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Soviet Active Measures Reborn for the 21St Century: What Is to Be Done?

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Soviet Active Measures Reborn for the 21St Century: What Is to Be Done? Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive DSpace Repository Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items 2018-12 SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES REBORN FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: WHAT IS TO BE DONE? Perkins, Alexander M. Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/61246 Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES REBORN FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: WHAT IS TO BE DONE? by Alexander M. Perkins December 2018 Thesis Advisor: Carolyn C. Halladay Second Reader: Mikhail Tsypkin Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Form Approved OMB REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED (Leave blank) December 2018 Master's thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES REBORN FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 6. AUTHOR(S) Alexander M. Perkins 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 10. SPONSORING / ADDRESS(ES) MONITORING AGENCY N/A REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. A 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Americans were largely surprised when the intelligence community revealed that Russia had launched a widespread influence operation focused on the 2016 U.S. presidential election. With their high- tech, social-media focus, these practices struck many as a newly implemented tactic against the United States. However, throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union developed and deployed influence operations—then called “active measures”—against the United States and its allies. During the last decade of the Cold War, the United States actively and systematically combatted this threat. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, active measures seemed to fade into history as well. This thesis argues that Russia has reincarnated this Cold War relic and is using active measures throughout the world to advance its strategic interests, especially in its post-Soviet space. Russia is utilizing 21st-century technology to gain access to Western populations and sow discord, distrust, and disorder. Thus, this thesis examines the Soviet-era active measures, the U.S. Cold War countermeasures, and Russian active measures today to make recommendations on ways to counter this form of malevolent influence. This thesis finds that the United States should organize purposefully and consistently to counter Russian active measures, educate the American public to increase its resiliency against foreign influence, and intensify its strategic public diplomacy efforts throughout Europe. 14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF Russia, Soviet Union, active measures, United States, countermeasures, influence PAGES operations, and Cold War 145 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES REBORN FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: WHAT IS TO BE DONE? Alexander M. Perkins First Lieutenant, United States Air Force BS, Bellevue University, 2010 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (EUROPE AND EURASIA) from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 2018 Approved by: Carolyn C. Halladay Advisor Mikhail Tsypkin Second Reader Afshon P. Ostovar Associate Chair for Research Department of National Security Affairs iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT Americans were largely surprised when the intelligence community revealed that Russia had launched a widespread influence operation focused on the 2016 U.S. presidential election. With their high-tech, social-media focus, these practices struck many as a newly implemented tactic against the United States. However, throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union developed and deployed influence operations—then called “active measures”—against the United States and its allies. During the last decade of the Cold War, the United States actively and systematically combatted this threat. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, active measures seemed to fade into history as well. This thesis argues that Russia has reincarnated this Cold War relic and is using active measures throughout the world to advance its strategic interests, especially in its post-Soviet space. Russia is utilizing 21st-century technology to gain access to Western populations and sow discord, distrust, and disorder. Thus, this thesis examines the Soviet-era active measures, the U.S. Cold War countermeasures, and Russian active measures today to make recommendations on ways to counter this form of malevolent influence. This thesis finds that the United States should organize purposefully and consistently to counter Russian active measures, educate the American public to increase its resiliency against foreign influence, and intensify its strategic public diplomacy efforts throughout Europe. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION..........................................................2 B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION ...........................2 C. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................2 1. Validity of the Threat ....................................................................3 2. The Cold War Never Ended..........................................................6 3. NATO Enlargement Created Tension .........................................7 D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES .......................9 E. RESEARCH DESIGN .............................................................................10 F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE ............................11 II. ACTIVE MEASURES DEFINED ......................................................................13 A. WESTERN TERMINOLOGY ...............................................................14 1. Propaganda ...................................................................................14 2. Disinformation and Misinformation ..........................................15 3. Political Warfare ..........................................................................17 4. Public Diplomacy .........................................................................18 5. Information Operations...............................................................19 B. DEFINING ACTIVE MEASURES ........................................................20 C. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................25 III. SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES DURING THE COLD WAR .......................27 A. SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES .............................................................27 B. SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES TECHNIQUES .................................31 1. Media Disinformation ..................................................................32 2. Forgeries .......................................................................................35 3. Agents of Influence ......................................................................38 4. Front Groups/Organizations ......................................................41 C. COUNTERING SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES ................................43 1. First Era of Countermeasures: End of WWII to Reagan’s Election..........................................................................................44 2. Second Era of Countermeasures: The Reagan Administration to the Collapse ...................................................49 D. CONCLUSION .........................................................................................60 IV. RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES ......................................................................63 A. THE REBIRTH OF ACTIVE MEASURES .........................................63 vii B. RUSSIA’S MILITARY PERSPECTIVE ..............................................66 C. RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES APPARATUS .................................69 1. The Presidential Executive Office ..............................................69
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