POLITICAL INDIGENIZATION AND -MAKING IN 'S

Robert J. Kaiser University of Wisconsin-Madison

The National Council for Eurasian and East European Research 910 17th Street, N.W. Suite 30 0 Washington, D .C. 20006

TITLE VIII PROGRAM

Project Information*

Sponsoring Institution : University of Wisconsin-Madiso n

Principal Investigator : Robert J. Kaise r

Council Contract Number : 813-18g

Date : 10, 200 0

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Individual researchers retain the copyright on their work products derived from researc h funded through a contract or grant from the National Council for Eurasian and Eas t European Research (NCEEER) . However, the NCEEER and the United State s Government have the right to duplicate and disseminate, in written and electronic form , reports submitted to NCEEER to fulfill Contract or Grant Agreements either (a) fo r NCEEER's own internal use, or (b) for use by the United States Government, and a s follows: (1) for further dissemination to domestic, international, and foreign governments , entities and/or individuals to serve official United States Government purposes or (2) fo r dissemination in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act or other law or policy o f the United States Government granting the public access to documents held by the Unite d States Government . Neither NCEEER nor the United States Government nor any recipien t of this Report may use it for commercial sale .

The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract or grant fund s provided by the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, funds whic h were made available by the U .S. Department of State under Title VIII (The Soviet-East European Research and Training Act of 1983, as amended) . The analysis and interpretations contained herein are those of the author . Executive Summar y

This paper, part of a larger research project on the geography of nationalization and nationalis m

in Russia's republics, offers an analysis of geographic variability in the success of homeland-makin g

projects in Russia's republics . Homeland-making is defined as the efforts by the titular elites of these

republics to construct ethnically stratified networks of social interaction that privilege members of th e

titular group over all others living in the . The paper focuses specifically on politica l indigenization within the republics, both at the republic and at the rayon-scale of analysis . Althoug h

cultural indigenization and socio-economic stratification along ethnic lines are also part of the process o f

homeland-making, political indigenization is the critical first step, which leads to cultural and economi c

indigenization programs as institutional projects of the republics. The paper begins with some genera l

comments about the process of homeland-making and political indigenization . It then assesses how far

these processes had advanced by the end of the Soviet period, followed by a detailed analysis o f

homeland-making in the republics during the post-Soviet period . This paper is part of a larger research project on the geography of nationalization an d nationalism in Russia's republics.1 The focus of this broader study is on the way in which place mediate s both inter-ethnic relations in the republics of the Russian , and intra-state relations between th e republics and the central government of the state . In turn, this larger research examines the ways in which the republics themselves are being remade as titular group in the post-Soviet period , and the impact of these changes on inter-ethnic relations in Russia ' s republics . The geographic scale o f this analysis is at the local or rayon level . using newly available disaggregated ethno-demographic , ethno-political and socio-economic data to analyze the relationships between place . politics and identity , and how they are changing in Russia s republics during the 1990s . -

In this report. after a brief discussion of the meaning of place and homeland-making as mediator s between power and identity, the analysis focuses on the geographic variability in the success o f homeland-making projects in Russia s republics . Titular homeland-making projects are defined a s efforts by titular elites to construct ethnically stratified networks of social interaction privilegin g members of the titular group over all others living in the republic . This paper examines trends regardin g political indigenization within the republics, both at the republic and at the rayon-scale of analysis .

Political indigenization . or the ethnic stratification of political elites favoring titular group members, i s clearly only one as p ect of homeland-making. Cultural indigenization as well as ethnic stratification i n the socioeconomic sphere are also significant dimensions of homeland-making . Nevertheless, politica l indigenization is viewed here as the critical First step in homeland-making, which – if successful –

The republics of the Russian Federation include : Adigey, Altay. , , , . . , Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia . , -Khalm ' g Tangch, , Komi. Mari-El, , North Ossetia-Alaniya, , . Tyva, and . Due to the conflict i n Chechnya, no data were available from that republic during the time period of this research project, and so it is no t included in the analysis . 2 As a major part of the NCEEER-funded project. the rayon-level data for Russia's republics were collected , adjusted for territorial comparability, and placed in databases linked to GIS boundary files using Arcview . All of these data and the linked boundary files for the rayons of Russia's republics are available on the internet at: http://polyglot. lss.wisc.edu/creeca/kaiser/

1 ultimately should result in the creation of cultural and economic indigenization programs as institutiona l projects of the republics .

Homeland-making

The role of place in mediating the relationship between power and identity, including th e relationship between ethno-national identity and the state . remains an under-studied subject . although i t has received increasing attention during the past decade in the fields of cultural and political geograph y

(Agnew 1987 ; Agnew and Duncan 1989 ; Kaiser 1994 ; Paasi 1996 : Massey 1994: Sack 1997). In much of this research, place has been redefined away from the more traditional, static definition as a bounde d land area which is unchanging and reactionary, and toward a reconceptualization as a more dynamicall y constituted, historically contingent network of social interaction . This redefinition of places as networks of social interaction incorporates localized and global actors, events and processes in the continua l making, unmaking, and remaking of places . Viewing place as a "historically contingent process" (Pre d

1984) means that the identity of place Is by necessity unfixed and so "for ever open to contestation "

(Massey 1994, 169) .

Nationalist efforts at homeland-making may be seen as attempts to fix the identity of places or t o stabilize their meaning "by laying claim to some particular moment/location in time-space when th e definition of the area and the social relations dominant within it were to the advantage of that particular claimant group" (Massey 1994, 169) . Homeland-making is necessarily a contentious process, since th e very act of claiming a homeland signifies that competing exclusionary claims to that place at leas t potentially exist . Seen in this way, homelands are never ethnically or politically neutral places, sinc e they are constructed in an effort to establish political dominance and control by members of one ethni c group (now nationalized) over all others living there or having potential claim to that place .

' Although elections have been used to analyze political attitudes in Russia's republics before, nearly all of thes e studies have focused on elections to Russia's Duma, and no study has systematically examined local elections to

2 National territoriality, or the political geographic strategy through which nationalists seek to gai n

control over the future of the nation by gaining greater decision-making authority or sovereignty in a

particular place defined as the "ancestral homeland" of the "nation," is the impetus behind the making o f

homelands . In other words, although nationalists and analysts frequently depict homelands as ancient o r

primordial, in reality homelands do not exist before nationalism, and the territorialization of identity .

Nevertheless, the degree to which these nationalistic homeland-making projects succeed (i .e., the

degree to which the proclaimed homelands become ethnically exclusionary or stratified networks o f

social interaction privileging members of the "indigenous nation" over all others) depends not only o n

the creation of preferential institutions that privilege the members of one particular ethno-national grou p

throughout the . Homeland-making is subject to contestation not only by ethnic others, but is als o

contested from within the ethno-national community at the local scale . The success of homeland-makin g

projects depends on the degree to which the more localized networks of social interaction incorporate d

within the area being nationalized are congruent with the more geographically expansive homeland s

being constructed. When there is a high degree of congruence, the images of homeland and nation bein g

constructed are said to resonate among the general population .

Viewing place and homeland in this way necessitates a further redefinition of th e

"nationalization of the masses" as a process that involves both their politicization (i .e . . the politica l

socialization of the masses toward a national consciousness) and also their territorialization (i .e., the territorial socialization of the masses toward a homeland consciousness) . Indeed, in many ways thes e

two processes are really one and the same thing, since political socialization toward a national identit y

always incorporates a process of territorialization, just as territorialization toward a homeland identity i s

always a political process . ' This has significant ramifications for inter-national conflict and conflic t

management strategies, which will almost certainly fail if they do not provide subordinate groups whos e

republic, and rayon governments within Russia's republics .

3 members have been nationalized with some degree of territorial autonomy . Such strategies ignore an essential aspect of ethno-national identity .

In the present report, this reconceptualization of homeland-making as nationalization is applie d in the context of the ethnic republics of the Russian Federation. Many analysts and politician s

(principally in ) have argued that Russia's republics are artificial constructs of th e

Soviet era. and that they should therefore be dismantled in the post-Soviet era . If Lenin held that th e provision of territorial autonomy or eyen sovereignty in an ethnic federation was the key to solving th e national problem of "Great Russian Chauvinism " inherited from the , Russo-centri c politicians and political analysts during the 1990s have argued that the very existence of the non-Russia n republics is the greatest national problem facing Russia today . Other more moderate voices haye argue d that the republics have become the focus of identity for their populations regardless of ethnic affiliation .

For example, both Tatar and Russian residents of Tatarstan are said to have developed a "Tatarstani " homeland identity toward the republic . A third position is that the titular group members themselve s have developed a homeland consciousness toward their republics, and that all members of all titula r

"nations" feel a sense of homeland to an equal degree .

All three positions are difficult to test empirically, as is the development of a sense of homelan d generally . Nevertheless, it is possible to examine the political . socio-economic and cultural attitudes an d behavior of titular and non-titular group members in the republics, in order to assess indirectly the degre e to which the republics function as ethnically neutral or ethnically exclusionary networks of socia l interaction .

The next section of this report summarize homeland-making in the USSR during the Soviet er a and assess the degree to which Russia's republics had become titular homelands by the end of the 1980s .

' More generally, Massey (1994), Pred (1984) and Paasi (1996) have all made the case that just as places are socia l constructs, societies are spatial constructs .

4 This is followed by a detailed local-scale analysis of homeland-making through political indigenizatio n that is occurring in the post-Soviet period .

Homeland-making in the USS R

Although nationalists throughout the region depict their nations and homelands as ancient if not primordial, homeland-making, and nation-making for that matter, scarcely preceded the Soviet era .

Networks of social interaction, or the meaningful places in people's day-to-day lives, were defined i n highly localized terms by the vast majority of the population in the Russian Empire, and identity wa s defined in similarly localized terms (Kaiser 1994) .' Ethnic homelands were for the most part invention s of the Soviet era, during which ethno-national were constructed in order to contain, contro l and ultimately overcome the so-called "national problem ." The ethnic territories created during th e

1920s and 1930s were viewed as empty containers, meaningless places in and of themselves, throug h which interethnic animosities and fears would be overcome, and in which Sovietization would b e facilitated. Howeyer, far from solving the "national problem," the ethnic homelands themselves, and the institutions created within them to privilege titular group members, created a new "national problem" fo r the state that was much more intractable than the one that the homelands were constructed to solve, sinc e they facilitated the nationalization (i .e ., the politicization and territorialization) of ethnicity in the Sovie t

Union (Connor 1984 ; Kaiser 1994 ; 1991) .

Nevertheless, there was a great deal of variability in the degree to which the Soviet-made homelands had become meaningful ethno-national places at a popular or mass leyel by the end of th e

Soviet era.' For example, intra-national and intra-homeland conflict since 1992 in Tajikistan indicat e

This more localized scale of communal and homeland identity was true not only for the Russian Empire, but wa s generally the case throughout the world, at least until the end of the nineteenth century . According to several scholars who have examined the question of local vs . national identities and loyalties, localities continue to be th e places that matter most to people in their day-to-day lives (e .g ., Agnew 1987 ; Massey 1994) . Of course, success in homeland-making is not once-and-for-all process, and varies with each individual over time . Still, the titular political and cultural elites of some communities have been much more successful than others i n

5 that it is clearly a less well-integrated ethno-national network of social interaction than is , where inter-national and inter-homeland conflict with the Azerbaijanis has mobilized the vast majority o f the ethno-national community . Of course, the Baltic republics were forged by nationalists outside the

Soviet Union during the inter-war period and were much more fully developed as titular homelands, o r nationalized places toward which members of the titular groups felt a strong sense of exclusiveness . In other words, as a result of historical contingency, the Baltic republics were more successful i n institutionalizing national and homeland identities at a mass level . It could be argued that it was the re - incorporation of these "nation-states" that proved fatal for the USSR, since separatism during the lat e

1980s did not come from the Soviet-made ethnic homelands, but rather from the Baltics .

In general . it is also apparently the case that the former union republics were mor e comprehensive homelands, since they had a more complete set of formal institutions that facilitated th e development and maintenance of titular networks of social interaction than did the autonomous unit s within the USSR. It is also true that the hierarchy of territorial autonomies essentially reflected a hierarchy of titular privileging usin g a less and less comprehensive set of institutions as one descende d the hierarchy from union republic to autonomous . This resulted generally in a more weakly developed sense of homeland among the titular group members in the autonomous and blast s than in the autonomous republics, except in those cases where the autonomous okrugs and blasts wer e geographically congruent with localized ethnic networks of social interaction that preceded thei r institutionalization, or where the autonomous okrug or blast was created to partition a broader ethno- national community/homeland (i .e., in , Nagorno Karabakh, Nakhichevan . and in the Agi n and Ust ' Ordin Buryat Autonomous Okrugs) .

The variability in successful homeland-making during the Soviet era depended not only on th e 's standing in the federal hierarchy . There was a great deal of variability among the territories a t

constructing and reproducing a homeland and national consciousness over time and across the localities that constitute the national homeland . the same autonomous level. In the following sections, the geographic variability in homeland-makin g among Russia's republics serves as the analytical focus of attention .

Russia's republics as titular homeland s

Over the past decade, there has been a great deal written about the nature of power, place an d identity in the republics of the Russian Federation, and three distinct positions may be identified . First , in an effort to de-legitimize the republics and ethnic federalism in Russia generally, a more Russo-centri c stance depicts the non-Russian autonomous territories in Russia as artificial constructs of the Soviet era .

In a similar vein, non-Russians ethnic groups indigenous in the Russian Federation are depicted a s cultural, not territorial communities . in order to decouple ethnically-based and place-based identity

(Kolossov 1992, 40 : Petrov 1994) . In contrast, "Mother Russia" (whose boundaries are by no mean s agreed to by all who argue from this position) is depicted as a natural, organic and eternal homeland of the Russian nation . Although the non-Russian territories are viewed as artificial constructs without legitimacy, their very existence is viewed as the most serious national problem facing Russia today .

From this Russo-centric position, the solution to this national problem is to eliminate the ethni c territories from Russia, and to replace the ethnic federation with a new set of borders . Several proposals have been put forward for alternative administrative , ranging from economically rational region s all the way to a return to the guberniias of the imperial era (Busygina 1993 : Amelin 1997, 239-58) .

A second more moderate position also argues that ethnically-based and place-based identitie s have been decoupled. but unlike the Russo-centric position, depicts the republics as meaningful sites o f identity that bind the entire citizenry of the republic together . For example, several political an d anthropological analysts in Moscow, as well as moderate Tatar politicians such as President Shaimiyev , have argued that a Tatarstani identity is shared by Russians, and ethnic others who live i n

Tatarstan, and that this Tatarstani identity is relatively more important than ethnic identity for th e residents of the republic .

7 There are two discernable stances taken by those who advocate this position. The first stance i s represented by analysts at the center such as Valeriy Tishkov, who take this position in order to de - legitimize titular claims to privileges in the republics, and so to undermine titular nationalization an d territorialization as institutional projects, while at the same time supporting the legitimacy of th e republics as meaningful interethnic networks of social interaction (Tishkov 1995 ; Drobizheva 1996a, 38 -

9 . 72-73 : Drobizheva 1996b, I3 : Yamskov 1996) . The second stance is represented more by titula r political and cultural elites in the republics, who seek to promote non-titular loyalty to the republics i n order to stabilize interethnic relations, as well as economic and political conditions both internally and i n their relations with Moscow . Interestingly, those titular political and cultural elites who take this stanc e tend at the same time to be engaged in more ethnically exclusionary projects of nation- and homeland - making in their republics. This is certainly the case with Shaimiev in Tatarstan (Graney 1999) .

A third position -- argued primarily by titular nationalists – is that the republics themselves are natural, organic, and eternal homelands of the primordial living there, and that a s such only members of the titular nations or their nationalist spokespersons) should have the right t o determine the future status of these homelands (i .e . . write the fundamental laws of the land, control th e critical agencies of political and cultural socialization such as the media and education curricula . and control the selection of political and cultural elites whose business it is to safeguard the special status o f the titular people in its homeland) . While nationalistic organizations whose spokespersons advocate thi s exclusionary position exist in every republic in the Russian Federation, Chechnya is the only republi c where titular nationalists pursuing this exclusionary, separatist agenda came to power in the 1990s .

Although there is undoubtedly a bit of truth in all of these positions (or at least segments of th e population in each republic who perceive their relationship to the republic in each of these ways), non e of these positions has been subjected to much in the way of empirical testing, aside from a survey or tw o which can be interpreted to support nearly all of the positions listed above . These assertions tend to be

8 derived more from the ethno-political position of the speaker than from the results of research an d analysis .

This paper examines the degree to which Russia's republics have become titular homelands (i .e ., ethnically stratified networks of social interaction privileging members of the titular group) . To do this, I examine trends regarding political indigenization within the republics, both at the republic and at th e rayon-scale of analysis . Ethno-political stratification is clearly only one aspect of homeland-making, and ethno-cultural as well as economic privileging of titular group members (and/or perceptions of suc h titular privileging) are significant dimensions of homeland-making as well . Nevertheless, political indigenization, or the ethnic restratification of political elites in favor of the titular group, is viewed her e as the critical first step in homeland-making, which, if successful, ultimately should result in the creatio n of cultural and economic indigenization programs as institutional projects of the republics . Because w e are dealing with the onset of interethnic change in Russia's republics, it is necessary to focus attentio n first on political indigenization as a sign of future trends .

The primary sources of data are the ethnic composition of political appointments to elit e positions and the ethnic composition of deputies elected to the republic parliaments . Unfortunately, n o comprehensive set of data exists that provides comparable measures for all republics for the last decade .

Some republics report the ethnic identity of political elites in the administrative branch of government, o f candidates as well as deputies to republic parliaments, and also provide the ethnic composition of th e electorate at the city and rayon levels . Others provide no political data by ethnicity . What follows is the result of my efforts during the past two years to piece together the local-scale ethno-political patterns .

This picture is constructed using a series of local-scale databases pieced together from informatio n provided by Goskomstat Rossii, the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy o f

Sciences, and the Ministry of Nationality Affairs (Kaiser 1999) . I also traveled to Kabardino-Balkaria ,

9 and a part of this picture has been pieced together as a result of data collected and interviews conducte d in Nal'chik during July 1997 .

Analysis

As a point of departure, newly available data on the ethnic composition of the work force i n

Russia's republics help to establish the relative titular and Russian positions among political elites at the end of the Soviet era (Table 1) . Of the republics for which data are available . only Kalmykia an d

Kabardino-Balkaria had titular groups that held a majority or plurality of political elite positions an d were over-represented in both urban and rural areas in 1989. This condition of titular group dominanc e among political elites also existed by the end of the Soviet era in Sakha, Tatarstan and North Osseti a

(Tables 3 . 6 and 7). These data provide an initial indication that it was in these republics that th e institutions and/or the localized networks of social interaction had gone the farthest in titular homeland - building, and it is in these republics that we should expect the most dramatic shift toward furthe r homeland-making during the 1990s .

The geography of this initial division among the republics is striking . It is in the republics o f

Eastern (or Asiatic) Russia (including Tatarstan and Bashkortostan) and in the North regio n that titular homeland-making was most apparent . In . the republics tend to be mor e international or Russian-dominated places, and do not tend to function as homelands (i .e . . as ethnicall y exclusionary networks of social interaction) . Nationalization among non-Russians indigenous to the core region of European Russia has been much less apparent than it has been among non-Russians indigenou s to the peripheral of Russia . We should expect that during the 1990s the titular groups in thes e republics have been much less successful in nation-making and homeland-making . The analysis that follows examines these two regions of the Russian Federation separately .

In a later report, the results of surveys conducted for this research project in Tatarstan and North Ossetia-Alaniy a in late 1998 on homeland identity and how the changes during the 1990s have affected the populations' sense of

1 0 European Russia

Throughout much of the Soviet era, centrally mandated indigenization programs helped t o establish and maintain titular group privileges in home republics . Ethnic quotas were instituted to promote interethnic equalization through the proportional representation of titular group members amon g political and cultural elites, university students, and so forth. This quota system was the centerpiece o f policies designed to solve the national problem in the USSR . It was also one of the first things to go with the disintegration of the USSR, not only in the newly independent non-Russian states (i .e ., the former union republics), but in Russia itself with decentralization and democratization .

As confirmation of the lack of nationalization and homeland-making among the titular group s with republics in European Russia, the titular groups with republics in this region have tended t o experience a roll-back of the political indigenization that did occur during the Soviet era . This provide s an initial indication that indigenization resulted more from centralized directives initiated in Mosco w than from successful homeland-making among titular group members in their republics .

For example, during the first democratic elections to Karelia's parliament held in 1990, th e number of Karelian deputies declined markedly . The nationalistic Karelian Congress mobilized as a result of this poor showing, but only one candidate out of the ten that the Karelian Congress ran in 199 3 gained a seat in parliament (Birin 1995, 12) . Realizing that Karelian nationalists did not have sufficien t control of either the centralized institutions of the republic or the localized networks of social interactio n to remake the republic into a Karelian homeland . the Karelian Congress in 1995 proposed the creation o f a "Karelian " as a geographically constricted area within the republic . The "Karelian Oblast " wa s to include those rayons with the highest concentration of living in them, and it was to becom e the new homeland within which Karelian identity could be preserved (Birin 1996, 41-43) . Even thi s proposal gained little public support among Karelians and was rejected by the republic's parliament . homeland and interethnic relations in these two republics will add another dimension to this picture . 11 The serves as a second example . According to a survey conducted in 1996, on e third of all Komis surveyed felt themselves to be equally members of a second ethno-nationa l community (the second overwhelmingly Russian), and only 12 .8 percent of Komis in this survey fel t that members of the titular group must occupy key positions in the republic's government (Vyacheslavo v et al. 1996, 25-29)Y Nevertheless, even in the Komi Republic, the parliamentary elections of 199 5 resulted in titular over-representation, with Komis winning one third of the seats (16 of 48) whil e representing only about one quarter of the total population . 10 More significantly, a rayon-level analysi s of the parliamentary elections indicates that Komi candidates won seats in rayons where Komis were a majority of the population, and Russian candidates won in Russian majority rayons . So, even in a republic where one third of the titular group identifies equally with both the titular and Russia n communities, ethnically exclusionary voting patterns at the rayon level predominated during the parliamentary elections . Of course . this indicates that although the republic overall appears to be an

"internationalized " place . at the rayon scale the Komi republic is a relatively highly ethnically segregate d place, where members of each ethno-national community vote for members of their own group . This is almost certainly an indication that a localized sense of place and identity, rather than a Komi nationa l consciousness/sense of homeland, continues to predominate for the majority of titular group members .

Mari-El provides a third and final example from European Russia . Comparable to the situation in Karelia and the Komi Republic, Maris lost ground in the parliament during the 1990s, where thei r percentage of seats dropped from 43 .3 percent in 1993 (the same as their percentage of the tota l population, i .e. proportional representation) to 27 .6 percent in 1996 (Table 2) . During the 1996 election s for republic president, Mari-El was also one of only two republics in the Russian Federation where a

8 20 .3 percent of Russians and 53 .5 percent of included in the survey felt this way . 9 5 .3 percent of Komis favored an exclusively Komi parliament, and 5 .5 percent favored an exclusionary Kom i language law . 54 .4 percent of Komis expressed the belief that it is better for the president of the republic to b e Komi, while 41 .7 percent of Komis said the ethno-national identity of the president made no difference . 10 Data on parliamentary elections provided by the Russian Ministry of Nationality Affairs . They are also availabl e in Guboglo (1996, vol. 3, part 1, 116-117) .

1 2 titular president was replaced by a Russian . At the republic scale, a rather than an indigenization of political elites was clearly in evidence . Nevertheless, Maris held the majority of loca l seats to city and rayon-level councils (137 of 267 or 51 .3 percent) and were over-represented i n government at the local scale, while Russians, who were able to organize effectively in the major citie s and in the republic as a whole, gained only 40.1 percent of the city and rayon council seats (Sharov 1995 ,

51) .

In European Russia, the removal of Soviet-era Moscow-directed indigenization programs and their replacement with democratization during the 1990s has tended to reduce titular group politica l representation, and Russians have been the main beneficiaries of this change . This can be read as at leas t indirect evidence that nationalization and territorialization have been limited among titular grou p members indigenous to Russia ' s core region . When provided the opportunity to engage in nation- an d homeland-making through political indigenization, the titular group elites in this region have been unabl e to capitalize . " Nevertheless, even in European Russia . a rayon-level analysis of political behavio r during parliamentary elections indicates that local networks of social interaction tend to b e ethnically exclusionary rather than ethnically neutral, even where homeland-making and nation-making a s institutional projects are not in evidence . Localized networks of social interaction among indigenou s peoples in this region continue to exert a strong influence on political behavior .

Republics in Russia 's peripher y

As noted above . it is in the republics outside Russia's European core area that titular homeland - making tends to be much more pronounced . During the Soyiet era, titular political indigenization

The limited political power of indigenous republic elites in this region was once again demonstrated in th e December 1999 elections to the Russian Duma . Support for Otechestvo-Vsya Rossiya (OVR) by the titular presidents and/or prime ministers in several of the republics located in European Russia, including in Karelia an d Udmurtia, did not help OVR candidates . Russian presidents in European republics, such as Komi Republi c (Spiridonov) were relatively more successful in getting their candidates elected, but this is more likely to result i n russification than in political indigenization (Russian Regional Report, vol . 4, No. 48, 22 December 1999) .

1 3 occurred not only as a result of centrally mandated quotas from above, but was also promoted "fro m below" by titular political and cultural elites in the republics . This is similar to what was occurring in the union republics during the 1970s and 1980s (Kaiser 1994) . Since the disintegration of the USSR and the removal of indigenization programs "from above," political indigenization in these republics ha s increased dramatically. Nation and homeland-making are clearly discernable institutional projects of th e political elites in many of these republics . While fairly rapid political indigenization is occurring in mos t of these republics, the analysis that follows will focus on Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Sakha, and North

Ossetia .

In all four of these republics, the titular group was over-represented by the late Soviet period , and Tatars and even held a majority of political elite positions in the administrative an d legislative branches of their respective republics (Tables 3-7) . In all four cases, titular over- representation increased dramatically during the 1990s . In contrast to most of the republics in Europea n

Russia, political indigenization in these republics is being promoted by localized networks of socia l interaction, as well as by titular political elites in the republics. This nationalization "from below " ha s more than compensated for the loss of Soviet-era indigenization programs initiated and maintained b y

Moscow. The following section provides an analysis of the methods employed to bring this politica l indigenization about .

Both malapportionment and presidential powers of appointment were used to promote titula r political dominance . In the first case, electoral districts of unequal population size were used to elec t deputies to parliament . The rural population, which was overwhelmingly titular, was fayored over the urban population . This was particularly the case in Tatarstan, where people in rural districts chose nearl y half of the representatives, even though they made up only a little over one quarter of the total populatio n in the republic. In other words, each rural vote had the same political weight as two urban votes, and thi s clearly facilitated political indigenization . While Tatars are less than half the total population in the republic and only 42 percent of the urban population, they account for nearly two thirds of the rura l

1 4 population (Statisticheskiy Komitet SNG 1993, vol . 7, part 1, 178-83) . The malapportionment favorin g rural voters clearly contributed to Tatar over-representation among candidates and elected representatives .

In addition to malapportionment, the presidential power of appointment is fairly strong in man y of the new republican constitutions, and presidents are able to select the rayon and city administrativ e heads throughout the republic in several cases, including Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Kalmykia an d

Kabardino-Balkaria .12 Presidents in all four of these republics have tended to appoint individuals from their own inner circles whom they know will be loyal, or to whom they owe special favors . These appointments are not necessarily made for overtly nationalistic reasons (i .e., they are not made explicitl y with the goal of filling posts with titular nationalists) . Nevertheless, these appointees tend to com e overwhelmingly from the president's own ethno-national group,13 and more specifically from his hom e region or locality, which retains great significance as a meaningful network of social interaction . In turn , the titular political elites selected by republic presidents tend to appoint their own friends and allies t o elite posts in city and rayon goyernments, resulting in a more comprehensive political indigenization o f localities throughout these republics .

The political indigenization of city and rayon administrations that results from this system o f presidential appointments has a second important effect . Most of the republics allow these local politica l elites to run for seats in parliament . and most of the parliaments also use the rayons and a s electoral districts . Consequently, the administrative directors of these units have a decisive advantage i n competing for these parliamentary seats . In Tatarstan. for example . local political directors make u p only 17 percent of the seats in the last Supreme Soviet, but account for 50 percent of the seats in th e

Although this is in violation of the Russian Constitution . which states that local and city political leaders must b e elected, Moscow has not yet acted to "correct" this situation in these republics, primarily because the presidents i n these republics have been allies of the Yeltsin administration . 17 of 21 presidents were members of the titular group . Buryatia, the Komi Republic and Udmurtia had Russian presidents, and Mari-El and Altay elected Russian presidents in 1996 . Alexey Lebed was elected president m

1 5 current parliament (Guboglo 1997 . p . 155) . Of course, this process not only accelerates the politica l indigenization of parliament, but also undermines the separation of powers between the administrativ e and legislative branches of government .

A number of studies also suggest that . in addition, local titular candidates were better organized , made better use of (or had greater control over) mass media, and were generally more successful i n gaining signatures in order to run and in getting out the vote .14 All of these advantages attest to the fac t that the titular networks of social interaction in these republics are relatively more effective in this regar d than are non-titular and even Russian networks of social interaction. In other words, these republics do

function more as titular homelands than either as ethnically neutral or as Russian places . As a result of these advantages, titular group members dominated the list of candidates for parliaments in all of thes e republies, and this domination increased during the 1990s . By the time of the elections, titular dominance was already all but guaranteed. and the titular percentage of deputies in parliament almost exactly matched the titular percenta g e of candidates running for office (Tables 6 and 7) .

As Tables 3-7 clearly illustrate, political indigenization in all cases has occurred at the expense

of Russian representation . While Russians were slightly under-represented in most of these republics a t

the end of the Soviet era, that level of under-representation has increased markedly during the 1990s .

The loss of Russian political standing in these republics has resulted in rising interethnic tensions, an d

has also contributed to rising Russian out-migration from the nationalizing republics in Russia ' s

periphery to the European core of the state (Kaiser 1997) .

Khakassia in 1996, and is listed as a Ukrainian . See Politika (October 1997) . "Spisok chlenov Soveta Federatsii p o regionam," Politika, October 1997 (www .cityline.ru:8083/politika) . This effectiveness was demonstrated again in the December 1999 elections to the Russian Duma, where titula r presidents in several of these republics, and especially in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Kabardino-Balkaria wer e able to predetermine the winners (Russian Regional Report, vol . 4, No. 48, 22 December 1999) .

1 6 Republics with two or more titular group s

Political indigenization is also apparent in Kabardino-Balkaria and Dagestan,15 but was no t occurring equally among all titular groups . Instead, the political and cultural elites of one titular group have sought to reconstruct these places as more exclusively their own, while marginalizing not onl y

Russians and other non-titular groups, but also members of the other titular groups in the republic. For example, there has been a Kabardinization and an Avarization of political elites respectively in these tw o republics . This was particularly the case in Kabardino-Balkaria, where Kabardin president Kokov ha s extensiverayons powers of appointment which have resulted in a Kabardinization of elite positions i n and cities throughout the republic, even in regions of Balkar and Russian concentration .

As in the cases cited above, this Kabardinization was not done for overtly nationalistic reasons . but in order to place loyal indiyiduals from the president's inner circle (and from his home locality) i n elite positions throughout the republic . This lack of an ulterior nationalistic motive was something tha t even Balkar nationalists conceded during interviews . Nevertheless, the Kabardinization of political elite s in Balkar and Russian/Cossack rayons has become one of the most contentious issues in the republic, an d was one of the most frequently mentioned causes of rising inter-ethnic tension and national separatism , not only by members of the Balkar Congress, but also by representatives of Cossack organizations . ' The presence of Kabardins in power positions within Balkar and Russian regions of the republic has served a s a lightning rod for popular resentment . This is not surprising since the insertion of Kabardin politica l elites into non-Kabardin places both disrupts the local networks of social interaction and threatens th e homeland-making capabilities of the indigenous groups in these regions . In an interesting twist, Balka r and Russian/Cossack elites and organizations have begun to act in concert as subordinated minorities i n an effort to shift the balance of power in the republic in their favor . Thus far, however, they have been

No information was available for Karachay-Cherkessia, and so that republic was not included in this part of th e analysis . These conclusions are drawn from interviews conducted during a research trip to Nal'chik in July 1997 .

1 7 unsuccessful in these efforts, and a growing resentment against both Kabardins, and also against Moscow

for siding with Kokov, is increasingly in evidence .

A second issue that is critically important in republics where there are multiple titular o r

indigenous groups like Kabardino-Balkaria is the perception of equality . Every Balkar that I interviewed

spoke of the Balkar loss of equality during the post-Soviet era, which was a central theme in the charg e

of Kabardinization and the need for a separate Balkar republic. However, in comparing Balka r

representation in the last Supreme Soviet with their representation in the present parliament, it does no t

appear that they have lost status : in both legislative bodies they were, in fact, over-represented (Table 8) .

Among administrative political elites, they have gone from a status of being over-represented at the en d

of the Soviet era to a situation of proportional representation today . Kabardin national spokesperson s argue that are being treated fairly, and cite their proportional representation as evidence o f

interethnic equality. However, Balkar nationalists' perception of unequal status and treatment derive s

from their view that as one of two indigenous groups in the republic, they should have equal status wit h

the Kabardins, even though Balkars make up less than ten percent of the total population . Equality in th e

case of the Balkar minority is defined according to the principle "one nation, one vote," rather than "on e

person, one vote, " which they see as an instrument to deprive them of a meaningful political voice .

Dagestan's administrative branch was clearly constructed with inter-ethnic parity in mind . In th e

new constitution adopted in 1994 . the "State Soyiet" is to consist of fourteen members, with on e

representative from each of the fourteen ethnic communities in Dagestan . The list of fourteen group s

sending a representative to the State Soviet included not only the so-called "peoples of Dagestan " (i .e . ,

indigenous groups), but also non-titular groups such as the Russians, Azerbaijanis and Chechen s

(Guboglo 1996, pp . 162-4) .

1 8 Nevertheless, although data are relatively limited, the charge of Avarization has also been mad e

by non- in the republic,17 and pressure is increasing from among the other titular groups for a

federalization or confederalization of titular places within the republic . However, Avarization in th e

republic as a whole is hampered by the fact that the central authorities have little political power outsid e

Makhachkala . Dagestan functions as a highly decentralized group of ethnic enclaves, with each ethni c

territory controlling its own borders with its own militia, and little effective regulation of these ethni c

enclaves coming from the State Soviet . Dagestan is also one of the few republics in this region whos e

local rayon and city political leaders are popularly elected, which has diminished the power of the centra l authorities in to control the process of political indigenization from above . However,

Dagestan is apparently moving toward a system of political appointments more similar to that found in other republics in this region (Russian Regional Report, vol. 4, no . 47, 14 December 1999). This wil l almost certainly lead to greater pressure for Avarization from the center, and consequently growin g separatist sentiments among non-Avar Dagestanis throughout the republic .

In the republics with two or more titular groups, the nation- and homeland-making institutiona l projects of the dominant group have resulted in the geographic fracturing of the republics internally, as increasingly subordinated titular groups engage in local-scale homeland- and nation-making projects .

These republics clearly do not function as homelands for all titular groups, and efforts by one titula r group to reconstruct the entire republic as its homeland necessarily threatens the place of other titula r groups living there. Fear of losing status in the republic as a whole does not appear to be as great a concern as the fear of losing control over the localized networks of ethno-social interaction (i .e . . localized homelands) . Rising subordinate group separatism in Kabardino-Balkaria and to a lesser degre e in Dagestan does not necessarily pose a threat to the territorial integrity of Russia, since the politica l

17 The most publicized case of Avarization occurred in the city of Khasavyurt, where an Avar was elected mayor i n 1997, even though voting is highly segregated along ethnic lines and Avars are a small minority of the tota l population in the city . Thirteen Kumyk and Chechen deputies serving in the city assembly resigned in protes t (JEWS Russian Regional Report, vol . 2, no. 16, 8 May 1997) .

1 9 elites of subordinate groups overwhelmingly advocate the creation of their own republics within th e

Russian Federation .

Conclusion s

The indigenization of political elites in republics outside of European Russia indicates that thes e republics had, for the most part, become titular homelands (i .e . . ethnically exclusionary networks of social interaction controlled by titular elites) by the end of the Soviet era . Titular political elites in thes e republics were able to use their dominance within these networks to enhance their dominant status and s o to more substantially "fix" the identity of these places as titular homelands (i .e ., to nationalize territory) .

However, even though this titular nationalization in the republics outside European Russia was fairl y pronounced, there is little evidence that political indigenization and titular homeland-making are th e result of overtly displayed exclusionary nationalist political agendas . The ravon-level analysis reveal s that titular networks of social interaction m these republics were more well-deyeloped than non-titula r networks at the outset of the post-Soviet era, and that titular elites were able to capitalize on this initia l advantage in order to secure their positions in power within these republics .

In European Russia, titular group members actually lost ground to non-titular groups as a resul t of decentralization and democratization during the post-Soyiet era, providing substantial evidence tha t these republics had not become titular homelands by the end of the 1980s . Political russification in thes e republics was substantial during the 1990s, yet this loss of titular political representation has no t apparently served as a catalyst for rising non-Russian nationalism among these titular groups .

Nonetheless, even in these republics the ravon-level analysis of political behavior in this study als o strongly suggests that localized networks of social interaction continue to exert a strong mediatin g influence over political decision-making . Within these supposedly more internationalized or even russified republics, there are titular group places and non-titular group places, but on the whole there i s little evidence that there are ethnically neutral places . Of course, this holds true at the local scale for

2 0 republics throughout the Russian Federation . This also means that an ethnically neutral republic identity

(e .g., "Tatarstani") has not become a primary community of meaning for many residents in most of th e

republics . Of course, this also means that identification with an ethnically neutral Russia (i .e ., a

"Rossiyan" identity) has not supplanted an ethno-territorial identity for more than a small segment of th e population in the republics .

Surveys conducted during the 1990s tend to support these conclusions : even in Tatarstan, 24 . 5

percent of Russians identify themselves primarily according to ethnic belonging, while only 5 .5 percen t

identify themselves as Tatarstanis, and 6 .9 percent as Rossiyans . 41 .2 percent of Tatars surveye d

identify themselyes primarily according to ethnic identity . and only 8 .6 percent identify themselve s

primarily as Tatarstanis . Only 1 .9 percent identify themselves as Rossiyans (Drobizheva 1995, p . 277) .

A higher percentage identifying with the republic was found among titular and Russian respondents i n

Sakha. but it was still far below those who identified themselves primarily according to ethnic identit y

(Table 9) .

As noted above, membership in an ethno-national community was the most frequently cited for m

of identity. An even higher percentage of titular group members and Russians agreed with the statemen t

that they never forgot that they were a member of their ethnic group . Higher still was the percentage tha t

said it is necessary for people at the present time to feel themselves a part of their ethno-nationa l

community (Table 9) .

These last two results indicate fairly clearly that ethnic identity is uppermost in the minds of

titular group members . and that, if anything, this will become more pronounced in the coming years I n

the 's periphery. This should also mean that the identity of the republics outside

European Russia as ethnically exclusionary places or homelands will become more "fixed" and

dominant, thus diminishing the interethnic networks of social interaction that exist within them while a t

the same time heightening the level of interethnic tension and the potential for conflict .

2 1 The republics of the Russian Federation were artificially created during Soviet era, but so wa s the Russian Federation itself. Indeed all "homelands" are artificial social constructs of relatively recen t vintage. The most important question regarding Russia ' s republics is whether they have becom e imagined or perceived as homelands by members of the titular groups living in them . On the basis of the results of this analysis, few of the republics in European Russia have become homelands in this regard , and the most meaningful places for the indigenous peoples in this region are the localities in which the y live . Because of the lack of homeland- and nation-making in these republics, they pose little threat to th e territorial integrity of the Russian Federation .

The republics outside the European core have become titular homelands to a much greate r extent. These republics have become real or meaningful networks of social interaction for members o f the titular groups living there . These are the republics and titular groups that pose a potential threat t o the territorial integrity of Russia . However, as noted in the report, titular nationalists intent on independence have come to power only in Chechnya . and Moscow's willingness to accommodate titula r national and homeland identity through flexible asymmetrical federalism has diminished the politica l support for separatist groups and organizations . At present these republics do not pose a serious threat t o

Russia, though the loss of non-titular and particularly Russian status and political power in thes e republics is a growing cause for concern .18 Ironically. the one thing that would truly threaten the territorial integrity of "Mother Russia" would be the very thing that Russian nationalists advocate : th e dismantling of the non-Russian republics, particularly in Eastern Russia and in the , which would almost certainly result in an explosive rise in separatist nationalism and ethno-territoria l violence .

This issue is taken up in the second NCEEER project report .

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2 5

Table 1

Ethnic Composition of Political Elites and Total Work Force in Russia's Republics, 198 9 (%)

URBAN RURA L Occupation Titular Russian Titular Russia n Altay Republi c Political Elites 7 .8 79 .4 33 .6 58 . 8 Work Force I 1 .0 82 .4 37 .4 52 . 0 Index 71 .5 96 .3 89 .9 113 . 1 Khakassia Political Elites 9 .9 78 .7 27 .0 69 . 9 Work Force 5 .2 .7 83 23 .9 63 . 0 Index 190 .4 94 .0 113 .0 111 . 0 Kalmykia Political Elites 57 .6 38 .8 53 .5 41 . 3 Work Force 49 .3 42 .0 41 .6 35 . 1 Index 116 .8 92 .4 128 .6 117 . 7 Kom i Political Elites 1 .5 69 .3 55 .6 34 .4 Work Force 4 .4 61 .5 47 .2 36 . 8 Index 51 .9 112 .7 117 .5 93 .5 Udmurti a Political Elites 21 .0 70 .7 51 .4 42 . 8 Work Force 21 5 65 .2 58 .6 34 .9 Index 97 7 108 .4 87 .7 122 . 6 Mari-El Political Elites 25 .0 61 .5 72 .2 19 . 8 Work Force 27 .8 60 .9 70 .8 21 .5 Index 899 101.0 102 .0 92 . 1 Buryati a Political Elites 35 .4 6)) I 39 .8 56 .4 Work Force 16 .2 74 .8 32 .5 63 . 2 Index 218 5 50 .3 122 .5 89 2

Bashkortostan Titular Russian Tatar Titular Russian Tata r Political Elites 20 .5 43 .4 30 .6 33 .6 17 .1 36 . 8 Work Force 4 9 49 .2 26 .5 34 .6 17 .9 33 . 8 Index 137 .6 58 .2 115 .5 97 .1 95 .5 108 . 9 Kabardino-Balkaria Kabardin Balkar Russian Kabardin Balkar Russia n Political Elites 43 .2 15 .1 31 .4 68 .7 15 .6 10 . 0 Work Force 33 .6 8 .7 44 .2 69 .5 10 .6 14 . 3 Index 128 .6 173 .6 71 .0 98 .8 147 .2 69 . 9 Chechen-Ingushetia Chechen Ingush Russian Chechen Ingush Russian Political Elites 12 .5 12 .6 72 .1 60 .5 I I 0 22 . 6 Work Force 31 .9 9 .1 48 .5 73 .4 12 .3 9 . 9 Index 40 .1 138 .5 148 .7 82 .4 89 .4 228 . 3

Dagestan-Urban Avar Dargin Kumyk Lezgin Russian Political Elites 18 .1 10 .0 I5 .7 8 .8 22 . 3 Work Force 18 .5 10 .6 14 .0 9 .6 20 . 3 Index 97 .8 94 .3 112 .1 91 .7 109 . 9 Dagestan-Rural Avar Dargin Kumyk Lezgin Russia n Political Elites 39 .7 17 .9 7 .9 11 .2 1 . 9 Work Force 34 .4 18 .4 12 .0 12 .0 2 . 8 Index 115 .4 97 .3 65 .8 93 .3 67 .9 Source : Newly available occupation data from the 1989 census, provided by Goskomstat RF, Moscow, 1997 .

2 6 Table 2

Ethnic Composition of Mari-El Parliament, 1993-1996 (Percent )

National Group 1993 1996 % of Total Pop Mari 43 .3 27 .6 43 . 3 Russian 46 .7 55 .2 47.5 Sources : 1993 data: V. Sharov, "Etnopoliticheskaya situatsiya v Respublike Mariy El, in M . Guboglo, ed ., Razvivayushchiysya elektorat Rossii, vol . 2 (Moskva: Tsentr po Izucheniyu Mezhnatsional'nykh Otnosheniy . 1995), pp . 40-51 . 1996 data provided by the RF Ministry o f Nationality Affairs .

Table 3

Ethnic Composition of Political Elites in Tatarstan, 1990 and 199 5

Politica l Politica l Suprem e Parliament , % of Tota l National Group Elites, 1990 Elites, 1995 Soviet. 1990 1995 Pop, 198 9 Tatar 56 .2 77 .0 58 .0 73 .3 48 . 5 Russian 38.0 25 .1 43 . 3 Sources : M . Guboglo, ed ., Resursy mobilizovannoy etnichnosti (Moskva : Tsentr po Izucheniyu Mezhnatsional'nykh Otnosheniy, 1997), p . 129; Mansurova, "Dinamika rotatsii politicheskik h elit RF i RT," in Respublikanskaya nauchno-prakticheskaya konferentsiya "regional ' nyye elity i obshchestvo (, 1995), p . 52; D. Iskhakov, "Politicheskoye razvitiye Tatarstana posl e prinyatiya Konstitutsii (1992-1994)," in L . Drobizheva, ed ., Suverenitet i etnicheskoy e samosoznaniye (Moskva. 1995), p. 75 .

Table 4

Political Elites in State Administration in Bashkortostan, 1989 and 1996 (% )

Heads of Ad - % of Tota l National Group 1989 Cabinet 1996 ministration 1996 Population, 198 9 27.7 67 .5 58 .5 21 . 9 Russians 29.0 19 .0 15 .0 39 . 3 Tatars 34.0 13 .5 18 .5 28 . 5 Others 9.3 0.0 8 .0 10 . 6 Sources : 1989 census data on occupations provided by Goskomstat RF . 1996 figures found i n M. Guboglo, ed ., Resursy mobilizovannoy etnichnosti (Moskva: Tsentr po Izucheniyu Mezhnatsional'nykh Otnosheniy, 1997), p . 152 .

2 7

Table 5

Ethnic Composition of the Bashkortostan Supreme Soviet and the Republic Legislature , 1980-1995 (%)

Supreme Soviets Republic Parliament, 199 5 National Group 1980 1985 1990 Upper HouseLegislative House Tota l Bashkirs 38 .6 39.0 34.0 37 .6 56 .4 43 . 5 Russians 33 .2 34.0 36.0 29 .4 23 .l 27 . 4 Tatars 20.7 20.0 21 .0 27 .1 12 .8 22 . 6 Others 7 .5 7 .0 9.0 5 .9 7 .7 6.5 Sources : For data on Supreme Soviets : M . Guboglo, ed .. Resursy mobilizovannoy etnichnost i (Moskva : Tsentr po Izucheniyu Mezhnatsional'nykh Otnosheniy, 1997), p . 153 . For Republi c Parliament, data provided by the RF Ministry on Nationality Affairs .

Table 6

Ethnic Composition of the Sakha Parliament, 1990-1993 (Percent )

199 3 National Group 1990 Candidates Deputies % of Total Po p Sakha 46 .3 60 .6 60.8 33 . 4 Russian 34 .2 20 .5 27 .5 50 . 3 Source : F . Zykov, "Etnopoliticheskaya situatsiya v Respublike Sakha do I posle vyborov 1 2 Dekabrya 1993 g .," in M . Guboglo, ed ., Razvivayushchiysya elektorat Rossii, vol . 2 (Moskva : 1995), pp. 313-316 .

Table 7

Ethnic Composition of the N . Ossetian Parliament, 1990 and 1995 (Percent )

199 5 National Group 1990 Candidates Deputies % of Total Pop Ossetin 70 84 86 53 Russian 24 13 10 30 Source : L. Gostiyeva, A. Dzadziyev and A . Dzarasov, Severnaya Osetiya : ot vyborov do vyborov (1993-1995)," in M . Guboglo, ed ., Razvivayushchiysya elektorat Rossii, vol . 3, part 2 (Moskva: Tsentr po Izucheniyu Mezhnatsional'nykh Otnosheniy, 1996), pp . 123-130 .

2 8

Table 8

Ethnic Composition of Parliament in Kabardino-Balkari a 1991 and 1996 (Percent)

National Group 1991 1996 % of Total Pop Kabardins 62 .5 59 .7 48 . 2 Balkars 13 .1 12 .5 9 . 4 Russians .0 20 na 31 . 9 Sources : Narodnyye deputaty verkhovnogo soveta Kabardino-Balkarskoy SSR (Nal'chik, 1991) ; Balkarskiy Forum (January 1997) .

Table 9

Primary Community of Meaning (%)

Primary community Tatarstan Tyv a Sakha of meaning Tatars Russians Russians Sakha Russians Ethnic group 41 .2 24.5 32 .1 16 .0 49.6 31 . 5 Religious group 14 .7 6 .9 O .5 1 .1 0.8 6 . 0 Republic 8 .6 5 .5 4.3 O .0 18 .2 14 . 2 Rossiyan l .9 6 .9 l .0 2 .0 7.0 9 . 8 "I never forget that I am (Tatar/ Tuvan/Sakha/Russian)" 50 .5 27 .2 54.5 21 .1 71 .2 36 . 9 "It is necessary to feel onesel f a part of one'sethnic group"57 .1 39.9 73 .9 37 .4 79.9 46 .4 Source : S . Ryzhova, "Nekotoryye aspekty natsional'nogo samosoznaniya russkikh v respublikakh Rossiyskoy Federatsii, " in L . Drobizheva, ed ., Suverenitet i etnicheskoye samosoznaniye (Moskva: Institut etnologii i antropologii, 1995), pp. 277-280 .

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