Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs The Toppling of Ben Ali: Isolated Development or First Domino? SWP Comments Comparable Challenges – Varying Conditions Muriel Asseburg / Isabelle Werenfels Following the fall of Tunisia’s President and in light of the upheaval in Egypt, the spectre of domino effects has been raised. The lack of prospects for young people, social injustice and political repression – all causes that sparked the protests in Tunisia – are problems in virtually all Arab states. Demonstrations against the regimes have gathered force from Algiers all the way to Sana’a. Nevertheless, the Tunisian scenario is unlikely to repeat itself: the differences in political, social and economic conditions are too large. A lot depends on whether Tunisia achieves a successful transformation and on how the situation in Egypt develops. However, the developments thus far have shown that stability can be deceptive and dictators are unable to guarantee long-term stability. The EU should reconsider its benevolent policies vis-à-vis the authoritarian rulers in the Mediterranean region. Socio-economic factors alone are insuffi- equality, and the increasingly “mafia-like” cient for explaining why Tunisia was the practices of the ruling family all played first Arab state to see a dictator toppled by important roles. With regard to the ruling the people. The combination of political, family’s decadence, the Tunisians saw their economic and social factors proved deci- suspicions confirmed by the WikiLeaks sive. Firstly, the growing socio-economic cables. problems hit the regime in its Achilles heel. Secondly, there were few political valves For a long time, Ben Ali was able to legiti- in Tunisia through which people could mise his rule by pointing to the compara- voice discontent. The country had a press tively high living standards of the Tunisian that was among the world’s least free, and people. His strategy of substituting eco- the police and secret service prevented nomic prosperity for political freedoms, any activities or assemblies critical of the however, became increasingly unfeasible. regime – including those of legal organisa- At the same time, the high levels of un- tions like the Tunisian League of Human employment, not least among young Rights. It can therefore come as little sur- academics, the rising levels of social in- prise that the demonstrators, who initially Dr Muriel Asseburg is head of the Middle East and Africa Division SWP Comments 5 Dr. Isabelle Werenfels is a researcher at the Middle East and Africa Division February 2011 1 called for jobs and social justice, increas- for Arab elites. Not only have they begun to ingly called for freedom. It wasn’t until the marshal their defences against protests, but second to last day of his rule that Ben Ali they have also announced political reforms for the first time indicated openness to and have taken measures to alleviate socio- political concessions – it was too late. economic emergencies. Thirdly, it proved Ben Ali’s undoing that The concerns of the rulers, the sense of political and economic power was concen- solidarity among the Arab peoples and the trated with him and his family. He was emulation effects all arise from a common therefore unable to subscribe the social consciousness: the problems that combined injustices, corruption or brutality of the to form the proverbial straw that broke the security forces to other parties. In the camel’s back in Tunisia also exist in other course of the protests, it became increas- Arab countries. Using this realisation, how- ingly clear that the situation would only ever, to predict the end of all Arab autoc- be calmed by his resignation. As a result, racies would be premature. After all, the divisions opened up among the power specific conditions in each of the respective elites: key figures within the regime dis- Arab states render a repeat of the Tunisian tanced themselves from Ben Ali – it scenario improbable. remains an open question whether this was due to political convictions or oppor- tunism. Ultimately it was Tunisia’s army Republics At Risk? chief who induced, or perhaps forced, the When considering possible domino effects, president to leave the country. the extremely fragile polities in Yemen and Fourthly, it was representatives of all the Palestinian territories come to mind segments of society who took to the streets. first. The assumption that held sway for Tunisian society is modern, educated, and Tunisia until just a few weeks ago could, homogeneous in terms of ethnicity and however, also apply to the republics in the confession, and the considerable degree southern and eastern Mediterranean area – of equality afforded to women in Tunisia namely that stagnation has been mistaken is largely unparalleled in the Arab world. for stability. A closer examination reveals a There is also a high degree of networking paradoxical phenomenon: structures and and mobilisation via the electronic media dynamics that at first sight seem to have a which generated a correspondingly intense destabilising effect such as plural power collective outcry over the brute force em- centres or fragmented societies, can play ployed by the security forces. The successful into the hands of the regimes and extend modernisation of Tunisian society provides their life spans. good conditions for a process of democrati- In Algeria, riots are almost a part of sation that has now been set in motion. daily life, at least on the local level. In Jan- uary 2011, these riots expanded to cover larger swathes of the country. Even if these Initial Reactions riots have always died down again and have The events in Tunisia have stirred strong failed to generate political consequences, emotions amongst populations stretching it is probable that they will flare up to a from Morocco to Saudi Arabia. Protests greater extent in the future. Similar fac- against authoritarian regimes have inten- tors are at work here as in Tunisia: un- sified, opposition figures have called for an employment and a lack of prospects for emulation of developments in Tunisia, young people as well as a widespread desperate individuals have resorted to self perception that “mafia-like” clans of elites immolation – one such individual served as are enriching themselves at the cost of a catalyst for the events in Tunisia. The fall the general population and – unlike the of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali is also unsettling Tunisian case – a sense that the entire state SWP Comments 5 February 2011 2 apparatus treats the citizens with con- addition to the fragmentation within the tempt. society, this is also due to the traumatic Nevertheless, there are many arguments experiences of many Algerians during the against the likelihood of Algeria experienc- civil war of just ten years ago. ing regime change “from below” in the Ben Ali’s resignation, however, may near future. Firstly, with its strong presi- generate positive effects in Algeria over the dent and influential military leaders there medium term. Those in power in public are several competing power centres. The and behind the scenes will reconsider the lack of personalisation and the uncertainty forced constrictions on political latitude as to who is currently exercising control that have existed for many years. Looking over specific political and economic spheres forward to the presidential elections in makes it easier to shift responsibility off on 2014 and the successor to Bouteflika, they others. In the end, the forced resignation of will also have to decide whether they will Abdel Aziz Bouteflika by the people would push through an unpopular candidate or if not have any major impact on the political they will allow a candidate who enjoys a system. certain degree of legitimacy. Secondly, the Algerian society is very No Arab ruler has issued such a clear heterogeneous. There exists, for example statement on the events in Tunisia as strong regional solidarity as well as tension Libya’s ruler, Muammar al-Qadhafi, who between Kabyle Berbers and the Arab condemned the Tunisian people and majority. The social fragmentation is defended Ben Ali. Concerns about rioting reflected in the political landscape and is in his own country likely played a large role fostered by those in power to skilfully play in this. Riots over housing shortages erup- one group critical of the regime against ted in Libya in early January 2011 and were another. The opposition is correspondingly noteworthy for both their size and length. divided and incapable of action – this even At first glance, there are a number of holds true for the Islamists who were so striking similarities between Libya and powerful two decades ago. There is no Tunisia. Political power is also concentrated political power existing today that can in Libya within a single person, Muammar channel the protests. al-Qadhafi, and economic power likewise Thirdly, the authoritarian ruling powers concentrated within his family. WikiLeaks have established a series of political valves also published less than flattering reports for releasing pressure: opposition parties on the topic. Like Tunisia under the rule of are included in the Parliament; the press is Ben Ali, Libya under Qadhafi’s rule is also kept on a rather long leash; the security one of the least free states in the world. forces hold back during protests. The so-called “grassroots” system allows for Fourthly, with its rich reserves of oil and neither political parties nor political activi- natural gas, Algeria is a state with consid- ties extending beyond tightly controlled erable currency reserves and little foreign processes. The opposition and its most debt. The revenues from oil sales have not powerful element, the Muslim Brother- only helped to establish a system of patron- hood, has had no chance to organise itself age-based, regime-stabilising structures, within the country.