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Disabled Submarine Escape and Rescue Considerations

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Disabled Submarine Escape and Rescue Considerations 49th International Conference on Environmental Systems ICES-2019-323 7-11 July 2019, Boston, Massachusetts Disabled Submarine Escape and Rescue Considerations Stephanie M. Mohundro1 and Sara Jane Neal 2 Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington Navy Yard, DC 20316, USA12 Abstract HE United States Navy’s (USN) submarine escape and rescue program supports US and foreign submarine T services by providing the essential capability to rescue sailors at depth in the event of a distressed submarine (DISSUB) event, as demonstrated in support of the loss of the Argentinian submarine ARA SAN JUAN in November 2017. The USN operates the Submarine Rescue Diving and Recompression System (SRDRS) and the Submarine Rescue Chamber Fly-away System (SRCFS) for deep and shallow water rescue. As a result of the lessons learned from exercises as well as the ARA SAN JUAN events, the program is actively pursuing technology improvements to address shallow water rescue capability gaps, enhance survivability challenges of DISSUB sailors, maintain efficiency, and increase international engagements. While maintaining existing rescue readiness, the final manned testing and certification of the Submarine Decompression System (SDS) will be completed; delivering to the fleet the ability to recover and medically treat sailors from a pressurized DISSUB. While the delivery of the SDS system will significantly advance the USN rescue capabilities, additional techonology improvements are still required to ensure a robust and sustainable submarine escape and program. This paper will serve to update government and industry partners on the status of our capabilities, current acquisitions and procurements, highlights of recent exercises, their pertinent lessons learned, and to share perspectives on future technology objectives with emphasis on environmental systems. I. Background Submarine Escape and Rescue has long been an integral part of the overall USN undersea warfare (USW) enterprise. Due to numerous submarines sinking with survivors that perished on board the vessels with no way off, the Submarine Escape and Rescue (SER) program was established in the beginning of the 20th century to provide the capability to rescue survivors of a DISSUB. The capability was validated during the successful response to the USS SQUALUS on 23 May 1939 when the SRC saved thirty-three submariners of the 310-foot boat from a depth of 240 feet. Due to flooding in the aft compartment, twenty-four sailors and two civilians died, but using the Momsen- McCann rescue chamber provided by the Washington Navy Yard-based Experimental Diving Unit, thirty-two sailors and one civilian were successfully brought to the surface. The evolution was accomplished in four trips spanning thirty-nine hours from the time the submarine initially sank. While the USS SQUALUS is considered to be the only successful rescue of a USN DISSUB, submarining is a dangerous business as illustrated by the near misses of the USS SAN FRANCISCO (2005), USS GREENVILLE (2001), and USS MONTPELIER (2012), the sinking of the RN Kursk in 2000 and most recently of the loss of the ARA SAN JUAN with all personnel in November 2017. As one of only four flyaway submarine rescue systems globally, the USN submarine escape and rescue program is a humanitarian-focused avenue that provides safety to USN submarine sailors as well as partner-nation submarine sailors. Beyond the singular event of the loss of the ARA SAN JUAN, partnerships with other nations are continually being fostered and new ones founded. Through partnership with the NATO Submarine Escape and Rescue Working Group (SMERWG), the Asia Pacific Submarine Conference (APSC), Diesel Submarine Initiative (DESI) and several others, the USN submarine escape and rescue program continues to expand its global footprint to ensure DISSUB survivors can be rescued across the globe. 1 Stephanie M. Mohundro, Submarine Escape and Rescue Research and Development. 2 Sara Jane Neal, Technical Warrant Atmosphere Control Copyright © 2019 Naval Sea Systems Command II. Submarine Escape and Rescue Integrated Capabilities The SER program focuses on four separate pillars that establish the four specific technology areas focused on accomplishing the successful retrieval of survivors of a DISSUB event. These four pillars are: (1) Alertment, search and localization of a DISSUB; (2) Onboard DISSUB survival of personnel; (3) Escape of survivors at depth to the surface; and (4) Rescue of personnel from depth to the surface. Alertment, Search and Localization. Alertment of a DISSUB is accomplished on USN submarines by the launch of a Submarine Emergency Positioning Indicator Radio Beacon (SEPIRB) by DISSUB survivors. Each submarine compartment has two SEPIRBS that are passively launched from either the forward or aft compartments to identify to rescue forces that a submarine is in distress and requires assistance. Figure 1. Submarine Emergency Positioning Indicator Radio Beacon Once alerted, the search and localization of the DISSUB by rescue forces is accomplished by surface and subsea equipment to establish a datum point for the DISSUB. The SER program mobilizes the Assessment Underwater Work System (AUWS), which is comprised of a medium-weight Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) SIBITSKY. In addition to providing localization of the DISSUB, the SIBITSKY also is responsible for hatch and debris clearance, establishing communications if able, and providing intervention if necessary. The ROV operates to 2000 feet of sea water to support the deep water rescue requirements. Figure 2. SIBITZKY ROV. DISSUB Survival. In the case of a DISSUB event, it is anticipated that there will be a loss of normal power and therefore a loss of normal operations of atmospheric and environmental control. Survivors will have to rely on available emergency battery capabilities and passive technologies to provide Carbon Dioxide (CO2) scrubbing, Oxygen (O2) generation, and contaminant, humidity and temperature control. Space available onboard precludes the ability for these measures to be large and physiological constraints preclude the ability to require high levels of manpower to operate. The short-term and long- term effects of personnel subjected to increased pressures while awaiting rescue or sustained exposure to atmospheric contaminants is also a concern. The decision to escape versus await rescue is a result of atmospheric and environmental conditions onboard the DISSUB degrading significantly to the point that the Senior Survivor has determined the risks of awaiting rescue are higher than attempting escape. All USN submarines are outfitted with passive CO2 removal curtains and O2candles to provide atmosphere control. There are sufficient quantities of CO2 curtains and O2 candles to support seven days of survivability for a full submarine crew complement. Beyond the removal of CO2 and the introduction of O2, USN has limited means of passively removing atmospheric contaminants. The Senior Survivor uses Guard Books to monitor the atmosphere of the Figure 3. Left, CO2 Curtains. Right, Oxygen Candles. DISSUB and colormetric tubes to determine the toxicity levels of Top, Guard Book. constituents, with the primary focus on seven Submarine Escape Action Limit (SEAL) gases. The seven SEAL gases are Carbon Monoxide, Hydrogen Cyanide, Ammonia, Chlorine, Hydrogen Chloride, Sulfur Dioxide, and Nitrogen Dioxide; these specific contaminants have been identified as the most likely atmospheric contaminants resulting from a DISSUB event. Each SEAL gas has two specific thresholds (SEAL Level 1 and SEAL Level 2) that are monitored to identify when escape must be attempted to support survival of personnel during the escape sequence and once on the surface. In the event the SEAL Level 1 of a particular SEAL gas, is approaching or has been met, all survivors 2 International Conference on Environmental Systems will don the Emergency Air Bib (EAB) and commence escape, such that all personnel have escaped (or been rescued) prior to the SEAL Level 2 limit(s) being met. While reasonably accurate at surface pressure, i.e. 1 atmosphere absolute (ATA), internal navy testing has identified that the accuracy and precision of colormetric tubes to provide toxicity levels at higher pressures, i.e. greater than 1 ATA, may be degraded. At this time, however, currently developed technology precludes the ability to provide more accurate capabilities. With the exception of monitoring and controlling the atmosphere during a DISSUB event, any additional actions on the part of the DISSUB crew are kept at a minimum to reduce the physiological effects of the confined and austere environment while awaiting rescue. Escape. All USN submarines are outfitted with Submarine Escape and Surface Survival Protection Equipment (SESSPE) suits that allow for escape from a submarine down to 600 fsw. The equipment itself can support escape to deeper depths; however, there is high likelihood of death. Two survivors can escape per cycle via each Figure 4. Submarine Escape and Surface Survival Protection Equipment. escape trunk by charging the escape trunk with air from regulators prior to flooding the trunk and opening the upper hatch. The trapped air within the suit provides positive buoyancy and breathable air to the escaper until reaching the surface. Once on the surface and self-contained, single-man liftraft can be inflated via a compressed CO2 cylinder, allowing for a minimum of 24 hours of surface survivability. The rapid flood-up time reduces the risks associated with decompression
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