds of studies were dedicated each year to the

Soviet-German war, called the "Great Patriotic War" in the official discourse.

They glorified the common struggle and sacrifice of the Soviet people against the

German invaders. The recruitment of Ostarbeiter played a marginal role in this

discourse. It was associated not so much with resistance as with complicity of people, who were "driven to Germany like cattle." Suspicion of Ostarbeiter, paramount during Stalin's rule, never completely disappeared in later Soviet

times.

Noteworthy is a voluminous collection of records of and on UPA - Litopys Ukrains 'koi Povstans 'koi'Armii edited by Peter Potichnyj and Yevhen Shtendera - vol. 1 (Toronto, 1978), vol. 5 (Toronto, 1984), Vol. 11 (Kyiv and Toronto, 2007). 15 Wolodymyr Kosyk, The Third Reich and Ukraine (New York, 1993). 16 Mykhailo Marunchak (ed.), V borot'bi za ukrains'ku derzhavu: esse'i, svidchennia, litopysannia, dokumenty Druho'i svitovoi viiny [English title - Struggle for an Independent Ukraine] (Winnipeg, 1992).

10 The official narrative, however, did not try to censure information about the forced deportation of Soviet citizens to Germany. Several studies appeared on this issue, most of them immediately after the war and during Khrushchev's

Thaw, the most significant of which was a short article by I. Slyn'ko.17

Soviet works strongly emphasize the brutalities of the German occupation administration and the resistance of the Soviet underground and partisans, with little consideration of other aspects. They ignore the existence of volunteers for the work in Germany in the first months of the Werbung. They also ignore differences in the attitudes of various German institutions and officials to the recruitment. The collective suffering of all the Soviet nations was emphasized.

The Nazis' treatment of the Ukrainians and other "Soviet nations" was implicitly equated with that of the Jews, even though the most radical Ukrainophobes, like

Reichskommissar Erich Koch, clearly saw the difference in the Nazi hierarchy between the two ethnic groups. It is difficult to imagine that Nazi dignitaries would discuss at length the need for humane treatment of Jewish workers and measures to improve their conditions in order to enlist them as Germany's allies, as they did with regard to the "Eastern workers." Soviet studies tend to inflate numbers, thus exaggerating the resistance of the population. This tendency was the outcome of three factors: the efforts of individuals who were "compromised" by remaining under German occupation to provide a "heroic alibi"; attempts of the local authorities to present their region in the most positive light; and a

17 I. Slyn'ko, "Ugon naseleniia Ukrainy v fashistskoe rabstvo," in S. Bubenshchikov (ed.), Nemetsko-fashistskii okkupatsionnyi rezhim (1941-1944 gg.) (Moscow, 1965), pp. 219-30.

11 centralized campaign from above to produce a uniform narrative of heroism and

suffering.

Even though post-Soviet Ukraine freed itself from the constraints of

Soviet dogma, in the early 1990s the Ostarbeiter question was still largely ignored by the scholarly community. Most western Ukrainian and Kyivan historians have readily adopted the diaspora's approach to World War II, while

eastern Ukrainians remained in thrall, to a greater or lesser degree, to the old

Soviet narrative of the "Great Patriotic War."

Similarly to Germany, interest in Ostarbeiter in Ukraine was prompted to

a large degree by the compensation paid by the German government to the former

forced laborers. To receive the payment former "Eastern workers" had to produce

evidence of their involuntary employment in the Third Reich. Many of them

contacted the mass media, especially if relevant evidence was missing, providing them with their stories. Once the Ostarbeiter question came under the spotlight, it raised public awareness and sparked scholarly interest. This coincided with the

growing interest of young Ukrainian scholars in social and oral history.

Consequently, many articles, document collections and memoirs were published along with a few monographs and dissertations. Most of these works

analyze available archival sources or oral testimonies, discuss methodological questions of source study, and examine Ostarbeiter letters. Tetiana Pastushenko

1 R studied Ostarbeiter letters to reconstruct the writers' mentality. Her case study

Tetiana Pastushenko, "Lysty iak dzherelo vyvchennia problemy ukrai'ns'kykh 'ostarbaiteriv' periodu Druhoi' svitovoi* viiny," in Storinky voiennoi istorii Ukra'iny

12 of the correspondence between a forced labourer from Poltava oblast with her co- villagers indicates the dominance of the pre-Soviet patriarchal system of beliefs in the mindset of rural "Eastern workers" and the negligible impact of Soviet rule and Soviet values.19 In another article she analyzes how the differences in the treatment of Galician Ukrainian labourers and Ostarbeiter affected their perception of each other.20 Similarly, Helinada Hrinchenko studied Ostarbeiter representation of the past on the basis of oral testimonies from Kharkiv oblast.21

no. 6 (2002), pp. 70- 77; Tetiana Pastushenko, "Budni ukrains'kykh ostarbaiteriv: borot'ba za vyzhyvannia (za materialamy spohadiv kolyshnikh prymusovykh robitnykiv)," in Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal no. 6 (2005), pp. 160-76. Tetiana Pastushenko, "Pro shcho lystuvalysia mizh soboiu ukrai'ns'ki prymusovi robitnyky v Nimechchyni v roky Druhoi' svitovoi' viiny," in Storinky voienno'i istorii Ukrainy no. 7: part I (2003), pp. 227-33. 90 Tetiana Pastushenko, "Do pytannia pro vzaiemovidnosyny u seredovyshchi ukrains'kykh prymusovykh robitnykiv natsysts'ko'i Nimechchyny," in V. Voronin et al. (eds.), Druha svitova viina i dolia narodiv Ukrainy. Materialy Vseukrains 'koi naukovoi konferentsii. Ky'iv, 23-24 nepenn 2005 p. (Kyiv, 2005), pp. 84-91. 91 Introduction in Helinada Hrinchenko (ed.), Nevyhadane: usni istorii ostarbaiteriv (Kharkiv, 2004); Helinada Hrinchenko [Gelinada Grinchenko], "Osobennosti rekonstruktsii proshlogo v ustnykh svideteFstvakh byvshikh ostarbaiterov," in Storinky voienno'i istorii Ukrainy, no. 8: part 1 (2004), pp. 52- 58; Helinada Hrinchenko [Gelinada Grinchenko], "'Ostarbaitery' Tret'ego Reikha - strategii vyzhivaniia," in Storinky voienno'i istorii Ukrainy, no. 7: part I (2003), pp. 219-26; Helinada Hrinchenko, "Tekstual'nyi analiz usno-istorychnoho svidchennia (na prykladi usnykh interv'iu z kolyshnimy 'ostarbaiteramy' Kharkivs'koi oblasti)," in Skhid-Zakhid, no. 6 (2004), pp. 151-70.

13 Increased interest in the Ostarbeiter topic led to the appearance of a few short generalizing works. Most notable among them is Oleksandr Potyl'chak's study of the deployment of Ukrainian Ostarbeiter and POWs in the economy of

99 the Third Reich. It introduced to the field new archival sources, which have subsequently been utilized by many other scholars.

Some regional studies have also appeared. In her dissertation Tetiana

Lapan researched the recruitment of Ukrainians and the conditions of their stay in 9^

Germany with a focus on Galicia. Serhii Hal'chak defended his dissertation and published a book on Ostarbeiter from Vinnytsia and KhmePnyts'kyi

(Kamianets'-Podil's'kyi) oblasts.24 His study relies heavily on a large variety of archival sources, but it also uncritically approaches Soviet sources and exploits some theses of the old Soviet paradigm. A. Meliakov studied the bureaucratic 9S mechanism of the Werbung in Kharkiv.

The recruitment of the "Eastern workers" and their deployment in

Germany is a topic of history textbooks and history publications aimed at a broad Oleksander Potyl'chak, Trudovi resursy radians 'kykh viis'kovopolonenykh ta "ostarbaiteriv" z Ukrainy u natsysts'kii viis'kovii ekonomitsi v roky Druhoi svitovoi viyny (Kyiv, 1998). Lapan, Verbuvannia i deportatsiia naselennia Ukrainy do Nimechchyny. Serhii Hal'chak, "Skhidni robitnyky" z Podillia u Tret'omu Reikhu: deportatsiia, natsysts'ka katorha, opirponevoliuvacham (Vinnytsia, 2004); Serhii Hal'chak, "Ostarbaitery" z Podillia (1942-1947) [dissertation] (Kharkiv, 2003). Podillia, a historical region, traditionally includes Vinnytsia and Khmel'nyts'kyi (Kamianets'-Podil's'kyi) oblasts. 9S A. Meliakov, "Mobilizatsionnye aktsii v okkupirovannom Khar'kove: vzgliad potentsial'nykh 'ostarbaiterov,'" in Epokha. Kul'tury. Liudi, pp. 182-91. 14 audience. They describe in great detail the sufferings of the "Eastern workers" and the brutality of the occupation regime. However, they tend to overlook examples of volunteer recruitment and the existence of pro-German sentiments among many Ukrainians, especially during the early stages of the occupation.

These works also mistakenly assign "Ostarbeiter" status to Ukrainian Galician labourers. Two contradictory factors come into play to propagate this paradigm: the old Soviet tradition to disregard the Nazi hierarchy of ethnic/sub-ethnic groups with emphasis on the equal suffering of all Soviet nations, and a new trend to promote a uniform national narrative.

A very important contribution to the study of the Werbung in Ukraine in the last fifteen years was the publication of numerous oral testimonies or written recollections of Ostarbeiter. One that deserves special attention is the voluminous

"... It Was Captivity" which includes letters, and oral testimonies as well as

Oft academic articles. Other publications include testimonies of Ostarbeiter from

Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava and Rivne oblasts. A few Ostarbeiter, most of whom ended up in West after the war, shared their experiences during the Soviet

Tetiana Pastushenko et al. (eds.), "...To bula nevolia": spohady ta lysty ostarbaiteriv (Kyiv, 2006). 97 For Kharkiv, - Helinada Hrinchenko (ed.), Nevyhadane: usni istorii ostarbaiteriv (Kharkiv, 2004); for Poltava, - Oleksandr Sydorenko and Vasyl' Kotliar (eds.), Svitanky v pit'mi: knyha zhyttia ukra'ins'kykh "ostarbaiteriv" (Poltava, 2007); for Kirovohrad, - Vasyl' Bodnar (ed.), OST - tavro nevoli (Kirovohrad, 2000); for Rivne, - Volodymyr Iashchuk (ed.), Ostarbaitery: spohady zhyteliv Rivnenshchyny, vyvezenykh hitlerivtsiamy na katorzhni roboty do Nimechchyny (Rivne, 1996).

15 and Nazi regimes in their own publications, which feature more detailed accounts of their stories. These include Viktoria Babenko's Back to the Enemies, Vira

Smereka's In German Captivity and Antonina Demchyna's From East to West.

Similar Ostarbeiter biographies appeared in the West and Russia - Flight from

Novaa Salow by Julia Alexandrow, Kolkhoz Childhood and German Captivity by

Antonina Khemelendyk-Kokot, and Mikhail Chernenko's Strangers and Ours.

In contrast to the significant volume of Ostarbeiter recollections, very few archival sources have been published. The most important one is a two-volume collection of German records on the Werbung in Belarus, but many of these records are also relevant to Ukraine. Other noteworthy publications of archival sources, which include information about the recruitment, are Kyiv in the Times of the Nazi Onslaught and The Ukrainian Thrust: Dnipro Ukraine, 1941- 1955

Viktoria Babenko-Vudberi, Obratno k vragam (Kyiv, 2003); Vira Smereka, V nimets'kii nevoli: spomyn-shchodennyk (1942-1944), (Uzhhorod, 1998); Antonina Demchyna, Zi Skhodu na Zakhid (Kyiv, 2000). Julia Alexandrow and Tommy French, Flight from Novaa Salow: Autobiography of a Ukrainian Who Escaped Starvation in the 1930s under the Russians and then Suffered Nazi Enslavement (Jefferson, N.C., 1995); Antonina Khelemendyk-Kokot, Kolhospne dytynstvo i nimets'ka nevolia. Spohady (Toronto, 1989); Mikhail Chernenko, Chuzhie i svoi (Moscow, 2001). Galina Knat'ko et al. (eds.), Belorusskie ostarbaitery: ugon naseleniia Belarusi naprinuditel'nye raboty v Germaniiu, 1941-1944: dokumenty i materialy v dvukh knigakh (Minsk, 1998).

16 published in Ukraine, and Fascist Occupation Politics in the Temporarily

•5 1 Occupied Regions of the Soviet Union published in Germany.

***

This study uses a variety of archival sources. The bulk comes from the

Central State Archive of the Highest Organs of Government and Administration of Ukraine, TsDAVOV (Tsentralnyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Vyshchykh Orhaniv

Vlady i Upravlinnia Ukrainy). As one of the central Ukrainian archives, it is the repository of a range of relevant German, Soviet and Ukrainian nationalist documents originating from not only Kyiv but also other Ukrainian regions. It also holds translated copies of many German documents that were brought to

Kyiv from Ukrainian regional archives for use by the Soviet security organs.

German documents consist of weekly and bi-weekly reports on the situation in the occupied territories, which were compiled by various German institutions in their area of jurisdiction and include information on the propagandizing and course of the recruitment. Regular reports on the moods of the population (Stimmungen der Bevolkerung) describe the change in popular attitudes. Reports produced by competing Nazi institutions or certain individuals,

T. Vrons'ka et al. (eds.), Kyiv u dni natsysts'koi navaly: za dokumentamy radians 'kykh spetssluzhb (Kyiv-Lviv, 2003); Volodymyr Serhiichuk (ed.), Ukrains'kyi zdvyh: Naddniprianshchyna. 1941-1955 (Kyiv, 2005); Norbert Miiller et al. (eds.), Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik in den zeitweilig besetzten Gebieten der Sowjetunion (1941-1944) [Europa unterm Hakenkreuz: Die Okkupationspolitik des deutschen Faschismus (1938-1945)] (Berlin, 1991).

17 which include accusations of their rivals' inefficiency, corruption or cruelty during the campaign, are the most interesting and revealing of this type of source.

Another category of sources consists of various regulations pertaining to the

Werbung.

The next group of German documents that this study uses are those collected for criminal proceedings against Nazi dignitaries. The Nuremberg Trial condemned the Nazis' use of forced labor in the conquered territories, and it brought to light records on the recruitment and handling of Ostarbeiter which are readily available to researchers. However useful they are, they bear the mark of hasty translation and thus contain errors and misspellings. They were treated with caution.

Soviet and Ukrainian nationalist (Banderite) documents provide a necessary counterbalance to the German side of the story. Soviet sources comprise information collected by Soviet underground cells about conditions in the occupied territories and extensive reports about the situation in each oblast during the German occupation which were compiled in the first months after the

German retreat. The Banderites established underground cells throughout Ukraine in 1941-1943. They produced regular analytical reports about the situation in their area of responsibility, which included information on the recruitment and popular resistance and avoidance of it. Both Soviet and Ukrainian nationalist sources richly document the practices of popular resistance and the brutality of the Nazi recruitment measures.

18 This study uses various Ukrainian newspapers published during the

German occupation, which are stored in the V. Vernads'kyi National Library of

Ukraine in Kyiv. Local newspapers were strictly censored from the beginning of

1942, and thus functioned only as a part of the German bureaucratic machinery.

They provide another opportunity to examine German propaganda. They also published official announcements and regulations pertaining to the Werbung. The most important of these newspapers was Kyiv's New Ukrainian Word (Nove ukrains 'ke slovo), which was often cited by regional newspapers.

Microfilm copies of many relevant records from TsDAVOV and some other Ukrainian archives - most notably the State Archive of Kharkiv oblast - are also found in the Widener Library at Harvard University. This library holds microfilm copies of some wartime occupation newspapers and a complete collection from the Russian "Special Archive" (Osobyi Arkhiv) of "Reports from the Occupied Eastern Territories" {Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten) compiled by the Nazi Security Police.

Widener Library also has two huge collections, which, despite initial expectations, proved of little use to this study. The first one includes so-called

"filtration files" of the Ostarbeiter. After the war, returning Ostarbeiter were placed in so-called filtration camps. There, NKVD officers interrogated them about the circumstances under which they were sent to Germany, what they did there, whether they were involved in "anti-Soviet activities" or communicated with "anti-Soviet elements," and so on in order to determine their loyalty to the

Soviet state. Special "filtration files" were created for each former Ostarbeiter.

19 The slightest indication of voluntary departure to Germany paved the road straight to the Gulag. That is why all of the former "Eastern workers" did their best to present facts in such a way as to indicate that they had been driven to Germany against their will and had no chance to escape or evade. Thus, little credibility should be assigned to such sources.

The second huge collection includes postcards sent home by the

Ostarbeiter. They contain some information about Ostarbeiter conditions in

Germany, but for various reasons they very episodically and briefly mention the

Werbung.

***

Reading wartime testimonies, one can notice a discrepancy between how strongly the Werbung, which came to symbolize the brutality of the Nazi occupation, featured in the lives of contemporaries versus how little was written about it afterwards. This study attempts to fill this gap in the historiography of

World War II and twentieth-century Ukraine. It provides a detailed analysis of the bureaucratic component of the recruitment, popular attitudes and motivations as well as resistance, avoidance and accommodation. It demonstrates that the

Werbung became a chief factor that changed the popular perception of the

German occupation.

Some of the above-mentioned studies approached these issues earlier; the goal of this study is to incorporate previous scholarship, recently published

20 sources and archival records to provide a deeper understanding of and reconsider scholarly assumptions about the Werbung.

21 Chapter I: The Werbung Mechanism

In anticipation of victory in their Blitzkrieg on the eve of the Soviet-

German war the Nazi leaders did not plan to use Soviet labor in the Reich. They feared that Soviet workers, brainwashed by the communist system, might influence German workers by spreading communist ideas in Germany. At first,

Hitler explicitly ruled out the possibility of using Soviet workers, but in July 1941 he softened this position somewhat. Consequently, German bureaucrats were ordered to prepare guidelines for the employment of "Russian labor."

Initially, the Labor Ministry proposed to recruit workers only from the territories annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939-1940 (Western Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states), whose populations were known for their hostility to the

Bolshevik regime. Only if the labor force from these territories became exhausted could qualified workers be recruited from the Soviet pre-1939 territories. At that time German bureaucrats did not envision a large-scale mobilization of Soviet workers because of "numerous technical difficulties." They were still thinking

Edward Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany (Princeton, N.J., 1967), p. 73; Hans Pfahlmann, Fremdarbeiter und Kriegsgefangene in der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1939-1945 (Darmstadt, 1968), p. 45. Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, p. 76.

22 in terms of a Blitzkrieg war that would not put a larger strain on the German economy.

In the late fall of 1941 the failure of the Blitzkrieg became apparent. Nazi

Germany now faced the looming prospect of a drawn-out war of attrition on the

Eastern Front. Under these circumstances, the question of alleviating the unexpected labor shortage brought about by the mobilization of men into the armed forces came to the forefront. Unlike the Western allies, Hitler was unwilling to decrease expenditures on social programs, increase prices of basic foodstuffs or employ women, i.e. embark on a policy that could raise public discontent, thereby endangering his popular legitimacy. Instead, Hitler and his entourage chose to bring workers to "Greater Germany" from the newly occupied

"Eastern territories," who were intended to preserve German workers for more prestigious forms of labor, keep women out of the workforce, and fill existing vacancies. As Goring declared, "the German skilled worker belongs in armament production, not shovelling and chipping stones; the Russian is there for that." In

According to Ian Kershaw, "Few, if any, twentieth-century political leaders have enjoyed greater popularity among their own people than Hitler in the decade or so following his assumption of power on 30 January 1933. It has been suggested that at the peak of his popularity nine Germans in ten were 'Hitler supporters, Fiihrer believers.' Ian Kershaw, The "Hitler Myth": Image and Reality in the Third Reich (New York, 1989), introduction. if "Iz zapisi soveshchaniia u reikhsmarshala Geringa, posviashchennogo voprosam ispol'zovaniia rabochei sily iz okkupirovannykh sovetskikh oblastei," in Galina Knat'ko et al. (eds.), Belorusskie ostarbaitery: ugon naseleniia Belarusi naprinuditel'nye raboty v Germaniiu, 1941-1944: dokumenty i materialy v dvukh

23 this context, the stability and well-being of the former was dependent on the brutal exploitation of the latter. As Gabriel Kolko aptly noted, "The Nazi economic antidote for the consequences of their refusal to impose hardships on

Germans comparable to those of 1914-1918 was to escalate the barbarism they inflicted on conquered Europe."

The "Eastern workers" were regarded as a source of cheap labor with little need for subsistence, who could replace Western European workers who were

"eating too much." This view was part and parcel of Nazi theory of racial superiority vis-a-vis the "Eastern space" [Ostraum], which was traditionally shared by large sectors of German society. The Ostraum included above all the

Poles and all eastern Slavs. The treatment assigned to them was very different from the one accorded to the "racially close" and "civilized" Western Europeans.

knigakh (Minsk, 1996), vol. 1, p. 36; Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, p. 77; Ulrich Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers: Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany under the Third Reich (Cambridge, 1997), p. 149. He demonstrates that the Nazis encouraged women to leave the labor market, and even when the German male civilian labor force decreased by nearly 11 million from 1939 through 1944, the number of employed women remained practically constant over the same period of time. Gabriel Kolko, Century of War: Politics, Conflicts, and Society since 1914 (New York, 1994), pp. 186, 193. See also Czeslaw Lulczak, Praca przymusowa Polakow w Trzeciej Rzeszy i na okupowanych przez niq terytoriach innych panstw (1939-1945) (Poznan, 2001), pp. 8-11 and Ulrich Herbert, "Labor as Spoils of Conquest, 1933-1945" in David F. Crew (ed.), Nazism and German Society, 1933-1945 (London and New York, 2001), pp. 231,233.

24 After long hesitation Hitler approved the use of Soviet POWs in the

German economy in his orders of 15 and 31 October 1941. In response, on 7

November Goring issued instructions for the "maximum utilization of Russian manpower," which concerned mostly Soviet POWs, although civilian workers

were also mentioned. Ministerialdirektor of the Reich Labor Ministry Werner

Mansfeld was put in charge of this process in the post of General Plenipotentiary

for the Employment of Labor (Generalbevollmachtigter fur den Arbeitseinsatz, or

GBA).

In early November 1941 Paul Pleiger, the director of the Reich Works for

coal and iron and the Reich commissioner for coal supply, received permission

from Goring to recruit 12,000 Ukrainian miners for the Ruhr basin. On the same

day that Goring issued his instructions Pleiger's representatives flew to Kryvyi-

Rih (an important metallurgical center in southeastern Ukraine, known for its heavy industry) to inspect the local situation. In the aftermath of their inspection

around 5,000 miners were brought to the Ruhr basin in December 1941-January

1942 (the first transport left on 17 December with 760 miners; 440 more were

TO sent later that month). The Kryvyi-Rih experiment drew the attention of the

Gerald Reitlinger, The House Built on Sand: The Conflicts of German Policy in Russia, 1939-1945 (N.Y., 1960), pp. 114, 260; Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, p. 77; Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, pp. 148-50; 1206-PS, Nuremberg Trials. 38 "Reichskommissar fur die Ukraine: Lagebericht [14 January 1942 ]," in Central State Archive of the Higher Agencies of Power and Administration of Ukraine, Kyiv (further TsDAVOV) 3206/2/27, p. 8; Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, pp. 151-53; Rolf-Dieter Miiller, "Die Zwangsrekrutierung von

25 German bureaucracy to a new pool of manpower, even though it failed to recruit

12,000 workers as planned. This was an isolated episode, which involved qualified labor. All expectations to eliminate the labor shortage in the German economy were centered on the vast numbers of Soviet POWs.

While this question was being studied, Soviet POWs were being starved to death en masse. Most of them did not survive the ravages of malnourishment, abuse, and the harsh winter of 1941-42. Out of 3.35 million Soviet POWs taken captive in 1941, more than 1.4 million had died by December 1941 and 2 million by February 1942. At the time when German officials were looking for a

Ostarbeitern 1941-1944," in Wolfgang Michalka (ed.), Der Zweite Weltkrieg: Analysen, Grundzuge, Forschungsbilanz (Munich, 1999), pp. 772-83 (p. 775 cited); Pavel Polian, Zhertvy dvukh diktatur: Zhizn', trud, unizhenie i smert' sovetskikh voennoplennykh i ostarbaiterov na chuzhbine i na rodine (Moscow, 2002), p. 150; Pfahlmann, Fremdarbeiter und Kriegsgefangene, p. 47. 39 "Reichskommissar fur die Ukraine: Lagebericht (14 January 1942 )," in TsDAVOV 3206/2/27, p.8. Christian Streit, Keine Kameraden: Die Werhmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangener, 1941-1945 (Stuttgart, 1978), p. 10; Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, p. 141. According to Mansfeld's report of February 1942 only 1.1 million POWs were left out of 3.9 million taken captive in 1941, of whom only 400,000 were currently employed - "Vortrag von Min. Dir. Dr. Mansfeld, Generalbevollmachtigter fur den Arbeitseinsatz, iiber allgemeine Fragen des Arbeitseinsatzes [den 20.2.42]", in Belorusskie ostarbaitery: ugon naseleniia (vol. 1), p. 74; "Aktenvermerk des Wehrwirtschafts- und Rustungsamtes," in Norbert Muller (ed. and intro.), Die Faschistische Okkupationspolitik in den Zeitweilig Besetzten Gebieten der Sowjetunion (1941-1944) [Europa unterm Hakenkreuz:

26 solution to ease the labor shortage, millions of people who could have been

effectively employed in industry had been starved to death. Paradoxical from a pragmatic point of view, this approach was typical of the Nazi mindset, with its preponderance of ideological considerations over purely economic ones.

Now that Soviet POWs had been effectively starved to death in the millions, eliminating them as a labor force, the Nazis turned their attention to the civilian population. In the ensuing discussions of the terms of Soviet labor recruitment and deployment two different approaches were proposed by the pragmatic proponents of winning over the population and by the ideological purists. Rosenberg's Eastern Ministry {Ostministerium), which in theory administered the occupied territories, together with the Foreign Ministry and the

Labor Ministry, made an attempt to secure privileged treatment for Ukrainians compared to the other Soviet workers and the Poles on the basis of their anti-

Soviet attitudes and because such treatment would boost pro-German sentiments among them.

This proposal was blocked by the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA,

Nazi Security Head Office). Reinhard Heydrich's directive of 20 February 1942 defined the Ukrainians as "Russians" and grouped them together with other non-

German Soviet citizens as Ostarbeiter ("Eastern workers").41 This term applied to

Die Okkupationspolitik des deutschen Faschismus (1938-1945)] (Berlin, 1991), p. 249. "Iz obshchikh polozhenii po verbovke i ispol'zovaniiu rabochei sily iz okkupirovannoi territorii SSSR [20 fevralia 1942]," in Belorusskie ostarbaitery: ugon naseleniia Belarusi, vol. 1, pp. 54-55; 3040-PS, Nuremberg Trials; Herbert,

27 the former residents of Soviet Ukraine with the exception of the District Galicia,

Soviet Belarus without Bialystok oblast, and Russia. It included the pre-1939

Soviet Union (so-called "original Soviet-Russian territory") as well as Volhynia

and western Belarus, the territories of interwar Poland. National differentiation

did not make any difference, since "for decades they were placed under Bolshevik

supremacy and were educated in the spirit of hatred towards national-socialist

Germany and European culture."42 Therefore, they had to be treated as a single mass.

The fear of "contamination" from the racially inferior and communist

indoctrinated "Eastern people" made it necessary to make them visible. Like for

the Jews, Heydrich's directive stipulated the introduction of a special insignia for

all Ostarbeiter, the badge "Ost" - a blue rectangle with white letters. Eastern workers were supposed to wear it all times outside of their living quarters.

According to the directive, the "Soviet-Russian workers" were supposed to be officially "recruited" in the recruitment [ Werbung] process by special Labor

Ministry commissions, given a medical check-up, screened by the security police,

and sent by train in enclosed transports to the Reich. Once in Germany, the

Ostarbeiter had to live in guarded barracks enclosed by barbed wire, which they

could leave only for work, and be segregated from the Germans as much as possible. The directive followed Goring's instruction and on a practical level

elaborated the treatment of the Ostarbeiter as equal to that of POWs, a point it

Hitler's Foreign Workers, pp. 164-66; Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia (Boulder, Co., 1981), pp. 442-43. Polian, Zhertvy dvukh diktatur, p. 92.

28 emphasized explicitly. Among other things, sexual intercourse was outlawed for the "Eastern workers." Violators were to be executed or sent to concentration camps depending on whether the "offender" or the opposite side was male or female, and a German or a foreign worker. Fugitives were to undergo "special treatment."

Heydrich's directive set the practical framework for the treatment of

Ostarbeiter in the Reich.43 It showed mostly clearly the preponderance of Nazi racial theory over pragmatic considerations in Germany's policy of foreign labor deployment, even though existing conditions favored an approach based on economic incentives for Ukrainians, who at the time were on the whole positively disposed towards German rule.

***

The actual campaign commenced in late December 1941-early January

1942. Initially, many Ukrainians volunteered for work in the Reich. In Kharkiv alone, where, according to a German source, there was a "noticeable influx of volunteers to work in Germany due to the catastrophic situation in the city," 2,000 workers signed up in the first five days of the campaign, while in Kyiv around

Many of its stipulations were somewhat mitigated in a long series of decrees in 1942-43. Fugitives, for example, were usually placed in concentration camps rather than executed. Sexual intercourse was discouraged but not punished unless a German woman was involved.

29 1,500 young volunteers showed up. Special emphasis in both cities was placed on the recruitment of metal workers. 5 According to a local newspaper, as of 18

January the number of volunteers in Kyiv was high enough for three transports instead of the expected one.46 Reportedly, some people even walked more than

110 km to be registered for work in Germany. A newspaper wrote, "Only those who will be diligently working on rebuilding of the [ruined] cities receive the right to work in Germany."47 The first train to Germany left Kyiv on 28 January to the sound of a brass band. A newspaper published an enthusiastic report of the departure with a picture of smiling people standing in front of a train. Three more trains departed Kyiv on 18 and 25 February, and on 11 March, respectively. The cars in these trains were filled with straw and had no sanitary provision, but the food supply was adequate.

44 Anatolii Skorobohatov, Kharkiv v chasy nimets'koi okupatsii (1941-1943) (Kharkiv, 2004), p. 113; Rolf-Dieter Muller, "Die Rekrutierung sowjetischer Zwangsarbeiter fur die deutsche Kriegswirtschaft," in Ulrich Herbert (ed.), Europa und der "Reichseinsatz": Ausldndische Zivilarbeiter, Kriegsgefangene und KZ-Hdftlinge in Deutschland 1938-1945 (Essen, 1991), pp. 234-50 (p. 237 cited); Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, p. 85; Pfahlmann, Fremdarbeiter und Kriegsgefangene, p. 47. 45 Nove ukrains 'he slovo, 11 January 1942. 46 Nove ukrains 'ke slovo, 18 January 1942. 47 Ibid. Nove ukrains'ke slovo, 17 February 1942; Nove ukrains'ke slovo, 11 March 1942; Karel C. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule (Cambridge, 2004), p. 255; Oleksandr Potyl'chak, Trudovi resursy

30 The first train from Kharkiv left for Germany on 18 January 1942 with

1117 workers and the second one on 23 January with 1114 people, 1078 of whom were metal workers. The third transport left the city a week later with 1167 people, 1124 of whom were also metal workers, who were predominant among the people in the fourth transport in mid-February as well (1105 out of 1158). By the end of February six transports had left the city.4

In the heavily industrialized Stalino (now Donets'k) region the registration began on 27 January. German officials announced through the local press that volunteers between the ages of 15 and 45 would be employed in mining and agriculture (men) and in housework and agriculture (women). Preference was given to unmarried and childless individuals.50 A local newspaper counted 6000 volunteers and warned that the registration would end soon.51 The first train departed Stalino on 15 February, followed by the second one on 18-19 February and the third on 22-23 February. Most of the people in the transports were radians'kykh viis'kovopolonenykh ta "ostarbaiteriv" z Ukrainy u natsysts'kii viis 'kovii ekonomitsi v roky Druho'i svitovo'i viiny (Kyiv, 1998), p. 20. Pfahlmann, Fremdarbeiter und Kriegsgefangene, pp. 47-48; Polian, Zhertvy dvukh diktatur, pp. 157, 172. Polian provides slightly different figures for the second transport: 1147 people and 21 January as the departure date. 50 "Der Aufbau in der Ukraine schreitet fort," UdSSR #104 (25 February 1942), in TsDAVOV 3676/4/105, p. 12. 5 Denis Bukalov, "Ostarbaitery Donbassa," in L. Eremina and E. Zhemkova (eds.), Komi travy: Sbornik statei molodykh istorikov, (Moscow, 1996), pp. 155- 59 (p. 158 cited). Ihor Tarnavs'kyi, Nimets 'ko-fashysts 'kyi okupatsiinyi rezhym v Donbasi (1941- 1943 rr.) [dissertation] (Donets'k, 1999), p. 67.

31 miners and construction workers. The second transport included 650 construction workers out of the total of 898 people. At least four more trains left the city in

March with a total of 6550 people. One of these transports allegedly came under attack from Soviet partisans, as a result of which one worker was killed and two were severely wounded.

Qualified male workers dominated the first transports in the industrial centres of eastern and southern Ukraine. The retreating Red Army blew up or damaged practically all large factories and mines, which deprived a significant proportion of the local population of jobs. A total of 6400 unemployed metal workers were reported in Zaporizhzhia. The total number of jobless in Kharkiv hovered between 100,000 and 140,000, and reached almost 80,000 in Stalino. In the Donbas basin alone, 30 percent of the approximately 144,000 coal miners were evacuated by the Soviet authorities.55

Many of them considered employment in German industry as a way to escape joblessness and starvation. German industry was also interested in these workers, so in the first weeks of the Werbung a disproportionately high number of the transports originated from Kharkiv and the Stalino-Kryvyi Rih industrial regions. The industrial areas of Ukraine supplied a disproportionately high number of Ostarbeiter throughout the Werbung.

The Nazis regarded the urban population as "excessive eaters," while the peasants were required for maintaining the food supply flow to the Reich and the

Polian, Zhertvy dvukh diktatur, p. 157. Polian, Zhertvy dvukh diktatur, pp. 171-72. Pfahlmann, Fremdarbeiter und Kriegsgefangene, p. 47.

32 front. The recruitment of peasants was largely halted during harvest time and spring fieldwork.56 In contrast, the transports from industrial centers operated uninterruptedly. By mid-July 100 transports had left Stalino oblast alone for

Germany with approximately 1000 people in each.57 As early as late summer

1942 the Werbung in the industrial city of Horlivka was halted because the

"reservoir of free labor is exhausted." In total, 252,200 Ostarbeiter came from this oblast, the highest number in Ukraine.59

Transports from predominantly agricultural regions of Right-Bank and the northern part of Left-Bank Ukraine included workers from more diverse fields; even here, though, industrial labor was preferred. Men dominated the first transports, although to a lesser degree than in those from industrial centers. For example, the Ostarbeiter train that left Rivne on 2 April 1942 contained 446 men and 216 women. Another transport that left the city 17 days later included 189 men and 74 women. Similarly, the 11 April transport from Kherson had 422 men and only 130 women.60

56 For example, Erich Koch temporarily halted the recruitment in the rural areas of southern Ukraine in his decree of 15 April 1942. It again came to a stop in late July - early September 1942. en Tarnavs'kyi, Nimets 'ko-fashys 'kyi okupatsiinyi rezhym v Donbasi, p. 69. 58 "Fragen des Arbeitseinsatzes von Ukrainern im Reichsgebiet," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 21 [18 September 1942]. Hiroaki Kuromiya, Freedom and Terror in the Donbas: A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, 1870-1990s (Cambridge, 1998), p. 273; Bukalov, "Ostarbaitery Donbassa,"p. 158. Potyl'chak, Trudovi resursy, p. 23.

33 However, in the occupied territories the women visibly outnumbered men, many of whom had been conscripted into the Red Army or evacuated as skilled labor. In Kyiv, for example, there were twice as many women as men over the age of 16 (169,939 vs. 84,017), according to the city census of January 1942.61 Soon the supply of skilled male workers became exhausted, and the Nazis increasingly started to recruit women. During the occupation an almost equal number of men and women were drafted for work in Germany.

At first, a significant number of workers from agricultural regions also left for Germany more or less voluntarily. Describing the departure of alleged volunteers to Germany, a local Vinnytsia newspaper wrote on 3 March:

One thousand young men and women came to Vinnytsia railway

station to leave together as a group for Great Germany. Everyone

has a special feeling that reflects energy and responsibility towards

the new world-Europe. Everyone aspires to see the life of Great

Germany.62

With the intensification of the Werbung the first quota was announced: the occupied territories of the Soviet Union were to deliver 380,000 workers for agriculture and 247,000 for industry of the Third Reich, 527,000 of them from

Leontii Forostivs'kyi, Kyiv pid vorozhymy okupatsiiamy (Buenos-Aires, 1952), p. 55. 62 Vinnyts'ki Visti, 5 March 1942.

34 Ukraine (84% of the total number). To ensure a steady flow of volunteers, a monthly allowance was established in the Reichskommissariat for Os tar better family members who were not able to support themselves. This allowance was usually between 130 and 180 karbovantsi, which was deducted from an

Ostarbeiter's salary. It was increased in certain localities in late 1943.64 If more than one family member had been sent to Germany, the amount was the same. A similar policy was introduced in areas under military administration. In Kharkiv,

Ostarbeiter's relatives had to fill out a request form. The city uprava reviewed each case, deciding on necessity and amount of the allowance.65 Starting fall

1942, the recruits received an additional 250 karbovantsi to purchase clothing.66

Dallin, German Rule in Russia, p. 429; Potyl'chak, Trudovi resursy, pp. 18-19. 64 Oleksandr Sydorenko and Vasyl' Kotliar, Svitanky v pit'mi: knyha zhyttia ukrains'kykh "ostarbaiteriv" (Poltava, 2007), p. 31; Ukrains'ki visti [Kirovohrad], 27 May 1942; Potyl'chak, Trudovi resursy, p. 20; Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, p. 257; "Wirtschaftliche Lage im Reichskommissariat Ukraine," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 43 [26 February 1943]; Markus Eikel, '"Cherez brak liudei...': nimets'ka polityka naboru robochoi' syly ta prymusovi deportatsii" robitnykiv iz okupovanykh oblastei Ukrainy 1941- 1944," in Ukrains 'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal no. 6 (November- December) 2005, pp. 139-60 (p. 153 here). 65 A. Meliakov, "Mobilizatsionnye aktsii v okkupirovannom Khar'kove: vzgliad potentsial'nykh 'ostarbaiterov,'" in Epokha. Kul'tury. Liudi, pp. 182-91 (pp. 189- 90 here). 66 "Anwerbung von Ostarbeitern fur das Reich; hier: Bekleidungsbeihilfe," in State Archive of Kharkiv Oblast' (further DAKhO) 3080/2/002, p. 43; Nova Shepetivshchyna [Shepetivka], 10 February 1943.

35 In some localities they received an advance payment of 100 karbovantsi together with their summons.

The allowance was too low to provide adequate support for family members and was usually delayed for a few months.68 In Stalino, for example, the

Labor Exchange began issuing the allowance in July 1942 to families whose members had been sent to Germany in February.69 A similar six-month delay was reported in Kharkiv in mid-1943.

A special department in the local administration was established to provide assistance to the families of the Ostarbeiter. Besides the allowance, family members were supposed to receive employment assistance, privileged access to food rationing, and free health services.71 In Kharkiv this department ran kindergartens for toddlers whose parents worked in the Reich.

Sydorenko and Kotliar, Svitanky vpit'mi, pp. 38-39. 68 In Kyiv in January 1942 a kilogram of butter sold for 381 karbovantsi, a kilogram of beef for 91 and a kilogram of potatoes for 10. The average monthly salary, however, was only 477 karbovantsi. Forostivs'kyi, Kyiv pid vorozhymy okupatsiiamy, p. 48. Tarnavs'kyi, Nimets 'ko-fashys 'kyi okupatsiinyi rezhym v Donbasi, p. 68. 70 A. Meliakov, "Do rozshyrennia dzherel'noi bazy doslidzhen' z istorii deportatsi'i naselennia Ukrainy do Nimechchyny u 1941- 1944 rr.," in Storinky voiennoi istorii Ukrainy no. 8 (part 1), pp. 132- 45 (p. 136 here). 71 One report mentions that families of Ostarbeiter received 4 kg of bread and 12 kg of flour ["krup"] every month in addition to 150 karbovantsi. It is not clear what region it refers to. See "Zvit OUN pro podii ta rozvytok natsional'no vyzvol'nykh zmahan' na skhidnoukrains'kykh zemliakh. 14 lypnia 1942," in

36 By the end of the winter it became apparent that Mansfeld's efforts to bring large numbers of Ostarbetter had ended in failure. There were 53,000 in

Germany in March 1941, almost three months after the beginning of the campaign. Transportation problems stood in the way of bringing more. In cities like Kyiv and Kharkiv there were not enough trains to deliver recruits. Available transports were disbanded to serve the needs of the Wehrmacht. Mansfeld also objected to bringing more Ostarbeiter in unheated trains during the extraordinary brutal winter of 1941-42. "It is absurd to transport these laborers in open or unheated closed freight cars," he explained, "simply to unload dead bodies upon arrival."75 He even questioned the economic effectiveness of bringing Soviet labor to the Reich. The Nazi bigwigs did not consider him "tough enough" for this job. Mansfeld's work was also quietly sabotaged by Nazi gauleiters, who did not want "communist workers" in their fiefdoms, and he did not have enough

Volodymyr Serhiichuk (ed.), Ukrains 'kyi zdvyh: Naddniprianshchyna. 1941-1955 (Kyiv, 2005), pp. 54- 63 (p. 55 here). 72 "[Charkow] Lagebericht Nr. 9 fur die Zeit vom 11.11.1942 bis 25.11.1942," in TsDAVOV, 3676/4/479, p. 21. Dallin, German Rule in Russia, pp. 431, 451 (table). Pfahlmann, Fremdarbeiter und Kriegsgefangene, p. 48. 75 "Vortrag von Min. Dir. Dr. Mansfeld, Generalbevollmachtigter fur den Arbeitseinsatz, iiber allgemeine Fragen des Arbeitseinsatzes [den 20.2.42]," in Belorusskie ostarbaitery: ugon naseleniia (vol. 1), p. 74.

37 influence in the Nazi bureaucratic system or direct access to the Fuhrer to overcome their resistance.

The winter crisis of 1941-42 worsened the labor shortage and bolstered the

Nazis' determination to fix it with "Eastern workers." Hitler stepped in to appoint a "tougher party man." On 21 March 1942 the gauleiter of Thuringia, Fritz

Sauckel, replaced Mansfeld as the General Plenipotentiary for the Employment of

Labor. Having strong work discipline but little imagination, he was labelled by

Gobbels as "one of the dullest of the dull."76 However, as an old Nazi and a gauleiter, Sauckel was able to ensure better cooperation from his Parteigenosse, and he could approach Hitler directly.

Sauckel's attitude towards the recruitment of Ostarbeiter was more in line with the views of the radical Nazis. During the first meeting with his staff he suggested that the "Eastern workers" would have to be handled so roughly by the

German administration in the East that they would come to feel that they would prefer to go to Germany for work.77

When the members of Rosenberg's Ostministerium stressed the need for better care and more attractive incentives to encourage the recruitment of volunteers, Sauckel brushed off their ideas:

What you say might be good and proper, and if the people from the

East want to come voluntarily, then let them. But I have neither the

Dallin, German Rule in Russia, p. 429. Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, pp. 154-55.

38 time nor desire to concern myself with the correct taste of Russian

cooking or the spiritual life of peasants. I have received my

mandate from Adolf Hitler and I will bring millions of eastern

workers into Germany without considering whether they want to or

not.78

Sauckel was following radical Nazi discourse even when he suggested that

the Ostarbeiter should not be treated harshly:

Even a machine can produce something when I provide it with

fuel, lubricant, and care. How many more possibilities should I

rely on in [using] people more primitive than the machine in

composition and race?79

The appointment of Sauckel as the Plenipotentiary for the GBA

significantly changed the foreign labor program in Nazi Germany, turning it into

an organized program that was systematically executed and central to Germany's war effort. The labor draft was supposed to receive priority over everything else.

To centralize the Werbung, the labor office of Rosenberg's ministry was

incorporated in the GBA. It changed its name to the Recruitment Commission of

Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, p. 134; Muller, "Die Rekrutierung sowjetischer Zwangsarbeiter," p. 237. "Programa vystupleniia po radio F. Zaukelia [20 aprelia 1942]," in Belorusskie ostarbaitery: ugon naseleniia (vol. 1), p. 110.

39 the GBA [Anwerbekommissionen des G.B.A.]. In contrast with his broad powers,

Sauckel was given a very limited bureaucratic apparatus. To expedite the campaign, he doubled the number of his agents in the East, calling to the field an additional 200 labor officers,80 who were assigned the military rank of

Sonderfuhrer in order to facilitate their cooperation with the Wehrmacht. They formed Werbekommissionen to supervise the overall recruitment process. Even so, this number was very small for such a huge territory.

Sauckel's small apparatus had to rely on good will and cooperation of various other bureaucratic institutions to ensure the prompt delivery of the

Ostarbeiter. Some of these institutions, in particular the military authorities of the

Army Group Rear Areas (Ruckwartiges Armeegebiet, or Koriick) "Centre" and

"North," viewed the Werbung with little enthusiasm out of the rather pragmatic consideration not to reinforce the partisan movement in the area or antagonize the local population. The Wehrmacht often shipped POWs to Germany in return for preserving local labor for their own needs. In addition, the widespread partisan movement in largely forested and swampy Belarus and northwestern Russia disrupted the recruitment from the second half of 1942 until the very end of the

German occupation. According to a late 1944 Wehrmacht estimate, partisans prevented the German authorities from making use of more than 1.5 million laborers on occupied Soviet territory.

Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, p. 134. 1 Miiller, "Die Rekrutierung sowjetischer Zwangsarbeiter," p. 241.

40 Unlike Belarus or northwestern Russia, the predominantly steppe terrain of Ukraine put constraints on the development of partisan movements and made it easier to recruit the labor. The Soviet and Ukrainian nationalist partisan movements there were largely limited to forested Volhynia and the northern parts of Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts. Also, while Sauckel had trouble gaining cooperation in territories under military administration and in Belarus, he found complete understanding and support from the Reichskommissar for Ukraine,

Erich Koch, who regarded the deployment of Ukrainians for work in Germany as one of his main tasks and fully cooperated with Sauckel. He reportedly told him,

"I am willing to supply labor to you. How I do that is none of your business, and I don't want to be advised about it."82

****

The technology of the Werbung was initially based on earlier German experience with the forced allocation of Polish labor in 1940-41, but later it assumed its own forms in line with the cumulative radicalization of the Nazi regime. Each recruitment drive was initiated by Sauckel, who also set target numbers, which in turn were confirmed by Rosenberg. In Reichskommissariat

Ukraine Erich Koch sanctioned each new wave. The Ostministerium and the

Reichskommissariat coordinated their work with Sauckel's chief representative in the "East," Staatsrat (State Councilor) Peukert.

Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, p. 159.

41 The Reichskommissar and Sauckel's representatives then contacted the

Generalkommissar on the number of required people and the deadline. The target number was then divided among the Stadtskommissariat (in major cities) and the

Gebietskommissariat (in the countryside). The number was often assigned with little or no consideration, or even knowledge, of a local situation. On one occasion a target number was assigned to the Odesa region, until Sauckel found out it could not be met because this area was part of Transnistria, under Romanian administration.83 The number could also drastically differ from one locality to another for no apparent reason. Thus, when 3000 women were recruited from the

Chernihiv region in fall 1942, a little less than 25 percent of all available "able- bodied" women, some settlements received a quota of 60 percent and others only

2 or 3 percent.84

The Gebietskommissariat and the Stadtskommissariat, which formed the lowest rung of the German administration in Reichskommissariat Ukraine, carried out the recruitment on the spot, and police units were placed at their disposal to enforce it. German officials were responsible for meeting the assigned quota in their area of command, and it was left up to them to decide how to do it. As an official in charge of the Werbung in Vasyl'kiv Gebietskommissariat explained, "I

83 Otto Brautigam, Uberblick iiber die besetzten Ostgebiete wdhrend des 2. Weltkrieges (Tubingen, 1954), p. 92. 84 Brusyliv was required to supply 248 female recruits out of 398 available and Kolilianka 54 out of 109, while Terekhovna only 5 out of 461 and Ianivka 20 out of 598. See "Wirtschaftliche Lage in der Ukraine," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 32 [4 December 1942].

42 had the responsibility within the territory of Vasyl'kiv for the conscripting of the local workers for the Reich. The choice of means, which were used to execute my task, was left to me."85

This rule was followed on every level of the administrative pyramid, while

OS

Sauckel's representatives provided "advice and technical expertise."

The Ukrainian administration (city uprava and raion uprava) was on the next rung down. They received a quota from their superiors and were often threatened with severe punishment if it was not met; a few of them were subsequently executed for "sabotaging the Werbung."81 The Labor Exchange was part of the Ukrainian administration, but it was subordinated to the German Labor

Department. The Ukrainian administration had its own Labor Department as well.

To a certain extent, it also controlled the Ukrainian police, who most of the time carried out the dirty job of enforcing the Werbung. The Information Sections of the upravas participated in propaganda campaigns to recruit volunteers for employment in Germany. They oversaw the availability of propaganda material

" 254-PS, Nuremberg Trials. "Testimony of Fritz Sauckel, taken at Nurnberg, Germany, on 5 October 1945, 1030-1200, by Major John J. Monigan, Jr., CAC, OUSCC," 3722-PS, Nuremberg Trials. 87 For example, in Uman' [Cherkasy oblast] a certain Horban' was shot in March or April 1943 for the failure to send 6000 recruits to Germany, - "Informatsiini povidomlennia z terytorii skhidnykh oblastei Ukra'my (kviten' 1943 - lystopad 43): Uman'," in TsDAVOV, 3833/1/113, p. 14.

43 on the streets, delivered lectures at factories, and wrote articles for local newspapers.

Village elders occupied the lowest level of the Werbung machinery. They usually received a quota from raion chiefs, which they had to fill by compiling lists of people for deportation to Germany by a certain date and sending them to the raion Labor Exchange or raion chief.

The Ukrainian administration was an instrumental and indispensable part of the Werbung. As pointed out by M. Karnaukh, a former Ostarbeiter,

For us ordinary mortals, many of our fellow countrymen during the

occupation were worse than the Germans. For a German could not

know everything and everybody; it was our people who

denounced, hunted down, and drove [people] to Germany.

Policemen, elders, and uprava officials distinguished themselves

with their zeal...

In areas under military command, the Wirtschaftsstab Ost (WiStab Ost), subordinated to the High Command of the Wehrmacht, administered the

Werbung. In accordance with the division of Army Groups, it was split into

Maryna Mykhailiuk, "Natsysts'ka propahanda v okupovanomu Kyievi," in Ukrains 'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal no. 1 (2005), pp. 131 - 44 (pp. 133-34 here). 89 Mykhailo Koval', "'Ostarbaitery' Ukrai'ny: raby Hitlera, izhoi* Stalina," in Mykhailo Koval', Ukraina v Druhii svitovii i Velykii Vitchyznianii viinakh (1939- 1945 rr.) (Kyiv, 1999), pp. 170-95 (p. 176 cited).

44 "North," "Center," and "South" branches, the latter dealing with Ukraine. On a parallel level, the Werbung was carried out through the Kommandatura, the

German military administration.

In cooperation with the Reichsbahn, the office of the Reichskommissar and the military authorities also administered the transportation of the Ostarbeiter to the Reich within their areas of command. Transports were supposed to hold at least 1000 recruits each. The Reichsbahn threatened to turn back the "under- occupied" trains at the border of the Reich. It considered such transports unprofitable because of the shortage of railway cars. ° In reality, however, many trains carried fewer than 1000 Ostarbeiter. Smaller transports with a few cars were also attached to other trains. The convoying of the transports was entrusted to the SS, although the Wehrmacht was also used, especially soldiers returning to

Germany.

***

The bureaucratic mechanism of the Werbung in the occupied Soviet territories reflected the knowledge that the German bureaucracy gained from its over-two-year experience of the shipment of Polish labor to the Reich. Poland was another country populated by an "inferior race," so this experience was of more relevance than that in Western Europe. '

"Telegramm. An: Generalkommissar - Abteilung Arbeit. Dnjepropetrowsk," in TsDAVOV 3206/2/6, p. 55. For the recruitment in Poland, see Lulczak, Praca przymusowa Polakow w Trzeciej Rzeszy, pp. 51-72.

45 The bureaucratic mechanism was set in motion with the introduction of the general labor duty (Arbeitspflicht) for the local population between the ages of

18 and 45 in the occupied areas of the USSR by Rosenberg's decree of 5 August

1941. It was confirmed by Erich Koch in December 1941 for Reichskommissariat

Ukraine. The decree was followed by the registration of the population. In Kyiv the registration took place in early October 1941, again in November 1941, and was followed by the general census in January 1942.

The first registration in Kharkiv, which was captured by the Wehrmacht on 24 October, more than a month later than Kyiv, commenced on 6 December

1941.92 All individuals between the ages of 14 (in some localities 15 or 16) and 50 were required to register with the police and the Labor Exchange. When people without registration were caught by police during security check-ups and raids,, they were brought to the Recruitment Office to be sent to Germany.

The Labor Exchange (Arbeitsami) became a key element in the process of selecting Ostarbeiter. Around 500 offices were created on the occupied Soviet territories. They relied heavily on local personnel, while Germans were placed in key positions. This is confirmed by data from areas under military rule, where, as of July 1943, there were 114 Labor Offices staffed by 762 German officials and

3188 local assistants.93

9 "Bekanntmachung der Charkower Stadtverwaltung" [5.12.1941], in DAKhO 2982/4/047, p. 1. 93 Muller, "Die Rekrutierung sowjetischer Zwangsarbeiter," p. 249.

46 The Labor Exchange had two departments of male and female labor, which were further subdivided by occupation.94 In Kyiv it was housed in a three- storey building with 114 staffers, who could process daily between 5000 and 6000 people.95 The Labor Exchange kept a registry of people's employment. Under threat of severe penalty unemployed individuals had to appear at a local office of the Labor Exchange, usually every two weeks for men and once a month for women (in certain cases every day, and they had to bring their own spades or other tools), from where they were sent to their assigned work place, mostly road or bridge construction, building fortifications, or shoveling snow in the winter.

They were employed every day that there was work to be done.

"Able-bodied" individuals were supposed to have either proof of registration from the Labor Exchange or a "work passport" [Arbeitskarte] from the job, which was renewed each week.96 The police regularly checked documents on the street, and those without either of these papers were brought to the Labor

94 "Dokladnaia zapiska o vyiavlennykh voennykh, administrativnykh, karatel'nykh i khoziaistvennykh uchrezhdeniiakh nakhodivshikhsia v gorode Kieve v period okkupatsii" [23 December 1943], in T. Vrons'ka et al. (eds.), Kyiv u dni natsysts 'koi navaly: za dokumentamy radians 'kykh spetssluzhb (Kyiv-Lviv, 2003), p. 437. 95 "Reiestratsiiabezrobitnykh," in TsDAVOV 3206/2/193, p. 53. 96 In Kyiv, the "work passports" were introduced in March 1942 and 60,000 of them were issued the following month. See Eikel, "Cherez brak liudei," p. 141.

47 Exchange. It was also the responsibility of house custodians in the city to insure

there were no unregistered unemployed people living in the buildings.

In Kyiv as of December 1941, shirkers were to pay a fine of 300 karbovantsi. A repeated "offence" could lead to eviction from the city. House

custodians who failed to report unregistered unemployed individuals faced a 500- karbovantsi fine. Repeat offenders could be tried for sabotage.98 In other places labor-dodgers were usually threatened with a 1000 karbovantsi fine and the most recalcitrant risked being sent to a labor camp. Special camps were introduced

for "inveterate work-shy elements," which could be placed there for up to six months. To further discourage the failure to register at the Labor Exchange, some

"Postanova N239 holovy mista Kyieva vid 9-ho hrudnia 1941 roku - "Pro zakhody shchodo reiestratsii' na birzhi pratsi vsikh bezrobitnyk cholovikiv," in TsDAVOV 3206/2/193, pp. 36-37; "Nakaz No. 261 po kharkivs'kii mis'kii upravi," in DAKhO 2982/4/011, p. 76 (page number not very legible); "Bekanntmachtung der Charkower Stadtverwaltung," in DAKhO 2982/4/047. 98 "Postanova N239 holovy mista Kyieva vid 9-ho hrudnia 1941 roku - "Pro zakhody shchodo reiestratsii na Birzhi pratsi vsikh bezrobitnykh cholovikiv," in TsDAVOV 3206/2/193, pp. 36- 37. "Rozporiadzhennia gebitkomisara Gel'nera pro oboviazkovu iavku na birzhu pratsi, m. Berdychiv [Hazeta "Nova Doba", #145, vid 11 lypnia 1942]," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/262, p. 9; Ukrains'ka dumka [Cherkasy], 25 June 1942, cited from, Cherkashchyna v period Velykoi Vitchyzniano'i viiny. Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv (Cherkasy, 2000), pp. 50-51. When the Werbung began, the unemployed were sometimes left to finish an assigned job before being sent to Germany.

48 local administrations published the names and addresses of "shirkers" who had been punished with a stint in a labor camp.100

To keep better track of the labor, in spring 1942 the German authorities introduced a restriction on change of a place of work. In Reichskommissariat

Ukraine this law took effect with Koch's decree of 4 March. From then on, the

Labor Exchange had total control over the workers. Without formal approval from this office a worker could not change his employer, obtain a job, or be dismissed.101 Around the same time Arbeitskarte were issued for the employed individuals, which contained information about all work performed (in Kyiv they were introduced on 1 March).102 Every week a worker had to get a stamped note from his place of work certifying uninterrupted employment. People also needed a stamp from the Labor Exchange to receive food coupons, which became necessary for survival with the beginning of famine in the major cities during the winter of 1941-42 and thereafter.103

This was still not enough. According to a Kyivan newspaper, "the detection and registry of the inveterate unemployed were complicated by their

100 Fedir Shevchenko (ed.), Lysty z fashysts'ko'i katorhy (Kyiv, 1947), pp. 146-47, cited from Sydorenko and Kotliar, Svitanky v pit'mi, pp. 40-41. 1 L. Vorob'ieva, "Systema ugneteniia ukrainskogo naroda nemetsko- rumynskimi okupantami (1941-1944)," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/239, p. 41; "Informatsiini povidomlennia z terytorii" skhidnykh oblastei Ukrai'ny. Dnipropetrovs'k," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 32. Kyiv u dni natsysts 'hoi navaly. p. 56. 103 "Reichskommissar fur die Ukraine: Lagebericht (14 January 1942 )," in TsDAVOV 3206/2/27, p.7

49 frequent change of place of residence." To combat such avoidance of labor duty and for security reasons, appointed house custodians, house gate-keepers

[storozhi], and street cleaners [dvirnyky] had to monitor and report any new tenants, unemployed individuals, or "work-shy elements" along with unregistered communists, NVKD members, and Jews.105 A regulation was introduced to make it more difficult to move from one place of residence to another. Each household received a stamped card listing how many people lived there, specifying their names and ages. From time to time police conducted random house searches, looking for unregistered people. In major cities there was a poster on every building reminding the residents to notify the authorities about any suspicious persons. Informants were promised a 1000 karbovantsi reward for turning in suspects.106

Nove ukrains'ke slovo, 1 April 1942; Vorob'ieva, Systema ugneteniia ukrainskogo naroda, p. 44. 1 5 "Postanova N239 holovy mista Kyieva vid 9-ho hrudnia 1941 roku - Pro zakhody shchodo reiestratsii' na birzhi pratsi vsikh bezrobitnykh cholovikiv," in TsDAVOV 3206/2/193, pp. 36- 37; "Allgemeine Lage und Stimmung in Ukraine: Arbeitseinsatz," Meldungen aus den besetzen Ostgebieten, No. 7 [12 June 1942], p. 13; "Rozviduval'na informatsiia Tsentral'noho shtabu partyzans'koho rukhu pro stanovyshche v okupovanomu Kyievi," in Kyiv u dni natsysts 'ko'i navaly, pp. 258-59; "Doklad o polozhenii v okupirovannom protivnikom Kieve (ot 25 sentiabria 1942)," Ibid, p. 276. 1 "Ohliad suspil'no-politychnoho, kul'turnoho i hospodars'koho zhyttia pivdenno-ukra'ins'kykh zemel' (kviten' 1943): Dnipropetrovs'k (selo)," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 9; "Opys naselennia Skhidnoi" Ukrainy (peredovsim Kyiv)," ibid, p. 65.

50 Travel to another area or a major city, or even a visit to an adjacent village, required a pass issued by the police. Men without a proper pass who were caught by the police were often used as forced labor for 10-15 days (women could usually move about more freely). Despite this regulation, many men continued to travel around-with their passports only.17 This all-embracing system of registration and surveillance established during Nazi rule facilitated the process of weeding out the population for a large-scale deportation to Germany. It was supposed to make mass avoidance very difficult, if not impossible. In practice, however, people who had become accustomed to the more omnipresent Soviet system of surveillance and control learned to take advantage of loopholes, networking, bribery, and Mat ["pull"] to mitigate its effect.

***

Local administration, employers, and house custodians in cities played a major role in deciding who was to be sent to Germany. In the countryside, village elders were influential. Usually they received orders on how many people to assign for deportation to Germany and were threatened for failing to meet the required numbers. Below is a typical order, as received by the elder of the village of Medvidky (Vinnytsia oblast):

Nove ukrains'ke slovo, 19 May 1942; "Informatsiini povidomlennia z terytorii skhidnykh oblastei Ukrai'ny. Dnipropetrovs'k (selo)," in TsDAVOV, 3833/1/113, p.9; Ky'iv u dni natsysts 'koi navaly, p. 47.

51 According to the Gebietskommissar's instruction of 12.2.1942

about the procurement of labor to Germany, the Labor Department

and raion uprava propose to select 10 persons of various

occupations from your village, men and women between the ages

of 17 and 45. The selected people should be physically healthy...

should have a doctor's bill of health...

[I] warn all village elders: this is an important matter and you will

be held responsible in accordance with wartime law if you fail.108

The village elder was often required only to assign a certain number of people for work in Germany and submit the list to the raion uprava or the

Gebietskommissariat. It was the responsibility of the latter to enforce the

Werbung by means of the local police force and the cooperation of village authorities. The elder, however, could also be held responsible for the villagers' non-compliance. To make sure everything "ran smoothly," some of them accompanied the recruits to a gathering point or a medical commission.109

Serhii Hal'chak, "Skhidni robitnyky" z Podillia u Tret'omu Reikhu: deportatsiia, natsysts'ka katorha, opir ponevoliuvacham (Vinnytsia, 2004), p. 74. For a very similar order from the Chernihiv region, see Sydorenko and Kotliar, Svitanky v pit 'mi, pp. 36-37; for Lityn [Vinnytsia oblast], see Eikel, "Cherez brak liudei," p. 151. Also, "6 lystopada 1942. Nakaz holovy Bazars'koi raiupravy - starosti Mezhylivs'koi sil'upravy pro nehaine pryznachennia osib na robotu do Nimechchyny v kil'kosti, zhidno roznariadky," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/262, p. 40. 109 Eikel, "Cherez brak liudei," p. 152.

52 The village elder received instructions in the raion uprava to exclude certain categories of people from the Werbung. An instruction to the village elder of Hubnyka, Haisyn raion (Vinnytsia oblast) ordered the elder to compile a list of indispensable people who should not be sent to Germany. The list had to include

"agronomists, agricultural and animal technicians, accountants, veterinary workers, tractor drivers who have passed current courses, combine operators, municipal economy specialists, blacksmiths, cartwrights, joiners, and other specialists required for the agricultural economy."110 Instructions issued by the

Wehrmacht in early 1943 mention metal and construction workers, who comprised the bulk of the first transports from southeastern Ukraine, along with lumbermen, coopers, and those fluent in the German language. Other

119 instructions mention foresters, quarry and railway workers, and road builders.

Family members of the Ukrainian police, local administration, or those who occupied vital (from the occupier's point of view) positions and on enterprises working for the Wehrmacht were also protected from being sent to

Germany, although this was not always the case in 1943. These people received

"immunity stamps" on their job cards, which shielded them during the mass round-ups. There were some other exceptions. The Volksdeutsche (ethnic

Germans living in the "East") and "Asiatic people" were spared deportation. The

110 Hal'chak, "Skhidni robitnyky" z Podillia, pp. 99-100. 111 "Anwerbungen fur das Reich," in DAKhO 3080/2/002, p. 60; "Durchfurung der Verordnung uber Arbeitspflicht und Arbeitseinsatz im Operationsgebiet der neu besetzten Ostgebieten vom 6.2.43," in DAKhO 3086/1/21, p. 23. 119 The latter two were often conscripted in 1943.

53 former received exemptions on the basis of their racial superiority, while it was argued that the latter might scare the Germans. People who spoke German were also exempt, although this rule was not always followed. This approach demonstrated the deep Nazi fear of the fraternization between ordinary Germans and Ostarbeiter.

It was left up to village elders to handpick recruits for the Werbung, if the selected individuals fit the criteria. Few elders would convene a village gathering to consult on how the quota should be met. In some cases, they announced the list during the gathering and more often contacted the selected individuals individually. They often used their authority for their own ends or to settle a score. Some demanded sexual favors from women to have them excluded from the list, and others - money or vodka.

The elders were advised to send to Germany primarily unmarried people and those who did not live in a given locality permanently. They preferred to get rid of strangers rather than people with whom they were close. There were many former Red Army soldiers living in the countryside - locals, deserters, or

POWs released by the Germans in summer and early fall 1941. Others included

Ukrainian POWs from areas of Left-Bank Ukraine adjacent to the front - it was too dangerous for them to live there. The rest were Russians or members of other

Soviet nationalities who managed to convince the Germans, with some help from

in "27 bereznia 1942. - Nakaz kyivs'koho hebitskomisara starostam makarivs'koho raionu pro prypynennia vidpravlennia naselennia na pivden' v zviazku z "verbovkoiu" naselennia vikom vid 14 do 55 r. u Nimechchynu," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/285, p. 18.

54 the local population, that they were local Ukrainians. A certain number of outsiders were POWs who had escaped from German camps and legalized themselves with forged identity cards. These former POWs and deserters were working in peasant households, replacing the shortage of manpower. As strangers who did not have the necessary connections, they were sent to Germany en masse at the beginning of the recruitment campaign.115 Similarly, many urban residents

In the first months of the war the Wehrmacht preferentially treated Ukrainian, Baltic and Belarusian POWs under the premise of their anti-Bolshevik credentials. It concerned especially those who came from areas that had already fallen under German control. They were released en-masse, especially the Ukrainians and Baits, sometimes to people claiming to be their relatives, on bail to the village elder or after a petition from a local community. Many Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians escaped captivity and almost certain death claiming to be a Ukrainian or discovering "relatives" among the locals. In total 318,800 POWs were released, the overwhelming majority of them Ukrainians. This practice was stopped on 13 November 1941. In some localities, however, large numbers of POWs were released in early 1942 too. Pavel Polian, Zhertvy dvukh diktatur, pp. 97-98; Mykhailo Lebid', "Chasy nimets'koi okupatsii v Matvii'vs'komu raioni na Volyni (spohady kol. Holovy raionovoi upravy)," in Ievhen Shtendera, Peter Potichnyj (eds.), Volyn' i Polissia: nimets 'ka okupatsiia. Knyha tretia - spomyny uchasnykiv [Litopys Ukra'ins'ko'i Povstans'koi Armi'i. Vol. 5] (Toronto, 1984), pp. 197-219 (pp. 208-10 here). 115 H. Sova, Do istori'i bol'shevyts'ko'i diisnosti: 25 rokiv zhyttia ukrains'koho hromadianyna v SSSR (Munich, 1955), p. 87; Fedir Pihido-Pravoberezhnyi, "Velyka vitchyzniana viina": spohady ta rozdumy ochevydtsia (Kyiv, 2002), pp. 142-43; "Usni istori'i. Korobenko Mykhailo Mytrofanovych," in Tatiana Pastushenko (ed. et al.), "...To bula nevolia": spohady ta lysty ostarbaiteriv (Kyiv, 2006), p. 402.

55 who had fled to the countryside to escape famine became the target of the first recruitment drive.

Aside from the outsiders, village elders also preferred to get rid of people they deemed undesirable, who might be political adversaries or personal enemies.

Local authorities staffed by Ukrainian patriots could "draft" Russophile-oriented people or vice-versa. In one area they drafted former communist party members or other Soviet activists, in another one - the children of victims of Soviet repressions. Some former communists who felt threatened by their neighbours reported them for deportation to Germany so they "could continue their communist activity unimpeded."11?

In the predominantly Ukrainian villages of western Volhynia Poles were selected for shipment to the Reich. Thus, Poles constituted 40 percent of the 1500 recruits sent to Germany as of May 1943 in an area with a population of 42,000,

37,000 of whom were Ukrainians.118 The Ukrainian police raided Polish villages

"Iz direktivy glavnogo shtaba sukhoputnyh voisk ob uskorenii tempov mobilizatsii russkoi rabochei sily dlia Germanii [10 maia 1942]", in Belorusskie ostarbaitery: ugon naseleniia Belarusi (vol. 1), pp. 122-23; 117 "Allgemeine Lage und Stimmung in Ukraine: Arbeitseinsatz," in Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten # 7" (12 June 1942), p. 13.

1 in "Zvit providnyka raionu; [Bereznivs'kyi] raion 'Bereh' Kostopil's'ko'i okruhy, 4 travnia 1943 roku," in P. Sokhan', P. Potichnyj et al. (eds.), Merezha OUN(b) i zapillia UPA na terytorii VO "Zahrava," "Turiv," "Bohun" (serpen' 1942- hruden' 1943 rr.): dokumenty. [Litopys UPA. Nova seriia, torn 11] (Kyiv and Toronto, 2007), p. 245.

56 to fill their quota, while the Polish police targeted Ukrainian villages.119 In one of his decrees an OUN leader in Volhynia emphasized the need to reach an agreement with village elders to send to Germany "the worst element - various denouncers, provocateurs, Poles, thieves, komsomol members, etc." Stepan

Kutsai mentions that in a Volhynian village under the control of the Ukrainian nationalists the list of recruits included all Soviet activists, almost all Polish girls, and one person per each Ukrainian family with more than three able-bodied members.121

Selecting one person from families with many children seems to have been quite a common practice in the countryside. In this way village elders tried to ensure that every family would retain enough members to support it.

Local authorities and employers also tried to include in the lists sick people or persons who were less valuable to them. The same was true of house custodians, who reported "many ill people, old people unable to work, even

11 "Dopovidna zapyska shtabu partyzans'kykh zahoniv Rivnens'koi oblasti pro diial'nist' ukrains'kykh natsionalistiv [28 travnia 1943]," in Volodymyr Serhiichuk (ed.), OUN-UPA v roky viiny: novi dokumenty i materialy (Kyiv, 1996), p. 68. The majority of the Ukrainian police in Volhynia deserted to Ukrainian nationalist partisans (UPA) in March 1943. The German authorities recruited a new police force predominantly from the Polish population of the region. 120 "Nakazy kraievoho providnyka OUN (ZUZ) (B) D. Dmytriva," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/43, p. 30. Stepan Kutsai, Nimechchyna ochyma ostarbaitera. Rozpovidi pro perezhyte (Luts'k, 2003), pp. 41-42.

57 199 cripples, or anybody they disliked." According to a German report dated

September 1942, on average 5-10 recruits out of 100 were either sick people or children.123 Children comprised 11 percent of the deportees in one reported

Ostarbeiter transport.1 Within a short span of time in the early summer 1942 three trains returned from Germany to Kyiv alone with 1300 Ostarbeiter "unfit to work." This number included persons suffering from tuberculosis, heart disease, malaria, hernias, semi-blindness, and infectious diseases. One of the trains contained an "astonishing number" of epileptics and mentally ill individuals. A large number of people between the ages of 65 and 70, who could barely move, 19S was also found.

Sometimes it took weeks for a train to deliver the sick people back home.

They were packed 50-60 people to a car with no provision for food or other needs; the dead were dumped right beside the tracks, and newborn babies were thrown out of the windows. In some cases, transports with Ostarbeiter on the way to Germany and transports with sick returnees stood alongside each other for a

"Allgemeine Lage und Stimmung in Ukraine: Arbeitseinsatz," in Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 7 (12 June 1942), p. 13; Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, pp. 260-61. 123 084-PS, Nuremberg Trials. 124 "Ostarbeiter - hier: Vermittlung von Arbeitsunfahigen und Kindern," in DAKhO 3080/2/002, pp. 17-17(reverse). 125 "Lagebericht fur den Juni 1942: Arbeits- und Sozialwesen," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/475 (vol. 2), pp. 290-91; "Fragen des Arbeitseinsatzes von Ukrainern im Reichsgebiet," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 21 [18 September 1942].

58 long time. The appearance of the latter and their stories evoked great panic among

Ostarbeiter.

The transports with sick returnees also shocked the population and increased its resistance to the Werbung. The Nazi authorities were utterly displeased with this tendency, but for a rather different reason. They did not want to spend German resources on moving people back and forth. Special emphasis was placed on the enforcement of the medical examination and other selection criteria. Local administrations were warned against sending ineligible people.

Nevertheless, this trend continued. According to a senior member of the

Ostministerium, more than 100,000 sick Ostarbeiter were sent back by October

1942.128 In December 1942 alone, 1252 Ostarbeiter "unfit to work" were shipped back to Generalbezirk Kiew; a large proportion of them had not even reached

Germany, but were turned back from a transit camp (Zwischendurchlager) in the

General-Government.

***

054-PS, Nuremberg Trials; 084-PS, Nuremberg Trials; "Fragen des Arbeitseinsatzes von Ukrainern im Reichsgebiet," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 21 [18 September 1942]. 127 The sick and pregnant Ostarbeiter were not sent home anymore after March 1943 because "they usually spread negative propaganda." See 315-PS, Nuremberg Trials. 294-PS, Nuremberg Trials. 129 "Allgemeine Stimmung und Lage. Generalbezirk Kiew," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/474, p. 83.

59 In cities, a person selected for deportation to Germany usually received a summons from the local branch of the Labor Exchange or the local uprava delivered by uprava officials, policemen or house custodians. Some received a summons when they went for the registration to the Labor Exchange. The notice, which usually entailed severe punishment for evasion, indicated a time and date when a person had to show up at the Labor Exchange or the Recruitment Agency with his or her passport and job card. Recipients of these summonses who refused to sign them were to be immediately detained and incarcerated until the date of

111 deportation to Germany. In some places, policemen visited the residences of recruits on the day after the scheduled departure for Germany to make sure they did not avoid it somehow.

In Kharkiv, house custodians who delivered the summons wrote a detailed report on each case of failed delivery: "She's gone to the village," "Her mother said she's in the village but she's probably home," "She's sick, which is doubtful." See Meliakov, "Mobilizatsionnye aktsii v okkupirovannom Khar'kove," pp. 183-84. 131 "2 travnia 1943. Zrazok povistky berezans'koho shtadtkomisara hromadiantsi I. D... pro oboviazkovu iavku dlia vidpravky na katorzhni roboty do Nimechchyny," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/242, p. 144. Also see an order of the chief of Nizhyn (Chernihiv oblast) raion uprava to the commandant of a police station in the village of Verhi'ivs'ke, in Sydorenko and Kotliar, Svitanky v pit'mi, pp. 36- 37. Also "23 noiabria 1943. Iz akta gorodskoi kommissii sodeistviia o nemetsko- fashistskikh zlodeian' v gor. Kremenchuge: Ustanovlenie kreposnicheskogo rezhima i uvod sovetskikh grazhdan v nemetskoe rabstvo," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/242, p. 71. "23 noiabria 1943. Iz akta gorodskoi komissii sodeistviia o nemetsko- fashistskikh zlodeian' v god. Kremenchuge: Ustanovlenie kreposnicheskogo

60 In the countryside recruits were driven to the raion uprava, and after their medical check-up and registration, they were taken by cart or truck under police escort to a nearby railway station. From there they were sent directly to Germany or a transit camp in a major city, where they had to undergo the above-mentioned procedure if they had not done so before.

The Recruitment Agency, which carried out the actual "recruitment" of the Ostarbeiter, was stationed usually in the same building as the Labor Exchange or next to it. People who arrived there had to pass a usually superficial medical examination to confirm if a person was "work-fit" and to weed out circumcised

Jews. Women were checked to see if they were "innocent." Some Ostarbeiter left anecdotal stories about their medical exams. One of them from Volhynia mentions,

The [medical] commission consisted of one old German,

probably a paramedic, not a doctor. We walked in one by one.

Finally, I came in. I was required only to pull down my pants. The

old [German] ... asked if I had had sexual intercourse with a girl.

Then he put a mark across a name in the list and it was over.

rezhima i uvod sovetskikh grazhdan v nemetskoe rabstvo," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/242, p. 70. Vera Fursenko, "DI-PI: dni i gody," in A. Popov (ed.), Vpoiskakh istiny. Puti i sud'by vtoroi emigratsii: sbornik statei i dokumentov (Moscow, 1997), pp. 98- 135 (p. 98 here). Kutsai, Nimechchyna ochyma ostarbaitera, pp. 42-43.

61 Mikhail (Mykhailo) Chernenko from Kharkiv left a very similar account of the medical commission:

At the entrance a Ukrainian policeman ... redirected all men to a

table beside which was sitting a German in a white doctor's coat

on the top of the officer uniform. Everybody was supposed to pull

down the pants to show this part. Meantime, the German was

asking in broken Russian a, family name and age. He wrote

something down, then touched this part with a finger in a rubber

glove and nodded his head to proceed.135

However, this was a very emotional procedure. The medical commission was the institution whose decision signified that there was no way out for "able- fit" individuals. Some Ostarbeiter testimonies reflect this:

I came on the given date to the medical commission... Music was

playing in the courtyard. There was some incomprehensible music:

was it to cheer us up? The courtyard was full of people, recruits

and those who were seeing them off. Everyone was in tears. Those

who had passed the examination and were not found unfit were

135 Mikhail Chernenko, Chuzhie i svoi (Moscow, 2001), p. 27.

62 crying together with their parents. The screaming resembled that at

a funeral. The atmosphere was horrible.

The medical commission was usually manned by local doctors, but

German medics could be present too. Besides the medical examination, the recruits had to undergo the process of registration, during which personal data and employment were verified to make sure they fit the criteria. They were also screened there by the security police.

Before their departure to Germany, the recruits were placed in a transit camp. Those who arrived from the countryside or were seized during police raids were also taken to a camp for medical examination and registration. The detainees were fed once a day, usually a thin soup and 150-200 grams of bread. If they were lucky, they could sleep on the floor, covered with a bit of straw. Sometimes the building was so packed that it was not possible to lie down.

Large transit camps could be outdoors, where the recruits were exposed to all the elements. In Kyiv the Labor Exchange, the Recruitment Office, and a transit camp operated in a series of adjacent buildings on Lviv Street. Detained individuals arrived at the transit camp at 24 Lviv Street, where police cordoned them off. It had a bad reputation. The commandant of the camp, a certain Kriiger, beat the recruits and encouraged his subordinates to do the same. The relatives of the detainees were often smashed into the mud with the butt of a rifle. The camp, which was divided into men's and women's barracks, was located in a large yard

"Spohady. Chabanova Evheniia Arsentii'vna," in "...To bula nevolia, " p. 331.

63 surrounded by multi-story buildings and a barbed-wire fence. The recruits were taken to the Recruitment Office across the street, while their parents waited outside. They filled in registration forms, passed the medical exam, and were screened by the security police. Only official volunteers with a registration pass were permitted to leave the camp.

A contemporary who visited the camp in the first days after the return of the Soviet army found that the "dirt there was unbelievable, remnants of straw in

no the corners, some rags...." The detainees left hundreds of graffiti on the walls, doors, and windowsills; one inscription, signed by eleven girls from the village of

Krasne in Poltava oblast, described their experience, "... we stayed here for two weeks, suffered, ate gruel once a day, and bedbugs didn't give us any rest at night...."139

The transit camp in Poltava was stationed in a former secondary school and the adjacent courtyard. There were bars on the windows of the building, and the courtyard was enclosed by two rows of barbed-wired fence. In this small

Ky'iv u dni natsysts 'koi navaly, p. 56; "Spohady. Kasich Halyna Vasylivna," in "...To bula nevolia," pp. 151-52; Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, p. 263; Wolodymyr Kosyk, The Third Reich and Ukraine (New York, 1993), p. 326 (on beatings). 138 I. Slin'ko, "Ugon naseleniia Ukrainy v fashistskoe rabstvo," in S. Bubenshchikov (ed.), Nemetsko-fashistskii okkupatsionnyi rezhim (1941-1944) (Moscow, 1965), pp. 219-30 (p. 226 cited). 139 Ibid.

64 building with no furniture and dirty courtyard between 1500 and 2000 people waited to be processed.140

The Uman' (Cherkasy oblast) transit camp was also housed in a former school building. The detainees were packed into a very small space. Since no fuel was provided, they burned straw picked from the ground to warm themselves up.

The recruits received a thin soup, and one kilogram of bread was issued every day for eight people. In the absence of water, they ate snow to quench their thirst. The men were not let outside, so they often relieved themselves right through the windows.141 A letter sent to Germany from Western Volhynia described a transit camp in this region in similar terms: "The imprisoned workers are locked in a schoolhouse. They cannot even go out to answer the call of nature, but have to do it like pigs in the same room."142

Desperation reigned in the camp, especially in the second and third year of the Werbung. Valentyna Orlenko described the conditions in the Zhytomyr transit camp, which was also stationed in a former schoolhouse.

The house was guarded by policemen. In a room on the second

floor groups of girls were sitting on scattered straw: some were

1 Sydorenko and Kotliar, Svitanky v pit'mi, pp. 35-36. For a very similar description of the transit camp in Kirovohrad, see "Pysachenko Petro Ivanovych," in Vasyl Bodnar (ed), OST- tavro nevoli (Kirovohrad, 2000), pp. 78-79. 141 "Wirtschaftliche Lage in der Ukraine," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 47 [26 March 1943]; Muller, "Die Rekrutierung sowjetischer Zwangsarbeiter," p. 243. 142 018-PC, Nuremberg Trials.

65 weeping, other were wringing their hands in desperation, and still

others were silent with hopeless grief.

The detainees clung to each other for support. Neighbors, fellow villagers,

or classmates formed groups. Familiar faces and shared experience helped them to bear the ordeal. They stuck together during the procession to the train, and most

of the time they boarded the same railroad cars. Once in Germany, many of them

ended up living bunk-to-bunk in the same barracks. As one Ostarbeiter noted,

"Misfortune united us even more, bonding us like one family."144

The camps were usually built near railway stations to expedite the

transfers. After two or three days at the assembly point, the Ostarbeiter were sent to the train station on foot (in Kyiv sometimes on a streetcar). This march through the city had a very negative effect on the mood of the local population. A

contemporary described such a procession in Kyiv:

Loaded with bags of warm clothing and carrying trunks on their

backs, they were sweltering. Behind them was a whole string of

Kyivan rickshas, which the exhausted 'volunteers' had rented with

the last of their money. They obviously had no more energy to

carry everything they needed on the road and abroad. Among them

143 Slin'ko, "Ugon naseleniia Ukrainy," pp. 225-26. 144 "V nevoli [Oleksii Hryhorovych Tsaryk]," in Volodymyr Iashchuk (ed.), Ostarbaitery: spohady zhyteliv Rivnenshchyny, vyvezenykh hitlerivtsiamy na katorzhni roboty do Nimechchyny (Rivne, 1996), p. 94.

66 were also very young ones, and some of the women carried small

children in their arms. Kyivites observed the procession with eyes

"full of surprise and horror." Some said, "Ukraine is being

liberated from the Ukrainians."1 5

These processions were often accompanied by violence and abuse. They reminded a German official in Kherson region of stories about the transports of

African slaves he had read about in his youth. When the recruits arrived at a train station, occasionally they had to endure a farewell ceremony with solemn speeches made by local administrators. They boarded the train often under the

sounds of a brass band. At the same time, police struck the relatives of the deportees with rifle butts or clubs, preventing them from passing food and clothing. Recruits were beaten if they moved "too slowly." A combination of pomposity and brutality created a surreal atmosphere.

Once the train began moving, some of the deportees often cried. The train's departure signified the beginning of a journey into the unknown. Antonina

Demchyna tellingly describes this moment:

The lamenting lasted for hours. Some mothers were standing on

the rails, threatening to jump under the train. One was lying down

145 The last phrase is a sarcastic reworking of the Nazis' propaganda emphasis on German liberation of Ukraine from "Judeo-Bolshevism." Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, p. 263-64. Kosyk, The Third Reich and Ukraine, p. 325.

67 on the rails and shouting.... Finally, the train began moving,

slowly gaining momentum. People were running on both sides,

tearing their hair and lamenting loudly. Some mothers fainted, as

did the girls in our [train] car. Regaining consciousness, they

started lamenting again because they failed to look upon their

loved ones for the last time.147

***

Despite some initial success in attracting volunteers, their numbers were not high enough to fulfill the quotas imposed by Sauckel after he became the

General Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor. The first rumors about the cruel treatment of the Ostarbeiter and bad working conditions had begun trickling out of Germany, further discouraging volunteers. A Kyiv newspaper first mentioned these rumors in its 14th April 1942 issue, vehemently denying them.148

In such a situation Nazi apparatus embarked on large-scale coercive measures in

April 1942.

At first, the prime targets were the unemployed, who were weeded out through the Labor Exchange. The recruitment extended to other sectors of the population, when jobless people could not fill the imposed quota.

147 Antonina Demchyna, Zi skhodu na Zakhid (Kyiv, 2000), p. 75. See also Viktor Andriianov, Arkhipelag OST: sud'ba rabov "Tret'ego reikha" v ikh svidetel 'stvakh, pis'makh i dokumentakh (Moscow, 2005), pp. 34-35; Kosyk, The Third Reich and Ukraine, p. 326-27. 148 Nove ukrains 'ke slovo, 14 April 1942.

68 Following a German instruction, on 1 April the Ukrainian municipal administration in Kyiv ordered the city district administrations (raion uprava) to provide 20,000 "volunteers" for Germany.149 To facilitate the drive, earlier the

Labor Exchange updated the employment registry of all Kyivites. House custodians were instructed to prepare a list of all men and women between the ages of 15 and 60 living in their buildings. Right after Easter (5 April) Ukrainian policemen began visiting Kyivites selected for deportation and handed them summonses. Policemen confiscated their passports and had them sign a form to appear "voluntarily" at the Recruitment Office on a designated day and time.

Those who decided not to evade the deportation and comply with all requirements were often officially considered "volunteers," which further increased the confusion surrounding the actual number of volunteers.

From the first days of the forced recruitment there were many avoiders, which called into a question the ability of the authorities to meet the target number.151 The mayor of Kyiv, Leontii Forostivs'kyi, was "extremely dissatisfied" with the pace of the recruitment. He assigned a minimum daily quota for each city district, which varied from 15 to 80 people. The heads of each raion uprava were held personally responsible for meeting the target numbers.

Kyiv u dni natsysts 'koi navaly, pp. 56-57; Potyl'chak, Trudovi resursy, p. 21. 150 "Doklad o polozhenii v okupirovannom protivnikom Kieve (ot 25 sentiabria 1942)," in Kyiv u dni natsysts 'koi navaly, p. 278. 151 Abwehr Group "South" reported as early as on 16 April 1942 that the first days of the forced Werbung led to the "escape of many men." Pfahlmann, Fremdarbeiter und Kriegsgefangene, p. 49.

69 Forostivs'kyi's detailed instruction outlined the procedure for the forced recruitment.

1. Every district uprava must immediately draw up a list of all

persons that are the object of the recruitment and summon them

through a signed summons.

2. Make a notation in the passports of the people leaving for work

in Germany, "For work to Germany" or "For work to Germany

voluntarily," and detect them immediately through registration

offices, confiscating their food cards.

3. Submit to police lists of individuals who did not appear in

response to the summonses.

4. If some individuals move to the countryside or disappear, their

apartment has to be sealed and a report drawn up about work

avoidance. Send these reports immediately to the

Administrative Department...

8. A guard detail consisting of one house custodian and three

street cleaners for every neighborhood must be established as a

liaison with the Labor Exchange and house administration.

They are at the disposal of the district uprava and police during

the dispatching of labor.

"11 kvitnia 1942. — Nakaz holovy m. Kyi'v raiupravam pro nezadovil'nyi khid vidpravky robochoT syly do Nimechchyny po m. Kyi'v ta miry prymusu shchodo

70 One of the areas in Kyiv that produced "unsatisfactory results" was the

Zaliznychnyi district, where very few people lived in communal buildings, so the house custodians could not effectively monitor the residents. Many individuals had connections with or relatives living in the countryside, where they could hide

to evade the "trip to lovely Germany." Only thirteen people showed up every day

instead of the daily target of 50 "volunteers." The raion chief therefore asked

Mayor Forostivs'kyi to sanction police intervention, which would involve policemen going after the list of people selected for the labor draft in Germany. In reply, Forostivs'kyi issued the requested order and authorized the raion chief to use police for nocturnal house searches.

From 4 April to 6 May 1942, 26,193 workers were sent from Kyiv to the

Reich, at least 2650 of whom were volunteers.154 Despite all these efforts, the head of the German city administration {Stadtskommissariai) Rogausch notified

Forostivs'kyi in early May 1942 that Kyiv had thus procured only 50 percent of

dezorhanizatoriv," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/285, pp. 20-22; Also, the same document in the State Archive of Kyiv Oblast (further DAKO), 2356/2/34, pp. 6- 7 and 2412/2/18, pp. 1-2. 153 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, pp. 261-62. 154 "Lagebericht fur den Generalbezirk Kiew. April 1942," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/475 (vol. 2), pp. 13-14 (mentions 1/3 volunteers), p. 129 (more realistically, only 10 per cent volunteers). Another German data shows that 41,900 workers were sent from Kyiv in April/May 1942, 6722 of them voluntarily (16 per cent). This figure includes also residents of the Generalbezirk sent to Germany through Kyiv railway station.

71 the target number.155 To correct this situation, the recruitment of workers employed in municipal enterprises was necessary. It quickly became apparent that fishing out the unemployed or semi-employed people was not enough to meet the imposed quotas.

With the increase in the number of "volunteers to build a new Europe," trains loaded with the Ostarbeiter, as announced in the local press, began departing daily: the 13th transport left Kyiv on 16 April, followed by the 14th a day later.156 Besides shipping the residents of Kyiv, the city railway station became a departure point for people from the surrounding regions, who were brought to the city on trucks or trains.

As more and more people tried to avoid the labor conscription to

Germany, similar coercive measures were applied in other regions of Ukraine. In early May 1942 a Kyiv newspaper boldly acknowledged that, although people in many cities and villages had volunteered to work in Germany, in other places

"resolute means were used to secure the required number of workers."157 Mass round-ups and raids (Razzien) were soon introduced, along with the (nocturnal) house searches. A specific area would be sealed off by the police, who checked everybody's passports and job cards. Very often people were summarily detained and brought to the Recruitment Centre. One of the first such cases took place at

DAKO 2356/2/34, p.8. Nove ukrains 'ke slovo, 14 April 1942. Nove ukrains'ke slovo, 3 May 1942.

72 Easter time in Kharkiv, where police sealed off a local church detaining all the churchgoers.

By mid-summer 1942 the flow of volunteers had virtually stopped.

Statistical data from Generalbezirk Kiew demonstrate that the number of official volunteers dropped from 4030 in June to 3914 in July, 425 in August and only 5 in September.159 The number of actual "volunteers" was probably even lower, as

German data often categorized people who complied with all regulations and did not attempt to avoid the recruitment as "volunteers." The emphasis of the

Werbung irreversibly shifted to the forced procurement of Ostarbeiter. The occupation authorities resorted to the application of sheer brutal force and methodical manhunts to procure the required quotas.

Police raids and house searches became common in late summer 1942, usually on the eve of a scheduled transport departure. In Berdychiv (Zhytomyr oblast), for example, local policemen carried out nocturnal house searches on 2

September 1942 to boost the required numbers for a 1500-person transport scheduled for the next day. On the same day a spectator at a local theatre alerted the audience near the end of a show that policemen had surrounded the building.

An uproar ensued. All "able-bodied" people without proper papers were detained and after filtration sent to Germany in the above-mentioned transport.160

Skorobohatov, Kharkiv v chasy nimets 'koi okupatsii, p. 116. Muller, "Die Rekrutierung sowjetischer Zwangsarbeiter," p. 240. 160 "Werbung von Ukrainern fur den Arbeitseinsatz im Reich," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 25 [16 October 1942).

73 Kyiv was one of the places hit hard by the recruitment. Like in any major city, it was more difficult there to dodge the Werbung, owing to a relatively heavy police presence, the monitoring role of house custodians in communal buildings, and lack of private space. Within the first nine months of 1942 around 11 percent of Kyivites (34,000) and 7 percent of the entire population of Generalbezirk Kiew

(156,000) were transported to Germany.161 After some adjustments, the target number was almost 100 percent fulfilled.

This was achieved by means of a systematic manhunt, including house-to- house searches, mass round-ups on the street and at markets, movie theatres, and beaches, which resulted in the detention of hundreds of people. Other methods included reductions of "excessive personnel" in health care institutions and the city administration. According to a Nazi report, by October 1942 the labor reserve was virtually exhausted. The continuation of the Werbung was possible

151 "Kiew, 15.9. 1942," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/474, p. 293. A similar number of Kharkovite (43,000 out of over 400,000) were shipped to Germany by November 1942. See A. Skorobohatov [Skorobogatov], "'Zhizn' s vragom': povsednevnaia zhizn' v okkupirovannom nemtsami Khar'kove (1941-1943)," in Epokha. Kul'tury. Liudi, pp. 312- 25 (p. 319 here). 162 Ibid, pp. 168,292-94. 163 Clinics, hospitals, childcare facilities, ambulatories and other health care institutions underwent staff reductions on average of 27 per cent in fall 1942, through personnel being sent for Germany. See "Veresnia 1942. - Vidomist' na robitnykiv systemy okhorony zdorov'ia, iaki pidliahaly vidpravtsi do Nimechchyny," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/285, p. 25.

74 only at the cost of conscripting workers from factories working for military needs.164

***

When Sauckel assumed his position in March 1942 there were only 53,000

Ostarbeiter employed in the Third Reich. He immediately set the objective to triple the number of recruited laborers by "adopting the severest measures."165

The occupation administration was supposed to dispose of all non-essential workers. Plans were drawn up to procure 1.6 million foreign workers for the

German economy in spring and summer 1942, over one million of whom were to come from the occupied areas of the Soviet Union.166

At first, the Werbung targeted the unemployed but their number was rapidly diminishing. Sauckel visited Ukraine in late May and came to the conclusion that "there is an extremely prodigal use of the workforce compared with the conditions in Germany." His statement ran counter to the Wehrmacht

lb4 "Lageberichterstattung. von 1.10.1942 fur September 1942," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/475 (vol. 2), p. 629; "Allgemeine Stimmung und Lage. Kiew Generalbezirk," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/474, pp. 82-83. 165 "Telegramm," in TsDAVOV 3206/2/006, p. 1; "Telegrama F. Zaukelia reikhskomissaram okkupirovannykh vostochnykh oblastei o priminenii samykh suvorykh mer pry verbovke rabochei sily [31 marta 1942]," in Belorusskie ostarbaitery: ugon naseleniia Belarusi, (vol. 1), p. 74. Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, p. 131. 167 "Pis'mo F. Zaukelia nachal'niku khoziaistvennogo shtaba "Ost" i reikhskomissaram okkupirovannykh vostochnykh oblastei o rezul'tatakh roboty

75 economic authorities' claim that there was a labor shortage in Ukraine in farming and harvesting, since many men had been drafted or evacuated by the Soviets.168

Sauckel demanded the registration of "superfluous labor" for deportation to the

Reich and the "strict limitation" of the additional employment of workers in the occupied territories. Even before this instruction, the Wehrmacht Supreme

Command issued a directive to confine to the "extreme limit" the use of labor at enterprises and in organizations working for military needs and to retain only the

"indispensable workforce," sending the rest to Germany.169 At this time, however, military commanders in the occupied territories began complaining about the labor shortage for their own needs. This was a harbinger of future conflicts.

During the first campaign 919,000 Ostarbeiter were brought to Germany between April and July 1942: 57,000 in April; 173,000 in May; 324,000 in June and 365,000 in July.170

verbovochnykh komissii i ikh zadachakh po dal'neishemu uvelicheniiu vyvoza rabochei sily v Germaniiu [5 iiunia 1942]," in Belorusskie ostarbaitery: ugon naseleniia Belarusi, (vol. 1), pp. 130-31.

1 /TO •• Brautigam, Uberblick tiber die besetzten Ostgebiete, p. 92; Eikel, "Cherez brak liudei,"p. 142. The Army emphasized that the Werbung should be run on a voluntarily basis; however, it stipulated the use of force if voluntary measures failed to generate the required numbers. "Iz direktivy glavnogo shtaba sukhoputnykh voisk ob uskorenii tempov mobilizatsii russkoi rabochei sily dlia Germanii [10 maia 1942]," in Belorusskie ostarbaitery: ugon naseleniia Belarusi, (vol. 1), pp. 122-24. 170 Dallin, German Rule in Russia, p. 451 (table). Edward Homze provides slightly different numbers: 110,000 in April, 273,000 in May, 324,000 in June and

76 The results of the first campaign were met with acclaim in Berlin.

Hermann Goring, the chief of the Four-Year Plan and formally Sauckel's boss, made the latter an example for other Nazis: "If everyone in his field applied only a tenth part of the energy that Sauckel did, you would easily achieve the assigned goals."171 Hitler too regarded him highly.

Harvest-time brought a relative standstill to the Werbung in August 1942.

Bringing in the crops required a large number of agricultural workers because of the shortage of tractors and other machinery that had been destroyed or evacuated by the retreating Red Army in 1941. The steady supply of bread to the front and to Germany was an even higher priority for the Nazis than the supply of foreign workers: emphasis was placed on the shipment of POWs.

In mid-August Sauckel toured Ukraine again to evaluate the results of the campaign. After his return, he attended Hitler's conference with his senior economic advisors. This meeting initiated a second campaign, which was launched in September 1942. Its goal was to bring another million Ostarbeiter to the Reich. Reichskommissariat Ukraine and the "Army Group South Rear Area" were required to supply 450,000 workers each until May 1943, half of this number by the end of 1942.m

264,500 in July in his Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, p. 134. They both agree that 972,000 Ostarbeiter were brought to Germany by July 1942. G. Knat'ko et al. (eds.), Belorusskie ostarbaitery: istoriko-analiticheskoe issledovanie (Minsk, 2001), p. 47. 017-PC, Nuremberg Trials; Belorusskie ostarbaitery: istoriko-analiticheskoe issledovanie, p. 48.

77 One of the peculiarities of the second drive was a goal to recruit voluntarily 400,000 mostly Ukrainian female domestic workers, between the ages of 15 and 35, who did not have children and "whose appearance, if possible, was close in racial terms to that of German women," for placing with German families, especially those with many children and strong national-socialist credentials, as well as for employment in restaurants and cafes. This racial selection was entrusted to the SS. This measure was supposed to improve the situation of German women by shielding them from the effects of the war. It also had a racial purpose. Hitler was apparently surprised to find many blond and blue- eyed Ukrainian women when he spent time in his Werwolf headquarters near

Vinnytsia in the summer 1942. He came to believe they were of German rather than Slavic origin, since the "Germans had spread like beer" in the past, and he contemplated the possibility of assimilating some of them into the "German race."

Despite this expectation, the women in question were supposed to have the same rights as the other Ostarbeiter.

The program was tacitly abandoned without much ado, like some of the

Fiihrer's other bizarre ideological undertakings. Apparently, Hitler never returned to this topic. It was simply unrealistic to recruit voluntarily half a million young,

173 019-PS, Nuremberg Trials; "Iz protokola soveshchaniia po povodu ispol'zovaniia v Germanii sovetskikh grazhdan s territorii, okkupirovannykh nemetsko-fashystskimi zakhvatchikami, kotoroe prokhodilo u F. Zaukelia osen'iu 1942 g.," and "Ukazaniia reikhsfiurera SS i shefa politsii ob ispol'zovanii zhenskogo rabochego personala (vostochnykh robotnits) v domashnem khoziaistve v Germanii [10 sentiabria 1942]," in Belorusskie ostarbaitery: ugon naseleniia, pp. 218-19; 165-67.

78 "racially pure" Ukrainian women in late 1942. The Nazi bureaucracy, however,

continued to recruit "Eastern" women as house servants in Germany with no regard to "racial criteria" and their own desires.

During the second drive Sauckel was again becoming concerned with finding a new source of untapped labor. Reichskommissar Koch, who shared his concern, issued several decrees to intensify the Werbung in Reichskommissariat

Ukraine. In his directive of 24 October 1942, Koch expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that, despite his earlier orders permitting only four-grade public schools, other types of schools continued to exist, including university-type institutes in

Kyiv and Poltava. "It is not relevant to prepare new cadres that can be of use to the German leadership only in ten years." The institutes were soon closed down and their students sent to Germany. Most public schools were also closed in the winter of 1942-43 with the excuse that they lacked heating, and they were never re-opened. Teachers who did not manage to obtain the "right papers" became

Ostarbeiter too. At the same time, many of the surviving cultural institutions were closed down and their staff reported to the Labor Exchange.

Many potential Ostarbeiter could also be found in the "regions infested by bands," where the Werbung was not possible without a heavy police presence.

Sauckel lobbied for shipment to Germany rather than summary execution of

174 TsDAVOV 3206/1/232, pp. 2-3. 175 For Kyiv drama theatre, see "5 veresnia 1942. - Rozporiadzhennia hebitskomisara m. Kyieva mis'kupravi pro prypynennia diial'nosti dramatychnoho teatru Shevchenka ta nadsylku ioho personalu do birzhi pratsi," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/285, p. 19.

79 everybody captured during the anti-partisan operations. On 26 October 1942

Goring, the head of the Four-Year Plan, and a week later SS chief Himmler issued

directives about the deportation to Germany of all "able-bodied" men and women

seized during the anti-partisan operations and not suspected of "bandit

activities." Villages in partisan-controlled areas were burned during such

operations, and their adult residents deported to Germany with no screening.

"Special treatment" was to be limited to a minimum because of the "current

situation in the armament industry in the fatherland."177 These directives mainly pertained to Belarus and central-western Russia (Army Group "Center"), but they also came into effect during the anti-partisan campaign in Volhynia, and the northern parts of Kyiv, Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts.

The second drive was expanded to the territories that came under German control during the summer 1942 offensive towards Stalingrad and the North

Caucasus. It encountered serious difficulties there. The Soviets evacuated most of the skilled workers and destroyed the railway network, which was never fully restored during the brief period of the German occupation. The restored lines were overloaded with military supplies. The recruits from Voroshylovhrad (now

Luhansk) were forced to endure an 80-km march to a railway station in Roven'ky, since Voroshylovhrad was not connected to the railway network.178 Despite these

Belorusskie ostarbaitery: istoriko-analiticheskoe issledovanie, p. 58. 3012-PS, Nuremberg Trials. Polian, Zhertvy dvukh diktatur, p. 186.

80 difficulties, the occupation authorities managed to recruit 65,000 workers from

Voroshylovhrad oblast.

Especially harsh conditions awaited the Ostarbeiter who were sent to the

Reich during the winter. The outside temperature dropped as low as minus 25 to minus 40 Celsius, and it was not much warmer inside. Many deportees lost their extremities in the freezing cold and the mortality rate was high. To warm themselves up, they tried whenever possible to construct makeshift stoves, so- called "burzhuikas," in the freight cars, stealing coal during bathroom stops.

Hunger and cold were not the only ordeals that the "Eastern workers" faced on the way to the Reich. Groups of Soviet partisans, who tried to disrupt the enemy's logistics, regularly targeted the German railway network in northern

Ukraine. Some Ostarbeiter transports were blown up or damaged, which resulted in heavy casualties.

By the end of 1942 a half-million more Ostarbeiter were brought to the

Reich. Their total number reached 1,480,000; almost half of them (710,000) came

Muller, "Die Rekrutierung sowjetischer Zwangsarbeiter," p. 241.

1 RO "Spohady. Siniaieva (Andrieieva) Oleksandra Ivanivna," in "...To bula nevolia," p. 311; "Vospominaniia ostovtsev, vernuvshikhsia domoi. Rasskaz Galiny Andreevny Kravchenko (Donetskaia oblast', Ukraina)," in Georgii Verbitskii (ed. and intro.), Ostarbaitery: istoriia rossiian, nasil'stvenno vyvezennykh na raboty v Germaniiu vo vremia Vtoroi mirovoi voiny (St. Petersburg, 2004), p. 52. 181 "Usni istorii. Korobenko Mykhailo Mytrofanovych," in "...To bula nevolia, " p. 392.

81 from Koch's fiefdom, Reichskommissariat Ukraine. The ensuing winter and frequent conflicts with the Wehrmacht prevented Sauckel from obtaining higher numbers of laborers. However, he had cause for congratulating himself because for the first time in the war, employment in the Reich had reached the 1939 level.

At this time Sauckel was facing increasing criticism from other German institutions and individuals. The Wehrmacht and Rosenberg's Ostministerium in particular began criticizing Sauckel's Werbung methods. Otto Brautigam, a deputy in the Political Department of the Ostministerium, echoed these concerns in his note of October 1942:

In the prevailing unlimited abuse of the Slavic humanity

"recruiting" methods were used, which probably have their origin

in the blackest periods of the slave trade. A veritable manhunt set

in. Without regard for state of health or age, human beings were

being shipped to Germany like freight, and it became clear, once

they had arrived, that more than 100,000 had to be sent home

because of severe illness or other disabilities. It requires no

Belorusskie ostarbaitery: istoriko-analiticheskoe issledovanie, p. 60; Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, p. 144. On the number of Ostarbeiter from Reichskommissariat Ukraine, see "Okkupatsiia: Obzor meropriiatii germanskikh vlastei na vremenno okupirovannoi territorii, podgotovlennyi na osnove trofeinykh dokumentov, inostrannoi pechati i agenturnykh materialov, postupivshykh s iiunia 1941 g. po mart 1943 g.," in D. Koval'chenko et al. (eds.), Neizvestnaia Rossiia. XXvek (Moscow, 1994). Vol. 4, pp. 235-330 (p. 319 cited), citing Deutsche-Ukraine Zeitung for January 1943.

82 elaboration to understand that these methods - which of course are

not being applied in this form to nationals of enemy countries like

Holland or Norway, but only to the Soviet Union - have their

repercussions on the resistance of the Red Army.

Even some civil administrators questioned such an approach. In his letter to Erich Koch, E. Wenck, an agriculture official in the Vasyl'kiv (Kyiv oblast)

Gebietskommissariat, and a man with an extensive Russian background, questioned the brutal nature of the Werbung. "Can we rule over this highly intelligent nation for a long period of time with such Genghis-Khan methods?"

Like most other moderates, he advocated more humane treatment to achieve the same practical goals as the radicals. His conclusion followed a typical colonial narrative, reminiscent of the British colonial administrators in India or Africa:

In the past we were known as a nation of thinkers and poets, today

we are workers and materialists, tomorrow, after the war we should

become the rulers... For the first time in history a nation can

benefit from the mismanagement of a mighty neighbour to

guarantee its own future security and domination... If we do not

succeed against a nation with a more or less feminine character,

without a ruling strata, almost without men who can carry a

183 294-PS, Nuremberg Trials; Dallin, German Rule in Russia, p. 444. TsDAVOV 3206/1/28, p. 12.

83 weapon, barely with any national sentiments, fatigued after a long

period of oppression and dulled by minority feelings - this nation

feels the need to rely on strong liberators whom it watches with

admiration and wants to obey. If we do not succeed, then, damn it,

we do not deserve anything!

Unlike some German civilian bureaucrats, the Wehrmacht was an

institution that could not be simply ignored. As early as March 1942 the High

Command of the Wehrmacht expressed concern in a letter to Sauckel over the treatment of the "Russian workers" in Germany similar to that meted out to

POWs. It demanded that they be fed on a par with other foreign workers, their wages increased to stimulate work productivity, and the dismantling of the

guarded enclosure. The authors of the letter concluded: "Russian labor is the most valuable catch that the German war industry has received so far in the Russian

campaign. Its preservation and utilization for improving work productivity is highly important."186

Starting in early summer 1942, the military began to raise concerns about the forced recruitment.187 By October 1942 the concern of the Wehrmacht was

185 Ibid, p. 14. "Predpolozheniia glavnogo komandovaniia vermakhta General'nomu upolnomochennomu po ispol'zovaniiu rabochei sily F. Zaukeliu ob ulutshenii uslovii truda vostochnykh rabochikh [25 marta 1942]," in Belorusskie ostarbaitery: ugon naseleniia Belarusi, (vol. 1), pp. 66-69. Pfahlmann, Fremdarbeiter und Kriegsgefangene, p. 50.

84 well known. The Wehrmacht was primarily worried about a possible popular uprising, intensification of guerrilla activity, a general disruption of order by the disgruntled population, and the stiffening resistance of the Red Army as a result of Soviet propaganda's exploitation of the Germans' maltreatment of Soviet workers. As emphasized in a report from Army Sector B, the violent implementation of the Werbung was sparking popular discontent, which "is contributing to more people joining the [partisan] bands or swinging into the

Bandera camp or other groups that are hostile to us."

Motivated by these fears, Field Marshal von Kleist, the chief of Army

Group "B" (formerly "South") stipulated in his order of 17 February 1943 that

"recruitment must take place only on a voluntary basis, since the residents of the

Crimea and Ukraine are to be considered our allies."1 Some military commanders followed suit. Sauckel complained about these military orders to

Hitler on 10 March 1943.191 The Fuhrer stepped in to overrule the ban on the use of force in the Werbung. In addition, Sauckel increased his authority in a series of decrees issued by Hitler. One of them, dated March 1943, gave him absolute

According to the Ostministerium's representative, "the question of the treatment of Ukrainian Ostarbeiter causes considerable worry among the Army agencies." Dallin, German Rule in Russia, p. 441.

1 RQ 0-54 PS, Nuremberg Trials. It summarized, "After all, we are not at war with the Ukrainian population and certainly not with people, who by their voluntary enlistment for labor help us to win the war". Dallin, German Rule in Russia, p. 441. 191 407-PS, Nuremberg Trials.

85 control over regional labor offices. Sauckel used his newly-expanded authority to appoint his close friend Peukert to run the Labor Department in the

Ostministerium. Rosenberg lost control of the Werbung. With Koch's support and his expanded powers Sauckel could now simply ignore Rosenberg's protests.

With Hitler's intervention on his behalf, Sauckel won the confrontation, and his authority over the recruitment of "Eastern labor" was no longer openly questioned.

After the crucial defeat of Nazi Germany in Stalingrad and the complete conversion of the Reich's economy into a war economy a new labor force was required. However, the procurement of new Ostarbeiter was seriously disrupted in the winter of 1942-43. It dropped to less than 30 per cent of the previous level and regained full momentum only in April 1943. At least 50,000 refugees retreated to Ukraine with the German troops from southern Russia in January-

February 1943; most of them were Don or Kuban Cossacks and Muslim ethnic groups from the North Caucasus. Sauckel's agency was eager to tap this new workforce. Many of these refugees voluntarily went to the Reich to escape Soviet retributions.

During the winter 1943 offensive, the Red Army pushed the Wehrmacht out of Voroshylovhrad oblast and a smaller part of Stalino oblast. On February 26 the Soviet army retook Kharkiv, but the Germans seized it back a month later.

Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, pp. 159-60; Belorusskie ostarbaitery: istoriko-analiticheskoe issledovanie, p. 49.

86 The front stabilized until late summer 1943. In newly "liberated" Kharkiv labor officials counted 40,000 to 50,000 residents between the ages of 14 and 25. They expected many of them would go to Germany willy-nilly to escape the famine raging in the devastated city. The first transport left the city on 24 April with only

306 workers. Despite expectations, the "recruitment was difficult since there were very few volunteers."

In February 1943 Sauckel ordered the recruitment of 180,000 more

Ostarbeiter for the first quarter of the year, 150,000 of them from Ukraine. Then he set a new goal of sending 5000 Ostarbeiter per day starting from 15 March:

4000 of them were to come from Ukraine. The rate was doubled to 10,000 per day from 1 April. One million more "Eastern workers" were to be brought to the

Third Reich within the next four months, at least 800,000 of them Ukrainians.194

The third drive was overwhelmingly focused on Ukraine, as the Werbung was increasingly undermined in other areas. In early 1943 the Reich lost almost all of its occupied Russian regions (the rest were turned into operational zones), while large areas of Belarus were controlled by Soviet partisans, and the recruitment there was limited to large cities. In addition, the Wehrmacht continued to hold back the skilled labor and reserved a considerable number of workers for its own needs. So, the ratio of workers from Ukraine in 1943 was even higher than planned, and the Reichskommissariat Ukraine supplied a disproportionally large share. The Werbung assumed the most brutal forms there.

Polian, Zhertvy dvukh diktatur, pp. 188, 203. 019-PS; 3012-PS, Nuremberg Trials.

87 The campaign gained foil momentum once the weather improved in April

1943. In the second part of that month Sauckel made another trip to Ukraine, during which his representatives prepared him a gift. During an ostentatious ceremony the 1000 transport was dispatched to Germany on 20 April, Hitler's birthday.195

At this time the Werbung was modified to targeting specific age groups.

Initially, the total deportation to the Third Reich was ordered for those born between 1922 and 1925 (i.e., 18-21-year olds). Village elders and raion chiefs had to compile a list of all individuals born in those years, separated by gender and year of birth, and send them to the Gebietskommissars. Each year was expected to include 2 per cent of the entire population and, correspondingly, 6 percent for the three given years. If the number of people born in these years in a particular settlement was lower than 6 percent, other age groups were to be added to make up the "shortage." Each settlement was supposed to supply for work in Germany at least 6 percent of the population. The raion chiefs and village elders were to be punished if a list was incomplete or falsified "deliberately or through negligence."196

This time no exemptions were granted on social or specialist grounds. A

Gebietskommissar, however, could issue a very limited number of exceptions for indispensable workers. These types of workers, as well as those exempted on medical grounds, received a special "exemption document"

Polian, Zhertvy dvukh diktatur, p. 192. 196 "Reichswerbung; Einziehung von Jahrgangen," in TsDAVOV 3206/2/185, pp. 4- 4 (reverse).

88 (Riickstellungsausweis), explaining the reason for the exemption. A registry of all exemption cases was maintained on the Gebiet level to preclude forgery.197

Later, the Werbung commissioners began recruiting the 1926-27 age group (16-17-year olds). It followed a similar procedure. All persons in the given age group were told to show up on a specific day for the registration. Businesses and organizations were ordered to stop employing them. A typical announcement for Kamianets'-PodiPs'kyi stated:

All residents of the city of Kamianets'-Podil's'lcyi born in the

years 1920, 1921, 1922, 1923, 1924, 1925, and 1926, who do not

have an exemption note from the Labor Office, should appear on 8

August 1943 at the labor camp office for a medical exam. Those

who evade the two-year labor duty in Germany will be regarded as

partisans and punished accordingly.

After 9 August 1943 managers employing persons born in the

years 1920-1926, who do not have a note exempting them from

going to Germany, will be considered as sabotaging the regulation

1 OS of the German authorities.

Ibid. For military areas, "Durchfurung der Verordnung iiber Arbeitspflicht und Arbeitseinsatz im Operationsgebiet der neu besetzten Ostgebiete vom 6.2.43," in DAKhO 3086/1/21, pp. 23-24.

1 OS Podolianyn, 5 August 1943; Hal'chak, "Skhidni robitnyky" z Podillia, p. 98; For a similar order for Kyiv, see "27 kvitnia 1943. Rozporiadzhennia heneralkomisara Kyieva pro mobilizatsiiu vs'oho naselennia 1922-1925 rokiv

89 It was much easier to register and fish out all individuals of a certain age than to look for a "non-essential" workforce, which led to many bureaucratic squabbles. Teenagers between the ages of 16 and 21, and especially 16 to 18 year olds, represented mainly unqualified labor (there was very little professional training done in the previous two years of the German occupation), which could be replaced more easily than older and generally more skilled workers. There were many more 16-19 year-old men than their older compatriots, since they had not been eligible for the Red Army draft in 1941. The deportation of these men to the Reich meant that, in the event of the Germans' retreat, they would not expand enemy ranks - a definite point to consider.

Another innovative feature of the fourth recruitment drive was that entire families were sent to Germany, including small children, who were placed in special kindergartens while their parents and older brother(s) or sister(s) worked.

Security screening was also almost non-existent.

At this stage popular resistance assumed large-scale proportions, which only increased the brutality and ferocity with which the occupation authorities tried to meet the assigned quota. People were summarily detained during house searches and large police raids on streets and in markets, churches, etc. It was explained to local administrators that the procurement of laborers for the Reich

narodzhennia dlia vidbuvannia prymusovoi' pratsi holovnym chynom v Nimechchyni," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/242, p. 145.

90 was their most important responsibility.1 9 As acknowledged by Zhytomyr

Generalkommissar Ernst Leyser during a conference with Rosenberg in June

1943,

It is certain that recruitment of labor, in this sense of the word, can

hardly be spoken of. In most cases, nowadays it is a matter of

actual conscription by force... I have consequently authorized the

commissioners of the areas to apply the severest measures in order

to achieve the imposed quota... The problem of labor mobilization

cannot be handled with white gloves.200

By June 1943, according to German statistical data, the number of

"Eastern workers" in Germany had reached nearly 2 million (1.982 million).201 A

909 few months later, in November 1943, their number dropped to 1.8 million.

Sauckel was satisfied with having achieved this number "despite the greatest difficulties." He credited his subordinates, who had done their job "with the greatest fanaticism and devotion."

199 Jonathan Steinberg, "The Third Reich Reflected: German Administration in the Occupied Soviet Union, 1941-44," in The English Historical Review, Vol. 110, No. 437 (June 1995), pp. 620-51 (p. 638 cited). 265-PS, Nuremberg Trials. 201 Dallin, German Rule in Russia, pp. 431, 451 (table). Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, p. 148. 203 407-IX-PS, Nuremberg Trials.

91 With the failure of Operation "Citadel" in July 1943, the Wehrmacht

resumed its retreat. By October 1943 the Soviet troops retook almost all of Left-

Bank Ukraine. Reminiscent of the Red Army tactics earlier in the war, the Nazis

initiated, on orders from Himmler, the scorched-earth policy and forced

evacuation of the population. However, the rapid advance of the Red Army

disrupted these plans. Only 847,000 people had been evacuated from the

abandoned areas with a population of 11,035,000, and only 380,000 crossed the

Dnipro (Dnepr) River by the end of September.204 Priority in the evacuation was

given to skilled workers and scientists, who were sent straight to the Reich.

Despite Sauckel's expectation, the total number of recruited workers from the

abandoned territories was very low - 8611. The Wehrmacht sent the rest for

construction of fortifications. By mid-December their numbers somewhat increased: 35,000 refuges and evacuated people were sent to Germany, 9 percent

of the total number.206

Even in Right-Bank Ukraine the Labor Exchange and Recruitment Office

stopped playing a major role in the Werbung with the approaching front and ensuing disorganization. People were summarily detained during police round­ ups. The detainees were sorted into those who looked "fit for labor" and loaded onto trains. Often whole families with small children were selected. They usually

204 "liber die Wirtschaft des Reichskommissariates Ukraine fur September 1943," in TsDAVOV 3206/6/243, p. 8. Nazi reports indicated that only less than 10 per cent of the population was evacuated voluntarily. 205 Ibid, pp. 7-9. Polian, Zhertvy dvukh diktatur, p. 201.

92 underwent medical check-ups only in a transit camp in the General-Government.

Some recruits were forced to walk several hundred kilometers to the nearest railway station. The deportation was especially frustrating for the Ostarbeiter who

907 were captured in the last days of the German occupation. They were the most likely to attempt an escape.

During this period there was still a certain number of volunteers, most of whom were refugees fleeing from Soviet retributions. For them, working in

Germany was the fastest way to the West. In Melitopil' (Zaporizhzhia oblast) 589 people out of 17,840 refugees volunteered, and in Zaporizhzhia - 552 out of

1982.208

The following year, 1944, brought a new program devised by Sauckel.

The goal of the fourth recruitment drive was to supply the German economy with a record 4.2 million workers. The majority of them would come from Italy and

France. With the major part of Right-Bank Ukraine still in German hands in early

1944, Sauckel set a quota for it too. The occupied "Eastern territories" were supposed to produce 350,000 Ostarbeiter, 200,000 of them from Ukraine and the

Crimea.209 Logistical problems, the rapid advance of the front, the chaotic

"Spohady. Komendantova (Vitvyts'ka) Valeriia Mykolai'vna," in "...To bula nevolia," pp. 171-73; "Spohady. Rudniev Ievhen Mykolaiovych," in "...To bula nevolia," p. 234. 90S Pfahlmann, Fremdarbeiter und Kriegsgefangene, p. 58. Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, p. 149; Polian, Zhertvy dvukh diktatur, p. 208; 1292-PS, Nuremberg Trials.

93 situation near the frontlines, and the population's large-scale efforts to avoid

deportation to Germany seriously impeded Sauckel's new plan. However, the

fourth drive was facilitated by the availability of many thousands of refugees, most of whom were moving westwards on foot. As in late 1943, the retreating

Nazis tried to take away the entire "able-bodied" population from the abandoned territories. In January-February 1944 alone, 284,000 people were evacuated from

910

Ukraine and the Crimea, some of whom were recruited for labor in Germany.

The fourth drive did not last long in Ukraine. Between late March and early April 1944 the Red Army retook all the territory of the Reichskommissariat, with the exception of the westernmost part of Volhynia. The Werbung came to an end in Ukraine. During the last recruitment drive approximately 211,000

Ostarbeiter were sent from Ukraine and the Crimea, 141,000 of them in the first 911 quarter of the year. ***

Over the course of the war a total of 2.8 million Ostarbeiter were brought to Germany, roughly 1.4 million each from areas under military and civilian administration. Out of this number, 2.3 million "Eastern workers" came from

Ukraine (82 percent), 920,000 of them from the Army Rear Areas (40 percent).212

Potyl'chak, Trudovi resursy, p. 26. 911 Muller, "Die Rekrutierung sowjetischer Zwangsarbeiter," pp. 236 [table], 246. 919 Dallin, German Rule in Russia, p. 452; Muller, "Die Rekrutierung sowjetischer Zwangsarbeiter", p. 234. The figure for the military area includes the recruits from Reichskommissariat Ukraine, when it came again under the military administration during the German retreat in 1943-44.

94 These numbers alone demonstrate the efficiency of the Nazi bureaucratic machinery despite its well-known institutional squabbles. Governed by Weberian principles of state bureaucracy and deprived of any ethical restraint, the Nazi administrators were able to procure for the Third Reich the intended number of

Ukrainian forced laborers. The procurement was achieved through a combination of complex bureaucratic measures of registration, control, and surveillance with the brutal application of sheer force.

The number differed regionally and within the same region. Many factors came into play: urban or rural area, proximity to the frontline, durability of the occupation, proportion of the Jewish population,213 arbitrariness of the Nazi quota, and partisan presence. The latter was especially relevant in the northern part of Ukraine. Twelve percent of the population (76,185 people) became

Ostarbeiter in Zhytomyr oblast. In some raions, however, this figure rose between

20 and 28 percent (28 percent in IanushpiP, 24 percent in IemiFchyne, and 20 percent in Liubar).214 Rivne oblast, which was more "partisan infested," supplied the smallest number of Ostarbeiter (22,272).215 This factor was the only one that

Sauckel's planners could do nothing about.

The extermination of the Jews in areas with the high Jewish presence (most of Right Bank Ukraine) put a strain on local economy. An additional number of Ukrainian workers was required to replace the Jews. 214 O. Strel'tsova, "Zhytomyrshchyna pid chas nimets'ko-fashysts'koi okupatsii" [dissertation], in TsDAVOV 4620/3/264, p. 41. Patsula and Sorokhan, "Zaruchnyky Druhoi' svitovo'i," in Ostarbaitery: spohady zhyteliv Rivnenshchyny, p. 11.

95 Chapter II:

"Like in the old days in Shanghai":

German Propaganda and Popular Response to the

Werbung

German propaganda units poured into Ukraine together with the advancing German troops in the summer and fall of 1941. From the outset, they distributed numerous leaflets giving promises to the conquered population, which the Nazi policy makers did not even contemplate to follow. German propaganda contributed to the initial moderately friendly attitude of Ukrainians to the new rulers, but the realities of Nazi policy in the occupied "eastern territories" brought to nil the propagandists' efforts, gradually changing the moods of the population.

Development of the German propaganda campaign for the Werbung followed the same paradigm.

The large-scale propaganda campaign for the recruitment of labor to

Germany began in late December 1941. Announcements about voluntary departures to Germany appeared in local newspapers, on large posters, in leaflets and brochures, broadcast on radio and loudspeakers, and read out in churches.

Propagandistic messages also appeared in newsreels preceding the feature film presentations.

96 Volunteers were promised decent working and living conditions, a good salary and food; their relatives were to receive financial benefits and food coupons. One of the first such calls by Zhytomyr's Stadtkommissar and Labor

Exchange was published in a local newspaper:

Ukrainian men and women! The Bolshevik Commissars have

destroyed your factories in order to leave you without a salary and

bread. The German nation is giving you an opportunity to obtain a

useful and well-paid job. During the period of your employment in

Germany your families at home will receive adequate support.

Volunteers for work in Germany have to appear at the Zhytomyr

Labor Exchange (Selians'ka Street, 10) on Friday, 9 January 1942,

and on Saturday, 10 January 1942 between 7:30 a.m. and 4:00

p.m.216

A similar announcement, published in the Proskuriv (now

Khmel'nyts'kyi) newspaper Ukrains'kyi Holos (The Ukrainian Voice), promised free room and board and a salary of 40 to 80 Pfennigs daily depending on qualifications.217 "Great Germany has decided to help the Ukrainian population, which is suffering from unemployment and misery brought about by the war and

216 TsDAVOV, 4620/3/262, p. 36; for Kyiv, see Nove ukrains'ke slovo, 11 January 1942, for Rivne region, Patsula and Sorokhan, "Zaruchnyky Druhoi' svitovoi'," pp. 5-6. 217 Ukrains'kyi Holos, 29 January 1942.

97 the Bolshevik devastation. There is work and bread available for many; houses are not destroyed and [are] in good condition." The announcement ended with the words: "Ukrainians! Get to know the Fiihrer's country; sign up to join the workers' ranks of Great Germany."218

A worker was supposed to earn enough money in Germany to buy a plot of land and build a house after the war. Newspapers and posters also cited

Reichskommissar Koch, who promised that those working in Germany would be given priority in the land distribution after the disbandment of the kolkhoz system.

At the same time, agitation posters appealing for people to go to Germany appeared in offices, public places, and on the streets. Leaflets were also printed en masse. During the first eight months of 1942 the Propaganda Department of

Reichskommissariat Ukraine distributed 1.2 million posters, 700,000 brochures, and 1.1 million leaflets.220 A total of 350,000 pieces of agitational materials were

991 distributed in July alone. A pro-Werbung leaflet distributed in various regions of Ukraine in multiple versions in the Ukrainian and Russian languages followed a standard pattern:

219 Kostopil's'ki Visti [Rivne oblast], 31 May 1942. Cited from Patsula and Sorokhan, "Zaruchnyky Druhoi svitovoi'," p. 6. 220 "Auszug aus den Lagebericht des Generalkommissars, Kiew" [1 September 1942], in TsDAVOV 3676/4/307, p. 64. 99 I Potyl'chak, Trudovi resursy, p. 20.

98 Workers! The German army liberated you from Stalin's oppression

and the terror of the Judeo-Bolshevik commissars. The Bolsheviks

demolished your factories, destroyed a large proportion of your

buildings, economies, and foodstuff. They deprived you of most of

the means of existence.

GERMANY CAN AND WANTS TO HELP YOU

• In Germany you will receive work and bread. • We will offer you good and humane treatment. • We will provide you with an adequate diet. • Your family will not suffer deprivation. • You will be able to correspond freely with your families. • You can spend your free time in Germany according to your own needs and interests.

If you are going to work in Germany now, you and your family will receive an advantage during the partitioning of land and the organization of artisan and handicraft businesses.

We call on you to guarantee a safe and happy future for yourself

999 and your family with your work in German industry.

Additionally, other leaflets promised the same living conditions and food as those offered to German or foreign workers from other European countries.

One of them listed the price of bread, meat, milk, and other staples in Germany as well as clothing. It included also information on the weekly food-rationing norm

999 DAKhO "Fond lystivok periodu Velyko'i Vitchyznianoi' viiny," p. 21. This leaflet was distributed in Russian in Kharkiv oblast. For a very similar leaflet in Ukrainian in Podillia region see Hal'chak, "Skhidni robitnyky" z Podillia, p. 56.

99 for workers. According to the leaflet, life in the Third Reich was so good for

Russian workers223 that the number of sick people dropped there to 2 out of every

100 workers from 20-25 per 100 in Russia. This was the result of a better climate and living conditions for Russian workers in Germany.224 The leaflet emphasized opportunities for a volunteer to upgrade his qualifications or acquire "new knowledge, learn German customs and habits, the German way of life [poriadki] and work, which he will be able to use in the future in his life and work at home."225

Although Hitler and his entourage on many occasions explicitly ruled out the "civilizing mission" in its traditional colonial sense for Ukrainians and

Russians, who were to be treated "with whips like niggers," the civilizing discourse was permitted in propaganda. Pictures in the newspapers, posters, and traveling exhibits showed images of happy German peasants and workers living in spacious houses, enjoying a plentiful supply of food, or relaxing at a summer

A number of German propaganda material distributed in eastern Ukraine, particularly on the territory under the military administration, referred to the local population as "Russians." Sometimes it was even the case in Right-Bank Ukraine. Some of that material was printed in Germany for all Soviet territories. It also depended on the personal preferences of the German chiefs and the political orientation of the employed native staff. 224 "Usloviia zhizni i raboty dlia edushchikh v Germaniiu," in DAKhO "Fond lystivok periodu Velyko'i Vitchyznianoi' viiny," pp. 32-33 (page numbers not very legible). 225 Ibid.

100 resort.226 Ukrainian newspapers were overwhelmed with stories about life in

"beautiful Great Germany," the "land of true socialism," the best country in the

world in terms of economy, technology, standard of living, social welfare, and

culture. In one of its April 1942 issues the Stalino-based newspaper published a

typical article couched in excited terms:

The new land opened up before our eyes, with its huge, carefully

built plants, factories, beautiful houses with streets clean as

mirrors, and nice, educated people. We have not seen this in

Russia. Here we became really convinced that Great Germany,

which liberated us from the Bolshevik yoke, would bring us

happiness, freedom, and culture. No doubt about it.227

Occupation newspapers, posters, and leaflets repeatedly emphasized such

"German qualities" as order, cleanliness, love of work, high moral standards, and

sense of justice. Ukrainian workers were promised to undergo a certain "civilizing

German propaganda generally put a heavy emphasis on the pictorial part of the message. Even its leaflets usually came along with appropriate pictures and photos. This was probably a direct consequence of the conviction of propaganda officials that, "the primitive character of the population accords with the fact that a pictorial representation made more of an impression on them than did printed statements and tables of figures." See Theo J. Schulte, The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia (Oxford, 1989), p. 155. 227 Bukalov, "Ostarbaitery Donbassa," pp. 158-59.

101 process," acquiring new specialties, habits, and even morale. As suggested in one poster:

Right now, You are being given a great opportunity to study in the

most technically equipped, and the most culturally advanced

country - Germany. In the old days, young persons were very

happy if they had a chance to go to study in Germany. Now You

are being called in.

UNDERSTAND THIS!

DO NOT EVADE THE TRIP TO GERMANY!228

Appealing to the parents of would-be Ostarbeiter, the poster continued its glorification of Germany:

Let your children see the world, let them see how the nation that

became the world victor ["svitovym peremozhtsem"] through its

culture, its knowledge, and development, lives. Let your children

work where they are going to see real culture. You will see them

again at home, but this time they are going to be equipped with

everything that makes your children strong and happy. Man is

strong and happy only when he can do good work and knows how

"Do ukrains'koi molodi ta Ti bat'kiv" in DAKhO "Fond lystivok periodu Velykoi" Vitchyznianoi' viiny," p. 14 (page number not very legible).

102 to do it. This is exactly what Your children will bring You from

229 Germany.

German propaganda described employment in Germany as a Ukrainian patriotic duty, and Germany's victory was presented as being in the best interests of Ukraine. "You are defending your Motherland while you are working in

Germany!" Newspapers, especially in Right-Bank Ukraine or the Kyiv region, sometimes pointed out that Germany was fighting an "intense war against ... the eternal enemy of Ukraine - Red Moscow." A future economic benefit of the work in Germany for Ukraine was also mentioned: acquired knowledge would help to rebuild the Ukrainian economy after the war:

Ukrainian youth! Think what a great task awaits you after the end

of the war. The country that was exploited for 23 years by the

Judeo-Muscovite Commune and from which all the life-blood was

sucked out, should be reborn, should assume the very economic

role in the life of our continent that it is destined to do on account

of its riches. What great work waits for You! Ukrainian youth, you

will do this work!

229 Ibid 230 Podolianyn [Kamianets'-Podil's'kyi], 18 June 1942. 231 Podolianyn, 20 May 1943.

103 Ukrainian workers were contributing to the all-European struggle against

"Bolshevik oppression and the Jewish yoke." Newspapers, posters, and leaflets called for a joint struggle. "You too should work for the victory of Europe. Sign up for work in Germany." "The workers of the East are doing their best in

Germany's factories, plants, and farms, while qualified German workers are helping to bring order to life in the East." "Those who stand aside [from the joint work] are helping Bolshevism, since they exclude themselves from the family of

European nations and want to live at the expense of others."

Subsequent messages emphasized labor duty as everyone's responsibility:

"At a time when young Germans are going to the front and will not be coming

9^4 home until the war is over, Ukrainian youth must perform its labor duty." For every German worker replaced by a foreign worker, a new soldier is sent to the frontline.

To achieve victory the German army is fighting and shedding its

blood, and the German economy is working. There are many

millions of men and women, representatives of all the European

nations, working in Germany. While German soldiers sacrifice

232 Ukrains'ki visti, 30 September 1942. See also "Informatsiinyi material dlia propahandystiv," in the State Archive of Khmel'nyts'kyi oblast (further DAKhmO) 420/1/1, (page number not very legible). 233 Holos Poltavshchyny [Poltava], 10 May 1942. 234 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, p. 254. See also "Informatsiinyi material dlia propahandystiv," in (DAKhmO) 420/1/1, (page number not very legible).

104 their lives and blood, the workers of Europe provide their strength

for the victory.235

Ukrainians should not complain, according to the propaganda messages, as the Germans are stoically making far greater sacrifices.

At home in Ukraine we can often hear grumbling about Adolf

Hitler taking people away to work in Germany. However, in order

to achieve the final victory Germany is not requiring any greater

sacrifice of the Ukrainian nation than the Germans themselves are

making on a far greater scale.

"Can labor duty be compared with the sacrifice on the battlefield?"237 As

German propaganda explained, Ukrainians are not required to make a larger sacrifice than any other European nation.

It was explained that labor conscription was applicable to every European nation, all of whom were treated equally. In this regard, the Werbung was sometimes described as Ukraine's cooperation with Europe or even a return to the

235 "Hromadiany Kharkova!"; "Spetsialistamy v Nimechchynu!," in DAKhO "Fond lystivok periodu Velykoi' Vitchyznianoi" viiny," pp. 20; 31 (page numbers not very legible). See also Nove ukrains 'ke slovo, 14 April 1942. 236 Nove ukrains 'ke slovo, 11 October 1942. See also "Informatsiinyi material dlia propahandystiv," in DAKhmO 420/1/1, (page number not very legible). Nove ukrains 'ke slovo, 15 November 1942.

105 European civilization through a common struggle against the enemies of Europe -

"barbaric Bolshevism and plutocratic Britain and the USA." "The New Europe is calling you! Show that you [young Ukrainians] are worthy to join our great family

- the family of European nations."

The propaganda machine sometimes presented the labor recruitment as a process of learning. In its article "For Study in Germany," a Kyivan newspaper noted:

The recruitment has begun of 14-18 year-old youths, who will go

to Central Germany for educational work. Working in different

fields for one year, the youths will obtain productive skills of

certain qualifications, learn cultural work, and harden themselves

physically.239

The newspaper mentioned 1,400 of these "students" in the first transport; several more were expected the following month. Apparently, the "students" did not suspect that they would be treated like POWs during their period of "study."

"A peasant will learn in Germany a lot of [things], which he cannot learn here [in Ukraine]" - emphasized a brochure with guidelines for local propagandists.

Podolianyn, 20 May 1943. See also "Informatsiinyi material dlia propahandystiv," in DAKhmO 420/1/1, (page number not very legible). Nove ukrains 'ke slovo, 29 April 1942.

106 When he comes to work in [German] factories, he will familiarize

himself with the modern machinery and modern equipment. After

coming back [home], he will be proud of what he has learned and

seen. And all of those who stayed here, they will look at him with

jealousy and astonishment. When he tells them of what he has seen

and experienced in Germany, some of his fellow countrymen ...

will regret they haven't been in the Reich.240

In a more sophisticated approach, the propaganda appealed to young people to "come to their senses" and stop avoiding the Werbung by remembering that they are required to perform labor duty in peaceful conditions only, while their peers in the "as yet unliberated areas" are being conscripted into the Red

Army:

How many of them are not going to come back home? How much

suffering will they endure even if they survive? And if they come

back, are they not going to be cripples for the rest of their life?

THINK ABOUT THEM, ONLY ABOUT THEM, when you are

called to do peaceful work for the common good!

240 "Informatsiinyi material dlia propahandystiv," in DAKhmO 420/1/1, (page number not very legible).

107 Do you think they would not prefer work in peaceful conditions if

they were given a chance to swap places with you?241

With the aid of this rhetorical device, German propaganda was apparently trying to make the most of popular comparisons of life on both sides of the frontline. It exploited the fact that many young men in the occupied territories had escaped conscription to the Red Army in the first months of the war and did not

949 want to be drawn into the war again.

Another comparison with Soviet reality was of a more dubious quality.

Claims, such as, "Without a doubt, Stalin would not ask you to volunteer for the work, he simply ships people whom he wants," could not be taken without a pinch of irony.243 Everybody was perfectly aware of the actual methods behind the

Werbung.

In another field of propaganda, movie theatres throughout Ukraine screened a newsreel entitled "The Road to Germany." It showed happy people boarding a train and smiling from the windows of the moving cars. They arrive in beautiful Germany: clean, neat, and with excellent roads. The smiling newcomers put on new clothing that has been issued to them and pull on shiny boots. They 241 Uriadovi Dunaievyts'ki visti [Dunaievets'], 4 June 1943, cited from Hal'chak, "Skhidni robitnyky" z Podillia, p. 97. 242 A Nazi report about the population mood in Kyiv in early 1943 pointed out that although the majority sympathize the Soviets, they are afraid of being conscripted to the Red Army. See "Lagebericht von 1.7.1943 - 25.8.1943," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/476, p. 208. 243 Nove ukrains 'ke slovo, 15 November 1942.

108 start to work. The men are shown driving teams of sleek horses, and the women are hugging fat pedigreed cows. A rest break starts as the sun is setting. The

Ostarbeiter arrange themselves along the edge of an enchanting pond and start singing a Ukrainian folksong, while the good-natured German boss quietly appears, sits down, and, smiling affectionately, listens to their singing in a fatherly

244 way.

In the city, the recruitment to the Reich was also promoted by mobile propaganda exhibits. In Kharkiv, one such exhibit, entitled "Ukrainians Are

Working in Germany," opened on 28 September 1942 at the hall of the city uprava. Visitors could view a photographic display about work in Germany and get brochures with such titles as "Friend, I'll help You, I'm Going to Germany" or

"Your Work in Germany Is Helping to Destroy Bolshevism."245 A similar exhibit was organized in Kyiv by the Museum of the Transition Period (Muzei

Perekhidno'i Doby) under the direction of Prof. Oleksander Ohloblyn.

Beginning in late spring 1942, the Werbung propaganda took a new turn.

A number of articles appeared about Ukrainian workers on leave from Germany visiting their parents and family. To give their stories some credibility, full names and sometimes the addresses of the "interviewees" were given, often from a different region, so that readers could not verify the information. Occupation newspapers also published numerous "letters" that Ostarbeiter had sent to their families and friends. These letters also appeared on posters and in leaflets. The Anatolii Kuznetsov, Babi Yar: A Documentary Novel (New York, 1967), pp. 263-64. 245 Meliakov, "Mobilizatsionnye aktsii v okkupirovannom Khar'kove," p. 186.

109 Propaganda Department of Generalbezirk Mykolaiv alone printed 3000 posters of these letters. Purportedly, they had a certain propagandistic success, since they contained the full texts of the letters with the addresses of the recipients.

The authors of these letters described their happy life in Germany, denying the rumours about maltreatment, discrimination, and bad working and living conditions. "I live in a hotel room where there is plenty of everything," an alleged

Ostarbeiter claims in her letter.247 Another newspaper cited: "We have ... large, bright, and warm rooms; a radio, piano, library, and various entertainments."

One of the letters summarized, "I've never even dreamed of being so well accepted.... Now I'm sleeping on a soft bed such as I've never slept on in my life."249 "Life is so good that it can't be better," - repeated another letter.250

The letters also showed the writers' admiration for the German lifestyle, and German cleanliness and order. One of them excitedly pointed out that every

German worker and peasant owns a bicycle - one can even see a 70-year-old woman herding cows to the pasture on a bike. The Vinnytsia newspaper informed its readers that one of these joyful letters, from a certain Hanna

Levchuk, convinced her father to send his second daughter to Germany. Photos

4 Potyl'chak, Trudovi resursy, pp. 20-21. Wendy Lower, Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine (Chapel Hill, 2005), p. 123. 248 Nova Shepetivshchyna [Shepetivka], 2 April 1942; Podolianyn, 16 April 1942. 249 Ukrains 'ki visti, 27 May 1942. 250 Podolianyn, 26 May 1942. 251 RidnyiKrai [Bohodukhiv, Kharkiv oblast], 1 August 1943. 252 Vinnyts 'ki visti, 26 March 1942.

110 of nicely dressed and happy Ukrainians going to restaurants, movies, and cabarets

after work were also published. A propaganda poster summed up this line: "Only now do we, who accepted that offer and are living in Germany, understand why

Stalin erected a wall around us and why he did everything to prevent us from finding out what was happening in the last ten years in Germany, the land of true socialism."253

The letters sometimes went on to preach in detail what Ukrainians must do to achieve the German level. "In order to live as well as people live in Germany... we have to help the Germans once and for all get rid of the Jews and the communists; we have to learn from the Germans how to live and work like human beings," suggests the writer of a letter published in the Kharkiv newspaper Nova

Ukraina (New Ukraine).254

Another propagandistic measure was a copycat of the Stalinist industrialization drive of the 1930s. On 9 July 1942 the director of the Labor

Office in Chernihiv awarded the 350,000th Ukrainian Ostarbeiter a watch and fifty rubles. His family received a basket of food. This story, headlined "The

350,000th Ukrainian Worker Goes to Germany," was displayed in large numbers on agitation posters, leaflets, and mobile exhibits. This propagandistic gesture allegedly received a positive response from the population. "[It] dispelled the

Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, p. 254. 254 Nova Ukraina, 24 April 1943. Cited from Meliakov, "Mobilizatsionnye aktsii v okkupirovannom Khar'kove," p. 186. Polian, Zhertvy dvukh diktatur, pp. 168, 176, 193; Verbitskii, Ostarbaitery: istoriia rossiian, p. 113.

Ill concerns of the departing [workers] about the welfare of their families that are left behind to a larger extent than numerous promises."256 Three weeks later, on 28

July, the propagandists staged a celebration in connection with the "400,000th

Ukrainian worker" going to the Reich.

In late 1942 German propaganda embarked on a new experiment: to enlist some Ostarbeiter as Werbung propagandists in Ukraine. According to a Nazi report, they achieved a certain success only in MykolaiV, while in other areas they

'yen were met with mistrust. Despite this setback, the experiment was continued the following year. Rosenberg's Ostministerium selected trustworthy Ostarbeiter and organized propaganda courses for them. Subsequently, several groups of graduates disguised as ordinary workers on vacation were sent to Ukraine for a

German-supervised propaganda tour. One of their tasks was to promote the

Werbung. Typically, a local administration in the countryside was notified in advance about the propagandists' visit to gather the population. In cities such

Dmytro Tytarenko, "Zvity batal'ionu propahandy 'U' iak dzherelo z pytannia pro vplyv natsysts'koi" propahandy na naselennia okupovano'i Ukrainy," in V. Voronin et al. (eds.), Druha svitova viina i dolia narodiv Ukrainy. Materialy Vseukrains 'ko'i naukovoi konferentsi'i. Kyiv, 23-24 nepenn 2005 p. (Kyiv, 2005), pp. 165-71 (cited p. 170). 257 "Wirtschaftliche Lage in der Ukraine," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 32 [4 December 1942]. "Vertrauliche Aussagen von in ihre Heimat auf Urlaub entsandter ukrainische Propagandisten," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/161, pp. 46-57; Pavel Polian mentions 30 Ostarbeiter propagandists, who under the code-name "Action Berlin" went on a propaganda tour to Stalino and Orel (Russia) after instruction in Berlin in summer 1943. This was probably the same group. Polian, Zhertvy dvukh diktatur, p. 202.

112 gatherings were usually held at a factory or movie theatre, and in towns - on the central square.

On the other hand, Nazi officials organized "familiarization trips" of handpicked workers on the living and working conditions of the Ostarbeiter. In one such case, three Ukrainian peasants from Zhytomyr even had an audience with Rosenberg.259 The "findings" of their trips were widely publicized. Both the

CtetariezYer-turned-propagandist tours across Ukraine and the "Ukrainian workers'" trips to Germany allegedly received a favorable response from the population.

The church was another institution involved in the propaganda for the

Werbung. Upon their arrival the German troops proclaimed the "end of the atheistic regime." Religious life resurfaced with renewed vibrancy. Churches were reopened and parishes quickly mushroomed. The German administration proclaimed religious freedom. Two major Ukrainian Orthodox Churches appeared

-a pro-Russian traditionalist Autonomous Church and a pro-nationalist

Autocephalous Church along with a large variety of Protestant denominations.

PotyFchak, Trudovi resursy, p. 20; Podolianyn, 2 May 1942. For Dnipropetrovs'k, see "Ohliad suspil'no-politychnoho, hospodars'koho i kul'turnoho zhyttia na pivdennykh zemliakh Ukrai'ny [veresen' 1942]," in Ukrains 'kyi zdvyh: Naddniprianshchyna, p. 97. The question of religious life in Ukraine during the German occupation is discussed in Berkhoff, "Was There a Religious Revival in Soviet Ukraine under the Nazi Regime?" in Slavonic and East European Review 78, no. 3 (July 2000),

113 Despite frequent German interference and certain limitations that were imposed on religious groups, especially after mid-1942, such a policy signaled a dramatic shift after the two decades of the Bolshevik decimation of organized religion.

Relative religious freedom was widely seen as the most positive aspect of German rule. As a result, the clergy remained one of the most loyal elements throughout the occupation.

Both Orthodox churches regularly read out calls for work in Germany during Sunday mass. Church leaders also made special public appeals. In May

1942 the Archbishop of Luts'k and Kovel and the administrator of the

Autocephalous Church, Polikarp (Sikors'kyi), called on Ukrainians to volunteer

"for their sacred duty and honor to produce workers on the anti-communist labor front." While the German army is spilling its blood in the fight against the

"horrible enemy of humankind and European Christian culture - Muscovite-

Jewish Communism - ... we must maintain the labor front together with the

German nation."

The Autonomous Church also appealed to the faithful to "fulfill the sacred labor duty." Archbishop Panteleimon of Kyiv "used every opportunity to point out in his messages to parishioners the Germans' merits in the liberation from

Bolshevism and everyone's obligation to support the German authorities, and

pp. 536-67; Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair (Chapter 10: Religion and Popular Piety), pp. 232-52. 261 State Archive of Volhynia oblast (further DAVO) R-69/1/310, p. 3. Polikarp's appeal with a similar content was published two months later in the press: Nove ukrains'ke slovo, 2 July 1942.

114 exercise sacrifice and patience until the final victory." Bishop Veniamin of

Poltava issued an appeal for people to go to Germany in November 1942. The message was published in the local press and distributed among the clergy to be read out during mass.

The German authorities recognized the significant role of the Church in propaganda. According to a Nazi official,

The Orthodox clergy have repeatedly put themselves at the

disposal of German propaganda. The clergy provided especially

noticeable support for the Werbung. [Orthodox] bishops made

statements to the press and handed their subordinates

psychologically well-prepared messages for delivery in churches.

The use of the Orthodox Church is of crucial importance, taking

into account the lack of propaganda, especially in the countryside,

and the huge influence of the church there.264

***

From the very beginning of the Werbung, the Soviet armed resistance was, for the obvious reasons, unconditionally opposed to it. Soviet partisans seriously

262 "Lagebericht fur den Generalbezirk Kiew Marz-April 1942," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/474, p. 549. 263 "Lagebericht fur November 1942 [Generalbezirk Kiew]," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/475, p. 719. 264 Ibid, pp. 718-19.

115 undermined the recruitment in Belarus and central and northern Russia, and from late 1942, in northern Ukraine. Soviet partisans and the underground circulated numerous leaflets against going to "German slavery," warning that this spelled certain death. In their propaganda they often tried to tap into Ukrainian national sentiments. One leaflet from Zhytomyr oblast called on the population to "help the Ukrainian freedom-fighters with anything that you can" and explained that the

"German hangmen are scattering the Ukrainians all around Europe so that they would not live together and never mention their Ukraine."

Soviet partisans killed German and local Ukrainian officials who administered or enforced the recruitment. In a number of cases, the partisans attacked police convoys with deportees to Germany or even trains. Soviet underground activists who had infiltrated the occupation administration supplied their compatriots with the "correct papers" to avoid the Werbung and tipped off the local population about impending police round-ups.

However, the attitude of the Soviet partisans toward the Ostarbeiter was ambiguous. They knew that a certain number of "Eastern workers" were going to

Germany voluntarily. In northern Volhynia, according to Nazi reports, the "Red

"1943r... Lystivka z zaklykom ne lkhaty na katorhu v Nimechchynu, rozpovsiudzhena Baryshivs'koiu pidpil'noiu orhanizatsiieiu," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/262, pp. 59-60.

116 bands" burned down the houses of volunteers. The partisans also blew up some

Ostarbeiter transports, although it is not clear if they did so deliberately.

Soviet activists began to scorn the Ostarbeiter, calling them weak people who did not have the guts to resist. This attitude heralded subsequent discrimination, yet there is only circumstantial evidence of its existence during the occupation. In their official propagandists materials the Soviet partisans and underground sympathized with the plight of the workers being deported to

Germany.

The Ukrainian nationalist organization OUN(b) (Banderites) found itself in an open confrontation with the Nazi authorities before the Werbung began.

They seemed to be opposed to it from the very beginning. As early as April 1942 the Security Police reported that the Banderites issued numerous leaflets calling on people to avoid the recruitment and offering advice on how to do this. Two months later the Nazis observed that the Bandera movement was "extremely negative" about the recruitment of workers to the Reich demanding that their members step up propaganda against it. In their orders Banderite regional

Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 30 [20 November 1942]; Pfahlmann, Fremdarbeiter und Kriegsgefangene, p. 51; Eikel, "Cherez brak liudei,"p. 153. 267 "Lagebericht fur den Generalbezirk Kiew. April 1942," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/474, p. 610. "Allgemeine Lage und Stimmung in der Ukraine. Arbeitseinsatz," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 7 [12 June 1942]. The report indicates that the Banderite propaganda does not have an effect on population so they spread "horror stories" about the treatment of the Ostarbeiter.

117 leaders required that the population be informed that the Ukrainians working in

Germany were enduring hunger and misfortune but also dying. Their

"Instructions on Propaganda" suggested using the following slogan:

We want to work neither for Moscow nor for the Jews, Germans,

or other foreigners but for ourselves.

The Banderites regarded young people as their special mobilization base and the core of a future army. They were keen on not losing this base. Some contemporaries explained the creation of the first armed groups in mid-1942, which later evolved into Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), for OUN orders to young people threatened by the Werbung to escape to the forest.271 Similar to the

Soviet partisans, the Banderites and later UPA took steps to disrupt the Werbung in areas under their control. Thus, in spring 1943 they destroyed a transit camp in

"Ukrainische Propagandatatigkeit," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 20 [11 November 1942]. 7 "Ukrainische Widerstandsbewegung," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 17 [20 August 1942]. For a similar leaflet from Dnipropetrovs'k oblast, see "Iz razvedovatel'noi svodki No 3 operativnoi gruppy Ukrainskogo shtaba partizanskogo dvisheniia," in TsDAHOU 62/1/253, p. 55. 271 "Vytiah z protokolu dopytu Hryhoriia Pryshliaka," in Grzegorz Motyka et al. (eds.), Poliaky i ukraintsi mizh dvoma totalitarnymy rezhymamy 1942-1945 [Pol 'shcha ta Ukraina u trydtsyatykh- sorokovykh rokakh XX stolittia: nevidomi dokumenty z arkhiviv spetsial 'nykh sluzhb. Tom 4] (Kyiv-Warsaw, 2005), part I, p. 672.

118 the town of Kivertsi, freeing the recruits, many of whom were then mobilized to

UPA.272

German propaganda addressed the Banderites' anti-Werbung rhetoric in a rather dull way. One of their leaflets explained,

Ukrainians! Do you know why the OUN is against the departure of

workers to Germany?... The workers and peasants working in

Germany are helping to forge weapons against Bolshevism. And

this is the main reason, since the OUN is fighting for

Bolshevism.273

***

Economic concerns were the most important factor for the first volunteers.

They also played a role in the compliance of many non-volunteers. The Soviets' scorched-earth policy led to the large-scale destruction of industry, agricultural equipment, and even livestock, grain, electricity, and water supply. Central Kyiv, left largely intact during the first months of the war, was completely blown up by

Soviet agents during the first week of the German occupation, becoming the most

[Volodymyr Makar], "Pivnichno-zakhidni zemli: zbroina samooborona ukrai'ns'koho narodu," in Volyn' iPolissia: nimets'ka okupatsiia, pp. 15-29 (p. 20 cited). 273 Mykhailo Marunchak (ed.), V borot 'bi za ukrains 'ku derzhavu: essei, svidchennia, litopysannia, dokumenty Druho'i svitovoi viiny (Winnipeg, 1992), p. 926.

119 blatant example of the Soviets' disregard for the lives of their own citizens. The extensive destruction led to mass unemployment. In early 1942 in Kyiv only

40,000 out of 320,000 residents were officially employed.274

The Soviet destruction of food supplies, coupled with the Nazis' unwillingness to support "excessive eaters," brought about mass starvation or malnourishment in major Ukrainian cities. In late 1941 the daily bread ration in

Vinnytsia was 300 grams, 214 grams in Lutsk and Rivne, and only 200 in Kyiv.

Under these circumstances, many people were willing to go to Germany to escape the starvation. As one Ostarbeiter succinctly explained in a letter to her mother,

"There was a big famine in Kharkiv, and I was forced to go to Germany, which saved my life."277 Another wrote,

There were so many promises about a happy life in Germany from

the German propagandists at a gathering station in Kyiv. Natalka

z/4 Koval', "'Ostarbaitery' Ukrainy," p. 172. Karel Berkhoff examines Nazi-orchestrated famine in Kyiv in chapter 7 of his Harvest of Despair, pp. 164-86. A similar fate befell Kharkiv, where 120,000 died of famine during the German occupation. Hal'chak, "Skhidni robitnyky" z Podillia, p. 65. 277 Helinada Hrinchenko [Gelinada Grinchenko], "Ostarbaitery" Tret'ego Reikha - strategii vyzhyvaniia," in Storinky voienno'i istorii Ukrainy, no. 7: part I (2003), pp. 219-26 (p. 222 here).

120 and I believed this because a famine had broken out and we had no

choice.

Not only volunteers had the expectations to escape famine. Many residents of the starving cities, who had received a summons, initially did not see a reason to avoid the departure to Germany. The general belief was, "since they are sending us to work, they will provide food."

Some other volunteers might not starve, but they hoped to improve their well-being in Germany. As a volunteer from Volhynia put it,

And here I read about the recruitment to Germany. I made my

decision, even though my parents were opposed to it. I'll go; I'll

have a profession, earn money, and I am no longer going to be a

hired laborer.280

Iulia Bresinuk from Kamianets'-Podil's'kyi oblast mentions that many villagers, who volunteered from her village, were lured by the promise of high

278 Mykhailo Hava, "Nedorucheni lysty (spohad pro ukra'i'ntsiv z nashyvkoiu 'Ost')," in Vborot'bi za ukrains 'ku derzhavu, p. 947. 7 For one of such examples see Chernenko, Chuzhie i svoi, p. 25. 280 He was a Komsomol member during a brief period and that could also have been a factor in his decision. It is noteworthy that the interviewee did not want to have his name mentioned, since the voluntary employment in Germany still discredits him in the eyes of other villagers. Patsula and Sorokhan, "Zaruchnyky Druho'i svitovoi," p. 6.

121 wages in Germany. They left for a train station on eight to ten big horse carts.

Iulia's family welcomed the Germans, which was not surprising. Seven out often of her sisters and brothers died during the Great Famine of 1933 after the family's grain stock was requisitioned. Subsequently, her father was detained and tortured by the Soviet security police to be released from prison by the advancing German army. Several of her relatives were killed or disappeared in the 1930s. She recalls that her older brother Ivan and sister Halyna volunteered to go to Germany.

"The money we can make, Papa" - Ivan was pestering Papa to let

him and Halyna go - "in six months, we'd make more than I get

paid in three years at town hall!... The war will be over in six

months, Ukraine will be a free country again."

The father showed some reservation. Then Halyna intervened:

"If we don't go now, we might miss a chance. The war won't last

long... We'll be back in six months or less. We'll both be rich."282

Julia Alexandrow and Tommy French, Flight from Novaa Salow: Autobiography of a Ukrainian Who Escaped Starvation in the 1930s under the Russians and then Suffered Nazi Enslavement (Jefferson, N.C., 1995), pp. 58-59. Ibid, p. 58. The names in the text are anglicized - "Julia" instead of "Iulia" and "Helen" instead of "Halyna."

122 Aside from and connected with economic considerations, curiosity and a desire to see the world were two other significant motivations to go to Germany.

During the two decades of Bolshevik rule Soviet Ukrainians were completely closed off from any interaction with the outside "capitalistic world." At the same time, they got used to traveling to distant regions of the Soviet Union, places like

Magnitogorsk, during the Stalinist industrialization drive of the 1930s. The collectivization, dekulakization, and Great Famine uprooted millions of Ukrainian peasants traditionally attached to their land. Large numbers of them moved to

(often faraway) cities or other regions. Long journeys away from their families were nothing new to them; their travels were simply confined by the Soviet boundaries. In fact, the Soviet propaganda encouraged and extolled youthful adventurism associated with traveling.

German propaganda ably exploited people's desire to see the world. One poster that the Nazis distributed in Ukraine depicted curious Soviet people looking westward through a hole in a huge wall. The caption read, "Stalin placed a high wall around you. He knew perfectly well that anyone who sees the outside world will fully grasp the pitiful state of the Bolshevik regime."

In his post-war analysis, Otto Brautigam, the head of the Political

Department of the Ostministerium, wrote that "many volunteered, often out of

i8j Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, pp. 213-14. See also "[Rivne, 10 serpnia 1943] Propahanda v spravi naboru do Raikhu. Khid dumok promovy v spravi verbuvannia," in DAKhmO 420/1/1, pp. 17-18.

123 curiosity, to see for themselves the life in the much reviled "capitalist" state."284

This curiosity is well described in Viktoria Babenko's memoirs. When she expressed some concerns, her friend brushed them off:

Why are you worried? We will live better in Germany. [Normal]

people are living there too! Thank God, we are going. We will see

the world! You would not have a chance to go abroad under Soviet

rule! We will see how the capitalists are living there. And we will

come back when the war is over.

She indicates that much of the youth shared this attitude:

A lot of people saw it as an opportunity to see the world, to travel

for the first time in their lives. That was the reason why a lot of us

went to Germany. Yes, we got a chance to get out of the Soviet

paradise. But what [awaits] us in the foreign land? That is the

question.

Oleksii Dovhopol from Kirovohrad oblast echoes the same argument:

Brautigam, Uberblick iiber die besetzten Ostgebiete, p. 90. See also Podolianyn, 28 June 1942. 285 Viktoria Babenko-Vudberi, Obratno k vragam (Kyiv, 2003), p. 122. 286 Ibid.

124 We were taken away in early summer 1942. Even the word "taken

away" [zabraly] does not reflect the reality. No one knew yet what

is in this Germany. That's why we accepted the recruitment

calmly. Before receiving a summons, we, boys and girls, almost

never left Onufrii'vka [their village] and we didn't mind [to leave].

True, it was a little scary - the world is not a small place.

However, it was very interesting how people are really living there.

At first, we regarded it almost as a tourist excursion. And we lived

in such conditions that we had nothing to lose but misery.287

Previously mentioned Iulia Bresinuk also recalls that she treated her sister and brother's departure to Germany almost as a tourist trip. "Don't forget to write about the train ride and the things you see in Germany," she shouted.288

As the war unfolded and the Soviets retreated, people began eagerly grasping any information about life abroad. German propaganda bombarded the population with images of and stories about "beautiful Great Germany." Many curious Ukrainians approached the German troops and their allies with questions about their native countries, trying to compare the Soviet way of life with that of the "capitalistic world." Most of the time, German soldiers gave an explanation to curious Ukrainians similar to this one - "Germany is the best country in the world. There was famine, unemployment, and communism after the World War,

287 "Dovhopol Oleksii Stepanovych," in OST- tavro nevoli, p. 42. 288 Alexandrow and French, Flight from Novaa Salow, p. 59. Pihido-Pravoberezhnyi, "Velyka vitchyzniana viina, " p.78.

125 but now workers are living well."290 As a Nazi report on the course of the

Werbung in Kyiv pointed out in April 1942, "The workers' attitude is good....

The majority is glad to get to the country about which they have heard so many positive things from the German soldiers."

There were many veterans of World War I who had ended up in Germany

as POWs. They spread the word that "Germans are not bad people" and "life in

Germany is good." In stark contrast to what Soviet propaganda was describing, the advancing German troops generally behaved well towards the Ukrainians in

1941. People found them sociable and friendly. This removed some initial

anxiety, and a lot of people expected similar treatment in Germany. According to

a contemporary,

We still remembered the shootings of the Jews in Berdians'k, but

we also recalled the Germans' good treatment of us during the trip

from Berdians'k to our village on foot. We told each other that

290 "Nimets'kyi voiak na OSUZ," in TsDAVOV 3833/3/2, p. 80. 291 The report clearly exaggerates such moods. Right in the next paragraph it mentions the use of bribery to avoid the Werbung. "Lagebericht fur den Generalbezirk Kiew. April 1942," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/475 (vol. 2), p. 14.

9 09 Many contemporaries compared the pillage, robbery and debauchery of the retreating and demoralized German (and especially Hungarian) soldiers in 1943 to their "gentlemanly" behavior in 1941.

126 maybe it will not be that bad in Germany. The Germans look like a

cultured nation, so why should they treat us cruelly?

Ievhenii (Evgenii) Vil'son expresses similar views in his description of the motivations of the early Ostarbeiter,

In my transport of spring 1942 there were volunteers going for

work in Germany as well. Having survived the hungry winter of

1941-42, many people were in a desperate situation: the continuing

famine, the frontline kept moving quickly eastward, and the

Germans had not shown their true face and intentions yet. Mothers

with tears and hope blessed and let their sons and daughters go to

Germany, "After all is said and done, Germany is a civilized

country - this is the West, this is Europe! It couldn't be worse than

here!"294

An Ostarbeiter from Poltava region, Viktor, also wrote in a letter that he had not expected anything bad from the "civilized Germans."

Antonina Khelemendyk-Kokot, Kolhospne dytynstvo i nimets'ka nevolia. Spohady (Toronto, 1989), p. 143. 294 "Dopolneniia k ostovskim rasskazam. Dopolneniia k rasskazu Ievgeniia Ivanovicha Vil'sona," in Ostarbaitery: Istoriia rossiian, p. 82.

127 German propagandists, who made speeches in Romodan [a town in

Poltava oblast], vividly described the future for the young people

who had already completed a higher education in engineering, and

who would go "voluntarily" for work in Germany. They would get

various benefits, which we did not have in the Fatherland...

We believed these words because they were uttered by the

representatives of the great and cultured German nation...

We knew about German literature, German composers, and other

figures of their culture and could not believe that we were so

basely deceived.

The author of the letter echoes the above-mentioned "civilizing discourse" of German propaganda. He also expresses the hope to make use of his professional training. Many people shared this expectation. A certain number of volunteers also hoped to continue their studies or gain new skills.296 The future

Ukrainian writer Mykola Petrenko disseminated verses critical of German rule during the occupation, which brought fear to the hearts of his parents. They suggested to him,

295 Hava, "Nedorucheni lysty," pp. 944-46. 296 Vira Smereka, V nimets'kii nevoli: spomyn-shchodennyk (1942-1944) (Uzhhorod, 1998), p. 8.

128 [People] are being taken to Germany, so you should go. People are

cultured there. They won't know about your verses. You'll be

given work; you'll learn something good and survive this war!

The fear of punishment for "hostile verses" played hand in hand with expectations of a new learning experience. This aspiration also closely reflected the above-mentioned motif of German propaganda.

Even those who were forcibly driven out of their houses to an assembly point or from there to a train station did not expect anything bad at first. The rationale was the same: "Why should they treat us badly?" As one Ostarbeiter mentions,

Our parents followed us as we were herded [by mounted Ukrainian

police]. My mother was falling on the ground, screaming... And I

said, "Mother, why are you crying? I'll be back. Aren't the

Germans the same people as us?" At the time I shared the

conviction that all people are the same, because that is what they

had drummed into our heads.

The last phrase is probably a reference to Soviet "internationalist" schooling. But this had more to do with the quintessentially pre-nationalist (pre-

297 Mykola Petrenko, Cherez 48 dovhykh rokiv (Lviv, 2005), p. 23. 298 "Spohady. Kasich Halyna Vasylivna," in "...To bula nevolia," p. 151. The last phrase in the original - "bo nam tak vbyly v holovu."

129 modern) perception that all human beings are "God's creatures," all of them having God's blessing. This idea was still widely popular, especially in rural

Ukraine. One of the most vivid manifestations of this perception was putting flowers on the graves of German soldiers and traditional women's lamentation ceremonies during their burial.299 People showed compassion to all victims of the war, a gesture unheard-of in "civilized Europe" or even in staunchly nationalist

Galicia.

German soldiers also made a good impression on the population with their appearance: well fed and dressed in neat uniforms, they contrasted sharply with

Soviet soldiers and enhanced the image of Germany as an affluent country. A certain number of recruits, especially women, expected to earn some money in

Germany and buy better clothing. An Ostarbeiter account describes this expectation:

The freights cars were full of young people... who in their naivete

unjustifiably thought that in Germany they would buy nice dresses,

blouses, and fashionable city shoes. Unjustifiably, they dreamed

about dressing up in clean clothes so they could go out after work

to show off, listen to music, or even dance.300

Hans Koch, "Der Sowjet-Nachlass in der Ukraine. Stimmungs- und Erfahrungsbericht. [30.9.1941]," in TsDAVOV 3206/2/26, p. 1(a); Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, pp. 214-15. Khelemendyk-Kokot, Kolhospne dytynstvo, p. 145.

130 The first "volunteers" also included a certain number of Jews, who went to Germany to escape death at home. It was easier to hide one's ethnicity in a

faraway land. Recruitment agencies were first and foremost concerned with meeting the assigned quota rather than weeding out Jews. It was also difficult to

screen efficiently a large number of people within a short period of time with a limited staff.

Besides the Jews, the Polish population of Volhynia often volunteered for the Werbung to avoid the massacre perpetrated by the Ukrainian nationalist insurgents of the UPA. German reports mention Polish volunteers as late as May

1944.301 In Volhynia former Soviet activists and POWs also preferred to go to

Germany for fear of reprisals at home. In some villages former communists who were not selected by the elders approached those who were selected, offering to go to Germany instead of them.302 In the areas under its control in Volhynia, the

301Polian, Zhertvy dvukh diktatur, p. 215. For a similar Soviet report of May 1943, see "Dopovidna zapyska shtabu partyzans'kykh zahoniv Rivnens'ko'i oblasti pro diial'nist' ukrains'kykh natsionalistiv [28 travnia 1943]," in OUN- UPA v roky viiny, p. 68. For a Polish source, see "Depesza gen. Tadeusza Komorowskiego do Sztabu Naczelnego Wodza RSZ w Londynie z 19 sierpnia 1943 r. dotyczajca sytuacji na Wolyniu i w Galicji," in Poliaky i ukra'intsi mizh dvoma totalitarnymy rezhymamy, part I, p. 235. "Zvit providnyka okruhy, [Stolyns'ka] okruga 'Halo,' za misiats' zhovten' 1942," in Merezha OUN(b) i zapillia UPA na terytorii VO "Zahrava, " p. 221.

131 UPA targeted former communists and non-local POWs as "pro-Bolshevik

elements" providing them another reason for the volunteer recruitment.303

Soviet POWs who were released on bail provided by local communities to help with the harvest never felt safe in other regions either. They could be

detained again at any time by the German authorities so they often preferred to

avoid it by volunteering for work in Germany.3

Some people who were arrested by the police preferred to "vanish" in

Germany too. One of them was a certain Maria, a niece of the Ukrainian insurgent leader Borovets' (Bul'ba). She was arrested by the security police when the Nazis

started a crackdown on Bul'ba's guerillas. Her relatives saved her from certain death bribing the police with gold. She was not released but sent to Germany.

Another type of constrained volunteer consisted of single mothers (or those whose husbands were in the army) whose only child had been recruited.

They often preferred to go to the Reich with their child to being left alone at home. The last wave of such volunteers included Ukrainians who sought any

For UPA exterminating Soviet POWs, see "Vidkrytyi lyst do chleniv Provodu Organizatsi'i ukrains'kykh natsionalistiv pid provodom Stepana Bandery. Komanduvach UNRA Otaman Taras Bul'ba Borovets'," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/107, pp. 5-7; "Vytiah iz protokolu dopytu Iuriia Stel'mashchuka vid 28 liutoho 1945 r.," in Poliaky i ukraintsi mizh dvoma totalitarnymy rezhymamy, part I, pp. 442-44; "Vytiah z protokolu dopytu Oleksy Kyryliuka vid 27 chervnia 1944 r.," ibid, pp. 448-51. Sova, Do istori'i bol'shevyts'ko'i diisnosti, p. 87. 305 "Spohady. Komendantova (Vitvyts'ka) Valeriia Mykolai'vna," in "...To bula nevolia," p. 178.

132 possibility to escape the returning Soviet regime in late 1943 and the first half

! 944.306

Typical for the first Ostarbeiter was a combination of a certain level of compulsion, the aspiration to escape the economic deprivations and famine at home, and some hopes and expectations, as exemplified by Antonina

Khelemendyk's account:

For us, to leave for Germany meant almost the same thing as

deportation to Siberia in the past, with one difference though. We

had a certain hope that in Germany we would earn something, and

we would get ourselves some more decent clothes. We saw that all

the Germans were wearing good quality clothing, made with good

fabrics and well sewn, so we thought we could dress well there

. 307 too.

Iurii Pashchenko, who was recruited from the Onufriivka district of

Kirovohrad oblast in summer 1942, mentions that the conscripts obeyed even though the Werbung was met without any enthusiasm. They were brought to a

Pihido-Pravoberezhnyi, " Velyka vitchyzniana viina," pp. 166-67; "Vospominaniia ostovtsev, ostavshikhsia na Zapade. Rasskaz Sergeia Fedorovicha Cherniavskogo," in Ostarbaitery: Istoriia rossiian, pp. 43-44. 307 Khelemendyk-Kokot, Kolhospne dytynstvo, p. 143.

133 transit camp in Kirovohrad unguarded. The doors of the train were open the entire way to Germany; nobody tried to escape. He explains,

Let me repeat. These were the first transports of workers. We did

not know what awaited us. Therefore, we were quietly accepting

the lot of our fate.309

Many Ostarbeiter quietly accepted the "lot of their fate" in the first months of the Werbung. When twenty involuntary recruits from a Volhynian village did not get on a transport in May 1942 and were left alone, they were confused about what they should do.310 Apparently, they did not see any reason to run away.

***

The hopes of the Ostarbeiter for decent treatment and conditions were soon dashed. It is beyond the scope of this study to deal with the Ostarbeiter experience in Germany. A brief analysis is important, however, to see how it affected the Werbung and popular attitudes to it in Ukraine.

A few other Ostarbeiter also mention transports with open doors in the first months of the Werbung. See Kutsai, Nimechchyna ochyma ostarbaitera, pp. 48- 49. 309 "Pashchenko Iurii Mykhailovych," in OST - tavro nevoli, pp. 26-27. He eventually ended up in Sachsenhausen concentration camp and barely survived it. Kutsai, Nimechchyna ochyma Ostarbaitera, pp. 43-44.

134 A rupture between German propaganda and reality came at the very beginning. Up to sixty recruits, and sometimes even more, were loaded onto freight cars, popularly known as "cattle cars" (teliachi vahony), which were filled with straw and had no toilets, which drew comparisons with the Bolshevik deportation to Siberia. The cars were so densely packed that the recruits often had to sleep in turns. The journey to a transit camp usually lasted from three to five days, sometimes much longer. During the short train stops it was typical to see large groups of men and women, surrounded by guards, relieving themselves right

-511 next to the train. Some guards enjoyed taking pictures of this scene. Large numbers of Ostarbeiter mentioned such episodes. For many of them this was the first in a series of humiliations, which they remembered for decades. As one female Ostarbeiter summarized, "It is shameful to talk about this indignity but impossible to forget."

Some recruits were placed in an even worse situation: they were not let out, so some parts of train cars were full of excrement. "That one corner [assigned

311 "Lagebericht fur Oktober 1942," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/475 (vol. 2), p. 581; Khelemendyk-Kokot, Kolhospne dytynstvo, p. 144; "Spohady. Kasich Halyna Vasylivna," in "...7b bula nevolia," p. 152; "Usni istorii: Zinai'da Ivanivna Kovalenko," in Helinada Hrinchenko (ed.), Nevyhadane: usni istorii ostarbaiteriv (Kharkiv, 2004), p. 58; "Ziuzina (Zhukovs'ka) Lidiia Mykhailivna," in OST - tavro nevoli, p. 151; "Vospominaniia ostovtsev, vernuvshikhsia domoi. Rasskaz Marii Danilovny Min'skoi (Donbas, Ukraina)," in Ostarbaitery: istoriia rossiian, p. 50; Smereka, V nimets'kii nevoli, pp. 13-14; Andriianov, Arkhipelag OST, pp. 41-42. 312 Andriianov, Arkhipelag OST, p. 42.

135 for relieving] was beginning to acquire a heap of smelly stuff. Men and women used it indiscriminately, and all sense of modesty vanished along with all hope," concludes one of the recruits.313 The recruits usually tried to dispose of excrement through holes or small windows in the cars. This did not always work:

People squatted where they stood to relieve themselves; there was

no place to "go." One boy tried to scoop up his own feces with his

hands and throw it out the little window, but it blew back in and

dribbled down the wall. It was hot and it stank in there. Some girls

passed out, and all we could do was leave them in a lump on the

floor till they woke up.314

In some cases recruits were fortunate enough to create a makeshift toilet

lie by carving holes in the floor.

Often, very little or no food was provided for an Ostarbeiter transport.

A woman from Krasnodon (Voroshylovhrad oblast) mentions that during her 24-

Vladimir Bohdan, Avoiding Extinction: Children of the Kulak (New York, 1992), pp. 128-29. 314 Alexandrow and French, Flight from Novaa Salow, p. 76. 315 "Vidpovidi na zapytannia ankety. Kobzysta (Shevchenko) Mariia Fedorivna," in "...To bula nevolia," p. 100; Serhii Hal'chak, "Etapuvannia "skhidnykh robitnykiv" z Podillia v natsysts'ke rabstvo," in "...To bula nevolia," pp. 50-62 (52-53 cited); 054-PS, Nuremberg Trials; Demchyna, Zi Skhodu na Zakhid, p. 77; "Vidchai dav sylu dlia vtechi [V. Taradaiko]," in Ostarbaitery: spohady zhyteliv Rivnenshchyny, pp. 68-69.

136 day journey to the Reich, she received only 2 kg bread, 300 g of sausage and one

serving of gruel.317 Many others mention that they were given no food at all

during a journey lasting many days. Those who did not take enough food with them starved. Some people survived on sunflower seeds brought from home.

Whenever possible, the recruits traded their belongings for food with locals

during a train stop. Another danger awaited the Ostarbeiter when Soviet aviation

(or the Allies in Germany) bombed the transports. The recruits were kept inside locked train cars and left to the mercy of fate.

In a transit camp (Zwischendurchlager) the Ostarbeiter had to undergo

"disinfection": women had their braids cut off despite their protests. In the bathhouse women had to endure the stares and laughs of the male staff, who took pictures, offered to rub them with soap, etc. As a German report pointed out,

Since mainly Ukrainian peasants were transported in the last

months, and as far as the female portion of these are concerned,

they are mostly of a high moral standard and used to strict

decency, they must have considered such treatment as a national

degradation.

316 Very few mention being fed well on the way to Germany. See Chernenko, Chuzhie i svoi, pp. 29-32. Slin'ko, Ugon naseleniia Ukrainy, p. 227. 1 Leonid Abramenko et al. (eds.), Ky'ivs 'kyi protses. Dokumenty ta materialy (Kyiv, 1995), p. 53 [interrogation of Boris Drachenfels]. 3'9 054-PS, Nuremberg Trials.

137 This view is confirmed by the numerous female Ostarbeiter, who describe the utter humiliation of the "disinfection" process.320

After the "disinfection" the recruits were assigned an ID number and given a metal bar with a cord to wear around the neck. They were addressed mostly by their ID numbers; almost all of the recruits remembered their number for several decades afterwards. When the Ostarbeiter finally ended up in

Germany, they were assigned to a workplace in a process reminiscent of a slave- market in the "good old" slave-trading days. Prospective employers looked at their teeth, groped them, etc.

Humiliation was a decisive element of the Ostarbeiter experience. It overshadowed the bad housing, the bad working conditions, and the bad food to

Demchyna, Zi Skhodu na Zakhid, pp. 83-84; Smereka, V nimets'kii nevoli, p. 11; Babenko-Vudberi, Obratno k vragam, pp. 125-26; Kuznetsov, Babi Yar, pp. 198-99; "Spohady. Kasich Halyna Vasylivna," in "...To bula nevolia," p. 152; "Polina Ivanivna Ieskina," in Nevyhadane: usni istori'i ostarbaiteriv, p. 141; "Usni istori'i: Olena Volodymyrivna Kalashnikova," ibid, p. 152; "Usni istori'i: Vassa Ivanivna Halustova," ibid, p. 191; Oleksandr Sydorenko, Ostarbaitery z Poltavshchyny v avstriis'kii zemli Vorarl'berh v 1942-1945 rokakh (Poltava, 2007), p. 22; Alexandrow and French, Flight from Novaa Salow, pp. 77-80; "Shche i vysmoktuvaly krov nashu [Mordiuk Iefrosyniia Ivanivna, Rivne]," in Ostarbaitery: spohady zhyteliv Rivnenshchyny, pp. 63-64. For many Ostarbeiter this scene reminded them of Harriet B. Stowe's "Uncle Tom's Cabin." This book for was a part of the school program and popular reading in the 1930's.

138 which people had gotten used during Stalinist times. Promised by German propaganda to be treated equally with other European nations, they found themselves on a lower rung of the Nazi hierarchy of foreign workers, below Poles and Galician Ukrainians, not to mention Western Europeans and Czechs, and higher only than Jews and Gypsies.323 The hierarchy of nationalities, which was enforced by many regulations, was instantly noticed by the Ostarbeiter, who felt humiliated to be treated worse than Western European POWs, the conquered

Poles (German propaganda claimed, that unlike Poland, Ukraine had been liberated) and Galician Ukrainians. The better treatment meted out to the latter was especially incomprehensible to the Ukrainian "Eastern workers," as they were of the same nationality as the Galician Ukrainians and lived in the same country. Some of them expressed indignation even after a few decades:

This does not apply to some camps with particularly harsh conditions, which were found at some factories and especially mines. Starvation was a constant problem and workers were routinely killed. In one particularly brutal camp, only fifty men remained alive by the end of the year from a transport that arrived from Kharkiv in January 1942. Three to four persons had died each day. See Kosyk, The Third Reich and Ukraine, p. 257. 323 On the basis of their racial criteria the Nazis developed an elaborate hierarchy of the foreign workers. It was finalized in a joint decree of Goring and Sauckel of 28 December 1942. The decree classified all foreign labor in four major groups from the highest to the lowest level: 1) foreign workers (with the exception of the three other groups); 2) Poles (Galician Ukrainians included); 3) Ostarbeiter, 4) Jews and Gypsies. Each group was subjected to a separate regulation and treatment and kept separately at work and in the camp/living quarters. Herbert, "Labor as Spoils of Conquest," pp. 240-47.

139 Let's take a bar. Those from Western Ukraine enjoyed the same

rights as the Germans. For example, we were not allowed to enter a

bar. When we arrive, we are all standing in the corridor. A barman

comes out, takes the money and brings beer to the corridor. But

those from Western Ukraine came in, sat down at a table, and were

drinking there. They had more rights - they could go wherever

they wanted. That's how it was.324

The Ostarbeiter were well aware that the documents held by "privileged"

Galician Ukrainians indicated that they were "Ukrainians from the General-

Gouvernment." This was probably the reason why thousands of Ostarbeiter sent letters home requesting their relatives to get a certified note from the local administration that they were Ukrainians, not Russians, since "Ukrainians are treated better." It is very doubtful that those who received this note saw their conditions improve. One such group who petitioned the German authorities to be reinstated as Ukrainians received the following reply:

Tetiana Pastushenko, "Do pytannia pro vzaiemovidnosyny u seredovyshchi ukrains'kykh prymusovykh robitnykiv natsysts'ko'i Nimechchyny," in Druha svitova viina i dolia narodiv Ukrainy, pp. 84-91 (p. 88 cited). See also Smereka, V nimets 'kii nevoli, pp. 185-86.

140 These Ostarbeiter cannot be considered Ukrainians since they

come from Reichskommissariat Ukraine, not from the General-

Gouvernment. Please inform the Ostarbeiter about this.

Denial of Ukrainian affiliation was not only a question of status. It was very painful for nationally conscious Ukrainians to realize upon their arrival in the

Reich that they were not recognized as such, but were treated as the uniform

"Eastern nation" and commonly called "Russians."

The low status of the Ostarbeiter was most visible in the restriction of movement. Initially they were virtually kept under arrest, and it was only in 1943, after a series of decrees were passed, that they were permitted to go out freely on

Sundays and, in time, on some other days. They were not allowed to visit movie theaters, restaurants, bars, museums, and churches, or to use streetcars in order "to prevent contamination by lice." At work the "Eastern workers" were frequently abused by "racially superior" managers and supervisors, while on the streets they were the objects of public scorn. Some stores "greeted" them with signs, "No dogs or Ostarbeiter allowed." Many recall hearing, in different versions, the

il> Ibid., p. 89. For one of the examples, see Ostarbeiter letters in Hava, "Nedorucheni lysty," pp. 945-47.

141 German phrase, Du bist Schweine (You are a pig). Lidia Kotova typifies this feeling in her recollection:

We were led through the city by guards and dogs. The German

population flocked to watch us and the kids shouted "Russian

pigs!" It was painful to bear such humiliation. On holidays the

German women used to bring their nicely dressed children to our

camp to take a look, like at a zoo. We realized this and began

hiding in the barracks.

The badge "Ost" signified the humiliating position of the "Eastern workers." They quickly realized that "Ost" was a sort of racial slur in the Nazi discourse and demanded a sign that indicated their nationality. Even more importantly, most Ostarbeiter, especially those from Right-Bank Ukraine, knew that Jews had to wear an ethnicity badge. The assignment of a similar badge had a

327 Polian, Zhertvy dvukh diktatur, pp. 312, 315; Khelemendyk-Kokot, Kolhospne dytynstvo, p. 177; "Vidpovidi na zapytannia ankety. Kolisnyk VasyP Serafonovych," in "...To bula nevolia," p. 110; "Spohady. Borshch Leonid Mykolaiovych," ibid, pp. 116-17; "Spohady. Rudniev Ievhen Mykolaiovych," ibid, p. 236; "Usni istorii: Vassa Ivanivna Halustova," in Nevyhadane: usni istorii ostarbaiteriv, p. 189; "Dubova Mariia Kostivna, selo Poshybliak Lysians'koho raionu Cherkas'ko'i oblasti," in Svitanky v pit'mi, p. 54; "Piatybrat H.O., Khersons'ka oblast, misto Hornostai'vka," ibid, p. 73; "Ocheretnia Antonina Petrivna," in Ost-tavro nevoli, p. 25; Fursenko, "DI-PI: dni i gody," p. 103. 32 "Shevchenko (Kotova) Lidiia Pavlivna," in Ost - tavro nevoli, p. 60. Similarly, Fursenko, "DI-PI: dni i gody," pp. 109-10.

142 very concrete meaning for them. It also reminded them of animal tagging. They

sarcastically deciphered "OST" as "Beware the Soviet Beast" (Osterigaites'

Sovetskoi • Tvari) or "Beware the Soviet Comrade" (Osterigaites' Sovetskogo

Tovarishcha).330 "The incident with the "Ost" badges clearly showed us,"

concludes one Ostarbeiter, "that we were in an alien and hostile country where nothing good was to be expected. This realization was especially painful for those

•5-7 1 who came to Germany voluntarily."

Not everyone had bad experiences. Those who worked in agriculture were usually well fed. If not, most of the time they could steal some food, and the

situation was not too bad if the landlord did not maltreat them. This was also •3-5 -j true of house servants. The majority was not so lucky, however.

329 In her very detailed recollection Viktoria Babenko powerfully demonstrates the Ostarbeiter' utter indignation and anger after being told to stitch the badge "like animals." They were forced to do so only after a 3-day food deprivation and police intervention. Babenko-Vudberi, Obratno kvragam, pp. 136-39. 330 For the "beast," see "Bobakha Anna Petrivna," in Ostarbaitery z Poltavshchyny v avstriis 'kii zemli, p. 42. For the "comrade," see "Pichurina P.K., Hovohuivins'k Zhytomyrs'kyi raion Zhytomyrs'ka oblast," in Svitanky v pit'mi, p. 60. This kind of "decipherment" was popular for the Soviet citizens to show their irony or discontent. For example, during the collectivization the Soviet Communist party (VKP) was "translated" by the peasants as the "second serfdom" [VtoroeKreposnoePravo]. 331 Babenko-Vudberi, Obratno kvragam, p. 139. Sometimes Ostarbeiter regarded their status as captivity. See Hrinchenko, "Ostarbaitery" Tret'ego Reikha - strategii vyzhyvaniia," p. 222. 332 According to German data, 862,000 out of 2,758,000 Ostarbeiter were employed in agriculture in the summer 1944. The rest were in mining (253,000),

143 Initially the Ostarbeiter were not allowed to send letters home. Still, information about the harsh conditions in Germany soon reached Ukraine. A

Kyi van newspaper mentioned these rumours in mid-April 1942, denying them stoutly barely three months after the first transports left for Germany.334 The first available source of information was the stories and images of sick Ostarbeiter who were sent home. The transports full of those injured during work accidents, many of them with missing limbs, sick and skeletal people, some barely able to walk, made a very bad impression on the population. They kept coming almost every week in the summer and fall of 1942. Six railroad cars full of maimed metal (883,500), chemical (93,000) industries, in construction (110,000) and transport (205,500). See Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, p. 298 (table). 333 Viktor Pedak, journalist from Zaporizhzhia, has collected many stories of the humane treatment and compassion of the Germans towards Ostarbeiter and Soviet POWs. Most Ostarbeiter who were treated well worked for the German farmers or as house servants. Some recount being fed 4-5 times a day and enjoying generally much better conditions than at home. Even so, the majority mentioned the initial (or subsequent) deprivation and starvation and thought of themselves as being "saved" by the "good German landlord." Viktor Pedak, Diakuiemo i mertvym, i zhyvym: svidchennia liudianosti pid chas viiny 1941 — 1945 rr. (Zaporizhzhia, 2005). Some Ostarbeiter letters published in "OST - tavro nevoli" also mention good conditions in Germany, pp. 180-91. See also Helinada Hrinchenko [Gelinada Grinchenko], "Osobennosti rekonstruktsii proshlogo v usnykh svidetel'stvakh byvshikh ostarbaiterov," in Storinky voiennoi istorii Ukrainy, no. 8: part 1 (2004), p. 55. 334 Nove ukrains'ke slovo, 14 April 1942.

144 female Ostarbeiter returned to Donbas on 6 September alone. The appearance of these people per se refuted the claims of German propaganda.

The returnees also circulated stories about the treatment and living conditions of the "Eastern workers." One woman, who returned to a village near

Uman' (Cherkasy oblast), told the story of her ordeal. She was in a transport of over 2000 sick Ostarbeiter on the way back to Ukraine. Of this number, only around 100 were still alive when they reached Warsaw. The rest had not survived the long journey; the transport stopped for two or three weeks at major stations with the people locked up inside. She left the train in Warsaw and walked all the way back home. Such horrifying stories made people more resolute to avoid the

"voluntary departure" to Germany at any cost.

Moreover, many "Eastern workers" managed to send or pass on letters home through their German acquaintances - German soldiers leaving for the

Eastern Front - or Ukrainian Galicians, so quite a few people became aware of the actual situation. Passing letters through the German soldiers became so popular that some Ostarbeiter urged their relatives to approach the Germans for this

"Ohliad suspil'no-politychnoho, hospodars'koho i kuFturnoho zhyttia na pivdennykh zemliakh Ukrai'ny [veresen' 1942]," in Ukrains'kyi zdvyh. Naddniprianshchyna, p. 98. 336 "Informatsiini povidomlennia z terytorii skhidnykh oblastei Ukrai'ny (kviten' - lystopad 1943): Uman'," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 15.

145 purpose. Those letters were the most outspoken. With no fear of censorship, senders described their experiences in the "blackest tones."

The ban on communication significantly affected the morale of the

Ukrainians both in Germany and in Ukraine, leading to the proliferation of rumours unfavorable to the Germans. Iulia Bresinuk describes this anxiety and what effect it had on the Werbung:

We waited eagerly for a postman with news from Ivan and Halyna.

Two weeks, two months, four months [passed], no news. Two

more months [passed], still nothing. They were supposed to be

back by now! No one had received any word from family members

who had gone off to work, not in our village or any of the

Tin surrounding ones. People stopped volunteering.

The ban was lifted in June 1942 after protests from the Wehrmacht and

Rosenberg's Ostministerium. Ostarbeiter were now allowed to send a letter home

337 Hrinchenko, "'Ostarbaitery' Tret'ego Reikha - strategii vyzhyvaniia," p. 223. 33 "Fragen des Arbeitseinsatzes von Ukrainern im Reichsgebiet," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 21 [18 September 1942]. 339 She mentions that the ban on comminication led to rumors that "they're shipping the adults to Germany to make soap out of their flesh and bones." Alexandrov and French, Flight from Novaa Salow, p. 61. In the text the anglicized "Helen" appears instead of "Halyna."

146 twice a month. Because of censorship concerns, after November 1942 they were allowed to write only postcards. Even then the postal service was very chaotic. Letters sent to Rivne or Zhytomyr could end up in Minsk (Belarus).

Letters sent to Kyiv would be rerouted to Minsk and then sent back.341 It could take many months before a letter reached the addressee. Some Ostarbeiter received a reply from their family only a year later. German propagandists later attributed the lost and delayed letters to "incorrectly written addresses."343

The communication between the Ostarbeiter and their families proceeded much more efficiently in 1943. Every day in April-May 1943 censors handled approximately 110,000 postcards in the Ukrainian language, two-thirds of them sent from Ukraine and one-third to Ukraine. The sheer volume of the correspondence precluded a thorough examination. The censors checked out only

30-35 percent of the postcards, 4.5 percent of which were seized.344 Thus, a letter

340 "Schriftverkehr der in Deutschland eingesetzten russischen Arbeiter mit ihren Angehorigen," in DAKhO 3080/2/002, p. 10. 3 ' Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 38 [22 Januar 1943]. 342 "Vidpovidi na zapytannia ankety. Bosiak Ievheniia Stepanivna," in "...To bula nevolia," p. 87. 343 "Usloviia zhizni i raboty dlia edushchikh v Germaniiu," in DAKhO "Fond lystivok periodu Velykoi Vitchyznianoi viiny," p. 32 (page number not very legible). 344 "Stimmungsbericht auf Grund von Briefen, die im April und Mai 1943 ausgewertet sind," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/161, p. 13. Censorship was much more thorough for the Ostarbeiter who worked on some military plants or built fortifications such as the Atlantic Wall. In this case the censors often treated a postcard with a chemical solution to detect cryptography.

147 that described the plight of the Ostarbeiter had a good chance of reaching

Ukraine.

Many of them sent home desperate letters urging their relatives to avoid the deportation to Germany at any cost. Some expressed utter desperation:

"Daddy, don't let Iaryna go to Germany. She would do better to hang herself at home than come here to curse the day she was born!"346

Even letters examined by the censors contained a lot of hidden information that was easily decoded by a knowledgeable reader. The Ostarbeiter often used Aesopian language to describe their situation. For example, a son would write to his parents: "I am living very well, like Brovko/ the Ivanenkos," while Brovko was the name of their dog and the Ivanenkos were the poorest

family in the village.347 A desperate Ostarbeiter could tell her parents that "Halia got married the same way as Kharyton did in our village. I will follow them soon." It was well known to everybody in the village that this Kharyton had

345 "[Charkow] Lagebericht Nr.9 fur die Zeit vom 11.11.1942 bis 25.11.1942," in TsDAVOV, 3676/4/479, pp. 5-6; Oleksa Voropai (ed.), lasyr: Lysty, opovidannia i narodna tvorchist' u nimets'kii nevoli (London, 1966), p. 16; For similar letters, see Sydorenko and Kotliar, Svitanky v pit'mi, p. 48; Serhii Shevchenko, "Raby Hitlera - kirovohrads'ki repatrianty: dokumenty vidomi i nevidomi," in OST - tavro nevoli, pp. 3-10 (p. 8 cited). 347 Kirill Chistov "Fol'klor i iazyk ostarbaiterov," in V. Chistova and Kirill Chistov (eds.), Preodolenie rabstva: fol'klor i iazyk ostarbaiterov, 1942-1944 (Moscow, 1998), pp. 9-51 (cited pp. 27-29); Kuznetsov, Babi Yar, p. 195; Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, pp. 257-58; Dmytro Malakov, Oti dva roky... U Kyievipry nimtsiakh (Kyiv, 2002), p. 174.

148 hanged himself. Expressions, such as "I'm living very, very well," i.e. several repetitions, meant that life was very bad indeed. Proverbs, such as "I'm living like the naked on thistle", "a mouse under a broom" or a "cat on a pear-tree" conveyed a very clear message to the addressee. It was also not difficult for a careful reader to understand that such statements as "It's raining horribly; I'm sleeping only three hours a night. I'll see you if I survive..." or even "We have mosquitoes flying and biting; we haven't been bitten yet" hinted at the Allies' air raids rather

349 than ram or mosquitoes.

Consequently, large sectors of the population were well aware of the conditions in which the Ostarbeiter were living. The leitmotif of many letters sent home was "We were deceived" or "Soviet propaganda was right - we are being treated like slaves." A Banderite report from Uman' dated spring 1943

"Suspil'no-politychnyi ohliad OUN pro podii' ta rozvytok natsional'no- vyzvol'nykh zmahan' na Bilotserkivshchyni. 19 chervnia 1942 roku," in Ukrains'kyi zdvyh: Naddniprianshchyna, pp. 49- 54 (p. 51 here). 349 Bukalov, "Ostarbaitery Donbassa," p. 159; Tetiana Pastushenko, "Lysty iak dzherelo vyvchennia problemy ukra'ins'kykh "ostarbaiteriv" periodu Druhoi' svitovoi' viiny," in Storinky voienno'i istorii Ukrainy no. 6, 2002, pp. 70- 77 (p. 72 here). The planes were usually described as "birds," the bombs, aside from "rain," as "gifts" or "eggs" and air alarm as "music." Chistova and Chistov, Preodolenie rabstva,pp. 176-85. 350 Kosyk, The Third Reich and Ukraine, p. 253; I. Kovalenko, "Tsili i metody nimets'koi imperiialistychnoi polityky na okupovanykh terenakh," in Yevhen Shtendera and Peter Potichnyj (eds.), Volyn' i Polissia: nimets'ka okupatsiia [Litopys Ukrains'koi' Povstans'koi' Armi'i, vol. 1], (Toronto, 1978), pp. 56-102

149 mentions letters from Germany that describe a high mortality rate among

Ukrainian workers, who starved to death or were killed during the Allies' air bombardment. The Ostarbeiter are kept like prisoners, treated like cattle, and often called "Bolshevik," the letters state. The recruits' living conditions became widely known, as well as the fact that, contrary to the propaganda messages, the "Eastern workers" were not treated on par with other foreign workers, "not even with the Poles," and worse than the French POWs.

The letters from Germany were often mentioned as the major reason behind the mass avoidance of the Werbung. German propaganda could hardly deny them outright, so it called the negative reports a "few ridiculous letters from spoiled mama's boys" versus the "enormous number of letters from our contented workers."353 The propagandists also implicitly acknowledged certain problems, mentioning "constant improvements." Another trick was to claim that an area to

(pp. 93- 94 here). The article was originally published in a Banderite journal "ideiaiChyn"inl943. 351 "Informatsiini povidomlennia z terytorii skhidnykh oblastei Ukrai'ny (kviten' - lystopad 1943): Uman'," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 15. See also Kovalenko, "Tsili i metody nimets'koi imperiialistychnoi polityky," pp. 93-94. 352 "Allgemeine Lage und Stimmung im Reichskommissariat Ukraine," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 32 [4 December 1942]; "Lagebericht. Kiew. 25.9.42," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/474, pp. 439-40; "Lagebericht fur Oktober 1942," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/475 (vol. 2), pp. 580-81; "Fragen des Arbeitseinsatzes von Ukrainern im Reichsgebiet," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 21 [18 September 1942]. Nove ukrains 'he slovo, 11 October 1942. See also "Informatsiinyi material dlia propahandystiv," in DAKhmO 420/1/1, (page number not very legible).

150 which Ukrainian labor was being recruited was better off than others. By this time, however, nobody trusted official reports anymore. They were commonly ridiculed. A typical anecdote from late 1942 -43 mocked the German propaganda machine and its chief:

Goebbels decides to find a proper place for himself in the afterlife.

First, he visits hell, where he sees incredible luxury, all kinds of

entertainment, beautiful women, etc. Then he visits heaven. He

observes the quiet and calm existence, modest food, etc. All this

makes him think that life is boring there. So, after his death he

chooses hell. This time, however, he sees all the horrors described

by Dante. Goebbels started yelling that he was deceived:

everything looks completely different from what he was shown

before. The cunning devil replies, "It was not a lie, it was

propaganda."354

With German propaganda discredited and ridiculed, rumours became a

ire major source of information, just like in Soviet times. Nazi reports classified

354 "Lagebericht von 13. zu 20.2.1943," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/476, pp. 81-82. 355 As acknowledged by Kyiv's Generalkommissar, "For many years the Soviet man got used to receiving truth through rumors, because the Soviet propaganda lied absolutely and masterfully or at least distorted the facts. That is why people now put more trust in the illegal agitation and the "eyewitness" information than the official press propaganda." - "Allgemeine-, Feind-, und Deutsche

151 rumors as "whisper propaganda" (Flusterpropaganda) and attributed most of them to former Soviet activists, the Soviet underground, Ukrainian nationalists, and Jews in hiding. Some rumours were probably spread deliberately, but their popularity reflected people's expectations. Thus, rumours about the

"normalization" of the Soviet regime in the wake of Stalingrad originated from the introduction of officers' insignia in the Red Army and the fact that patriotic rhetoric had replaced the Marxist class struggle, which was reminiscent of tsarist times. The rumours picked up and inflated this tendency. According to these rumours, the tsarist tricolor was reinstated, the kolkhozes were abolished, the communist party was disbanded, etc. Some rumours even went as far as to claiming that tsarist generals who had arrived from Great Britain were leading the new Russian army, Stalin had been removed from power, and soon a tsarist heir would head the state. These rumours exploited people's disillusionment, their growing hatred of the Ubermenschen, and the hopes of a normal life after the return of the Soviets.

In the same way, rumours about Ostarbeiter conditions were fueled by information that was leaking from the Reich and growing feelings of distrust,

Propaganda. Lagebericht fur 1942," in TsDAVOV, 3676/4/307, p. 55 (page number not very legible). "Propagandalage in der Ukraine," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 47 [26 March 1943]; "Lagebericht fur Januar 1943," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/476, pp. 129-31; "Lagebericht von 13. zu 20.2.1943," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/476, pp. 144-47; Arkadii Liubchenko, Shchodennyk (Lviv, 1999), pp. 112- 13; 120.

152 uneasiness, and fear at the behavior of the German authorities. The rumours were becoming more dramatic as the attitude towards the new rulers worsened.

When the news about the "Ost" badge became widely known in Ukraine, it conjured up the fate of the Jews, who were forced to wear the "Star of David" badge before being exterminated. It gave rise to various rumours, mainly in

Right-Bank Ukraine, where the largest concentrations of Jews had lived. One rumour claimed Ostarbeiter would eventually be killed and turned into soap.

Another rumour in an area with a mixed Ukrainian-Polish population in eastern

Volhynia (Berdychiv) envisaged the introduction of special armbands for

Ukrainians and Poles. In Kyiv, a Russian-German ditty about the Werbung and the famine that was raging in the city was broadly circulated, implying that the fate of the Jews and the Gypsies would also befall the Ukrainians:

The Germans came - gut Juden kaput Zigeuner too The Ukrainians later.360

On the connection between the killing of Jews and the rumors on Ostarbeiter, see Alexandrov and French, Flight from Novaa Salow, pp. 61-62, 72. "Propagandawesen und Fiihrungsmittel in der Ukraine," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 21 [18 September 1942]; Lower, Nazi Empire- Building, p. 125; Alexandrov and French, Flight from Novaa Salow, p. 62. •5CQ "Propagandawesen in der Ukraine," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 24 [9 October 1942]. In original, "Nemets prishel — gut/ Iuden kaput/ Tsigoiner tozhe,/ Ukrainets pozzhe. " "Lagebericht fur November 1942," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/475 (vol. 2), p. 658; Kuznetsov, Babi Yar, pp. 101-02.

153 The large-scale recruitment of women generated rumours that female

Ostarbeiter were being forced into brothels. Apparently, these rumours originated

from the practice of the Wehrmacht to "hire" women, often with the application of

force, for military brothels. According to a German report, a large number of women avoided the "voluntary departure" to the Reich because "they did not want

this."361 Some reports blamed the Banderites for spreading these rumours.362

Similar rumours gained popularity again in 1943. As for men, it was suggested

that male Ostarbeiter were being sterilized, although this story was not as popular

as the one regarding females.

Another set of rumours claimed that upon their arrival in Germany, the

Ostarbeiter were placed in concentration camps. Apparently, these rumours were

fueled by the deplorable living conditions and the fact that for a long time they were not let out of the barracks. In 1943 increasingly more information was becoming available about the heavy death toll and the destruction resulting from

jbl "Lagebericht fur den Generalbezirk Kiew. Mai 1942," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/475 (vol. 2), p. 180; "Lagebericht fur den Generalbezirk Kiew. April 1942," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/475 (vol. 2), p. 14; "Fragen des Arbeitseinsatzes von Ukrainern im Reichsgebiet," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 21 [18 September 1942]; "Wirtschaftliche Lage im Reichskommissariat Ukraine," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 43 [26 February 1943]. "Allgemeine Lage und Stimmung in der Ukraine. Arbeitseinsatz," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 7 [12 June 1942].

154 the Allies' air attacks on the German cities, prompting various rumours and providing another reason to avoid the deportation to the Reich.

The ferocity with which the German administration extracted food from

Ukraine gave rise to rumours about a big famine in Germany.364 More realistic rumours - about the large number of Ostarbeiter who had died of hunger - circulated throughout Ukraine, apparently fueled by letters from Germany about malnourishment.365 Similar rumours claimed that a Recruitment Agency or raion uprava had in its possession or had posted a list of deceased, prompting inquiries from anxious relatives.366

Horror stories about the terrible physical condition of the Ostarbeiter who had been sent back were widely circulated throughout the German occupation, increasing the sinister perception of the Werbung. Thus, in Kryvyi Rih people talked about a young woman who had returned home from Germany with a boiled-off face and no fingers "because the landlady did not like her."367

Nazi sources mention such rumors as early as September 1942. See "Lagebericht. Kiew. 25.9.42," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/474, p. 440. "Propagandawesen in der Ukraine," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 24 [9 October 1942]. 365 For example, "[Charkow] Lagebericht Nr.9 fur die Zeit vom 11.11.1942 bis 25.11.1942," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/479, pp. 5-6. 366 On Kyiv see "Uber Propaganga. Bericht von L. Dudin," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/307, p. 68. 367 "Ohliad suspil'no-politychnoho, kul'tumbho i hospodars'koho zhyttia pivdenno-ukrai'ns'kykh zemel' (kviten' 1943): Kryvyi Rih," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 10.

155 The population could not understand why Germany needed such huge numbers of workers and, amidst all these rumours - true or false - awaited with horror a new wave of the Werbung. A Ukrainian who worked as a translator for a German commission in Vinnytsia observed in the late summer of 1943 that the

"departure for work in Germany was perceived in Ukraine as a death sentence."369

A Kyiv resident L. Nartova described this perception in her diary,

We are stuck in a terrifying, terrible captivity and all thoughts

center on one thing - who among our acquaintances and loved

ones will lose their children, who will not be able to hide them.

Liusia, Kostia, Galochka, Alesha... God, what a terrible, insane

grief for parents.370

***

The essence of German propaganda in the occupied East was explained by

Sauckel in his usual crude way. "Like in the old days in Shanghai," the German authorities were supposed to "go out to catch people and drug them with liquor

368 "AUgemeine Stimmung und Lage. Kiew Generalbezirk," in TsDAVOV, 3676/4/474, p. 83; "Allgemeine Stimmung der Bevolkerung im Generalkommissariat Ukraine (BerichtsschluB 1.2. 43)," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 43 [26 February 1943]. Mykhailo Seleshko, Vinnytsia: spomyny perekladacha komisii doslidiv zlochyniv NKVD v 1937-1938 (New York, 1991), p. 115. See also Alexandrow and French, Flight from Novaa Salow, p. 72. 370 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, p. 262.

156 and promises in order to get them to Germany."371 Obviously, such a strategy could work only so far as there was some belief in the credibility of the given promises.

As acknowledged by the security police in one of its analytical reports, a major flaw of the German propaganda lay

... in the perception of Soviet citizens as backward, semi-literate

and with a limited outlook. As a result of this misconception,

readers do not take the [propagandistic] material seriously. They

joke about and ridicule its content. Since the level of the Bolshevik

Pravda, Izvestiia and Krasnaia Zvezda was very high from the

point of view of journalistic quality, the reader got used to placing

a high demand on the form of a text.372

Jonathan Steinberg, "The Third Reich Reflected: German Administration in the Occupied Soviet Union, 1941-44," in The English Historical Review, Vol. 110, No. 437 (June 1995), p. 638; cited from Walter Naasner, Neue Machtzentren in der Deutschen Kriegswirtschaft, 1942-1945: Die Wirtschaftorganisation der SS, das Amt des Generalbevollmachtigter fur den Arbeitseinsatz und das Reichsministerium fur Bewaffnung und Munition/ Reichsministerium fur Rustung und Kriegsproduktion im nationalsozialistischen Herrschaftssystem (Boppard, 1994), p. 117. 372 "Lagebericht ffir den Juni 1942: Propaganda," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/475 (vol. 2), p. 241.

157 Despite its disconnection from reality and fairy-tale style of reporting,

Soviet propaganda at least showed a modicum of respect for ordinary people. It claimed to take into account their aspirations and needs, and treated them seriously or at least pretended to do so. This was not at all the intent of German propaganda, which did not provide any positive program, utilized colonial rhetoric, and reduced its messages to the animalistic mantra of "work, work, and work." It did not generate any trust in the society, thereby contributing to the proliferation of rumours, popular jokes, and anecdotes. When propaganda failed, the German authorities resorted to applying sheer force to procure the required number of Ostarbeiter.

As increasingly brutal methods were employed for the Werbung, people started to compare it with the Soviet deportations to Siberia. Kyivites pointed out that the Ostarbeiter transit camp in the city was located on the site of a Soviet transit camp for prisoners awaiting deportation to Siberia.373 The German night raids resembled the Soviets' sudden night arrests, and the cruel treatment by the

373 "Lagebericht von 2.4 - 18.4.1943," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/475 3676/4/475 (vol. 2), p. 78; "Lagebericht fur Oktober 1942," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/475 (vol. 2), p. 577. John Armstrong provides other German evidence of popular comparison of the Werbung with the terror of banishment to Siberia: John Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism (Englewood, Co., 1989) 3rd edition, p. 89; Also 265-PS, Nuremberg Trials. On one occasion, an unknown individual was hanged by the order of a Gebietskommissar, after he openly denounced the Werbung at a village gathering in Vinnytsia oblast on the grounds that it was similar to the Bolshevik deportation to Siberia. See "Uber die Bereisung des Reichskommissariats mit Prof. v. Griinberg in der Zeit vom 13.8. bis 3.9. 1942," in TsDAVOV 3206/2/026, p. 28 (reverse).

158 police resembled the brutality of NKVD convoy guards. It was argued that while the Werbung resembled the Soviet deportations of 1934 and 1937, and German rule overall resembled Bolshevik rule, the Bolsheviks were at least "our people"

(svoi), whereas the Germans were aliens. A large number of German and

Ukrainian nationalist sources agree on the popularity of this attitude from late

1942 until the very end of the German occupation.

At the very end of the German occupation a source from Kamianets'-

Podil's'kyi concluded that compassion for the plight of Ukrainian workers in

Germany and POWs, together with the public executions, unequal treatment, and beatings, was one of the reasons of the Ukrainians' extreme hatred of the

374 Germans.

A crucial effect of the Werbung on the moods of the population is also confirmed by German reports. One of them of October 1942 bluntly summarizes the situation:

By reason of my capacity as commandant of the Assembly Point

for workers and the respective transport of workers to the Reich,

and thereby being in touch with various groups of the Ukrainian

population, I am informed of the morale of the Ukrainians in the

various areas of Eastern Ukraine. In light of this knowledge I must

state that an atmosphere of animosity has taken the place of the

374 "Zvity z terytorii' Kamianets'-Podil's'koi i Mykola'ivs'ko'i oblastei (veresen' 1943 - 45): Kamianets'-Podil'shchyna, sichen' 1944," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/22, p. 10.

159 original attitude toward the Reich. This sudden change of mood is

connected partly with the scarcity of food for the civilian

population, caused by the war and intensified by the measures

aimed at centralization. The more important motive is the extreme

abuse in the treatment of the Eastern workers shipped to Germany,

which has taken place at various times.

Historians of Stalinism have shown in their works that avoidance of targeted individuals or groups became a survival strategy during the Stalinist

"inf. terror of the 1930s. The mass terror led to the anatomization of society, which

continued throughout the German occupation.377 Unlike the Holocaust or the murder of Soviet activists, which affected only a certain group, the Werbung

affected practically every family. Unlike the mass murder of Soviet POWs, which

affected a far smaller number of people and took place mostly in a relatively short

span of time at the very beginning of the German occupation, the forced recruitment lasted from March-April 1942 until the very end of Nazi rule, keeping

almost every family in fear for a lengthy period of time.

375 054-PS, Nuremberg Trials [I have modified the translation]. Similarly, "Allgemeine Lage und Stimmung im Reichskommissariat Ukraine," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 32 [4 December 1942]. "inf. Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s (Oxford, 1999). 377 "Kiew, 15.9. 1942," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/474, p. 164; Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair (especially Chapter 9).

160 As a result, the Werbung became the single most important event that turned the population against German rule. In the words of a contemporary, it became the "biggest calamity that overshadowed all other calamities."378

The traumatic experience of the German occupation led to the view of the

Bolsheviks as the "lesser evil," overshadowing in the popular conscience the earlier Bolshevik atrocities and their brutal methods of conducting the war, and thus laying the groundwork for the popular acceptance of the myth of the "Great

Patriotic War" a few decades later.

378 In original: "naibil'she lykho shcho zaslonylo usi lykha." See "Informatsiini povidomlennia z terytorii skhidnykh oblastei Ukrainy (kviten' - lystopad 1943): Nikopol'," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 34.

161 Propaganda Cartoons for the Werbung:

1. I should not stand aside when the Fatherland needs help. 2. Young people of other European nations have been performing labor duty for a long time. 3. I am also hurrying to register on time. 4. The best workers are rewarded. I too will be working diligently and carefully. 5. I will also see the world and visit Berlin, the center of European culture. 6. I will return to the Fatherland with a specialty, strong in body and spirit, rewarded for my diligent work.

1, R «* Hjui> «»»• MTSpoiifc, «•«« tUTknlx }. MOJUAb IMUIMX «ipont»«>HHX ttftpQAll )tW«

162 Propaganda Poster:

Carefree Life in Germany

*£*• ••%&*' ft' | <&**%-£$ :\y eifypooTHe mmzin

x

• • • -ly Va

K» =W *"» •$•

B HlH@4MHHi

%

163 Chapter III:

The Brutalization of the Werbung: Resistance,

Avoidance and Accommodation

As the voluntary recruitment tapered in spring 1942, the Nazi bureaucracy

embarked on a series of coercive measures to fill the quotas. At first, many people

complied with the requirements. Gradually, evasion of the recruitment assumed massive proportions, as more information was becoming available about

Ostarbeiter conditions in Germany, and more and more manpower was required

for Germany. The evasion reached a level where it threatened to undermine the

Werbung.

In summer 1943 the Generalkommissar of Kyiv reported that in his area

only slightly more than 50,000 people could be transported to the Reich out of

224,312 labor conscripts. More than 80,000 avoided capture, and the rest were

"37Q

released for "economic, social or health reasons." In one Gebiet of the

Generalbezirk, only 25-30 percent of the required recruits were seized in late

summer 1942, despite the efforts of all available policemen. Most able-bodied

Muller, "Die Rekrutierung sowjetischer Zwangsarbeiter," p. 244.

164 residents escaped to the forest taking all their belongings with them. The Nazis suspected that local Ukrainian officials were tipping them off.

Similar conditions existed in other areas. Under these circumstances, the

Nazis started to apply increasingly brutal methods to crush the evasion and resistance. Violence became far less hidden and bureaucratized and was increasingly manifested in the sheer application of unrestrained force. Man- hunting police raids and round-ups became a common feature of everyday life.

Contemporaries often compared these operations with the old days of the slave hunt. Erich Koch, the ruler of Ukraine, clearly endorsed this view. At one time he told his subordinates that as an inferior race Ukrainians were supposed to be

101 lassoed, if necessary.

During a typical raid police sealed off a crowded place, like a central square or market, detaining everybody without proper documents, and sometimes everyone between the ages of 15 and 45. In a city a few neighbourhoods could be sealed off and mopped up. Police went from house to house detaining (suspected) recruits, who were then brought to a transit camp where their fate was decided.

In Dnipropetrovs'k a big police raid in early April 1943 embraced the whole city. Numerous dodgers and those without proper documentation were

im "Kiew, 15.9.1942. Werbung," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/474, p. 295. 381 "Akt oskarzenia przeciwko Erichowi Kochowi z 5 lutego 1955r.," in Poliaky i ukraintsi mizh dvoma totalitarnymy systemamy, p. 75.

165 brought to labor camps and prisons.382 In Kyiv, police carried out a large citywide raid on Sunday, 12 July 1942. It caught 1645 individuals, 614 of whom were selected for deportation to Germany. Upon further examination, 76 sick individuals and 145 detainees working for German institutions were released, leaving only 255 persons (200 women and 55 men) for the shipment to the

Reich.383

The results vis-a-vis the manpower employed were deemed unsatisfactory, so the German authorities resorted to more isolated raids and round-ups requiring fewer resources. They began targeting markets, movie theatres and beaches.

The manhunt yielded numbers below expectations, as many Kyivans escaped the city or learned how to avoid risky places, acquire proper documents, etc. On the other hand, it meant that the city's "free" labor was virtually exhausted. Detainees were often largely those who had no reason to hide or escape.

Thus, a morning raid of Kyiv's beaches caught only 20 dodgers, despite the fact that it was a popular recreation place, especially among women. In another operation, which took place on 18 August 1942, police sealed off the

"Jewish Bazaar," the largest city market visited daily by many thousands of people. They checked 2000 residents, 394 of whom were brought to a transit

"Ohliad suspil'no-politychnoho, kul'turnoho i hospodars'koho zhyttia pivdenno-ukrai'ns'kykh zemel' (kviten' 1943): Dnipropetrovs'k (misto)," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 5. "Fragen des Arbeitseinsatzes von Ukrainern im Reichsgebiet," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 21 [18 September 1942]. 384 "Kiew, 15.9.1942. Werbung," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/474, pp. 293-94. 385 "Kiew, 15.9.1942. Werbung," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/474, p. 294.

166 camp. Of this number, a further 194 detainees were released on health grounds or

•70/: their employment at military-related enterprises.

Market raids became a frequent event in the city. Thus, on 5 September

1943 in Oleksandriia (Kirovohrad oblast), police encircled a marketplace, detaining everybody - men, women, old people and children - who were supposed to be sorted out the next day.387 Once the police presence became evident during a market raid, hundreds of people tried to run away frantically in every direction, topping stands and stumbling over each other. Police fired shots at the escapees.

One such police raid on a Kyiv marketplace is described in great detail by

Anatolii Kuznetsov:

Trucks zoomed into our square at top speed, and Germans, dogs

and policemen poured out of them. A cordon was set up. The

women in the marketplace screamed and scattered in all directions;

baskets fell off counters, and potatoes rolled all over. Some

managed to elude the cordon, others did not; and the crowd surged

in waves from one exit to another, where "Arbeitskarten" were

already being checked....

They were taking mostly women, the various village girls who had

came to the bazaar. These girls were quickly loaded into covered

trucks, where they wailed, shook the canvas and shoved their

386 Ibid, p. 295. Kosyk, The Third Reich and Ukraine, p. 327.

167 hands through the openings: "Oh, Mama, help! Save me!" One

dishevelled woman shouted, "I've got an infant at home. Look,

I've got milk!"388

Peasants bringing food to the city were a common catch at the market raids. As this police tactic became widely known, the number of villagers willing to take such a risk significantly decreased. It was mostly older peasants with children who felt more secure about bringing their produce. Consequently, the market raids affected food delivery in the starving cities.

Aside from markets, it soon became a common practice to raid churches, movie theatres or even factories full of people. Ukrainian police raided movie theatres in the towns of Zviahel' and Novohrad-Volyns'kyi of Generalbezirk

Volhynia-Podillia on 20 and 29 October 1942, respectively, detaining the "work-

ion able" civilian audience. Several more towns of the Generalbezirk experienced the same in the fall of 1942. In Berdychiv alone, police raided movie theatres at least three times: on 2 September, and 14 and 16 November 1942.390 This practice

Kuznetsov, Babi Yar, p. 261.

TOO "28 lystopada 1942. Zi zvernennia heneralkomisara do komisariv v Zviaheli, Berdychevi i Zhytomyri vidnosno oblav v kinoteatrakh," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/262, p. 48; "Zhytomyrshchyna pid chas nimets'ko-fashysts'ko'i okupatsii. Dysertatsiia Strel'tsova O.A.," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/264, pp. 35-36. "Werbung von Ukrainern fur den Arbeitseinsatz im Reich," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 25 (16 October 1942); "28 lystopada 1942. Zi zvernennia heneralkomisara do komisariv v Zviaheli, Berdychevi i Zhytomyri vidnosno oblav v kinoteatrakh," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/262, p. 48.

168 was commonly followed in other areas of the Reichskommissariat, despite the fact that it was drawing criticism from many German officials. The movie theatre raids scared the population off from what was regarded as an important element of German propaganda.

A tragedy happened during one police manhunt raid at a Kyiv confectionary factory on 18 March 1943 to detain 50 female workers. The women tried to escape from the factory windows by rappelling down a rope, and a few fell to the ground. When trucks with the captives were leaving the premises of the factory, some mothers of the workers rushed to the scene and threw themselves

•5QI under the wheels to stop the raid. Eleven people died. In another incident, which occurred in October 1942 in Kyiv, people were suddenly surrounded while they were listening to a band playing at a market. Several tried to escape but were shot.392

Certain improvisations were employed depending on the situation. In

Lysychans'k (Voroshylovhrad oblast) police surrounded the building of the local

"Prosvita" society during a concert. All the actors and spectators were sent to a

iyi Koval', "'Ostarbaitery' Ukrainy," pp. 184-85. •5Q9 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, p. 263. 393 "Prosvita" (Enlightenment) was a society created in nineteenth century Galicia for the preservation and development of Ukrainian language, culture and education among the population. It was outlawed in the Reichskommissariat but existed in some areas under the military government.

169 transit camp.394 In western Volhynia, pilgrims visiting Pochai'v Monastery were detained and locked inside, including the "lame, blind and old."

Another method was to trick people into gathering in a certain area and then detain them all. On one occasion at the Poltava railway station the authorities announced a distribution of food rations. When the workers arrived to receive the food, they were surrounded by the police. In Kryvyi Rih, officials invited youth to a transit camp to show them a movie about the life of Ukrainian workers in the

Reich. After the event they were all detained. Similarly, peasants were invited to attend a village gathering in Iaruns'k district of Zhytomyr oblast. The police again intervened and captured 250 recruits. The same tactics were employed in

Verkhovtseve (Dnipropetrovs'k oblast).399 It was very common for the local authorities to summon an individual for a "re-registration" and catch him there.

People had gotten used to repeated registrations and initially did not suspect a trick.

In the countryside, whole villages were sometimes surrounded and all inhabitants checked. In July 1943 police "isolated" the villages of Maidan-Bobryk and Pykivs'ka Slobidka in Khmil'nyk district (Vinnytsia oblast); as a result of the

Oleksandr Potyl'chak, Trudovi resursy, p. 25. 395 018-PS, Nuremberg Trials. Potyl'chak, Trudovi resursy, p. 22. Kosyk, The Third Reich and Ukraine, p. 325. Potyl'chak, Trudovi resursy, p. 25. "Informatsiini povidomlennia z terytorii skhidnykh oblastei Ukra'iny (kviten' - lystopad 1943). Nikopol': Gebits'ki visti," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 36.

170 operation 80 and 256 villagers, respectively, were sent to Germany.400 Such operations became common with the approaching frontline in late 1943 and early

1944, and especially during the retreat. Along with the police, they often involved

German and native military units stationed nearby. The man-hunters went house- to-house, giving little time for people to collect their belongings. Sometimes the recruits were shoved into the streets in their sleeping apparel. A contemporary vividly describes a police raid in a village near Kyiv. The sheer application of violence was again accompanied by pomp, creating a sense of absurdity:

The police came around to the cottages flushing out the

deportees... And there, my God, what a scene! The whole village

was milling about, and the deportees were being formed into a

column. The policemen barked "Get going!" and the band, made

up of the handicapped, blared forth. Women ran along beside the

column, shrieking and sobbing, clinging to their daughters' necks;

the policemen pried them away, and some women fell to the

ground; the Germans brought up the rear, laughing. And the band

kept playing a march, so jolly that my hair stood on end.401

400 Hal'chak, "Skhidni robitnyky" z Podillia, p. 95. 401 Kuznetsov, Babi Yar, pp. 209-10.

171 The recruits seized during the house searches were often given no time to collect their personal belonging and food. A Wehrmacht report blamed the village elders for this misconduct:

The village elders are frequently corruptible; they lock up the

drafted workers in cellars, who were dragged from their beds at

night, until they are shipped out. Since the male and female

workers often are not given any time to pack their luggage, etc.,

many workers arrive at the transit camp with entirely insufficient

equipment (without shoes, only two items of clothing, no eating

and drinking utensils, no blankets, etc.). In particularly extreme

cases, new arrivals have to be sent back again immediately to get

the most necessary things. The threatening and beating of workers

by the police are a daily occurrence if people do not come along.

This is reported from most of the communities. In some cases,

women were beaten until they could no longer march.402

Recruits seized during police raids and brought straight to a transit camp found themselves in an even worse situation. Their parents tried to pass on food and other vital things to their children in a transit camp or during a march.

However, as mentioned earlier, such attempts were often blocked by the guards.

Some even did not know that the police had caught their relatives until they

402 054-PS, Nuremberg Trials (I have modified the translation).

172 received a letter from Germany. As a result, many labor conscripts were sent to

Germany in light summer clothes and with little or no food.403

Tearful farewells accompanied the columns of detained recruits. Grief- stricken parents lamented, not knowing if they would ever see their children alive again.

On the morning of 12 December we were arranged in a long

column and herded under convoy of German soldiers and "our"

policemen.... From the gates of the camp women who had come to

bid farewell to their relatives followed us far out of the city... Mid­

way. .. the guards set about pushing the women out of the column.

And then something improbable occurred: the several hundred

women started lamenting, crying and dashing into the column to

say good-bye to their relatives, embracing and kissing them. The

column got mixed up and turned into a disorderly crowd. The

guards tried to separate the women from the men and restore order

with their rifle butts and clubs. The women's lamenting exploded

403 Ostarbeiter were told in fall 1942 to ask their relatives to send them winter clothes for free. They had to fill out a form indicating what kind of clothes they needed. An appeal to help the Ostarbeiter with clothing was also issued in Ukraine. See "Merkblatt fur Bebriebsfuhrer und Ortsbauernfuhrer iiber die Versorgung mit Bekleidung," in DAKhO 3080/2/002, p. 53; "Beschaffung von Winterkleidung fur die im Reich eingesetzten Ostarbeiter," ibid, pp. 49-50. A sample letter in the same file, pp. 51- 52 (reverse).

173 even stronger, turning into a wild roar enough to drive one crazy.

Never in my life before or after have I heard something similar.

This roaring accompanied us for half an hour.

It was not always easy to keep an upcoming police raid secret. A

Ukrainian policeman was not isolated from the rest of the community. He could tip off acquaintances or simply boast about his omniscience to the local girls, who quickly spread the news. People were thus alerted, so the manhunters caught fewer than the expected number of souls. The German authorities often did not trust the local police and notified them about raids at the last minute. When, on 30

July 1943, the Ukrainian police under the Germans' supervision was to surround and raid the village of Karabchiiv in Ruzhyn district (Zhytomyr oblast), which did not supply recruits, they were to leave Ruzhyn, according to the plan of the operation, on horse carts at 11 p.m. in order to start the operation in the village at

3 a.m. The Ukrainian police was to be informed about the character of their mission only within 2-3 km of the destination.405

As police raids became widespread, people eligible for the Werbung started to avoid public places or run away at the first sign of the approaching police. As summarized by the German censors on the basis of letters sent to

Germany,

404 "Volovych Oleksii Ivanovych," in OST - tavro nevoli, p. 162. Similarly, Voropai, Iasyr, p. 3; Seleshko, Vinnytsia, p. 115.

405 «27 lypnia 1943. Nakaz ober-leitenanta zhandarmerii pro wedennia v diiu viis'kovykh chastyn," in TsDAVOV, 4620/3/262, pp. 51-53.

174 In order to secure the required number for the labor transport, men

and women, including 15-year-old youngsters, are allegedly taken

from the street, from the market places and village festivals, and

carried off. The inhabitants, therefore, hide themselves in fear and

avoid any appearance in public.406

In some cases, villagers organized "patrols" that monitored roads leading up to a village to alert the inhabitants about the approaching police. At the first alarm young people took to the forests. In the village of Zarubyntsi near

Pereiaslav (Kyiv oblast) villagers took turns standing on a hilltop to watch if policemen were crossing the Dnipro River. By the time they arrived in the village everybody had gone into hiding.407 This tactic was especially effective in northern

Ukraine, where the police presence was very limited in the countryside because of the partisan threat, and policemen moved around in large convoys. The Luts'k

Labor Department reported that recruitment officials found many villages deserted upon their arrival; all the people had fled to the forest.408 In western

Volhynia they also encountered organized armed resistance from the population.

There, Banderites established a network of village self-defence units. In some cases, the poorly armed villagers managed to stave off the man-hunters.

406 018-PS, Nuremberg Trials. 4 7 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, p. 267. 408 Eikel, "Cherez brak liudei," p. 144.

175 The police often carried out house searches at night, when there was a higher chance of finding a conscript at home. In response, the youth started to bivouac on a mass level in the fields, forests or hideouts, with the result that nocturnal house raids were becoming less effective.409

In the northern regions of Ukraine, targeted individuals often joined the

Soviet or Ukrainian nationalist partisans to escape the Werbung. As acknowledged by Alfred Rosenberg,

The reports I have received show that the increase of partisan

bands in the occupied Eastern Regions is largely due to the fact

that the methods used for procuring laborers in these regions are

forced measures of mass deportation, so that the persons in danger

prefer to avoid this fate by escaping into the woods or going to the

partisan bands.410

In summer 1943 the commander of Army Group Rear Areas "South" also connected the increase in partisan activity with the Werbung.

Partisan activity has grown considerably in July compared with the

previous month. This is not attributed to the emergence of new,

larger partisan detachments but to the formation of countless new

409 "Lagebericht von 21.2 - 13.3. 1943," in TsDAVOV, 3676/4/476, pp. 169-70. 018-PC, Nuremberg Trials.

176 small groups, especially in the northern part of the Area [Army

Group "South"]. According to the testimony of captives, these

small groups mostly consist of youth, who are hiding from the

labor duty in Germany.411

The long marches of the recruits became one of the elements of the gradual brutalization of the Werbung. Initially they took place in the frontline regions or in areas captured during the summer 1942 offensive (in Ukraine,

Voroshylovhrad and part of Stalino oblasts). In Kramators'k recruits routinely had to endure an almost 100 km march to Stalino. These kinds of marches became common during the Germans' retreat in late 1943 and early 1944. If they had not been destroyed by Soviet aviation, the closest railway stations were used for military transports and could not handle the large numbers of the labor conscripts, refugees, and forcibly evacuated population. The recruits and evacuated people were forced to undergo long and strenuous foot marches to the next available railway station. The guards were merciless. Those who tried to run away were often shot.

411 Koval', "'Ostarbaitery' Ukrainy,"pp. 188-89. 412 Tarnavs'kyi, Nimets'ko-fashysts'kyi okupatsiinyi rezhym v Donbasi, p. 69. As mentioned previously, recruits from Voroshylovhrad endured an 80 km march to the railway station in Roven'ky. Recruits from Taganrog (Russia) walked 100 km to Mariupol' (Stalino oblast). See "Larisa St., Jahrgang 1928, St. Petersburg/RuBland," in Die Sprache der Opfer, p. 107.

177 In December 1943, 2500 men of various ages were assembled in

Kirovohrad and forced to endure a march of over 200 km to the railway station in

Uman'. Guards were shooting the exhausted captives and those who had collapsed. At night they were packed in a shed so tightly that they had to stand.413

Another column that left the city that same month walked even further, to the railway station in Zhmerynka. The recruits completed the more than 300 km march in two weeks. Those who tried to sneak away were shot on the spot by the guards.414

Mass Avoidance and Retaliation

The police raids and round-up operations did not stop the mass avoidance.

In Chernihiv, in late March 1943, 5900 people were ordered to show up to the

Recruitment Office for the shipment to Germany, but only 2400 complied (two- fifths of the total figure). Of this number 1400 (three-fifths) were discharged, as they were required for local needs, while 378 were found to be sick. Only 556 people were selected and placed in a guarded camp, 350 of whom escaped during the night. In total, only 206 people, 3 percent of the planned number, were available for transit to Kyiv before being transported to Germany. This number probably further decreased during the transportation.415 In the Nizhyn area of the

Polian, Zhertvy dvukh diktatur, p. 233. 414 "Volovych Oleksii Ivanovych," in OST- tavro nevoli, p. 163. Polian, Zhertvy dvukh diktatur, p. 193.

178 same oblast, 650 out of 800 recruits escaped.416 In Volhynya, 2500 16 to 21-year-

old individuals received summonses to show up for the Werbung on 17 May

1942. Only 210 of them complied, despite the threat of punishment that awaited their relatives. The medical commission exempted 80 more recruits out of this number.417

Mass avoidance was not common just to the forested regions of northern

Ukraine. It became a countrywide phenomenon. Resistance to the Werbung turned into a riot in Akymivka (Zaporizhzhia oblast). It was brutally crushed by the police. Ten alleged organizers of the riot were executed. Mass resistance assumed brazen forms also in Kryvyi Rih in April 1943. Around 20 percent of recruits escaped an April 14 transport, some of them straight from the railway station, where local men pulled out scores of women from a convoy, threatening guards with stones. According to a contemporary, the departure of that transport could have been totally disrupted if the "girls had been more courageous."419

Apparently, women were, overall, more affected by the threat of punishment and afraid to flee. Some men even entered a train car during the incident and forced the female recruits out.420 The German authorities mobilized a lot of police for the

Pfahlmann, Fremdarbeiter und Kriegsgefangene, p. 50; Miiller, "Die Rekrutierung sowjetischer Zwangsarbeiter," p. 239. 417 Patsula and Sorokhan, "Zaruchnyky Druhoi svitovoi," p. 10. 418 Ky'ivs'kyiprotses, p. 19 [interrogation of Georg Heinisch]. 419 "Ohliad suspil'no-politychnoho, kul'turnoho i hospodars'koho zhyttia pivdenno-ukrains'kykh zemel' (kviten' 1943): Kryvyi Rih," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, pp. 9-10.

179 next transport a week later, so "there were 1 -2 policemen for every "volunteer."

Still, very few left for Germany.

In the neighboring town of Kamians'ke only 16 men and 25 women instead of 5000 showed up for labor duty in Germany on 4 May 1943. The authorities threatened on the radio to start shooting dodgers, to no avail. The following night police managed to catch 150 avoiders. On 5 May a transport left for Germany with only 200 recruits, half of whom managed to run away en route.

The German administration switched to issuing requests instead of threats. That did not work either. Nobody showed up for the next transport on 18 May.

Similarly, around the same time in the area of Luts'k only 210 out of over 2,500 reported to the medical commission, of whom 130 were recruited.

To break the mass avoidance and set neighbours against each other, the

German authorities began employing the tactics of collective responsibility. One such method was fining every resident of a village for the failure of the village to supply the required number of recruits. In one instance, in his order of 4 February

1943 Reinhart, the Gebietskommissar of Lokhvytsia (Poltava oblast), imposed a fine of 1000 karbovantsi on all residents over 16 years old in three villages, with fines of 500 and 200 karbovantsi, respectively, for the residents of three and two other villages. The fine was decreased tenfold if all recruited workers left for the

"Informatsiini povidomlennia z terytorii skhidnykh oblastei Ukrai'ny (kviten' - lystopad 1943): Nikopol'," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 36. 423 [Makar], "Pivnichno-zakhidni ukrains'ki zemli," p. 29.

180 Reich in five days. Apparently, the villages were classified into three groups depending on the rate of avoidance of the labor duty in Germany. Those with a higher rate were punished more severely. Pressure from co-villagers was not enough, so the same order stipulated the confiscation of a cow or, if unavailable, a pig weighing over 60 kg from the families of avoiders.425

The practice of collective fining was used in many localities. The fine depended on the whims of the German administrators and differed from place to place. In the villages of Verkhniodniprovs'k Gebietskommissariat

(Dnipropetrovs'k oblast) families of avoiders were forced to pay 2000 karbovantsi, village elders - 3000, and a whole village - 10,000 in August

1943.426 According to a contemporary from this area, "such methods sow the seeds of dissension among the population but yield little results for the

Germans."427

This was a rather benign method compared with the more ruthless approaches that were applied throughout Ukraine, especially in areas under civil administration. Recruits were often warned that their relatives would be punished

Sydorenko and Kotliar, Svitanky v pit 'mi, p. 41. A similar report from the district of Vasyl'kiv mentions that the property of the villagers was confiscated until the penalty was fully paid: 254-PS, Nuremberg Trials. 425 Ibid. 426 "Informatsiini povidomlennia z terytorii skhidnykh oblastei Ukrai'ny (kviten' - lystopad 1943): Dnipropetrovs'k," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 61. "Informatsiini povidomlennia z terytorii skhidnykh oblastei Ukrai'ny (kviten' - lystopad 1943): Dnipropetrovs'k," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 61.

181 if they attempt to evade the Werbung. If the threat did not work, the relatives of

the avoiders were taken hostage. In retaliation for the above-mentioned disruption

of two transports in Kryvyi Rih in April 1943, which happened as a result of mass

flight and evasion, 300 parents of avoiders were taken hostage.42

Taking hostages during the Werbung was carried out in Generalbezirk

Kyiv as early as May 1942. A local Gebietskommissar held hostages until the required number of recruits showed up.430 This method proved its effectiveness

and from the fall of 1942 was used throughout the Reichskommissariat. It was

applied with particular brutality in the northern parts of Ukraine. A special order

of the Gebietskommissar of Monastyryshche in Generalbezirk Volhynia-Podillia

of 7 July 1943 stipulated the arrest of 16 to 50-year-old family members of

avoiders and the confiscation of their property. The implementation of the

decision was entrusted to the Ukrainian police under the supervision of German

officials.431

For example, see announcement of Dunaievets' Labor Exchange in a local newspaper in Hal'chak, "Skhidni robitnyky" z Podillia, p. 90. 429 "Ohliad suspil'no-politychnoho, kul'turaoho i hospodars'koho zhyttia pivdenno-ukra'ins'kykh zemel' (kviten' 1943): Kryvyi Rih," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 10. 430 "Lagebericht fur den Generalbezirk Kiew. Mai 1942," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/475 (vol. 2), p. 197. 1 "Nakaz hebitskomisara - politsai-fiureru v Monastyryshchi pro zahal'ni miry pokarannia za nepidkorennia nakazu 'ikhaty na robotu v Nimechchynu," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/262, pp. 45-46.

182 A great number of Ostarbeiter recount that the application of collective responsibility was the reason they left a hideout and placed themselves at the disposal of the manhunters. A contemporary report from Dnipropetrovs'k confirms that this was the reason why the majority of women tacitly accepted their fate and complied with instructions. Another one from Kamians'ke

(Kryvyi Rih district) concludes that "all youth... would run away if their parents had not been punished for this."433 In this city 450 parents of avoiders were taken hostage in early 1943 alone.434

When the threats and hostage taking did not work, the German authorities resorted to burning down the houses of "inveterate offenders." The application of this punishment was described in great detail by a German official from Vasyl'kiv

Gebietkommissariat (Kyiv oblast).

During 1942 the conscription of workers was accomplished by the

means of propaganda, only very rarely the application offeree was

necessary. Only in August 1942 measures had to be taken against

two families in the villages of Glewenka [Holovynka] and Salisny-

432 "Ohliad suspil'no-politychnoho, kul'turnoho i hospodars'koho zhyttia pivdenno-ukrains'kykh zemeP (kviten' 1943): Dnipropetrovs'k (misto)," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 5. 433 "Ohliad suspil'no-politychnoho, kul'turnoho i hospodars'koho zhyttia pivdenno-ukrains'kykh zemeP (kviten' 1943): Kamians'ke," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 12. 434 "Zvit OUN pro stanovyshche na pivdenno-skhidnykh terenakh Ukrai'ny na perelomi 1942-1943 rokiv," in Ukrains'kyi zdvyh. Naddniprianshchyna, p. 171.

183 Chutter [Zalisnyi Khutir], each of whom was to supply one person

for labor. Both were requested in June for the first time, but did not

obey repeated requests. They were brought by force, but succeeded

twice to escape from the transit camp and from the transport.

Before the second arrest, the fathers of both men were taken into

custody as hostages, to be released only when their sons showed

up. When after the second escape the re-arrest of both the fathers

and the boys was ordered, the police patrols found the house to be

empty. That time I decided to take measures to show the

increasingly rebellious Ukrainian youth that our orders have to be

followed. I ordered the burning down of the fugitives' houses. As a

result, people started to obey willingly the orders concerning labor

obligations...435

The official goes on to describe another case of burning down houses that he ordered the following year.

After the initial successes, passive resistance of the population

began, which finally forced me to start again making arrests,

confiscations, and transfers to labor camps. After a while,

convoyed people for the next transport overran the police at the

435 254-PS, Nuremberg Trials [I have modified the translation]. The village names are apparently misspelled.

184 railroad station in Vasyl'kiv and escaped. I saw again the necessity

for strict measures. A few ringleaders, of course, escaped before

they could be found in Plissezkoje [Plysets'ke] and in Mitnitza

[Mytnytsia]. After repeated attempts to get hold of them, their

houses were burned down...

He concludes,

My actions against the labor duty fugitives were always reported to

Gebietskommissar Dohrer in Vasyl'kiv, and to the

Generalkommissar in Kyiv. Both of them knew the circumstances

and agreed with my measures because of their success.436

The German official in question was accused of misconduct, but he had nothing to worry about. Another official, Gebietskommissar of Kremenets'

(Volhynia) Muller, responsible for burning down houses in the village of

Bilozirka, was exempt on the basis of a directive of 21 September 1942 by the

Generalkommissar of Volhynia-Podillia that specifically emphasized, "The homes of those who avoid the labor duty are to be burned; their relatives are to be

436 Ibid [I have modified the translation]. The village names are apparently misspelled.

185 arrested as hostages and brought to the labor camps." 37 The rampage in Bilozirka was described in a letter intercepted by a German censor.

The order came to supply 25 workers, but no one reported: all had

fled. Then the German police came and began to set fire to the

houses of those who had fled. The fire became very violent, since it

had not rained for two months: in addition, the grain stacks were in

the farmyards. You can imagine what happened. The people who

hurried to the scene were forbidden to extinguish the fire, beaten and

arrested, so that seven homesteads burned down. The policemen,

meanwhile, ignited other houses. The people fell on their knees and

kissed the hands of the policemen, but the policemen beat them with

rubber truncheons and threatened to burn down the whole village. I

don't know how this would have ended if Sapurkany had not

intervened. He promised that the workers would show up by the next

morning. During the fire the police went through the adjacent

villages, seized laborers, and placed them under arrest. Wherever

they did not find any laborers, they detained the parents until the

290-PS, Nuremberg Trials [I have modified the translation]. His subordinates issued similar directives. See Eikel, "Cherez brak liudei," p. 152.

186 children appeared. That is how they raged throughout the night in

Bilozirka.438

Another letter intercepted by the censor describes a similar action in two other Volhynian villages.

On 5 December some people from the Kowkuski [?] district were

scheduled to go to Germany, but they didn't want to and the village

was set on fire. They threatened to do the same thing in Borovychi,

as not all who were scheduled to depart wanted to go. Thereupon,

three truckloads of Germans arrived and set fire to their houses. In

Vrasnychi 12 houses and in Borovychi 3 houses were burned.439

The tactic of burning houses was employed predominantly in the northern part of Ukraine, where the police had gotten used to this practice during the counter-partisan operations. Recruits in other areas, too, were often threatened that their households would be confiscated or burned down if they dodged the Werbung. In the rural areas of Vinnytsia oblast, a recruit had to sign the following form upon receiving a summons:

018-PS, Nuremberg Trials [I have modified the translation]. According to Wolodymyr Kosyk, the incercepted letter was written by Antonina Sidelnyk. See Kosyk, The Third Reich and Ukraine, p. 255. 439 018-PS, Nuremberg Trials.

187 I hereby confirm that I have received a notification about the

obligatory appearance for work in Germany.

I understand that in the case of failure to obey this order my or my

family's house, yard and all livestock will be confiscated.

Even if after this I do not appear for the departure to Germany,

then my or my relatives' house will be burned down.440

The Medical Institute and Other Schools

In late 1942 the Medical Institute became one of the symbols of the mass evasion in Kyiv.

In the first half of 1942 some technical, agricultural and pharmaceutical institutes and technical schools were allowed to exist, and students were generally spared from the Werbung. This led to an increase in enrolment. From November

1941 to September 1942 the number of students at the Medical Institute in Kyiv increased from 594 to 2504.441 These "excessive numbers" disturbed the Nazis.

After Koch's above-mentioned decree of 24 October 1942 schools began to be closed, and students were deported en masse to Germany.

Three weeks after Koch's decree was issued, the Kyiv Medical Institute was closed on the grounds of "severe political crimes and corruption," and

440 Hal'chak, "Skhidni robitnyky" z Podillia, pp. 91-92. Recruits were forced to sign a similar note in other regions as well. For Kryvyi Rih, see "Ohliad suspil'no-politychnoho, kul'turnoho i hospodars'koho zhyttia pivdenno- ukrains'kykh zemel' (kviten' 1943): Kryvyi Rih," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 9. 441 "Kiew, 15.9. 1942," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/474, pp. 235-38.

188 students were told to report to the Recruitment Office. At the designated time only 56 out of more than 2500 students showed up, most of them sick or pregnant.

The authorities publicly announced the order on the radio and in newspapers, threatening severe punishment for avoiders, to no avail.443 Repressions followed.

Not only students but also their relatives were stripped of their food cards by a special decree passed by Mayor Forostivs'kyi.444 Relatives were also taken hostage, and some of them ended up in Germany instead of the students. Some students were caught during house searches and street round-ups. Many of them fled to the countryside to evade capture. They were followed by an instruction issued to village elders to notify the higher authorities about all individuals living

Security Police suspected the rector of the Institute and other senior professors in the promotion of Ukrainian nationalist sentiments. That is probably what the phrase "severe political crimes" hints at, while the accusation of the corruption probably blames the Institute for the drastic increase in the number of students. "17 lystopada 1942. Rozporiadzhennia heneralkomisara kerivnykam viis'kovykh ta tsyviPnykh ustanov pro represii do studentiv za aktyvnyi opir u nasyl'nyts'komu uhoni 'ikh u Nimechchynu," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/242, pp. 147- 48. Nove ukrains'ke slovo, 15 November 1942; Arkadii Liubchenko, Shchodennyk, p. 94. 444 "21 lystopada 1942. - Rozporiadzhennia kerivnyka viddilu kharchuvannia m/u vsim raionnym upravam pro vidbyrannia produktovykh kartok u rodyn studentiv, iaki ukhyliaiut'sia vid vidpravky na robotu do Nimechchyny," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/285, p. 31. And, "25 lystopada 1942. - Zvedennia pro kil'kist' khlibnykh kartok vidibranykh u rodyn studentiv medinstytutu," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/285, p. 33.

189 in a given settlement who had ever attended the Medical Institute. Even after all these measures only around 100 students were deported to Germany by the end of

1942.446 Some students managed to find work at a newly opened military hospital.

Only 300 replied when a local newspaper changed its tone and published a call for all students of the Medical Institute to report to the hospital. The majority suspected it was just another trick to get everybody arrested.447

By mid-December 1942 the Kyiv city uprava's list of avoiders included

725 students from the Medical Institute.448 On 10 February 1943, however, their numbers decreased to 329, including students from the Conservatory.449

"11 hrudnia 1942. - Rozporiadzhennia holovy V. Dubechans'ko'i raiupravy starosti sela Oseshchyna vidnosno vyiavlennia ta reiestratsi'i vsikh buvshykh slukhachiv medinstytutu," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/285, p. 34. 446 "Allgemeine Stimmung und Lage. Kiew Generalbezirk," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/474, p. 82; Blanka Jerabek, Das Schulwesen und die Schulpolitik im Reichskommissariat Ukraine 1941-1944 im Lichte deutscher Dokumente, (Munich, 1991), pp. 114-15; Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, p. 265. According to Fedir Pihido-Praboberezhnyi's recollection, many students were detained and sent to the Recruitment Office after they showed up for a re-registration and replacement of student IDs. Pihido-Praboberezhnyi, "Velyka vitchyzniana viina," p. 150. Jerabek, Das Schulwesen und die Schulpolitik, p. 115. 448 "18 hrudnia 1942. - Zvedennia pro nadkhodzhennia aktiv vid raiuprav m. Kyieva za 18/XII na studentiv medinstytutu, shcho ukhyliaiut'sia vid iavky na pryimal'nyi punkt z pochatku kompanii," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/285, p. 35. 449 "10 liutoho 1943. - Zvedennia pro ukhylyvshykh do iavky na verbuval'nyi punkt po vidpravtsi na robotu do Nimechchyny po m. Kyiv studentiv

190 Other institutes experienced the same fate. The Veterinary Institute was closed two weeks after the Medical Institute. Other Kyiv institutes and technical schools (Agricultural and Hydro-Meliorative Institutes, and the Technical School of Water Sciences) were closed in the winter and early spring of 1943. Students who had been caught were sent to "beautiful Germany" or employed locally.450

Institutes and technical schools were closed throughout

Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Often police surrounded the buildings and took the students to a transit camp straight from the classroom. This fate befell the

"excessive eaters" from the Pharmaceutical and Building technical schools in

Vinnytsia in February and May 1943, respectively.451 Students at still operating schools were afraid to attend lectures.

Primary schools were also closed en masse in late 1942 and early 1943 under the pretext of the shortage of fuel or military needs, and teachers sent to

Germany. In other areas primary schools operated only on paper. Instead of schooling, the pupils did their share of the labor duty by picking medicinal plants.

Practices of Evasion

medinstytutu ta konservatori'i za stanom na 10 liutoho," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/285, p. 41. 450 "Opys naselennia Skhidnoi' Ukrainy (perevazhno Kyiv)," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 73. 451 Hal'chak, "Skhidni robitnyky" z Podillia, pp. 85-86. For Uman' [Cherkasy oblast], see "Informatsiini povidomlennia z terytorii skhidnykh oblastei Ukrainy," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 13.

191 Documents Forgery and Deception

One of the methods to avoid deportation to Germany was to procure the

"right" papers. "Document mills" emerged, which sold fake Arbeitskarte, with a special price list. In Kyiv, a document that shielded an individual from deportation could cost from 600 to 3000 karbovantsi as of September 1942.452

Archimandrite Mykhailo of the Stavropigian Monastery at the Church of All

Saints in Kyiv was implicated in early 1943 in producing forged documents to avoid the Werbung.453 He probably did it for compassionate reasons.

The falsification of dates of birth on passports became very popular, especially in 1943, when the Werbung started to target specific age groups.

Teenagers tried to lower their age (first to 15 and later to 14) or raise it to become ineligible for the deportation. Older people would pad their age to reach the age limit of 45, which exempted them from the labor duty. A resident of Kyiv left an anecdotal story about this practice.

One of the female teachers showed up with makeup on, and we

didn't recognize her. She had dyed her hair (the Germans don't

like gray), painted blue spots under her eyes and elsewhere, put on

large glasses, stooped, and went before the commission. The

Germans were sitting at the table, acting important and serious.

She approached the table. They barely looked at her: "Passport!"

452 "Kiew, 15.9.1942. Werbung," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/474, p. 297. 453 Polian, Zhertvy dvukh diktatur, p. 202.

192 She produced her passport. "Forty-five, nein" ["no"], one of them

said. We couldn't help laughing to ourselves.454

Mothers with small children and pregnant women were exempt from the

Werbung.455 Many got pregnant to avoid the deportation. When it was too late, there was an option to "borrow" children from other families or orphanages for the duration of the recruitment drive.456 In 1943 such "excuses" no longer worked.

Initially, predominantly unmarried people were conscripted for the labor duty in Germany. Many tried to escape it through a last-minute marriage. The authorities very quickly caught on to this practice and recommended that such couples be sent straight to Germany.457

Bribery

Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, p. 268. 455 Some regulations exempted only mothers of small children, while other applied to all underage children. The Stadtskommissar of Kyiv in his order of 9 October 1942 exempted from the Werbung women with children younger than 16. See Nove ukrains'ke slovo, 9 October 1942; also "Povidomlennia shtadskomisara," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/285, pp. 26-27. 456 "Lagebericht fur Oktober 1942," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/475 (vol. 2), p. 577; Bukalov, "Ostarbaitery Donbassa," p. 159. 457 "19 travnia 1942 r. - Rozporiadzhennia raishefa makarivs'ko'i raionnoi' upravy starostam makarivs'koho raionu pro zakhody do selian, iaki odruzhenniam namahalysia unyknuty 'verbovku' v Nimechchyni," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/285, p. 22.

193 The most reliable method was to bribe Labor Exchange employees or doctors at the medical commission. In Vinnytsia "it was known to everybody" that a certain Volksdeutsche official in the Labor Office accepted bribes. She had enough food, so she asked for gold, foreign currency, good dresses and other women's clothing. In Kyiv, official exemption from the labor duty in Germany cost 3000 karbovantsi. The price increased in 1943 to 15,000.459 Similar conditions existed in Kharkiv, where the local municipal administration was accused of rampant corruption. At least one official was arrested on charges of accepting bribes from individuals wishing to avoid the labor recruitment.460

Ukrainian administrations in other areas were also accused of corruption.

It cost less to get a transfer to a position from which people were not sent to Germany. In one instance, "payment" consisted of a shopping bag with potatoes and carrots, a half-loaf of bread and a piece of bacon laid on the top. The gift was covered with a newspaper. The petitioner leaned the shopping bag during the conversation with the clerk in such a way that the bread and the bacon were peeping out. After the deal was successfully concluded, the bag was "forgotten" under the clerk's table.461

Seleshko, Vinnytsia, p. 116. 459 Kuznetsov, Babi Yar, p. 197. 460 "[Charkow] Lagebericht Nr.9 fur die Zeit vom 11.11.1942 bis 25.11.1942," in TsDAVOV, 3676/4/479, pp. 20-21; "[Charkow] Lagebericht Nr. 10 fur die Zeit vom 26.11.1942 bis 10.12. 1942," ibid, pp. 32-33. 461 Kuznetsov, Babi Yar, pp. 221-22; See also "Kiew, 15.9.1942. Werbung," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/474, p. 297.

194 One of the most elaborate tricks was to bribe responsible bureaucrats to be included in a list of recruits that had been sent to Germany and then go in hiding.

This guaranteed that the family members would not be punished. In cities there was also an option to bribe house custodians, who were obliged to report the unemployed and "work-shy elements."

In the countryside a present of vodka to a policeman or village elder was often enough to be left alone for a while. Some people paid with a half-litre of vodka or even a good meal.463 A few managed to bribe policemen at the last moment, on the way to a railway station or in a transit camp.464 In some cases, policemen thus "encouraged" released groups of 14-20 recruits straight from the train.465

It was also possible to bribe German officials, although people generally preferred to approach the local staff. They shared the same cultural code, one element of which was blat (pull), and a language barrier was not conducive to arranging such a delicate question.466 German officials also required a bigger

462 "Lagebericht fur den Generalbezirk Kiew. Marz - April 1942," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/475, p. 14. "Vyhnannia radians'kykh hromadian v nevoliu do fashysts'koi' Nimechchyny. Dysertatsiia Lefterovo'i," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/242, p. 64. 464 "Volovych Oleksii Ivanovych," in OST - tavro nevoli, p. 162; "V nevoli [Oleksii Hryhorovych Tsaryk]," in Ostarbaitery: spohady zhyteliv Rivnenshchyny, p. 94. 465 Hal'chak, "Skhidni robitnyky" z Podillia, p. 243. 466 On the ubiquitous character of blat in the Stalinist times, see Sarah Davies, Popular Opinion in Stalin's Russia: Terror, Propaganda and Dissent, 1934-1941

195 "reward," often gold. Germans officials were especially often approached by

their Ukrainian acquaintances. Few helped for compassionate reasons rather than

468 money.

Hiding

Hiding was perhaps the most widespread practice of evasion. People who

received summonses or were called up to recruitment centres tried to make

themselves scarce. Moving to the homes of relatives in another village or town

was an option many attempted. This was not safe, however, since people who did

not live permanently in a given settlement were a prime target of the Werbung. So

they had to be vigilant all the time, always ready to move to another location. In

cities, many individuals tried to give false information about their current address,

so that they could continue to live at home, keeping a low profile, when they

wanted to quit a job or were called to labor duty in Germany.

It was very common for the recruitment dodgers to hide in the bushes,

swamps, fields, forests, the Dnipro marshes or other rarely visited and desolate

(Cambridge, 1997) and Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s (Oxford, 1999). 467 For one of such cases, see "1945 r... Rozpovid' Voitsekhivs'koi', zhytel'ky m. Berdycheva, pro sprobu iT dochky kinchyty zhyttia samohubstvom aby ne 'fkhaty do Nimechchyny," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/262, p. 57. 468 Seleshko, Vinnytsia,pp. 116-17. 469 "Durchfuhrung der Verordnung iiber Arbeitspflicht und Arbeitseinsatz im Operationsgebiet der neu besetzten Ostgebiete vom 6.2.43," in DAKhO 3086/1/21, p. 23.

196 areas. This was especially effective if the hiders were tipped off in advance about police house searches. The success of their endeavour greatly depended on the ability of their relatives to supply them with food unnoticed and their readiness to face the cold and other elements. This was a serious challenge in the cold part of the year. As described by one who went into hiding,

... We moved to a swamp. Many people were hiding there like us.

Thin and exhausted, they tore off their clothes every morning

frozen to ice. They did not burn large fires; only charcoal was

smoldering here and there. The escapees cooked scarce food and

warmed themselves up. When daylight set in, it brought fear.470

Whole villages ran away to the forest before the incoming recruitment officials.471 In some remote areas fugitives set up secret dugout camps that provided shelter for hundreds of people. One such camp in Chyhyryn district

(Cherkasy oblast) even had cattle at its disposal. Patrols guarded the approaches

479 to the camp, and relatives brought food from nearby villages.

Many did not venture far from home. They went into hiding in attics, sheds or house dugouts. These places, however, did not provide a highly efficient

470 Recollection of Anna Demina (Cherkasy oblast), in Viktor Andriianov, Arkhipelag OST, pp. 43-44. 471 "Wirtschaftliche Lage im Reichskommissariat Ukraine," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 43 [26 February 1943]. 472 Koval', "'Ostarbaitery' Ukrainy," p. 184.

197 hideout during a house search. There was no limit to people's ingenuity in disguising a shelter. In one case, parents immured their son in the house-stove,

An"! leaving a hole so he could get in and out.

People who went into hiding depended greatly on the support of their families, especially on the steady supply of food. Therefore, this was often not an option for a small and poor family with only one able-bodied member (typically a son or daughter of elderly parents).

A hider could also bring reprisals down on his family. The family could lose a cow or be forced to pay a fine. Parents of many hiders were taken hostage, which forced them to leave their hideouts and submit themselves to a Werbung commission. Quite a few Ostarbeiter were sent to Germany instead of a sister, brother or another relative, who had gone into hiding. Some were even detained in the Recruitment Office or village uprava, where they went to report that their relative was not at home. They did not receive a summons and did not expect anything bad. Others "exchanged" themselves for a captured relative, usually a father or mother. The relative was either taken hostage or recruited instead of the avoider. Some parents went to Germany instead of their children, although this was rarer.474 In the countryside often a brother was "exchanged" for his sister.

This was especially the case in families with several daughters and one son. Men were also considered more valuable labor in peasant households. The local

"Usni istorii. Korobenko Mykhailo Mytrofanovych," in "...To bula nevolia, " p. 392. 474 See an Ostarbeiter letter in Hava, "Nedorucheni lysty," p. 940.

198 authorities, concerned with meeting the assigned quota, did not care much about whom to send to Germany.

A number of people in hiding were denounced by their neighbours.

Personal feuds motivated this behavior as well as the fear of collective punishment or of one's own relative being recruited in place of a person in hiding.

Another reason was envy on the part of the neighbours whose own relatives had been sent to Germany. As mentioned by a contemporary,

It was necessary to hide not only from the policemen but also from

"good" neighbours. German lackeys [posipaky] exclaimed with

their slanderous tongue, "Hey, you're hiding yours, but mine has

gone... Liar, they'll catch yours too...."

These foamy [piniavi] baba Pelazhkas and Paraskas [typical

traditional Ukrainian women's names] whispered to the [village]

elders and policemen... whose daughter or son and where [he or

she] was hiding.475

Similarly, a German official wrote that the families who had sent their children, some voluntarily, to Germany, welcomed with some satisfaction the burning of houses of "inveterate avoiders."476

475 D. Strikha, "Dva roky nimets'ko-fashysts'ko'i okupatsii na Lubenshchyni," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/297, p. 82. 254-PS, Nuremberg Trials.

199 Because of all the dangers and challenges, only a relatively small minority managed to hide successfully for more than a year. Many more successfully waited out the Werbung for several weeks or a few months at the very end of the occupation until the return of the Soviets.

Self-inflicted Wounds

Self-mutilation became the last refuge against the deportation when other means failed or did not seem to be a realistic option. Although some men practiced it too, self-mutilation was especially widespread among young women, who, unlike men, generally preferred a more passive form of evading the

Werbung. Physical appearance is traditionally the symbolic capital of women, so this practice signified total desperation. It was also one of the few possible practices of evasion when the threat of collective punishment precluded hiding.

There was much of simulation of various diseases and self-mutilations, especially in the latter period of the occupation. A contemporary vividly describes its popularity.

They called in ten people at a time. Those who came in were

standing silently in the corridor, looking at each other. Some had

sore eyes (probably done deliberately), others had something else,

some had a hand in a sling, others had a stick, or had something

200 [wrong] with their leg. I had a stick too. Valia Iehorova dribbled

Ann acid on her legs from her toes up and an ulcer developed.

Anatolii Kuznetsov in Kyiv mentions a woman who cut off a finger with a hatchet.478 Other sources mention cases of people cutting off fingers in the Kryvyi

Rih area.479 A more popular practice was to engineer a temporary injury. Some abraded their skins with wire brushes and smeared kerosene or vinegar on the scrapes to produce sores.480 Others tried to poison themselves (with mushrooms, etc) to become temporarily incapacitated. One woman rubbed herself with pepper to produce a fever. The next time she poured boiling water on herself and successfully avoided deportation. Another woman, K. Zhyhorlovs'ka from

Berdychiv, poured boiling water on her leg. When she regained consciousness, she applied caustic soda to the sore.

477 "Spohady. Chabanova Evheniia ArsentiiVna," in "...To bula nevolia, " p. 331. 478 Kuznetsov, Babi Yar, p. 197. 479 "Ohliad suspil'no-politychnoho, kul'turnoho i hospodars'koho zhyttia pivdenno-ukrai'ns'kykh zemeP (kviten' 1943): Kamians'ke," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 12. 480 Kuznetsov, Babi Yar, p. 197. 481 Bukalov, "Ostarbaitery Donbassa," p. 159.

201 I stayed in bed a whole month suffering from unimaginable pain

and a fever of 40-41.5 Celsius. Doctors barely saved me from

blood poisoning.

"Boiling" one's body, especially the legs, with hot water or the application of a red-hot iron to various parts of the body is mentioned in several other accounts alongside with rubbing the skin with various substances. In combination, these methods of self-mutilation could produce a skin sore that looked like the harbinger of an infectious disease, while the local authorities had a specific order not to send people with infectious diseases to Germany. Besides

AQ'l pepper, soda, salt and garlic were used to make wounds and blisters. Garlic- induced wounds were especially effective. They could be explained as signs of typhus or scabies. Likewise, the application of the milkweed flower to one's face could make it swell and mimic a skin disease, while pouring perfume in one's eyes turned them into a red sore. Besides imitating infectious diseases, many people drank infusion of shag tobacco to induce heart problems or smoked tea

482 "1945r... Zi spohadiv Zhyhorlovs'koi K.L., zhytel'ky m. Berdycheva pro te iak vona obvaryvshys' kypiatkom unyknula nimets'ko'i katorhy," TsDAVOV 4620/3/262, p. 57. 483 "Usni istorii'. Oleksandra Mykolaivna Halkina," in Nevyhadane: usni istorii ostarbaiteriv, p. 54; Serhii Shevchenko, "Raby Hitlera," p. 5; "23 noiabria 1943. Iz akta gorodskoi komissii sodeistviia o nemetsko-fashistskikh zlodeian' v gor. Kremenchuge: Ustanovlenie kreposnicheskogo rezhima i uvod sovetskikh grazhdan v nemetskoe rabstvo," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/242, p. 71.

202 leaves.484 A skilfully made injury could work like a time mechanism. One peasant woman applied Lylypus herb to her son and nephews, who walked around with swellings and wounds for six weeks only to be discharged by the medical commission. She healed their skin with potato leaves and sugar.

Not everyone was successful in avoiding the Werbung through self-injury.

The problem with minor self-inflicted wounds was that they could often grant only a short respite, usually a one-month postponement. One Ostarbeiter describes in great detail various practices for engineering self-inflicted wounds and the difficulty of avoiding the Werbung in such a way:

Then there began the organized recruitment of everybody of a

certain age. When they sent summonses to the people with my year

of birth (1926), on somebody's advice my female friend and I

made a strong infusion of shag tobacco and drank it before the

medical commission. And this helped. We were granted a ten-day

postponement. Then new summonses came. What to do? We

begged our neighbor, a paramedic named Sabinina, and she gave

us an injection of gasoline. I got it in my leg and my friend in her

shoulder. It looked like phlegmon. The pain was unbearable! The

suffering was intolerable, we screamed from the pain. But the

484 "Spomyny: Oleksandra Ivanivna Ponedilok (Shcherbyna)," in Nevyhadane: usni istori'i ostarbaiteriv, p. 223; "Spohady. Chabanova Evheniia Arsentii'vna," in "...To bula nevolia, " p. 330. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, p. 269.

203 result was another ten-day postponement again. You could get only

a ten-day reprieve. However, the young organism healed quickly

after the incision....

She had to come up with a new plan:

We dissolved lime in a bucket; I put my leg in it. I scratched my

skin with my fingernails until small wounds opened, on which I

laid copper scratched from coins. But this was not enough in order

not to be taken away. What to do? I took unburned lime, spread it

on my wounds, bandaged them up and dribbled water from above.

Oh, my God, what torment! I could not bear it for long, tore off my

dressing, and ... Hurrah! Horrible burns, blisters. I'm [going to the

doctor] again ... Again he gives me a note.. .487

The success of such attempts depended to a large degree on the tacit cooperation of doctors, since the self-inflicted character of wounds was often evident to professionals. It was easier to get a note from a local doctor, which could be turned in during the medical examination.

The deliberate self-infliction of injury was also attempted after the medical commission. Some women avoided the Werbung by jumping off the upper floors

486 "Spohady. Chabanova Evheniia Arsentii'vna," in "... To bula nevolia, " pp. 330- 31. 487 Ibid, p. 331.

204 of buildings or the roof of a transit camp to break their legs or hands. Their last chance was to injure themselves on the train in order to be turned back at a transit camp on the German border.

Women were threatened with punishment if the fact of the self-mutilation was established. When three young women from a village near Kamians'ke

(Kryvyi Rih district) rubbed their hands with soda to make them swell, they were threatened with hanging once they would recover. Doctors received instructions with a description of the most common methods of self-mutilation and were told to pay extra attention to patients' symptoms. One of them, sent by

Generalkommissar of Volhynia-Podillia Feierabend stated,

I have been informed by doctors that young persons drink an

infusion of shag tobacco, which causes increased heart activity and

dizziness, before arriving at the office for the transportation to the

Reich. This way they hope to deceive the doctors during the

commission and avoid the departure to the Reich.

Repeated observation also indicates that some artificially induce

skin diseases, first of all, shin swelling, to obtain an exemption

from labor duty in the Reich. A doctor who carries out the medical

check-up should pay attention to such things and in suspicious

488 Ohliad suspil'no-politychnoho, kul'turnoho i hospodars'koho zhyttia pivdenno-ukrai'ns'kykh zemel' (kviten' 1943): Kamians'ke," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 12.

205 cases hold a second check-up after the effects of the infusion of

shag tobacco [disappear].

A precise clinical examination is necessary for shin swelling.

I ask to ascertain if respective observations are being made during

the recruitment to the Reich. Owing to the importance of this issue,

send me your reports no later than [.. .]489

Doctors who helped their patients to avoid the Werbung presented a more serious problem for the Nazis. For money or for reasons of compassion or political considerations they could either "find" a non-existent disease or explain how to simulate it. Nazi reports repeatedly mention doctors working on behalf of

"hostile forces" (the Soviet underground or the Banderites) and sabotaging the

Werbung. The German authorities distrusted local doctors but nevertheless were forced to rely on them. In his directive, the above-mentioned Generalkommissar of Volhynia-Podillia pointed out,

It has been determined that the population selected for departure to

the Reich repeatedly tried to avoid it by inflicting self-injuries. To

achieve this goal they often used the services of a third party. Thus,

a Ukrainian doctor was detained, who induced temporary work

incapacity for people before their shipment to Germany by

489 17 veresnia 1943. Nakaz heneralkomisara - vsim hebitskomisaram pro te shchob ne dyvliachys' na fakty samo-znivechennia moloddiu, domahatys' vsebil'shoi' vidpravky pidlehlykh vyhnanniu," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/262, p. 56.

206 administering injections that caused incredible swellings of various

organs. The swellings did not abate for three months.

Since there is a shortage of German doctors and we have to use

local doctors, I ask to keep under the strictest control the work of

the medical commissions.

It cannot be tolerated anymore that to the detriment of the

recruitment to the Reich Ukrainian doctors are applying very strict

criteria in the verification of work capacity. I ask you to let me

know immediately your observation of similar cases.490

Many Ukrainian doctors applied "very strict criteria in the verification of work capacity." In Kremenchuk (Poltava oblast) almost all doctors tried to declare the recruits unfit.491 Soviet sources on the Soviet resistance, which usually tend to inflate numbers, claim that a great number of people were saved from deportation by doctors working for the underground. Doctors helped over 1000 recruits to avoid the Werbung in Lityn district (Vinnytsia oblast) and 61 in Medzhybizh

"23 lystopada 1942. Nakaz heneralkomisara mis'kym i hebitskomisaram, kerivnykam medychnykh komisii pro neobkhidnist' vstanovlennia naisuvorishoho kontroliu nad ukrains'kymy likariamy, shcho dopomahaiut' pryznachenym na medohliad u zvil'nenni vid vidpravky do Nimechchyny," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/262, pp. 54-55. 491 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, p. 269.

207 district (Kamianets'-Podil's'kyi oblast). Six hundred exemption documents were handed in by the Soviet underground in Proskuriv (now Khmel'nyts'kyi).492

In the later period of the German occupation recruits often underwent a medical examination only in the Reich. This way the Nazis largely eliminated the problem of local doctors' unreliability. Self-mutilation then did not guarantee exemption from the Werbung as the recruits were deported with little regard to their physical condition. One such deportee was Nadiia Ivanova from Kirovohrad oblast, who left a detailed and emotional account of her ordeal.

...A [local] doctor made me rub garlic and tied it up below the

knees. Oh, my God, what torment! In half an hour it started to burn

as if a red-hot iron was attached. I was shouting [and] crying for

two hours, rolling on the grass in the garden near the house. I

wanted to throw away this "compress," but father begged me in

tears, "Bear it, my child, bear it." We did everything the doctor

advised.

The next day we were assembled near a store... My fellow

villagers were crying and lamenting. They carried me under my

arms because I couldn't walk on my own. My legs were severely

492 M. Mekheda et al. (eds.), Podillia u Velykii Vitchyznianii viini (1941-1945): zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv (Lviv, 1969), p. 416; Hal'chak, "Skhidni robitnyky"zPodillia, p. 243.

208 swollen, and the parts applied with garlic were covered with

blisters.

The transit camp... freight cars at the railway station. I couldn't

walk, so I was placed in the corner of the car fenced in by the sacks

that we had brought (mostly dried bread)...,493

Ivanova underwent a medical examination only in Krakow and was slowly

sent back home. A local doctor saved her legs from amputation/94 Some were not

so lucky. Many died of an overdose, blood poisoning or infections from their self-

inflicted wounds.

Suicide

When the deportation to Germany seemed unavoidable, some recruits preferred to take their lives. Reports of (attempted) suicide, committed predominantly by women, are numerous. Young women were especially

susceptible to the rumours of Ostarbeiter being forced into brothels. Parting with their families was also psychologically more difficult for teenaged girls than boys.

Suicide was usually attempted out of desperation, when all other means to

evade the Werbung had failed. An unnamed resident of Berdychiv (Zhytomyr oblast) attempted suicide only after her mother was taken hostage, which forced

"Ivanova Nadiia Iefremivna," in OST- tavro nevoli, p. 148. Ibid, pp. 149-50.

209 her to abandon her hideout, and she did not have enough money to bribe a

German official to get an exemption.495

Suicide was also frequently attempted in the transit camp or on the train, once it had become clear that a deportee had passed the point of no return. A

Banderite report of April 1943 from Donets'k region describes one such episode.

Huge depression among the selected [girls]; they often commit

suicide. In Slovians'k, the [transit] camp is [surrounded] by barbed

wire, German guards all around it. Weeping and insane shouting

arise from the middle of the camp. A hired harmonica player

muffles the peoples' cries by playing on a mouth organ. Two girls

hanged themselves during the night. In Kramators'k, one girl

probably went mad before the departure of the train. She rushed

out of the train car, tore her clothes, and fell onto the rails with

insane shouting. The Germans picked her up and threw her back in

the car.496

495 "1945 r... Rozpovid' Voitsekhivs'koi, zhytel'ky m. Berdycheva, pro sprobu ii dochky kinchyty zhyttia samohubstvom aby ne 'ikhaty do Nimechchyny," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/262, p. 57. 496 "Ohliad suspiFno-politychnoho, kul'turnoho i hospodars'koho zhyttia pivdenno-ukrai'ns'kykh zemel' (kviten' 1943): Donbas," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 2.

210 Another source mentions two women who took their lives in the Poltava transit camp. The first hanged herself in a toilet, and the second cut herself with barbed wire.497 Many more sources mention frequent suicides without substantiating the cases.

Escapes

When a recruit was caught by Sauckel's manhunters, his fate was not yet decided. There were some possibilities to escape en route and many took the chance. Many recruits escaped during the long marches to a transit camp or a railway station. The police convoy was usually sparse and the crowd was sometimes not counted, especially at the chaotic stage near the end of the occupation. The best way was to sneak along the road into tall grass or bushes.

Some marches "lost" a quarter or even a third of the recruits on the way. The guards reacted decisively, scared to be punished for "carelessness" or even

"sabotage." When noticed, the escapees were shot at by the guards and when caught, severely beaten.

In rural areas recruits were often delivered to a district transit camp by horse cart. This was especially the case if their number was too low to justify a foot march and trucks were not available. Policemen occupied a separate cart and the detainees were driven on others. This presented an opportunity for escape, which many people took despite the risk of being shot. On one occasion, a group escape took place at the very end of the journey, when the recruits on the carts

Sydorenko and Kotliar, Svitanky vpit 'mi, p. 36.

211 saw a transit camp and heard desperate voices from there, urging them to run

away at any cost.498 When recruits were transported to a transit camp on a truck, some managed to jump out of the vehicle.499

Escape from a transit camp was more difficult but possible. To prevent

escapes, recruits were sometimes locked up on the upper floor of the transit camp building. This did not always prevent the flight. Some managed to flee by rappelling down a rope made of belts tied together or similar material.500

Most transit camps, however, had barbed wire around the outside perimeter and were constantly guarded. Some recruits managed to escape even under these circumstances. On at least one occasion in the Kyiv transit camp, a number of detainees managed to dig an underground passage and escape.501 In the

Oleksandriia (Kirovohrad oblast) transit camp the detainees dug a passage from a toilet, and quite a few of them managed to flee before the German guards noticed the mass escape. The captured runaways were severely beaten, and some of them

CM were killed. A Nazi report, probably written about the same event, mentions that 468 out of 1059 ran away from this camp.

Even more difficult was an escape from a railway station, where a lot of guards were usually present. A few managed to mix with relatives, who came to 498 "Iavors'ka (Hurzhii) Polina Ivanivna," in OST- tavro nevoli, pp. 48-49. 499 'Piskun Olena Fedorivna," ibid., p. 154. 500 "Usni istorii'. Osadchuk Antonina Prokopivna," in "...7b bula nevolia" p. 411. 501 "Spohady. Kasich Halyna Vasylivna," ibid., pp. 151-52. 502 "Pys'menna (Mamrenko) Iuliia Sydorivna," in OST- tavro nevoli, p. 133. "Wirtschaftliche Lage im Reichskommissariat Ukraine," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 43 [26 February 1943].

212 bid farewell and pass on clothing or food. One unusual case happened in

Vasyl'kiv, where the recruits escaped by overpowering the guards.504

A large number of recruits escaped from trains. Some deportees managed to tear off the car boards and jump off the moving train, which was quite dangerous.505 As mentioned by a contemporary, "The youth jumped off the moving train, even from the roof. So many of them became cripples!"506

Escaping during a train stop was especially common and much safer. One of the safest options was to blend with the local population at a railway station.

Some tried to take children by their hands to look like locals.507

German reports indicate that in many transports more than a quarter of all deportees escaped, and as many as 500 from one train that left Kyiv.508 Another

300 out of 628 recruits escaped near Fastiv from another train that left Kyiv.509

Many more sources mention less numerous escapes from Ostarbeiter transports.

504 254-PS, Nuremberg Trials. 505 "Spohady. Komendantova (Vitvyts'ka) Valeriia Mykola'ivna," in "...To bula nevolia," p. 172; "Spomyny: Hanna Ivanivna Fedorenko," in Nevyhadane: usni istorii ostarbaiteriv, p. 220; Shevchenko, "Raby Hitlera", pp. 8-9; "Vidchai dav sylu dlia vtechi [V. Taradaiko]," in Ostarbaitery: spohady zhyteliv Rivnenshchyny, p. 68. 506 Shevchenko, "Raby Hitlera," p. 9. "Ziuzina (Zhukovs'ka) Lidiia Mykhailivna," in OST- tavro nevoli, p. 151. 508 Miiller, "Die Rekrutierung sowjetischer Zwangsarbeiter," p. 244; 054-PS, Nuremberg Trials. 509 "Kiew, 15.9.1942. Werbung," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/474, p. 297.

213 Hunger sometimes motivated mass flight. In such cases the starved deportees ran from a train to a nearby village to get some food.510

The escapees, then, would make their way home for many weeks. The closer an escape took place to their home the better chance they had to come back home. As mentioned by Maria Vlasenko from near Lubny (Poltava oblast),

I escaped six times. The last time I fled from near Kovel'

(Volhynia); I walked with my friend Natalia for 45 days. We were

hungry and cold. She was the kind of person that would never beg.

I had to do it alone. That is how we reached home. Two weeks

later the Germans came again to take me away. I went into hiding.

However, I left the hideout when the Germans took away my

father.511

Another Ostarbeiter from Poltava oblast, Kateryna Kovalenko, managed to escape from the train near Lviv and travel across Ukraine safely back home.

The second time she ran away in Kyiv and again returned home, only to be finally shipped to Germany in May 1943.512

510 054-PS, Nuremberg Trials. 511 "Vlasenko (Siriachenko) Mariia Afanasivna, 1924 roku narodzhennia, urodzhenka sela Khittsy Lubens'koho raionu Poltavs'ko'i oblasti," in Svitanky v nevoli, p. 78. 512 "Kovalenko Kateryna Ivanivna, viazen' Ravensbriuka #33030," ibid., p. 126.

214 Escapees like Maria Vlasenko and Kateryna Kovalenko walked back home on secondary roads or paths to evade the police. Some tried to sneak onto a freight train to get a ride home. Some begged food, while other did a short stint working on a peasant homestead. A large number of escapees ended up in partisan groups.

Those who returned home lived with the constant fear of being caught again. They were the most likely to attempt another escape. Hanna Ivanenko managed to escape nine times, yet she finally ended up in Germany.513 Neither did Volodymyr Tsutsol from Kirovohrad oblast avoid this fate, even though he escaped several times. He conveys the never-ending cycle of avoidance and escape:

I was taken to Zlynka [a transit camp]. I ran away from there and

was hiding at home in a rabbit hole. Policemen took away my

mother, so I was forced to leave the hole. We were loaded onto the

train cars in Zlatopole. I jumped off the train on the way but didn't

reach home. Policemen arrested and beat me up well.. .514

513 u Spomyny: Hanna Ivanivna Dedorchenko," in Nevyhadane: usni istorii ostarbaiteriv, pp. 216-22. 514 "Tsutsol Volodymyr Ivanovych," in OST- tavro nevoli, p. 138.

215 Few were more successful. A. Budiak from Vinnytsia and Ievhen Chekai from Poltava oblast managed to escape respectively nine and twelve times, successfully avoiding the Werbung.

The authorities adopted harsh measures to curb the escape rate. If the guards spotted persons trying to escape, they fired at and chased them. A considerable number of escapees were killed this way. If a significant number of recruits had escaped, the police was brought in to mop up the area. When caught, escapees were severely beaten and "recruited" again or punished by a term in a labor camp. Sometimes they were shot. If an escape took place on the territory of the Reich, the runaway was put in a concentration camp.516 A dirty, shabbily dressed fugitive had little chance of reaching Ukraine without knowledge of the local language and a familiarity with the terrain.

To further discourage flight, the guards often appointed a "responsible" individual for each train car, who would be punished if an escape took place.

SI 7

Sometimes they threatened to punish two random persons in a car. Even more effective was the assignment of a few guards to each train car. In a few cases the recruits attacked the guards, trying to overwhelm them and run away.518 Such attempts were severely punished and were rarely attempted. More often

515 Hal'chak, "Skhidni robitnyky" z Podillia, p. 235; P. Panchenko et al. (eds.), Bezsmertia. Knyha Pam'iati Ukrainy. 1941-1945 (Kyiv, 2000), p. 216. 516 Security Police directive of 17 December 1942 stipulated sending all fugitive Ostarbeiter to the concentration camps: 1063-D-PS, Nuremberg Trials. 517 Hal'chak, "Etapuvannia 'skhidnykh robitnykiv' z Podillia," pp. 51, 55-56. 518 "Pys'menna (Mamrenko) Iuliia Sydorivna," in OST- tavro nevoli, pp. 133-34.

216 successful escapes took place after guards rushed to stop an escape in a certain train car. People left unguarded in other cars ran away in all directions. In some cases a group of recruits could start a fight among themselves. Taking advantage of the disturbance, the recruits from other train cars sneaked out unnoticed. It is highly possible that they all acted upon an agreed upon scenario.

Transports could be guarded by a large number of policemen and soldiers who went to Germany on vacation. Guards were told absolutely not to treat the

Ostarbeiter gently but to kick them or strike them with their rifle butts.519 It was suggested to have at least 30 guards per transport. Some had even more. Thus,

8 police officers and 125 soldiers and policemen accompanied transport No.

23119, which left Kyiv on 16 June 1943. Two or more of them guarded each train car, and the rest were in the last car. Even such a large number of guards did not prevent a flight during which four escapees were shot.521

Intimidation also worked well to curb the escape. The recruits were often threatened that their families would be shot if they escaped.522 The repressive mechanism, however, did not always run efficiently. A letter from the chief of the

Makariv raion uprava (Kyiv oblast) indicates that bureaucratic red-tape and a lack of institutional cooperation provided some opportunities for a runaway to

519 Kyivs 'kyi protses, p. 53 [interrogation of Boris Drachenfels]. 520 "Ostarbeitertransporte: hier: Begleitkommandos," in DAKhO 3080/2/002, pp. 32-33. 521-"Erfahrungsbericht uber Zivilarbeitertransport Fahrtnummer 32119 vom 16. Juni 1943," in TsDAVOV 3206/2/285, p. 7. "Spohady. Illiashenko Volodymyr Fedorovych," in "...To bula nevolia," p. 140.

217 stay unnoticed. It mentions that only 15 recruits arrived in Kyiv out of 39 that had been sent there. The rest had fled. The chief complains in the letter that the identities of six of them are unknown, since files came back on only 18

523 escapees.

Help from the Authorities

Many successful cases of evasion would not be possible without some assistance from the local authorities. Village elders were an instrumental part of the Werbung. A few of them, however, warned their fellow villagers about incoming raids or helped them to evade the recruitment. These elders could be members of the Soviet or Ukrainian nationalist undergrounds. One elder and his scribe from a village in Korsun'-Shevchenkivs'kyi district (Kyiv oblast), who were members of the Soviet underground, used stolen forms to forge exemption documents. They also destroyed recruitment lists. In total, they allegedly helped

334 people.524

In many areas of western Volhynia Banderites controlled village or even raion administrations. Village elders shared lists of recruits with OUN representatives, who visited the people on the list, ordering them to go into hiding.

They would be gone from the village when the native police arrived to catch the

523 «23 travnia 1942. Vidnoshennia shefa makarivs'ko'i raiupravy - komendantovi raionu z prokhanniam zavesty oblik vtikachiv vid po'izdky do Nimechchyny selian," in TsDAVOV 4620/3/242, p. 150. 524 KovaP, "'Ostarbaitery' Ukra'iny," pp. 184-85. Soviet sources often tend to exaggerate data.

218 dodgers a few days later. The Ukrainian police in western Volhynia was to a larger degree under Banderite influence until March 1943, when it deserted to the

UP A, so it often did its job leniently if it affected ethnic Ukrainians, not Poles or

Jews.

Compassionate reasons and a willingness to help a fellow countryman probably more often motivated those officials who tried to "sabotage the

Werbung.'" The village elder and officials of the raion uprava were not disengaged from the rest of the community. They could help their acquaintances during the age-based conscription of 1943. Community solidarity worked in certain situations too, despite the fact that officials could be punished if the recruitment rate was deemed too low. The safest way to help was to list the targeted individuals as qualified labor indispensable for local needs or to inflate the personnel of various organizations. The raion chief of Novyi Sandzhar in

Poltava oblast claims in his memoirs that he helped hundreds of people this way, but he could not help more, and 3000 recruits were still sent to Germany.

Similarly, the raion administration in Matiiv (now Lukiv, Volhynia) allegedly

S. Novyts'kyi, "U zmahanniakh za voliu volyns'koi' zemli. Viina i nashi nadii'," in Volyn' i Polissia: nimets'ka okupatsiia, pp. 163-94 (p. 165 here). As previously mentioned, those villages preferred to send to Germany Poles and other "undesirables." Sova, Do istorii bol'shevyts'ko'i diisnosti, pp. 87-88.

219 inflated the number of workers required for railway construction and agricultural needs. As a result, no more than 200 people were shipped to the Reich.

The personal involvement of local administrators in hiding targeted individuals also occurred, even though it was more dangerous. In one such case a village elder repeatedly hid evaders in his barn since nobody would search his

528 property.

The Ukrainian police was generally despised and well known for its brutal enforcement of the Werbung. Some policemen, however, also warned young people about impending raids or even helped to hide them, especially if the recruits were their relatives or acquaintances. They probably tipped off

Kyivites on the eve of a large-scale raid on 12 July 1942. A few policemen were caught and shot for "sabotaging the Werbung." One of them, from

Verkhniedniprovs'k (Dnipropetrovs'k oblast) was shot for letting the recruits off the train.531 527 Lebid', "Chasy nimets'koi okupatsii v Matvii'vs'komu raioni na Volyni," pp. 211-12. The author, who was the raion chief at that time, mentions that the raion consisted of 66,000 residents. It is not clear, however, if he refers to statistical data from before or during the German occupation, and if the latter, whether the Jews are included or not. "Iavors'ka (Hurzhii) Polina Ivanivna," in OST- tavro nevoli, p. 48. "Balashova (Polietaieva) Antonina Mykhailivna," in OST - tavro nevoli, pp. 52-53. "Fragen des Arbeitseinsatzes von Ukrainern im Reichsgebiet," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 21 [18 September 1942]. "Informatsiini povidomlennia z terytorii skhidnykh oblastei Ukra'iny (kviten' - lystopad 1943): Dnipropetrovs'k," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 61.

220 A contemporary from Dnipropetrovs'k wrote in June 1943 that in the countryside elders and police overall felt sympathy with the escapees, who are tacitly employed in many cases at their old place of work.532 A Nazi report seems to agree on this issue.

All the recruitment commissions of the Generalbezirk

[Dnipropetrovs'k] have detected that the Ukrainian police tries

again and again to sabotage the success of the recruitment

measures by assisting escape attempts or by the poor

implementation of round-ups.

Accommodating practices

A wide variety of accommodating practices emerged to avoid the recruitment. For women, the most popular was to place themselves under the

"protection" of German military and civilian personnel.534 Sexual relations between the occupiers and Ukrainian women seem to have been quite widespread.

One reason for this was that women greatly outnumbered men. Most young men had been mobilized into the Red Army or evacuated east as skilled labor. The

532 "Informatsiini povidomlennia z terytorii skhidnykh oblastei Ukrai'ny (kviten' - lystopad 1943): Dnipropetrovs'ka oblast (cherven')," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 34. 533 "Wirtschaftlichuy e Lage im Reichskommissariat Ukraine," Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, No. 43 [26 February 1943]. 534 "Informatsiini povidomlennia z terytorii skhidnykskhidn; h oblastei Ukrai'ny (kviten' lystopad 1943): Dnipropetrovs'k," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 31.

221 Germans also received much better food rations and significantly higher salaries and could offer gifts or share some food with their starving lovers. They were in a position of power and could provide help with regard to a number of issues too, including the Werbung.

Almost every Ukrainian wartime memoir mentions local women or prostitutes dating the Germans. Popular folklore scorned these women. A popular anecdote claimed that there was no meat in Ukraine, since "all the cows are hanging out with the Germans, all the pigs have signed up as Volksdeutsche

[ethnic Germans] or work in the police, and all the sheep have been sent to

Germany."535 A pro-Soviet verse popular in Kyiv in early 1943 directly reproached women.

Ukrainian girls are smiling at the Germans, They have forgotten their boys. Only their parents are sad for them Mourning their sons. Girls, you loved the officers-fliers And to them swore your fidelity with tears. But in a difficult time you forgot your falcons [boys] And sold yourselves to the Germans for a piece of bread.

"Lagebericht von 2.4. - 18.4.1943," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/476, p. 81. "Lagebericht von 21.2 - 13.3. 1943," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/476, p. 175.

222 Some examples of pro-Soviet folklore went even further, calling for retribution. A pro-Soviet verse used this motif to justify a Soviet air raid on Kyiv on 11 May 1943, which led to a high casualty rate among the civilian population.

Why shouldn't I bomb Kyiv If my wife is sleeping with a Hungarian?

This verse was so popular that in a slightly modified version it even reached Vinnytsia. Another verse had an even more sinister overtone.

Daddy, mommy, please forgive us For bombing you. If we could, we would have killed our wives and children For betraying us to the Germans.539

537 In Russian original - "Zachem mne Kiev ne bombit', / esli zhena s vengertsem spit." At that time there were many Hungarian soldiers stationed at or passing through Kyiv. "Lagebericht von 20.4 - 1.6. 1943," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/476, p. 197. "Don't blame me, Mom,/ that I bombed out Kyiv, / my wife was sleeping with a German, /1 only woke her up". In original, "Ne rugai menia mamasha / chto ia Kiev rozbombil, / moia zhena s nemtsem spala, / ia ei tol'ko razbudil." In Seleshko, Vinnytsia, p. 152. rig In Russian original - "Batiushka, matushka, prostite, / chto my vas bombili. / Esli by my mogli, svoikh zhen i detei by ubili, / potomu chto nas nemtsam predali." "Lagebericht von 20.4 - 1.6. 1943," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/476, p. 196.

223 Ukrainian nationalists also frequently mentioned the "nationally unconscious Ukrainian women" who are "gadding about with the Germans," although their rhetoric on this issue did not assume such ferocity.

German sources confirm the widespread character of the relations between

Ukrainian women and German soldiers or officials, which caused jealousy among

Ukrainian men.540 There was ambiguity in the attitude of German institutions. The

Wehrmacht tacitly acknowledged these relationships as providing comfort for soldiers, when they are far from their families, while the ideologically purist SS, concerned with "racial contamination" and "inbreeding with the inferior race," tried to outlaw it.

There were frequent complaints that the relations between German officials or military personnel and Ukrainian women were affecting the Werbung.

In Novohrad-Volyns'kyi (Zhytomyr oblast), for example, a labor official complained that military personnel were shielding their Ukrainian lovers from deportation to the Reich.541

On the other hand, German officials took advantage of their position and often threatened to send to Germany women who refused their sexual advances. A contemporary from Kryvyi Rih mentions one such incident in spring 1943: "This

For example, "Sonderbericht uber das Verhaltnis der Charkower Bevolkerung zu den Deutschen," in TsDAVOV 3676/4/479, pp. 43-47. 541 Lower, Nazi Empire-Building, p. 111. For a similar Banderite report, see "Ohliad suspil'no-politychnoho, kul'turnoho i hospodars'koho zhyttia pivdenno- ukrai'ns'kykh zemel' (kviten' 1943): Dnipropetrovs'k (misto)," TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 5.

224 is not a single episode. This [type of] violence has been happening very often recently."542 Local policemen often followed suit. Some proposed marriage to attractive women selected for work in Germany. Some women chose to avoid the deportation this way.543

A number of men tried to escape the Werbung by joining the police, auxiliary military formations, and aircraft defence or finding work as drivers for the Wehrmacht. As one of them put it, "It's better to die of a bullet in one's native land than slowly starve to death in Germany."544 Some willy-nilly volunteers tried to reassure themselves that the war would end before their training was over.

Similarly, Banderite instructions that were issued in Volhynia in fall 1943 permitted joining the police "only to avoid the forced departure to Germany."546

However, Ukrainian policemen themselves were not all the time immune from the

542 "Ohliad suspil'no-politychnoho, kul'turnoho i hospodars'koho zhyttia pivdenno-ukrains'kykh zemeF (kviten' 1943): Kryvyi Rih," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 11. 543 "Spohady. Kasich Halyna Vasylivna," in "...To bula nevolia," p. 152; Viktor Andriianov, Patniat' so znakom OST: Sud'ba vostochnykh rabochikh v ikh sobstvennykh svidetel'stvakh, pis'makh i dokumentakh (Moscow, 1993), pp. 22- 23. 544 "Ohliad suspil'no-politychnoho, kul'turnoho i hospodars'koho zhyttia pivdenno-ukrains'kykh zemel' (kviten' 1943): Dnipropetrovs'k (misto)," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 5. 545 Ibid. 546 "Nakazy Kraievoho providnyka OUN (ZUZ) (B) D. Dmytriva," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/43, pp. 25, 30.

225 Werbung. Those accused of petty transgressions were often stripped of their rank

and sent to Germany.547

***

The intensification of the Werbung and the application of coercive measures led to the emergence of a large variety of practices of avoidance. In response, the ethically uninhibited Nazi machinery embarked on brutal measures to curb the mass evasion, which in its turn prompted new forms of avoidance followed by more brutal actions on the Nazi side. Burning down houses, hostage taking and shootings were the ultimate measures which led to some compliance.

Mass evasion of the Werbung evoked collective solidarity and as such defined the perception of the German occupation.

Although by 1943 almost everybody had tried to avoid the departure to

Germany by all means, and probably at least 100,000 Ukrainian Ostarbeiter did not survive the war, statistically, young men recruited to Germany had far better chances of surviving than those who avoided the Werbung and were later drafted into the Soviet Army. Untrained, dressed in civilian clothing, and sometimes even without weapons, most of them died in the first weeks of the fighting. Having been compromised by living under the German occupation, they were cheap cannon fodder for the Soviet authorities. Some contemporaries pointed out this fact: "Our boys from Pokrova [who waited out the Werbung by hiding in the

547 "Ohliad suspil'no-politychnoho, kul'turnoho i hospodars'koho zhyttia pivdenno-ukra'ins'kykh zemeF (kviten' 1943): Kamians'ke," in TsDAVOV 3833/1/113, p. 12.

226 steppe] were mobilized into the Soviet Army in January 1944. Unequipped, they died in the first month, all of them."548

548 "Balashova (Polietaieva) Antonina Mykhailivna," in OST- tavro nevoli, p. 54.

227 Epilogue and Conclusions

The ordeal of the Ostarbeiter did not end in May 1945. Near the end of or after the war many of them discovered that the Soviet soldiers were more brutal and rude than the Germans.549 A lot of other witnesses mention large-scale rape.550 Many thousands of female Ostarbeiter were most probably raped. One witness describes a hospital in a transit camp in Hungary with possibly a few hundred patients, most of whom contracted venereal diseases after being gang- raped by Red Army soldiers.551 These cases are difficult to document, as the surviving "Eastern workers" are usually reluctant to talk about such "shameful acts." The myth of the "Great Patriotic War," which still lives on in the larger part

549 "Spohady. Hrushko (Tereshchenko) Halyna PanteliTvna," in "...7b bula nevolia," pp. 135-36; "Vospominaniia ostovtsev, vernuvshikhsia domoi. Rasskaz Marii Danilovny Min'skoi (Donbas, Ukraina)," in Ostarbaitery: istotiia rossiian, p. 51; Babenko-Vudberi, Obratno k vragam. 550 A female Ostarbeiter mentions, "Many of our girls did not return home because of those 'victors.' Having survived the German hell they were raped and killed by the 'liberators.' Many of these girls disappeared in the Oder." "Pys'menna (Mamrenko) Iuliia Sydorivna," in OST - tavro nevoli, pp. 135-36. Also, "Vospominaniia ostovtsev, ostavshikhsia na Zapade. Rasskaz Very Grigor'evny Fursenko," in Ostarbaitery: istoriia rossiian, p. 30; "Vospominaniia ostovtsev, vernuvshikhsia domoi. Rasskaz Marii Vasil'evny Abramovoi (Donetskaia oblast', Ukraina)," ibid, p. 63; Koval', "'Ostarbaitery' Ukrai'ny," pp. 193-95; Fursenko, "DI-PI: dni i gody," p. 119. 551 Babenko-Vudberi, Obratno k vragam, pp. 243-55.

228 of Ukraine, also discourages them from talking about the atrocities of the

"liberators."

Things went better for women who found a "protector" among Red Army officers or members of the NKVD, or those whose family members were officers or communist party members.

Rumors about the brutal treatment of Ostarbeiter by NKVD officials and

Red Army soldiers leaked to the Western Allies' zone of occupation, convincing many not to return home. Many others, especially volunteers and political enemies of the Soviet regime, were determined from the very beginning to seek refuge in the West. The reality was not very promising for them. The Western

Allies had agreed at the Yalta Conference to hand over all Soviet citizens to the

Soviet authorities, regardless of their consent. This agreement did not affect the western Ukrainians as former Polish citizens. Many Ostarbeiter managed to avoid the transfer to the Soviet side by posing as or marrying western Ukrainians or

Poles. Quite a few female Ostarbeiter married French POWs. Tearful ceremonies took place during the forced transfer to the Soviet zone of occupation. Frequent cases of suicide were reported.

Despite all odds, the overwhelming majority decided to return voluntarily.

The humiliating experiences of the Ostarbeiter in the Reich brought about a desire for revenge and contributed to the growing identification of many of them with Soviet power, which had defeated the despised Ubermenschen. The

Ivan Maistrenko, who visited many Ostarbeiter camps with a capella of bandura players, points out in his memoirs that the anti-German consolidation and

229 overwhelming majority of Ostarbeiter did not rationalize their return in political terms. Mostly in their early twenties or even teens, they were eager to come back in order to reunite with their parents and relatives.

While women suffered sexual abuse, male returnees were more severely punished for "working on the enemy side." Many of them were sent as forced laborers for 2.5-5 years to Siberia, to rebuild mines in the Donbas, or elsewhere.

Suspected volunteers received 10 or more years of labor camps. After the screening at transit camps many Ostarbeiter walked home for months.

Once at home, they were prevented from entering institutions of higher education, discriminated against in the workplace, and forced to report regularly to the NVKD. Residents of Kyiv were banned from returning to their native city.

Repressions and discrimination sparked a desire to suppress memories. Many managed to avoid discrimination by changing their names or concealing information about their work in Germany. Some revealed their past to their children only during Perestroika. The Ostarbeiter were, as a Russian researcher aptly put it, "victims of two dictatorships."

*** the identification with the Soviets especially increased after Stalingrad. He mentions that in one camp a bandura player had to stop visiting his Ostarbeiter girlfriend since it was deemed too dangerous for both of them. Inhabitants of the camp did not tolerate "any distinct Ukrainians with anti-Soviet sentiments." See Ivan Maistrenko, Istoriia moho pokolinnia: spohady uchasnyka revoliutsiinykh podii v Ukraini (Edmonton, 1985), p. 359. Polian, Zhertvy dvukh diktatur.

230 After initial hesitation, which stemmed from the fear of communist

indoctrination and racial contamination, in late 1941 the Nazis embarked on a

program to bring millions of Soviet workers to the Reich. They based the planning on their experience with the recruitment of Polish workers, but as it proceeded the Werbung of Ostarbeiter assumed its own dynamics. It began with

the introduction of general labor duty and the registration of population. The registration disclosed unemployed labor, which, along with the volunteers, was transported to Germany at the outset. By summer 1942 the main pool of unemployed workers became exhausted in most places, and the German

authorities began targeting employed individuals. In late spring and summer 1943 the Nazis embarked on age-based all-out recruitment.

When wide-ranging bureaucratic measures failed to procure the required number of recruits, the application of unrestrained force was introduced. The recruitment turned into a manhunt. Police raids and mass round-ups became a

daily occurrence, especially in major cities. The violence exacerbated into mass beatings, house burnings, hostage taking, and ultimately, shootings.

The feeling of racial superiority vis-a-vis the eastern Slavs and the belief that the forced recruitment could not be carried out with "white gloves" provided

a raison d'etre for the increased brutality, even though many German bureaucrats,

especially the military, questioned the effectiveness of this approach. Despite its

institutional shortcomings and squabbles, the Nazi bureaucracy worked quite

efficiently, procuring ever-increasing numbers of Ukrainian Ostarbeiter.

231 It is common in the historiography of World War II to regard the German

occupation regime in the Soviet Union, and in Ukraine in particular, as a huge

failure. This approach goes back to the seminal study by Alexander Dallin.554 In

this connection, the Werbung is commonly described as a failure.555 Scholars have

showed that the Nazi bureaucratic machinery functioned with many flaws, and it

was riddled with in-fighting, nepotism, lack of qualification and arrogance.

Towards the end of the occupation it managed to instill hatred in the souls of the

initially predominantly friendly or neutrally disposed population.

This argument does not take into account the fact that, as

Reichskommissar Koch put it bluntly, pleasing "those niggers" was not a priority

or, as some would put it, was not even on the agenda of the German

administration, which was concerned above all with questions central to the

conduct of the war or Nazi ideological tenets. Bureaucratic regulations,

surveillance, registration, propaganda and intimidation were supposed to keep people in check. Brutal force was readily used when these methods did not work.

The German authorities did not feel bound in any way to "respond" to the population, and the ability to apply force unrestrained by any ethical standards provided a powerful tool for manipulating the population of the occupied

Dallin, German Rule in Russia. The first edition of the book was published in 1957. It was followed by other classical works, most notably Reitlinger's The House Built on Sand. 555 Rolf-Dieter Muller, "Die Rekrutierung sowjetischer Zwangsarbeiter."

232 territories according to their own considerations. With the exception of the

"partisan-infested" northern areas, logistical factors, climate, and a certain reservation on the part of the Wehrmacht affected the recruitment rate in Ukraine to a far greater degree than mass-scale popular resistance. Once it was in place, the Werbung mechanism functioned in Ukraine quite efficiently until the very end of the German occupation. This was drastically different from Western Europe, in particular France and Italy (after the occupation), where popular resistance seriously thwarted the forced recruitment near the end of the war. The Nazis did not dare to resort to man-hunting tactics and the application of unrestrained terror against a more "racially valuable" population.

Ideologically fervent civil officials carried out the recruitment with the utmost zeal in Reichskommissariat Ukraine, where most of the worst abuses took place. This applies, in particular, to northern Ukraine, where they became

"hardened" during the counter-partisan operations. The military authorities demonstrated greater restraint in the area under their command. House burnings, hostage taking and shootings during the recruitment were relatively less reported.

However, the forced recruitment was being carried out there in full swing as well, and people lived in constant fear. There seemed to be little regional difference with regard to the effects of the Werbung on everyday life.

556 Zygmunt Bauman powerfully demonstrates the ability of modern bureaucracy based on rational Weberian principles and devoid of any ethical restriction to solicit the cooperation of victims on the basis of study of Judenrate in Jewish ghettos during the Second World War. See Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (New York, 2000), especially Chapters 4-5.

233 The Ukrainian administration and police were an instrumental part of the

Werbung. Constrained by the shortage of staff and the lack of knowledge of the

Ukrainian and Russian languages, the German officials supervised the whole process while local administrators enforced it, often doing the dirtiest jobs.

Ukrainian officials were threatened with punishment if they failed to meet the quota. Some tried to help their countrymen, and a few were executed for

"sabotage." However, the overwhelming majority did little to alleviate the plight of the recruits. After the war one of the most prominent Ukrainian officials in

Nazi-occupied Ukraine, Mayor Leonid Forostivs'kyi of Kyiv, wrote about his efforts to help the city during his time in office. At the same time, archival records demonstrate that he was the one who issued regulations about the forced recruitment and punishment of avoiders in Kyiv in spring 1942.

"Riding with the devil" and executing the orders of their German superiors meant that Ukrainian officials shared moral responsibility even if they were simple pawns. Many Ostarbeiter expressed particular disgust at "our fellows," who eagerly helped the Germans carry out the orders.

At the beginning of the campaign Nazi propaganda convinced some

Ukrainians to come to Germany voluntarily, "drugging them with promises," as

Sauckel put it. Economic considerations, the perception that "they have nothing to lose" and curiosity to see life in a "capitalist country" motivated the first volunteers. Many more did not want to leave for Germany but complied with the recruitment, as they "did not expect anything bad there." The flow of volunteers

Forostivs'kyi, Kyiv pid vorozhymy okupatsiiamy.

234 began to diminish radically in late spring 1942, and Ukrainians started to demonstrate increasing reluctance to go to Germany.

Beginning in late 1942 the population began to await the Werbung with horror. Resistance and avoidance stiffened and assumed large-scale proportions.

The Werbung came to define the exploitative character of the German occupation and the degrading status of the "eastern" nations in the Nazi worldview. It became the chief factor that turned the majority of the Ukrainians against the occupiers and paved the way to a reconciliation with the Soviet regime.

Mass resistance and the "heroic struggle" of the Soviet people, including the Ukrainians, against the German occupiers became a cornerstone of the Soviet narrative of World War II. The truth was that only a small fraction of the society was involved in the Soviet organized resistance, most of which emerged only in the few last months of the occupation. Ukrainian nationalists (Banderites) were even less successful outside of Western Ukraine. Unlike Poland, no underground society with clandestine associations, school network and newspapers emerged in

Ukraine during the Nazi occupation. This could not be realistically expected in a society that was deeply fragmented by the Stalinist terror and the cataclysms of the 1930s. The Nazis favored this state of affairs and on their own tried to suppress any vestige of social solidarity and cohesion. Yet certain manifestations of social solidarity existed, the most important of which were the attempts to save

See the classic study on Poland under the Nazi rule: Jan Gross, Polish Society under German Occupation: the General Gouvernement, 1939-1944 (Princeton, N.J., 1979).

235 hundreds of thousands of Soviet POWs in late 1941, which were not allowed to continue.

Subsequently, the Werbung was the only measure that led to a wide range of practices of mass resistance and evasion, fostering collective solidarity in an otherwise deeply atomized society. Unlike any other measure introduced by the

Nazi rulers, the forced recruitment of "Eastern labor" affected almost every family in Ukraine for most of the occupation and came to epitomize Nazi rule.

236 Bibliography

1. Primary Sources

1. Public Archives

Central State Archive of the Highest Organs of Government and Administration of Ukraine (TsDAVOV).

State Archive of Kyiv Oblast (DAKO).

State Archive of Kharkiv Oblast (DAKhO).

State Archive of KhmePnyts'kyi oblast (DAKhmO)

State Archive of Zhytomyr Oblast (DAZhO).

State Archive of Volhynia oblast (DAVO).

"Osobyi Arkhiv" from the Russian State Military Archive.

Harvard University's microfilmed records from Ukrainian and Russian archives at

Widener Library.

2. Contemporary Periodicals

1. Nova Shepetivshchyna [Shepetivka] (1942-43).

2. Nove uhrdins 'ke slovo [Kyiv] (1941 -43).

3. Podolianyn [Kamianets'-Podil's'kyi] (1941-43).

4. Ridnyi Krai [Bohodukhiv, Kharkiv oblast] (1943).

5. Ukrains 'kyi Holos [Proskuriv] (1942)

6. Ukrains 'ki visti [Kirovohrad] (1942-43).

237 7. Vinnyts 'ki Visti [Vinnytsia] (1942-43).

3. Published Documents

1. Abramenko, Leonid, et al. (eds.) Ky'ivs'kyi protses. Dokumenty ta

materialy (Kyiv, 1995).

2. Klee, Ernst, and Willi Dressen (eds.) "Gott mit uns": Der deutsche

Vernichtungskrieg im Osten, 1939-1945 (Frankfurt am Main, 1989).

3. Knat'ko, Galina, et al. (eds.) Belorusskie ostarbaitery: ugon naseleniia

Belarusi na prinuditel'nye raboty v Germaniiu, 1941-1944: dokumenty i

materialy v dvukh knigakh (Minsk, 1998).

4. Koval'chenko, D., et al. (eds.) Neizvestnaia Rossiia. XX vek, Vol. 4.

(Moscow, 1994).

5. Mekheda, M., et al. (eds.) Podillia u Velykii Vitchyznianii viini (1941-

1945): zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv (Lviv, 1969),

6. Motyka, Grzegorz, et al. (eds.) Poliaky i ukraintsi mizh dvoma

totalitarnymy rezhymamy 1942-1945 [Pol'shcha ta Ukrai'na u trydtsiatykh-

sorokovykh rokakh XX stolittia: nevidomi dokumenty z arkhiviv

spetsial'nykh sluzhb. Tom 4] (Kyiv-Warsaw, 2005).

7. Muller, Norbert, et al. (eds.) Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik in den

zeitweilig besetzten Gebieten der Sowjetunion (1941-1944). [Europa

unterm Hakenkreuz: Die Okkupationspolitik des deutschen Faschismus

(1938-1945)] (Berlin, 1991).

238 8. Nuremberg Trials. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Office of the United

States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axes Criminality (Nuremberg,

1945-46).

9. Potichnyj, Peter and Yevhen Shtendera (eds.) Litopys Ukrains'koi

Povstans 'koi Armii, vol. 1, (Toronto, 1978); vol. 5 (Toronto, 1984); vol.

11 (Kyiv and Toronto, 2007).

10. Serhiichuk, Volodymyr (ed.) OUN-UPA v roky viiny: novi dokumenty i

materialy (Kyiv, 1996).

11. Serhiichuk, Volodymyr (ed.) Ukrains 'kyi zdvyh. Naddniprianshchyna.

1941-1955 (Kyiv, 2005).

12. Shevchenko, Fedir (ed.) Lysty zfashysts 'koi katorhy (Kyiv, 1947).

13. Vrons'ka, T., et al. (eds.) Kyiv u dni natsysts 'koi navaly: za dokumentamy

radians 'kykh spetssluzhb (Kyiv-Lviv, 2003).

4. Memoirs, Recollections and Interviews

1. Alexandrow, Julia and Tommy French Flight from Novaa Salow:

Autobiography of a Ukrainian Who Escaped Starvation in the 1930s under

the Russians and then Suffered Nazi Enslavement (Jefferson, N.C., 1995).

2. Babenko-Vudberi, Viktoria Obratno k vragam (Kyiv, 2003).

3. Bodnar, Vasyl' (ed.) OST- tavro nevoli (Kirovohrad, 2000).

4. Bohdan, Vladimir Avoiding Extinction: Children of the Kulak (New York,

1992).

239 5. Brautigam, Otto Uberblick uber die besetzten Ostgebiete wahrend des 2.

Weltkrieges (Tubingen, 1954).

6. Chernenko, Mikhail Chuzhie i svoi (Moscow, 2001).

7. Demchyna, Antonina Zi Skhodu na Zakhid (Kyiv, 2000).

8. Forostivs'kyi, Leontii Kyiv pid vorozhymy okupatsiiamy (Buenos-Aires,

1952).

9. Fursenko, Vera "DI-PI: dni i gody," in A. Popov (ed.), Vpoiskakh istiny.

Puti i sud'by vtoroi emigratsii: sbornik statei i dokumentov (Moscow,

1997), pp. 98-135.

10. Hrinchenko, Helinada (ed.), Nevyhadane: usni istorii ostarbaiteriv

(Kharkiv, 2004).

11. Humenna, Dokiia Khreshchatyi Iar (Kyiv 1941-43) (New York, 1956).

12. Iashchuk, Volodymyr (ed.) Ostarbaitery: spohady zhyteliv Rivnenshchyny,

vyvezenykh hitlerivtsiamy na katorzhni roboty do Nimechchyny (Rivne,

1996).

13. Khelemendyk-Kokot, Antonina Kolhospne dytynstvo i nimets'ka nevolia.

Spohady (Toronto, 1989).

14. Kutsai, Stepan Nimechchyna ochyma ostarbaitera. Rozpovidi pro

perezhyte (Luts'k, 2003).

15. Kuznetsov, Anatolii Babi Yar: A Documentary Novel (New York, 1967).

16. Lebid', Mykhailo "Chasy nimets'koi okupatsii v Matviivs'komu raioni na

Volyni (spohady kol. Holovy raionovoi' upravy)," in Ievhen Shtendera,

Peter Potichnyj (eds.) Volyn' i Polissia: nimets 'ka okupatsiia. Knyha tretia

240 - spomyny uchasnykiv [Litopys Ukrai'ns'koi' Povstans'koi' Armi'i. Vol. 5]

(Toronto, 1984), pp. 197- 219.

17. Liubchenko, Arkadii Shchodennyk (Lviv, 1999).

18. Maistrenko, Ivan Istoriia moho pokolinnia: spohady uchasnyka

revoliutsiinykh podii v Ukraini (Edmonton, 1985).

19. Malakov, Dmytro Oti dva roky... UKyievipry nimtsiakh (Kyiv, 2002).

20. Marunchak, Mykhailo (ed.) V borot 'bi za ukrains 'ku derzhavu: esse'i,

svidchennia, litopysannia, dokumenty Druho'i svitovoi viiny [English title -

Struggle for an Independent Ukraine] (Winnipeg, 1992).

21. Novyts'kyi, S. "U zmahanniakh za voliu volyns'ko'i zemli. Viina i nashi

nadii'," in Ievhen Shtendera, Peter Potichnyj (eds.) Volyn' i Polissia:

nimets'ka okupatsiia. Knyha tretia — spomyny uchasnykiv [Litopys

Ukrai'ns'koi'Povstans'koi Armi'i. Vol. 5] (Toronto, 1984), pp. 163- 94.

22. Pastushenko, Tetiana, et al. (eds.) "...To bula nevolia": spohady ta lysty

ostarbaiteriv (Kyiv, 2006).

23. Pedak, Viktor Diakuiemo i mertvym, i zhyvym: svidchennia liudianosti pid

chas viiny 1941 - 1945 rr. (Zaporizhzhia, 2005).

24. Petrenko, Mykola Cherez 48 dovhykh rokiv (Lviv, 2005).

25. Pihido-Pravoberezhnyi, Fedir "Velyka vitchyzniana viina": spohady ta

rozdumy ochevydtsia (Kyiv, 2002).

26. Seleshko, Mykhailo Vinnytsia: spomyny perekladacha komisii doslidiv

zlochynivNKVD v 1937-1938 (New York, 1991).

241 27. Smereka, Vira V nimets 'kii nevoli: spomyn-shchodennyk (1942-1944)

(Uzhhorod, 1998).

28. Sova, H. Do istorii bol'shevyts 'koidiisnosti: 25 rokivzhyttia ukrains 'koho

hromadianyna v SSSR (Munich, 1955).

29. Sydorenko, Oleksandr (ed.) Ostarbaitery z Poltavshchyny v avstriis 'kii

zemli Vorarl'berh v 1942-1945 rokakh (Poltava, 2007).

30. Sydorenko, Oleksandr and Vasyl' Kotliar (eds.) Svitanky v pit 'mi: knyha

zhyttia ukrains'kykh "ostarbaiteriv" (Poltava, 2007).

31. Verbitskii, Georgii (ed.) Ostarbaitery: istoriia rossiian, nasil'stvenno

vyvezennykh na raboty v Germaniiu vo vremia Vtoroi mirovoi voiny (St.

Petersburg, 2004).

32. Voropai, Oleksa (ed.) Iasyr: Lysty, opovidannia i narodna tvorchist' u

nimets 'kii nevoli (London, 1966).

33. Zwangsarbeit in Berlin, 1940-1945: Erinnerungsberichte aus Polen, der

Ukraine und Weifirufiland (Erfurt, 2000).

2. Secondary Sources

1. Dissertations

1. Lapan, Tetiana Verbuvannia i deportatsiia naselennia Ukrainy do

Nimechchyny ta umovy ioho pratsi i pobutu u nevoli (1939-1945) (Lviv,

2005).

242 2. Tarnavs'kyi, Ihor Nimets'ko-fashysts'kyi okupatsiinyi rezhym v Donbasi

(1941-1943 rr.) (Donets'k, 1999).

2. Monographs

1. Andriianov, Viktor Arkhipelag OST: sud'ba rabov "Tret'ego reikha" v

ikh svidetel'stvakh, pis 'makh i dokumentakh (Moscow, 2005).

2. Andriianov, Viktor Pamiat' so znakom OST: Sud'ba vostochnykh

rabochikh v ikh sobstvennykh svidetel'stvakh, pis'makh i dokumentakh

(Moscow, 1993).

3. Anschiitz, Janet and Irmtraud Heike Feinde im eigenen Land:

Zwangsarbeit in Hannover im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Bielefeld, 2000).

4. Armstrong, John Ukrainian Nationalism (Englewood, Co., 1989).

5. Bauman, Zygmunt Modernity and the Holocaust (New York, 2000).

6. Berkhoff, Karel C. Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under

Nazi Rule (Cambridge, 2004).

7. Bohn, Robert, et al. (eds.) Der "Auslandereinsatz" in Flensburg, 1939-

1945 (Bielefeld, 2002).

8. Chistov, Kirill and V. Chistova (eds.) Preodolenie rabstva: fol'klor i iazyk

ostarbaiterov, 1942-1944 (Moscow, 1998).

9. Dallin, Alexander German Rule in Russia (1941-1945): A Study of

Occupation Policies (Boulder, Co., 1981).

10. Davies, Sarah Popular Opinion in Stalin's Russia: Terror, Propaganda

and Dissent, 1934-1941 (Cambridge, 1997).

243 11. Fitzpatrick, Sheila Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary

Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s (Oxford, 1999).

12. Frankenberger, Tamara Wir waren wie Vieh: Lebensgeschichtliche

Erinnerungen ehemaliger sowjetischer Zwangsarbeiterinnen (Miinster,

1997).

13. Gelderblom, Bernhard "Am schlimmsten waren das Heimweh und der

Hunger": Briefe nach sechzig Jahren Zwangsarbeit in und um Hameln,

1939-1945 (Holzminden, 2004).

14. Gerlach, Christian Kalkulierte Morde: die deutsche Wirtschafts- und

Vernichtungspolitik in Weifirussland 1941 bis 1944 (Hamburg, 1999).

15. Gross, Jan Polish Society under German Occupation: the General

Gouvernement, 1939-1944 (Princeton, N.J., 1979).

16. Hal'chak, Serhii "Skhidni robitnyky" z Podillia u Tret'omu Reikhu:

deportatsiia, natsysts'ka katorha, opir ponevoliuvacham (Vinnytsia,

2004).

17. Herbert, Ulrich Hitler's Foreign Workers: Enforced Foreign Labor in

Germany under the Third Reich (Cambridge, 1997).

18. Homze, Edward Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany (Princeton, N.J., 1967).

19. Jerabek, Blanka Das Schulwesen und die Schulpolitik im

Reichskommissariat Ukraine 1941-1944 im Lichte deutscher Dokumente

(Munich, 1991).

244 20. Kahle, Hans-Jurgen "Verschleppt nach Cnxhaven": Zwangsarbeiter und

Kriegsgefangene in Cuxhaven, Land Hadeln, und dem Kreis Wesermunde

in derNS-Zeit (Cuxhaven, 1995).

21. Kershaw, Ian The "Hitler Myth": Image and Reality in the Third Reich

(New York, 1989).

22. Knat'ko, G., et al. (eds.) Belorusskie ostarbaitery: istoriko-analiticheskoe

issledovanie (Minsk, 2001).

23. Kolko, Gabriel Century of War: Politics, Conflicts, and Society since 1914

(New York, 1994).

24. Kosyk, Wolodymyr The Third Reich and Ukraine (New York, 1993).

25. Koval', Mykhailo Ukra'ina v Druhii svitovii i Velykii Vitchyznianii viinakh

(1939-1945 rr.) (Kyiv, 1999).

26. Kuhn, Anja and Thomas Weifl, Zwangsarbeit in Hattingen (Essen, 2003).

27. Kuromiya, Hiroaki Freedom and Terror in the Donbas: A Ukrainian-

Russian Borderland, 1870-1990s (Cambridge, 1998).

28. Looz-Corswarem, Clemens von (ed.) Zwangsarbeit in Diisseldorf:

"Auslandereinsatz" wdhrenddes Zweiten Weltkrieges in einer rheinischen

Grofistadt (Essen, 2002).

29. Lower, Wendy Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine

(Chapel Hill, 2005).

30. Lulczak, Czeslaw Praca przymusova Polakow w Trzeciej Rzeszy i na

okupowanych przez niq terytoriach innych panstw (1939-1945) (Poznah,

2001).

245 31. Meyer, Marcus "... uns 100 Zivilauslander umgehend zu beschaffen."

Zwangsarbeit bei dem Bremer Stadtwerken, 1939-1945 (Bremen, 2002).

32. Mulligan, Timothy The Politics of Illusion and Empire: German

Occupation Policy in the Soviet Union, 1942-43 (New York, 1988).

33. Panchenko, P., et al. (eds.) Bezsmertia. Knyha Pam'iati Ukrainy. 1941-

1945 (Kyiv, 2000).

34. Pfahlmann, Hans Fremdarbeiter und Kriegsgefangene in der Deutschen

Kriegswirtschaft 1939-1945 (Darmstadt, 1968).

35. Polian, Pavel Zhertvy dvukh diktatur: zhizn', trud, unizhenie i smert'

sovetskih voennoplennykh i ostarbaiterov na chuzhbine i na rodine

(Moscow, 2002).

36. Potyl'chak, Oleksander Trudovi resursy radians 'kykh viis'kovopolonenykh

ta "ostarbaiteriv" z Ukrainy u natsysts'kii viis'kovii ekonomitsi v roky

Druhoi svitovoi viiny (Kyiv, 1998).

37. Reitlinger, Gerald The House Built on Sand: Conflicts of German Policy

in Russia, 1939-1945 (London, 1960).

38. Schlenker, Roland "Ihre Arbeitskraft ist aufdas scharfste anzuspannen":

Zwangsarbeiter und Zwangsarbeiterlager in Gelsenkirchen, 1940-1945

(Essen, 2003).

39. Schonborn, Siegfried Kriegsgefangene und Fremdarbeiter in unserer

Heimat, 1939-1945 (Freigericht, 1990).

40. Schulte, Theo J. The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia

(Oxford, 1989).

246 41. Schwarze, Gisela Die Sprache der Opfer: Briefzeugnisse aus Rufiland und

der Ukraine zur Zwangsarbeit als Quelle der Geschichtsschreibung

(Essen, 2005).

42. Schwarze, Gisela Kinder die nicht zdhlten: Ostarbeiterinnen und ihre

Kinder im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Essen, 1997).

43. Skorobohatov, Anatolii Kharkiv v chasy nimets'ko'i okupatsii (1941-1943)

(Kharkiv, 2004).

44. Spoerer, Mark, Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hakenkreuz: Ausldndische

Zivilarbeiter, Kriegsgefangene und Haftlinge im Deutschen Reich und im

besetzten Europa, 1939-1945 (Munich, 2001).

45. Streit, Christian Keine Kameraden: Die Werhmacht und die sowjetischen

Kriegsgefangener 1941-1945 (Stuttgart, 1978).

46. Vogel, Bernhild "Wir waren fast noch Kinder": Die Ostarbeiter vom

Rammelsberg (Goslar, 2003).

47. Werbizky, G. Ostarbeiter Mail in World War II (Tenafly, N.J., 1996).

48. Werner, Constanze (ed.) Kiew-Munchen-Kiew: Schicksale ukrainische

Zwangsarbeiter (Munich, 2000).

3. Articles

1. Berkhoff, Karel C. "Was There a Religious Revival in Soviet Ukraine

under the Nazi Regime?" Slavonic and East European Review 78, no. 3

(July 2000), pp. 536-67.

247 2. Bukalov, Denis "Ostarbaitery Donbassa," in L. Eremina and E. Zhemkova

(eds.), Komi travy: Sbornik statei molodykh istorikov (Moscow, 1996), pp.

155-59.

3. Chistov, Kirill "Fol'klor i iazyk ostarbaiterov," in V. Chistova and Kirill

Chistov (eds.), Preodolenie rabstva: fol'klor i iazyk ostarbaiterov, 1942-

1944 (Moscow, 1998), pp. 9-51.

4. Pohl, Dieter "Fashysts'ka okupatsiia Ukra'my v 1941-1944 rr. u pratsiakh

zakhidnykh uchenykh," Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal, no. 5 (1994), pp.

127-36.

5. Eikel, Markus '"Cherez brak liudei...': nimets'ka polityka naboru

robochoi syly ta prymusovi deportatsi'i robitnykiv iz okupovanykh oblastei

Ukrainy 1941- 1944," Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal no. 6 (2005), pp.

139-60.

6. Hal'chak, Serhii "Etapuvannia "skhidnykh robitnykiv" z Podillia v

natsysts'ke rabstvo," in Tetiana Pastushenko, et al. (eds.) "...To bula

nevolia ": spohady ta lysty ostarbaiteriv (Kyiv, 2006), pp. 50-62.

7. Herbert, Ulrich "Labor as Spoils of Conquest, 1933-1945," in David F.

Crew (ed.), Nazism and German Society, 1933-1945 (London and New

York, 1994), pp. 219-73.

8. Herbert, Ulrich "Labour and Extermination: Economic Interest and the

Primacy of Weltanschauung in National Socialism," Past and Present: A

Journal of Historical Studies, no. 138 (February 1993), pp. 144-95.

248 9. Hrinchenko, Helinada [Gelinada Grinchenko] "Osobennosti rekonstruktsii

proshlogo v ustnykh svidetel'stvakh byvshikh 'ostarbaiterov,'" Storinky

voiennoi istorii Ukrainy, no. 8: part 1 (2004), pp. 52-58.

10. Hrinchenko, Helinada [Gelinada Grinchenko] "'Ostarbaitery' Tret'ego

Reikha - strategii vyzhyvaniia," Storinky voiennoi istorii Ukrainy, no. 7:

part I (2003), pp. 219-26.

11. Hrinchenko, Helinada "TekstuaPnyi analiz usno-istorychnoho svidchennia

(na prykladi usnykh interv'iu z kolyshnimy 'ostarbaiteramy' Kharkivs'koi'

oblasti)," Skhid-Zakhid no. 6 (2004), pp. 151-70.

12. Lysenko, A. "Blagotvoritel'noe dvizhenie na territorii Zapadnoi Ukrainy v

gody Vtoroi mirovoi voiny," in Bernd Bonwetsch and S. Posokhov (eds.),

Epokha. Kul'tury. Liudi (istoriia povsednevnosti i kul'turnaia istoriia

Germanii i Sovetskogo Soiuza. 1920-1950-e gody) [Materialy

mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii (Khar'kov, sentiabr' 2003]

(Kharkiv, 2004).

13. Meliakov, A. "Do rozshyrennia dzherel'noT bazy doslidzhen' z istorii

deportatsii naselennia Ukrainy do Nimechchyny u 1941- 1944 rr.,"

Storinky voiennoi istorii Ukrainy no. 8 (part 1), pp. 132-45.

14. Meliakov, A. "Mobilizatsionnye aktsii v okkupirovannom Khar'kove:

vzgliad potentsial'nykh 'ostarbaiterov,'" in Bernd Bonwetsch and S.

Posokhov (eds.), Epokha. Kul'tury. Liudi (istoriia povsednevnosti i

kul'turnaia istoriia Germanii i Sovetskogo Soiuza. 1920- 1950-e gody)

249 [Materialy mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii (Khar'kov, sentiabr'

2003] (Kharkiv, 2004), pp. 182-91.

15. Mykhailiuk, Maryna "Natsysts'ka propahanda v okupovanomu Kyievi,"

Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal no. 1 (2005), pp. 131-44.

16. Miiller, Rolf-Dieter "Die Rekrutierung sowjetischer Zwangsarbeiter fiir

die deutsche Kriegswirtschaft," in Ulrich Herbert (ed.), Europa und der

" Reichseinsatz": Ausldndische Zivilarbeiter, Kriegsgefangene und KZ-

Hdftlinge in Deutschland 1938-1945 (Essen, 1991), pp. 234-50.

17. Miiller, Rolf-Dieter "Die Zwangsrekrutierung von Ostarbeitern 1941-

1944," in Wolfgang Michalka (ed.), Der Zweite Weltkrieg: Analysen,

Grundzuge, Forschungsbilanz (Munich, 1999), pp. 772-83.

18. Quinkert, B. "Terror und Propaganda. Die "Ostarbeiteranwerbung" im

Generalkommissariat Weiflruthenien," Zeitschrift fiir

Geschichtwissenschaft no. 47 (1999), pp. 700-21.

19. Skorobohatov, A. [Skorobogatov] "Zhizn' s vragom": povsednevnaia

zhizn' v okkupirovannom nemtsami Khar'kove (1941-1943)," in Bernd

Bonwetsch and S. Posokhov (eds.), Epokha. Kul'tury. Liudi (istoriia

povsednevnosti i kul'turnaia istoriia Germanii i Sovetskogo Soiuza. 1920-

1950-e gody) [Materialy mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii

(Khar'kov, sentiabr' 2003) (Kharkiv, 2004), pp. 312-25.

20. Pastushenko, Tetiana "Budni ukrai'ns'kykh ostarbaiteriv: borot'ba za

vyzhyvannia (za materialamy spohadiv kolyshnikh prymusovykh

robitnykiv)," Ukrai'ns 'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal no. 6 (2005), pp. 160-76.

250 21. Pastushenko, Tetiana "Do pytannia pro vzaiemovidnosyny u

seredovyshchi ukrai'ns'kykh prymusovykh robitnykiv natsysts'koi

Nimechchyny," in V. Voronin et al. (eds.), Druha svitova viina i dolia

narodiv Ukrainy. Materialy Vseukrains'koi naukovoi konferentsii. Kyiv,

23-24 nepeHM 2005 p. (Kyiv, 2005), pp. 84-91.

22. Pastushenko, Tetiana "Lysty iak dzherelo vyvchennia problemy

ukrai'ns'kykh 'ostarbaiteriv' periodu Druhoi' svitovoi viiny," Storinky

voiennoi istorii Ukrainy no. 6 (2002), pp. 70- 77.

23. Pastushenko, Tetiana "Pro shcho lystuvalysia mizh soboiu ukrai'ns'ki

prymusovi robitnyky v Nimechchyni v roky Druhoi svitovoi viiny,"

Storinky voiennoi istorii Ukrainy no. 7: part I (2003), pp. 227-33.

24. Rekotov, P. "Orhany upravlinnia na okupovanii terytorii Ukrainy (1941-

1944 rr.)," Ukrains 'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal no. 3 (1997), pp. 90-100.

25. Shevchenko, Serhii "Raby Hitlera - kirovohrads'ki repatrianty: dokumenty

vidomi i nevidomi," in Vasyl' Bodnar (ed.), OST - tavro nevoli

(Kirovohrad, 2000), pp. 3-10.

26. Slyn'ko, I. "Ugon naseleniia Ukrainy v fashistskoe rabstvo," in S.

Bubenshchikov (ed.), Nemetsko-fashistskii okkupatsionnyi rezhim (1941-

1944 gg.) (Moscow, 1965), pp. 219-30.

27. Steinberg, Jonathan "The Third Reich Reflected: German Administration

in the Occupied Soviet Union, 1941-44," The English Historical Review

vol. 110, no. 437 (June 1995), pp. 620-51.

251 28. Torzecki, Ryszard "Die Rolle der Zusammenarbeit mit der deutschen

Besatzungsmacht in der Ukraine fiir deren Okkupationspolitik," in Werner

Rohr (ed.), Okkupation und {Collaboration (1938-1945): Beitrdge zu

Konzepten und Praxis der Kollaboration in der deutschen

Okkupationspolitik (Heidelberg and Berlin, 1994), pp. 239-72.

29. Tytarenko, Dmytro "Zvity batal'ionu propahandy 'U' iak dzherelo z

pytannia pro vplyv natsysts'koi propahandy na naselennia okupovanoi

Ukrai'ny," in V. Voronin et al. (eds.), Druha svitova viina i dolia narodiv

Ukrainy. Materialy Vseukrains 'koi naukovoi konferentsii. Ky'iv, 23-24

nepeuH 2005 p. (Kyiv, 2005), pp. 165-71.

252