UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

AIR reviewU N I VE R S ITY THE PíOfESSIONAl JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Revol ut iona by War—A C ompabison of Chinese Communist and North Viet n a mese Stratecy and Tactics...... 2 Dr. Charles A. Russell Maj. Robert E. Hildner, USAF Devel opmen t of the Stratecy of Pea c eful Coexistence during the Khrushchev Era ...... 13 Capt. Richard J. Erickson, USAF T he Ret ur n of Shoo-Shoo B a b y ...... 22 William G. Holder Resour c e Management, E conomic Analysis, and Disc o u n t in g in the Depar t ment of Defen se...... 32 Maj. Richard Zoek, USAF T he Mil it a r y Lea der —A M anager of Peo ple...... 37 Jerome G. Peppers, Jr. Mihtary AíFairs Abroad Viet n a mese Air Force Technica l Training, 1970-1971 ...... 43 Capt. Drue L. DeBerrv, USAF In My Opinion J unior Officer Per spect ives of USAF Mid d l e Management...... 52 Col. Victor F. Phillips, Jr., USAF A S el ec t ive Air ma n Rec r u it in g Program...... 56 Lt. Col. Robert W. Davis, USAF D iv o r c e—M il it a r y Style...... 60 Dr. John J. Marsh Books and Ideas Mu ST W e BeaT THE SwORD OF LlMITED W.AR INTO A PlüWSHARE?...... 67 Dr. Russell F. Weigley A Q uarter Cent ur y of Frustration—S in o -Amer ic a n Rel a t ions, 1944-1969 ...... 71 Dr. Kenneth R. Whiting T he Continuing Sea r c h for a Mil it .ary Image...... 75 Dr. George W. Collins Amer ic a n Foreign Policy—T he Ends and the Mea n s...... 80 Col. Harold L. Hitchens, USAF T he Contributors...... 87

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Addrca manuscripts to Editor. Air Ooivmíty The Chinese Com muni st and North Vietnamese theory Review Division. Bldg 1211, Maxwell AFB, AL and practice of revolutionary warfare are analyzed 36112. Pruited by Covernment Príntíng Office. and differentiated by Dr. Charles A. Russell and Addrcu sulncnptions to Siiperintendent of Major Robert E. Hildner in their lead article. Documente. CPO. Washington DC 20402: yearly “Revolutionary W ar." Other insights Ixrhind the 14.50 domestic. $5.75 foreign. single copy 75*. iron and baml>oo curtains are provided by C'aptain Richard J Erickson's 'Development of the Strategy of Peaceful Coexistence during the Khrushchev Era" and by Dr Kenneth R. Whitings "A Quarter Century Vd. XXIV No. 2 Jam. sky-Febh i ary 1973 of Frustration-Sino-American Relations. 1944-1969." REVOLUTIONARY WAR

A Comparison of Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese Strategy and Tactics

Dr . C harles A. Russel l Major Robert E. Hil dn er

N MARCH 1972, North Vietnamese forces onrv was surprising since the war in Vietnam launched a massive invasion of South Viet- has long been regarded by them as essentially a nam which signaled a dramatic increase in guerrilla war against ill-equipped and relatively the tempo and íerocity of a war that many be- lightly armed peasants who were sustained by a Ilieved to be in its final hours. The offensive stubbornness and dedication bordering on fanat- represented a determined effort to effect a icism. However, to the student of insurgency North Vietnamese victory, either militarily or and revolutionary warfare, the invasion and use politically, and was characterized by the unprec- of conventional forces was viewed as a logical edented ase of conventional military forces. and predictable result of the strategy and tac­ To many Americans, the employment of con­ tics of “protracted war” advocated by Nlao ventional forces and modern sophisticated weap- Tse-tung in his writings on guerrilla warfare.1

2 Many such students equate overall North Viet- imperialism can be attacked successfully through namese strategy and tactics to those of the the use of revolutionary warfare. By concen- Communist Chinese and fail to realize that, trating forces in rural base areas and gradually while the North Vietnamese indeed were heav- building their political, military, and economic ily influenced by the Chinese, there are signifi- strength, the countryside can eventually sur- cant andextremely important differences between round the cities, crushing imperialism and elimi­ the two in both strategy and tactics. Thus, we nating foreign control.2 believe it usefnl to compare the Chinese and For the Chinese, revolutionary activity North Vietnamese theories of revolutionary war within the underdeveloped world is a two-stage as a means not onlv of evaluating the current process. The initial phase of new democratic situation in Southeast Asia but also, hopefully, of revolutions is that through which most colonial projecting future developments. and semicolonial States are now passing. Led by the Communist partv, a united front composed of the peasantry, small bourgeoisie, and the The Chinese View proletariat can—using the tactics of guerrilla Formed in the war against Japan and refined warfare—achieve victory over imperialism ex- during her subsequent civil war, Communist ternally and feudalism internally. Only later China’s doctrine on the use of revolutionary can a transition to socialism be achieved. In the warfare is spelled out clearly in the various united front, the peasantry is by far the most writings of Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao. The significant element. Readily accepting Commu­ Chinese see their political and military theories nist control, it forms the bulk of the revolution­ as a valuable weapon for use by underdevel- ary forces. Since the focus of revolutionary ac- oped States in eliminating political or economic tivitv is the imderdeveloped world and within domination by the industrialized West and as it the rural areas of any given nation, peasant particularlv applicable to the revolutionary support is essential to the success of the revolu­ efforts of colonial and semicolonial nations to- tionary effort. To insure this support, an exten- day. sive program of agrarian reform is criticai. Equallv criticai is the continued political indoc- theoretical basis and geographic trination of all revolutionary forces, from the focus o f the revolution common soldier or peasant upward. Such in- Rooted in the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of doctrination is important in building the revo­ “just” war, Chinese theorists see those wars of lutionary spirit which Mao considers so vital in national liberation initiated by oppressed peo- helping the materially inferior guerrillas con- ples in colonial and semicolonial countries as quer the better-armed forces of imperialism. just conflicts aimed at eliminating internai feud­ al oligarchies and foreign political or eco­ revolutionary strategy nomic domination. In such countries, cities are seen as the strongholds of imperialism. Con- Strategically, the Chinese concept of revolution trolling govemment and industry and effective- and revolutionary warfare is based on the doc­ ly suppressing the growth of the proletariat, trine of protracted war. For Mao this equates imperialism is almost invulnerable. In the coun- to a long and drawn-out struggle designed to tryside, however, where imperialist elements gain time in which the revolutionaries can im­ must rely on a weak feudal oligarchy to main- prove their military capability while awaiting a tain control, the position is much weaker. There change in the international situation and/or the 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

internai collapse of their opponents. Essentially For the Chinese Communists, geographic defensive, this strategy acknowledges the ina- space is essential in the development of base bility of the revolutionaries to achieve a quick areas and the implementation of protracted military victory over the better-equipped forces war. Without a large area wherein guerrilla of their opponents. Specifically rejecting the forces may maneuver freely and thus gain time concept that roving guerrilla bancls without ties to establish base areas and develop the strategy to the peasantry can ever achieve success, of protracted war, effective guerrilla operations much less victory, the Chinese strategy of pro- would be almost impossible. Since maneuver is tracted war calls for a retreat into the rural as essential to insurgent survival as base areas, countryside, the establishment there of secure Mao seriously questions the possibility of organ- base areas, and the gradual buildup of insur- izing a viable guerrilla movement in any geo- gent economic, political, and military power. graphically small nation. The only possible ex- For the overall strategy of protracted war, ceptions to this general rule are in those cases the concept of guerrilla base areas is fundamen­ where the forces of repression are weak and tal to ultimate insurgent victory. Located in ineffective or the guerrillas receive substantial generally inaccessible rural regions far from externai aid. anv metropolitan centers, these areas function Closely linked to a need for space is the ne- not only as launching platforms for attacks cessity of developing an offensive strategy that against the enemv but also as material supply can be carried out within an overall defensive centers, as training bases for the development posture (protracted war). In this context the of conventional militarv forces, and as focal Chinese appreciate full well that once the points for political indoctrination activities. momentum of a guerrilla movement is blunted, Perhaps more important, they also provide a any chance for ultimate victory has vanished. means to form military fronts in the enemys Accordingly, Mao continually counsels short rear, subjecting him to continuai harassment campaigns of quick decision, brief tactical throughout the entire area he presumes to con- offensives within the strategic defensive, and a trol. In this sense, base areas function and de- policy of continuai attack to exploit guerrilla velop strategically in somewhat the same man- mobility and flexibility. A static front is alwavs ner as a tumor within the human organism. As to be avoided in favor of fluid, ever changing the tumor gradually envelops and destroys in- lines of combat wherein guerrillas continually tervening tissue, so base areas link up with one seek out their opponents. Once having located another, overcoming enemv resistance and them. they must strike swiftly, attacking at the eventually destroying hostile forces by isolating most opportune time and point, and then with- them within the cities and other strong points. drawing to attack again in another area. In Finally, those conventional forces developed short, while the overall strategy of protracted within the base areas combine, issue forth. and war is of necessity defensive, guerrilla tactics destroy the enemy municipal strongholds. As must alwavs be offensive. To implement such summed up by Mao, . . guerrilla warfare tactics, however, both geographic space and could not last long or grow without base base areas are essential.4 areas.” 3 The third concept in protracted war, closely Three additional and interrelated concepts related to the ideas of geographic space and also are criticai to the doctrine of base areas base areas, is the proper relationship between and the overall strategy of protracted war: the conventional and guerrilla forces. In contrast to idea of space and time, the concept of offense the views held bv many insurgent leaders, Mao within a defense, and the proper relationship Tse-tung is adamant on the point that guerrillas between guerrilla and conventional forces. alone can never completely defeat an enemv. REVOLUTIONAR Y WAR 5

Onlv conventional military forces can accom- tainous regions, the military balance of forces plish this: . . there can be no doubt that our strongly favors the more powerful and better- regular forces are of primary importance be- equipped enemy vis-à-vis the weak, poorly cause it is they who are alone capable of pro- armed, and often disorganized revolutionaries. ducing the decision.” 5 Although insurgent units Accordingly, the rebel tactics used in this are of great importance and in certain stages of phase of protracted war result, in Mao’s protracted war carrv the burden of combat, words, from the “objective conditions of the their efforts are not decisive. Rather, they sup- situation." Since these conditions make it plement regular units bv harassing, weakening, clearly impossible for the revolutionary forces and extending the enemv to the point where to engage in conventional warfare, as they lack conventional forces can mount a concentrated the equipment, training, arms, and even per- attack and achieve final victorv. sonnel for such operations, the only tactics left While the Chinese Communists view con­ to them are those of revolutionary (guerrilla) ventional military forces as essential to ultimate warfare. The basic objectives of guerrilla opera­ victory, thev see these forces as a natural out- tions, which constitute the primary form of growth of the guerrilla movement. For them, combat in this first stage of protracted war, are the insurgent cadres are a training ground to wear down the enemv gradually, erode his where guerrillas can leam to operate in larger morale, extend his lines of communication, and and larger groups, graduallv assuming the sta- weaken his forces, thus trading geographic tus and operational patterns of conventional space for time. Withdrawing slowly, the guer­ forces. To accomplish this, however, space for rillas constantly harass enemv imits as they maneuver is essential, as are base areas where advance, counterattacking continuallv. Declin- troops can be schooled in military doctrine and ing to fight pitched battles or engage in frontal equipped for regular operations.6 assaults, the insurgents favor flanking attacks and the use of favorable terrain to ambush indi­ vidual enemy columns. Substantial use also is stages and tactics o f protracted war made of multiple point assaults, wherein small Within Chinese revolutionary theory the guerrilla groups slow an enemy advance while growth of protracted war is a highly structured larger insurgent cadres attack from the flanks process, developed and carried to a successful and rear. Emphasizing mobility, swift advances conclusion through three separate and clearlv and withdrawals, and the rapid concentration defined stages. Each successive stage in such a or dispersion of forces, guerrillas reject the war is not onlv a natural outgrowth of its pre- concept of a passive defense for a continuing decessor but also a determinant of those tactics offense, thereby carrying out the Maoist dictum used in its development. Evolving in accord- of always conducting an offensive strategy ance with the laws of revolutionarv warfare, within the overall defensive posture of pro­ the sequential development of the various tracted war. stages is not subject to change, nor can the tac­ Following the fallback of insurgent forces to tics of one be used effectively in another.7 base areas within the interior of the country Entitled “The Enemy’s Strategic Offensive and enemv occupation of most urban areas, —Our Strategic Defensive," the first stage in protracted war enters its second stage, the protracted war is essentially defensive in na- stalemate or equilibrium. Forced to operate at ture. Characterized by a gradual withdrawal the end of overextended and vulnerable com­ of revolutionarv- elements toward the interior munication lines, exhausted by continuai insur­ of the country with the establishment there gent harassment, and without additional mili­ of secure base areas, preferably within moun- tary resources. the enemy advance comes to a 6 AIR UN1VERS1TY REVIEW halt. The attention of hostile forces is now fo- írom his urban redoubts and achieving victory.8 cused on consolidating their positions, particu- larly within the urban areas. In a similar man- tactics o f guerrilla units ner insurgent efforts are devoted to building and expanding base areas, increasing the politi- As a result of the criticai role played by guer­ cal and military education of guerrilla cadres, rilla units in two of the three phases in pro­ and gradually building a conventional military tracted war, the creation of a firmly based and capability. Although the primary form of com- highly effective insurgent movement always has bat remains guerrilla warfare, and the basic been a primary matter for the Chinese Com- tactics utilized in phase one of protracted war munists. Convinced that ultimate victory in still remain valid, this stage is characterized by such a war is not possible without a guerrilla a deliberate effort—beginning at the platoon apparatus to function as a springboard for the levei—to regularize insurgent forces, upgrading later development of conventional military their equipment, size, and operational capabil­ forces, both Mao and Lin Piao have devoted an ity. Gradually, larger and larger units are com- important segment of their writing to a de- bined for joint operations vvhich now, in some tailed discussion of basic guerrilla tactics and cases, are conducted on a quasi-conventional operations. levei. Thus, the slow transition is initiated to In their writings neither Mao nor Lin Piao change a heretofore totally guerrilla force into seeks to outline in detail the actual mechanics the nucleus of a regular military establishment. of any given maneuver (ambush, assault, re- Integral to this process is the use of base areas treat, etc.). Rather, they search for those under- to create the coordinated and unified command lving factors that set aside the successful guer­ structure so essential for large-scale military rilla unit from its less effective counterpart. In operations. this analysis they identifv four key factors that The third and final phase in protracted war appear criticai: aggressiveness, initiative, mobil- involves the development of an insurgent ity and deception, and finally flexibility. counteroffensive and the total destmction of all Central to all guerrilla tactics is the thesis enemv forces. With the initiation of this stage, that insurgent forces must never revert to a mobile warfare conducted by relatively large passive or defensive stance and allow the conventional units of regimental or divisional enemy to seek them out. A spirit of aggressive­ size characterizes the period. In this phase ness and a willingness to attack and repeatedlv guerrilla forces play a purely secondary and harass the enemy are vital to successful guer­ auxiliarv role in support of regular elements. rilla operations. Exploiting a superior knowl- Used primarily to harass enemy units—slowing edge of the terrain and choosing the most advan- their withdrawal, blunting a counterattack, cut- tageous time and place for anv action, guerrillas ting exposed communication lines, and wreak- must maintain a continuing assault against ing havoc in their rear—guerrillas cooperate the enemy. Never should such operations be closely with regular elements of the revolution- mounted without at least a 70 percent chance ary army. To insure sueh cooperation and pro- of absolute success or in a situation where the vide maximum effectiveness on the part of in­ enemy’s position is unclear. Also, at the point surgent groups, both forces normallv operate of attack the insurgents should normallv have under the direction of a unified command. Re- at least a six-to-one numerical superiority over lying essentially upon conventional forces but their adversaries. Particularlv effective opera­ also taking advantage of the extreme mobilitv tions are those carried out at night or under possessed by guerrilla elements, Mao sees this cover of fog or rain and directed against mov- combination as capable of ousting the enemy ing enemy columns. A small force slows the REVOLUTIONARY WAR 7

column’s advance, and larger insurgent ele- guerrillas’ true strength, location, and inten- ments then attack the flanks and rear simulta- tions. When coupled with night attacks or neously. Unable to retreat and attacked on all those mounted in rain or fog or in conjunction sides, the column is thrown into total disarray. with ambushes, mobility further heightens de­ Equallv effective are anibushes wherein a hos- ception and the confusion of enemy command- tile force is decoved into terrain from which ers. In these operations the overall objective is insurgents can suddenly open fire from con- to create a State of fluidity wherein battle lines cealed positions. Essential to these stratagems, are not based on the known location of two however, are a spirit of combative aggressive- opposing forces but rather established and bro- ness and a readv willingness to nndertake any ken off at the discretion of the insurgents. risk that can result in damage to the enemy. Flexibility, the final tactical precept stressed Closelv related to the idea of aggressiveness bv both Mao and Lin Piao, actually refers to is that of initiative. Bv initiative Mao means ingenuity. For survival and for success, the in­ maintaining a constant control over anv given surgent leader must be able to improvise, battle or campaign. Only by making the first change plans suddenly, and even quickly alter move in a combat situation and thereby forcing prearranged tactics. He must not be bound by the enemv to react hastily can a guerrilla force rigid military Solutions or tactical consider- keep an opponent off balance and incapable of ations. Rapidly changing relationships between mounting a coordinated antiguerrilla operation. enemy and rebel forces make long-range or Thus, initiative is essential for insurgent sur- rigid tactical plans impossible to develop and vival. The maintenance of such initiative, how­ execute. Accordingly, the insurgents must be ever, requires continued study and rapid exploi- able to make the most of every opportunity tation of all enemy weaknesses, particularly his that presents itself, moving quickly to take limited manpower, lack of knowledge of the advantage of each enemy miscalculation and terrain, and inadequate intelligence. By utiliz- error.9 ing these weaknesses to the utmost, the guer­ rilla can maintain his freedom of operation and continually force an enemy into costly errors. The North Vietnamese View Mobility and deception also are closely Unked with the concepts of aggressiveness and initiative. To a signifieant degree, mobility is Strongly influenced by Chinese theory, the the key to all eífective guerrilla warfare. With- North Vietnamese have adopted a doctrine on out it the other tactical precepts of Mao and revolutionary warfare many aspects of which Lin Piao would be totally ineffectual. For the are strikingly similar to concepts formulated Chinese, mobility connotes an ability to con- earlier by Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao. Tested centrate and chsperse forces with great rapid- in insurgent actions against the Japanese during ity. Thus, a numerically superior guerrilla unit World War II as well as in the anti-French focused at the point of an attack must be able campaigns of 1945-54, this doctrine has been to withdraw quickly and regroup in another further refined in Viet Cong operations against area if plans or unexpected enemv resistance South Vietnamese and American forces. As a requires such action. Similarly, guerrillas must consequence of this continuous thirty-year be able to mount a sudden and fierce attack on struggle and despite their basic ideological debt one enemy flank, quickly break oif the assault, to the Chinese, the North Vietnamese feel they circle the enemv rear, and renew operations on have improved on many aspects of Maoist another flank. In this way mobility also facili- strategy and thereby created a unique body of tates deception, deluding the enemy as to the strategic and tactical thought particularly ap- 8 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

plicable to guerrilla operations in small colonial urban guerrilla networks. In no case can one and semicolonial nations. area be ignored at the expense of another.10

stages and forces o f revolution theoretical banis and geographic focus o f revolution In the eyes of both North Vietnam and Com­ For the North Vietnamese as well as the munist China, revolution within the underde­ Chinese, the theoretical basis for revolution is veloped world is a two-stage process. The initial the Marxist-Leninist concept of a “just” war. In phase is a national democratic revolution aimed this formulation, struggles by colonial and semi­ at freeing a nation from externai domination colonial nations to attain independence from and from the political/economic control exer- foreign domination are just wars. Annexed to cised by indigenous feudal oligarchies. Only France, invaded by the Japanese, and later sub- after these ehanges have taken place is a transi- ject to a French colonial administration, the tion to socialism, the second stage, possible. three-decade battle for Vietnamese indepen­ Although holding almost identical views on dence fits perfectly the Communist criterion for this revolutionary process, North Vietnamese such a war. In this conflict the repressive and and Chinese doetrines diverge in regard to the “unjust” efforts of the French and Japanese forces involved. Initially, Vietnamese theorists imperialists were a failure. A similar fate accepted the Chinese argument that a united (according to Communist beliefs) will meet the front, led by the Communist party, must focus equally “unjust” American attempt. Since a just attention on the peasantry because of its quan- war is by definition a people’s war, the revolu­ titative strength and receptivity to party lead- tionary spirit of the populace, fostered and ership. As a result of these factors, this group guided bv the Communist party, cannot fail to would become the primary revolutionary force.

triumph over even the rnost advanced tech- BvJ virtue of its location in rural areas, these nology of an opposing force. In such a conflict, areas would be focal points for insurgent effort. imperialist forces will crumble and withdraw or Cities, as the home of the small bourgeoisie and suffer absolute defeat when they are met by the proletariat (less important elements in the resolute and unending opposition of the people. united front), should be abandoned in favor of Although basing their revolutionary efforts the countryside. on the just war concept, North Vietnamese While agreeing that rural areas and the peas­ theorists did not move on to adopt Maoist antry would be important elements in future views concerning the inevitable conflict be- revolutionary activity, North Vietnamese lead- tween rural and urban areas. While accepting ers refused to ignore the militarv potential the Chinese idea that future insurgent activity offered by citv-based guerrillas or the idea that will be centered vithin the rural backlands of revolution could develop as easily in urban cen- the underdeveloped world, they do not thereby ters as in the countryside. By 1963 this oppos­ automatically write off the revolutionary poten- ing position had become official doctrine tial of the urban masses. Rather, they argue through the writings of North Vietnamese that the impetus for revolution can stem from Communist partv leader Truong Chinh. Chinh the cities as well as the countryside and that not onlv affirmed traditional Vietnamese stress the urban insurgent movement shares a coequal on the importance of urban insurgency but role with its rural counterpart. Thus, the North went on to argue that the revolutionary im­ Vietnamese believe a revolution is developed pulse could develop first in the cities and from and carried to success through the creation of there flow outward to the countryside, a con­ rural base areas as well as strong and effective cept eompletely anathema to all Maoists. In HEVOLUTIONAR Y WAR 9

1966 these theoretical formulations were location, the Chinese advocate establishing further strengthened by Vietnamese claims that these areas within the mountainous interior of a the peasantrv was incapable of playing a direc- nation far from any urban centers. Since a large tive role in extended guerrilla operations. In- geographic area is necessary for this activity as stead, the urban working class under Commu- well as for the war of maneuver so important nist leadership would be the leading element in to guerrilla success, Mao questions the possibil- this activitv. With these ideological modifica- itv of creating viable base areas within any tions to Maoist theory, the North Vietnamese small nation. As such areas are absolutely essen- not only showed the “creative nature" of their tial for the development of guerrilla operations revolutionary effort but also provided a useful (in both the Chinese and Vietnamese views), theoretical underpinning for their continued em- Mao concludes that effective insurgent activity phasis on the importance of urban insurgency.11 is generallv impossible within a small nation.12 While rejecting the single-minded Chinese Seeing the Chinese as unduly influenced by emphasis on the importance of rural guerrilla geographic fatalism and an overeinphasis on warfare, North Vietnamese authorities are in the strength of opposing imperialist forces, full accord with Nlao’s stress on the significance Vietnamese theorists argue that base areas can of continuing political instruction for all guer­ be established in small nations as well as larger rilla cadres. Convinced that motivated and in- ones. Further, in many instances they call for doctrinated insurgents can easily overcome an the creation of these base areas in regions con- opposing force that is technologicallv superior tiguous to urban centers where revolutionary but spiritually inferior, the authorities place elements within the cities can be exploited great emphasis on political instruction at all effectively. leveis of tiie insurgent structure as well as Implicit in the Vietnamese rejection of among the local populace within those areas Chinese views on the location of base areas is a controlled by the guerrillas. VVithout such in- parallel downgrading of Maoist arguments re- doctrination, revolution itself is impossible. garding the need for permanency in these in- stallations. According to both Mao and Lin Piao, base areas must be permanent, not transitory, revolutionary strategy and should be abandoned by insurgents only as In their overall strategic approach to revolution a last resort. In contrast. the North Vietnamese and revolutionary warfare, Vietnamese theorists view such bases as only semipermanent at best. are again stronglv influenced by manv of .Vlao’s Recognizing that local geography works against teachings. Adopting the Chinese concept of the creation of areas similar to the Chinese protracted war, which they refer to as a “war mountain redoubts, the Vietnamese see their of resistance” or a “people’s war of liberation," bases as indefensible against a determined the North Vietnamese agree on the need for an enemy assault. As Truong Chinh States, “No extended struggle to break the spirit and back­ base can be absolutely firm . . . we must al- bone of their “imperialist” opponents. ways have in mind the moment we may have Despite similar views on this subject, the to abandon it.” 13 Thus, as in the argument over Chinese and North Vietnamese disagree strong- establishing base areas or conducting effective ly as to whether viable base areas can be es- guerrilla operations within a small nation, tablished within small nations, as to where such space appears to have played an important role areas should be located if established, and in shaping both Chinese and North Vietnamese as to the proper relationship that should exist views on these aspects of revolutionary warfare. between conventional and guerrilla forces. In In addition to disagreements on the nature regard to the matter of base areas and their and location of base areas, the Chinese and 10 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Vietnamese are far apart on the relationship and finally the feasibility of moving backward that should exist between conventional and and forward between the three phases. guerrilla forces. For the Maoists, this relation­ By contrast, the North Vietnamese view is ship is a simple matter: regular military units much less rigidly struetured and more flexible. are the key to revolutionary vietory. Guerril- Within each stage it also reflects the strong las, although important, are only auxiliaries to influence exerted on national guerrilla strategy conventional elements. While they may bear by North Vietnams small size. the brunt of fighting during various phases of Overall, Vietnamese and Chinese views differ the conflict, insurgents alone can never attain a on two basic points: (1) the progressive and final and decisive vietory. This can be achieved sequential manner in which the three stages of only by regular combat forces. In contrast to protracted war must develop and (2) the rela­ this Chinese distinction between the functions tionship between conventional and insurgent of guerrilla and conventional elements and to forces. For the Chinese, the movement from the paramount position accorded the latter, one stage to another in protracted war is a con- North Vietnamese doctrine views the two tinuous and progressive process. Each phase is groups as coequal. Final vietory is achieved not precisely delineated, and in passing from one to by the regular forces alone but rather through another this development is generally carried the joint and combined efforts of both groups. out at essentially the same time throughout the While disagreeing on many aspects of pro- nation. If planned properly, the process is on- tracted war (“war of resistance” in Vietnamese going and does not involve a retreat from a terminology), the guerrilla theorists of both na- more advanced stage to an earlier one. North tions are in total accord as to the need for Vietnamese theoreticians do not differentiate as maintaining an offensive strategy within the precisely as the Chinese between the various overall defensive posture of protracted war. On stages in protracted war. Instead, they tend to this point the writings of Mao, Lin Piao, Vo see each stage merging into another without a Nguyen Giap, and even Truong Chinh agree clear-cut demarcation between the two. In ad- completely. Recognizing the basic posture of dition, they do not believe a uniform develop­ protracted war as necessarily defensive, since in ment of the various phases is possible through­ its early stages most revolutionary elements are out an entire nation. Rather, one portion of the unable to defeat enemy conventional forces in State may be involved in stage one, others in open combat, guerrilla war is the principal al- stage two, and a few in stage three. Additional- ternative available to the revolutionaries.14 ly, areas that have advanced to the third stage may be forced back into a secondary or initial phase. Aecordingly, the development of pro­ stages and tactics o f protracted war tracted war is not necessarily progressive or The North Vietnamese, like the Chinese, see sequential. Instead, it quite probably will be protracted war as evolving in accordance with sporadic and subject to innumerable retreats the laws of revolutionary warfare through three and deviations. separate stages: the enemy offensive and the In the second major area of disagreement, revolutionary defensive, a period of stalemate, Maoists clearly define the functions and roles of and finally the revolutionary counteroffensive. guerrilla and conventional forces, placing pri- From this point onward, however, Vietnamese mary emphasis on the latter. In contrast, the and Chinese concepts diverge, particularlv in Vietnamese emphasize strongly the guerrilla regard to the tactics used in each stage of the charaeter of all military operations, advocate conflict, the possibility of operating within sep­ the use of mixed conventional and insurgent arate stages in different parts of the country, forces in all phases of protracted war, and even REVOLUTIONARY WAR 11

endorse the use of roving guerrilla bands—a for phase two of protracted war. coneept particularly repugnant to Mao.15 The third phase in protracted war (the To a substantial degree these differences counteroffensive) also reflects a difference in between North Y7ietnam and Communist China North Vietnamese and Chinese views. To a are further aecentuated in the strategy and tac- significant degree this divergence seems to stem tics advocated by each State for the three stages from the Vietnamese idea of interlocking or of protracted war. YVhereas for stage one the mixed warfare. While accepting the Maoist Chinese urge a retreat to the countryside, the dictum that the counteroffensive is character- avoidance of positional warfare and pitched ized by widespread use of increasingly larger battles, an emphasis on guerrilla operations, conventional units, the Vietnamese do not go and the creation of secure base areas in remote on to assign guerrilla cadres a purely auxiliary sections of the country, the Yrietnamese have a role as do the Chinese. Instead, even the con­ substantiallv different set of plans. Thev recom- ventional forces developed during phase two mend a dedicated defense of the cities by using retain guerrilla characteristics and work hand positional warfare, the creation of guerrilla in hand with purely insurgent elements. No- units to operate in these areas even after losing where in Vietnamese doctrine are the two them, the predominance of mobile quasi-con- tvpes of military forces so clearly differentiated ventional warfare over insurgent operations dur- as in Maoist theory. Further, the counteroffen­ ing mueh of stage one, and finally the develop- sive does not, as Mao demands, become the ment of some base areas in close proximity to prerogative of solely conventional elements, the cities. Again, geographic space appears to the forces he believes are alone capable of at- have played a significant part in Vietnamese taining final victory. Instead, for the North Viet­ modifications of .Vlaoist doctrine. namese final victory results from a combined During the second phase of protracted war guerrilla and conventional efFort with the former (the equilibrium), Y^ietnamese and Chinese tac- units playing an important role. tical doctrines again diverge, although not to the extent evident in stage one. For the tactics o f guerrilla units Chinese this is essentially a period wherein base areas are expanded, conventional forces In contrast to Chinese and Vietnamese dif­ created, and the insurgent / militarv / economic ferences over guerrilla strategy, basic unit potential developed. Guerrilla warfare, how- tactics are quite similar for botli nations. Fol- ever, remains the basic militarv tactic for the lowing the Chinese lead, North Vietnamese period. In the Y7ietnamese view, however, al­ insurgent theorists have focused attention on though insurgent operations are still wide- trying to isolate those factors responsible for spread, mobile warfare conducted by relatively success in small unit operations. From this large-scale conventional elements also is very analysis Truong Chinh, Vo Nguyen Giap, Le important. In such operations conventional Duan, and others conclude, as did Mao earlier, elements also work closely with smaller, purely that these factors may be summed up as aggres- guerrilla groups in the tactic that Truong siveness, initiative, mobility and deception, and Chinh refers to as an interlocking or mixed finally Hexibility. form of warfare. The total interdependence Although both the Chinese and North Viet­ between larger units conducting mobile quasi- namese place equal stress on the first three fac­ regular operations and the smaller guerrilla tors, the Vietnamese seem to emphasize the cadres, as well as the advocacv of positional importance of Hexibility more than their and even siege warfare in this phase, is a Chinese mentors. Throughout the writings of significant departure from the Chinese concept General Giap and his teacher Truong Chinh, as 12 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

well as in captured Viet Cong documents, in- Maoist strategy of protracted war as a basic surgents are continually admonished not to be- strategy for revolution within the underdevel- come rigid in their tactical thinking or tied oped world, the North Vietnamese have moved down to prearranged plans. Instead, they are quickly to adapt, alter, and tailor this concept urged to improvise as the situation changes and to the realities of their own situation. These learn how to shift from agreed-upon opera- adaptations, in the words of General Giap, rep- tional plans to less formalized courses of ae- resent “. . . a wise and Creative application of tion.16 Marxist-Leninist principies on revolutionary In summarizing Vietnamese views on the war and revolutionary armed forces to the strategy and tactics of revolutionary warfare practieal situation of a small, weak, colonial vis-à-vis those of the Chinese, one can perhaps and semi-feudal country.” 17 best describe the Vietnamese position by the Hq Air Force Office of single word “adaptive.” Although accepting the Special Investigations

Notes 1 For an excellent summarv of such writings, see Dr. Ralph L. Powell. 1968», pp 22-30. 37 —40. 60-61. 88-91; Le Duan. "On the South Vietnamese "Maoist Military Doctrines,” Asian Survey, VIII. April 1968. pp. 239-62. For Revolution." Vietnamese Studics: South Vietnam, Realities and Prospects, ed. the text of Maos militar)' writings as set out in a single volume, see Selected Nguyen Kiiac Vien Hanoi: Xunhasaba. 1968). p. 11 Military Wntmgs of Mau Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963). 11. Le Duan. pp. 12-13: Truong Chinh, Hw Tap, September 1963: Le Duan. 2. Nlao Tse-tung, Selected Works. II (Peking: Foreign Languages Press. 1965), "The Role of the Vietnamese Working Class and the Duties of the Labor Union pp. 136—13. 316-17. in the Near Future.” Hoc Tap. May 1967, in Joint Publication Research Service 3. Ibid., p. 94; pp. 85, 93-99, 119. 1.33. JPRSi 41.648, Translations from Hoc Tap. June .30. 1967. pp. 9-35; Truong 4. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works. I Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), Chinh. The Resistance Will Win (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, pp. 40-45. 199, 293. 1960), facsimile edition reproduced in Tmong Chinh. Pnmer for Revolt New 5. Mao Tse-tung, On Cuerrilla Warfare. trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 147—49. Praeger. 1961). p. 56. 12. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works. II, pp. 97. 99. 127. 6. Ibid., pp. 46, 53, 55-56, Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, II, pp. 106-8. 13. Truong Chinh. The Resistance Will Win, p. 189. 229-30. 14. Ibid.; Ciap. pp. 40—44. 80. 7. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, II. pp. 136-41, 172-74. 15. Vo Nguyen Ciap. Big Victory, Great Task New York: Praeger. 1968), p. 8. Ibid., pp. 140. 157-59; Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works. I, pp. 159. 238-40. 55; Giap. Peoples War. Petrples Army. pp. 17. 24. 42-4-1. 91 Truong Chinh. 9. For Mao s analysis of the concepts of aggressiveness, initíative, mobility The Resistance Will Win, pp. 139—42. and deception, and flexibility. see Mao Tse-tung, Basic Tactics, trans. Stuart B. 16. Mai Elliott, trans.. Documents of an Elite Viet Cong Delta Vnit. Part Schram (New York Praeger. 1966), pp. .55-66. 83-89, 270; Mao Tse-tung. Se- Three: "Military Organization and Activities." ed. David W. P Elliott Santa lected Works, I. pp. 238-40; Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works. 11. pp. 85—87. Monica: Rand Corp., Rin-5850. 1969), pp. v, 63, 64. ^ also Truong Chinh. The 157-65, 170-74; Mao Tse-tung, On Cuerrilla Warfare. pp. 42-46. 98-105. Resistance Will VV;in, p. 181. 10. Vo Nguyen Giap, Peoples War, Peoples Army New York: Bantain. 17. Giap. Peoples War. Peoples Army, p. 61. DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGY OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE DURING THE KHRUSHCHEV ERA

Captain Ric h a r d J. Erickson

EVERAL years ago a book appeared entitled, The War Called Peace: Khrushchev s Communism. The title of this work by Harry A. and S Bonaro Overstreet aptly describes peaeeful coexistence, a term fraught vvith implications of Orwellian newspeak that “war is peace" or, more to the point, “peace is war." It is the belief of George F. Kennan, tormer U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, that no term has been more loosely and at times more unscrupulously nsed than peaeeful coexistence. It is the purpose of this artide to examine this concept as it evolved during the premiership of Nikita S. Khrushchev.

13 14 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

Peaceful Coexistence as “It is both ironical and ominous that these prin­ a Treaty Principie cipies were proclaimed for the first time in a Peaceful coexistence was fírst introduced as a treaty which recognized China’s conquest of her principie of international relations in the colonial protectorate in Tibet."3 (Emphasis Chinese-Indian treaty of April 29, 1954. The added.) preamble of that treaty set forth as the basis for At the Bandung Conference (Indonésia) in intercourse between the two countries five April 1955, the five principies underwent principies: modification and became the ten principies. respect for territorial sovereignty and Moscow was not pleased with the alteration integrity inasmueh as a number of the new principies mutual nonaggression were directed against Soviet policy. Therefore mutual nonintervention the leadership of the Communist Party of the equality and mutual benefit Soviet Union (cpsu) and the pro-Soviet world peaceful coexistence. passed over and soon forgot the “ten principies At the time, índias Prime Minister Jawahar- of Bandung.” The Soviet Union continued to lal Nehm referred to the “five principies’ as speak in terms of the five principies as if no Pancha Shila, a phrase he had acquired on his revision had occurred.4 When Nehru visited 1952 visit to Indonésia. Originally Pancha Shila Moscow almost immediately after the confer­ referred to the five moral principies of the ence, he signed a joint statement with the So­ Buddhist religion relating to personal behavior, viet Premier in which the reference was to but the Prime Minister thought Pancha Shila Pancha Shila rather than to the ten principies apropos to State behavior. of Bandung. The Soviets equated the five principies with Shortly before the XXth Party Congress of peaceful coexistence, which was only one of the cpsu convened in 1956, International the five. As Russell H. Fifield, Professor of Po- Affairs (Moscow) reiterated that “in their state­ litical Science at the University of Michigan, ment of October 12, 1954, the Soviet and noted: “At any rate it is obvious that four Chinese Communist governments said that they widely accepted approaches to international would base their relations with the countries of behavior were combined with a fifth, peaceful Asia and the Pacific Area on Pancha Shila." 5 coexistence, to become the Five Principies of The article indicated that it was the intent of Peaceful Coexistence.” 1 If it is difficult to fol- the Soviet Union to continue such relations low the reasoning of the Soviets (that, in effect, with the emerging nations. This intent received a part is equal to the whole), it is not difficult formal acknowledgment at the XXth Party to understand the purpose behind their equa- Congress where peaceful coexistence was con- tion. sidered at length. There is no evidence that either Nehru or Nu (of Burma) subscribed to the strict Communist The Concept of interpretation. This did not, however, prevent Peaceful Coexistence Khrushchev from asserting at Bhakra-Nangal, índia, on November 23, 1955: “The Five Prin­ Before the XXth Congress, partv ideologue cipies of Peaceful Coexistence proclaimed by Mikhail M. Suslov said: “. . . the foreign policy Prime Minister Nehru and our friend Chou of the Soviet State worked out by our Party. En-lai suit us perfectly.” 2 How perfectly may has been carried out with strict adherence to be gleaned from a comment made by Wladyslaw principies and, at the same time, with max- W. Kulski, Professor of Russian Studies at Duke imum elasticity.” 6 The distinction which he University, coneerning the Sino-Indian treaty: was niaking was between strategy (the ideologi- PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE IN KHRUSHCHEV ERA 15 cal analysis valicl for a historical epoch, which Soviet power was the decree on peace, the decree is constant) and tactics (“which depends on a on the cessation of the bloody war.” 14 But Lenin judicious choice of the main battlefield in each viewed peaceful coexistence as a “temporary strategic stage,” which is, bv its nature, flex- equilibrium," that is, as tactics. How did Khrush­ ible).7 chev justify peaceful coexistence as a strategy? Raymond L. Garthoff, a leading authority on The answer is to be found in the concept of the Soviet military afFairs, in Soviet Strategy in the Creative application of Marxism-Leninism.15 It Nuclear Age (1958) offers a discussion of the was said that “the XXth Party Congress, draw- concepts of strategy and tactics.8 Strategy, he ing on Lenins teachings and the experience of points out. is of a higher order of generality international relations . . expounded peace­ than tactics and also of broader scope and long- ful coexistence.16 Li short, Khrushchev cre- er duration. Thus, vvrites Kulski, “Tactical flex- atively applied Marxism-Leninism to the existing ibility meant the ability to adjust the current conditions of international relations and in so policy to the existing circunistances, to what was doing determined that peaceful coexistence possible at a given time.” 9 Tactics may best be should become a strategy. It is o ver the appli­ described as "protracted conflict"—that is, “The cation of Marxism-Leninism to the present enemy advances, we retreat; enemy halts, we conditions of international relations that the harass; enemy tires, we attack; enemy retreats, Chinese Communists disagreed. They asserted we pursue.”—as defined bv Chairman Mao Tse- that Khrushchev did not creatively applv Marx­ tung and quoted and adopted bv the Soviet ism-Leninism but rather he revised it.17 leadership. What are the conditions of peaceful But peaceful coexistence, as Khrushchev told coexistence? These were cited at both the XXth the XXth Party Congress, is “not a tactical Party Congress of the cpsu and at the 40th move, but a fundamental principie of Soviet Anniversary of the October Revolution in 1957 foreign policy.” 10 It is a strategy. In the Soviet (at which time the Moscow Declaration of 1957 view, peaceful coexistence is valid for “an his­ was proclaimed): torical epoch" more or less prolonged. It is on . . . in essence the repudiation of war as a this point that the Communist Chinese disagree means of solving controversial issues. It presup- with the Soviet view. They view peaceful coex­ poses an obligation to refrain from every form of violation of the territorial integrity and sover- istence as a tactical maneuver. “To attain their eignty of another State. It implies renunciation of aim of plunder and oppression. the imperialists interference in the internai affairs of other coun­ always have two tactics: the tactic of war and tries. It means that political and economic rela­ the tactic of peace;’ therefore the proletariat tions must be put on a basis of complete equalitv and the people of all countries must use two and mutual benefit.18 tactics to counter the imperialists. . . .” 11 These conditions of peaceful coexistence are Peaceful coexistence is viewed as representing composed of the same components as the five “the present stage of historical development.” principies found in the 1954 Sino-Indian treatv. On occasion, peaceful coexistence has been re- It is important to note that the five principies ferred to as “an historical inevitability.” 12 were enunciated as the basis for relations be- Seeking to claim historical continuity, Khrush­ tween the “socialist camp” and Asia and África chev made reference to “the Leninist principie (the tiers monde or third world). At the XXth of peaceful coexistence of countries. . . .” 13 Or Party Congress they were asserted as the basis again, “From its very inception," wrote Khrush­ of relations for a historical epoch between the chev, "the Soviet State proclaimed peaceful co­ two camps—socialist and capitalist, East and existence as the basic principie of foreign policy. West. Thus were the principies of peaceful It was no accident that the very first act of the coexistence broadened. 16 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

VVhy did the leadership of the cpsu opt for a First Corollary of Peaceful Coexistenee: policy of peaceful coexistenee? In 1959 Khrush- War Is Not Inevitable chev wrote of the growing concern over the Khrushchev proclaimed at the XXth Party implications of teehnology: “In our age of the Congress that “war is not fatalistically inevita­ H-bomb and atomic techniques, this is the ble.” 22 In the official History of the Communist main thing of interest to every man.’ 19 As Party o f the Soviet Union, the following reason is Shepilov, member of the Communist Party of given for the nonapplieability of Lenin’s thesis the Ukraine, noted in the spring of 1957, “The of the inevitability of war: atomic bombs are a threat to the whole of mankind. ” 20 (Emphasis added.) The “whole of The 20th Party Congress of the cpsu drew the mankind” includes socialism as well as eapital- conclusion that there was a real possibility of averting wars of aggression in the present day inter- ism. The Soviet leadership realized that a nu­ national conditions. Lenin formulated his thesis clear or general war would end in the destrue- about the inevitability of such wars in the epoch tion of both camps. This awesome fact had of imperialism, at a time when, first, capitalism far-reaching implications on both Soviet was the only, and all-embraeing world system. and strategy and tactics. secondly, when the social and political forces that had no interest in, and were opposed to, war were Technology not only made wars more de- weak, poorly organized and henee unable to com- structive but also made the world smaller. As pel the imperialists to renounce war.23 Khrushchev wrote in October 1959: Conditions had changed. The balance of world forces had shifted more favorably toward We, all of us, well know that tremendous the socialist camp. A modification of Lenin’s ehaxiges have taken place in the world. Gone indeed are the days when it took weeks to cross thesis was now in order. As Khaishchev told the ocean from one continent to the other or when the XXth Party Congress: a trip from Europe to America, or from Asia to There is, of course, a Mandst-Leninist precept África, seemed a verv complicated undertaking. The progress of modern teehnology has reduced that wars are inevitable as long as imperialism ex- our planet to a rather small place; it has become, ists. In that period [before the Second World War in this sense, quite congested. And if in our daily and earlier] this precept was absolutely correct. life it is a matter of considerable importante to At the present time, however, the situation has establish normal relations with our neighbors in a changed radically. Now there is a world camp of denselv inhabited settlement, this is so much the socialism which has become a mighty force. . . . more necessary in the relations between States, in Vloreover, there is a large group of other countries with a population running into many hundreds of particular States belonging to different social systems.21 millions [the uneommitted third world], which are actively working to avert war. . . . As long as capitalism survives in the world, the reactionarv The “normal relations” which Khrushchev en- forces representing the interests of the capitalist visaged were based on peaceful coexistenee. monopolies will continue their drive toward inili- Although peaceful coexistenee has a special tary gambles and aggression and may trv to un- leash war. But war is not fatalistically inevitable.24 meaning to the Soviets (as will become evident when the corollarv to peaceful coexistenee, the Two factors caused the shifting balance of concept of peaceful competition, is examined), world forces that led Khrushchev to assert the it is of course a sign of good judgment that the noninevitability of war. First, there was the leadership of the U.S.S.R. recognizes the mu­ growing might of the socialist camp under the tual suicidai character of a general war. Peace­ leadership of the Soviet Union. Second. there ful coexistenee represents the stated intentions was the evolution of a “zone of peace." 25 the of the Soviet Union to eontain the intercamp uneommitted nations of the third world. These conflict. factors represented a considerable restraining PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE IN KHRUSHCHEV ERA 17 factor, as the Soviets saw it, upon the iinperi- chev saw the emergence of a “zone of peace” alists and made it possihle to avert general war. as eontributing to the shifting balance of world Ideologically, militarily, and economically forces in favor of the socialist world. He re- the might of the Soviet Union vvas expanding in ported this development to the XXth Party Soviet eves. By the time of the XXIst Party Congress: Congress (1959) Khrushehev boasted, “Capital- Comrades, between XIXth and the XXth Con- ist encirclement of our country no longer ex- gresses of the Cominunist Party of the Soviet ists.” 26 In fact, said Khrushehev, socialism Union very important changes have taken place in would begin to eneirele the encirclers. intemational relations. . . . The forces of peace have been considerably augmented by the emer­ Khrushehev frequentlv asserted the ideologi- gence in the world arena of a group of peace- cal strength of the Soviet Union and the “so- loving European and Asian States which have cialist camp.” To Tomoo Hirooka, a Japanese proclaimed non-participation in blocs as the prin­ news correspondent, he said on June 18, 1957 cipie of their foreign policy. ... As a result, a (as he had manv times before): “All the world vast zone of peace, including peace loving states, both socialist and non-socialist, of Europe and will come to communism.” 27 On April 9, 1958, Asia, has emerged in the world.34 to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Khrush- chev proclaimed: “Capitalism is at its ebb, With recognition of the emergence of a vast heading for collapse." 28 “zone of peace" (a zone of developing nations Militarily the U.S.S.R. was also strong. In this aligned with the “socialist camp” against war), belief Khrushehev told the Kalinin eonstituency Soviet foreign policy became increasingly di- of Moscow on Februarv 24, 1959: “Under pres- rected toward closer relations with the devel­ ent conditions, the use of threats and ultima* oping third world countries in an attempt to tums, especially in relation to the Soviet Union, seek a common understanding with them is obviouslv an unsuitable method, for it is not against the West. in accord with the real correlation of forces." 29 Because of the shifting balance of world In Kiev on May 11 he said: “But our country is forces and the growth of world technology, big, it is difficult to defeat in war." 30 Or again, there existed no third choice, as Khrushehev in Leipzig, East Germany, in March: “We possess saw it, in foreign policy for any State: either it everything to restrain any aggressor." 31 was peaceful coexistence or it was war. In Economically, too, the Soviet Union was char- Khrushchev's words to the XXth Congress: “In- acterized as “on the move.” To the Vllth Com- deed. there are onlv two ways: either peaceful munist Party Congress of Bulgaria, Khrushehev coexistence or the most decisive destruetive asserted on June 4, 1958: “We are firmly con- war in history.” 35 In 1960 Major General Niko- vinced that the time is approaching when social- lai Talenskii, Chief Editor of Military Thought, ist countries will outstrip the most developed joumal of the Soviet military staff, stated: capitalist countries not only in tempo but also in “War as an instrument of policy is becoming volume of industrial produetion.” 32 In Hungarv outdated [because] the process of development on April 7, 1958, Khrushehev, then First Secre- of techniques in the destmetion of peoples tary of the cpsu, spoke of the W ests attempts makes it impossible now to use weapons for the to catch up with the U.S.S.R.: “Who now in- solution of political tasks, as has been the case tends to catch up with the Soviet Union in sci- in the course of thousands of years." i(> entific development? The United States of Amer­ This statement does not mean, of course, that ica is now setting for itself the task of catching the Soviet Union would forego the use of these up with the Soviet Union.” 33 weapons for self-defense. Nor does it mean the Coupled with the growth in power of the renunciation of the use of all force and vio- Soviet Union and the “socialist camp," Khrush- lence. Only use of nuclear force in a general 18 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

war was General Talenskiis eoncern. The “Friendship,” said the First Secretary, “is U.S.S.R. continues to support “just wars of na- true and strong if people share the same views tional liberation.” As the XXth Party program on events, history and life.” 40 Peaceful coex­ reads: “It is their duty to support the sacred istence is not friendship. “We are guided by the struggle of the oppressed peoples and their just principies of proletarian internationalism, friend­ anti-imperialist wars of liberation." 5| This res- ship and brotherly co-operation between peoples ervation leaves a wide range of military activi- in mutual relations between socialist States.” ties open. Participation, directlv or indirectly, But, Khrushchev added, “When we talk about in wars of national liberation (tempered with coexistence we have in mind socialist and cap­ caution and concern about escalation of such italist States. Those forces opposed to each oth­ limited wars to the levei of general nuclear er: antagonisticconditionsexistbetween them.” 41 conflict) becomes possible. It is noteworthy that no third conceptualization Khrushchev gave attention to the problem of seems to exist for neutrals. escalation, clearly qualifying Soviet involve- What is peaceful coexistence, then, if not ment in the nonsocialist world by announcing friendship? At Prague in 1957, Khrushchev ex- that “socialism does not intend to overthrow plained: “Indeed it happens that people do not capitalism in other countries by means of ‘ex- get married for love, but despite that they live porting’ revolutions.” 38 On the contrarv, revo- their whole lives together. And that is what we lutions to be successful from the Soviet view- want. We live on one planet and therefore we point must be indigenous. However, nonindig- want peaceful competition.” 42 Socialism has enous Communists might assist in bringing a no love for capitalism but wishes to have revolution to fruition. Once a war of national peaceful competition. Peaceful coexistence liberation was under way, it was the duty of all provides the conditions necessary for peaceful Communists to support it. In this way the So­ competition. viet Union remains outside the conflict and consequently removed from actual military Second Corollary of involvement while assisting nonetheless the Peaceful Coexistence: “Progressive forces" of the liberation move- Peaceful Competition and Its Implications ment. Becoming involved in this manner has as its purpose the prevention of escalation of “just What does peaceful competition entail? “For wars of national liberation" into nuclear holo- over forty years,” Khrushchev told a Soviet- caust. Czechoslovakian Friendship Meeting, Julv 12, Peaceful coexistence is a struggle that differs 1958, “a socialist and capitalist system have from war not in objectives sought but in the existed. Of course, irreconcilable political and means used. In the words of the late Marshal ideological contradictions existed and will exist Boris M. Shaposhnikov of the Red Army, “If between these two Systems, and there was and war is a continuation of politics only by other still will continue to be a certain struggle be­ means, so also peace is a continuation of tween them.” 43 (Emphasis added.) That certain conflict by other means." Peace is the absence struggle is represented todav by the concept of of general nuclear war and nothing more. peaceful competition, a corollary to peaceful Khrushchev described to his comrades what coexistence. peaceful coexistence will do: Peaceful competition makes peaceful coexist­ ence a dynamic, rather than a static, relation- Peaceful coexistence affords favorable opportun- ities for the struggle of the working class in the ship. Conditions between the socialist and capi­ capitalist countries and facilitates the struggle of talist camps are not frozen. On the contrarv, as the peoples of the colonial and dependent coun­ Khrushchev indicated in 1957: “But in peaceful tries for their liberation.;1

competition we will work to win out. Here if 1 of the ideological struggle were compatible. may say so, the Soviet people will be on the The economic front is, as Khrushchev ex- offensive.” 44 Peaceful coexistence becomes a plained at the XXIst Party Congress, January form of intense ideological, economic, political, 27, 1959, "the main field in which the peaceful and cultural struggle between the “proletariat competition of socialism and capitalism is tak- and the aggressive forces of imperialism. ing place. . . ." 51 The Soviet challenge: “Let On the ideological front, Khrushchev has us prove to each other the advantages of one’s frequently referred to "peaceful coexistence in own system not with fists, not by war, but by the field of ideology as treason.” 40 In 1955 he peaceful economic competition in conditions of told the East Gennan Communist leaders: peaceful coexistence.” 52 For this reason the Soviets labor to develop People say our smiles are not honest. That is not true. Our smiles are real and not artificial. But if the resources of their own coimtry. Khrush­ anyone believes that our smile means that we have chev, speaking on the new Seven Year Plan in given up the teachings of Marx. Engels and Lenin, 1958, said: “The realization of the Seven Year thev are badlv mistaken.46 Plan of the development of the national econ- Later in the vear he asserted, "If certain omy for 1959-1965 will be another important people regard as a violation of the ‘Geneva stage in peaceful economic competition of the spirit’ our conviction that victory will be on two systems—socialism and capitalism.” 53 the side of socialism, of Marxism-Leninism, Strengthening of the domestic economy is in- these people obviously do not understand the tended to give the Soviets “a decisive advan- ‘Geneva spirit’ correctly. They should remem- tage in the intemational alignment of ber that we have never renounced our ideas, forces.” 54 The purpose of the plan is to affect the struggle for victory of communism.” 47 In favorably the balance of world forces and make the 1960 Moscow Declaration we find: it all the more likely that general nuclear war can be avoided. Peaceful coexistence of countries vvith diifering social systems does not mean conciliation of so- Moreover, it provides the Soviet Union with cialist and bourgeois ideology. On the c-ontrary, it an economic base from which they can exert implies intensification of the struggle of the work- themselves intemationally. The leaders of the ing class of all the Communist Parties, for the cpsu have long recognized a close relationship triumph of socialist ideas.48 between economics and politics, arising out of In his report to the Central Committee of Communist ideology. It was not surprising, the cpsu in 1963, Khrushchev said: "Hatred of therefore, that shortly after Stalin’s death the class enemies is necessarv. because it is not pos- Soviet Union began to engage in intemational sible to become a good fighter for vour people economic competition through trade and aid. or for Communism if one does not know how Conimentators in the West called it an “eco­ to hate enemies. Yes, comrades, a harsh class nomic offensive.” 55 In 1955, for example, struggle is now in progress throughout the Khrushchev told a group of United States Con- world.” 49 gressmen visiting the U.S.S.R. that "we value Professor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., of Harvard trade least for economic reasons and most for University, reasoned that an absence of coexist- political purposes.” Two years later the Chair- ence in the field of ideology would mean that man of the Council of Ministers, Nikita S. there could not be coexistence at all. "The Khrushchev, proclaimed: “We declare war world would break up into self-contained parts, upon you—excuse me for using such an each sealed off from the rest bv high walls expression—in the peaceful field of trade. We against ideas.” 5(1 The leadership of the cpsu did declare war. We will win over the United not agree; peaceful coexistence and continuation States. The threat of the United States is not 20 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

the ic bm, but in the fíeld of peaceful produc- scientific relations [as well as] mutual exchange tion.” 56 A “war called peace” is what is meant of tourists. . . .” 61 by coexistence. The Soviet weltanschauung may be stated On the political front, Khrushchev discussed briefly: (1) the world is divided into two eter- before the XXth Party Congress the technique nally antagonistic Systems that are bound to try of winning control in a country through parlia- to dominate one another; (2) Communism will mentary majority: prevail in the end; and (3) in this struggle all The winning of a stable parliamentary majority methods are permissible except those that in­ backed by a mass revolutionary movement of the volve a risk of general nuclear war. Resting on proletariat and of all the working people eould these three pillars of belief is the lintel of ereate for the working elass in a number of capi- peaceful coexistence. talist and former colonial eountries the conditions needed to secnre fundamental social ehanges. In the eountries where capitalism is still strong In the author’s o pin io n , peaceful coexistence and has a huge military and police apparatus at its has been, in the past, the inversion of General disposal, the reactionary forces will of course in- evitably offer serious resistance. There the transi- von Clausewitz’s famous dictum, “War is the tion to socialism will be attended bv sharp elass, continuation of polities by other means.” revolutionary stniggle. Peaceful coexistence has been merely a period of struggle waged by nonnuclear means. Up to But he added, “It is not tme that we regard this point, the Soviet strategy has appeared to violence and civil war as the only way to re- be a transmogrification of the golden rule: make society.” 57 “Prevent others from doing unto you what you Anastas I. Mikoyan, member of the Presid- want to do imto them.” Peaceful coexistence ium and Central Committee of the cpsu, of- has meant that the West was expected to re- fered the assembled Congress the following main passive while the “socialist camp” at- example: “Because of the favorable postwar tempted to gain the upper hand (or to use situation in Czechoslovakia the socialist revolu- Khrushchev’s words, “to bury us”). In 1959 tion was earried out by peaceful means.” 58 Khrushchev called for an “end of the Cold Another delegate, I. G. Kebin, cited the Baltic War," by which he probably meant, stop resist- States, in their transition to socialism, as having ing. Perhaps coexistence was originally devised been “peacefully" occupied and then annexed as surrender on the installment plan. to the U.S.S.R.59 In short, heretofore peaceful coexistence has In other words, the Soviets are willing to use proven to be neither peaceful nor coexistence. parliamentary means to achieve their objectives Apparently, an estrangement in vocabularies domestically within a country or to use diplo- existed between West and East. “Peaceful macy on the international plane. But the choice coexistence" eould have been ranked with of whether peaceful political means are em- those terms which lend themselves to being ployed or not depends upon the particular cir- cumstances involved. exploited for their strong positive connotation as universal values but which vet do not seem On the cultural front: “The ussr proposes to to motivate sufficiently meaningful discussion of the capitalist States that we should compete the concepts they represent. However, Ameri­ . . . not by expanding the Cold War but by can foreign policy is and must be governed by exchanging our cultural values.” 60 And peace­ the future prospect of true peace and coexist­ ful coexistence aims at “creating conditions in ence, not bv the misunderstandings. fears, and which chere may be normal . . . cultural and legacies of the past. Hq Air University PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE IN KHRUSHCHEV ERA 21

Note* 1 Russdl H Fifield, "The Five Principies of Peaceful Coexistence." Ameri- 28. Ibtd., p. 6. can Jounuil o f Intemationul Law. vol. 52 (Juiy 1958), p. 505. 29. Ibid., p 8 2 Nikita S Khmshchev as quoted in Soviet World Outlook. Dcpurttneut of 30. Ibid., p 10. S tic Publícation no 6836. Julv 1959. p 182 (Hereafter eited a* Soviet World 31. Ihid., p. II. Outlook.) 32. Ibul , p. 7. 3. Wladystaw W Kulski. Pcactful Coexistence An Analysis o f Soviet Foretyi 33. Ibid Policy (Chicago: Henry Regnery Compam. 1959), p. 137. 34. Pravda. Fcbmary 15. 1956. as quoted in Kulski. p 124. 4. See V Durdcnevskii. “Five Principies. International Affuin (Moscow). 35. Hudson. Lowenthal. MucFarquhur, p. 43. vol. 3 (March 1956). p 45 36. New York limes, October 13. 1960 5. Ibul. 37. As quoted ui Philip El Moscly, "Tlie Mcainug of Coexistence. Foreien 6. Pravda. Febmars 17. 1957. as quoted in Kulski. p. 69. Affuirs. vol 41 (October 1962). p. 40. 7. Kulski. p. 81. 38. “On Peaceful Coexistence." p. 80. 8. P. 3. 39. Mosely, p. 42. 9. Kulski. pp. 69-70. 40. Khrushchev, Pravda. March 27. 1958, as quoted iii Kulski. p. xxi 10. Nikita S Khmshchev. Speeeh to the XXth Parts Congress" .is quoted in 41 Pratda, June 30, 1957. as quoted in Kulski. p. 134 C. F Hudson. Richord Lowenthal. and Roderick MacFarquhar, The Slno-Soviet 42. "Speeeh at Praguc Castlc." Radio Prague, Julv 12. 1957. Soviet World Dispute (New York; Praeger. 19611. p. 42. (Hereafter eited as Hudson, Lowen­ Outlurik, p. 98. thal, MacFarquhar. ") 43. Soviet World Outlook, p. 97 11. *Long Live Leninism." editon.il. Peoplet Daily, .April 22. 1960. as re* 44 Interview with Williain Kandolph Hearst. Jr.. November 22. 1957, Prat - printed in Hudson. Lowenthal. MacFurquhar, p. 98. do, November 29, 1957. as quoted ui Soviet World Outlook, p. 98 12. Nikita S. Khmshchev to the Jubilee Session of the Supreme Soviet of the 45. .As quoted in Arthur Schlesinger. Jr.. "Coexistence v. Peace," Survey, no. USSR. November 6. 1957. New Times. no. 46 (November 14. 1957). supple 50 (January 1964). p. 14. ment, p. 6. 46. As quoted m Dean Acheson. Power and Diplomaçy (New York Athe- 13. History of the Communist Party o f the Soviet Union .Moscow: Foreign neum, 1963). pp. 10-11. Languages Pubhshmg House, [1964)i. p. 679. (Hereafter eited as History o f the 47 Khrushchev. "Speeeh about Trip to índia, Burina and Afghumst.ui ." Prav- Communist Party. > da, Decernber 30. 1955. as quoted in Soviet World Outlook, p. 188 14. Nikita S Khmshchev. "On Peaceful Coexistence," Foreiffi Affairs. vol. 18 48. As quoted in Sir Williain Hayter. "Tlie Mcaning of Coexistence.’ Survey, (October 1959). p. 79. t Hereafter eited as "On Peaceful Coexistence. "i no. 50 (January 1964), p. 24. 15. Terms defined Revisionism destroys Marxisin-Leiunism |»y decluring 49. Schlesinger. p. 23. "that it is outmoded’ and alleges that it has lost its significance for social prog- .50. Ibid.. p. 15. ress Dogmatism destroys Marxism-Leninism by "replacing the study of con- 51 Soviet World Outlook, p. 99. crete situations with inerelv quoting classics and sticking to books, and leads to 52. "On Peaceful Coexistence,” p. 86. the isolation of the Party from the masses.” Creative Marxism revitalizes Marv- 53. Soviet World Outhtok, p 99. ism-Leninism through its 'Creative application" to "changing condi- 54 Khrushchev, "On Peaceful Coexistence." reciting the "control figures for tions.**—Nfosçòw Declaratiori of 1957 as reprinted in Hudson. Lowenthal. the economic development of the USSR." report delivered at Üie XXIst Parts MacFarquhar. pp. 52-53. Congress. p. 43. 16. Pravda, March 12, 1958. as qnoted in Soviet W orld OutliK>k, p. 98. 55. There are several reasons whv tlie Soviet Union did not engage in such 17. This applies not only to peaceful coexistence but to the Soviet leader- actions earlier. not least of which was Stalin himself. See Roliert Lormg Allen. ships view of the inevitability of war, peaceful transitiou to socialism. and the Soviet Economie Warfare (Washington. D.C.: Public Affairs Press. 1960). like. 56. Interview with William Randolph Hearst. Jr.. November 22, 1957. in 18. Khrushchev as quoted in Soviet World Outlook, p. 98. Washington Post and Times Herald. November 24, 1957 This remark svas omit- 19. "Ou Peaceful Coexistence. p. 79. ted from the Soviet text puhlished in Pravda. 20. Pravda. February 13, 1957. 57 As quoted in Leo Gmliow. Current Soviet Policies, II (New York: Praeger. 21. "On Peaceful Coexistence." p. 78. 1957). p. 38. 22. Hudson. Lowenthal. MacFarquhar, p. 14. 58. Pravda. February 19. 1956, as quoted in Kulski. p. 29. 23. History o f the Communist Party. pp 644-45. 59. Pravda. February 19, 1956. as quoted in Kulski, p. 29. 24. Pravda. Februarv 15, 1956. as quoted m Kulski. p. 97. 60. Khmshchev, “Speeeh at the Budapest Opera House." Budapest radio 25. At times a third factor is included. namelv, the acceptabilitv of a peuce broadeast, April 3, 1958. as quoted in Soviet World Outlot/k, p. 99. policy by the masses. 61. Khrushchev. "Speeeh at the Celebration bv Builders of Lenin Central 26. Khrushchev and the Shifting Balance o f World Forres. Legislaiive Refer­ Moscow Stadium." Pravda, August 1. 1956, as quoted iu Soviti World Outlook. ente Service, Senate Document 86. September 1959. p. 4. p. 185. 27. Ibul.. p. 5. f

THE RETURN OF SHOO-SHOO BABÍ The original crew o f Shoo-Shoo Bal>y poses beside lhe lale-tnodel B-17C o f the Eighth Air Force.

VAST majority of the B-17s met a rather inglorious end fol- lowing World War II. Most either faced the scrapper’s torch or ended up as aluminum ingots. Almost all these com- bat-weary Flying Fortresses met their demise across the waters; very A few made their way back to the States. This fact is sorely realized todav, what with the burgeoning of aircraft museums around the world. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, there are only three Forts left in existence that actually saw combat. These are the Swoose, which is awaiting the day it will be displayed at the Smithso- nians Air and Space Museum. Then there is the Xíemphis Belle, dis­ played in Memphis, Tennessee. The third Fort, which like the Mem- phis Belle served with the 9 lst Bomb Group, has just returned to the States, eventually to be restored and displayed in the magnificent new Air Force Museum. Yes, after almost thirty years, the Shoo-Shoo Baby has come home. The Bahy was (or should we say “is”?) a late-model B-17G, serial number 42-32076, that was assigned to the 401st Bomb Squadron of the 91st Bomb Group. Lieutenant Paul G. McDuffee was assigned as her original pilot. The favorite song of Crew Chief Hank Cordes was “Shoo-Shoo Baby”; hence it was inevitable that the song title would adom the nose ot the then-new Fort, along with a rather scantily clad young lady. In all the long list of 340 missions made by the 9 lst, surely the strangest entry of all was this notation: “9-4-44, Gdynia—recalled" and immediately below, on the same date, was “ 1 A/C Marienburg, At this stage o f her career, Baby hoasted three “Shoos" and a modest- ly posed pinup. . . . “A ” markings designate Fortresses o f Baby‘s .9/.ví Bomb Group, massing for takeoff (opposite). . . . Three from tlie 91st head for the target o f the day.

Completed.” Though in the early days the the mess and likely to make contact at any group sometimes had to struggle to get more moment. than half a dozen planes in the air, this was At 30,600 feet the plane broke clear, almost certainlv the only case in Eighth Air Force his- in the middle of a group of B-24s. “We were tory for which a group got mission credit with within wing tip distance of the last plane in the onlv one aircraft participating. formation,” McDuffee recalled, “and the slip- And it all started out as a perfectly normal stream bounces nearly tore the wings off. We morning for pilot Paul McDuffee and the crew were all petrified!" of the Shoo-Shoo Baby. At hriefing, the weight Except for the 24s, there was not a plane in was hanging way up on the wall, so everyone sight. They flew in circles for some minutes, knew at once it would be a long, mean one. looking in vain for other 91st planes. Checks Gdynia, a Polish rail and shipping center, was indieated that Baby s radio was working, and the target. The group was to assemble at alti­ no message of any change in plans or a recall tude over East Anglia and proceed from there. had been received. As usual, the weather was miserable, with Finally, far off in the distance appeared a fog, zero visibility, and a heavy overcast. The group of B-17s, and Shoo-Shoo Baby headed for crews went through the “set and sweat” peri- an intercept. When she elosed up, however, the od, waiting for a mission scrub that never crew could see it was not the 91st but another carne. Instead, the planes took off, only to be First Division group. At the moment. Mc­ swallowed up immediately in the overcast. Duffee was not choosv and decided to tuck in Shoo-Shoo Baby cut through a thin layer of where he could and ride with the herd. The overcast into clear air at several thousand feet, only open spot was deputv lead, so Shoo-Shoo without another plane in sight, and then Baby slid in there, despite protestations and plunged into a layer above that seemed endless. general shaking of fists by the other pilots in McDuffee and the crew kept looking and the formation. With radio silence ordered, that climbing higher and higher, reaching for the was about all they could do. top, scared stiff at the thought of several dozen “We d found a home,’ McDuffee declared, other Forts struggling just as blindly through “and we weren t about to be dispossessed!"

24

26 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Hardly recognizable evert as a B-17 (the result o f var- ious postwar modifications for civilian use in Sweden, Dennuirk, and France as well as subsequent nose dam- age), Shoo-Shoo Baby was given to the U.S. Air Force by France. Recovery began by distnantling her to go home.

The group was apparently going to a target other than the one assigned to the 91st, for the heading was approximately 40 degrees, which carried them up near the tip of Sweden before they swung right on a 145-degree heading. “When we approached the coast the naviga- tor immediately pieked up Gdynia and Danzig, whieh obviously were not the targets, and we changed to a eourse of 190 degrees. About that time we hit a terrific flak barrage and hundreds of fighters,” MeDuffee remembered. “We opened the bomb-bay doors and headed for the target when the others did, though we really didn’t know what it was. After turning off the target run, we noticed that six B-17s had been lost.” On the way to the coast, Shoo-Shoo Baby encountered a mystery that no one to this day has been able to explain. “A shell burst ahead and above us, emitting what appeared to be a big puff of brown smoke. Immediately, another burst just above us, and the whole plane was covered with what looked to be brown tobacco juice. The Windows and windshields were com- pletely covered, and the wipers onlv made it worse. The onlv way we could see to fly for the rest of the trip was to slide back the Windows a bit and sort of stick one eye out.” About halfway across the North Sea coming back, Shoo-Shoo Baby left her unknown friends and set eourse for Bassingboum. The plane landed safely after 12 hours and 55 minutes in the air, and all four engines quit simultaneously on the taxi strip—all the fuel was gone. In talking to the tower, MeDuffee asked how many others had gotten back OK. “Nobody, said the tower man, and then before shock RETURN OF SHOO-SHOO BABY 27

could totally overwhelm the crew, “Nobody [Guenther] asked me if I knew the way to else went. We had a recall. Sweden because we might run out of gas. I “Waiting for us to come in was Colonel stated that I did and that 1 had the course Claude Putnani and some major general,” charted. This was all in jest, but I have often McDuffee recalled. “W e were sure that our wondered what would have happened had this names were mud! When I stepped out of the been overheard by the ground crew, since actu- plane after all those hours of flying, I fell to my ally we did go to Sweden. knees; and when Colonel Putnam carne up, I “We had trouble on take-off with a full gas asked him not to be too hard on us, since I was and bomb load. The supercharger on number already on my knees.” three engine overheated but after take-off was “He just laughed and said that we'd been to operational. We rendezvoused with many other Marienburg, that our flight reflected honor on B-17s over the English Channel, and the plot- the 91st, that the general was pleased and had ted course was toward Berlin, then doglegged said the 91 st would get group credit for our around Berlin, to Poznan, where the bombs [lone] mission.” were to be dropped, north to the Baltic Sea, Why didn’t Shoo-Shoo Baby get the recall? A out across Denmark, and fínally back down the freak accident had disabled the radio so that it English Channel to home. appeared to function normallv but did not re- “Soon after we crossed the German border, ceive. So the crew never got the recall. we lost number three engine, I believe because The “tobacco juice”? They never did dis- of losing oil pressure. Bob could not get the cover what it was. All his buddies claim that prop feathered. It continued to windmill the en- McDuffee flew through a blivet for sure, but, as tire trip with no vibration. We attempted to he says, “Who ever saw a blivet flying at stav in formation with three engines but found 30,000 feet?” this impossible and had to drop out. We con­ McDuffee flew his 30th mission in the Baby tinued on course to the best of my ability. We on the 24th of May 1944, having flown several were losing altitude but continued to the target missions with Lieutenant Robert J. Guenther as and dropped our bombs. Flying alone toward his copilot, preparatorv to Guenther’s taking the Baltic Sea, we saw many German fighters over the aircraft commander post. attacking formations of B-17s and could not Then commander duties were handed over to understand why they didn’t pick us out as a Bob Guenther, who would be Baby's second straggler. Before we reached the Baltic Sea, we and final military boss. It was then. supposedly, lost the second engine, and the decision had to that the nose got the additional “Shoo” that be made to go to Sweden because we could not appears in the only known wartime picture of make it back to England. Bob asked for a the plane. But there appears to be some uncer- course to Sweden, and I charted one to a little tainty about this. town called Ystad in the very southernmost After several missions with Guenther at the part of Sweden. helm, the Baby was faced w'ith an extremely “All loose equipment, including machine tough one: a mission to Poznan. Poland, that guns, radio equipment, and clothing, was approached the capacity of the B-17. The mis­ thrown overboard in order to lighten the ship. sion length was approximately 1450 miles. The An attempt was made to drop the bali turret, flight is well remembered by one of the crew but it wouldn t move. members, J. M. Lowdermilk: “As we approached the co&stline, Bob was “The navigator always got to the plane late, interested in knowing whether or not it was as the rest of the crew was ready to go, and I Sweden. I eonfidently stated that it was, but remember that as I walked up to the plane Bob after the flak started coming up as we got over 28 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

land, I wasn’t so sure. All of it was low, and I cloud cover across Norway and into northem believe the Swedes were just telling us ‘Don t Scotland. I was loaded into the bomb bay with try anything.’ Just before we reached land we what seemed like 30 other men. We returned lost the third engine, and we were losing alti­ to our base in England and then back to the tude fast. A Swedish fighter carne up and led us States.” to Malmõ, Sweden, where a B-24, also in trou- ble, landed just ahead of us. Actually, we had to swing wide to keep from colliding. F ollowing the war, the Baby was “At this point I blew my chance to be a hero. officially given to Sweden by the United States.

The B-17 carried a navigational aid called a She was modified into a transport by sa a b, Geebox. This instrument had a red button that served with the Danish Air Lines, and then with was to be pushed in case of ernergency, to pre­ the Royal Danish Air Force. In 19.54 the plane vení certain information from falling into the was sold to the Babb Company and then to the hands of the enemy. I was so glad to get down Institute Géographique National in France for on the ground and out of the plane that I failed work as a survey aircraft. Her last mission in to push the button. performing that function was in 1961. She has “We were removed from the plane by Swed­ not flown since. ish soldiers with rifles and machine guns. Most Steve Birdsall, the Australian air historian, of us were wearing heated flight suits over long traced her through years of hard tracking. He underwear, and we were a sorry-looking sight found her engineless and parked on the ramp at coming off the plane.” Creil, France, in a somewhat battered condi- The pilot, Bob Guenther, now a resident of tion. He brought his find to the attention of the Scottsdale, Arizona, explains: “None of us ex- 91st Bomb Group Memorial Association and cept the engineer ever saw Shoo-Shoo Baby initiated efforts to save Shoo-Shoo Baby from again. The engineer went along with the the scrap heap. As Birdsall pointed out, “This Swedes to help them take her to the intern- veteran was the last combat B-17 to survive, ment area. and she deserves a better fate.” “We were taken into a building, where we When found, the Baby had undergone a submitted name, rank, and serial number. We number of rather extensive modifications to were told that the American authorities would perform the many jobs she had done since the be informed of our presence. Within the next fateful Poland raid. All the original equipment few days, we were transported to a resort camp had been stripped out, and seats had been in- called Lokabrun near Ludvika. Treatment stalled. The waist-gun positions had been there was good. We had two men to the room closed up and Windows with curtains put in. and maid Service. There was a detachment of The complete nose section had been removed Swedish soldiers in the camp, but things were and a considerably longer nose installed. A mil- very informal. We soon bought civilian clothes itary-type nose will be installed when the air­ and bicycles, and each week we were allowed a craft is restored. There were also some “Win­ 24-hour pass from camp and a 3-day pass each dows” installed in the floor for the geographic month. We went to Stockholm a number of missions she performed. The tail turret was times, were arrested there for taking pictures of completely “metaled” over. Her sides carried the naval harbor, and generally had a good the sa a b commercial markings. time. French officials, as a gesture of friendship “During late October, 1944, we were taken between the United States and France, pre- to Stockholm, and on October 29 a white B-24 sented the B-17 to Secretary of the Air Force with a civilian crew took us out at night under Robert C. Seamans, Jr., for preservation by the Mari ilfe rm hi-anA, enn, o Wright-Patterson to Cennany,AB, Rhein-Main C-5A, by from AFB Airlifted Baby isatlast. honie The dismemhered pieces will re- quire many hours o f skilled tvork over the next several tyears before the Air Force Mus eu m can displutj a freshly renovated Shoo-Shoo Baby. Air Force Museurn. The joumey from France as possible to her fighting trim. Then she will to the Air Force Museurn required the assist- probably replace the Museurn’s present B-17, ance of the United States .Air Forces in Europe which did not see combat. to disassemble and crate the plane for truck The 91st Bomb Group Memorial Association shipment to Germany and eventual airlift to is quite excited about the acquisition and plans the United States. From Rhein-.Vlain .Air Base to hold one of its upcoming reunions at Dayton in Germany the Baby was flown directlv to so the members will be able to see her. The Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, home organization boasts some 17(K) veterans of the of the Air Force Museurn. Baby traveled in group, commonlv known as “Wrav’s Ragged stvle, in the belly of a giant C-5A transport. Irregulars.” On hand at Wright-Pat were several of As one 91st veteran put it, “When we Hew' in Shoo-Shoo Baby s old friends. Wartime pilot the likes of her, we were nothing but a bunch Paul McDuffee, now a Tampa, Florida, insur- of pimply-faced kids. But she now sure brings ance man, and retired Major General Stanley back a lot of memories to a lot of old fiftv- T. Wray, once 91st Bomh Group Commander, year-olds.” were waiting among the reception committee. VVelcome home, Baby! “lt‘s heen twenty-eight years,” said Mc­ Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio Duffee as he watched the disassemhled bomher being unloaded. ‘T ve just got to go over and kiss her.” And he did it! Acknowledgment The Air Force Museurn, over the next two or Recent photographs are by Len Pytel, and all are three years, plans to get the Baby back as near by courtesy of the Air Force Museurn. RESOURCE MAN AG EMENT, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, AND DISCOUNTING IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Major Ric h a r d Zock

HERE was a time, in the not-too-distant past, when the education of a young man with intentions of following a military eareer was heavily weighted toward the study of engineering, geopolities, and military history. Economics was not considered to he a terribly T relevant discipline to the military aspirant. Defense budgets were smaller in absolute terms; budget allocations were made on the basis of “need"; economic analysis was not considered to he a vital mili­ tary function; and scholarly pursnit in the field of economics was generally recommended for the student who planned a university teaching profession. The economist was perceived to he a theoretician, not a practitioner. In a sense, economists of prior generations tended to agree with the military educators. Although they perceived the study of economic theory to he relevant to the defense establishment, it was seen to he applicable only in the broadest sense. Maeroeconomics, the study of economic aggregates, dealt with the problems of alloca- tion of searce resources among the publie and the private sectors.

32 RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN DVD 33

The results of analyses at these lofty, theoreti- city applies, of course, to the produetive re- cal leveis certainly impacted upon the military sources at our disposal; the inonetary con- in the size of its budgets, but most felt this was straints simply denominate those land, labor, not an appropriate function to be perforined by capital, and technology limits in terms of the military itself. dollars—and rather “rubbery” dollars at that Microeeonomics, a more specialized disci­ during periods of inflation. pline often called “the theory of the firm, ' was With the increasing awareness of scarcity, it relegated to problems of profit maximization. would seem that to our “fly and fight” motto Sinee the militar)' sold no products, generated we might want to add “efficiently.” Given that no revenues, was not part of a market system, we have defined a specific role, mission, or ob- and charged no prices that could eover its jective, our mandate is clearly to fulfill that costs, profit maximization did not appear to be role or achieve that objective at minimum cost. a consideration for the military' planner. Conse- Similarlv, given the public funds (resources) quently the tools of microeeonomics languished entrusted to us, we have a vital responsibility in the private sector of the economy with little to maximize the military returns from those or no emphasis placed upon them in the inputs. It is the economies discipline that not-for-profit arena. stresses the resources to be combined in various It is clear that we have come a long way ways to achieve those elusive optima. since the era I have briefly described. With the Our current system in the Department of introduetion of large forces in-being during Defense does reflect this relatively new micro­ peacetime, the heavy demands on the nations economic approach to resource employment. resources by the military arm, and the dramatic The Planning, Programming and Budgeting growth in demand for the public dollar by "hu- System (ppbs) has imposed a requirement that man resources" programs, it became more evi- the marginal costs of and marginal returns from dent that the military is onlv one of manv various alternative resource mixes be assessed competitors for public funds. A new emphasis and that deeision-making in Defense emphasize was placed upon the capability to measure, in cost and contribution at the margin. This is not some meaningful way, the extra contribution to to say we have succeeded in neatly quantifying society emanating from additional expenditure the equivalent of the private sectors “marginal on defense. Bv the same token, periods of aus- cost = marginal revenue” equation. Clearly we terity produced a very relevant question: Does have not. Nor are any claims made that the society lose more total benefit if a dollar is eut quantifieations which have been made in any from Defense than it does when the dollar is way represent what the numbers should be. taken from Health, Education and Welfare? We do not yet have the capability in the mili­ For one even sketchily trained in the discipline tary to talk meaningfully in terms of normative of econoinics, these questions strongly imply economies; we are, however, interjecting some such terms as “marginal cost,” “marginal reve- rational economic analysis into the deeision- nue," and “marginal produet”—a few of the making process. analytical measures that make microeconomic With respect to the levei at which economic tools applicable to some macroeconomic prob­ analysis is to be performed, it would appear lems. that the concept is now being pushed as far The economist s skills, whether applied to down in the organizational framework as possi- efficieney in the large or in the small, are gen- ble. Originally stressed bv then Deputy Secre- erallv directed toward the resource allocation tary of Defense David Packard, the emphasis is dilemma. Although we concern ourselves with now being placed on decentralized analysis and budgetary limitations, the stark realitv of scar- deeision-making, with the responsibility for 34 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

resource management being passed down to —a brief rationale for the use of discounting ever lower leveis of cominand. One might ex- of future cash flows. pect that explicit guidance of some sort would The justification for use of present value fac­ naturally accompany a metamorphosis such as tors in DOD-proposed investments is stated as this. Some guidance does in fact exist. In Feb- follows: ruary 1969, the Assistant Secretary of Defense Interest will be treated as a cost which is related (Comptroller) issued an instruction establishing to all Government expenditures, regardless of the policy that an economic analysis would be whether there are revenues or income by way of performed in support of certain proposed in- special taxes for a project to be self-supporting. vestments in the Department of Defense.1 The This position is based on the premise that no public investment should be undertaken without publication was steeped in terms familiar to considering the alternative use of the funds which those who had acquainted themselves with it absorbs or displaces. ppbs; unfortimately, however, it stresses a con- 1. One way for the DOD to assure this result is to cept that may have applicability only under adopt in public investment evaluations an interest certain conditions. The instruction set out as its rate policy which reflects the private sector invest­ purposes and objectives to: ment opportunities foregone. The discount rate reflects the preferenee for current and future mon- 1. identify systematically the benefits and costs ey sacrifices that the public exhibits in non-govern- associated with resource requirements . . ment transactions.4 2. highlight the key variables and the assump- tions on which investment decisions are based and The reader is encouraged to digest this rea- allow evaluation of these assumptions; 3. evaluate alternative methods of fínancing in- soning carefully, for it is sound and eminently vestments; and rational, so long as all the conditions stated 4. compare the relative merits of various alter- therein are met. Whether those conditions are natives as an aid in selecting the hest alternative.2 all in fact being met is, however, subject to Clearly, these objectives are sound, rational, question. and highly worthv of pursuing. They represent The thesis stated above is an opportunity an explicit statement of goals which, if at- cost concept, which justly contends that the tained, will lead to an efficient allocation of cost of using resources in one employment must scarce resources among competing uses. be denominated in terms of the retum sacri- The dod Instruction does not, however, ad- ficed in diverting those resources from their dress to any extent the dazzling array of analyt- next-best employment. It savs that the cost of ical tools available to assist economic analvsts using resources in the public sector is what they in their pursuit of these objectives (nor do I could have returned by being productively ap- mean to imply that it should). There is simply a plied in the private sector. This is undeniably listing of quantitative techniques, most of true, a valid concept, if there are in fact pro- which are typically treated in depth in most ductive alternative ernployments o f those re- statistics, economics, and management Science sources in the private sector. courses.3 The instruction does, however, give If, however, there is less than full employ­ particular emphasis to the tool of discounting ment of resources in the nongovernment and establishes rather specific guidelines for sphere, what is the opportunity cost? If indus- applying the method. The guidance includes try is operating at 75 percent of capacitv and —a prescribed discount rate (10%); nearly 6 percent of the labor force is unem- —a table of discount factors (at 10%) which ployed, would those resources have been em- reflect an assumption that cost and/or savings ployed at all had it not been for the public flows will occur more or less continuously rath­ sector? What is the cost to the private sector of er than in a “lumpy,” once-per-period fashion; hiring a man who would otherwise have been RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN DOD 35 unemploved? Is there an opportunity cost to all these disparate resource utilization rates do the nongovemment sector when the military exist, the Treasury still faces a positive interest purchases vehicles from a firm that employs rate in its long, intermediate, and short term capacity which otherwise would have been borrowings in the capital market. It eould be idle? asserted that this rate is, in part, indicative of Consider the fiscal 1972 and proposed fiscal the private sector's required rate of return for 1973 federal budgets. Thev have been, admit- the forsaken use of funds. True enough, but tedly, clearly stimulative in nature. The federal that required rate of return for virtually riskless budget, as a vehicle for fiscal policy, is the lending is not the basis put forth in support of means by which incrementai government discounting government investments. If that spending is achieved. In accord with Keynesian were the rationale, the composite rate would economic theory, federal expenditures can and be simple enough to calculate and would not should be used to create supplemental demand, be 10 percent. promote spending, and generate greater in- One crucial problem emerges from any dis- come, employment, and resource utilization. cussion of an appropriate social rate of dis­ This additional government expenditure is as count. It is the problem of defining that rate much directed toward stimulation of the na- and determining its composition. Welfare eco- tional economy as it is toward providing nomies offers some help in this matter by con- specific public goods and Services. If this is the tending that there are actually two measures case, can it be said that the opportunity cost of which require quantification. The first is the resources diverted from the private sector is of marginal social rate o f time preference, which the same magnitude as it would be if all re­ reflects societvs rational bias in favor of con- sources were fullv emploved? One eould even sumption sooner rather than later. The second ask whether there is an opportunity cost at all. is a ri.sk adjusted marginal social rate o f return To counter this reasoning, one line of argu- from investment, which reflects the returns that ment might be to point out that idle capacity the private sector sacrifices when resources are and unemploved resources exist only in a spotty diverted to public projects. To oversimplify, fashion throughout the economy. While Steel one measure mirrors societv s preference for a industry resources may be underemployed, the dollar s worth of consumption now rather than construction industry is simultaneously pressed tomorrow; the other reflects the opportunity to the limits of its capacity. Consequently, in cost of what that dollar eould have returned by such an example, an opportunity cost is im- produetive employment between today and posed on the private sector bv government tomorrow. There are elements of both in the construction projects, but the cost is consider- theoretically appropriate social rate of dis­ ably less (or possibly nonexistent) with respect count, but they need not necessarilij be the to government demand for steel. To the extent same rate. Only if they do in fact coincide is it that this is true, it would be difficult to argue possible to aspire to a theoretical maximum or for a uniform discount rate to be applied to all optimum State of welfare in every segment of government investments. By the same token, a the economy. position that insistecl on the application of a The above may appear to be a tiresome standard rate for purposes of simplieity (a good digression into the ethereal and not-so-relevant reason incidentallv) would have to face up to world of theory, but it is in fact a vital point to the fact that in the aggregate there are unused be recognized when considering the concept of resources. Consequently, the credibility of the discounting. It explains why the U.S. Treasury opportunity cost rationale would be weakened. does in fact face a positive (and possibly rising) One might contend, then, that even though interest rate in its borrowing activities, while 36 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW simultaneously there may be a relatively low Does the foregoing discourse argue against opportunity cost to the private sector of divert- discounting of proposed dod investments? The ing resources to public projects (such as de- answer is “Not necessarily.” Discounting is still fense). a defensible tool for internai analytical pur- The significant point here is that when re­ poses (within dod). Its use would be to assist in sources are in excess supply relative to the recognizing the timing of cost and benefit demand for them (unemployment), the use of streams and as a decision-making aid in our an arbitrary discount rate for public invest- arraying of altematives in some priority fash- ments may well understate the benefits to be ion. There is no good rationale for giving equal derived from those investments in future years weight to equal dollar outlays, which differ while at the same time overstating the costs significantly in their timing, so long as a social today. The dod use of a 10 percent discount rate of time preference exists. The discounting rate for proposed investment projects may well thesis, however, should not be justified solely on be responsible for an unjustifíed bias against the grounds of the opportunity cost imposed on defense expenditures for “out year” benefits the private sector. That cost is clearly variable because of some simple, mathematically correct and one which may differ dramatically between but misguided computations. one industry and another, in some cases ap- The situation is, of course, worsened by the proaching zero. The opportunity cost thesis requirement that future rates of resource iinern- does not represent a totally credible single ra­ ployment clearly should be predicted and in- tionale for discounting in dod. Were discount­ corporated in any analysis of long-lived public ing defended more as an internai allocative investment proposals. Unfortunatelv, this may device, its use would be more believable. and a not be an attractive computational device, good case could be built for its reduction to since it would require government agencies to something below the current 10 percent rate. make explicit any expectations of future re­ source unemployment—a disclosure which most Air University Institute for Pro- likely would not be politically palatable. fessional Development

Notes 3. As this article was being written, the Defense Economic Analysis Council issued its definitive Eionamu Analysis Hantlbook, which does treat in some 1. Department of Defense Instruction 7041.3, “Econoinic Analysis of Pro­ detail each of the analytical techniques listed in DOD1 70413. posed Department of Defense Investments,** 26 Februarv 1960. 4. DODI 7041.3, V. D. 2. Ihui, I. A. Jerome G. Pepper s, J k.

THE MILITARY LEADER a manager of people N THE normal process of military organiza- agement, matrix organization, project manage­ tions, the leader is never suecessful alone. ment, personnel training, quantitative tech­ He achieves success by effeetively and ef- niques, operations research, and inventory ficiently marshaling the efforts of many peo- management, for a few examples. In return, of ple and focusing them on the units missions. course, military leaders have borrowed concept I and philosophy from their contem por aries in Thus, the determinant of military leadership is the individual’s ability to manage people. All nonmilitary and nongovemment enterprises. The other aspects of organizational functioning history of military organization reflects both have little signifieance unless the people are give and take in management thought, and no effeetively managed. military leader in today’s Department of De- The style of leadership (management) fense should consider his job beyond help from adopted by a leader is tremendously influenced outside sources: reported research, expository by his feelings about people. In turn, his articles, or accounts of suecessful and unsuc- adopted style exerts tremendous influence on cessful leadership techniques. the behavior of his people. Stated simply, if he An effective military leader may not be to- feels that his people are responsible individuais, tally effícient. He may be gauged a success on he will act accordingly in his direction of their the basis of results so long as only a casual efforts, and they will tend to act as they sense measurement of cost is attempted. When cost he expeets them to act. If, on the other hand, measurement is also used to determine success, he feels that people are “no damned good,” the leader must become conscious of cost-effec- they will sense it and respond in kind. In brief, tiveness and begin to evaluate his leadership/ it can be said that leadership is a relationship management actions from the point of view of that exists between people, and that relation­ both effectiveness and efficiency. In the military ship is most certainly affected by the feelings of environment, effectiveness is the driving feature, the people involved. as it must be for national survival. American The same style of leadership or the same military leaders have been and are now effective, technique of influence will not be equally as is evidenced by our continued existence as a effective for all people or in all situations. society and source of world influence. Neverthe- Therefore, the effective leader will be the indi­ less, improved use of people should be a major vidual who aequires the ability to “read” the personal goal of every military leader, and it is situation, know his people, and respond to both to that goal that the remainder of this article is in a tailored manner. He recognizes that there addressed. is a difference between what his (the leader’s) a basic philosophy—involvement job should be and what the other person’s job should be, and this recognition permits him to Doing a consistently good job of managing strueture his own behavior as required by the people is not accidental. It requires consider- situation and the people involved. In other able effort, a real interest, the ability to under- words, the leader’s style and applied technique stand people, a lot of time, and a willingness to must be sufficiently flexible to be appropriate share. Further, the leader must adopt an Out­ to the particular group’s needs and expecta- look that permits him to change because every tions. interpersonal contact offers that possibility. Throughout history, military leaders have Therefore, the leader must approach the peo- contributed immeasurably to management phi- ple-management task with desire and dedica- losophy and managerial techniques. Their more tion if he is to succeed with efficiency. recent contributions have been adapted and Suecessful management of people is an exer- adopted worldwide in the areas of Systems man­ cise in involvement. Detachment is not a step-

38 MANACER ÜFPEüPLE 39

ping-stone to success even though it may some- ple as distinctive persons with greatly different times be a worthwhile strategy. Most of the backgrounds. The people manager aspiring to a time, however, the leader must be sufficiently high probability of continuing effectiveness will involved with his people so that he is con- make a concerted effort to know his people so seiouslv working to help them improve their that he can intelligently face any situation ability to perform on the job. This demands his coming his way. commitment to helping subordinates grow in It should be clear that a leaders first concern competence, in abiÜty to handle responsibility, for his people ought to be to know as well as and in capability to identifv needs that must be possible those individuais who report directly satisfied for organizational success. to him. In many organizations this will leave a Involvement dictates that the leader learn to relatively large nurnber of people with whom know his key subordinates as individuais, as the leader will have infrequent personal con- persons. He cannot be involved with individu­ tact. These people, of course, should be known ais, as he must be, if he permits himself to by subordinate supervisory personnel under the think of his subordinates onlv in terms of same guide: those who report directly. Thus, “group.” Together, of course, the individuais this approach to leadership effectiveness is well form the group, and the group is the organiza­ within the capabilities of all responsible leaders tional element he leads and manages. But he and does not impose an unreasonable burden. will most likely acquire his greatest success and The first, and likely most obvious, learning most satisfving job performance when he learns médium is the personnel record system of the to know his people as individuais and works to organization. These files offer quick and basic relate their personal values, desires, and drives information about an individuais background, to organizational needs and group success. education, prior jobs, and experience. With Unless he does leam to know his people as this, the leader can approach each individual at individuais, he will probably adopt some phi- an appropriate time for amplification through losophv that will lead him to thinking in terms discussion, which can be most valuable in es- of “average man.” Such thinking masses people tablishing rapport and displaying interest in the and forces them into molds that they do not fit person as an individual. A few comments from and that eliminate any sense of individuality or the leader about the man’s past (as gleaned personalitv. The techniques and notions that from the records) will establish that the leader must accompany “average man” conceptuali- was, in fact, sufficiently interested to learn zations do not fit most of the people. Their use, something about him prior to the conversation. then, increases the individual’s sense of irrita- Private conversation with each individual tion and discomfort and makes him restive in offers the leader a good opportunity to learn the unit, restricting his capacity to contribute. how the other feels about his work, how he thinks, and how he responds to his environ- ment. If these conversations are motivated by learning to know him sincerity, the leader will recognize the effects An effective leader is able to evaluate the situa- of his involvement, as earlier outlined, and tion in which he finds himself and determine further recognize that he is establishing a foun- how his people’s individualities can best be dation of mutuality from which can develop used in that situation. Most do this automatical- empathy and understanding. He will be address- ly, seldom consciously thinking about what ing a need, existing in each of us, for assurance process is taking place. Obviously, knowing the that the boss is indeed interested in making our individualities of the people means that much eontribution a meaningful and worthwhile use has gone before—much learning about the peo­ of abilities and skills. 40 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

These private conversations should be fre- leader expects his people to work for goals, he quent and should never be considered as no must contribute to the establishment of those longer necessarv. The leader should arrange the goals and to their attainment. The group will, opportunity for these conversations in sueh a unconsciously at least, expect to learn that the way that they never give an impression they leader has some established personal goals, has are held “because it’s time for another chat.” exerted effort to define the group goals clearly, Rather, they should be inaneuvered so that and encourages members of the group, indivi­ they seem to develop naturally and give the dually, to set personal goals to whieh group other person an assurance of true interest. An membership will contribute. important element should be the leader’s desire Enthusiasm is a hallmark of leadership, and to listen to the other person. It is vital that the it is contagious. Problems are opportunities to leader recognize how much difference true the enthusiastie leader who gets a charge out of listening—not just hearing—will make in his the ehallenge of risk that aecompanies the learning about his personnel. opportunities. He is eager to work with new VVhen this is recognized by the leader, he requirements because he is confident in his abil- will be wise to somehow transfer to the other ity to meet the future even though he recog- person how that person’s words and actions are nizes the probability of difficulties. In his en­ modifying the leader’s actions, thinking, and thusiasm he eagerly seeks help when he needs understanding. Thus, the involvement process it and is intelligent enough to recognize, and and its resulting changes in the people partici- admit, that sueh help is often needed. Aecord- pants will be recognized and acknowledged. ingly, he is also enthusiastie in his help to oth- Often the other person will react in kind by ers, reeognizing with empathy the similarities revealing how the association is also ehanging of their needs and his. Thus, the leader leads by him. VVhen this begins to surface, the relation- example with his enthusiasm and his eagerness ship will likely blossom with greater faith, both to seek and give help for goal attainment. trust, and performance. People work best, and in a more cooperative A leader is often able to help a subordinate fashion, when they understand what they are attain some personal goal if he knows that the expected to do and why their participation is goal exists. Therefore, some part of the learn- necessarv. The communicative skills of the ing-to-know-him process should include devel- leader play an important role in the creation of opment of the opportunity for the participants an atmosphere of cooperative effort. Efficient to express their goals on this job and for this use of the human resources demands communi- life. Thus, the leader leams some of the motiva- cation, coordination, and cooperation, and the tional factors of his people and is better able to effective leader realizes this. Accordingly, he help them, individually and eollectively, realize works for two-way communication, aimed at their potentials. The leader, then, can encour- understanding and acceptance, through con- age his people to seek new experiences and can scious application of the principie of feedback contribute the support whieh only he can pro- for both participants of every confrontation. He vide for personal improvement efforts. recognizes, too, the effect of attitude on com­ munication, coordination, and cooperation and strives to keep his thinking and, hence, his atti­ the leader leads tude constructive at all times. He avoids the A leader is expected to set the pace, provide a caustic results of negativism in thinking and funetional participation to the group, and con­ attitude and the impact of sueh negativism on tribute to the group in a manner that helps his people. make goal attainment probable. Thus, if the A good leader might also be considered a MAN ACER OF PEOPLE 41

part-time public relations specialist. People in bility of occurrence, so the leader has to accept successful group operations accomplish much that he will commit errors and be exposed to that is worthv of display to others. The leader the same in the efforts of others. This is not to realizes this and does his part for the group by say that error and failure should be condoned publicizing the accoinplishments of his people under any or all circumstances, but their proba­ individually and in group. He will work for his bility must be accepted. This creates a situation own professional development and encourage in which the leader must define for himself the the same in his people in recognition that the fine line dividing honest error/failure and inad- work itself constitutes an important element for equate performance. job satisfaction and human motivation. Thus, with his understanding and enthusiasin he en- the leader helps courages performance, innovation, creativitv, and initiative. Truly effective leadership requires the leader to Loyalty is an essential ingredient for effec- help his people realize and use the talents and tive leadership, and it must be displayed without abilities of the other people of the unit. In this equivocation. The leader, if he desires to re- manner a cooperative approach to group suc- main so, must develop and evidence his loyalty cess is formulated, and no one in the unit feels to his people, his boss, and his organization. he is alone in his efforts to succeed. In defense This should in no way be interpreted to require organizations, sueh an environment is vital for blind loyalty in which the boss, the imit, and mission capability because today’s sophisticated the people can do no wrong because, obviously, weaponrv has made the one-man victor highly there is always that likelihood. Normallv, how- improbable. Rather, military missions today are ever, the boss, the unit, and the people act ef- suecessfully accomplished only through the fectivelv, and the leader's si gnificant contributions cooperative use of the skills of many, directed are loyalty and support through decisions based with coordination for a common purpose. For on a sounder foundation than hoped-for popular- this reason, the skill of the leader helping to itv. instill an active cooperative spirit becomes a Not all people will live up to the leader’s tremendously signifícant determinant for con- expectations. The leader needs to recognize sistently successful group performance. that sometimes a person will disappoint him, The leader helps his people come to grips but he should not permit this recognition to with understanding that the varieties of back- become an expectation—for the obvious reasons grounds represented in the group will cause already discussed. Sometimes the natural ri- some ideological conflict that should be used valry that exists in the group will encourage for the common good. Progress is usually some individual to overextend himself and cre- sparked by such conflict if the participants ac­ ate a condition in which he cannot perform as cept the fact that there is normally more than expected. Other times an individual, for any of one way to skin the eat. Such acceptance paves a wide range of reasons, just will not contribute the road to an intelligent judgment of the other as the leader expects. Thus, the leader must person’s point of view and offers a logieal means accept the probability of some individual fail- by which the opinions of all participants are ure, some disappointment, and be prepared to continually altered until agreement is reached. deal with it in a manner consistent with the This fonn of confrontation in which each partic- situation and the person. ipant reacts with understanding is dynamic and Error and failure are human frailties with innovative, offering the group a much wider which the leader must cope, in himself and range of alternatives for problem solution. others. Perfection continuously has little proba­ Active and dedicated people want to grow 42 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

in knowledge, experience, and ability. The and social stretching. No person or organization effective leader, recognizing this, helps his can be fully insulated from these stimuli. Mili- people by urging them not to be restrained in tary organizations are likely to feel even more their healthy curiosity by the artificial barriers of this change impact because of the transiency of the formal organization chart. In this man- of population and the ever present pressures of ner, the leader encourages his people to accom- urgent alterations oceasioned by world politics modate their curiosity, stretch into new experi­ and mission emphases. For these reasons, the ence areas, and enhance their understanding of ability of the military leader to help his people the needs and accomplishrnents of others adapt to change becomes significant for the unit. united with them for the eommon organiza- He cannot afford to be overly sold on the estab- tional objectives. Thus, communication is facil- lished routine of requirement, process, or itated, coordination is made more likely, and procedure. Instead, he must adopt the philoso- cooperation is gained from a willingness on the phy of grace: progress is impossible without part of all. change, so he should make change a graceful Success invokes change, and change can be and beneficiai process for his unit. frightening or disturbing when people do not understand what results are likely from the T he mil it a r y leader is not successful alone. suggested alteration of the familiar. This ap- He needs and relies upon the efforts of other pears to hold true even though all humans have people to accomplish the unit mission. Accord- been exposed to constant change throughout ingly, the military leader is, in faet, a manager their lives. Despite the constancy of change of people, and to be effective he must provide and the normal human desire to improve, life himself a conscious program aimed at knowing in an organizational endeavor seems to carry his people and how best to use them in the with it a desire to retain the status quo. Incon- current and projected situations. It should be sistent as this may be, the leader must still cope emphasized that the leader s effort to better his with it and simultaneously cope with the need ability to use people must not be left to for and problems of change and help his people chance. He may, in fact, over time become to adopt and accept. quite proficient by random situational leaming; The consistently successful organization dy- but not many would disagree that, in sum, this namically functions within a framework of con­ is likely to be an expensive and often disap- stant change. Each job performance, every pointing process. Therefore, this article urges a conversation, each ideological conflict—all alter purposeful effort to learn and apply learned the capacity and capability of the persons who knowledge to the task of managing people—a make the organization and thus change the task that can be psyehieally and tangibly re- organization. Sueh change must be expected, as warding when done well and successfullv. must be the changes resulting from the outside School o f Systems and Logistics, AFIT world s technology and its cultural, economic, Military Affairs Abroad VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE TECHNICAL TRAINING, 1970-1971

Captain Drue L. De Berry

RESIDENT NIXON, speaking at Guam United States Air Force because of the techni­ in 1969, announced a new American íor- cal requirements for air war. If Air Force assist­ eignP policy, a policy hased on the premise that ance was to be effectively provided, technical peace in Asia would depend primarilv on Asian training of allied air forces would assume even Solutions to Asian problems. The United States greater importance than it had in the past. would honor commitments in Asia and else- With this in mind it is worthwhile to review where by providing technical and economic usaf technical training efforts in Vietnam and assistance to its allies when requested and as examine that experience for methods that are appropriate, but American military presence appropriate to the future lower profile of was to assume a lower profile. We would look American military presence in Asia and reli- to the nation directly threatened to assume the ance on Asian Solutions to Asian problems. primary responsibility of providing manpower American policy in Vietnam in 1970 and for its defense. 1971 was aimed at self-sufficiency for the Re- This policy had particular signifícance for the public of Vietnam Armed Forces (rvnaf).

43 44 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Self-sufficiency was understood to mean that interrelationship between these two training after withdrawal of American combat forces objectives clearly emerged as planning pro- the rvnaf could inaintain the levei of security gressed. that had been won jointly by the United States vna f teehnical training had to be conducted and South Vietnam. The United States would in South Vietnam, rather than in the United continue to provide materiel support for the States. The most compelling reason for this was defense of South Vietnam, but it was expected the number of personnel who required training that the rvnaf would have the capability to and the time available. The increased pace of use United States equipment effectively. If that unit activations and the increased total number capability could be developed, the rvnaf of units directed by crimp required that more would be judged self-sufficient. people be trained and trained sooner. To train Training was the key to vnaf self-sufficiency, in the United States, vnaf recruits had to learn and the Consolidated rvnaf Improvement and English; and the Saigon English Language Modernization Program (crimp) was a major School, the starting point in the training pipe- training effort. Training had to meet two essen- line to the United States, could not provide tial objectives for the vnaf to become self- enough graduates to meet the quotas. Thus sufficient: (1) personnel had to be trained to meet in-country training conducted in the Viet- the immediate needs of expansion, and (2) the namese language was the only practical solu- vna f had to expand its capability to train re- tion to this dilemma. placements for personnel lost through attrition. In 1969 every vnaf teehnical training re- In terms of sheer numbers of personnel, the quirement was evaluated to determine if the requirements for expansion far exceeded the United States or South Vietnam was the more requirements for attrition, so it was during the suitable training location. A conference con- expansion phase that usaf assistance would be vened at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, in most necessarv. By January 1970 the vna f had June of that year identified the courses to be grown to a personnel strength of over 30,000 established in South Vietnam and the equip­ men, but fully half this number were unskilled. ment required to support those courses. Seven- In March 1971 crimp authorized a vnaf teen hard-core aircraft maintenanee courses strength increase of about 50 percent over the were among those identified. These were new 1970 figures. This crimp addition of untrained courses specially designed to meet vna f needs. personnel brought the teehnical training re- Instead of general helicopter maintenanee, for quirement for 1970 and the first six months of example, a course was designed to teach UH-1 1971 to nearly 34,000, and this figure included helicopter maintenanee, since the vnaf would only those personnel to be trained to perform not possess the variety of helicopters usually at the lowest skill levei. Upgrade training also studied in usaf Air Training Command heli­ had to be conducted. Massive United States as­ copter courses. The ereation of these basic sistance was required to meet these require­ courses marked the beginning of a major trans- ments for expansion. formation in the entire vna f teehnical training It was in reaching the second essential goal. program and forged a closer relationship be­ expanding the vna f capability to train replaee- tween the immediate objeetive of expansion ments for attrition losses, that self-sufficiency and the long-range goal of self-sufficiency. would have to stand the acid test. The extent of Pacer Bravo was the name given to the vnaf United States assistance required to train attri­ Improvement and Modernization Program tion replacements after satisfying the initial (vnaf i&m) plan to establish the seventeen expansion requirements would provide a sub- basic aircraft maintenanee skill courses in jective measure of vnaf self-sufficiency. The South Vietnam. (See accompanving list.) To MIL1TARY AFFAIRS AtiROAD 45

VNAF IMPROVEM ENT AND MODERNIZATION BASIC In addition to training vna f instructors and TECHNICAL TRA1NING COURSES provicling mt t ’s, the usaf built training aids for AFSC COURSE TITLE the new courses. In all, 869 training aids were 301X1 Navigation Systems Repairman speeifically designed and fabricated for vnaf 421X1 Aircraft Propeller Repairman use. These training aids were built at usaf Air 421X2 Pneudraulics Repairman Training Command Technical Training Cen- 421X3 Aerospace Ground Equipment ters. Repairman The Pacer Bravo courses began in March 422X0 Instrument Repairman 422X1 Mechanical Accessory Repairman 1970, and by 30 June 1971 there were 5599 422X2 Egress Systems Repairman vnaf graduates, with an additional 1414 stu- 423X0 Aircraft Electrician dents in training. Pacer Bravo was geared to 424X0 Fuel Systems Repairman the iinmediate requirements of crimp; in fact, 431X0 Helicopter Maintenance Repairman but for these requirements it might not have 431X1A Aircraft Maintenance Repairman been attempted. (recip) 431X1C Aircraft Maintenance Repairman (Jet) Pacer Enhance was a related program estab- 432X0 Jet Engine Repairman lished to provide expendable items required to 432X1 Reciprocating Engine Repairman support Pacer Bravo. Such items as paper, pen- 461X0 Munitions Specialist cils, and slide projectors were sent to assure 462X0 Weapons Specialist that minor as well as major training materiais would be available. By July 1971 it was appar- ent that the Pacer projects represented one of provide the instructors for these courses, 243 the most successful training experiments ever vnaf maintenance technicians were carefully attempted as part of a United States military selected for training in the United States on the assistance program. specific system they would later teach. This One problem still had not been fully solved training was conducted by basic technical and warranted further attention. .An initial schools and applicable field training detach- advantage of Pacer Bravo was that the Viet- ments. Foliowing this, the vna f graduates at- namese students need not understand English, tended the usaf Air Training Command in- since the in-country courses were taught in structor course. Finallv, they retumed to South Vietnamese. However, most of the technical Vietnam to establish schools at the vna f Air manuais used by the vna f were in English. To Training Center at Nha Trang .Air Base and be useful to many of the Pacer Bravo gradu­ satelÜte schools at Tan Son Nhut ab and Bien ates, these manuais would have to be translated Hoa .ab. into Vietnamese. usaf assistance did not stop after the instruc­ The job performance aid (jpa ) represented tors were trained. On 25 January 1970 the first one important effort to overcome this difficulty. element of two Mobile Training Teams (mtt’s ) jpa s were maintenance manuais written in arrived in South Vietnam to assist the vna f in­ both Vietnamese and English, designed jointly structors in establishing the new courses. From by the Air Force Systems Command, the Air then until 7 May 1971, elements of these two Force Logistics Command, and the xyzyx Cor­ mt t ’s were in South Vietnam, some for only a poration. (See accompanying sample pages.) few months and others for nearly a year. Many Manuais for UH-1, CH-47, and C-123 aircraft of the mt t members had taught the new vnaf had been produced by June 1971. These man­ instructors in the United States, so there was uais relied on simpler language, more pictures, real continuitv between preparation and appli- and learning by doing, but they were not de­ cation. signed to replace technical manuais needed for 46 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Pacer Bravo: a mernber o f a USAF Mohile Training Team watches as a Vietnamese former stu- dent conducts a class on aircraft landing gear stjsterns at Nlui Trang Air Base, South Vietnam.

Pacer Bravo training aids: an aircraft hydraulic system mockup . . . and an aircraft engine MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 47

guidanee in performing the more complicated increasing vna f skills and developing training maintenance tasks. self-sufficiency. The Pacer Bravo courses established a sub- In Januarv 1970 there were eight schools at stantiaJ vnaf technical training capability in the vnaf Air Training Center at Nha Trang ab: South Vietnam. With this basic experience and a liaison pilot training school, an air liaison with the proven success of the Pacer Bravo officer and forward air controller air ground courses as encouragement, increased emphasis operations school (alo/fac- acos), a technical was placed on emploving mtts in South Viet­ school, a general Services school, a Communica­ nam. These mtts covered a wide variety of tions and electronics school, a military training specialties, including such skills as univac school, an English-language school, and an air 1050-11 Computer operations and counterintel- base defense school. Together these schools ligence. Like the Pacer Bravo courses, the mt t were scheduled to train nearly 4500 students in effort made a significant contribution toward calendar vear (cy) 1970. The Air Training Cen-

UH-1 job performance aid

JP» IW-IH-2-9

INSTAtL AKTI-COUISIOW LIGKT gín oÉn ngü» owg

Instai I A nfl-C olIIslon llg M Sin Sonq 3«n 1»n ngiff ------/ NOTE GHI CKJ It llgfít Is to ba Instailad, Nôu phal gãn den,xer< Trano kè oo to n«xt paga. tlâp. 1. Oack Ttvat lans <3) Is not I. Klãw kinh dan (3)_không bl crackad or brokon. Chack núrr noãc ba*. Klôm dê’ (6) ttvat basa (6) Is not không bl rw/t hoãc qãy. crackad or brokan. • . 2. Placo bulb (4) Into bulb 2. Gãn bong (4) vao íuc. (3). racaptacla <5). Daprass An ,và xoay bóna dê“ gãn ar.d tu m bulb to sacura. chãc. 3. Instai I lans (3) on basa. 3. Gãn dan^O) vao dá. Cãt Placa ratalnlng rlng (I) at váig qli/II) tal v! trl instailad posItlcn. gãn. Slât *ít (2). Tlghtan scrav C2).

CAI/TI0N LUU Y Polioa-or oalntananca actlon Công tácbâo trl cin dyoc tiàp raqulrad: Oparatlonal Oack tuc: Pbâl klám hoat dô«g cud Antl-Col l Islon Llght. dan nqJa dung.

5 48 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

ter actually exceeded that schedule aiid trained sory Group (afgp) saw the need to provide the 6800 students in 1970. vna f with the capability to replace pilot losses By 1969 a command and staff school as the greatest challenge to self-sufficiency yet (equivalent to usaf Squadron Officer School) to be met. The planned upt course, if adopted, had been added, and the technical school had would solve this problem. Except for pilot been expanded considerably. During cy 1971 training and a few highly technical skills, the over 12,0(X) students were prograinmed to vnaf appeared self-sufficient in training by graduate from the Air Training Center schools. June 1971. In 1971, plans were also under consideration to One development that indicated the techni­ establish T-37 undergraduate pilot training cal growth of the vna f in 1971 was the fiight of (upt) as well as helicopter pilot training (hpt) the TP-001, the first aircraft ever built in South at Nha Trang ab. Navigators were already Vietnain. Components of this aircraft were being trained by the vna f at Tan Son Nhut by manufactured by hand at various vnaf bases. June 1971. The engine and the landing gear were the only The last vnaf helicopter student pilots pro- basic components not built in South Vietnam. grammed to be trained in the United States In February 1970 a Seventh Air Force plan departed South Vietnam on 25 June 1971. The provided for integration of vna f personnel into last students scheduled to enter fixed-wing 7AF units and into some United States Army training left for the United States in early 1972. helicopter units for training. This unprece- The United States had agreed to train a dented plan complemented the vnaf training number of pilots for the vnaf, and as that program and the usaf mt t training by giving figure was approached in 1972, the need for a newly trained men experience on the job. By vna f upt school would increase. In July 1971 30 June 1971 over 3000 vna f personnel had the director of training of the Air Force Advi- completed this training.

Colonel Oanh, Commander o f the VNAF Air Training, Center at Nha Trang AB. prepares for a fiight in the TP-001, the first airplane ever built in South Vietnam. VXAF mtmen worh sidt: by sitie with I 'nitetl States Amty persunnel of the 205th Aviation Company. 50 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

The integrated training program (it p) re- major reorganization with the activation of five quired close eoordination between the Air air divisions. One facet of that reorganization Force Advisory Group, 7AF, and the vnaf. It was the expansion of the Air Logistics Wing at was most easily conducted at joint-use bases Bien Hoa ab into an Air Logistics Command because there only training was required. At (alc) on the same command levei as the air sole-use bases (Cam Ranh, Phu Cat, and Phan divisions. The thrust of reorganization through- Rang) billeting support was also required. out the vnaf was directed toward absorbing Two types of integrated training were con­ units programmed for activation as part of ducted: familiarization and upgrade. In famil- crimp and toward more efficient management iarization training vnaf personnel gained ex- and effective employment of all Vietnarnese air perience but were not awarded a higher skill resources. To that end, the alc was required to levei. Those successfully completing upgrade provide depot-level inaintenance and logistics training in a 7AF unit, on the other hand, support for the entire vnaf. Logistics training were awarded a higher skill levei by the vnaf. was the key to providing the required support, Testing by 7AF units was largely subjective. If and in 1970 and 1971 considerable effort was the Vietnarnese trainee performed satisfactorily devoted to training programs at alc. on the job, he was recommended for upgrade. alc acquired and occupied a new formal vnaf on-the-job training (ojt) effectiveness training compound in late 1970. The new facil- was initially limited by the small number of ities were a decided improvement and included experieneed supervisors available relative to billets, classrooms, and a usaf dining hall. With the mass of people to be trained. During this the transfer of the dining hall to the vna f, stu­ period the it p carried the brunt of responsi- dents began receiving regular meais in the bilitv for providing experience and job training training area for the first time, and morale and to recent teehnical school graduates. performance were measurably improved. In January 1970 more vnaf students were Training literature was ordered and received trained in it p than ojt, but by May 1971 this for all courses taught by alc, and over eighty condition was reversed. Between January 1970 16-mm training films were also ordered. The and |une 1971, 4326 vna f personnel completed literature was acquired from usaf atc Techni- either familiarization or upgrade training cal Training Centers and was in English; the through ojt, and 1934 of these were upgraded. films were to be made specifically for the alc During 1970 and earlv 1971 vnaf personnel training program and would be in Vietnarnese. were allowed to enter ojt and it p for either Formal training, ojt, it p, and usaf Mobile familiarization or upgrade because the results Training Teams were all employed. In 1970, were the same—the man gained increased pro- 454 students graduated from formal training, ficiency in a skill. Improved skills without and 1883 were scheduled to graduate in 1971. higher skill leveis, however, made personnel Courses included metais processing, corrosion planning very diffícult. It was almost impossible control, supply accounting, and others related for us.AF managers to measure training progress. to alc functions, but students were drawn from This was less of a problem for vnaf managers, the air divisions as well as alc. Many of these who relied more on personal contact and less courses would eventually be taught by the Air on statistics for personnel managenient. By Training Center (atc) at Nha Trang ab, but March 1971, however, the continued emphasis until training facilities and instruetors were by usaf advisers on the need for higher skill available at Nha Trang, they would be taught leveis caused a marked shift from familiariza­ by alc personnel. tion training to upgrade training. Seven mtts conducted courses at alc in In 1970 and 1971 the vnaf experieneed a 1970 and 1971. Twenty depot personnel were MIUTARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 51

trained as console operators for the univac Bravo and Pacer Enhanee prograins. Through- 1050-11 Computer acquired by alc in March out 1970 and 1971, mt t ’s , it p, vnaf ojt, and 1970. Two mt t s helped establish depot-level the Air Training Center steadily improved the maintenance on communication systems in late competence of vnaf personnel in a wide variety 1970 and early 1971. A supply mt t was sched- of skills and qualified the vnaf to perpetuate uled to arrive at Bien Hoa ab in September that competence. Each of the training programs 1971 to establish four new supply courses and played a significant role in the overall accom- train vnaf instructors. plishment. By mid-1971 vna f self-sufficiency in During the first six months of 1971, 196 alc teehnieal training seemed assured. airmen and nco s upgraded to five-level skills But perhaps the most significant result of the through ojt, and five airmen upgraded as a usaf role in training the vnaf was yet to ap- result of it p. Another 29 received familiariza- pear. The usaf experience emphasized that in tion training through it p. the long rim the most produetive approach to Thus, teehnieal training at .Air Logistics providing teehnieal military assistanee is to Command was a significant feature of the Im- train allied instructors in the United States, provement and Modemization Program. As a whenever praetieal, and then assist them in result, important progress was made toward establishing a training capability in their own self-sufficiency during this period. country and in their own language. The usaf By June 1971 it was apparent that one criti­ experience in Vietnam eonfirmed the value of cai facet of establishing vnaf self-sufficiency—a exporting the training rather than importing sound and viable teehnieal training program— the students. had been achieved. The breakthrough had oc- United States Air Force Academy curred in 1969 with the initiation of the Pacer In My Opinion

JUNIOR OFFICER PERSPECTIVES OF USAF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT

Will l Be a Desiccated Staff Lieutenant Colonel at Forty?

COLONEL VlCTOR F. PHILLIPS, J r .

HE POIGNANTLY searching question that forms part of the title of this artiele appears in Ward Justs book Military Men.1 It might well be asked by junior Tofficers in today’s Air Force and provides the thesis for this artiele: lieutenants and captains contemplating Air Force career status are inHuenced by their observations of blue-suit middle management. In reeent years the military establishment has placed great emphasis on enticing the junior offieer to join and remain in the ranks of careerists. These efforts, as mani- fested by increased pay, greater responsibility, career development programs, and interpersonal interaction between superior and subordinate, are to be commended. The payoff, presumably, is in a higher retention rate ainong “quality” officers com-

52 IN MY OPINION 53

pleting their initial tours of active duty. This them to stay on active duty after the initial concentration of attention on younger officers tour. While partially agreeing, I maintain that leads me to believe that we may be negleeting an important variable in the decision model has the equallv important middle manageinent been overlooked or not sufficiently considered: segment. Perhaps “neglect” is too strong, but the junior officer, in deciding on his future, certainly there has been less articulation about looks ahead 10 or so years and asks, “What is the "middlers.” Yet it is this segment of Air that group doing, for that is where I will be Force managers toward vvhich the younger fairly soon?” To contemplate the long run officers direct no small amount of attention in (temporally speaking) is to see most colonels assessing their own future. and general officers gainfully employed and As a student of manageinent and organiza- well paid. But that is a long time away; what tion, I recognize the pitfalls in arbitrarily seg- lies between now, the alpha, and star rank, the menting management into “lower.’" “middle,” omega, in the junior officers’ perspectives is and “upper.” For the sake of conveniente in middle management. this instance, I would classifv usaf officers with My reasoning about the middle management less than 10 vears’ commissioned Service as role in the Air Force as a decision variable for lower management, between 10 and 20 as mid­ junior officers is partly intuitive and partly dle management, and above 20 as top manage­ empirical. Last year, I was privileged to be a ment. Admittedlv, this classifícation fails to member of a group of officers that conducted account for the particular job a person holds or an Executive Management Seminar for selected for exceptions such as the “fast burners” who Second Air Force (sa c ) commanders and key are colonels and commanders or directors at staff at a West Coast base. Concurrently, we less than 20 vears of Service. However arbitrary were able to interact at some length with the mv divisions, I believe they are reasonable and base Junior Officer Council. The Council ap- generallv accurate. peared to be a representative cross-sectional I have the uneasv feeling that, generically mix of rank, age, jobs, and career/noncareer speaking, we accept Air Force officers in mid­ intentions. Most of the Council members dle management (my definition) as a “given.” seemed satisfied with their present jobs and That is, they are pretty well committed to a pay. One point that appeared to cause dissatis- career once they pass the 10-year mark, and we faction was their “look down the road” toward need not be that much concerned about their the middle manageinent area. Several examples retention. We are, of course, concerned about were cited to illustrate their feelings that ma- something called “career progression” for this jors and lieutenant colonels were being under group. These officers are past the initiation rites or improperly utilized. The Council members and are now supposedly demonstrating some generally felt that they and their eontemporar- capacity to rise to top management. There are ies occupied or were undergoing training to transfers, school attendance, staff or line assign- occupy positions of responsibility and chal- ments, and all the other, perhaps too frequent, lenge, had minimum complaints about present "good stuff" that moves this group along to­ pay, but were concerned that if they commit­ ward the top. Yet there is also a certain amount ted themselves to a usaf career the job ehal- of perceived square-filling and some jobs that lenges tended to diminish or stagnate as they must be performed although seemingly unre- entered middle management. At least from lated to top managerial development. their present perspectives, this view seemed to Vlany people feel that providing junior be the way things are. I have since talked with officers with better pay and jobs of greater re- other junior officers and find general agreement sponsibility represents the best way to induce with these feelings. 54 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

VVhat are some implieations of the junior firms, middle management numbers only a few officers’ attitudes about middle management? hundred or less, as opposed to the literally First, it appears obvious that the usaf has thousands in the Air Force. Do we, then, just made quantum strides to satisfy junior officers give up and rationalize that Air Force middle during their initial tours of duty. The gains are management is too large to handle? I think not. there, but more will need to be done on a con- The “morale” construct is difficult to underz tinuing basis. Second, perhaps we have paid stand, quantifiably measure, and work with, but less attention than we should to the longer time 1 am not aware of any manager worth his salt perspective. We have become preoccupied who neglects it. So, too, Air Force middle with the here and now time frame of the management, while large, diverse, and not easy first-termers and have concentrated on upgrad- to handle, needs continuing attention. ing their work and pay. In stressing these items In evaluating middle management, we cer- to this group, we may have negleeted their in- tainly do not want to glamorize it just to pre- termediate future. Implicitly, we may be say- sent a bright, but false, picture to junior ing, “Aren’t you happy and fulfilled now? And officers. We do need to take a closer look at a look what the future holds for you at the couple of concepts. First, are we providing real colonel/general levei!” The junior officer may management jobs and opportunities for our respond, “Yes, things are going reasonably well middle managers? Are they spending 90 per- now, and I am aware of the fine opportunities cent of their time in routine duties that contrib- that await me if and when I get to top manage­ ute less than 10 percent to the mission? Are ment in the Air Force. What coneerns me is they forced by fiat or neglectful supervision to what lies between now and then. Will the path expend 90 percent of their energy on items be exciting or stultifying?” constituting 1 percent of their budget? Are we Again from Ward Justs Xíilitary Men, “How forcing them to be so involved with “Mickey do you get an innovative, aggressive man Mouse” work that they become discouraged through the middle management of the Army, and obsessed with the hygiene (job environ- where life can be very, very dull?” 2 I believe ment) factors, while the motivational (job itself) that in the Air Force we need some re-evaluation factors, such as recognition, sense of achieve- and explanation. The re-evaluation should be ment, etc., go wanting? 3 directed at sustained assessment of our middle Second, the idea of forced, multivaried as- managers and their jobs, and the explanation signments needs re-evaluation. I am not sure should address what the middle manager is do- that periodic transfers and school attendance ing and why it is necessary for him to do it. are always cost-effective or experientially The middle management segment of the Air worthwhile, at least to the degree required of Force is large in sheer numbers in addition to our middle managers, who perceive that get- being geographicallv and job disparate. It is ting their “tickets punched” at the “right" difficult in a number of variables to compare times and places is mandatory for success. We the usaf on a one-to-one basis with civilian may have established a self-fulfilling prophecy: industrial firms, which are often held up to us Those whom we promote are those who have as paragons of organizational virtue. The ap- had their tickets punched; therefore, the proper parent conclusion that large civilian organiza- route to the top is to get your ticket punched. I tions are better able to track their managers am not sure that the acquisition of needed ex- through the middle years of management by perience, sagacitv, and eclectic leadership is providing them with a continuing series of always enhanced by the generallv applicable meaningful jobs is not altogether germane—or policy of periodic changing of jobs. attendance accurate. Even in some large private sector at schools, etc. IN MY OPINION 55

Third, we should attempt to implement bet- well-founded explanations of the functions and ter performance evaluation and human asset purposes of 10- to 20-year officers. We need to accounting procedures.4 Fourth, the people at address the issue of what positive things are be­ dcs/p, Military Personnel Center, and the ing done for middle management to encourage Human Resources Laboratory should be en- junior officers to aspire to that step on the lad- couraged to take a closer look at middle man- der to the top. agement, but obviouslv not to the exclusion of The question which forms the subtitle of this lower and top management. article is not rhetorical. We cannot assure ev- Finally, the emphasis in career management erv young officer that he will be Chief of Staff should be on a sequential, sustained basis: “Or- and that each step along the way will be one of ganizational development is concerned not glamor and maximization of self-actualization. solelv with the individual, nor solely with the But we can provide him with better perspec­ organization, but with the symbiotic and svner- tives to help him analyze his Air Force future, gistic relationship between them.” 5 especially in the transitional years of middle The “explanation” that I inentioned pre- management. Junior officers will always have viously is really nothing but a rationale. It opinions on the attractiveness of being a staff forces us to ask “Why,” to assess, to re-evalu- lieutenant colonel at forty, but words like “des- ate, and then to articulate what we are doing. iccated" should not be a preconceived factor I have the feeling that some of the skeptical in their judgment. looks being cast at usaf middle management Air War College by junior officers are due in part to a lack of

Noto 1. Ward Just, Military Men New York: Avon Books, 1972), p. 153. formance by Virgil Rowland. The mterdependent subjects ol human asset ac­ 2. Ibúl . p. 230. counting and measure men t of managerial performance need a great deal of 3. Frederick Herzberg, Work and the Nature o f Man ; New York. World attention and study. Further consideration of them is beyond tfie purview of Publishing Co„ 1966;. Chapters 6-8. this article. 4. George Berkwitt. "The Big New Move to Measure Managers." Dun s. 5. Daniel Kegan. "Organizattonal Development: Description. l»ues and September 1971. pp 60-64. Abo. see such books as Appraising Managers as Some Research Results. ' Acadetny of Management Journal, December 1971, Managers bv Haiold Koontz and Emluatmg and Improcing Managerial Per- p. 454 A SELECTIVE AIRMAN RECRUITING PROGRAM

L ieu t en a .nt Colonel Robert VV. D avis

ITH a phase-down in the number of men lower index scores than the men in the as- W drafted each month and a look toward sured-of-being-drafted group.2 As the draft is the time when involuntary entry into the Service phased out, it can be assumed that both of will be a part of the past, some new recruiting these problem areas, quantity and quality, will approaches have been introduced. Additional increase. To meet its manpower needs, the Air steps are necessary, however, to attract the de- Force might be forced to look to other person­ sired quality and quantity of personnel into the nel resource areas besides the 18- and 19-year- Air Force. old untrained high school graduate. Tradition- At present all Air Force recruits are gener- ally, the Air Force has drawn from the 18- and ally treated alike regarding their selection of 19-year-olds and then, at considerable expense, Air Force specialty, pay, movement of depen- trained them through technical schools and on- dents and household goods, technical schooling, the-job training. and on-the-job training, regardless of the skill Briefly, the present Air Force enlistment possessed and the skill levei achieved prior to program operates in the following manner. The enlistment. A concerted effort should be ini- prospective recruit is administered the airman tiated to enlist men who are qualified in an Air qualification examination, and an aptitude in­ Force-related skill. These men would be com- dex is established in each of four broad areas: pensated for their abilitv by enlistment at a electronic, mechanical, general, and administra- grade higher than E -l, plus other benefits. The tive. If the individual achieves a qualifying cost would be offset through money saved by score (40 or more) in one or more of the apti­ not having to train them. tude indexes, he is counseled by the recniiter In an address at the Air Force Recruiting on the jobs for which he has qualified. The indi­ Conference on 10 August 1971, Air Force Chief vidual may enlist in one of the afsc:’s offered of Staff General John I). Ryan said that over under the Guaranteed afsc Program or enlist half of the Air Force recruits were motivated in the broad aptitude area, with classification by the draft and that for the first time in five into a specific afsc during basic training. En­ years the Air Force had failed to meet its listment, however, is contingent upon the avail- year-end nonprior-service recruiting objective.1 ability of a vacancy in the aptitude area or The current recruitment problem is not lim- afsc chosen by the applicant. After testing and ited to quantity onlv, which is no longer too selection of specialty, the recruit is sent to criticai; Air Force figures show there has also Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, for six weeks been a drop in quality. In a study of more than of basic Air Force training. After completing 14,000 airmen recruited in 1970, a comparison basic training, he is sent to a technical school was made of the aptitude indexes of men with or to his first duty base, where he will receive high draft numbers and those with low draft on-the-job training. While at Lackland the numbers. It was found that the men with high basic airman may take the Specialty Bypass draft numbers, who were assured or relatively Test and possibly forego technical training assured of not being called, had substantially school. After graduation from technical school.

56 IN M Y OPINION 57

he is sent to an Air Force base where he will normal progression described above, would this start working in his specialty area and continue man seriously consider entry into the Air his training through on-the-job training pro- Force? Experience indicates that he would not. grams. However, if it were possible to determine that The first-term airman’s progress through the he had a high degree of skill in a job specialty enüsted grades is as follows: during basic train­ which the Air Force needed, it would definitely ing his grade is E -l; upon eompletion of four be advantageous to enlist him and make proper months’ time in Service he is promoted to E-2; use of his skill. if he progresses normally in training, eight It is proposed that his basic training period months later he is promoted to E-3; and after at Lackland Air Force Base be shortened be- an additional 14 months he is promoted to E-4. cause of his maturity and responsibility. Fol- At this point it is generally considered that he lowing the shortened basic training, he would is not yet a fully productive airman. (Of course go to his first duty base with onlv enough leave this depends to some degree on his job spe­ time, prior to reporting, to assist in the move- cialty.) However, more than half of his ment of his family. Thus, shortlv after his en­ four-year enlistment period is over, and a con- listment he would be a productive airman. not siderable amount of money has been spent in an airman in an expensive training program. teaching him a skill. This proposed program would have these A manpower resource area that has not been advantages: expenses incident to a full basic fullv exploited by the Air Force concems indi­ training course would be reduced; eost of at- viduais who have an Air Force-needed skill that tending a technical school would be eliminated; was acquired through civilian schooling or man-hours that would otherwise be expended training. In the present system of recruiting, by an on-the-job training instructor while the these individuais are offered the same enlist­ new airman was undergoing on-the-job training ment incentives as the unskilled person. As a through at least the five skill levei would be result the Air Force has had little success in eliminated; and, with the exception of a few competing with industrv for these skilled indi­ weeks in basic training, the entire enlistment viduais. The belief that a man is not trained period would be productive. unless he has been trained by the Air Force is Up to this point it has been shown that con­ neither a valid nor a profitable one. With a few siderable savings in both man-hours and dollars changes in Air Force regulations and some leg- would aeerue to the Air Force. But how ean islative action, a different path could be paved the Air Force attraet this kind of skilled indi­ for selected individuais who have a usable skill vidual away from the civilian competition? at the time of entrv into the Air Force. Since he has more to offer than the majority of It should be emphasized that the following the recruits now enlisting, the incentives would proposal does not apply to the majority of new have to be greater. recruits. It is directed only toward those indi­ The first incentive area to consider would be viduais who have received considerable train­ salary; and since the military pay system is tied ing, formal or otherwise, prior to enlistment. As to grade, an entrv grade higher than E-l would such, it should be considered an additional re­ be necessary. How much higher than E-l cruiting program. would be a function of the specialty area and To illastrate how this program may work, demonstrated skill levei. If a five-level skill consider a man twenty-three years old with a were the required minimum, then entry as an wife and two children. He has approximately a E-4 or E-5 would be appropriate. With the year of vocational schooling and three or four recent increases in base pay and quarters allow- years of on-the-job experience. In view of the ance, plus fringe benefits and, in some special- 58 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

ties, professional pay, the Air Force is becom- Compared to the cost of putting an enlistee ing competitive with industry.3 Even with these through the Air Force technical training courses salary inereases, however, it could not be ex- appropriate to his specialty, the cost of sending pected that a skilled worker would take a new an already skilled airman through basic train­ job at a lower salary levei than he can ccmi- ing and then moving him and his family to the mand outside. first duty station would be minimal. It should Identifying individuais who would qualify for be noted here that the Air Force computes the enlistment at an advanced enlisted grade would average cost of moving an airman’s family, for not be too difficult. The .Air Force already has a a permanent change of station, at $416.4 considerable number of tests that could be used When the total salary paid an airman over a for this purpose. For instance, the skill-level 21I/6-month period as he progresses from E-l test given in the 685X0 Air Force specialty to through E-3 is compared to the total salary of a data processing programmer could be used an E-4 or E-5 over the same period, the for testing a civilian-trained programmer after difference is relatively small. removal of all references to specifically Air The monthly salaries in the following table Force-related questions. include base pay (under two years for pay), In the example our prospective enlistee is quarters (married), and subsistence allowances married and has two children. It would be safe at the 1 January 1972 pay rate.5 to assume that he has some household goods. A E-l $ 438.90/month X 6 weeks $ 658.35 definite block to recniiting this man would E-2 471.60/month X 8 months 3772.80 arise if he had to move his family and house­ E-3 484.50/month X 12 months .5814.00 hold goods at his own expense. Therefore, ap- 21Vè months $10245.15 propriate legislative action would be required E-4 $ 514.20/month X 2llA months $11055.30 to authorize the same allowances for movement E-5 545.10/month X 21V6 months 11719.65 of dependents and household goods as are granted an E-4 with four years of Service or an $ 11055.30 E-5 or higher grade. - 10245.15 .An additional incentive would be an agree- $ 810.15 ment, prior to enlistment, on at least the geo- $ 11719.65 graphic area of initial assignment and prefera- - 10245.15 bly the first base assignment. $ 1474..50 Points are given for time in Service in the Weighted Airman Promotion System. To keep During the 21'/2-month period for normal individuais of this select group competitive in progression from enlistment to E-4, the airman the promotion cycle, an award of time-in- would eam $10,245.15. An airman who entered service credit would be necessary, for promo­ the Air Force as an E-4 would earn in the same tion purposes only. If he enlisted as an E-4, his period $11,055.30; if he entered at E-5, Weighted Airman Promotion System points $11,719.65. In the first instance he would earn should reflect time in Service equal to two $810.15 more, in the second instance $1,474.50 years, which is the phase point when the aver- more, than the airman pursuing the normal age airman is promoted to E-4. progression. These differences equate to less Under this proposal, it might appear that the than twenty percent of the average cost of Air Force would be giving more than it re- many of the technical school courses. ceived, but when all aspects of the proposition There is another area of concem that would are considered individually it is evident the Air require attention if a program along the lines Force would receive a fair return. proposed here were adopted. Unless the pro- IN MY OFINION 59

grani was strictlv controlled and used only for ing prior to separation or retirement. This enlistment of individuais who passed a demand- training is in areas unrelated to their Air ing test, there would be consideralile repercus- Force-acquired skill but in trades designated by sion from within the enlisted ranks. Some air- the Department of Labor as undermanned.6 men and noncommissioned officers would feel With the supply of Air Force recruits dimin- that, since they had to work and wait for each ished by a less potent draft and with the time of their promotions, evervone else should do coming when the draft will be eliminated, the the same. However, such repercussion could be personnel resource area for prospective recruits minimized by rigidly controlling the program. must be enlarged. Ií this can be coupled with An obvious precedent for this program is the the benefits of lower training costs and a longer Airman Education and Commissioning Program productive period during an enlistment tour, it (aecp), which permits an airman close to a col- is definitely to the advantage of the Air Force lege degree to complete his undergraduate to institute a program by which trained and work, obtain his degree, and then enter the Air experienced individuais can be recruited. Force as a second lieutenant. Air War College It is interesting to note that, in light of the present attitude of the Air Force regarding where teehnieal training is acquired, the Air This article has been adapted from a paper prepared Force has an ongoing program at Forbes afb, by Colonel Davis as part of his academic work while Kansas, that gives enlisted men additional train- a student in the 1972 class of Air War College.

Notes

1. General John D Ryan, "Recruiting in the 1970s." SujypUrment to the .Air 4. USAF Cost and Pltmning Fartar,, AFM 172-3. Department of the Air Force Policy Letter for Cirmmanden. Department of the Air Force, Number Force. March 31. 1971, p. 19-1. 10-1971 (October 1971-, pp. 1-2. 5. "The Military Selective Service Act," Commanders Digest, Vol. 11, No. 3. 2. "Post-Draft Decline Feared in AF (^ualitv, Quantity,'* Air Force Times. Department of Defense. Noveinber 18. 1971, p. 1; "Basic Pav Rates." Air Force Deceinber 22, 1971. p 8 Times. Deeember 29, 1971, p. 4. 3. Federal Jobs—YVhat Theyre Worth Now.” U.S. Xews atui World Report. 6. "Skill Center Opens at Forbes Jan. 10." Air Force Times. Januarv 5. 1972, Januarv 10. 1972. p. 26. p. 3; "Skill Center Drops Limits," Air Force Times, Januarv’ 19. 1972. p. 8. DIVORCE—MILITARY STYLE

D r . J ohn J. Marsh

N TERMS of trauma and waste of human po- ond stage” of his military career. The second is tential, there is mueh similarity between a failure to establish systems and procedures to divorce and the military retirement system. make use of the retiree’s abilities in direct sup- Some of the rationale behind our present retire­ port of military funetions during the retirement Iment policy is to make room for young and or “second military” career. These failures are physieally vigorous personnel. Some men, in the inevitable result of the “divorce—military passing through the “dangerous forties,” are style” attitude. We must see the retiree as a prone to east off their faithful partner of valuable asset and not as a used-up resource. 20-odd years and run off with a younger and The following proposals offer potential meth- more seduetive model. One suspects that the ods for eliminating these failures, at the same Defense Department, like the errant male, may time pointing up their extent. No consideration also be interested in new alliances with those has been given to the fact that laws would have who are unaware of weaknesses and don t know to be changed and costs would have to be met. where the mistakes are recorded. Economically, These are important points, but consideration the retiree, like the ex-wife, is “bought off” of them at this stage would be tantamount to with monthly payments as compensation for negativism. Further, if these or similar propos­ past Services. In both cases, divorce and retire­ als are valid, they are of sufficient value— ment, the implication is that the individual cast militarily, socially, and economically—to justify off is of no further value to the party doing the a considerable expenditure of funds and legisla- “ridding.” tive/organizational action. The points that follow are pertinent to any retirement system; they are essential, and fail- the hase retirement center ure to implement them is a waste of human resources. What is proposed is a more positive The first proposal has to do with the inade­ approach by the military establishment towards quacy of the military efforts in assisting the re­ retirement and the retiree. The Defense De­ tiree in his transition to civilian life. Following partment must cease to view retirement as the A. H. Maslow’s hierarehy of needs, we should end of its personnel program, a means of pay- look first to the economic and then to the psy- ing off the faithful and putting them out to pas- chological needs, bearing in mind that these ture. Retirement must be seen as more than a needs are not discrete but overlapping. means to insure an orderly flow of personnel The economic need of the retiree is his sec­ out of the personnel system. Rather, it should ond career, his employment, his wage-earning be used as a means of moving selected persons future. This is the future to which the military into a status that allows them to be of contin- personnel system pays too little attention. The ued value to the defense of the eountry and to existing military personnel records and evalua- the welfare of society. tion systems are equaled by very few others in Two specific failures of the present military either the private or governmental sector. The retirement program result from the current retiree who can take advantage of such records “expulsion” philosophy. The fírst is inadequacy and evaluations may present an unequaled set of the system in assisting the retiree to make an of credentials to a prospective employer. The orderly and productive transition to the “sec- military training programs are collectively the

60 IN MY OPINION 61

largest and most sophisticated educational and priated fund sources, fees charged to the re­ training system in existence. A good portion of tiree, and/or a monthly deduction from pay this training is readily translatable into salable similar to that for the Old Soldiers Home. It skills if it can be documented in civilian terms. should be standardized Defense-wide with a Manv assigninents of the sênior noncommissioned Communications network, forms, regulations, officer and the officer provide extensive man- etc. The prospective retiree should come to be agerial and technological experience. The prob- interviewed one year before his retirement. An lem of the prospective retiree is threefold with extensive battery of examinations should be respect to his personnel records, performance administered, such as the Kuder, Strong Vo- evaluations, training, and experience. First, cational Interest Blank, Edwards Personality there is misunderstanding and even prejudiee Preference Schedule, catb, and other aptitude, on the part of some segments of government interest, personality, and related tests. Voca- and industry regarding the nature of military tional guidance should be available with the duty, training systems, and philosophy of oper- Veterans Administration, colleges, vocational ation. Second, the records-keeping system of rehabilitation, and other agencies. The prospec­ the military is not designed to allow for postre- tive retiree should be furnished data of the tirement credentials for employment purposes. Department of Labor on the eeonomie strue- Finally, there is a paucity of effort by the mili­ ture of the area he wishes to li ve in, the occu- tary to deal with employment problems of the pational Outlook for the next ten years in var- retiree. ious fields, etc. If he intends to go to school, An extensive placement Service should be catalogs, application forms, and advice on ad- established by the military, a chain of intercon- missions should be available. The retirement nected agencies, one per military installation, center should have brochures and employment with uniform procedures, records, etc. This Ser­ material from possible employers in the same vice should be based on the concept that mili­ manner as college and university placement tary personnel are professionals whose capabili- centers. ties in their second career should be made Standardized forms should be developed for available in a professional manner for employ­ résumés. The retiree’s personnel records of his ment that is in keeping with their status. This entire military career should be available for concept leads to the operation of this program data extraction and reproduction. Past and pres- separately from but cooperatively with federal ent pay scales should be included for pay and state employment systems. Experience sug- progression history, as well as a description of gests that the motivation of civil Service per­ his military training programs and current and sonnel, federal or state, to assist military re- past afsc’s , mo s s , etc. The résumé should be tirees in employment leaves something to be prepared by the retiree with the advice of the desired. This is largely because military retirees placement and guidance personnel of the cen­ tend to seek govemmental employment and ter, who also suggest appropriate places to send thus are a threat to civil Service personnel. it. The center should retain copies of it for use Furthermore, the military should take charge of in replying to inquiries seeking personnel with this Service, as it will have a very positive specialized skills and in brochures for distribu- effect on morale and consequently on retention tion at meetings of professional associations. and recruitment. All the retirement centers should work to- Such a Service should include the following gether cooperatively and not competitively. aspects. It should be voluntary, and serious Every major organization and professional asso- consideration should be given to making it ciation should be “penetrated.” At every con- self-supporting by financing it from nonappro- vention a Consolidated, service-wide listing of 62 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

retirees appropriate to that convention should misunderstand and misjudge nonmilitary life as be available. Retirees should be advised of are the Service members themselves. The wife conventions and conferences so that they may should participate in any decisions; an inesti- personally attend them if they wish. The retire- mable value will acerue in the morale area. ment centers could be linked to a master retire­ The military is an essentially authoritarian ment data center for all Services, so that a na- system whose purpose is the development of tionwide search of prospective retirees could be the unit or the accomplishment of the mission. made to satisfy any employers needs. About Individuais are developed as a means to that the most sophisticated placement system in ex- end. While the development and growth of the istence is that for higher education. That model individual for his own benefit is not opposed, it should be carefully examined in planning the is not viewed as a major goal except to the philosophy and operational procedures for car- degree that it eontributes to the unit mission. rying out this proposal. On the other hand, many elements of civilian The centers should be staffed with personnel life see individual growth as second to nothing. experienced in testing, vocational and academic Retraining is necessary for many military per­ guidance, employment counseling, and place­ sonnel so they can adjust to the civilian world ment Services. They should work closely with without becoming alienated and seeking refuge all agencies in the placement and employment in extreme reactionism. An integrated program côunseling fields. They should be familiar with of lectures, briefings, films, and even structured the full range of military training and activities classes should be made available to prospective so as to aid effectively in the interpretation of retirees. Outside resource personnel should be these programs to the civilian labor market. used, such as faculty of a business department Retirement center personnel should all be in a nearby university, directors of local em­ qualified to assist the retiree in making the ad- ployment Service offices, personnel managers of justment to civilian life. They should be skilled large companies, labor union officers, etc. counselors and knowledgeable in the psycho- The preceding set of proposals is designed to logical, sociological, and economic aspects of prepare the retiree for his second career and to the retirement process. Ideally, they would be “market’ an invaluable human resource effec­ persons who have, themselves, retired from the tively to the civilian community. They are not Service and adjusted to the civilian world for all-inclusive, and eertainly alternatives should several years. be proposed. Any proposal must do what has The largely economic preparation for retire­ not been done before. To date, we have failed ment will have tangential implications in the to be aggressive, humanistie, and nonmilitary psychological area, but this coverage is not in our approach. enough. There must also be briefing, training, reconciliation: recycling the retiree and orientation programs for the prospective retiree. He should be made aware of the ways The second set of proposals has to do with the in which he should adjust his thinking. As an failure of the militarvy establishment to make example, the use of one’s military title is taboo use of the retiree. He is just a number on a re­ in many fields. The standardization and systems tired roll. We have no system for using him to approach to administration is anathema to augment the military establishment, to plav a many politically oriented governmental agen­ role in civil defense, or to participate in the cies at the local levei. disaster recovery process. We do not even Preparation of the retiree must include the know what skills or talents he may have ac- wife in briefings, testings, and evaluations. quired after retirement, where he is employed, Many wives of career military are as prone to or what professional status he may possess that IN MY OPI\'ION 63

could benefit the Defense Department or other member, the armed forces, and the nation. federal or State agencies. An interrelationship of the retiree and the Effective use of retirees as an aid to the De­ armed forces should exist, to involve active fense establishment must be based on a dutv on a voluntary basis with certain emolu- data-gathering system that would encompass ments to the individual and benefits to the De­ the updating of active duty personnel records fense Department and the civilian coinmunity. to show certain selected postretirement infor- Before discussing this in detail, let us consider mation. Education, certain kinds of employ- the retiree from the psychological standpoint. ment, foreign-language experience, governmen- It is rarely admitted by the individual career tal activities, etc., are some of the things that serviceman that he is in uniform for altruistic are pertinent. Such a system would allow for reasons. The potential danger from combat and the implementation, in whole or in part, of the the frequent disruption of normal family life following proposal. are so great that a price can’t be put on them. This proposal is based on the idea that the Whether altruism is the primary motivation is nation and the individual military retiree are debatable; what cannot be denied is that it is a both being deprived of an association that major reason for the overwhelming majority of would be mutually beneficiai. This assertion the military, even though some mav be un- requires an analvsis of certain factors and an aware of it. From this, a number of conclusions acceptance of certain conclusions to be drawn follow. The first is that retirement is a trau- therefrom. These factors encompass a psyeho- matic experience, and one who maintains a logícal, sociological, military, economic, and healthv State of mind during and after it is a legislative consideration of the military retiree. benefit to society. The person who does not is a Only in the past two decades has anv serious danger. In the extreme, the individual who is studv been given to military retirees as a group. resentful of the ehange may become a political Not until the mobilization of World War II extremist, a reactionary, an alcoholic, etc. Sec- and the “commuphobia" that followed has ond, from the idea of “love of Service,” we ean there been a large professional military force be reasonably certain that a number of retired and a peacetime draft. These have resulted in a military desire to continue some association large outpouring of retiring personnel, which with the armed forces if the associations are started in the early 1960s and will continue for flexible in the requirements on the individual the foreseeable future. It will taper off some- and productive rather than “made work’ or what but will still be a significant feature of our merely training and indoctrination. Third, since socioeconomic structure. To put concreteness the military member served for altruistic rea­ to this point, one official source has projected sons in the first place, he may serve alter retire­ that 800,000 military personnel will be on the ment for something other than a paycheek. He retired rolls by 1975, 90 percent of them in does not want to be put to any significant grades E-7 to 0-5, under age 55, and with little out-of-pocket expense, but he may not demand or no disability. special pay. Fourth, we should recognize the AU the studies and proposals made to date “love of Service" motive of the individual and consider how to ease the adjustment to civilian respond to it, nurturing it rather than letting it life. All are predicated upon the concept that turn to bitterness. From this, there will often Service to the nation as a member of the armed be an involvement of the retired military forces is finished. The divorce is final, and there member in the social needs of his community. are only “occasional visitation rights and ali- Youth work, community improvement, and mony but no right of cohabitation. This con­ civil defense are all areas that need the pecu­ cept must be changed. It hurts the military liar talents of the military. Finally, we should 64 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

not overlook the impact upon the man in the segment ol industry. The Services might wish to Service from the contacts and relationships that rent or lease a piece of property in a certain will result when the retiree “rejoins” the mili- area for some purpose; a retired member could tary. The young man in uniform will gain serve as a contact in making appointments for knowledge from the retiree with respect to a negotiators, advising them of pertinent indus­ Service career and retirement for himself. trial facilities, water and power supplies, etc. The second basic premise is that a specific Of course, the man who is near a military in- benefit, militarily, will be gained from the peri- stallation can be used in a number of ways. The odic use of the retiree in an active duty status. experience and background of the retired mem­ The possibilities are infinite, but let us consider ber can be used to fill a temporary gap in as- a few of the more obvious. The retiree ean signed manning, handle a special project, render serve with a military unit of the civilian com- technical advice in a problem area, handle a ponents. He can lend his experience, technical temporary excess workload, or perform a dis- knowledge, and guidance to the local Reserve, interested management engineering analysis. National Guard, Civil Air Patrol, and rotc: A major benefit is the maintenance or up- units. He can even do this if they are not of his grading of military skills on the part of the re­ own Service. Imagine the value of a training tiree. While the mobilization of retirees may be program for an Army Special Forces Reserve a remote possibility in the missile age, the mili­ unit conducted by a retired tac fighter pilot tary threat has a way of coming full circle. who had served in Vietnam! Consider the in- Three times since the end of World War II we doctrination of a Marine Corps Reserve unit by have brought obsolete aircraft back from the a retired Navv officer with extensive sea duty scrap heap because they were required for mili­ in amphibious operations. What of the value tary operations. Retired personnel are a valu- rendered to an Air Force Reserve Aeromedical able asset that must not be allowed to rust Evacuation Squadron by a retired flight nurse away because their skills are thought to be ob­ or an Army doctor who had field hospital solete. They should be kept eurrent for the day experience? A retired Coast Guard pilot can when they may comprise the cadre of skills and brief cap personnel on sea search techniques. A experience needed for a conventional war. Also benefit for recruiting can be realized when a we must remember that military personnel, re­ retired Service member actively participates in tired and reserve, may be the key to a contin- recruiting activities. Small units such as radar uation of civil order after a massive nuclear dis- stations and recruiting detachments could aster. Military personnel are espeeially suited benefit from the specialized skills of retired to the creation and operation of the impromptu personnel in their area to supplement their and authoritative govemment structure with own resources. The former sanitation specialist, the command, control, logistical, and Communi­ for instance, could help the local radar unit cations systems essential for survival after a dis- when they have a problem with their sewage aster, man-made or natural. The maintenance disposal system. Or the former squadron com- of skills of retired military personnel will better mander could help the local recruiting detach- enable them to perform this task. ment by performing as a summary court for a The third basic premise has to do with the deceased recruiter. The retiree does not have to individual and what he will obtain from this be near a military unit to be of assistance. A proposal. We have already spoken of the eompany many miles from a base might bid on maintenance of his skills and his familiarization a contract, and the facilities capability determi- with changing concepts and organizational pat- nation could be done bvy a retired member in terns. We must not overlook the necessity for that community who is knowledgeable of that some material rewards to the individual. These IN MY OPINION 65

rewards are divided into two groups. In the able study would be the legal status of these first are those that can he put into effeet either persons with respect to military law, cornmand without legislation or without anv legislative authority, etc. difficulty. In the second group are tliose that In the event of recall to active duty in the would undoubtedly cause considerable debate; true sense of the terin, i.e., State of war, inobili- most of this group have a price tag on them. At zation, etc., these persons must be recalled in this point, let it be clear that the value of the the grade they may have earned under the “re- basic concept is so iniportant that it should be tirement promotion system. If they then were put into effeet, even if the emolunients listed “re-retired,” it would be in higher grades. here cannot be made available. An essential to this program is some system First, the retiree should be put on voluntary of management. First, it must be 100 percent active duty in a nonpay status except for such voluntary. It must be Hexible, because personal death or similar benefits as would accrue to desires must play a part in it. Some could only him under existing law. The authority to call participate in the summer, others only on eve- him to active duty would rest with the com- nings, some no more than one or two days at a mander of any military installation, unit, de- time. A good number may have so Hexible a tachment, office, etc., located otf a military civilian life that they could serve for several installation. These orders could be written or weeks at a time, travei overseas, etc. The indi­ verbal and later confirmed in writing. Some vidual must not only be íree to accept or reject tvpe of performance rating System should exist. the program but also to withdraw or rejoin as Points for the duty performed should be award- his situation changes. Conversely, the govern- ed, possiblv similar to the present system for ment must be íree to reject the individual if his the reservist. The points earned plus perfor­ Services are unacceptable or if he is too difficult mance reports would be used for “retirement" with his “likes and dislikes.” A form would be promotion consideration. The criteria here necessary, which the retiree would submit to could be very similar to that for reserve promo- the base, unit, or activity he wishes to assist. tions. This “retirement" promotion would be He would indicate his background, experience, an official promotion in all respects except for availability, etc. Some system of verification the retirement pav. The title is used and the would have to exist; also some degree of inter- insígnia is worn. It would be similar to the view and acceptance at the unit or base. Also, Navy Tombstone promotions of a few years there should be a sharing of the retiree where ago. If the resistance the Navy had to the elim- there are several installations and/or units in ination of that system is anv indication, this one area. “retirement” promotion should be a strong YVhile the personnel management for this motivating factor. program would have some difficulties, this The areas that could be added but would be should not close the door to any serious consid­ controversial concem travei pay and per diem, eration of this proposal. We stand to gain the clothing allowance for enlisted personnel, and Services of thousands of skilled people for to- rations and quarters. Could the retiree travei in day’s military needs, train them for a require- a tpa status? In some cases it might be neees- ment of tomorrow, benefit the civil government, sary. A clothing allowance might be beneficiai and improve relations between the military for the airman, or else a ruling from ir s that and civilian communities. This has the poten- the uniform maintenance costs would be de- tial of being measured in hundreds of millions duetible. Rations and quarters, in kind, should of dollars in value to the nation. be available for extended periods of duty and per diem for tdy. An area requiring consider­ W hat is proposed is a fresh new look at the 66 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW concept of retirement, a look at what it means must consider him as an asset to the military to the individual, the armed forces, and to so- establishment and find ways to use him in that ciety. From automobiles to admirais, from capacity after he retires. shoes to sergeants, our society has, for too long, Many are the benefits to be realized from worked on a “use it up and throw it out” phi- such approaches. Retention should improve, losophv. Our national policies with respect to the economic health of the retiree should be material goods as well as those dealing with improved, the morale of personnel should be human resources have reflected little considera- improved by the demonstration of sincere per- tion for the patina of age in things or in people. sonal concern, and the effectiveness of the mili­ The strident demand of our society is to value tary establishment should be raised. The image and use effeetively hoth our physical and our of the military should be enhanced by the re- psychological worlds. These proposals regard- tiree’s greater ability to integrate into the civil- ing military retirement will accomplish two ian community. Hopefully, such concepts as things. We must do as much to help the retiree these may lead to changes in the personnel re­ go into his sec-ond career as we do to woo and tirement system of the Defense Department. train him twenty or so years earlier. Also, we Santa Fe, New México Books and Ideas

MUST WE BEAT THE SWORD OF LIMITED WAR INTO A PLOWSHARE?

Dk. R ussel l F. Weic l ey

AVING been several times a Presidential consultant without immediate responsi- bility to implement his own advice, General Maxwell Taylor is aware of both the jealonsies Hthat such consultants arouse among persons who are saddled witb responsibility and the diffieulty that the consultant faces in making his advice effective. “In the end,” he says, "a consultant is likely to have only the recourse whieh I have taken: to write a book to show

67 68 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

how much better the world would have been too well—in the sense that they could profess to ‘had they listened to me.’ ”f believe that history bound them and cut off Of course, General Taylor was much less of- their options. General Taylor, who was not ten a cônsultant than a soldier exercising re- among the architects of policy interviewed for sponsibility and engaged in military action. His the Graff book earlier under review, shows a book is a memoir that not only tells the world reíreshing willingness to recognize that options how it might have been better off but also re- existed and choices were consciously made. In cords his career from birth in Keytesville, Mis- particular, Taylor emphasizes the wrong souri, on August 26, 1901, through cadet days choices made by some American policy-makers at West Point when General MacArthur was in the episode to which he returns repeatedly superintendent, Service and military education as a pivotal event of the war: the overthrow between the World Wars (with especially inter- and assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem. I agree esting and well-recounted episodes as a lan- with the General that reflection and the pas- guage student in Japan and Japanese-language sage of time make the fali of Diem seem all the officer at Vinegar Joe Stilwell s side in China), more pivotal, and it is a merit of Taylor's book leadership of airborne troops in World War II, that even if it is not altogether candid about command of the Eighth Army late in the Ko- the details of that event, it so well draws out its rean War, Service as Chief of Staff of the Army implications. It is a further merit of Taylor's under President Eisenhower and Chairman of judgment that, when choices were being made, the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Presidents Ken- he did not favor American complicity in the nedy and Johnson, and a tour as ambassador to overthrow of Diem. (He acknowledges, howev- South Vietnam in the criticai year from mid- er, that he joined in the criticism of Diem that 1964 to mid-1965. Although he reviews his encouraged the authors of the coup.) whole career. General Taylor characteristically Until Diem fell, as Taylor points out, it was is not joking when he says he is going to tell possible to believe, and with good reason in the how the world could have been made better, evidence, that South Vietnamese and American and about half the book is taken up with the military efforts to suppress Viet Cong insur- problems of the Kennedy and Johnson years gency were making progress and that if South that are largely still with us, especially the Vietnam retained reasonable political stability Vietnam war. these efforts would substantially defeat the in- In an earlier review published in this journal, surrection. To be sure, though General Taylor I expressed dismay at a species of misuse of his- does not point it out, there is a considerable torical know'ledge which I discerned as a ten- possibility that, had Diem lived, he might have dency of too many of the architects of the Viet­ worked out his own kind of accommodation nam policy of the Johnson administration.1 with Ho Chi Minh independently of the Ameri- These men were too thoroughly informed re- cans; but worse things than that could have garding the history of the Cold War in general happened in Vietnam—and did. Yet as Taylor and United States involvement in Vietnam in does point out repeatedly and rightlv, the fali particular to be unaware that they were choos- of Diem precluded for a long time whatever ing among options when they made their Viet­ chances of political stability South Vietnam nam policy. Yet they held that their administra­ had. In the military field, the event so encour­ tion was trapped in its Vietnam policy by a aged the Viet Cong to initiate a major bid for previous history that they knew in one sense victory, and gave them so many opportunities

f Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: W. W. Nor­ ton & Company, 1972, $10.00), 434 pages. BOOKS AND IDEAS 69 to exploit, that it reversed our hopeful progress, the American commitment: the United States cast South Vietnam upon the brink of military was henceforth ethically obliged to help the defeat, and led to President Johnson s decision South Vietnamese out of a predicament to to begin a large-scale American military inter- which the American government had greatly vention. That intervention rescued South Viet­ contributed. . . there is no question,” says nam for the time being but propelled the General Taylor, “but that President Kennedy United States itself toward many unhappy con- and all of us who advised him bore a heavy sequences. Still worse, American complicity in responsibility for these happenings [i.e., the the fali and assassination of Diem linked the coup and by implieation its consequences] by United States to the fate of South Vietnam in having encouraged the perpetrators through the most unfortunate possible way: a partner- the public display of our disapproval of Diem ship of shared guilt. “Bv our complicity,” says and his brother.” General Taylor, “we Americans were responsi- Persuasive as his argument for the pivotal ble to some degree for the plight in which the nature of Diem’s fali is, however, Taylors dis- South Vietnamese found themselves. That cussion of his proposal to set a terminal date thought gave pause to anv consideration of for American military involvement in Vietnam abandoning them.” American complicity in the if Diem failed to make satisfactory progress fali and assassination of Diem sealed the United casts a shadow of ambiguity over his many as- States presence in South Vietnam. General sertions in the book that the defense of South Taylor calls the autumn of 1963 "The Autumn Vietnam was indeed vital to the national inter­ of Disaster”—and not onlv because of the assas­ ests of the United States. Through such asser- sination of President Kennedy. tions as well as through reference to American When Taylor visited Diem just prior to that complicity in the fali of Diem, Taylor seeks to autumn of disaster, in the last week of Septem- justify our long involvement beyond the termi­ ber, he favored establishing specific political, nal date he contemplated, the end of 1965. But economic, and military goals to put before the why, if South Vietnam was so vital to us, could South Vietnamese as targets to be gained. He Taylor at one time consider an early termina­ also contemplated an end to the American in- tion of our militarvJ involvement? volvement in Vietnam if reasonable progress Similarly, Taylor twice refers with implied toward the goals were not achieved: . . approval to Kennedy administration policy waming to Diem that, if the programs lagged statements that he interprets as reaffirming the from his failure to perform, we Americans Tniman Doctrine. He writes, for example, of a would not feel obliged to stay in Vietnam statement of Secretary of Defense Robert indefinitely and wait for him to catch up after McNamara to a Congressional subcommittee doing our part.” At that time Taylor believed on 31 July 1961: “This was strong language that “we should take the end of 1965 as the which sounded very much like a restatement of target date for the termination of the military the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and a renewed part of the American task. If a further deterior- resolve to resist Communist aggression any- ation of the political situation should occur to where any time.” The Truman Doctrine of invalidate the target date, we would have to 1947 did promise to resist Communist aggres­ review our attitude toward Diem’s government sion anywhere any time—in Truman’s language, and our national interests in Southeast Asia.” “to support free peoples who are resisting sub- But American complicity in the coup that over- jugation by armed minorities or by outside threw and killed Diem bound the United States pressures.” But was it really wise to offer this to South Vietnam in a way Taylor had not fore- blanket promise of American help irrespective seen when he thus contemplated terminating of the degree to which the specific interests of 70 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

the United States were involved in any given power deeisively rather than employing strate- situation? Does General Taylor, in fact, believe gic gradualism. Perhaps so, but this belief may that the United States ought “to resist Commu- not take adequate notice of the fact that, as nist aggression anywhere any time"? Is such an Taylor remarks elsewhere, the North Viet­ affirmation consistent with his 1963 idea of namese leaders have proven to be “incredibly withdrawing the United States from Vietnam if tough" and willing to stand up under a vast the South Vietnamese government itself failed amount of punishment. Ilowever that may be, to get moving? Is such an affirmation consistent General Taylor is surely right to worry about with Taylor’s statement late in his book, when the effect of Vietnam on our ability to employ he is seeking to draw lessons from Vietnam in the option of limited war and on the general regard to future commitments of American mil- credibility of our military power as an instru­ itarv force, that “the choice of the cause is of ment of deterrence and of national policy. the utmost importance in avoiding future If there is a way out of the dilemma of discomfitures of the Vietnam kind. To gain ini- which Taylor speaks, one step toward finding tial popular support, the issue must offer a that way must be to elarify, more than Taylor clear promise of important national gain at does, our understanding of the eonditions under tolerable costs and thus qualify as a valid na­ which we ought to employ military force. De- tional interest”? Has not General Taylor in this spite the usual precision of the Generai s judg- latter statement defined the proper grounds on ments and his prose, the shadow of ambiguity which the United States ought to take up arms persists throughout this book, both about but the criteria which South Vietnam did not whether we should have persisted as long as we meet: to resist Communist aggression not “any­ have in Vietnam and about when we ought to where any time" but only when the situation use the instrument of limited war. My own offers important national gain for the United judgment is that we ought to employ active States and at tolerable costs? military force not to resist Communist aggres­ In the same concluding section, General Tay­ sion anywhere any time but onlv when the lor expresses well-founded concern about what probable costs of action are proportionate to the Vietnam experience will prove to have the dimensions of the American national inter­ done to American ability to utilize limited war, est at stake. American actions in Southeast Asia when limited war is likely to remain the only since 1961 have imposed costs too dispropor- appropriate instrument of American policy in tionate to any American interests at issue there. various circumstances. The Korean and Viet­ Furthermore, while recognizing with General namese experiences alike, Taylor rightly em- Taylor the danger of attrition to our worldwide phasizes, show that it is doubtful that limited interests if we relv only upon nonmilitary forms war can command enough support among the of power, I would go beyond the lessons he American public to continue as a usable tool. draws from both Korea and Vietnam to empha- . . any President wishing to exploit military size that, while we should be ready to fight force as an instrument of policy [is] impaled on when our interests demand it, the chief Service the three-horned dilemma: risking World War of our armed forces should be to obviate the III if he uses military power deeisively, another necessity of fight ing. I would emphasize that Vietnam if he uses it timidly, or the attrition of we would have been better off if we had found our world-wide interests if he relies only upon ways not to fight the Korean and Vietnam wars nonmilitary forms of power." The dilemma more sueeessfullv but to prevent them from may be even worse than Taylor thinks, for he occurring at all. I would give more weight than believes that we could have succeeded long General Taylor does to the dietuin of Rear since in Vietnam if we had used our military Admirai J. C. Wylie in his admirable little book HOÜKS AND IDEAS 71

on military strategy: "War for a nonaggressor harely euphemistic terins, Sheehan accused nation is actually a nearly complete collapse ol Taylor of having beeri shown up hy the Pen- policy.” 2 tagon papers as mendacious.3 Rut in trying to General Taylor’s memoir is worth a thought- draw lessons from Vietnam, even Taylor, in his fnl reading. It does not deserve the churlish pessimistic summary, misses the full grimness of review that Neil Sheehan gave it in the New those lessons. York Times Book Review, in which, nsing Temple University

Notes don B Johnson tEnglewood Clilf.s, N.J.. Prcntice-liaU, 1970' 1 Russell F. Weiglev, "W hat Wtts Past Wus Prologue.’* Air l rnitersitij Be- 2. J ( ’ VVylie Military Strategy: A C•curral Theory of hnvrr Cimtrol «New in-ti \\11. 6 (Seplember October 19711. 09-76. a review of Henry F C raffs Brunswick Kutgcr» University Press. 1967:. p 80. Tfu Tuesday Cahinet Delilfcrution atui Dccision on Peace and War under Lyn 3. New York rimes Book Heview, April 9 1972, j>. 3,

A QUARTER CENTURY OF FRUSTRATION: SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1944-1969

D r . K enneth R. VVhiting

PPARENTLY the flood of books about our “loss of China.” During the McCarthy peri- China is not about to ebb, nor is the od, the villains were the U.S. State Department Aquality any less eheekered as the years go by.officials, in both Washington and Chungking, These works vary from serious studies to pot- allegedly working hand in glove with the boilers aimed at grabbing off a segment of what Chinese Communists. Later Chiang Kai-shek appears to be an insatiable market. A yellow and his Kuomintang “clique” were the bad dustjacket with China in large red letters seems guys who stubbornly refused to earry out to be the answer to a publisher’s prayers. Un- needed reforms and thus allowed Mao and his fortunately, one of the characteristics of most gang to take over almost by default. Every Sec- American writing about China is the tendency retary of State from George Marshall to Dean to account for "the loss of China"—as if we Rusk has received a share of the obloquy so ever had it—as the work of one or more vil- generously dished out in recent years. On the lains, sometimes Chinese, sometimes American, other side, Mao Tse-tung is either the Great and sometimes both. These villains stubbornly Helmsman guiding the Chinese Revolution refused to comply with a simplistic solution so toward Utopia or a psychopathic monster sur- obvious to the author of the work explaining passing even Stalin—after all, Mao had more 72 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW people to piek on than did Stalin. liberal leadership aspiring to occupy a middle The two books t herein reviewed are guilty ground between Chiang on the right and Mao of the tendency to “villainize” to some degree. on the left. Caldwell’s book focuses on two main villains, CaldwelPs constant plaint is the lack of real- Chiang Kai-shek and the head of his secret mili- ization on the part of Washington and its man tary police, Tai Li. The late Professor Dulles’s in Chungking, General Pat Hurley, that the book is more restrained, but John Foster Dulles only salvation for China was firm American and Dean Rusk are portrayed as the heavies in support for a liberal third force. This is the the Sino-American drama between 1953 and same will-o’-the-wisp that eluded General George 1968. The two books are vastly different: Cald- C. Marshall during his mission to China in well’s is a personal record of his experienees 1945 and 1946. As John K. Fairbank points with the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (oss) out in the following passage from his Introduc- in China in the 1944-45 period while Dulles’s tion to Dulles’s book, this was indeed an ignis book, as its title indicates, is an attempt to de- fatuus: scribe American policy toward China between The American analysis of the late 1940’s that 1949 and 1969. The first is journalistic in style, China needed reform which Chiang Kai-shek re- the latter a scholarly work. fused to provide is now yielding to the recognition Caldwell would seem to have impeccable that the Chinese revolution had accumulated an credentials as a China watcher since he was urgeney and inevitability that probably no reform program could have satisfied. In a way, these re- born in Foochow and educated through secon- cent studies of the deep-seated malaise in Chinese dary school in China. He was an enthusiastic society, of the necessity for mass mobilization and supporter of Chiang Kai-shek when he was sent the participation of the farming population in po- to China in 1944 but was rapidly disillusioned litical life, all lend credence to Chiang Kai-shek’s during his two years with the Nationalists. He claim that reform would only feed the fire of re- bellion. It seems more plain that he represented vividly describes the totalitarian aspects of an old order that could not be remade with the Chiang’s Kuomintang regime, especially the same actors still on the seene; the reforms urged Gestapo-like methods of Tai Li and the Secret by sundry Americans could not perpetuate his Military Police, which he claims drove the lib­ power. It was far too late for reform to stave off erais into the arms of the Communists. His ac- revolution, and General Marshalls decision in 1946 to disengage from the Chinese mainland was count of Tai Li’s Happy Valley, the headquar- the only feasible one. (p. viii) ters where Li concocted his skulduggery, alleged- ly with the connivance of the Sino-American The only course open to Chinese liberais in the Cooperative Organization (sa c o ), headed by a situation prevailing at the end of the war was malevolent U.S. Naval captain named Miles, to fali in step with either Mao or Chiang, or sounds like a Dr. Fu Manchu thriller by Sax opt out entirely. Rohmer. Caldwell found himself playing a The best parts of Caldwell s book are Chap- whole series of roles: he was working for the ter 9, in which he describes two journeys from oss, involved with Tai Lfs outfit, and, through Kunming to Sian, some 1500 miles through a mysterious Mr. Chen, was in cahoots with Yunnan, Kweichow, Szechwan, and Shensi. and some leaders of the Chinese secret societies Chapter 10, in which he gives a vivid picture who were trying to create a “Third Force,” a of wartime Sian. He is obviously in love with

f Oliver J. Caldwell, A Secret War: Americans in China, 1944-1945 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972, $5.95), 218 pages. Foster Rhea Dulles, American Policy toward Communist China: The Histórical Record, 1949-1969 (New York: Crowell, 1972, $7.95), 173 pages. BOOKS AND IDEAS 73 the scenic beauty of west China and with its As the story moves through the 1950s and peoples, both Han and non-Han. Furthermore, 1960s, each incoming U.S. administration inher- it provides an artistic devic-e through whieh he ited a messy set of problems from its predeces- points up the contrast between the simple sor. The Roosevelt attempt to make Nationalist Chinese peasant, tilling his plot in the pure China a great power was a shambles when mountain environment, and the fetid political bequeathed to Truman. Truman tried to play a atmosphere of wartime Chungking. If one is neutral role from the closing years of the not too finickv about the lack of scholarly tone, Chinese civil war, but the Chinese intervention CaldwelTs book makes for good light reading in Korea made the backing of Chiang’s regime and does give some flavor of the weird political in Taiwan too tempting a gambit to be resisted. situation in China at the close of World War Furthermore, Peking’s backing of the Ho Chi n. Minh insurgeney in Vietnam led the United States to support the French. The incoming Eisenhower regime inherited a triple confronta-

F oster Rhea Dulles’s study is a tion with the pr c — Korea, Indochina, and Tai­ serious attempt to portrav the evolution of wan. The new Secretary of State, John Foster American poÜcy toward Communist China from Dulles, a cousin of our author, was less a states- 1949 to 1969. There is little, if anvthing, new in man than a fervent moral crusader against Professor Dulless account, but it does get the Communism, and Foster Rhea does not let his storv into a concise format, onlv 173 pages. It kinsman off lightly. Secretary Dulles’s refusal to is the sad tale of a series of lost opportunities be civil to Chou En-lai at the Geneva Confer- for a better understanding between Wash­ ence in 1954, his rejection of Chou’s offer to ington and Peking, at least as told bv Dulles. negotiate made at Bandung in 1955, and his The real tragedv seems to be that whenever one sabotaging of a reciprocai exchange of news- side hinted at détente, the other side was in a men between China and the United States in hostile phase; the urges toward détente never 1956—all are regarded as lost opportunities to seemed to coincide. Furthermore, underlving the better relations with Peking. Dulles’s bolstering American policy in Asia was the assumption that of the American position in Asia through a se­ the People’s Republic of China ( pr c ) was an ag- ries of treaties, especially the Mutual Defense gressive Communist nation determined to ex- Treatv with Taiwan and the creation of sea t o , pand into Southeast .Asia, an assumption that could not but cause alarm in Peking. Onlv Ei­ took as axiomatic that the Chinese were in- senhower ’s adamant refusal to engage Ameri­ struments of overaJl Kremlin strategy. .Ameri­ can troops on the mainland of Asia kept Dulles can policy-makers were altogether too slow from getting the U.S. even more deeply com- in realizing that Chinese nationalism was the mitted in Vietnam. When the Kennedy admin­ primarv driving force in Peking’s policies and istration carne in, the U.S. commitment to the that Vlao and his associates were never merely Diem regime in South Vietnam was one of its a Soviet instmment. With the hindsight that inheritances. It also inherited a messy situation makes historians and Sunday-morning quarter- in Laos. backs omniscient, Dulles assumes that Ameri­ During all this period, for domestic reasons can policy-makers should have been able to dis- no administration dared to move very far or tinguish between Peking’s rhetoric and its verv fast in easing relations with Peking. The serioas intentions. This was asking a lot of the Truman-Acheson tearn was faced with the hys- statesmen in Washington who were eonfront- terical McCarthv accusations of not onlv being ing either Chinese troops in Korea or Chinese- soft on Communism but even of being treason- assisted Communists in Indochina. able. The McCarthy spirit carried over into the 74 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Eisenhower period. Any suggestion that the leader did what he did, but not why the oppo- pr c be allowed into the United Nations infuri- nent reacted as he did—we can only surmise. ated the China lobby and the China bloc in Thus the study of American-Chinese relations Congress. Even Kennedy had to instniet Adiai tends to be one-dimensional and exceedingly Stevenson to resist the admission of the pr c ; he frustrating. felt that it was too early to get the American These presidents and their secretaries of State public to endorse sueh a move. had all seen Hitler’s rhetoric become action, Johnson, on taking offiee, found that during the word become deed. Why shouldn't they the Kennedy years the military mission in take Mao’s rhetoric seriously? Furthermore, South Vietnam had been increased from 800 to they had witnessed the enormous expansion of 16,000 men. Then carne the escalation with its Communism in the postwar years, an expansion tragic consequences for President Johnson. This from a single country, the Soviet Union, to was the situation bequeathed to Nixon when he fourteen countries by 1961, not even counting became President in 1969. Throughout the the gobbling up of the three Baltic States. The Kennedy and Johnson years, Professor Dulles’s number of people under Communist control main target is Dean Rusk, whom he portrays as had gone from fewer than 200 million in 1944 an anachronism of the early cold war days, a to 1200 million by the early 1960s, a sixfold man obsessed by the danger of Communist increase. Little wonder that administration af- expansion, the “Cold Warrior” incarnate. ter administration in Washington felt there was To a eertain extent, Professor Dulles seems more than just rhetoric emanating from Peking, to be indulging in a mild form of demonology, Moscow, and Hanoi. with the demons located mainly in the execu- Professor Dulles, who died in September tive branch of the American government. That 1970, lived long enough to be puzzled about the presidents and secretaries of State during Nixon. Throughout his book, onlv Nixon is de- those twenty years reflected American opinion picted as a more stalwart cold warrior than is played down. The Formosan Resolution of Dean Rusk. But the new policy enunciated at January 1955, which gave President Eisen­ Guam, plus other overtures made to Peking in hower an open-ended grant of authority in the 1969 and 1970, seemed to indicate a new ap- defense of Taiwan, and the Tonkin Bay Resolu­ proach to the pr c . As Dulles put it: “. . . these tion, which gave President Johnson similar steps were significant; they had broken through powers in Indochina—both passed Congress the patterns of the past.” (p. 243) with searcely a dissenting vote. Only when the Why has that epitome of cold warriorhood, casualty lists mounted precipitously did the Richard Nixon, emerged as the first President of public sour on the war. the United States to visit both Peking and On the other hand, the picture with respect Moscow? With no intention of derogating the to Chinese policies or Hanofs strategy is brilliance of the Nixon performance, neverthe- blurred. Mao, Chou, Lin Piao, and Ho Chi less he is operating in a different domestic and Minh are vague figures in the background. Pro­ international milieu than his predecessors. The fessor Dulles has little to say about the constant leadership in Peking, as it entered the 1970s, barrage of threats from Peking, threats that found itself in an almost untenable position. Its turned out to be somewhat hollow in retrospect now hostile neighbor to the north and west but were alarming at the time they were made. along a 6000-mile border, the Soviet Union, Unfortunately, we do not know what Peking’s had won great influente in índia, while Chinas real intentions were during many of the crises, ally, Pakistan, had just been torn asunder. since the Bamboo Curtain is very opaque in- Therefore, most of China s land frontiers ad- deed. Usually, we know why an American joined hostile neighbors. In Southeast Asia and BOOKS AND IDEAS 75

«ilong China’s coast loorned the United States the Communists in the early 1950s without i md its allies, a network of alliances stretching being stoned by an irate public on his return. A 5froin South Korea to Thailand. And Chinas China only mildly angry at Rússia and still in a I xaditional enemv, Japan, had become the state of peaceful coexistence with índia was vorld’s third-largest economic power, power proof against any blandishments by Dulles, | hat could be translated into militarv power in even if such a thought had crossed the mind of 5eking s opinion. In short, the leaders of the that crusader. But a China that had experi-

»bc were in a hostile relationship with the two enced two armed conflicts with índia and was I ;uperpowers and with two potentially danger- still shaken by its armed clash with the Rus- l >us neighbors, índia and Japan. Something sians on the Ussuri in March 1969 was open to i irastic had to be done to get out of such an Nixon blandishments. Thus, at least to some ibsurd impasse. The Peking leadership, noting extent, the “villains” of Professor Dulles and bat the United States was showing everv inten- Mr. Caldwell could better be called the victims i ion of lessening its overcommitment in Asia of the particular circumstances extant during vhile the Soviet Union was expanding its their tenure of office. x>mmitments in South Asia and showing an I do not intend this lengthy analysis of Pro­ ncreasing interest in completing its encircle- fessor Dulles’s book to disparage the work; nent of China, saw the American threat as the rather, I seek to point up the fact that it tends lesser of the two. Ergo, Peking’s favorable re­ to elicit thought and to provoke argument, sponse to the \ixon overtures and the summit both indicators of a good book. In less than 200 )f 1972. pages he has skillfully interwoven most of the i< The point to be made, a point that seems to salient facts pertinent to his topic and done it lave eluded Professor Dulles in his analysis of without sacrificing readability. Anyone desiring iie Sino-American relationship over two de- a compact account of American vicissitudes .•ades, is that presidents and secretaries of State vis-à-vis the People’s Republic of China over is well as Communist policy-makers are to a the last two decades could do no better than arge extent the victims of their domestic and read Professor Dulles s book. oreign environments. An Acheson could not Air University Institute for Professional lave joumeyed to Peking to drink toasts with Development

THE CONTINUING SEARCH FOR A MILITARY IMAGE

Dh. G eor ge \V. C ollins

N 1957, when he was Commander of the concentration in the jungles of Indo-China—or Tactical Air Cominand, General Otto P. some other area of concern in the local war Weyland wrote: "I don t think any unbiased problem. I not only think it illogical, but feel Air Force officer visualizes B-52’s fínding and that it would be a pure mal-employment of Idropping weapons on a small guerrilla troop such an expensive force when we can do the 76 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

job better and more economically with tactical been standing in the wings for more than a few air forces.” Obviously the pattern of warfare years, apparently awaiting security clearance. and the use of strategie and tactical weapon While Futrell has not established any organi- systems in Southeast Asia have not developed zational subdivisions, the contents inherently fit as General Weyland would have predicted. into three main sections: first, an account of the Forces of both the Air Force and Navy that history of ideas and institutions within Army were designed for tactical operations have car- aviation from its beginnings in 1907 through ried the burden of the “strategie” air war in the Second World War; then, discussion of the North Vietnam, while the B-52 Stratofortress period from 1945 to 1957, when basic postwar has been used in a tactical role, primarily south policy was formulated and the Soviet nuclear of the 17th parallel.1 But the long-endured war missile threat emerged; and, finally, a review of not only affected concepts of military opera­ the developments from the late fifties to 1964, tions, it also intensified apprehension as to the when first the “New Look” and then “flexible pervasive weight of the totality of military response” became American military policy. affairs upon America and, in the General John The three terms, “ideas, concepts, doctrine,” D. Lavelle incident, led to an inquiry to deter­ Futrell defines as representing the evolution- mine whether the First Commandment of arv process from the original thought to its ulti- American military policy (the principie of eivil- mate implementation as operational reality. ian eontrol) had been violated. About three-fourths of the material is con- This review deals with two recent books cerned with developments since 1945. Among which, while quite different in format and the old interservice rivalries discussed are the scope, are both coneemed with the role of the B-36 quarrel with the Navy, the arguments military in modem America. The first, by Rob- over a 70-group Air Force, as well as basic dis- ert Frank Futrell, with a look from the inside agreements over missions, money, and unifica- of one of the nation’s military Services, is a tion. In addition, there is considerable material lengthy examination of basic Air Force concep- on the Air Force attitude regarding the “New tual thought. The other is a eollection of read- Frontier” policy of nuclear stalemate and flexi­ ings appraising the impact of the military upon ble response. society and which, moreover, conveys a con- The role of Air University, along with var- temporary view of the military image. f ious organizations under its command charged For many years a faculty research scholar with the development of doctrine. looms large and historian at Air University, Dr. Futrell is in these pages. Given the responsibility for well known for his history of the air war in formulating air doctrine in 1946, Air University Korea.2 For this present work he has mastered found it to be a difficult task, and it was not a prodigious amount of primary material and until the mid-fifties that the first round of Air has included more than a hundred pages of Force manuais codifying doctrine appeared. documentation from the writings and speeches However, the concurrent joint efforts of the of major military and civilian air power leaders, armed Services to coordinate and frame an as well as their testimony before Congressional effective, unified doctrine failed. Even more committees and other forums. The book has unfortimate, Futrell maintains, was the fact

f Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrim’: A History o f Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1964 (2 vols., Air U niver­ sity, Ala.: Aerospace Studies Institute, 1971). Stephen E. Ambrose and Jam es A. Barber, Jr., editors, The Military and American Society: Essays and Readings (New York: The Free Press, 1972, $10.00), 322 pages. BOOKS AND IDEAS 77

that, in the development of Air Force thought, environment.” According to Futrell, that eon- stagnation set in during the fifties—and at a cept of continued evolution of doctrine, rather time when new problems of missiles and aero- than static doctrine, provided the Air Force space warfare had to be faced. He quotes with an Outlook suited not only to the needs of former Secretary of the Air Force Eugene M. massive thermonuclear deterrence but also to Zuckert to indicate how “parochial” Air Force lower leveis of conflict. thinking had becoine. One can conjecture that The effort to convert ideas and concepts into the need to counter the increasing criticism of doctrine and organization necessarily required the Eisenhower-Dulles “New Look policy of theoretical projection of advanced weapon Sys­ massive deterrence may have contributed to tems. The Air Force here tended to follow the the conservatism of .Air Force thought. That conservative view that “a bird in the hand, criticism carne from both within and outside etc.,” and as a result intercontinental missiles militarv circles; from Army Generais Maxwell were afforded a low prioritv; nor were nuclear D. Tavlor, Matthew B. Ridgway, and James M. weapons evaluated highlv at first as they were Gavin, who argued for more balanced forces few in number and not expected to be decisive. and were joined bv influential intellectuals such When Secretary MeNamara threw his support as George F. Kennan and Bemard Brodie, who, behind an extensive missile program rather dreading to risk the unleashing of thermonu- than the B-70, Air Force Chief of Staff General clear holocaust, also supported a larger role for Thomas D. White wamed that to rely pri- conventional militarv forces. The introduction marily on missiles, instead of a balanced strate- of the Kennedy administration in 1961 made gic force of missiles and manned boinbers, the formulation of air doctrine no easier, as the would breed a disastrous Maginot Line psvchol- critics of massive deterrence received a sym- ogy. But that was a losing battle, and the ob- pathetic hearing. Rejecting the favored Air solescence of the B-52s increased while no re- Force strategy of counterforce as “spasm war," placement was programmed. President Kennedv and Secretarv of Defense Among the more interesting doctrinal mat- Robert S. MeNamara instituted a policy of stra- ters which Futrell presents is the question of tegic stalemate and flexible response, stressing the desirability of separate strategie tactical air the capabilitv of coping with both nuclear and forces. The issue had arisen during World War conventional warfare. Meanwhile, Futrell ob­ II when Brigadier Generais Orvil A. Anderson serves, the .Air Staff decided late in 1961 to and Robert C. Candee both protested such ar- hold back the revision of doctrine until the bitrary division of air power—which Candee New Frontier militarv strategy had matured. condemned as mistakenly copied from the Brit- Ultimately, new vigor was íound, and a see- ish. The same question emerged again in the ond round of doctrinal study was undertaken in 1950s when Major General John De F. Barker, 1963-64. VVhile Futrell notes that the Air Deputy Commander of Air University, spoke Force never discovered a counterpart to the out against separate air arms, and former Secre­ Navys Mahan (to formulate basic, lasting air tarv of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter and doctrine), he has high praise for Air Force General Curtis E. LeMay independently pro- Manual 1-1, United States Air Force Basic Doc- posed the consolidation of sa c and tac. The trine. Drafted under the supervision of Major legitimacy of the question is evident, for in General Jerry D. Page, that 1964 manual is every major war in which America has engaged commended for its recognition that “basic doc­ since and including World War I, strategie trine evolves through the continuing analysis bombardment aircraft have been used in tacti­ and testing of military operations in the light of cal roles. Futrell cites a 1951 Air Staff paper national objectives and the changing military stating that the designations “strategie” and 78 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

“tactical” air forces “were arbitrarily chosen” provided, ineluding not only the relatively and were not intended to be rigidlv construed. well-known commanders but also such concep­ In assessing this book, one is reminded of the tual thinkers as Jerry D. Page, Noel F. Parrish, comment of Michael Howard, the eminent and Richard P. Klocko. British military historian, who said that the Finally, it is regrettable that Aerospace central problem for mankind in this century, Studies Institute could not have provided a bet- and one which the military historian must ter printing format. Earlier Air University publi- study, is this: “Under what circurnstances can cations, Greer’s for example, were not set in armed force be used, in the only way in which typescript and are easier to read. Furthermore, it can be legitimate to ase it, to ensure a lasting the Greer volume was indexed—a deplorable and stable peace?” ! For that is the problem omission in FutrelTs work, in which so many that Futrell has addressed in narrating the his- individuais, organizations, and ideas are dis- tory of air power thought within the United cussed that even to track down an individuai s States Air Force. He has most clearly stated the full naine or position is quite time consuming. convictions of many air leaders that without And whoever decided to place all the footnotes adequate American air power the probabilities at the back of the second volume made a seri- of a lasting and stable peace are verv limited. ous blunder. Each volume is large and awk- .Vloreover, the conceptual thinking within air ward to handle, and to cope with both at once power cireles and the Air Force s efforts to es- in an attempt to follow the documentation is tablish an organizational framework in which most annoying. One hopes that future reprint- to foster such thinking are described here with ing will correct these as well as the many tvpo- a thoroughness that will mark this book as an graphical errors. invaluable research tool for evervJ student of air power. There are some disappointments, nonethe- T he book of readings edited by less. In his chapters dealing with the pre-VVorld Stephen E. Ambrose and James A. Barber, Jr„ War II years, Futrell has not appreciably en- differs considerably from FutrelFs. The essays larged upon the work of Thomas H. Greer,4 deal primarily with post-1945 developments and he therefore could have more brieflv sum- within the American military and, more gener- marized that period. In addition, Futrell has ally, with how military demands and policies failed to provide any insight into the character have affected American societv.5 Both editors and background of the various air leaders. are established scholars of military aífairs. In Admittedly this is a study of ideas; however, the last ten years Professor Ambrose has pub- intellectual historv cannot ignore the human lished a number of books on American military elements. Snippets of those leaders' ideas, with history, and Barber, now teaching at the Naval no insight as to how their professional assign- VV'ar College, has written for the Naval War ments and ambitions may have nurtured them, College Review. In the book under considera- are insufficient. One is repeatedly struck, for tion here, the editors, besides presenting essays example, bv how the arguments of LeMay, of their own, have selected a well-chosen vari- Cannon, Schriever. Wevland, and others so of- etv of material bv governmental officers, jour- ten appear to be merely expressive of their nalists, and scholars on topics ranging from a dedication to the particular arm of air power critique of the militarv-industrial complex to they happened to command. This is not a ques- the relationship of the military to foreign poli- tion of their sinceritv, but it surely points to cv, race relations, domestic order, and even to the need for more biographical and professional ecology. It is surprising to learn that virtuallv data on the individual leaders than Futrell has half of the adult males in the United States BOOKS AND IDEAS 79

have had some military Service. That statistic ten lacked in civilian life. Ambrose, differing alone lends credence to the thesis of the exten- with Harry S. Truman’s interpretation of how, sive societal impact of the military. Except for as President, he had introduced integration in the essays by the editors, almost all the read- the military Services, credits black leaders with ings have been published previously. Most of having pressured the administration to take ac- them are of recent date; onlv three predate tion.8 Each of these readings is incisive and 1964, the selection from President Dwight D. very helpful to an understanding of the broader Eisenhower and those bv Samuel P. Huntington interrelations between the military and other and Jack Ravmond. aspects of American society. As might be expected, several of the contrib- Ambrose and Barber have included only a utors are dismayed about the concentration of few selections dealing with military planning military authority. Mr. Ravmond, of the New and operations. In one of these, I. F. Stone, a York Times, questions those legislative changes respected radical journalist, chastizes both Pres­ since 1947 that greatlv augmented the author- ident Nixon and the military Services for their itv of the Seeretarv of Defense and the Chair- continued support for strategic bombers, a pol- man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff while John icy that Stone denounces as an “expensive luxu- Kenneth Galbraith s apprehensions about the ry,’ since he doubts the bombers' penetration militarv-industrial complex exceed those of Ei­ ability. Nevertheless, this argument continues. senhower. Nevertheless Ambrose, himself a Time and again usaf has reiterated its need for challenging critic of many aspects of militar- a supersonic heavy bomber and last year was ism, concludes that, although the military is supported vigorously by Seeretarv of Defense gigantic, it has not swallowed the American Melvin R. Laird. who testified in the Senate society and “does not dominate our lives, estab- hearings regarding the sa l t agreement that he lish values, or dictate our foreign and domestic would not reeommend acceptance of that arms policies.” Furthermore, as Lawrence B. Tatum limitation unless further funds were provided observes in an article included in the book, the for the B-l bomber and Trident submarine number of military men appointed to kev non- development. Yet, although such development military positions within the government has funds were included in the fiscal 1973 dod declined in the past twentv years. He maintains budget, little bomber produetion is yet seen. that the high ineidence of their employment The variety of the selections in this book is immediatelv after the Second World War was such that most readers will find some articles primarily due to the shortage of civilian talent more noteworthy than others. Jack Raymond’s available at that time. Contrarily, today some comments on former Seeretarv of Defense Rob- people are fearful that the ascendancy of civil­ ert S. McNamaras interest in exercising opera- ian leadership in military affairs is dangerous,6 tional control will appeal to those who are at- although, as Tatum reminds us, that has been tracted to questions of the command of Ameri­ the American tradition.7 can military forces. Another thoughthil article For those individuais interested in current is Martin Blumenson’s “On the Function of the sociological tensions in America, there are per- Military in Civil Disorders,” which presents tinent selections by Professors Morris Janowitz another nuance in the long controversy regard­ and Charles C. Moskos, Jr., and by both the ing the respeetive merits of regular and militia editors, on socialization and race relations. The forces. Using the 1967 Detroit riots as an exam- writers generallv agree that the military has ple, Blumenson argues that regular soldiers provided individuais of “lower class” back- have demonstrated a far greater ability to act grounds with a sense of belonging and with successfully and with restraint than has the opportunities for better living, which they of- National Guard. 80 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

In general, while the editors are to be com- While the readings included in Ambrose- plimented on assembling these selections, they Barber are provocative and merit attention, would have assisted their readers more had the stature of this work obviously is not on they included a preface or introduction that the same plane with Futrell s original study. stated their intentions; in that respect the title Dr. Futrell s book is a major contribution to the is not a sufficient guide. And parallel to the history of military thought, and no one dealing typographical shoddiness of Futrells book is with the intellectual context of air power de­ the editorial laxity of Ambrose and Barber. The velopment, or even more generally with the citations regarding previous publication of the problems of war and peace in the twentieth selections included are incomplete and incon- century, can afford to overlook it. Within the sistent, sometimes lacking the volume number, usaf, it should be studied at the highest leveis date, and pagination from the journal where in what one hopes is a continuous effort to pro- the articles were originally published. Stylistie vide individual and organizational priority for changes were made unnecessarily and not indi- the formulation of ideas, concepts, and doc­ cated in the articles by Raymond and Tatum, trine. and in the latter the changes misrepresent the Wichita State University author s intended meaning.

Notes 1. For an account of lhe tactical use of the B-52. see VVilliain H. Greenhalgh. theine of the USAF Academy Fifth Military History Symposium held on 5-6 Jr.. AOK Airpower over Khe Sanh," Aerospace Historian, 19 (Mareh 1972). Octoher 1972 was “The Military and Society." As Professor Louis Morton 2-9. mused in the wrap-up session of that conference. there is an inconsistency in 2. Rolx;rt F Futrell. The United States Air Force in Korea. 1950-1953 {New treating the military as something apart from society. York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1961). 6. See Herman S. Wolk, “Antimilitarism in America," Air University Re- 3. Michael Howard. “Strategy and Poliey in Twentieth-Centurv Warfare." view. XXIII, 4 (May-June 1972). 13. The Harmon Lectures in Milltary History. no. 9 i U.S. Air Force Academy, 7. .An excellent article rcfuting the likelihood of domtnant militarism in Colorado. 1967). p. 12. America is Colonel Richard F. Rosser, USAF. “Civil-Militarv Relations in 4. Thoinas H. Greer, The Development o f Air Doctrine in the Armtj Air Arm, the 1980s.' Military Review. LII (Mareh 1972), 18-31. 1917-1941 Air University, Ala.: USAF Historical Division. 1955). 8. Harry S. Tniman. Memoirs, vol. II. Yen rs o f Trial and Hojh' (Garden City. 5. These topics currentlv are receiving much and proper attention. The New York: Doubleday and Co.. 1956). 182-8.3.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY- THE ENDS AND THE MEANS CoLONEL Ha ROLD L. HlTCHENS

EFENDERS of American support for War, and modem dissenters are fond of ealling South Vietnam over the past decade up the figure of the tall young Congressman haveD tended to take comfort in recalling pre­ from Illinois, Abraham Lincoln, as lie paced vious instances when Administration foreign up and down the aisle in the House, speaking poliey led to strong domestic repercussions. out against the war and President Polk's policies. Korea is the most recent example; our military Even farther back, the War of 1812—and the campaign there—once the initial Communist policies of Jefferson and Madison which helped invasion from the North had been halted— bring it on—sharply divided tlie countrv. New evoked the tvpical American disillusionment England sailors and merchants, for whom the with a poliey that does not result in immediate, war was supposedlv being fought, denounced tangible success. A century earlier there was it bitterly. Threats of secession and nullifieation great opposition in the North to the Mexican were rife, and Dimiel Webster, later to become BOOKS AND IDEAS 81

the great Champion of the Union, warned in sibility toward the rest of the world, but he 1814 that his state would not obev the con- eschews discussion of most underlying factors scription laws. in the current foreign policy controversy. In- Yet all these precedents of opposition to stead, he examines the bases for a series of cur­ American war policies do not account for the rent, commonly held denigrations of U.S. pol­ present torrent of shrill and violent criticism of icy. Are we arrogant and messianic? Not so, the Vietnam war nor of American foreign pol­ says Quigg. We are known abroad as self- icy in general. There is an eleinent of our popu- critics, and we have been far more restrained lace which, as author Philip Quigg puts it, and pragmatic than many smaller nations. . . believes that the United States is inher- Are we obsessively anti-Communist? Quigg, entlv aggressive, unprincipled and either in- writing before the recent Strategic Arms Liini- competent or unsuited to play any responsible tation agreements, finds that while we have had role in the world.” f real bases for resisting Communism, our poli­ Vietnam is, for a number of reasons, the fo- cies have been relativelv restrained. Further- cus of the uneasiness of some Americans over more, he says, “Our fear of communism has our foreign policy, but there are other under- been as nothing compared to our antagonists’ lying causes. There is the residual isolationism fear of freedom." that survives from the nineteenth centurv, A common radical-elite criticism of Ameri­ when Americans turned their backs on the can foreign policy is that we oppose revolution world and for a centurv bent their energies to and support "rightists." Quigg approaches this spreading over a continent. Then there was subject by raising a question: “Is revolution America’s deep involvement in the two World really a shortcut to a more just society?" He Wars and in the post-World War II period. thinks not, and he adds a consideration that Now’ the pendulum has swung back. There is revolutionaries are inclined to ignore—the mas- the coming of age, vocally, of the first genera- sive bloodshed that accompanies revolutions: tion of Americans to be brought up on televi- “For Americans to go about indiscriminately sion, where, in the passage of an hour or half promoting revolutions is trifling with human hour, problems are posed and neatly resolved. life on a very large scale.” This, of course, is (It takes time to realize that the problems of hardly a deterrent to American intellectuals, the real world are not so simply settled.) And and Quigg quotes living Kristol s observation finallv, there is the deep, subjective dissatisfac- that . . American foreign policy . . . must tion with our society felt by many intellectuals work within a climate of opinion that finds the and expressed through the media they largely idea of a gradual evolution of traditional socie- dominate. Often intelligent and articulate, they ties thoroughly miinteresting—which, indeed, convey the impression that in the “right" kind has an instinctive detestation of all traditional of society they would be the ones guiding pol­ societies as being inherently unjust . . .” icy and reaping the material rewards that now Some of our intellectuals’ enchantment with go to others. It follows that the policies of an revolutionary techniques arises from a mis- Administration to which they do not belong understanding of our own Revolution in the are, bv definition, misguided and ruinous. eighteenth centurv. Popular rhetoric to the Philip Quigg, who for fifteen years was man- contrary, the American Revolution does not aging editor of Foreign Affairs, notes how we eonstitute an example for poor, backward na­ have wavered between isolationism and respon- tions of today. Our Revolution had a conserva-

f Philip W . Q uigg, America the Dutiful: An Assessment o f U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971, $6.95), 223 pages. 82 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

tive, legalistie eharacter; it aimed only ut po- points out, “almost without exception the non- litical separation from Britain, because the Communist countries of Asia have urged the mother country was thought to have altered United States not to reduce its commitments the structure of the Empire as Amerieans had there in any significant degree.” The conclusion known it. As historian Daniel Boorstin has said, is that the United States is part of the world “The most obvious peculiarity of our American and, as Quigg demonstrates, critics of our for­ Revolution is that, in the modem European eign policy have failed to consider the con- sense of the word, it was hardly a revolution at sequences, even for our free society, should all.” The analogy to modern revolutions has we abandon the field to those nations whieh even less application when we consider that in have not renounced war. 1776 the United States was no poor country Quigg’s book will irritate a good many read- like most of the new nations of Asia and África. ers; the radical-liberals, for example, will come In 1776 the United States had the third-highest up with their usual knee-jerk reaction to any gross national product in the world, exceeded suggestion that not all of our policies in the only by Britain and France, and per capita in- postwar period have been iniquitous or failures. come was the highest in the world. The book will find some critieism from even Quiggs book also looks at instances of our the defenders of our policies; Quigg is at times supposed support of rightist dictatorships. The overly sensitive, particularly on our policies truth is, he says, that our policies have complex toward Vietnam, South África, and the Philip- causes and are not based on anv simplistic no- pines. As an example, in admitting “errors" in tion that “radical is risky and conservative is the case of South África, Mr. Quigg seems safe.” unaware of the impressive arguments to the In the remainder of his book, Quigg goes into contrary presented by Charles Burton Marshall other common assertions about recent Ameri­ and Dean Acheson. Probably the greatest can foreign policy. On our supposed overcom- by-product of the book will be increased recog- mitment and propensitv to intervene in other nition of the difficulties of conducting foreign nations’ affairs, Quigg recalls that while there policy in a democracy. Administration officials were 164 outbreaks of significant violence in in the United States have problems not even the world between 1958 and 1966 the United dreamed of in other nations. No one. for exam­ States had been involved in only seven. Quigg’s ple, expeets Moscow and Hanoi to let their analvsis includes a long discussion of each in- people know what they are planning, but stance. It we assume that the United States has Washington is expected to reveal all details, any national interests at all—however difficult moment bv moment. Any hint of benefits from to define-then we have to assume that such our policies for special interests in the United interests impose obligations, even though the States arouses automatic denunciation; yet, as radical critics call this self-righteous and hypo- Dean Acheson once mentioned to this review- critical. Many of these critics assert that our er. the support of special interests in a good national interest has the real aim of establishing cause is not to be neglected, and the former American economic domination of the world; Secretary of State reealled the Biblical injuric- yet, as Quigg says, “most nations of the Third tion, “Make to yourselves friends of the mam- World have nothing that is essential to us," and mon of unrighteousness." Quiggs understand- our trade and investment go mostly to the de- ing of the complexities—political and otherwise— veloped nations (Europe, Canada, etc.). Fur- in the foreign policy process will prove ben­ thermore, from the standpoint of political and eficiai, as will his conclusion that America has military intervention, our greatest “sin.” Viet- carried out, in a praiseworthv manner, the du- nam, is taking place in Asia; yet, as Quigg ties and responsibilities belonging to the world s BOOKSAND IDEAS 83

biggest povver. The altemative? As George Bali Raleigh would surely not, at this late date, be- has asked, If the United States does not walk grudge the authors getting in a good lick, right the world policemans beat, who willi* o tf the bat, for his cause. But the reader who wishes to find in this chapter an integration of naval strategy with the theme of current na­ tional security problems will be disappointed. ° A notlier recent book, by Raymond We can concede that Admirai Mahan gave OConnor, looks at the relationship between intellectual substance to the strategy of control force and diplomacy in American history. f The of the sea. But the future interaction of force connection is not always clearly defined; most, and diplomacy that will set the proper strategy although not all, of 0 ’Connor’s chapters focus for this eountry can no more be based on Ma­ on fairly narrow, sometimes legalistic, appli- han alone than on Clausewitz alone for land or cations of militarv pressure to achieve national Douhet alone for air, each to the exclusion of objectives. “The correlation between military the other two. This does not daunt Professor power and successful foreign policy is not gen- O Connor, however, and the thesis of this chap­ erally understood,” savs 0 ’Connor at the ter forms yet another in the currently fashion- beginning of his book, and he launches into a able array of assertions that we should adopt survey of how force influenced diplomacy what has been referred to as a “blue water throughout the history of the United States. strategy.” From this, the publisher’s blurb draws the 0 ’Gonnor makes a valid point in his state­ superficial observation that O Connor chal- ment that “Rússia, not surprisingly, has lenges the traditional view of the United States emerged as a rival to American naval domi­ as a peace-loving nation. This misleading state- nante, and her efforts should be viewed in light ment is based on the author’s examples of U.S. of the competition on the international scene territorial aequisition by military force. Apart and the virtual equilibrium prevailing in other from the fact that most of these were en- dimensions of military activity.” It does not fol- wrapped in political considerations and affected low, however, that the author s summation in by the inexorable pressure of American settlers the final paragraph of the chapter is true: for more land, the statement ignores completely . . . it is diffieult to avoid concluding that the stra- the biggest single addition to the territorv of tegic significance of sea power has increased, most the original United States, the Louisiana Pur- notably in its impact on land warfare. It is now chase, which was acquired, as Thomas A. Bailey capable of operating inland, with an even greater has put it, “at one bloodless stroke." potential for what is ealled “blackmail" and for affecting the outcome of wars, either unconven- 0 ’Connor, a former naval officer who is now tional, liinited or general. chairman of the history department at the What is not addressed by 0 ’Connor, and University of Miami, begins a chapter entitled should be in an analysis of force and diploma­ “Naval Strategy in the Twentieth Century" cy, is the extent to which in today’s world the with a quotation. long enshrined in the canon United States must pursue control of “sea of naval scriptures, from Sir Walter Raleigh: lanes” to achieve its national security objec­ “Whosoever commands the sea, commands the tives. Herman Finer, one of our most eminent trade; whosoever commands the trade of the political scientists, has noted that in 1917 Wal- world, commands the riches of the world, and ‘ Colonel Gcralil ) Carcy. now attending the Industrial Cnllcge of the Armed consequently the world itself. ' The courtepus Forces, provided ine with useful cominents on this chapter.

fRaymond G. 0 ’Connor, Force and Diplomacy: Essays Military and Diplomatic (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1972, $10.00), 167 pages. 84 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

ter Lippmann called for the United States to rily and politically, and he blames Churchill, enter World War I because at that time he not fdr, for concessions to Rússia that gave her thought sea power was decisive in Américas a stronger postwar position in Europe. To this survival and the new seagoing power was reviewer, the evidence presented by 0 ’Connor Imperial Germany. “It is a danger to America for assigning to Churchill the responsibility for . . says Professor Finer, to hark “back to these “errors” of strategy is not conclusive. Mahan s teachings, without multiplying 20 Even less substantial is his defense of the Allied knots by 350, and without multiplying the policy of unconditional surrender toward the power of poor shots of dynamite by megatonic Axis powers. Here I think the weight of opin­ nuclear explosive and radioactive force.” Fi- ion is correct—that, as Bailey says, the uncondi­ ner’s statement was an attack on the tional surrender policy “greatly complicated” neo-isolationism of Lippmann and many other the reconstruction of enemy nations. critics of U.S. “globalism” in the post-World 0 ’Connor’s chapter on President Truman is War II period, so he stressed the time eontrae- by far the most useful—and welcome—in his tion posed by the nuclear threat to our secu- book. Until recently, the great foreign policy rity. His point is just as valid with regard to the initiatives of the Truman Administration—the wide-ranging capabilities of air power, whether Truman Doetrine, aid to Greece and Turkey, or not it is accompanied by nuclear weapons. the Marshall Plan, and nato—were regarded as Seven of OConnors chapters were prepared statesmanlike applications of American strength in their original form under a contract with the in the interest of the free world’s peace and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. They prosperity. Academics and other intellectuals deal principally with the technical aspects of (who, despite their horror of dictatorship, are disarmament and the use of sanctions to en- fond of extraordinary one-man initiative on the force international agreements. Far more inter- part of a President whose policies they support) esting are the next two chapters. One, “Roose- had advanced Truman to the rank of the “near velt and Churchill: A Reinterpretation of the great" among Presidents. But fashions in Presi- Diplomacy of World War II," is a lengthy de- dents change, just as fashions in nearly every- fense of fdr s position on a second front, un- thing else; and with the disillusionment over conditional surrender, etc. It is intended to Vietnam carne a broader disenchantment with counteract what 0 ’Connor calls the “conven- the image of America as the Champion of the tional interpretation of the diplomacy of the free world, with consequent downgrading of Second World War. That interpretation, ac- the efforts taken bvJ Truman to reconstruct cording to OConnor, contends that Roosevelt, Europe after the war and to use American sup­ unlike Churchill, “did not understand” the port in protecting other nations from Com- correlation between force and diplomacy, that munist aggression. Truman’s reputation as a the President was “obsessed with the militarv President slipped as a result, jast as did that of aspects of the war,” ignored political objee- Kennedy and Lvndon Johnson later. 0 ’Connor’s tives, prolonged the conflict, enabled the Soviet assessment, then, is all the more refreshing, Union to shape the peace, and, finally, that he coming as it does while the breast-beating of so thus made it possible for the Soviets to domi- many of our liberal intellectuals is at its loudest nate Eastern Europe and threaten the security and their little-America policies are thrust con- of the Western World. O Connor s opinion is tinuouslv in the public eye. that the reverse is more nearly eorrect. He O Connor ticks off six dimensions in which argues that Churchill s policy of striking at the Truman’s exercise of Presidential power or Germans from the periphery of Europe, the influence defined American national security “indirect approach," was unsound, both milita- policy: BOOKSAND IDEAS 85

1. Control over nuclear weapons. Truman, All of this is pertinent, but I think the author the onlv President who ever directed the actual might have made more of the widespread fear employment of atomic bombs, in World War in 1947 and 1948 of a Russian take-over in the n , set the precedent for Américas poliey of war-devastated, poverty-stricken nations of restraint with respect to them thereafter; in Western Europe. As Senator Everett M. Dirk- fact, he bent over backwards to avoid waving sen, a leader in the House at the time, once them as a "big stick.” OConnors onlv criticism told this reviewer, fear of such a take-over was of Trumans policies comes in this general area: the determining íactor in the Congressional the Presidents abnegation of nuclear weapons deeision to pass the Marshall Plan. was not accompanied bv a corresponding 5. Conclusion o f a series o f military or quasi- beefing up of American conventional forces to military alliances. The North Atlantic Treaty carrv out our foreign poliey objectives in Eu- was the principal instrument among these, and, rope and the Far East. As the author says, as in the case of the Marshall Plan, 0 ’Cormor’s Truman. “bv failing to coordinate American discussion focuses on the careful efforts of capabilities with American commitments, en- the executive branch to work with the Senate dangered securitv and world peace.” in bringing about final approval of the treaty. 2. U.S. assumption o f unilateral responsibility The author notes here another example of for protection of the free world. Here OConnor Trumans expanding the Presidential authority notes that the American response to the Berlin as commander-in-chief to encompass the peace­ blockade was “as near complete an exercise of time disposal of forces to meet the obligations of executive prerogative as the nation had seen a military alliance. It was feared that the since the end of World War II.” It revealed, Russians, taking advantage of the Korean War, he says, that the future of resistance to Commu- would attack Western Europe, so Truman, nism would be determined in the White House. without asking Congressional approval, sent 3. New machinenj for the forrnulation and four American divisions across the Atlantic. execution o f defense and foreign poliey. This In a way, he was “bailed out” by the Korean ineluded the Department of Defense and the crisis itself, which resulted in legislation calling National Securitv Council. As 0 ’Connor savs, for a rapid expansion of the American military the new machinerv, under Truman s manipula- establishment. tion, “augmented the powers of the president 6. Memhership in the United Nations. Tru­ in international affairs, and the precedents es- man strengthened the “embryonie organiza- tablished by Truman in the utilization of this tion,” as O Connor calls it, by his commitment machinerv were not ignored by his successors.” of American forces to the defense of South 4. U.S. assumption o f the task o f promoting Korea. The whole Korean experience enlarged world prosperity. The Anglo-American Finan­ the role of the President in the conduct oi na- cial Agreement and the Marshall Plan were the tional seeurity affairs. The author uses it as a key measures here. 0 ’Connor rightly stresses departure point for his conclusions on how the landmark nature of Congressional approval Truman increased Presidential power in re­ of the Marshall Plan, the First of the giant sponse to the expanded scope of action de- peacetime foreign aid programs. He lists some manded of the President in foreign and military of the factors involved and calls the President affairs. Truman, says 0 ’Connor, “added new the “one absolutely essential figure” in the dimensions of power commensurate with Ameri­ promotion and adoption of the proposal. ca^ strength and her pre-eminent position in O Connor is correct in this, and he recognizes international affairs." Trumans superb orehestration of individuais 0 ’Connor’s final chapter, on victory in mod- and circumstances in the Marshall Plan effort. ern war, is a trivial, pedestrian summary of 86 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

how victory was aceomplished in selected wars Great Powers; and they blandly compare the from the American Revolution on. The author's future decline of the United States with the attempted distinction between “military” and precipitous fali of Great Britain after World “negotiated” settlernents is fuzzy, to say the War II. Not so bad, they say. But the situation least. Particularly clistressing is his unfortunate of the United States with respect to the rest of misconception of the Boer War, which began, the world now is a great deal different from says the author, “when the Boer settlers re- what BritaiiTs was. Britain could recede from volted against their colonial maSter, Great Brit- her empire and her obligations, for there was ain.” Nothing could be farther from the truth. the United States, ready to pick up the torch. The Boers were settled in two independent, But if we draw down and in, who then will long-established interior African republics, and protect the rest of the world? Or, for that mat- they were the ones who declared war against ter, who will protect us? Great Britain in 1899 and invaded Britain’s The truth is, as Morton Kaplan says, “the Cape Colony. We do not need to go into the world is beeoming so elosely interrelated that canses here, but obviously they were out of the the United States with its huge political, eco- author’s ken. nomic, ideological, and social power cannot The entire book is marred by the awkward, avoid affecting the destinies of people in the disjointed style that is frequently the character- remotest parts of the world. It does so whether istic of a book made up of essays written origi- it intervenes or fails to intervene. Almost any nally for other, particular purposes. There are decision it makes is in effeet a form of interven- other minor errors (e.g., in chronology), and tion.” What about efforts to “sanitize” our in- proofreading errors abound. In the product of a tervention by providing assistance multilater- university press, these are wondrous, to say the ally or through the United Nations? These, least, and someone should tell its proofreaders Kaplan asserts, could have much worse conse- how to spell “casualties.” quences than unilateral American aid. The merit of both these books (although But aid, in itself, will not be enough if it is Quigg’s is the better by far) is that both authors only economic or diplomatic. Military force recognize U.S. responsibilities to the rest of the will be required occasionallv—and not onlv the world, and they do not see the U.S. role as nuclear power meant to be used as a deterrent. completely invidious and destructive. Irrespon- Fighting forces must be maintained—and used, sible critics argue that we should not become at times—to throw the weight of the United involved or that we should become involved States on the side of international order. If we only where their own particular “moral” judg- esehew an active diplomacv and the occasional ment calls for it. But, as John P. Roche has use of force in the interest of the peace-loving pointed out, a moralist cannot play favorites. If nations, the alternatives will be grim. The there is one reason for us to support the black United Nations, as the Manchester Guardian liberation of Rhodesia and South África, there savs, is too weak to replace the alliances of the are a hundred reasons for “liberais" to support “American era," and who else will feed the the liberation of Rússia, China, and North Viet- millions of starving people we have aided? Not nam. As police States go, says Roche, the the United Nations, which is unprepared and U.S.S.R. makes Rhodesia and South África look divided, and not any foreseeable coinbination like amateur performers. of the democratic nations. The power is still Some people say we can do as Britain and ours, and although the glorv has faded, our Franee. which have fallen from their status of duty remains. Arlington. Viroinia The Contributors

W il l ia m C. H oldeh (B.S.A.E., Purdue Uni* C aptain Dhue L De B eh r y (USAFA) M.A., versity) is a space Systems analyst with the For- eign Technology Division. Air Force Systems University of Oklaliorna) is currently an in* Dr . C harles A. R ussell (J.D .. Ceorgetown Command. Wright-Patterson AFB. Ohio. He struetor in history at the Air Force Academy. University: Ph D.. American University) is He is a sênior navigator with 3500 hours ui Chiei, Acquisitions and Analysis Division. Di- has worked with the Biaring ( ompany ou the Bomarc B and the Saturn V. As a lieutenant in C-135 and C-141 transports and AC-1.30 gun- rectoratc of Special Operations, Hq AFOS1. the U.S. Army, he served three years as un air ships. with one tour in Soutlieast Asia. A From 1951 to 1971 he Served in lhe Director- defen.se guided mi.vsile instmetor. Mr. Ilolder graduate of Squadron Officer School. Captam ate of Special Investiga tions. Hq USAF. With DeBerry has published civil and military his­ is the author ol a number ol technicul orticles Major Hildner. he has lectured at Air Com- tórica) monographs. mand and Staff Coliege and USAF Special and a Injok. S

C olonel Vic t o r F. P hillips. J k . 'D.B.A.. Indiana University) is Chief. Hmnau Resource Management Studies. Air War Coliege. After a tour as navigator-boinbardier in Korea. he has M ajor Robert E. H il d n er «M.S., University served in Air Rescue Service; as instmetor. of Colorado! is currently a student in Air AFROTC. University of Connecticut. Hq M ajor Ric h a r d Zock (D.B.A., University of Command and Staff Coliege. His last assign- AFROTC, Maxwell AFB. aide-de-camp to ments were in Directorate of Special Investi- Colorado' is Chief. Econoinics Division. Commander, Air University; and five years as gations. Hq USAF, first as Chief, Middle East, Professional Military Comptroller Course, Air Associate Professor of Economics and Manage­ África, South Asia Section, then as Chief. University Institute for Professional Dcvelop- ment, USAF Academy. Western Hemisphere Section. He servcd in ment. He has flown F-86F. B-47, and B-57 air* countenntelligence with Office of Special craft. the latter at Phan Rang AB. Republic of Investigations. Japan. 1962-65. and as Com- Vietnam. 1967-68. He has taught at USAF mander. OSI Detachment. Da Nang Air Base. Academy and Air University; lectured at Uni­ Repuhlic of Vietnam. for a year. versity of Colorado. Auhurn University. and Southern Colorado State Coliege; and uow serves as lecturer in econoinics at Air War Coliege and Air Command and Staff Coliege.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert VV. Davls (B.S.. University of Utah) is assigned to duty with Captam Richard J. Erickson íj. D . University J er o me G. P epf er s, J r .. Major. USAF (Ret), the Military Assistance Command. Vietnam, of Michigan; Ph.D.. University of Virginiaj is (M.L.S., University of Oklaliorna) is Professor in the Directorate of Operations, having Assistant Staff Judge Advocate. Air University. of Maintenance Management. School of Sys­ graduated from Air War Coliege in 1972. He is a member of the Michigan l>ar and ad- tems and Logistics, Air Force Institute of Other assignments have been as Wing Weap- mitted to practice before the Suprcme Court Technology. His active duty assignments ons Officer. U.S. Air Forces. Europe; with of Michigan and other courb. He is a rnember (1940-64' were in maintenance, in Strategic PACAF. Takhli, Thailand. as Operations Of­ of teveral professional legal associa ti ons and Air Command from 1951. He is editor of the ficer. Aerospace Defensc Comimuid Dow .AFB, was U.S. Delegate to the 1972 Geneva Con- 4-voluine textbook AFIT Maintenance Man- Maine; and Chief. Aerospace Trammg Branch. ference on International Humanitarian Law of agement and author of numerous ;trticles. He USAF Academy. Colonel Davis is a graduate Armed ConflicL He is author of Intenuitional is a graduate of Industrial Coliege of the aLso of Squadron Officer School and the Army Law atui the Revolutionary State 1 1972». Armed Forces. Command and General Stafi Coliege.

87 plc University. He formerly taught at the University of Pennsylvania and Drexel Insti- tute of Technology. Dr. Weigley, once tnistee of the American Military Institute. has pub- lished several books on military history as well as articles in Erunfçlopaedia Britannica and historical jimrnaLs. He has been editor of the- quarterly journal, Pennsylvania History.

D h . C eo r c e W. C ollins (Ph D., University of Colorado) is Associate Professor of History. D h . J ohn J M arsh iPh.D., University of Wichita State University. He served as a boinb- Northern Colorado) is a íuculty member at er navigator during World War 11 and Korea Eastern New México University and Ássociate Director of Project NewCate, an educa ti onal and later in Strategic Air Command. He then taught navigation and history at the United program at New México State Penitentiary. States Air Force Academy until his retirement Hc served in the Air Force from 194-1 to 1965 in 1968. Dr. Collins has published articles on ui personnel and administrative assignments. A history and navigation. graduate of Squadron Officer School, he has published previous articles in Air University Review ;md ediicational jounials.

D r . K enneth R. W hiting Ph.D., Harvard University} is Director of the Docuinentary Research Directorate. Air University Institute for Professional Developrnent, Air University. A frequent contributor to Air University Re- view, he is the author of The Soviet Union Today: A Concise Haruibook (1962) and of numerous moriographs on Russiari subjects. Dr. Whiting formerly taught Russian history at Tufts College. C olonel Harold L. H it c h en s (Ph.D., Uni- versity of Chicago) is Chief. Concepts Devel- opment Branch, Directorate of Doctrine, Concepts and Objectives, Hq US.AF. His flying assignments have included test pilot and B-26 flight commander in Korea. He served two tours as Air Force Academy faculty member. Colonel Hitchens has edited several books and published articles in professional journals. He D r R ussell F W eic l ey (Ph.D.. University lectures on American history at Northern Vir­ of Pennsylvania) is Professor of History, Tem- gínia Community College.

The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected “Soviet Poliey in Latin America” hy Major Michael A. Nelson, USAF, as the outstanding article in the Novemher- Decemher 1972 issue of the Air University Review. EDITORIAL STAFF C olonel Eldon W. Downs, USAF Editor J ack H. Mooney Managing Editor L ieu t en a n t Colonel Philip M. F l a mmer , USAF Associate Editor Major Ric h a r d B. C omyns, USAF Associate Editor E dmund O. Barker Financial and Administrutive Manager

J ohn A. W est c o t t , J r . Art Director and Production Manager E nrique Gaston Associate Editor. Spanish Language Edition L ia Mid o si May Patterson Associate Editor, Portuguese Language Edition WnxiAM J. D e P aola Art Editor and Illustrator

ADV1SERS C olonel Sheldon I. Godkin //í / Aerospace Defense Command

C olonel Arthur G. Lyn n //

D h . H AROLD M . HELFMAN Hq Air Force Systems Command

C olonel H. J. D alton. J h . Hq Air Training Command

C olonel Irving H. Breslauer IIq Military Airlift Command

Fhanc is \Y. J ennincs SAF Office of Information

L ieu t en a n t Colonel John \\ W A lton Hq Strategic Air Cómmanil

C olonel Boone Rose. J h. Hq Tactical Air Command

Colonel Arthur S. Racen H

ATTENTION Air University Rcvieu is pultlished to stimnlate pro- fessional thought con cerni ng aerospace doctrines, strategy. tactics. and related techniques. Its contents reflect the opinions of its authors or lhe investiga- tions anil conciusions of its editors and are not to be eonstrued as carrying any ofiicial sanction of the Department of the Air Force or of Air University. Informei! contributions are welcomed. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW