January-February 1973, Volume XXIV, No. 2
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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW AIR reviewU N I VE R S ITY THE PíOfESSIONAl JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE Revol ut iona by War—A C ompabison of Chinese Communist and North Viet n a mese Stratecy and Tactics........................................................................ 2 Dr. Charles A. Russell Maj. Robert E. Hildner, USAF Devel opmen t of the Stratecy of Pea c eful Coexistence during the Khrushchev Era ..................................................................................................................... 13 Capt. Richard J. Erickson, USAF T he Ret ur n of Shoo-Shoo B a b y ................................................................................................... 22 William G. Holder Resour c e Management, E conomic Analysis, and Disc o u n t in g in the Depar t ment of Defen se.................................................................................................... 32 Maj. Richard Zoek, USAF T he Mil it a r y Lea der —A M anager of Peo ple.................................................................. 37 Jerome G. Peppers, Jr. Mihtary AíFairs Abroad Viet n a mese Air Force Technica l Training, 1970-1971 ............................................ 43 Capt. Drue L. DeBerrv, USAF In My Opinion J unior Officer Per spect ives of USAF Mid d l e Management................................. 52 Col. Victor F. Phillips, Jr., USAF A S el ec t ive Air ma n Rec r u it in g Program. .............................................................................. 56 Lt. Col. Robert W. Davis, USAF D iv o r c e—M il it a r y Style............................................................................................................... 60 Dr. John J. Marsh Books and Ideas Mu ST W e BeaT THE SwORD OF LlMITED W.AR INTO A PlüWSHARE?............................67 Dr. Russell F. Weigley A Q uarter Cent ur y of Frustration—S in o -Amer ic a n Rel a t ions, 1944-1969 ............................................................................................................... 71 Dr. Kenneth R. Whiting T he Continuing Sea r c h for a Mil it .ary Image....................................................................75 Dr. George W. Collins Amer ic a n Foreign Policy—T he Ends and the Mea n s.................................................. 80 Col. Harold L. Hitchens, USAF T he Contributors................................................................................................................................87 the cover Addrca manuscripts to Editor. Air Ooivmíty The Chinese Com muni st and North Vietnamese theory Review Division. Bldg 1211, Maxwell AFB, AL and practice of revolutionary warfare are analyzed 36112. Pruited by Covernment Príntíng Office. and differentiated by Dr. Charles A. Russell and Addrcu sulncnptions to Siiperintendent of Major Robert E. Hildner in their lead article. Documente. CPO. Washington DC 20402: yearly “Revolutionary W ar." Other insights Ixrhind the 14.50 domestic. $5.75 foreign. single copy 75*. iron and baml>oo curtains are provided by C'aptain Richard J Erickson's 'Development of the Strategy of Peaceful Coexistence during the Khrushchev Era" and by Dr Kenneth R. Whitings "A Quarter Century Vd. XXIV No. 2 Jam. sky-Febh i ary 1973 of Frustration-Sino-American Relations. 1944-1969." REVOLUTIONARY WAR A Comparison of Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese Strategy and Tactics Dr . C harles A. Russel l Major Robert E. Hil dn er N MARCH 1972, North Vietnamese forces onrv was surprising since the war in Vietnam launched a massive invasion of South Viet- has long been regarded by them as essentially a nam which signaled a dramatic increase in guerrilla war against ill-equipped and relatively the tempo and íerocity of a war that many be- lightly armed peasants who were sustained by a Ilieved to be in its final hours. The offensive stubbornness and dedication bordering on fanat- represented a determined effort to effect a icism. However, to the student of insurgency North Vietnamese victory, either militarily or and revolutionary warfare, the invasion and use politically, and was characterized by the unprec- of conventional forces was viewed as a logical edented ase of conventional military forces. and predictable result of the strategy and tac To many Americans, the employment of con tics of “protracted war” advocated by Nlao ventional forces and modern sophisticated weap- Tse-tung in his writings on guerrilla warfare.1 2 Many such students equate overall North Viet- imperialism can be attacked successfully through namese strategy and tactics to those of the the use of revolutionary warfare. By concen- Communist Chinese and fail to realize that, trating forces in rural base areas and gradually while the North Vietnamese indeed were heav- building their political, military, and economic ily influenced by the Chinese, there are signifi- strength, the countryside can eventually sur- cant andextremely important differences between round the cities, crushing imperialism and elimi the two in both strategy and tactics. Thus, we nating foreign control.2 believe it usefnl to compare the Chinese and For the Chinese, revolutionary activity North Vietnamese theories of revolutionary war within the underdeveloped world is a two-stage as a means not onlv of evaluating the current process. The initial phase of new democratic situation in Southeast Asia but also, hopefully, of revolutions is that through which most colonial projecting future developments. and semicolonial States are now passing. Led by the Communist partv, a united front composed of the peasantry, small bourgeoisie, and the The Chinese View proletariat can—using the tactics of guerrilla Formed in the war against Japan and refined warfare—achieve victory over imperialism ex- during her subsequent civil war, Communist ternally and feudalism internally. Only later China’s doctrine on the use of revolutionary can a transition to socialism be achieved. In the warfare is spelled out clearly in the various united front, the peasantry is by far the most writings of Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao. The significant element. Readily accepting Commu Chinese see their political and military theories nist control, it forms the bulk of the revolution as a valuable weapon for use by underdevel- ary forces. Since the focus of revolutionary ac- oped States in eliminating political or economic tivitv is the imderdeveloped world and within domination by the industrialized West and as it the rural areas of any given nation, peasant particularlv applicable to the revolutionary support is essential to the success of the revolu efforts of colonial and semicolonial nations to- tionary effort. To insure this support, an exten- day. sive program of agrarian reform is criticai. Equallv criticai is the continued political indoc- theoretical basis and geographic trination of all revolutionary forces, from the focus o f the revolution common soldier or peasant upward. Such in- Rooted in the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of doctrination is important in building the revo “just” war, Chinese theorists see those wars of lutionary spirit which Mao considers so vital in national liberation initiated by oppressed peo- helping the materially inferior guerrillas con- ples in colonial and semicolonial countries as quer the better-armed forces of imperialism. just conflicts aimed at eliminating internai feud al oligarchies and foreign political or eco revolutionary strategy nomic domination. In such countries, cities are seen as the strongholds of imperialism. Con- Strategically, the Chinese concept of revolution trolling govemment and industry and effective- and revolutionary warfare is based on the doc ly suppressing the growth of the proletariat, trine of protracted war. For Mao this equates imperialism is almost invulnerable. In the coun- to a long and drawn-out struggle designed to tryside, however, where imperialist elements gain time in which the revolutionaries can im must rely on a weak feudal oligarchy to main- prove their military capability while awaiting a tain control, the position is much weaker. There change in the international situation and/or the 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW internai collapse of their opponents. Essentially For the Chinese Communists, geographic defensive, this strategy acknowledges the ina- space is essential in the development of base bility of the revolutionaries to achieve a quick areas and the implementation of protracted military victory over the better-equipped forces war. Without a large area wherein guerrilla of their opponents. Specifically rejecting the forces may maneuver freely and thus gain time concept that roving guerrilla bancls without ties to establish base areas and develop the strategy to the peasantry can ever achieve success, of protracted war, effective guerrilla operations much less victory, the Chinese strategy of pro- would be almost impossible. Since maneuver is tracted war calls for a retreat into the rural as essential to insurgent survival as base areas, countryside, the establishment there of secure Mao seriously questions the possibility of organ- base areas, and the gradual buildup of insur- izing a viable guerrilla movement in any geo- gent economic, political, and military power. graphically small nation. The only possible ex- For the overall strategy of protracted war, ceptions to this general rule are in those cases the concept of guerrilla base areas is fundamen where the forces of repression are weak and tal to ultimate insurgent victory. Located in ineffective