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The Subsequent Political Landscape Of Winter is Coming: The Repercussions of the Arab Spring Revolutions (Synopsis) Thesis: The subsequent political landscape of the Arab Spring revolutions in the Middle East brought on economic devastation, human causalities and ineffective political reform; ultimately proving the overvaluation of the revolution. Arguments: 1. Economic Devastation: The economic cost for the resources used in the revolution and the decreased economic trade following the revolution has greatly hindered financial progression in Middle Eastern countries. Libya, Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain and Yemen have experienced a combined US $20.56 billion cost to GDP and US $35.28 billion cost to public finances since the beginning protests. Public revenues have fallen by 77% in Yemen and 84% in Libya.i Unemployment predictions estimate over a 1% increase as public investment possibly decline 10%. It is expected to take upwards of 5 years of recovery to reach pre crisis economic statistics.ii Libya’s GDP has fallen by approximately 60% with the value of oil exports decreasing 40%. Inflation in Yemen has risen by 20%. The country is predicted to decline another 0.5% in GDP, against the 3% growth projected before the revolution.iii 2. Human Casualties: The human casualties experienced by both civilians and protestors during the Arab Spring have nearly eradicated the population of participating nations. The death toll in Syria is approaching 70,000. As of January 2013, 60,000 civilians have been killed.iv Nearly 1,000 civilians have been killed in Egypt and 30,000 have been killed in Libya.v As of October 2011 700,000 people have fled Libya as part of mass refugee movements.vi In May 2012, approximately 500,000 Syrians had been internally displaced and 70,000 have left the country.vii Over 1 million children in Yemen are now suffering acute malnutrition. Approximately 250,000 of these children under 5 are at risk of death and 55% of the Yemen population now lives for under US $2 per day.viii 3. Ineffective Political Reform: The political parties and unqualified leaders put into power following the revolution are unable to lead their nations into a just political system After Saleh of Yemen steps down as president, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, Saleh’s vice president, was elected to rule in a one candidate election.ix Mohamed Morsi of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak’s successor, enforced a decree which would allow for him to rule without judicial oversight, giving him absolute power.x Tunisia has experienced several leaders since the resignation of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Mohamed Ghannouchi, former Prime Minister, became a self-proclaimed acting president of Tunisia.xi Ghannouchi’s rule would last only a few hours before Fouad Mebazaa would rise to power for less than a year.xii Next there would be Moncef Marzouki, the current interim President.xiii Counter Arguments: 1. The economic policies before the revolution contributed to the stagnant political growth. The revolution has now provided several countries in the Middle East with opportunities of economic expansion as previously corrupt regimes have been overthrown. Prior to the revolution 90% of those unemployed in Egypt were between the ages of 15 and 25 years.xiv Government reports boasted an unemployment rate of 9.7% in 2010.xv In Syria, unemployment was estimated at 25% of the general population while official reports offer an unemployment rate of only 8.3% as of 2010.xvi In 2007, unemployment in Tunisia stood at 12.4%, but by 2010 it had risen to 13.3% with the highest numbers amongst educated youth.xvii Between 2007 and 2010, the Arab nations of Bahrain, Yemen and Egypt would imported half of all food consumed. Egypt saw a 37% increase of local food prices between 2008 and 2010. xviii 2. The human rights violations leading up to the revolution outweigh the human casualties experienced during the protests. The poorest 40% in Egypt had yet to receive their share of cheap bread from government food programs. xix Many had to bribe local officials for necessities. Amjad Toukan of the Lebanese American University in Beirut reflects on his time in Egypt, “But I couldn't get water without bribing local bureaucrats, while middlemen were taking an excessive amount of what I made.”xx Until the revolutions, many were unable to voice their concerns due to censorship. Al Jazeera director-general Wadah Khanfar stated, “The intelligence agencies wanted to arrest people. They found something called Facebook. They found something called Twitter.”xxi 3. New democratic states will allow for the citizens to fairly select their leaders. Now that corrupt regimes have been overthrown, just leaders will be elected and reorganize political relations. Muammar Gaddafi of Libya held power from 1969 after overthrowing King Idris I. Largely opposed to American ideology, Gaddafi would encourage the Arab people to fight Western ideals in 1972.xxii Tunisia, had been under the rule of President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali since 1987. Ali was elected to presidency with over 99% of the votes, suggesting election fraud. Yet in 1991, Ali banned opposing political parties and underwent criticisms for human right policies.xxiii June 2, 2012, Mubarak is sentenced to life in prison, the first time the 84 year old President responds to corruption allegations.xxiv i Middlebrook, Peter, and Claire Hajaj. RE-THINKING THE ARAB SPRING. Rep. Geopolicity, Oct. 2011. Web. Mar. 2013. <http://www.geopolicity.com/upload/content/pub_1318911442_regular.pdf>. ii Khandelwal, Padamja, and Agustín Roitman. The Economics of Political Transitions: Implications for the Arab Spring. Rep. International Monetary Fund, Mar. 2013. Web. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1369.pdf>. iii Ibish, Hussein. "Foreign Policy Magazine." Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy, July-Aug. 2012. Web. 19 Mar. 2013. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/18/was_the_arab_spring_worth_it?page=full>. iv Fantz, Ashley. "Syria Death Toll Probably at 70,000, U.N. Human Rights Official Says."CNN. Cable News Network, 12 Feb. 2013. Web. 17 Mar. 2013. <http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/12/world/meast/syria-death-toll>. v Walid, Libya., Rod Nordland; Kareem Fahim Contributed Reporting From Outside Bani. "Libya Counts More Martyrs Than Bodies." The New York Times. The New York Times, 17 Sept. 2011. Web. 24 Mar. 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/17/world/africa/skirmishes-flare-around-qaddafi- strongholds.html?pagewanted=all>. vi International Organization for Migration. IOM Response to the Libyan Crisis. Rep. International Organization for Migration, 10 Oct. 2011. Web. <http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/media/docs/reports/IOM-sitrep-MENA.pdf>. vii Miles, Tom. "Half a Million Displaced in Syria; Refugee Numbers Rise: U.N." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 29 May 2012. Web. 16 Mar. 2013. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/29/us-syria-crisis-refugees- idUSBRE84S11R20120529>. viii Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Humanitarian Bulletin Yemen. Rep. N.p.: United Nations, n.d. Print. <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA%20Yemen%20Humanitarian%20Bulletin%20- %208%20May%202012.pdf> ix Craggs, Ryan. "Yemen Elections For New President, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, While Ali Abdullah Saleh To Exit." The Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 19 Feb. 2012. Web. 3 Mar. 2013. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/19/yemen-president-elections_n_1287465.html>. x Kirkpatrick, David D. "Morsi Extends A Compromise To Opposition." The New York Times. The New York Times, 09 Dec. 2012. Web. 23 Mar. 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/world/middleeast/egypt- protests.html?pagewanted=1>. xi BBC. "Tunisia Profile." BBC News. BBC, 21 May 2013. Web. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa- 14107720>. xii BBC. "Tunisia President Fouad Mebazaa Calls Election." BBC News. BBC, 03 Mar. 2011. Web. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12642942>. xiii BBC. "Tunisia Profile." BBC News. BBC, 21 May 2013. Web. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa- 14107720>. xiv "The Arabian Spring and Its Impact on MENA Economies." The Arabian Spring and Its Impact on MENA Economies. Research and Markets, Dec. 2011. Web. <http://www.researchandmarkets.com/research/31ba61/the_arabian_spring>. xvHandoussa, Heba. Egypt Human Development Report 2010. Rep. United Nations Development Programme, Dec. 2010. Web. <http://www.undp.org.eg/Portals/0/NHDR%202010%20english.pdf>. xvi "The Arabian Spring and Its Impact on MENA Economies." The Arabian Spring and Its Impact on MENA Economies. Research and Markets, Dec. 2011. Web. <http://www.researchandmarkets.com/research/31ba61/the_arabian_spring>. xvii Toujas-Bernate, Joël, and Rina Bhattacharya. "IMF Survey: Tunisia Weathers Crisis Well, But Unemployment Persists." IMF Survey: Tunisia Weathers Crisis Well, But Unemployment Persists. International Monetary Fund, 10 Sept. 2010. Web. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2010/car091010a.htm>. xviii "Food and the Arab Spring: Let Them Eat Baklava." The Economist. The Economist, 17 Mar. 2012. Web. <http://www.economist.com/node/21550328>. xix Ibid xx Ibid xxi Wadah Khanfar: A Historic Moment in the Arab World. By Wadah Khanfar. TED: Ideas worth Spreading. TED, Mar. 2011. Web. <http://www.ted.com/talks/wadah_khanfar_a_historic_moment_in_the_arab_world.html>. xxii Staff, CNN Wire, and Mike Pearson. "As Ruler, Gadhafi Sought World Stage." CNN. Cable News Network, 20 Oct. 2011. Web. <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/10/20/world/africa/libya-gadhafi-profile/index.html?hpt=hp_t1>. xxiii"Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali (president of Tunisia)." Encyclopedia Britannica Online. Encyclopedia Britannica, 10 Dec. 2012. Web. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/60277/Zine-al-Abidine-Ben-Ali>. xxiv Associated Press. "Hosni Mubarak's Rule and Downfall." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 02 June 2012. Web. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/02/hosni-mubarak-rule-downfall-timeline>. .
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