Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

The Toppling of Ben Ali: Isolated Development or First Domino? SWP Comments Comparable Challenges – Varying Conditions Muriel Asseburg / Isabelle Werenfels

Following the fall of ’s President and in light of the upheaval in , the spectre of domino effects has been raised. The lack of prospects for young people, social injustice and political repression – all causes that sparked the protests in Tunisia – are problems in virtually all Arab states. Demonstrations against the regimes have gathered force from all the way to Sana’a. Nevertheless, the Tunisian scenario is unlikely to repeat itself: the differences in political, social and economic conditions are too large. A lot depends on whether Tunisia achieves a successful transformation and on how the situation in Egypt develops. However, the developments thus far have shown that stability can be deceptive and dictators are unable to guarantee long-term stability. The EU should reconsider its benevolent policies vis-à-vis the authoritarian rulers in the Mediterranean region.

Socio-economic factors alone are insuffi- equality, and the increasingly “mafia-like” cient for explaining why Tunisia was the practices of the ruling family all played first Arab state to see a dictator toppled by important roles. With regard to the ruling the people. The combination of political, family’s decadence, the Tunisians saw their economic and social factors proved deci- suspicions confirmed by the WikiLeaks sive. Firstly, the growing socio-economic cables. problems hit the regime in its Achilles heel. Secondly, there were few political valves For a long time, Ben Ali was able to legiti- in Tunisia through which people could mise his rule by pointing to the compara- voice discontent. The country had a press tively high living standards of the Tunisian that was among the world’s least free, and people. His strategy of substituting eco- the police and secret service prevented nomic prosperity for political freedoms, any activities or assemblies critical of the however, became increasingly unfeasible. regime – including those of legal organisa- At the same time, the high levels of un- tions like the Tunisian League of Human employment, not least among young Rights. It can therefore come as little sur- academics, the rising levels of social in- prise that the demonstrators, who initially

Dr Muriel Asseburg is head of the Middle East and Africa Division SWP Comments 5 Dr. Isabelle Werenfels is a researcher at the Middle East and Africa Division February 2011

1 called for jobs and social justice, increas- for Arab elites. Not only have they begun to ingly called for freedom. It wasn’t until the marshal their defences against protests, but second to last day of his rule that Ben Ali they have also announced political reforms for the first time indicated openness to and have taken measures to alleviate socio- political concessions – it was too late. economic emergencies. Thirdly, it proved Ben Ali’s undoing that The concerns of the rulers, the sense of political and economic power was concen- solidarity among the Arab peoples and the trated with him and his family. He was emulation effects all arise from a common therefore unable to subscribe the social consciousness: the problems that combined injustices, corruption or brutality of the to form the proverbial straw that broke the security forces to other parties. In the camel’s back in Tunisia also exist in other course of the protests, it became increas- Arab countries. Using this realisation, how- ingly clear that the situation would only ever, to predict the end of all Arab autoc- be calmed by his resignation. As a result, racies would be premature. After all, the divisions opened up among the power specific conditions in each of the respective elites: key figures within the regime dis- Arab states render a repeat of the Tunisian tanced themselves from Ben Ali – it scenario improbable. remains an open question whether this was due to political convictions or oppor- tunism. Ultimately it was Tunisia’s army Republics At Risk? chief who induced, or perhaps forced, the When considering possible domino effects, president to leave the country. the extremely fragile polities in Yemen and Fourthly, it was representatives of all the Palestinian territories come to mind segments of society who took to the streets. first. The assumption that held sway for Tunisian society is modern, educated, and Tunisia until just a few weeks ago could, homogeneous in terms of ethnicity and however, also apply to the republics in the confession, and the considerable degree southern and eastern Mediterranean area – of equality afforded to namely that stagnation has been mistaken is largely unparalleled in the Arab world. for stability. A closer examination reveals a There is also a high degree of networking paradoxical phenomenon: structures and and mobilisation via the electronic media dynamics that at first sight seem to have a which generated a correspondingly intense destabilising effect such as plural power collective outcry over the brute force em- centres or fragmented societies, can play ployed by the security forces. The successful into the hands of the regimes and extend modernisation of Tunisian society provides their life spans. good conditions for a process of democrati- In , riots are almost a part of sation that has now been set in motion. daily life, at least on the local level. In Jan- uary 2011, these riots expanded to cover larger swathes of the country. Even if these Initial Reactions riots have always died down again and have The events in Tunisia have stirred strong failed to generate political consequences, emotions amongst populations stretching it is probable that they will flare up to a from to . Protests greater extent in the future. Similar fac- against authoritarian regimes have inten- tors are at work here as in Tunisia: un- sified, opposition figures have called for an employment and a lack of prospects for emulation of developments in Tunisia, young people as well as a widespread desperate individuals have resorted to self perception that “mafia-like” clans of elites immolation – one such individual served as are enriching themselves at the cost of a catalyst for the events in Tunisia. The fall the general population and – unlike the of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali is also unsettling Tunisian case – a sense that the entire state

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2 apparatus treats the citizens with con- addition to the fragmentation within the tempt. society, this is also due to the traumatic Nevertheless, there are many arguments experiences of many Algerians during the against the likelihood of Algeria experienc- civil war of just ten years ago. ing regime change “from below” in the Ben Ali’s resignation, however, may near future. Firstly, with its strong presi- generate positive effects in Algeria over the dent and influential military leaders there medium term. Those in power in public are several competing power centres. The and behind the scenes will reconsider the lack of personalisation and the uncertainty forced constrictions on political latitude as to who is currently exercising control that have existed for many years. Looking over specific political and economic spheres forward to the presidential elections in makes it easier to shift responsibility off on 2014 and the successor to Bouteflika, they others. In the end, the forced resignation of will also have to decide whether they will Abdel Aziz Bouteflika by the people would push through an unpopular candidate or if not have any major impact on the political they will allow a candidate who enjoys a system. certain degree of legitimacy. Secondly, the Algerian society is very No Arab ruler has issued such a clear heterogeneous. There exists, for example statement on the events in Tunisia as strong regional solidarity as well as tension ’s ruler, Muammar al-Qadhafi, who between Kabyle Berbers and the Arab condemned the and majority. The social fragmentation is defended Ben Ali. Concerns about rioting reflected in the political landscape and is in his own country likely played a large role fostered by those in power to skilfully play in this. Riots over housing shortages erup- one group critical of the regime against ted in Libya in early January 2011 and were another. The opposition is correspondingly noteworthy for both their size and length. divided and incapable of action – this even At first glance, there are a number of holds true for the Islamists who were so striking similarities between Libya and powerful two decades ago. There is no Tunisia. Political power is also concentrated political power existing today that can in Libya within a single person, Muammar channel the protests. al-Qadhafi, and economic power likewise Thirdly, the authoritarian ruling powers concentrated within his family. WikiLeaks have established a series of political valves also published less than flattering reports for releasing pressure: opposition parties on the topic. Like Tunisia under the rule of are included in the Parliament; the press is Ben Ali, Libya under Qadhafi’s rule is also kept on a rather long leash; the security one of the least free states in the world. forces hold back during protests. The so-called “grassroots” system allows for Fourthly, with its rich reserves of oil and neither political parties nor political activi- natural gas, Algeria is a state with consid- ties extending beyond tightly controlled erable currency reserves and little foreign processes. The opposition and its most debt. The revenues from oil sales have not powerful element, the Muslim Brother- only helped to establish a system of patron- hood, has had no chance to organise itself age-based, regime-stabilising structures, within the country. The problems of un- they have also allowed the government to employment among young people, housing quickly pump money into eliminating shortages and a lack of prospects all run social conflagrations (as was recently the rampant in Libya. case with the subsidisation of sugar and There are, however, fundamental differ- cooking oil). ences between Libya and Tunisia in two Finally, the Algerian society cannot be respects. Firstly, Libya is a state with a as easily and broadly mobilised to rise up small population and rich reserves of oil as was the case for the Tunisian society. In and natural gas. This enables the regime

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3 to quickly pay out exorbitant sums of The current protests pick up on how money to cushion the impacts of malad- theregime is viewed by large portions of the ministration. Oil revenues furthermore population: as sclerotic, corrupt, incapable allow for Qadhafi to buy the loyalty of a of making decisions and largely focused core group of elites. Secondly, the Libyan on the self enrichment and preservation society is not only considerably less of power for the presidential family and educated than the Tunisian, but its mem- its entourage. Even though a segment of bers define themselves first and foremost the economic and business elite supports according to their tribal affiliations. In the path of economic reforms being set this respect, the society has a strong hier- primarily by the president’s son Gamal, archical and vertical organisation, which and even though the regime portrays itself renders the uprising of broad masses of as the protector of the Copts, the Mubarak people rather unlikely. Smaller scale clan has increasingly failed to derive legiti- rebellions against Qadhafi by individual macy from its performance. tribes have occurred repeatedly in the past At the same time, the ruling elites in and may occur again. These rebellions, Egypt lack the resources needed to pur- however, largely entail power struggles chase loyalty on a grand scale. For this and competition over distribution policies reason the country’s rulers have, on the one among tribal elites rather than a change hand, created an apparatus for repression, to the political order. which has prevented political counter- The events in Tunisia therefore are likely weights to thrive. To date, the regime has to primarily have an impact within the justified this abroad by raising the spectre elite. Over the short-term, the hardliners of a power grab by the Islamists in what is seem to benefit from these events. It is con- the most populous Arab state as well as one ceivable, however, that Qadhafi’s son Saif al of Israel’s neighbours. Islam, who is known as a reformer, may On the other hand, the regime has experience an upswing. After all, he has allowed for a certain degree of freedom of been the one sent out in the past to calm expression. As a result, there is currently inflamed tempers, whether they be those a relatively pluralistic press as well as a of neglected tribes or repressed Islamists. multitude of societal organisations. Fol- Two weeks after the upheaval in Tunisia, lowing the 2005 parliamentary elections, Egypt experienced the largest popular up- however, political participation has been rising since the beginning of the Mubarak gradually limited. In this respect, the era. Indeed, despite considerable police November 2010 parliamentary elections violence, protests are neither a new pheno- marked a low point. As a result of extensive menon in Egypt nor a rarity. There have manipulation and open electoral fraud, the been bread riots time and again. In recent opposition has been all but excluded from years, the protests have increasingly taken parliament. This also eliminated an impor- on a more political character. In the middle tant forum for protest within the system. of the past decade, a relatively elitist move- Therefore, Egypt has been one of the ment formed in called “Kifaya!” (ara- states in which the developments in bic for “enough!”). Professional associa- Tunisia have had particularly strong effects. tions and worker unions united to protest As was to be expected, the government against the impact of economic reform and responded with mass arrests, spreading living and working conditions, above all in chaos and the delegitimisation of the pro- the periphery of the country. The younger tests. But contrary to what the regime has generation has used the new communica- claimed, as in Tunisia, it has neither been tions channels provided by the Internet and the Islamists nor foreign powers that are Twitter to give voice to its displeasure and fuelling the uprising. While the regime to mobilise. has clung to power, President Mubarak

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4 announced that he will not run for another of association, opposition figures regularly term in elections scheduled for the fall. He disappear into prisons, and the strongest reshuffled the government and announced potential opposition movement, the Mus- steps that would grant political freedoms lim Brotherhood, is forbidden. As a result and allow for meaningful political com- there are scant political valves for releasing petition. In early February, dialogue began pent up frustrations or forums in which with opposition forces – including the still opposition elements can organise. illegal . While a tran- Repression, however, is not the only sition to a democratic system is by no factor standing in the way of Syrians rising means guaranteed, at least a dynastic trans- up. A decisive reason seems to be the fear fer of power has become extremely unlikely that the regime’s collapse could quickly as this would be rejected not only by lead to civil war. The society is highly frag- broad segments of the population: Gamal mented from an ethnic as well as a con- Mubarak also lacks the support of the army. fessional viewpoint. The dread is that a In Syria also there is a widespread per- collapse of the regime could trigger revenge ception in the population of self-enrich- attacks on the Alawite minority on which ment among those closely associated with the regime is based as well as Christians, the ruling family and of a political and which are perceived as supporting the economic sphere marked by nepotism. In regime. The experience of civil wars in addition, economic reform and the partial Syria’s neighbouring states, Iraq and Leba- liberalisation of the state sector have con- non, also has a deterrent effect. In addition, tributed to a widening of the gap among Syrians assume that the regime would the social classes. Despite considerable crack down brutally on any uprising, even growth rates, poverty has markedly in- if this generated a large number of victims. creased. Involuntary internal migration This is suggested by the violent events of as a result of droughts has contributed to 1982 when tens of thousands of people further aggravating the social situation. were massacred in Hama during the sup- Thus far, however, this situation has pression of an uprising. not resulted in any notable protests and Last but not least, the path taken by the the day of rage that was called for in early regime also enjoys popularity and provides February simply did not take place – pri- the regime with a measure of legitimacy marily because demonstrations in Syria among important segments of society. The are usually organised by the regime, not business elite and upper middle class have against the regime. Exceptions are those profited in the past years from the eco- protests that have repeatedly flared up in nomic reforms and have an interest in the developmentally neglected Kurdish seeing these reforms continued. Above all, regions in the country’s north-eastern the president can point to a foreign policy, reaches, which have been bloodily subdued. which is viewed by the majority of the Indeed, Syria is viewed as one of the most population as a success. repressive states in the region. At the same Despite this relatively comfortable time, a certain degree of political opening position, the events in Tunisia and Egypt has occurred under Bashar al-Asad, who has have led the Syrian leadership to announce ruled for the past decade. The freedom of measures, such as an increase in subsidies the press has been slightly expanded, NGOs and the introduction of a social welfare are allowed to operate in areas deemed non- scheme for disadvantaged families, aimed political, and fear of the secret police has at alleviating social hardships. The presi- diminished. Nevertheless, tight restrictions dent has also hinted at future political remain in place in the political sphere. reform, for example in the area of press, There continue to be no competitive elec- local election and NGO laws. But the events tions, no freedom of assembly or freedom might also affect Syria’s foreign policy

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5 discourse: the populist rhetoric can be of those surveyed hit upon his immense expected to intensify – after all, the Syrian wealth. Many Moroccans view the King, leadership has identified Tunisia’s pro- who in accordance with the constitution Western orientation as the decisive factor has virtually absolute power and is also fuelling its instability. the country’s religious leader, as “holy”. The results of these surveys point to a second structural difference between Stable Monarchies? Morocco and Tunisia, which renders a Compared with the republics, the monar- widespread social mobilisation improbable: chies in the region are generally seen as large segments of the Moroccan society being more stable. This is due on the one have a traditional orientation and are struc- hand to the fact that the main decision tured into vertical (patronage) networks. maker in the monarchies has dynastic and, The urban-rural gap is large, illiteracy rates in Jordan and Morocco, also religious legiti- remain high (among women, over 50 per- macy. On the other hand, the monarchs can cent), and the middle class is smaller than easily address criticism and dissatisfaction in Tunisia. among the people by replacing the govern- A third factor that helps to stabilise ment. Nevertheless, specific conditions vary. the regime is the considerable freedom, Morocco is among the states in which in comparison with other states in the the events in Tunisia have thus far not Maghreb, granted by the King’s clemency. resulted in any noteworthy protests. This Morocco is one of the few states in the may seem astonishing as the gap between region in which there are more than the rich and poor is higher in Morocco than rudiments of a civil society. At least one anywhere else in the Maghreb, and young portion of the Islamist opposition is in- people have even fewer opportunities than corporated into the system; the palace in Tunisia. For about ten years, unemployed largely tolerates the non-legalised Islamist academics have camped out in front of the organisation “Justice and Charity”. Recent- parliament in Rabat – where they are at ly, however, the latitude in terms of free- least allowed to protest, a freedom they doms, such as , has would not be allowed in Tunisia. tightened and the human rights situation If one puts aside economic parallels – has deteriorated. both countries are oriented towards Citizens of Western Sahara have suffered reform, are poor in resources, and have more than any others from repression, difficulties remaining competitive on and have rebelled in the winter of 2010/11. global markets – the structural differences However, they cannot count on solidarity between the two countries are sizable. First from within Moroccan society. What are of all, Morocco is led by a relatively young likely to become items of broad attention monarch, who has initiated a generational are the King’s economic power and inter- shift within the spheres of politics and the ests, for example those associated with administration. During his twelve years as agriculture. During the course of the events the state’s ruler, Mohammed VI has earned in Tunisia, the government was quick to the reputation of a reformer. He allowed for announce the purchasing of cereals in an increase in women’s rights, the histori- order to prevent “bread riots”. Also, officials cal processing of his father’s authoritarian pointed to the democratic freedoms en- regime, and the initiation of a gigantic joyed by Moroccans. It is possible that room development project. Two newspapers con- for political participation will temporarily ducted surveys in 2009, the publication of be expanded. In the most extreme case the which the palace blocked, that indicated King’s power may be slightly curtailed. At over 90 percent of the population judged least over the medium-term, nothing else the King’s work positively. Only 17 percent is to be expected.

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6 Against the backdrop of the Tunisian opposition. They also strengthened the revolt, demonstrations have gained con- wing of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, siderable momentum in Jordan. For years, whose focus is not on political reform, but the Hashemite Kingdom has witnessed rather on the foreign policy agenda and protests, bread riots and even local up- more concretely on the fight against risings. The regime has generally responded “normalisation” of relations with Israel. by increasing food subsidies and suppress- This issue also consumes most of the energy ing protest by force. Yet, even an escalation of organised civil society – and thereby of protests is unlikely to seriously endanger offers an avenue for action, ultimately the monarchy. True, it does not oversee any playing into the hands of the regime. significant revenues from resource sales, In light of the developments in Tunisia, which might enable a policy of distribution the king made an effort to address the pro- on a grand scale. Also, Jordan is a country tests in Jordan once more by rolling back characterised by extremely uneven develop- subsidy cuts. He also fired the government. ment and high poverty in rural areas. There That this approach of short term measures are no social or political forces, however, and cosmetic political reform will meet which dispute the legitimacy of the rela- with success is doubtful. Even though the tively young king. Today this even holds king rests relatively firmly in the saddle, true for the majority population group of the pressure building on the streets cer- Jordanians of Palestinian descent. In addi- tainly underlines the urgency of sustain- tion, within the Transjordanian segment able and more just development policies of the population, the bonding force of and the need for a political opening. It will vertical tribal structures is particularly also lead to limitations on the monarch’s strong. Tribal representatives are markedly capacity to act on foreign policy. over-represented in the security apparatus, in the core elite surrounding the king, and in parliament. Due to close personal rela- Conclusions tions between the monarch and tribal The cases from the Mediterranean area leaders, a rebellion from within the secu- clearly show: the end of Arab autocracies is rity apparatus is rather unlikely. At the not imminent. So far, the authoritarian sys- same time, in recent months, an increase tems in the region have proven adaptable in political violence has been observed – enough to generally maintain stability. among the representatives of different Still, they have not managed to address tribes as well as between demonstrators the challenges that abound. Although and security forces. One reason behind Arab economies have generated moderate this might be that Transjordanians feel growth rates of three to five percent, they increasingly disadvantaged or see their have failed to create sufficient employment privileges at risk. opportunities for the rapidly growing popu- While the regime in Jordan is less repres- lations. Young people, in particular, are sive than those in Syria and Tunisia, politi- affected by unemployment – especially cal freedoms are still highly restricted. The those with higher education, who foster political opening that took place in the late greater expectations for their futures. The 1980s and early 1990s has been gradually stricter migration policies of European reversed since. The parliament, in particu- states have also eliminated an alternative lar, has been further devalued (aside from prospect for these people. its function as a mechanism for patronage). Many have abandoned hopes of change The manipulated November 2010 elections brought on through the political process. along with the electoral boycott by the This bears the risk of violent upheaval, strongest party, the Islamic Action Front, given the prevailing perception that the have further marginalised the conformist maintenance of the existing order is not

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7 primarily to serve the well being of the doms are ensured, the formation of politi- people, but rather the enrichment of a cal parties is allowed, and equal oppor- corrupt elite. This perception has been re- tunity is guaranteed – thus incorporating inforced in a number of countries by the all societal and political forces including disclosures of WikiLeaks at the turn of the moderate Islamist Ennahda Party. the year 2010/2011. Moreover, the authority to make decisions At the same time, young people in the must rest with the elected parliament and Arab world today are very well informed a government accountable to this elected and networked. Thanks to electronic media, body. Hence, consistent conditioning of despite censorship, they are able to follow support for the Tunisian transitional gov- current developments in realtime, and use ernment is called for. social networks and mobile phones to Generally, the EU should critically quickly, cheaply and effectively mobilise. scrutinise its policies vis-à-vis the region. The discourse in the Arab world is conse- The fact that close cooperation with dicta-

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und quently no longer centrally controlled (as tors like Ben Ali and Mubarak does not Politik, 2011 it still was during the time of Gamal Abdul guarantee long-term stability has now All rights reserved Nasser). Instead, it is increasingly deter- been clearly demonstrated. For this reason,

These Comments reflect mined by the Arab satellite channels and Europeans should return to the original solely the authors’ views. the solidarity and imitation effects created approach of the Euro-Mediterranean Part-

SWP among Arab youths using blogs, Facebook nership: long-term stability through Stiftung Wissenschaft und and Twitter. gradual economic and political opening. Politik German Institute for Protests in other countries across the In recent years, the EU member states and International and region are therefore likely to increase and their Mediterranean partners have largely Security Affairs could even develop into more uprisings. moved away from this approach and in- Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 This does not, however, mean that the stead focused on increased cooperation 10719 Berlin developments will follow the same pat- on combating terrorism and preventing Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 tern as the Tunisian case, that is, that the irregular migration. www.swp-berlin.org middle class plays a decisive role in driving ’s current questioning of its [email protected] the people’s uprising, that the regime col- Maghreb policy offers the chance to estab- ISSN 1861-1761 lapses quickly and that the country em- lish a new consensus among EU member

Translation by Robert Blasiak barks on a transition. It is impossible to states about the objectives of European predict when and under which conditions policy towards the region. The primary goal (English version of SWP-Aktuell 4/2011) psychological barriers collapse and the should be consistent support for political people put aside their fear of state powers. and economic transformation. In this sense, Furthermore, the overturning of additional the Europeans should send out clear signals regimes in no way guarantees the tran- and push for adherence to commitments sition to political systems that are more before upgrading relations and when pro- representative, inclusive and just. Indeed, viding financial support. Clear benchmarks few Arab societies offer relatively good should also apply to states rich in oil and preconditions for such a transition as is gas such as Libya. In addition, undesirable the case with Tunisia. developments within states such as The EU has announced its support for a Morocco and Jordan, which are viewed as democratic transition in Tunisia: concrete- “good performers”, should not be ignored ly, assistance in judicial reform and the but rather be clearly pointed out. Corre- holding of democratic elections. It should sponding signals from Brussels will, how- indeed closely and actively accompany ever, only be taken seriously by partner Tunisia’s transformation – without repeat- states to the South and East of the Mediter- ing past mistakes. The focus on establishing ranean if individual EU member states do formal institutions and processes only not contradict or circumvent them. makes sense if comprehensive political free-

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