PROFESSOR FABRICIO APOLO GÓMEZ SOUZA AND THE MOVIMIENTO DE
ACCIÓN REVOLUCIONARIA (MAR) OF MÉXICO
1956-1971
A University Thesis Presented to the Faculty
of
California State University, East Bay
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts in History
By
Miguel Huanaco
December 2020
Copyright © 2020 Miguel Huanaco
ii
PROFESSOR FABRICIO APOLO GÓMEZ SOUZA AND THE MOVIMIENTO DE
ACCIÓN REVOLUCIONARIA (MAR) OF MÉXICO
1956-1971
By
Miguel Huanaco
Approved: Date:
Electronic Signatures Available December 11, 2020 ______Anna Rose Alexander Ph.D.
Electronic Signatures Available December 11, 2020 ______
Elizabeth McGuire Ph.D.
iii
Table of Contents
Preface ...... v
1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1
2. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MAR ...... 9
3. THE COURTSHIP ...... 13
4. THE SPONSORSHIP ...... 18
5. THE RECRUITMENT ...... 24
6. TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS ...... 28
7. THE TRAINING OF THE 53 ...... 35
8. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SCHOOLS ...... 41
9. THE ROBBERY ...... 46
10. THE DOWNFALL ...... 52
11. THE APPREHENSION ...... 55
12. THE FALLOUT ...... 59
13. RUSSIA EMERGES ...... 63
14. THE CAPUTURE THROUGH BARRON’ S EYES ...... 67
15. OLEG M. NECHIPORENKO ...... 71
16. A KGB AGENT IN OUR MIDST ...... 74
17. CONCLUSION ...... 78
Bibliography ...... 82
List of Names Trained in North Korea by Group ...... 87
iv
Preface
There have been many scholarly works written about Mexico’s Movimiento de
Acción Revolucionaria (MAR) or revolutionary action movement; however, there has never been a scholarly work written about its founder Professor Gómez Souza. Ninety percent of the scholarly works written about the MAR are only available in Spanish, limiting their distribution to a broader audience of non-Spanish readers and restricting their research availability for scholars. I saw the need to both write a scholarly work about Professor Gomez Souza and to add to the existing literature about the MAR for a broader audience. This MA thesis project is ninety-percent archival, gathered and translated from Spanish declarations of formerly imprisoned MAR militants. Yet completing research on Mexico’s Dirty War was not easy because accessing archival records about the MAR and Professor Gómez Souza is difficult. The Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) archives have been sealed, and they were briefly unsealed during the
Vicente Fox presidency in 2002, only to be partially resealed again at the end of his presidency. The archival declarations used for this project come to us at a costly price.
DFS agents extracted testimonials from MAR militants after hours of questioning and torture, which raises the question about the accuracy of these declarations. However, these archives are all that the historical community has, and we will use them as a window into Professor Fabricio Gómez Souza and the MAR. The archives used were gathered from the Archivo General de la Nación, and donated by Guerrero’s ex-truth
v
commission, or (COMVERDAD) and are now compiled on a non-profit online database
for the world to read the injustices of the Dirty War.1
1 “Memoria y Verdad,” Archivos de la Represión (Archivos de la Represión, August 12, 2015), https://archivosdelarepresion.org/.
vi
1
1. INTRODUCTION
2
Professor Fabricio Apolo Gómez Souza was the first person to successfully take
53 Mexican recruits, undetected to receive political-military training by a foreign
government, something those renowned on the Mexican left never accomplished. Yet, the
name of Professor Gómez Souza is not uttered amongst the greats of the Mexican left.
The actions of Professor Fabricio Gómez Souza deserve recognition, and they deserve to be in the same conversation as that of Professor Lucio Cabañas Barrientos (the most recognized guerrilla fighter in Mexico), who is considered the Robin Hood of Mexico
during the Dirty War and Genaro Vázquez Rojas (Cabaña’s right-hand man).2 Or
Professor Arturo Gámiz García who attacked the barracks of Madera to start the Dirty
War In 19653. However, the life of Professor Gómez Souza does not come without
controversy. He could be labeled as a domestic terrorist for what he plotted against
Mexico, he was labeled a traitor to the country, and he was very likely a KGB agent.
However, we would not know what Professor Gómez Souza has been labeled because
there are currently no scholarly works dedicated to him; however, this is going to change
with the completion of this project. Whether or not one agrees or disagrees with Professor
Gómez Souza’s actions, he still deserves his rightful place amongst the greats of the
Mexican left. Yet, no single work has recognized Professor Gómez Souza for all that he
2 Fernando Herrera Calderon and Adela Cedillo. Challenging Authoritarianism in Mexico: Revolutionary Struggles and the Dirty War, 1964-1982. New York: Routledge, 2012: 50-51.
3 Ibid: 33‐34.
3
accomplished. Was he just a Mexican citizen with socialist ideas, or was he more than
that?
In order to understand Mexico’s Dirty War, we must first understand the events
that led to it. The Dirty War can be attributed to three factors; the unfulfilled promises of
Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution, the “Mexican Miracle” from 1940-1970, and the
need to unseat the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) or the Institutional
Revolutionary Party. Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution was to grant land ownership to
those who worked it and could afford to purchase the land.4 The PRI did not honor
Article 27, and the farmers that worked this land began organizing opposition to the PRI
to demand that they honor Article 27.5 In 1956, Professor Gamiz became their leader and
he led the attack on the Madera Barracks to gain weapons to fight the Mexican government for recognition of Article 27 by force.6 The attack on the Madera Barracks
drew backlash from the Mexican government in the form of fatal retribution, and this
drew an even fiercer opposition from the left.7 The attack of the Madera Barracks by
Professor Arturo Gamiz in 1956 signaled the beginning of the Dirty War. The
countryside agitation movements eventually united with the urban agitation movements.
By this time the economic “Mexican Miracle” from 1940-1970 was well on its way, and
4 Adela Cedillo and Fernando Calderón, Challenging Authoritarianism in Mexico: 22.
5 Ibid: 51.
6 Ibid: 149.
7 Ibid: 6.
4
the masses wanted a part of the economic success Mexico was experiencing.8 The
university student movement began to gain momentum through the success of the middle
class because of the “Mexican Miracle” and the exposure to Marxism.9 To further ignite
this flame was the success of the Cuban Revolution of 1959 led by Che Guevarra.
Mexico began to seek its own change of social reform and more widespread economic
distribution and saw the need to unseat the PRI from power in order to accomplish this.10
The leftists began to organize mass demonstrations, in retaliation the Mexican government began to incarcerate and torture leftists to gain information and attempt to suppress the movement. In return, the leftist’s protests grew even more because of the human rights violations by the Mexican government. Because of Mexico’s economic success the country was awarded the 1968 Olympics.11 As the start date of the Olympics
drew closer, the protests grew stronger in opposition to the Olympics and the Mexican
government. Agitated by the high cost Mexico spent on hosting the Olympic Games,
leftists protested for more widespread economic distribution for the country and
demanded justice for human rights violations. The climax of the Dirty War came on
October 2, 1968 at Tlatelolco Plaza in Mexico City, where it is estimated that over 300
8 Louise E. Walker, Waking from the Dream: Mexico's Middle Classes after 1968. Stanford University Press, 2013: 1.
9 Ibid.: 1.
10 Alberto Ulloa Bornemann. Surviving Mexico's Dirty War: A Political Prisoner's Memoir. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008: 6.
11 Walker, Waking from the Dream: 8.
5
Mexican students were massacred by the Mexican government for protesting.12 The
events of October 2, 1968 would play into the favor of Professor Gómez Souza.
This project intends to shed light on the role of Professor Gómez Souza in the
Mexican left during the Dirty War years. At the time of the Dirty War, the Mexican
Government sought out many socialist organizations and punished them with
incarcerations and torture. Nevertheless, Professor Gómez Souza recruited 53 members to receive political-military training in North Korea. After the unfortunate events of
Tlatelolco Plaza the protests continued and the official slogan of those protesting the
events that occurred became, “no queremos Olypmpiadas, queremos revolución” (we
don’t want the Olympics we want revolution).13 This played into the hands of Professor
Gómez Souza because he ultimately wanted a revolution to fundamentally change
Mexico. This attitude would lead him to the doorsteps of the Russian embassy to seek a
scholarship as a Mexican exchange student at the University of Patricio and ultimately to
the doorsteps of the North Korean embassy to convince them without compromise to
provide political-military training to the MAR. Did North Korea have a reason to agree to
train 53 Mexican nationals or was Russia truly behind the sponsorship of the MAR? Was
North Korea merely a smokescreen to distract the Mexican government, and was
Professor Gómez Souza the KGB agent to orchestrate the events? This thesis will attempt
12 The Dead of Tlatelolco: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 201, Archivo General de la Nación, Galería 2 IPS Caja 1459-A, F. 26-34 https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB201/index.htm
13 Adela Cedillo and Fernando Calderón, Challenging Authoritarianism in Mexico: 63.
6
to answer these key questions; however, we will also touch on the life of Professor
Gómez Souza and what drove him to take a guerrilla stance against the Mexican
government. However, most importantly, the project undertaken will attempt to answer and uncover the looming questions that hang over the events surrounding Professor
Gomez Souza and the MAR.
Can the biographical information about Professor Fabricio Apolo Gómez Souza point us to why he had socialists’ ideals or if he was a KGB agent? Professor Gómez
Souza was born at 0200 hours on January 2, 1933, in the town of Tuzantla, Michoacán, registered on sheet 16 and certificate number 38.14 He was born to a Mexican father,
Manuel Gómez Solache, and a Mexican mother, Esperanza Souza Huerta. He had one
half-sibling by the name of Eulalio Saulo Gómez Mejia, and three siblings by the names
of Alicia Gómez Souza, Ruenalda Gómez Souza, and Aníbal Gómez Souza.15 His
nephew Horacio Arroyo Souza also joined the MAR.16 He began his studies at the elementary level until receiving his title of schoolteacher at the Normal School of
14 “[Acta De Detención De Fabricio Gómez Souza] ∙ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Fabricio Gómez Souza] ∙ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 29, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14436: 1.
15 “[Acta De Detención De Eulalio Saulo Gómez Mejía] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Eulalio Saulo Gómez Mejía] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 29, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14434: 1.
16 “Horacio Arroyo Souza (a) ‘Rubén Palafox’, ‘Conrado’, ‘Víctor’ ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” Horacio Arroyo Souza (a) "Rubén Palafox", "Conrado", "Víctor" ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 29, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/18755: 3.
7
Morelia, Michoacán, at 17. From this point, he began his career as a schoolteacher in Las
Choapas, Minatitlán, and Nanchital, all in the state of Veracruz, México.17 After five
years of teaching, he received the title of elementary Professor. After ten years, he
transferred to Nanchital, Veracruz, where he met Zoila Antonio Cat, his future wife.18
They married in 1963; however, it was short-lived. At the beginning of their honeymoon,
Zoila fell ill and was unable to recover, she passed away in Mexico City. Professor
Gómez Souza always had socialist ideas; he always saw the need in Mexico for a socio-
economic change and for there to be a better distribution of wealth.19 After his wife’s
death, his socialist ideas fully manifested themselves, and he strengthened them by
reading Marxist teachings. It was in Veracruz, where he joined the Partido Comunista
Mexicano (PCM) and did political work for the Petroleum Workers of Veracruz.20 In
February of 1963, he solicited a scholarship through the Russian Embassy in Mexico to
the University of Patricio Lumumba in Moscow to study Economics. It is believed by
17 “[Acta De Detención De Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 29, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14436: 1.
18 Ibid: 1.
19 “[Acta De Detención De Eulalio Saulo Gómez Mejía] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Eulalio Saulo Gómez Mejía] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 29, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14434: 2.
20 Verónica Oikión Solano, and Marta Eugenia García Ugarte. 2006. Movimientos armados en México, siglo XX. Zamora, Michoacán: Colegio de Michoacán: 433.
8
some that it was here where Professor Gómez Souza offered his services to the KGB.21
He was successfully accepted into the university through the Mexican-Russian Cultural
exchange program and awarded a scholarship.22 Soon after this, he headed to Moscow,
Russia. The autobiographical information of Professor Gómez Souza is very limited;
however, it is still apparent that the death of his wife and the circumstances they found
themselves due to Mexico’s limited healthcare services and poor economic distribution
played a vital part on why his socialist ideas fully manifested themselves and why he fully committed himself to the Mexican left.
21 Samuel T., “Latin American Terrorism: The Cuban Connection,” The Heritage Foundation, accessed September 1, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/node/22863/print-display
22 “[Acta De Detención De Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 29, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14436: 2.
9
2. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MAR
10
Mexican students accompanied Professor Gómez Souza to Moscow to study and they formed part of the Mexican-Russian Cultural exchange program at the University of
Patricio. However, it seems that they also had socialist ideas. Once at the University of
Patricio Lumumba in September of 1963, Professor Gómez Souza began to take courses to learn Russian in conjunction with his studies in Economics.23 Other Mexican students
who were part of the Mexican-Russian Cultural exchange program were Alejandro López
Murillo, Juan Raúl Ching, Octavio Márquez Vázquez, Elisa Rodríguez, Candelario
Pacheco, Salvador Castañeda Álvarez, Camilo Estrada Luviano, Leonardo Mendoza, José
Luis Guerrero Moreno, and Martha Maldonado.24 The students that made up the
scholarship class from Mexico were exposed to and were members of leftist’s agitation
movements in Mexico.25 The Russian Embassy targeted and gave them scholarships as
recruits for future “subversion.”26 They would be easy to recruit for leftist organizations and open to having socialists discussions, as well shall see. The political discussions on
23 “[Acta De Detención De Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 29, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14436: 2.
24 “[Acta De Detención De Alejandro López Murillo] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Alejandro López Murillo] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14454: 3-4
25 Ibid: 3-4
26 “Volume 118, Part 14 (May 15, 1972 to May 23, 1972),” govinfo, 1972, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14-2/summary: 17432.
11
how there needed to be a new Marxists’ political line in Mexico and the need for a new group to represent this and establish a socialist government by force, began to take place in 1965.27 The discussions led to the agreement that something needed to be done to improve Mexico’s social environment. By 1967, the name of Movimiento de Acción
Revolucionaria (MAR) was chosen for the newly formed group. The group decided they needed to find political-military training outside of Mexico in order to accomplish their mission of an armed revolution.28 Professor Gómez Souza suggested the idea that the
group needed to train outside of Mexico to avoid detection and the group agreed.29
Shortly after this by 1968, the newly formed organization began to seek military training at various communist countries through their embassies situated in Russia.30 Professor
Gómez Souza’s plans seemed to be going perfectly. There was enough socialist support
of Mexican students at The University of Patricio Lumumba to garner political
discussions of Mexico’s current political climate and ultimately form a revolutionary
group and have this group agree to seek political-military training by a foreign
27 “[Acta De Detención De Alejandro López Murillo] ∙ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Alejandro López Murillo] ∙ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14454: 4.
28 “[Acta De La Declaración De Camilo Estrada Luviano (a)‘Cuauhtémoc’] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de la declaración de Camilo Estrada Luviano (a)"Cuauhtémoc"] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14860: 5.
29 Ibid: 5.
30 Ibid: 5
12
government for their ultimate plan of unseating the Mexican government for a socialist one.
13
3. THE COURTSHIP
14
The newly formed organization needed to find a country or sponsor to provide
political-military training outside of Mexico. If a country agreed to provide training to
them, why would they agree to do this? From the original group of student’s part of the
Mexican-Russian Cultural program, who eventually formed the MAR, Professor Gómez
Souza, Salvador Castañeda Álvarez, Alejandro López Murillo, and Camilo Estrada
Luviano left the only archival accounts of the events that transpired to lead them to North
Korea. The group visited different embassies, all situated in Moscow, to seek political-
military training for their newly formed organization.31 From the archival declaration
from Professor Gómez Souza extracted by DFS agents, the group went to the Cuban
embassy. They rejected them because they did not want to harm diplomatic relations with
Mexico. Mexico was the only country in Latin America that held good diplomatic
relations with Cuba after the Cuban Revolution of 1959 led by Fidel Castro and Che
Guevarra. Next, they went to the Embassy of Vietnam, where they were rejected because
of their current conflict with the United States. Next, they went to the Embassy of China,
where the Chinese offered their help but, on the condition that they side with the China-
Soviet ideology of Communism. Lastly, they ended up at the Embassy of North Korea.
Here, conversations occurred between Professor Gómez Souza and the North Korean
delegates, where Professor Gómez Souza explained the current political climate in
Mexico and the reason behind the armed struggle against the Mexican government. The
31 “[Acta De Detención De Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 29, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14436: 3.
15
North Koreans heard his request, and they agreed to provide political-military training to
the Mexicans. In 1968, the North Koreans invited and flew Professor Gómez Souza to
Pyongyang, North Korea, for twenty days to meet with North Korean government
officials, whom he does not recall by name. Here with a translator, they discussed the plan; they agreed that the first group to receive political-military training would be a group of ten.32 The archival declaration from Salvador Castañeda Álvarez extracted by
DFS agents does not include any information about the courting of different embassies or the North Koreans. He simply jumps into the trip to North Korea for political-military
training. The archival declaration of Camilo Estrada Luviano is not very revealing either.
He states that he did not know that there was a courting of different embassies, and if this
was true, he did not know which ones they were courting.33 The archival declaration
extracted by DFS of Alejandro López Murillo is the more detailed than of those already
mentioned, with the exception of Professor Gómez Souza; however, it still does not
reveal much. He stated that the group begins by visiting China. Here the Chinese stated
that the group would have to learn the Mao-Tse-Tung teaching, and then they would talk.
At the Cuban Embassy, they were rejected due to the good diplomatic relations held with
32 “[Acta De Detención De Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 29, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14436: 4.
33 “[Acta De La Declaración De Camilo Estrada Luviano (a)‘Cuauhtémoc’] ∙ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de la declaración de Camilo Estrada Luviano (a)"Cuauhtémoc"] ∙ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14860: 6.
16
Mexico in Latin America. At the Embassy of Vietnam, the group offered their services for the current conflict with the United States; however, the embassy rejected their help and stated that they only needed medical supplies and food.34 This led the group to the
Embassy of North Korea, here they let their request for political-military training be
known to the secretary at the embassy. The secretary at the embassy stated, “he would
pass on the request to his superiors.”35 After this interview, Alejandro López Murillo
states that he did not hear anything else about the topic; Professor Gómez Souza simply
mentioned an agreement was in place with North Korea to provide political-military
training to them.36 The mentioned archival declarations of the MAR militants historically
account for how the MAR ended up at the North Korean embassy; however, not one archival source pinpoints why North Korea agreed to provide political-military training to the MAR. More importantly, the historical account by the orchestrator himself, Professor
Gómez Souza, does not reveal which detailed conversations or agreements took place
between the North Koreans and him. There were no other witnesses from the MAR
present at the negotiations as well. He simply states it was a done deal. If there was any
type of deal between Professor Gomez Souza, North Korea, and Russia the other sources
present would not have known about the deal struck to lead the MAR to North Korea
34 “[Acta De Detención De Alejandro López Murillo] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Alejandro López Murillo] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14454: 6.
35 Ibid: 6.
36 Ibid: 7.
17
because Professor Gomez Souza was very discrete in his dealings when it came to the situation at hand or future situations as well shall soon encounter.
18
4. THE SPONSORSHIP
19
Finding the answer to why a country such as North Korea agreed to provide not
only political-military training to the MAR, but also financial support, was challenging.
Especially since archival documentation or declarations by former MAR militants was
limited. The archival declaration extracted by DFS of Professor Gomez Souza states that
when he returned to Moscow from his trip to North Korea, they ordered him to go to the
North Korean Embassy to collect 7,000-10,000 US dollars from a North Korean delegate
for travel arrangements for his group. Alejandro López Murillo dispersed the funds in
500.00 dollar increments to the MAR members.37 Subsequently, after the first group returned from training in North Korea, they brought 8,000 US dollars for the second
group for travel arrangements to North Korea.38 For the third group to make its way to
North Korea, Professor Gómez Souza again collected the funds at the North Korean
Embassy in Moscow, this time in the amount of 15,000-20,000 US dollars to be again
distributed by Alejandro López Murillo in 500.00 increments to the new recruits.39 After the third group of militants made its way to North Korea, funding would stop. The archival declaration extracted by DFS of Salvador Castañeda Álvarez does not state anything on the topic of financial support by North Korea for political-military training.
37 “[Acta De Detención De Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 29, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14436: 4.
38 Ibid: 5.
39 Ibid: 7.
20
Camilo Estrada Luviano is not very revealing either. The only fact that he mentions in
regard to monetary value is that Alejandro López Murillo handed him a plane ticket to
Moscow, where his final destination would be North Korea for political-military
training.40 The archival declaration of Alejandro López Murillo extracted by DFS states that in November of 1968, Professor Gómez Souza arrived in Mexico with 10,000 US dollars from North Korea for travel arrangements of the first group of ten members to be trained by North Korea. He gave him the funds to be dispersed amongst the members for travel purposes as he was named treasurer of the group in its inception in Moscow.41 He did point out that all of the currency was in 100.00 bills in US dollars. Again, he was given an unspecified amount of funds to distribute amongst the members in 500.00-dollar increments for plane ticket purchases to Berlin and travel purposes.42 This concludes the
archival declarations of those present at the MAR’s foundation in Moscow and of those
that we have archival evidence. Not one of the sources pinpoints why North Korea gave
funding or what kind of deal was struck (if any) with Professor Gómez Souza to give him
the amount of 25,000-30,000 US dollars for travel arrangements for the newly formed
40 “[Acta De La Declaración De Camilo Estrada Luviano (a)‘Cuauhtémoc’] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de la declaración de Camilo Estrada Luviano (a)"Cuauhtémoc"] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14860: 7.
41 “[Acta De Detención De Alejandro López Murillo] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Alejandro López Murillo] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14454: 10.
42 Ibid: 10.
21
guerrilla organization. This was no small amount; roughly 25,000-30,000 US dollars for a
group that was unknown to North Korea. It was either that Professor Gómez Souza had
excellent powers of persuasion or there were other inner dealings going on that we did
not know about on the exterior.
Archival sources did not reveal why North Korea agreed to fund the MAR for
political-military training; finding the answer in secondary sources proves even more
challenging. Salvador Castañeda Álvarez has written the most literary works on topics
related to the MAR compared to former MAR militants. Porque No Dijiste Todo, Los
Diques Del tiempo: Diario Desde La Cárcel, Papel Revolución, and Las Presas de Santa
Martha. Yet, not in one of the previously mentioned literary works does he touch on the
topic of North Korea funding the MAR. Former MAR militant Fernando Pineda Ochoa
does not reveal any facts about financial benefits or monetary exchanges between North
Korea and the MAR in his scholarly works En Las Profundidades Del MAR: El Oro no
Llego de Moscu and En La Balada De La Marina. However, in his archival declaration
extracted by DFS, he does reveal that in 1969 while in Mexico, either Professor Gómez
Souza or Ángel Bravo Cisneros gave him 500.00 US dollars to purchase a plane ticket to
Paris, France.43 The other former MAR militant, Saúl López de La Torre, in his scholarly
work, Guerras Secretas does not reveal or state any facts about any financial benefit or
43 “[Acta De Detención De Fernando Pineda Ochoa (a)‘Mario Fernández’] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Fernando Pineda Ochoa (a)"Mario Fernández"] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14457: 4.
22
monetary exchanges between North Korea and the MAR. The account of historian
Verónica Oikion Solano, a recognized and established Mexican historian on the subjects of armed struggle and socialists’ groups in Mexico. In her book, Los Movimientos
Armados volume II differs the most in her account as she cites archival sources detailing
the circumstances surrounding the funding received from North Korea to the MAR. She
reveals that in October of 1968, Professor Gómez Souza traveled to Pyongyang to meet
Kim II Sung, where formal talks were held. Here, Kim II Sung offered the MAR
“military training to the contingent guerilla group.”44 Here, Professor Gómez Souza received 25,000 dollars from the North Koreans for recruitment and travel arrangements for the rest of the group.45 Hugo Velázquez Villa, an established Mexican author, and
Professor at the University of Guadalajara. Has written books on the Mexican left to
include. Breve historia del MAR: La guerrilla imaginaria del MAR. In the mentioned
scholarly work, he touches on the topic of North Korean financing through archival
records and recalled conversations by former militants. Velázquez Villa gives the
historical account of Professor Gómez Souza traveling to Pyongyang in October of 1968
but provides no further details of the trip. He mentions that the North Koreans provided
Professor Gómez Souza with 10,000 US dollars for travel arrangements only.46 Based on
44 Verónica Oikión Solano, and Marta Eugenia García Ugarte. 2006. Movimientos armados en México: 434.
45 Ibid: 434.
46 Leticia Carrasco Gutiérrez and Hugo Velázquez Villa. Breve historia del MAR: La guerrilla imaginaria del Movimiento de Acción Revolucionaría. México: Universidad de Guadalajara, 2012: 57.
23
the secondary sources mentioned, not one pinpoints why the North Koreans provided
10,000- 25,000 US dollars for travel arrangements of the newly formed organization. The question again, is why did North Korea agree to fund the MAR for political-military
training? The only fact that the secondary sources agree on is that the North Koreans did provide travel and recruitment funding to the newly formed organization.
24
5. THE RECRUITMENT
25
Professor Gómez Souza returned to Mexico after traveling to North Korea to finalize the details of the agreement between him and North Korea. Upon his return, he traveled to Mexico to recruit additional members for the MAR. American journalist, author, and KGB expert John Barron, which his works include; KGB: The Secret Works
of Soviet Agents; Operation Solo: The FBI’s man in the Kremlin; and KGB Today: The
Hidden Hand. He was also an author for the Washington Bureau of Reader’s Digest,
where he wrote “The Soviet Plot to Destroy Mexico.” The information Barron provides is
the only available source of any kind about what Professor Gómez Souza did when he
returned to Mexico after the agreement with North Korea was in place. Once he returned
to Mexico, Alekseyevich Diakonov, a Russian rezindentur, directed Professor Gómez
Souza to Ángel Bravo Cisneros because of his radical reputation. Once Professor Gómez
Souza was in contact with Ángel Bravo Cisneros, he recruited him and told him that they
needed to form a group and be trained by experts outside of the country because their
mission was to “make Mexico another Vietnam.”47 Ángel Bravo Cisneros agreed. Then
Professor Gómez Souza told him to move to Mexico City for some time and recruit more
members, “but do not tell them any more than I have told you,”48 and he told him to be
ready to process the necessary documents for the new members to leave the country.
47 “Volume 118, Part 14 (May 15, 1972 to May 23, 1972),” govinfo, 1972, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14-2/summary: 17434
48 Ibid: 17434
26
Ángel Bravo Cisneros asked where the training would take place, and Professor Gómez
Souza replied, “that his job was to follow orders and not ask questions.”49
Upon recruitment, the new members did not know the name of the organization
they were joining or where training was to occur. According to the archival declarations
extracted by DFS of the MAR militants already mentioned, after Professor Gómez Souza
met with Ángel Bravo Cisneros in Mexico, Bravo Cisneros and Leonardo Isidro Rangel
were responsible for recruiting the second and third groups.50 The archival declarations
extracted by DFS that are available to us from the second group; Guillermo Moreno
Nolasco, Ramón Cardona Medel, Fernando Pineda Ochoa, Armando González Carrillo,
Martha Elba Cisneros, and Felipe Peñaloza García.51 The names mentioned all reveal the
same facts; After initial recruitment, the organization’s name was not revealed to them, just the nature of the revolutionary movement. However, in order to be effective, they needed expert training outside of the country. They were told by Ángel Bravo Cisneros and Leonardo Isidro Rangel to prepare their documents to apply for a passport to leave the country to go to Europe, however the final destination was not disclosed to them. The
49 “Volume 118, Part 14 (May 15, 1972 to May 23, 1972),” govinfo, 1972, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14-2/summary: 17434
50 “[Acta De Detención De Fernando Pineda Ochoa (a)‘Mario Fernández’] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Fernando Pineda Ochoa (a)"Mario Fernández"] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14457: 3.
51 “Personas Mencionadas En Los Archivos ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” Personas mencionadas en los archivos ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/page/nombres.
27
archival declarations extracted by the DFS from the third group that coincide with the
declaration of the second group is that of Rogelio Raya Morales and Elia Hernández
Hernández. They both reveal the same facts as those of the second group. The remaining archival declarations extracted by DFS of the third group that are available to us narrate the actions until arriving in North Korea, however it appears that they did not know what their final destination was until arrival. Professor Gómez Souza’s instructions were followed to the very last detail, the new recruits were not aware of where political- military training was to be or the name of the organization.52 The unfortunate event of
300 students massacred by the Mexican government on October 2, 1968 at Tlatelolco
Plaza in Mexico City made recruitment easier for the MAR. Once the MAR began to
recruit the MAR did not have difficulty convincing individuals to leave the country to
receive political-military training to overthrow the Mexican government that had just
massacred over 300 student activists to cause real change in the country.53
52 “[Acta De La Declaración De Elda Nevárez Flores] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de la declaración de Elda Nevárez Flores] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/15555: 3.
53 The Dead of Tlatelolco: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 201, Archivo General de la Nación, Galería 2 IPS Caja 1459-A, F. 26-34 https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB201/index.htm
28
6. TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS
29
North Korea appeared to agree to provide political-military training, funding, and
make travel arrangements from Latin America across Europe to Asia. According to the
archival declaration of Professor Gómez Souza extracted by DFS agents, he was part of
the second group that traveled to North Korea in January of 1969.54 However, he was
present in East Berlin for the travel arrangements of all three groups. The second group
would leave Mexico and layover in Paris. However, Professor Gómez Souza separated
from the group and made his way to East Berlin to the North Korean Embassy. Once the entire second group arrived in West Berlin, Professor Gómez Souza was informed by
Ángel Bravo Cisneros and Horacio Arroyo Souza. North Koreans ordered Professor
Gómez Souza to make his way to the Berlin train station.55 Prior to this, however, a
picture is collected by Professor Gómez Souza from each person in the second group and
given to the North Koreans; he claims not to know the reason as was the prior agreement
with North Korea.56 Professor Gómez Souza would later come to know the picture was to
receive a North Korean passport. Once at the train station the North Korean diplomats
would arrive and hand each member their respective North Korean passport indicating
them as North Korean nationals. In return, the North Korean diplomats would collect
54 “[Acta De Detención De Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 29, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14436: 5.
55 Ibid: 6.
56 Ibid: 6.
30
their Mexican passports for the time being for safekeeping. After this, then they would
begin their journey by train to Moscow, Russia.57 Each time the train crossed an
international border on their way to Moscow, the immigration officials reviewed the
group’s documents without incident, with the exception of the one occasion where an
immigration official discovered a Mexican military identification card on the person of
Felipe Peñaloza García, a MAR militant. However, nothing came of it.58 From here, the
train arrived in Russian territory. Once in Moscow, they disembarked the train without an
immigration inspection; they had already been inspected on the trip. They were met by
North Korean diplomats at the train station, who took the group to a hotel; Professor
Gómez Souza served as the Russian interpreter.59 The group waited in Moscow for 4-5
days waiting for a flight to Pyongyang. Once the group arrived in Pyongyang, they were
met by North Korean functionaries of the government in civilian clothing to be taken to
the site for political-military training.60 The archival declaration of Salvador Castañeda
Álvarez extracted by DFS agents does not reveal anything on this matter. The archival declaration of Camilo Estrada Luviano extracted by DFS agents reveals that In December
57 “[Acta De Detención De Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 29, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14436: 6.
58 Ibid: 6.
59 Ibid: 6.
60 Ibid: 7.
31
of 1968 he was given a plane ticket by Alejandro López Murillo from Mexico-Moscow.61
He had a layover in Paris, France, and then eventually, he flew to East Berlin. In East
Berlin, he was met at the airport by two North Koreans. He reveals that he had no idea how they knew who he was. The North Koreans then took him to a safe house where he remained for several days, however, not before giving them photographs of himself. The
North Koreans would return and hand him a North Korean passport, his picture, the
Korean name of KIM, and indicated him as a North Korean national.62 Then in January
of 1969, Alejandro López Murillo met him in East Berlin, where they would eventually
fly to North Korea. However, not before going through a border inspection in
Novosivirsk, Russia, where they showed their North Koran passport with Korean names
to Russian immigration officers, and they were let through without incident.63 According to Camilo Estrada Luviano, “by his estimation the Russians were already on board with
the plan.”64 They would eventually make it to Pyongyang. The archival declaration of
Alejandro López Murillo extracted by DFS agents reveals that Professor Gómez Souza put him in charge of collecting photographs from everyone in the group, and in turn, he
61 “[Acta De La Declaración De Camilo Estrada Luviano (a)‘Cuauhtémoc’] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de la declaración de Camilo Estrada Luviano (a)"Cuauhtémoc"] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14860: 7.
62 Ibid: 7.
63 Ibid: 8.
64 Ibid: 8.
32
would give the photographs to Professor Gómez Souza. Professor Gómez Souza would then personally deliver the photographs to the North Korean Embassy in Moscow with the purpose of the North Koreans sending the photographs to certain embassies in the communist block of Europe to expedite the travel process through the different borders.65
However, the original plan was revised, and they would now cross through East Berlin and take all of the members’ photos with him. He landed in Moscow on December 19,
1968. Here, he checked into Hotel Ukraine, and he had no problem getting around
Moscow because he spoke Russian very well. After this, he directed himself to the North
Korean embassy, where he came into contact with the embassy’s secretary. He told the secretary his name and that he was there on behalf of Fabricio Gómez Souza.66 He then
handed the secretary his picture and those of the rest of the group; however, the secretary
informed him that the plans had changed and that everyone was to now receive passports
identifying them as North Korean citizens. Alejandro López Murillo received instruction
that when Camilo Estrada Luviano arrived, they needed to go to the embassy to collect
their plane tickets to travel to East Berlin, where they were given their North Korean
passports. Once they arrived in East Berlin, they are met by a Korean by the last name of
Chang, where he takes them to a specific location and hands the group their respective
65 “[Acta De Detención De Alejandro López Murillo] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Alejandro López Murillo] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14454: 10.
66 Ibid: 10.
33
passports.67 The group stayed in East Berlin for a few more days then, on January 6,
Chang again met them and handed them each a plane ticket to Moscow with a final
destination of Pyongyang.68 The next day the group arrived in Pyongyang, and two
representatives of the working party of North Korea met them with an interpreter by the
name of Kim. They are then transferred to a hotel to await the remaining members of the
group.69 We will be covering the archival declaration of Ángel Bravo Cisneros extracted
by DFS agents because he was mentioned several times in the previous archival
declarations. His archival declaration begins when the group is already in Paris, France.
He reveals that part of the group goes by train and others by plane to West Berlin by
order of Professor Gómez Souza. Once in West Berlin, Professor Gómez Souza leaves
the group to meet someone (who is not revealed) at the East-West Berlin border to
arrange for the group crossing.70 Professor Gómez Souza then met with him at a corner
near Moscow Restaurant in West Berlin. Here, Professor Gómez Souza instructs him to
tell the group to wait a few days while the documents are prepared for the group to
67 “[Acta De Detención De Alejandro López Murillo] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Alejandro López Murillo] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14454: 11.
68 Ibid:11.
69 Ibid: 11.
70 “[Acta De Detención De Ángel Bravo Cisneros] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Ángel Bravo Cisneros] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14209: 3.
34
cross.71 Eight days later, the group would be instructed by Professor Gómez Souza to
meet at the central train station in West Berlin; he also instructed them to separate into
groups of three. Once at the train station, North Korean individuals arrived and gave each
individual their respective passport and took away their Mexican passport until there
return trip. Ángel Bravo Cisneros’ passport was given the Korean name of Komensik.72
His archival declaration ends here concerning the topic at hand because the remaining documents are blurry and unavailable. Based on all of the archival revelations extracted by DFS that were discussed, they all agree on the same narrative. The trip to North Korea was pre-arranged. North Korea financed it. The group was given North Korean passports to hide their true identities, and they had no issues whatsoever, reaching Pyongyang.
However, there is one splintering fact that stands out in the archival declarations. The central point to the travel arrangements and meeting places kept pointing to Moscow,
Russia, and the orchestrator for Moscow was Professor Gómez Souza. According to the archival declarations extracted by DFS the North Koreans kept physically showing their faces to the MAR, but the focal point was always Moscow.
71 “[Acta De Detención De Ángel Bravo Cisneros] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Ángel Bravo Cisneros] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14209: 3.
72 Ibid: 3.
35
7. THE TRAINING OF THE 53
36
The 53 recruits went to North Korea for political-military training; however, they
also received specialty training. The archival declarations of the first group reveal that the
training grounds were 30 Kilometers from the capital Pyongyang.73 Upon arrival, the
first, second, and third groups were all issued North Korean military clothing without
insignias for the duration of training and split into barracks between males and females.
Martha Elba Cisneros of the second group reveals the most descriptive detail of the
military uniforms issued to the men: “The men were issued olive-green uniforms with the
North Korean flag on it; the uniform contained buttons for closure.74 The training
provided to the MAR was of true military essence; they were not allowed to leave the
training grounds under any circumstance, and their only day off was Sunday.75 The
training regimen was consistent for all three groups. They would train from 0600-2300
every day with the exception of Sunday.76 The daily schedule was the following; wake-up
call at 0600, exercise for 30 minutes, followed by breakfast, which consisted of eggs,
73 “[Acta De La Declaración De Camilo Estrada Luviano (a)‘Cuauhtémoc’] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de la declaración de Camilo Estrada Luviano (a)"Cuauhtémoc"] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14860: 8.
74 “[Declaratoria De Martha Elba Cisneros Zavala Ante La P.G.R.] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Declaratoria de Martha Elba Cisneros Zavala ante la P.G.R.] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/15327: 7.
75 “[Acta De Detención De Rogelio Raya Morales] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Rogelio Raya Morales] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14459: 5.
76 Ibid: 5
37
ham, bread, butter, jelly, milk, and sometimes meat. The group would then rest for half
an hour, and then classes would begin until 1300, followed by lunch. Lunch consisted of
vegetables and meat; and after lunch, the group would take an hour siesta. Classes would
continue until 1900, followed by dinner, which consisted of similar contents to breakfast.
After dinner, the group would rest for half an hour, then in a group amongst themselves
review the lessons for the day, followed by a cultural hour (which was not specified);
after this, it was lights out at 2300.77 The instructors and what they taught was
documented and consistent in the second and third groups; however, there is no archival
evidence from the first and third groups that reveal who the specialists were in these
respective groups, but archival evidence does reveal the members of the first and third
groups received political-military training in the same areas as the second group.
Alejandro López Murillo, Camilo Estrada Luviano,78 Elia Hernández Hernández, and
Rogelio Raya Morales each reveal for the first and thirds groups the firearms training
they received on the following weapons; Mauser, AK-10, M-14, bazookas, grenade launchers, and arming and disarming firearms.79 They were also trained on the use and
77 “[Declaratoria De Martha Elba Cisneros Zavala Ante La P.G.R.] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Declaratoria de Martha Elba Cisneros Zavala ante la P.G.R.] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/15327: 8.
78 “[Acta De La Declaración De Camilo Estrada Luviano (a)‘Cuauhtémoc’] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de la declaración de Camilo Estrada Luviano (a)"Cuauhtémoc"] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14860: 8.
79 “[Acta De Detención De Rogelio Raya Morales] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Rogelio Raya Morales] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la
38
making of explosives and demolition. For self-defense and combat, the group was trained
in judo, karate, and guerrilla warfare. The group practiced marching as a unit and
performing ambushes, scenarios of tactical attacks on barracks, assaults on police
vehicles.80 According to Dimas Castañeda Álvarez, the group would practice the
assimilated tactics during the weekend against North Korean soldiers. They were also
taught survival techniques in the wild.81 The only mention of the first group being trained in specialties was through Angel Bravo Cisneros. He reveals that they were given the
“choice between specialties in demolition, radio transmission, and political theory;
however, he does not reveal who those specialists were.82 The archival declaration
extracted by DFS agents reveal that the first and second groups were trained in specialties; however, the archival sources only reveal who the specialists were in the
second group. Fernando Pineda Ochoa, Armando González Carrillo, and Felipe Peñaloza
García each reveal the most complete list of members that the North Koreans split into
represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14459: 4.
80 “[Acta De Detención De Rogelio Raya Morales] ∙ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Rogelio Raya Morales] ∙ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14459: 4.
81 “[Declaraciones De Dimas Castañeda Álvarez, Elia Hernández Hernández y Una Persona Más Que No Se Indica Quién Es] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Declaraciones de Dimas Castañeda Álvarez, Elia Hernández Hernández y una persona más que no se indica quién es] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/17641: 12.
82 “[Acta De Detención De Ángel Bravo Cisneros] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Ángel Bravo Cisneros] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14209: 6.
39
two sections based on aptitude for specialty training in communications and explosives.83
The communications group was; Fernando Pineda Ochoa, Marisol Orozco Vega, Martha
Elba Cisneros, Pedro Estrada Gámez, Andrés, Mancilla González, Manuel Arreola
Téllez, Felipe Peñaloza García, and Horacio Arroyo Souza. The group trained in explosives was; Armando González Carrillo, Ranulfo Ariza, Estanislao Hernández
García, Ramón Carmona Medel, Salvador N., Professor Fabricio Gómez Souza, José Luis
Chagayo Remigio, Ángel Bravo Cisneros, and Guillermo Moreno Nolasco.84 The archival declarations extracted by DFS from the second85 and third groups86 reveal the
North Korean instructor’s names and what they taught. Mun taught guerrilla tactics, Li explosives, Chang judo and karate, Koo weaponry and target practice, Chu political theory, and Dr. Li first aid. An interesting detail that Guillermo Moreno Nolasco reveals during his interrogation is the training in interrogation techniques and the falsifying of
83 “Personas Mencionadas En Los Archivos ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” Personas mencionadas en los archivos ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/page/nombres.
84 “[Acta De Detención De Fernando Pineda Ochoa (a)‘Mario Fernández’] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Fernando Pineda Ochoa (a)"Mario Fernández"] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14457: 7.
85 “[Acta De Detención De Felipe Peñaloza García (a)‘Efraín’] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Felipe Peñaloza García (a)"Efraín"] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14456: 6.
86 “[Acta De Detención De Rogelio Raya Morales] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Rogelio Raya Morales] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14459: 5.
40
identities. The group trained amongst each other how to answer questions during
interrogation, how not to tell the truth about their parents or family, and state they were
dead. They worked on appearing to be common delinquents, not revolutionaries.87 The
North Koreans trained them on having double personalities, with a change in name and false documentation.88 This part of the training explains why the MAR began to use
pseudonyms. According to Fernando Peñaloza García, when Ángel Bravo Cisneros met
them in West Berlin, he instructed them to adopt pseudonyms to make it harder to
identify them.89 The MAR sought out political-military training by a foreign government,
they were indeed successful in accomplishing this task and North Korea delivered in a
big way or some would say Russia delivered in a big way. The MAR was now experts in
firearm usage, hand to hand combat, explosives, pseudonym usage, personality change,
and specialties by field. The MAR was now prepared and poised to start the revolution they sought and defeat the Mexican government to replace it with a socialist government.
87 “[Declaración De Guillermo Moreno Nolasco (a) ‘Cornelio’ o ‘Miguel’] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Declaración de Guillermo Moreno Nolasco (a) "Cornelio" o "Miguel"] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/28709: 6.
88 Ibid: 6.
89 [Acta De Detención De Felipe Peñaloza García (a)‘Efraín’] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Felipe Peñaloza García (a)"Efraín"] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14456: 5.
41
8. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SCHOOLS
42
Upon the culmination of training, the MAR was to take over the training aspect of
new recruits in Mexico; however, they needed to establish training centers to accomplish this. The report issued by DFS, reveals that they believed the MAR had possibly established six guerrilla schools throughout the republic. Querétaro, Querétaro., Chapala,
Jalisco., and Pátzcuaro, Michoacán were confirmed. However, Salamanca, Guanajuato.,
La Piedad, Michoacán., and Irapuato, Michoacán were not confirmed. The information
released was incomplete, as we shall encounter via the archival declarations extracted by
DFS from the MAR members. Felipe Peñaloza García returned to Mexico after the second group completed its training and brought instructions to begin the process of opening political-military training schools, as North Korea was not going to train any more students after the third group.90 The archival declaration of Professor Gómez Souza
extracted by DFS agents reveals that the MAR had abandoned the plan to become a rural
guerrilla organization and opted to become an urban guerrilla organization. However, the establishment of new schools was necessary for recruits, where the instructors could train and teach the students everything they had learned in North Korea.91 The initial plan was
to put José Luis Guerrero in charge of the schools in Mexico, however, many of the MAR
90 [Acta De Detención De Alejandro López Murillo] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Alejandro López Murillo] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14454: 17.
91 “[Acta De Detención De Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 29, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14436: 8.
43
members disagreed with this idea because he did not go to North Korea. Instead,
Salvador Castañeda Álvarez and Felipe Peñaloza García were commissioned to begin the
process of looking for locations to open schools throughout the country; they successfully
found a location in Querétaro, Querétaro.92 Armando González Carrillo, Felipe Peñaloza
García, and Manuel Arreola Téllez were put in charge of opening the first school in
Pátzcuaro, Michoacán, which remained open in between one to two months.93 The
schools hosted three recruits at a time. The first three students at this particular school
went by the pseudonyms; Rosa, Manuel, and Hortencia. The instructors were Felipe
Peñaloza García (Efraín) and Armando González Carrillo (Cruz).94 Based on their
specialties, Felipe Peñaloza García would have taught communications and Armando
González Carrillo explosives.95 Professor Gómez Souza confirms the locations of
Irapuato, Guanajuato, and La Piedad, Michoacán had established schools; Manuel
Arreola Téllez (Héctor) (communications) and Felipe Peñaloza García (communications)
92 “[Acta De Detención De Alejandro López Murillo] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Alejandro López Murillo] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14454: 17.
93 “[Acta De Detención De Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 29, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14436: 8.
94 Ibid: 8
95 “[Acta De Detención De Armando González Carrillo] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Armando González Carrillo] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14446: 5.
44
were the instructors.96 The location in Salamanca, Guanajuato, was used more as a teacher safe house. The instructors met here before and after the conclusion of their teachings at their respective schools.97 The location of Jalapa, Veracruz, was not mentioned in the DFS report; nonetheless, it was established, and it would prove to be a fateful school in the future of the MAR. The school in Jalapa was used by Fernando
Pineda Ochoa, a communications specialist and who taught Morse code.98 The archival declaration of Felipe Peñaloza García extracted by DFS agents coincides with that of
Professor Gómez Souza on the establishment of the school in Irapuato, Guanajuato, and the instructors for the school were himself and Manuel Arreola Téllez.99 Felipe Peñaloza
García also reveals the school in Irapuato, Guanajuato was the first school established in the republic after Professor Gómez Souza returned from North Korea.100 He also touches on the school in Pátzcuaro, Michoacán in which he confirms the details already provided
96 “[Acta De Detención De Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 29, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14436: 8.
97 “[Acta De Detención De Fernando Pineda Ochoa (a)‘Mario Fernández’] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Fernando Pineda Ochoa (a)"Mario Fernández"] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14457: 2.
98 “Escuela De Guerrilla En Jalapa, VER ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” Escuela de Guerrilla en Jalapa, VER ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/16753: 2.
99 “[Acta De Detención De Felipe Peñaloza García (a)‘Efraín’] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Felipe Peñaloza García (a)"Efraín"] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14456: 9.
100 Ibid: 9.
45
by Professor Gómez Souza, however, he also adds to the information by revealing the list
of students present at the school; amongst those students, the list included José Luis
Guerrero. The instructors were Felipe Peñaloza García, Armando González Carrillo, and
Professor Gómez Souza, and they taught guerrilla tactics, demolition, weapons, judo, karate, economy, and philosophy. The course was two months long.101 The archival declarations extracted by DFS reveal that the MAR was ultimately successful in establishing schools throughout the republic; five out of six schools were confirmed based on the archival declarations. Everything seemed to be going smoothly and according to plan based on the expectations of Professor Gómez Souza to overthrow the
Mexican government by armed revolution. Every successful step that was taken as part of the plan was one step closer to starting the revolution.
101 “[Acta De Detención De Felipe Peñaloza García (a)‘Efraín’] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Felipe Peñaloza García (a)"Efraín"] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14456: 9.
46
9. THE ROBBERY
47
The MAR began to implement the training they received in North Korea almost
immediately upon their return to Mexico. Upon need and planning, the MAR established five sections to their organization; recruitment, education, exploration, expropriation, and
investigations. The respective sections with each of its members included; Education:
Professor Gómez Souza; Expropriation: Ángel Bravo Cisneros, Octavio Márquez
Vázquez, and Guillermo Moreno Nolasco; Recruitment; Alejandro López Murillo and
Horacio Arroyo Souza;102 Exploration; Horacio Arroyo Souza; Investigations; Professor
Gómez Souza.103 The leaders of the organization were; Professor Fabricio Gómez Souza,
Ángel Bravo Cisneros, Alejandro López Murillo, Octavio Márquez Vázquez, and
Guillermo Moreno Nolasco. After the MAR returned from North Korea, they no longer
received funding. The MAR had all but spent their funds on opening schools, acquiring
vehicles, equipment, and weapons; funds began to run low.104 This allowed the MAR to test their expropriation training; they began to gather intelligence on banks and different locations as possible expropriation targets. The following archival declaration by
102 “[Declaración De Guillermo Moreno Nolasco (a) ‘Cornelio’ o ‘Miguel’] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Declaración de Guillermo Moreno Nolasco (a) "Cornelio" o "Miguel"] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/28709: 8.
103 “[Acta De Detención De Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 29, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14436: 10.
104 “[Acta De Detención De Alejandro López Murillo] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Alejandro López Murillo] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14454: 17.
48
Alejandro López Murillo , who was not part of the expropriation team; however, he has
the most complete archival account of the expropriation process, and the important facts
coincide with the facts revealed by the members of the expropriation team. Furthermore,
I will also point out it was because of the knowledge Alejandro López Murillo possessed
that the MAR finally decided to carry out its first expropriation successfully. The archival declaration extracted by DFS of Alejandro López Murillo reveals that a part of the MAR began to look at banks in Querétaro, a pharmacy in San Luis Potosí, a beer making plant in Celaya, and checking cashing locations in Morelia. The group gathering intelligence sketched the locations and took photographs.105 Once Professor Gómez Souza returned
from North Korea with the second group, everything gathered on the possible targets for expropriation was presented to Professor Gómez Souza, and he flatly rejected everything.
He told them to continue gathering intelligence for possible targets to secure a good score without bloodshed unless it was in self-defense.106 Professor Gómez Souza wanted an
organized robbery; he wanted to alter the group’s appearance using make-up, wigs,
mustaches, and sideburns. He wanted to prepare alibis and fake identities in case of being
caught.107 He wanted to utilize vehicles that did not belong to the MAR and divide the
105 “[Acta De Detención De Alejandro López Murillo] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Alejandro López Murillo] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14454: 19.
106 Ibid: 19.
107 Ibid: 20.
49
money evenly to not raise suspicion.108 Alejandro López Murillo was a former employee
at the Bank of Commerce in Morelia. He knew the employees’ movements, the schedule
of money deliveries, and the money carrier’s movements, Jesús Ceballos. He pitched the
idea, and the MAR was on board. They decided to go through with the robbery at the
Bank of Commerce in Morelia and intercept the carrier Jesús Ceballos when transporting
money through the bus line Tres Estrellas de Oro in Mexico City.109 The MAR began to
coordinate the robbery through meetings and gathering of intelligence. Octavio Márquez
Vázquez, Salvador Castañeda Álvarez, and Dimas Castañeda Álvarez would replace the last two. 110 The MAR leadership had one final meeting, at Indios Verdes before the
robbery moved forward. Those present were Horacio Arroyo Souza, Ángel Bravo
Cisneros, Professor Gómez Souza, Guillermo Moreno Nolasco, Octavio Márquez
Vázquez, and Alejandro López Murillo.111 After providing intelligence on the Bank of
Commerce in Morelia and the route taken by Jesús Ceballos, Alejandro López Murillo
did not participate in the robbery. Guillermo Moreno Nolasco, who was on the
expropriations team, provides the most detailed account of the robbery on 19 December
108 “[Acta De Detención De Alejandro López Murillo] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Alejandro López Murillo] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14454: 20.
109 Ibid: 20.
110. Manuel Arreola Téllez (Hector) and Eufemio González Mancilla (Alfredo); Ibid: 21.
111 Ibid: 22.
50
1970. The plan was for Octavio Márquez Vázquez (Antonio), Ángel Bravo Cisneros
(Eliezer), Armando Gaytán Saldívar (Oscar), (Juan), Eufemio González Mancilla
(Alfredo), and Guillermo Moreno Nolasco (Cornelio) to split into two groups of three,
and each group was then to acquire a vehicle for the robbery and meet at 0500 hours at a
Denys. Eufemio González Mancilla (Alfredo), (Juan), and Guillermo Moreno Nolasco
(Cornelio) took a taxi to the Denys, with no sign of the others. They decided to walk to
the Tres Estrellas de Oro bus station. It was here that the other three were. Omar Márquez
Vázquez (Antonio) and Ángel Bravo Cisneros (Eliezer) were in possession of one
vehicle, and it was decided that they were going to use one vehicle for the robbery and
that they were moving forward with Eufemio González Mancilla’s (Alfredo) plan. Once
Guillermo Moreno Nolasco (Cornelio) identified the carrier’s vehicle, the members
moved into the bus terminal, each one sticking to their part of the plan. Armando Gaytán
Saldívar (Oscar), Octavio Márquez Vázquez (Antonio), and Eufemio González Mancilla
(Alfredo) entered the bus terminal to secure the package from the carrier and another young man with him. The carrier would not let go of the package, so Antonio hit him in the stomach to let the package go. Eufemio González Mancilla (Alfredo) was the lookout, and Armando Gaytán Saldívar (Oscar) was helping Octavio Márquez Vázquez (Antonio) secure the package. Once everything was in motion, Guillermo Moreno Nolasco
(Cornelio) brought out his machine gun hidden under his clothes. Immediately the other employees began to run out to help the two under attack. However, the weapons of the members committing the robbery went off, and the employees ran back inside. Octavio
51
Márquez Vázquez (Antonio) managed to secure the package, and they all made it back in
the car to get away successfully.112 The final score was 84,000 USD. However, this robbery would prove fateful as it would be their only score as a group and the original
MAR.113
Those who did not need to know of certain operations within the organization
were kept out of the planning and details. Archival sources extracted by DFS available to
us of the members that did not participate in the robbery appear not to have known about
the robbery. They either became aware of it by overhearing about the robbery or seeing
the large sums of money they assumed was from a robbery. The most glaring account is of Ramón Cardona Medel, he did not become aware of the robbery until he saw it on the news.114 The flow of information within the MAR organization seemed to be in a vacuum
and it appeared to be organized this way by its leader Professor Gómez Souza, as we
have seen time after time.
112 “[Declaración De Guillermo Moreno Nolasco (a) ‘Cornelio’ o ‘Miguel’] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Declaración de Guillermo Moreno Nolasco (a) "Cornelio" o "Miguel"] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/28709: 10.
113 Ibid: 10.
114 “[Acta De Detención De Ramón Carmona Medel] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Ramón Carmona Medel] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14210: 9.
52
10. THE DOWNFALL
53
The majority of the MAR and its leadership were apprehended after only four
months of returning to the country, virtually crippling them. After the founding MAR performed its only robbery to raise funds for their cause; they were careful in its money distribution and how the money was spent not to raise suspicion. However, this would not prove effective as the DFS would be led to MAR’s very front door. Of those members that directly participated in MAR’s first expropriation, the accounts of what came next all coincide. It was as if they did not know what hit them; next thing they knew they, were being interrogated by the DFS and jailed not only for the robbery committed but also for the contraband recovered at the MAR’s safehouses and for belonging to the MAR. It was not a good time to be identified as a leftist at this time and much worse to be identified as a guerrilla fighter because of the Dirty War the Mexican government was waging.115
Secondary sources confirm why and how the MAR was apprehended and turned
over to DFS for questioning. Pineda Ochoa, in Las Profundidades Del MAR, states that
the landlord of the Jalapa residence called the local police on the members. A month
earlier, there was a robbery in Mexico City where a police officer was shot and killed by
one of the assailants (completely unrelated to the MAR). The landlord suspected it was
the tenants.116 In Breve Historia Del MAR, Velázquez Villa states that Excelsior had
reported on 10 March 1971 that while in Jalapa, Veracruz Francisco Paredes Ruiz
115 “[Acta De Detención De Rogelio Raya Morales] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Rogelio Raya Morales] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14459: 9.
116 Fernando Pineda Ochoa. 2003. En las profundidades del MAR: 65.
54
(member of the MAR) was detained by Federal Police mistaking him in identity for one
of the bank robbers in Mexico City the month before. While in DFS custody, he
forcefully signed a confession stating it was him that performed the robbery.117 On his
possession, they found a false passport, he stated he had used the passport to travel to
Brussels, Berlin, Amsterdam, and Madrid, but he did not state the reason for his travel.
The DFS also found books based on socialism. He stated he belonged to a youth
organization involved in socialism and that he had socialist ideas.118 The account by
Oikion Solano in Movimientos Armados is virtually the same as that of Pineda Ochoa.
The MAR was reported to the local police by the landlord because he thought they were
common thieves hiding out in Jalapa, Veracruz.119 The MAR as an operational
organization in Mexico was short-lived, they only had the opportunity to showcase their
skills they had acquired in North Korea via the one successful robbery. Although, they
were successful in establishing schools throughout the republic and recruiting additional
members.
117 Leticia Carrasco Gutiérrez and Hugo Velázquez Villa. Breve historia del MAR: 26.
118 Ibid: 26.
119 Verónica Oikión Solano, and Marta Eugenia García Ugarte. 2006. Movimientos armados en México: 443.
55
11. THE APPREHENSION
56
Professor Gómez Souza was apprehended by the Mexican authorities to be turned over to DFS for questioning. Barron is the only source that provides insight into
Professor Gómez Souza’s arrest. Professor Gómez Souza ordered Ángel Bravo Cisneros to go to Jalapa, Veracruz, to check on operations. However, by this time, the militants at the safe house were already apprehended, and this was the same fate of Ángel Bravo
Cisneros once he arrived.120 After four days of not hearing anything from Ángel Bravo
Cisneros, Professor Gómez Souza decides to go to Jalapa, Veracruz. Upon his arrival.
“The guerrilla house appeared dark and empty as he unlocked the front door. However, suddenly a beam from a flashlight struck his face; then, the lights flashed on. “Ah Señor
Gómez,” said a man pointing a cocked .38-caliber revolver. “It is you for whom we have waited most.” Led away to jail, Gómez screamed curses and vows to kill all who might have betrayed him.”121 The apprehension of Professor Gómez Souza was significant
because it was like taking the head off of the beast for the MAR. This titan of a leftist
landed on the lap of the DFS without much effort. He was the leader and orchestrator of
the MAR. Some would say he was the focal point between the MAR and Russia. Now
that he was apprehended the plans of the MAR and Russia seemed to be put to a halt.
Upon the apprehension of common thieves in Jalapa, Veracruz, the Mexican
government did not know they were stumbling upon the first guerrilla organization of its
120 “Volume 118, Part 14 (May 15, 1972 to May 23, 1972),” govinfo, 1972, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14-2/summary: 17436.
121 Ibid: 17436.
57
kind. Authorities arrested the thieves they expected to find. However, they also found an artillery of weapons, ammunition, bomb-making materials, radios, walkie-talkies, lots of cash in USD and pesos, and socialist literature. Upon apprehension of the members, the interrogations began. The initial archival interrogation by DFS that is available to us of
Professor Gómez Souza states:
“When questioned, he stated that as the activities he carries out are carried out with absolute conviction of his actions, which tend to improve national life; It is his will not to make any statement that constitutes on his part betraying his colleagues and that he preferred death before wanting to betray his organization; that if he did, he would feel the most unhappy and disgusting individual; that he could not face any person related to his ideology, adding that if he is forced to relate his personal activities and those of the group to which he belongs, he will commit suicide at the first opportunity he gets.”122
Subsequently, after this initial declaration, he takes a different approach. He begins to
feed the DFS a fictional story. He states that he went to Russia on a scholarship to
complete his studies. He attempted to justify his travels to Berlin to sell pirated goods for cash to help fund his studies and accumulate cash.123 Eventually, Professor Gómez Souza
revealed to the DFS information, but it was not information they already did not know.
Nineteen arrests later and the capture of virtually all of its leadership, the truth of the
122 “Escuela De Guerrilla En Jalapa, Ver ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” Escuela de Guerrilla en Jalapa, Ver ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/16816: 1.
123 “[Acta De Detención De Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 29, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14436: 2.
58
group came to light, and the government came to know of the MAR and everything that
was done to establish the organization.124 The authorities arrived in Jalapa, Veracruz, to
arrest bank robbers, however, instead, they stumbled upon one of the first guerrilla
organizations in the country and certainly the only guerrilla organization trained by a
foreign country. The DFS had enough information about the MAR and its members to
issue an official press release to make the country and the world aware of their
existence.125 The MAR and Professor Gómez Souza were labeled traitors to the
country.126
124 “[Captura a 19 Integrantes Del Movimiento Acción Revolucionaria (M.A.R.)] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Captura a 19 integrantes del Movimiento Acción Revolucionaria (M.A.R.)] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/54242.
125 Ibid.
126 Traición a la patria. 1971. México: Ediciones José G. Cruz. http://books.google.com/books?id=n7RVAAAAMAAJ: 29-31.
59
12. THE FALLOUT
60
The apprehension of the MAR resulted in the detention of 19 militants. However,
there was a much larger fallout as a consequence of the capture of the MAR. The
detainees eventually received lengthy prison sentences for belonging to a leftist guerrilla organization and the conspiracy to wage a guerilla war against the government.127
However, the initial reaction of Mexican authorities was to extract as much information as possible through the interrogation methods of the DFS of torture and countless hours of questioning. After the capture of the nineteen MAR members and the information gathered, something questionable occurred. Five Russian diplomats were immediately expelled from Mexico; Dimitri A. Diakonov, Boris Voskoboinikov, Oleg M.
Netchiporenko, Alexandre Bolchakonov, and Boris P. Kolomoakov.128 Why would five
Russian diplomats be expelled from Mexico if North Korea trained the MAR? In the
archival declarations extracted by DFS previously mentioned not one MAR militant
mentioned the sponsorship of Russia. All of the authors of secondary sources that have already been mentioned never once state that Russia was behind the MAR. They had
every opportunity to state that Russia provided sponsorship and yet they never did, and they do not identify Professor Gómez Souza as a KGB agent. Shortly after the capture of the MAR, American journalist and Russian expert John Barron gave a press conference.
127 “[Lista De Miembros Del Movimiento De Acción Revolucionaria (M.A.R.)] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Lista de miembros del Movimiento de Acción Revolucionaria (M.A.R.)] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/15593.
128 Traición a la patria. 1971. México: Ediciones José G. Cruz. http://books.google.com/books?id=n7RVAAAAMAAJ:. 28.
61
In his press conference, he casually mentions that Fabricio Gómez Souza spoke Russian,
and he was a KGB agent.129 Could this have been the case? He released a Reader’s
Digest article titled “The Soviet Plot to Destroy Mexico” in 1971. The article is based on
“dozens of interviews with intelligence officers, on captured diaries and confessions, and
on conversations with Soviet defectors and KGB officers themselves.”130 The expulsion
of five Russian diplomats and the revelations of journalist John Barron opened up a can of worms and possibly an international incident if it was indeed true that Russia was
meddling in Mexico through North Korea. Based on the archival declarations extracted
by DFS and the revelation by John Barron it certainly appeared to confirm that Russia
was the true sponsor of the MAR.
With the apprehension of the MAR, the Mexican Government discovered they had
averted a disaster. According to Barron, in July of 1971, Professor Gómez Souza and the
MAR were preparing a full-scale attack on the country. While the MAR was planning
additional robberies, Professor Gómez Souza scheduled the first guerrilla attack for July
1971. “He planned to detonate bombs simultaneously at 15 airports, hotels, restaurants,
and public buildings throughout Mexico. The explosions would proclaim the existence of
129 “Conferencia De Prensa Del Señor John Barron ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” Conferencia de prensa del señor John Barron ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed September 1, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/15505: 2.
130 “Volume 118, Part 14 (May 15, 1972 to May 23, 1972),” govinfo, 1972, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14-2/summary: 17431.
62
the Movimiento de Accion Revolucionaria and a siege of the Mexican government.”131
His plan was to cause complete chaos that would cause the Mexican Government to lose
control and drive Mexican citizens to the ranks of the MAR.132 With the MAR’s arrest,
this full-scale attack and the arrival of the MAR on the national stage were averted, and
along with it, years of planning by the KGB came crashing down. Everything that had
been worked so hard for, the scholarships, the recruitment, the guerrilla training, and
most of all the sacrifices by the members of the MAR, were leading to the grand event
that was planned by Professor Gómez Souza; to finally reveal themselves to the world in
July of 1971 and finally start the sought after revolution they so much desired.
Everything had gone according to plan and they were so close to culminate the focal
point of their plan, however coincidence or intelligence by the DFS helped avert this
disaster and the coming out party of the MAR.
131 “Volume 118, Part 14 (May 15, 1972 to May 23, 1972),” govinfo, 1972, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14-2/summary: 17436
132 Ibid: 17436.
63
13. RUSSIA EMERGES
64
Upon the capture of the MAR, Russia was at the forefront of the investigation.
The article by John Barron confirms all of the events and actions that made it possible for
the MAR to recruit members and receive political-military training by North Korea.
However, North Korea was not orchestrating everything; his sources reveal that Russia
arranged everything. To support this claim, the archival sources of MAR militants
extracted by DFS continuously point to Moscow as the hub for all of the operations and
Professor Gómez Souza as its orchestrator.133 The scholarships were made possible to the
University of Patricio Lumumba, but only for those Russia saw as potential recruits for
their plan of “subversion”.134 They approved scholarships for the initial MAR members
already mentioned. This brings another question were the initial group of students from
Mexico KGB agents? Alejandro Lopez Murillo spoke Russian.135 Upon the arrest of
Salvador Castaneda Álvarez, they found many Russian articles that belonged to him, and
Fernando Pineda Ochoa knew and taught Morse code.136 The KGB plan was to make
133 “[Acta De Detención De Alejandro López Murillo] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Alejandro López Murillo] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14454: 10.
134 Volume 118, Part 14 (May 15, 1972 to May 23, 1972),” govinfo, 1972, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14-2/summary.17432: 17432.
135 “[Acta De Detención De Alejandro López Murillo] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Alejandro López Murillo] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14454: 10.
136 “Escuela De Guerrillas En Jalapa, Veracruz ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” Escuela de Guerrillas en Jalapa, Veracruz ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed September 4, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/6433: 1.
65
Mexico into another Vietnam and overthrow the Mexican government.137 It all started
with Professor Gómez Souza; he goes to the Russian embassy to inquire about a
scholarship in Moscow. Oleg M. Netchiporenko tells him they only send the best students
with the most potential. He then states he wants to be part of the plan to change Mexico
because he saw much need in the country from wage disparity, lack of resources, to better
healthcare. His wife had just died from lack of healthcare, and he was now on a crusade
to prevent this happening to anyone else and saw the need for change, starting from the top to include a new socialist system.138 His Scholarship was granted, and the other
students already mentioned because Netchiporenko had already identified them as
potential recruits for the KGB’s plan of “subversion.”
John Barron offers a different take on how Professor Gómez Souza formed the
MAR. Barron confirms everything that has already been mentioned about the formation
of the MAR; however, his sources reveal that the initial meetings and discussions were
not accidental but staged. He states that Professor Gómez Souza initiated the meetings
and discussions, and at the right moment, he intentionally brought up the creation of the
MAR and its ideals.139 He was directed by Russia to go to the North Korean embassy to
seek military training. The KGB told him exactly what to say once he arrived at the North
137 Volume 118, Part 14 (May 15, 1972 to May 23, 1972),” govinfo, 1972, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14-2/summary.17432: 17431.
138 Ibid: 17432.
139 Ibid: 17434.
66
Korean embassy.140 Russia could not appear to provide military training to the MAR, but
they would finance it through North Korea. Russia arranged all of the travel.141 Once the
MAR formed and recruitment began, the Russian agents in Mexico pointed him to Ángel
Bravo Cisneros because of his recruitment potential, and from their he recruited many more members for the MAR. 142 The version of events revealed by journalist John Barron
certainly line up and appear to coincide and highlight the splintering facts in the archival
declarations extracted by DFS from the MAR militants that Moscow was the focal point
to the entire MAR operation and Professor Gómez Souza its orchestrator. The facts and
clues are all in the archival declarations already mentioned. Not one MAR militant
confirms Russia’s involvement, but everything certainly points to that direction and John
Barron certainly believed it.
140 Volume 118, Part 14 (May 15, 1972 to May 23, 1972),” govinfo, 1972, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14-2/summary.17432: 17434.
141 Ibid: 17434.
142 Ibid: 17434.
67
14. THE CAPUTURE THROUGH BARRON’ S EYES
68
Barron offers a different take on how the MAR was captured once they returned
to Mexico. The MAR was back in Mexico and operating for only four months before they
were swiftly captured in Jalapa, Veracruz. However, before this, Raya Kiselnikova
suddenly defects to the Mexican embassy; Barron never outright states it, but he heavily
implies that it was through her defection that the Mexican government was to know of
the activities of the MAR and the identities of the members.143 Shortly after the MAR’s
capture, the Mexican government realized they had dodged a bullet because in, July of
1971, the MAR was preparing to launch a large-scale attack on Mexico.
Raya Kiselnikova reveals much about the involvement of Russia in Mexico.
Kiselnikova was a KGB agent working at the Russian embassy in Mexico, her cover was an employee in the commercial section, and she was a Spanish translator. She became so enamored with Mexico and the freedom she had experienced in the country that she decided she no longer wanted to be a KGB agent or go back to Russia. After two years as a KGB agent in Mexico, she got wind that Russia wanted to recall her because she broke protocol by meeting a local Mexican lover; before this could happen, she defected to local police. She was then handed off to Mexican intelligence services, where she tells all. She labels the Russian embassies as spy nests, “Russia has a complete espionage network in Mexico.”144 She then goes on to state that Russia was seeking to dominate this
143 Volume 118, Part 14 (May 15, 1972 to May 23, 1972),” govinfo, 1972, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14-2/summary.17432: 17435-17436.
144 “The Russian Embassies Are Spy Nests,” www.cia.gov (El Tiempo, September 2, 1999), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-01194A000400100001-1.pdf.
69
hemisphere.145 She labels Oleg M. Netchiporenko as chief of espionage operations in
Mexico. She reveals to the secret police the four names of the consular section. They
“spent only eight hours per week in their job issuing visas, while they spent the rest of
their time in secret operations involving Mexican workers and student organizations.146
She adds that “they are interested in the political scene, the relationship, between parties,
the student movement, the relations between the government and the people and
whatever is of military nature.”147 She also talks about listening devices placed in the
Russian embassy to spy on one another, and they were placed on the phones of important
Mexican officials.148 She touched on the past works of the Russians in the country. She
revealed that the student disturbances of 1968 were instigated by the Russians to arouse
popular reaction against the system of government.149 She reveals clandestine meetings between the KGB and its Mexican agents.150 The defection of Raya Kiselnikova was a
145 “The Russian Embassies Are Spy Nests,” www.cia.gov (El Tiempo, September 2, 1999), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA‐RDP79‐01194A000400100001‐1.pdf.
146 Eugene Carbonaro, “Soviet Spies in America,” www.cia.gov, September 2, 1999, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-01194A000400100001-1.pdf.
147 “The Russian Embassies Are Spy Nests,” www.cia.gov (El Tiempo, September 2, 1999), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-01194A000400100001-1.pdf.
148 Ibid.
149 “Complete Espionage Network Of Russian Embassy In Mexico,” www.cia.gov (El Heraldo, September 2, 1999), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-01194A000400100001-1.pdf.
150 Volume 118, Part 14 (May 15, 1972 to May 23, 1972),” govinfo, 1972, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14-2/summary.17432: 1743.
70
blow to Moscow and its plans they had for Mexico, but it was an even larger blow to
Professor Gómez Souza and the MAR because she appeared to have revealed their
identities to DFS, putting a major wrench in the plans of Moscow and the MAR. I do not
know if Raya Kiselnikova realized the huge impact and implications her defection would have, but it certainly caused title waves throughout Mexico, Russia, and the MAR.
Without her defection the involvement of Russia might have never came to light.
71
15. OLEG M. NECHIPORENKO
72
Oleg M. Nechiporenko, the KGB agent at the center of the MAR investigation, reveals what he thinks of John Barron’s work. In his book Passport to Assassination: The
Never-Before-Told Story of Lee Harvey Oswald By The KGB Colonel Who Knew Him,
Nechiporenko calls Barron’s claims exaggerated, he states he was never in love with
Kiselnikova like he claims in his article, and his wife felt she had been defamed in front of the entire world.151 He states that whatever information released by the CIA to Barron was done in order to burn him in Mexico as a spy and the diplomats named in the report that were expelled after the MAR was captured.152 He claimed that intelligence agencies often burn opposing spies when they fell to recruit them.153 He even criticizes the way
Barron describes his Spanish features.154 However, not once does Nechiporenko deny the claims made by Barron about Russia’s involvement with the MAR. He states that he disagreed with the expulsion, but not one single denial.155 Nechiporenko had every opportunity to flatly deny Russia’s meddling in Mexico and their involvement in the
MAR, however he never did. Nechiporenko was on the brink of delivering an important victory to Moscow with years of planning and the culmination of those plans finally
151 Nechiporenko, Oleg M., and Todd Bludeau. Passport to Assassination. New York: Carol Pub. Group, 1993: 297-299.
152 Ibid: 295.
153 Ibid: 295.
154 Ibid: 299-300.
155 Ibid: 296.
73
coming to fruition through the MAR to sabotage Mexico and exert its communist influence in the region. Mexico was always the grand prize for the KGB because it was in the United States backyard, and the plan for the MAR was one more plan they had attempted and came close to succeeding.
74
16. A KGB AGENT IN OUR MIDST
75
Professor Gómez Souza operated much like a KGB agent and had the makings of one through the entire process of the making of the MAR. According to various previously cited sources, Professor Gómez Souza spoke Russian. He alone communicated with the Russians while the group was in transit from Mexico to North Korea.156 Just because he spoke Russian does not indicate he was a KGB agent. However, according to a CIA memorandum based on unofficial reports from Mexico, Professor Gómez Souza in
1963 walked into the Soviet Embassy in Mexico and offered his services to the KGB.
The Soviets trained Gómez and several other Mexicans at the Patrice Lumumba
University in Moscow, and they later received special guerrilla training in North
Korea.157 This report confirms everything Barron had claimed about Professor Gómez
Souza. Upon the capture of Ángel Bravo Cisneros in Jalapa, Veracruz, he was
interrogated; however, Professor Gómez Souza withheld much from him. The KGB
never dealt with Bravo, just Gómez, according to Barron. Bravo knew the importance of
Professor Gómez Souza and the plans to be carried out, but nothing else.158 In a similar
instance, the KGB was relieved because in the official announcement by the Mexican
156 “[Acta De Detención De Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 29, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14436: 6.
157 Samuel T., “Latin American Terrorism: The Cuban Connection,” The Heritage Foundation, accessed September 1, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/node/22863/print-display.
158 Volume 118, Part 14 (May 15, 1972 to May 23, 1972),” govinfo, 1972, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14-2/summary.17432: 17436.
76
government, there was no inclination that they knew of the real sponsorship of the MAR.
“Apparently Gomez had not talked; seemingly, Netchiporenko, Kolomiakov, and
Diakonov were safe.159 However, Mexican intelligence would still become aware of the
KGB’s involvement, according to Barron, upon the arrests of the MAR, Mexican
intelligence presented as evidence; signed confessions, diaries that recorded the guerrilla
training and their plans of terror. Dossiers on Kolomiakov, Netchiporenko, and Diakonov
detailed their involvement and that of the KGB.160 Shortly after the previously mentioned
events, the five Russian diplomats would be expelled from Mexico.
Professor Gómez Souza was tight-lipped about many operations and details; however, was this out of security or secrecy? Throughout the existence of the MAR,
Professor Gómez Souza withheld much information from other militants. We can see this, example after example; the name of the organization was kept from recruits, the location of where training was to be held, the robbery performed by the MAR was withheld to only those performing the robbery. In the capture of Professor Gómez Souza, the KGB was not worried because they knew he withheld much from his comrades, and they were not worried about him giving up the identities of the Russians involved. In his statement to DFS, he said he would rather die than betray his colleagues. This leads to the same question would anyone other than the KGB have known if Professor Gómez Souza
159 Volume 118, Part 14 (May 15, 1972 to May 23, 1972),” govinfo, 1972, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14-2/summary.17432: 17437.
160 Ibid: 17436.
77
was a KGB agent? If he withheld his identity as a KGB agent to the rest of the MAR, this was undoubtedly not uncharacteristic of him. Professor Gómez Souza withheld much information out of secrecy or for security purposes. Whatever the case may have been,
everyone was not fully aware of what was occurring in the MAR at all times, just
Professor Gómez Souza.
78
17. CONCLUSION
79
Professor Gómez Souza died on May 10 of 2013. The words to commemorate
him were:
“When questioned, he stated that as the activities he carries out are carried out with absolute conviction of his actions, which tend to improve national life; It is his will not to make any statement that constitutes on his part betraying his colleagues and that he preferred death before wanting to betray his organization; that if he did, he would feel the most unhappy and disgusting individual; that he could not face any person related to his ideology, adding that if he is forced to relate his personal activities and those of the group to which he belongs, he will commit suicide at the first opportunity he gets.”161
These were the exact words used by Professor Gómez Souza when DFS interrogated him.
He did not reveal anything to them; they already did not know. This is the code he lived
by, and this is perhaps why there are still so many questions surrounding the life of
Professor Gómez Souza and the MAR. Perhaps the secret died with him, and
unfortunately, there are no available interviews or biographical works on the life of
Professor Gómez Souza to tell us differently. There are certainly indicators that Professor
Gómez Souza was a KGB agent and that Russia was indeed behind the entire operation;
the travel arrangements of the MAR through the entire Eastern bloc of Europe to finally
arrive in North Korea unbothered. The boss of the Eastern bloc during the Cold War era
was certainly Russia, and no one or anything would have made it across that many
borders without Russia knowing or orchestrating it. The teaching of Morse code by
Fernando Pineda Ochoa, only clandestine agents learn Morse code. What has become
161 “RESEÑA BIOGRÁFICA DEL CAMARADA FABRICIO GÓMEZ SOUSA,” MIR MEXICO, May 24, 2018, https://mirmexico.mx/2018/05/24/resena-biografica-del-camarada-fabricio-gomez-sousa/.
80
more evident and makes more logical and financial sense is that Russia orchestrated the
entire MAR operation through North Korea. Barron has confirmed this through CIA and
Russian sources. If it is true that Russia orchestrated the entire MAR operation, then it is
undoubtedly true that Professor Gómez Souza was a KGB agent. Whether historians
agree or disagree that he was a KGB agent and agree or disagree with his life, what is not
in dispute is what he accomplished for the Mexican left. He established the first guerrilla
organization in Mexico, took 53 recruits to North Korea to receive political-military
training, established education centers throughout the country, grew the organization’s
ranks from 90-100 recruits before his apprehension.162 The arrest of the MAR’s top
leadership did not signal the end of the MAR, the legacy that Professor Gómez Souza
built lasted well into 1980, blending with other guerrilla organizations.163 He deserves his
place amongst the greats of the Mexican Left! He deserves to be recognized for his
actions for the left, but he also deserves to be recognized for his unfaltering loyalty to the cause. After his seven-year sentence at Lecumberri (a clandestine prison for leftists) was complete and Professor Gómez Souza received amnesty, he dedicated his life to activism for the left by organizing and integrating himself into leftist organizations, not on the scale of the MAR, but something with a much less profile. In 1982 he integrated himself into comunista Corriente Socialista; in 1988, against election fraud, he integrated himself
162 Verónica Oikión Solano, and Marta Eugenia García Ugarte. 2006. Movimientos armados en México, siglo XX. Zamora, Michoacán: Colegio de Michoacán: 438.
163 Fernando Herrera Calderon and Adela Cedillo. Challenging Authoritarianism in Mexico: 61.
81
into Partido de la Revolucion Democratica (PRD). In 1995 he participated in the
foundation of Movimiento Democratico Magisterial in Michoacan to help crush the
Union Factions in Mexico. In 2005 he was on the founding committee of Comite
Promotor de la Unidad Socilista (CPUS) with the end goal of coordinating and unifying
diverse Communists/Socialists throughout the country to advance the Marxist party of the
proletariat. In 2009 he began the work of redacting the basic documents, principles,
statutes, and strategies that would give life to the Movimiento de Izquierda
Revolucionaria for the triumph of socialism.164 “Hard and irreducible in his principles,
Fabricio Gómez Souza, was always a consistent communist and revolutionary, however
he did not lose his warmth and humility for that. This is how he educated, with his word
and example, many generations of young communists.”165 Professor Gómez Souza will
always be remembered as a warrior for the left because he did not let the tortures or
imprisonment deter him from continuing to fight for the left. He will always be
remembered for the MAR.
164 “RESEÑA BIOGRÁFICA DEL CAMARADA FABRICIO GÓMEZ SOUSA,” MIR MEXICO, May 24, 2018, https://mirmexico.mx/2018/05/24/resena-biografica-del-camarada-fabricio-gomez-sousa/.
165 Ibid.
82
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“Volume 118, Part 14 (May 15, 1972 to May 23, 1972).” Govinfo, 1972. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CRECB-1972-pt14/GPO-CRECB- 1972-pt14-2/summary.
Walker, Louise E., and Walker, L.E. Waking from the Dream: Mexico's Middle Classes after 1968. Stanford University Press, 2013.
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List of Names Trained in North Korea by Group
Group 1 January 1969 - July 1969
Salvador Castañeda Álvarez (a) Jaime
Paulino Peña Peña; (a) Jesús
Octavio Vázquez Márquez (a) Antonio
Candelario Pacheco (a) Víctor
Martha Maldonado (a) Lupe
Camilo Estrada Luviano (a) Cuauhtémoc
Dimas Castañeda Álvarez (a) Simón
Eufemio González Mancilla (a) Alfredo
Alejandro López Murillo (a) Ramón
José de Jesús Esqueda (a) Juan166
*Listed by name and alias (a)
166 “[Acta De Detención De Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Fabricio Gómez Souza] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 29, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14436. P. 4.
88
Group 2 August 1969 - July 1970
Fabricio Gómez Souza (a) Roberto;
Ramón Cardona Medel (a) Antonino;
Armando González Carrillo (a) Cruz;
Fernando Pineda Ochoa (a) Rene;
Guillermo Moreno Nolasco (a) Cornelio;
Pedro Estrada Gámez (a) Ariel;
Marisol Orozco Vega (a) Carolina;
Martha Elba Cisneros (a) Cristina;
Estanislao Hernández García (a) Gerardo;
José Luis Chagoya Remigio (a) Arturo;
Felipe Peñaloza García (a) Efraín;
Andrés Mancilla González (a) Artemio;
Horacio Arroyo Souza (a) Rubén Palafox;
Manuel Arreola Téllez (a) Héctor;
Ángel Bravo Cisneros (a) Eliezer;
Ranulfo Ariza (a) Ricardo Salgado;
Salvador N. (a) Javier.167
167 “[Declaración De Guillermo Moreno Nolasco (a) ‘Cornelio’ o ‘Miguel’] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Declaración de Guillermo Moreno Nolasco (a) "Cornelio" o "Miguel"] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/28709, 5.
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Group 3 February 1970-August 1970
Félix Mendieta Ramos (a) Fidel Luis Antonio Alvarado Martínez (a) Carlos
Rogelio Raya Ramos (a) Romeo José Luis González Carrillo (a) Salomón
Leonardo Isidro Rangel (a) Gustavo Saúl López de la Torre (a)Fox
Valdemar Villareal Alvarado (a) Ricardo Robles Pedro Medrano (a) Cornelio
Armando Gaytán Saldívar (a) Oscar Fernando Peñaloza (a) Renato168
Elba Narváez Flores (a) Hilda José Luis Martínez (a) Néstor
Esperanza Rangel Aguilar (a) Catalina Juan Chávez Rocha (a) Jorge
Elia Hernández Hernández (a) Rita Francisco Paredes Ruiz (a) Ulises
Raymundo Ibarra Valenzuela (a) Antulio (a) Joaquín
Edilberto Arturo Castellanos Santiago (a) Felipe (a) Mario
Wenceslao José García (a) Saúl (a) Salvador
Donaciano Adalpe Cortes (a) Lorenzo (a) Santiago
Juan García De León (a) Braulio (a) Pedro169
Herminia Gómez Carrasco (a) Laura
168 “[Acta De Detención De Elia Hernández Hernández] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de detención de Elia Hernández Hernández] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/14451, 4.
169 “[Acta De La Declaración De Elda Nevárez Flores] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital De Los Archivos De La Represión,” [Acta de la declaración de Elda Nevárez Flores] ꞏ Biblioteca Digital de los archivos de la represión, accessed August 31, 2020, https://biblioteca.archivosdelarepresion.org/s/comverdad/item/15555,