Answer of the Federal Government to the Minor Interpellation tabled by the Members of the Bundestag Andrej Hunko, Jan Korte, Christine Buchholz, Annette Groth, Inge Höger, Ulla Jelpke, Niema Movassat, Frank Tempel, Katrin Werner and the Left Party parliamentary group

- Bundestag Printed paper No. 17-13168 of 11 April 2013 -

The policies of the European Union and the German Federal Government towards Libya and Tunisia in the justice and home affairs sectors

Preliminary remarks of the questioners

Previous interpellations have required the German Federal Government to provide information about projects to support and train the police forces of North African countries (Bundestag Printed papers 17/10107 and 17/11986). The European Union (EU) wishes to implement a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ (MoU) with Libya that has been negotiated by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission. The aim is ‘capacity building for crisis response coordination and public security’. The ‘reintegration of Libyan militias following the fall of Muammar al-Gaddafi’ is to be facilitated. A ‘crisis response centre and early warning system’ is currently being built up, while ‘national crime data’ should ‘be deployed effectively to combat national and international criminal networks’ in future. At the same time, the EU’s FRONTEX agency is negotiating a working agreement with the government and has been invited by the European External Action Service (EEAS) to take part in a joint fact-finding mission for this purpose. For its part, the EEAS is planning the implementation of a ‘crisis response operation in the field of border management in Libya’. The Libyan regions where this would be relevant have been placed under emergency law as closed zones subject to military control. The German Federal Government is planning its own ‘bilateral capacity building project in the security sector’ in Libya.

Tunisia, Libya, Algeria and Mauretania have announced that they will establish their own border surveillance systems. The EU is driving ahead the integration of these capabilities: The countries are to be integrated into the Spanish-led ‘Seahorse Mediterraneo Project’, the reconnaissance data from which will be collated by the EUROSUR border surveillance platform. The partner countries targeted are Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Tunisia has refused up until now to take part in ‘Seahorse Mediterraneo’ (gefangenen info, 373, ‘International: EU-Migrationsabwehr auf Kosten des arabischen Frühlings’).

The expectation is that Tunisia will be the first country in the Arab world to go through a ‘security sector reform’, which is being crucially supported by the German Federal Government (answer to oral question 36 put by Andrej Hunko, Member of the German Bundestag, during the German Bundestag question time on 20 March 2003, Minutes of Plenary Proceedings 17/250). The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and the Federal Police are involved in this work. Although the German secret services have been criticised a great deal of late on account of their role in the scandal about the National Socialist Underground (NSU) far-right terror group, they are running ‘cooperation projects’ with titles like ‘Intelligence Services in a Rule-of-Law State’ and ‘Counterterrorism’. Just one Federal Police mission to prevent unwanted migration, described as a training measure, will cost €650,000 (answer to written question 11 tabled by Dr Diether Dehm, Member of the German Bundestag, Bundestag Printed paper 17/12949). The European Commission now wishes to provide its own support for the Tunisian ‘security sector reform’ by deploying 14 specialists in ‘information exchange and technical support’ to Tunisia in order to identify weak points in that country’s security apparatus.

Although the EU and the German Federal Government have demanded the ‘orientation of their capabilities towards the combatting of organised crime and terrorism in line with rule-of-law norms and the protection of human rights’ (Bundestag Printed paper 17/11986), few efforts to achieve this on the part of Libya and Tunisia have come to light. The statement by an EU delegation dated 13 March 2013 (Local EU Statement on Religious Freedom and Fundamental Rights) notes that grave human rights infringements continue to be committed by state authorities in Libya. The barriers to freedom of movement and freedom of opinion in Tunisia were illustrated most recently by the police and military action against migrant participants at the World Social Forum (see http://ffm-online.org/category/mittelmeerraum/tunisien, 25 March 2013).

Preliminary remarks of the German Federal Government

The upheavals in the Arab world are a historic opportunity for the European Union to promote democratic structures and institutions, the rule of law and the protection of human rights in its southern neighbourhood. As an EU Member State, Germany has supported this from the very beginning. The German Federal Government has been contributing bilaterally to these processes since 2011 with its transformation partnerships programme. The German Bundestag has made a total of €100m available to support these transformation processes in the years 2012 and 2013.

One element in the anchoring of democratic structures in Tunisia and Libya is the establishment of democratically shaped and controlled security structures. The governments of Tunisia and Libya have committed themselves to do this, and expressly desire cooperation with the European Union and Germany in the justice and home affairs sectors.

We ask the German Federal Government: 1. To what extent are EU institutions (as far as the German Federal Government is aware, further to the account given in Bundestag Printed paper 17/10107 and including institutions of the EU Member States) involved in the establishment of border management systems, crime fighting, migration control or ‘security sector reform’ in Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt?

Tunisia

At the beginning of March 2013, the European Commission reached agreement with the transitional government on a ‘peer review’ of the security sector in Tunisia, in which twelve experts are now expected to take part. This project has been set up as part of the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) programme, is intended to assist the reorganisation (reform) of the Tunisian security apparatus and will encompass all fields within the jurisdiction of the Tunisian Ministry of the Interior. The project’s terms of reference are attached as an annex.

With regard to migration, reference is made to the answer to question 29.

Egypt

Apart from the EU, a number of EU Member States have offered support for the improvement of the security sector in Egypt or signalised their interest in cooperation. This is true, in particular, of training measures and technical support.

Libya

In Libya, the EU is planning a civilian CSDP mission on integrated border management that is due to take up its work in June 2013 (EU Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya)). The United Nations have taken over the coordination of international support for the reconstruction of the Libyan security sector, while the European External Action Service represents the EU in this field. With regard to the involvement of the EU’s FRONTEX agency, reference is made to the answer to question 8. With regard to EU support for crime fighting in Libya, reference is made to the answer to question 4.

According to a list published by the United Nations Support Mission (UNSMIL), which is responsible for the coordination of police reconstruction aid in Libya, the EU is currently implementing three projects:

• border management,

• development of criminal investigations intelligence (RELINC – responsibility for implementation lies with INTERPOL),

• support for national crisis anticipation and response capability.

In addition to this, a Security and Justice Sectors Programme is being implemented by the EU. Meetings are held every month at the EU Delegation in Tripoli, with reports being made on topics that include irregular migration (above all by the Office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)).

Algeria

The German Federal Government does not possess any relevant information.

2. What is the concrete content of the ‘transformation partnerships in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) Region’ in terms of measures to promote democracy, the rule of law, and media and press freedom (Bundestag Printed paper 17/10107)?

a) To what extent have the projects grown beyond their ‘start-up phase’, and what (initial) appraisals can the German Federal Government give for the purpose of their evaluation?

b) To what extent does the German Federal Government feel the measures to ‘promote and implement human rights’ have proved successful?

Since the beginning of 2012, a large number of measures have been implemented under the transformation partnerships programme. In the justice sector, for example, funding has been provided for activities undertaken by the German Foundation for international legal cooperation (IRZ) in Tunisia. The project partners include the Tunisian Ministry of Justice, the Higher Institute of the Judiciary and the Young Lawyers Association. A project implemented by the Hanns Seidel Foundation in this field (Legal, Judicial and Administrative Reform during the Democratic Transition Process in Tunisia) has also been supported with transformation funds.

With regard to the home affairs sector, reference is made to the answer to question 15.

In the field of human rights/transitional justice, for example, the Berlin-Hohenschönhausen Memorial has received funding to carry out a project (Confronting the Dictatorial Past in Tunisia). A project implemented by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Promoting a Broad Social Debate and Acceptance of the Universality of Human Rights) has been supported as well.

Since these activities are still ongoing (initially until the end of 2013), it is too early to evaluate them as yet.

3. What working visits, technical talks, courses or other forms of training assistance have which German authorities conducted with authorities in the North African countries since 2011?

a) What content has been delivered in these activities?

b) What authorities and which of their administrative units have taken part in them?

c) How much have they cost, and how have these costs been met?

Federal Ministry of Justice The German Federal Ministry of Justice (BMJ) has been coordinating its activities with the Federal Foreign Office since 2011 in North Africa, above all to support Tunisia and Egypt in building rule-of-law and democratic structures by means of measures in the legal field. This has been done primarily by the German Foundation for international legal cooperation (IRZ). The priorities for bilateral cooperation are the training and professional development of judges, the position of lawyers and their professional development, good legislation, the protection of human rights and the prison system; in addition to this, work has been done on business and banking law, and arbitration in Egypt. An event has been held with the Moroccan justice authorities concerned with combatting corruption.

Representatives from the BMJ unit responsible for international affairs and the directorates-general responsible for the relevant topics took part in these activities.

The costs for the BMJ’s bilateral cooperation with Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco have amounted to approximately €16,000 since 2011.

The IRZ’s bilateral cooperation activities with Tunisia in 2011 cost approximately €27,000.

The IRZ’s bilateral cooperation activities with Egypt in 2011 cost approximately €25,000.

The costs for the IRZ’s bilateral cooperation with Tunisia in 2012 amounted to approximately €210,000, which was financed with funds from the Federal Foreign Office (transformation partnership).

The costs for the IRZ’s bilateral cooperation with Egypt in 2012 amounted to approximately €150,000, which was financed with funds from the Federal Foreign Office (transformation partnership).

Federal Ministry of the Interior

I. Disaster response

Since a deployment during flooding in Tunisia in 1988, the German side, for which the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW) is working, has been continuously further developing its cooperation with its Tunisian partner, the National Civil Defence Office (ONPC). The following contacts with Tunisia have taken place since 2011:

• Transformation partnership project administered by the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK): Protecting and Saving Human Lives – Strengthening the Tunisian Fire Brigade. Goal: Improved training and equipment for Tunisian civil defence and disaster response units. The Director-General of the Tunisian ONPC recently visited the BBK in Germany on 8/9 April 2013 for talks about the management of the project.

• Trip by a 20-strong THW Youth delegation to Tunisia (23 February-3 March 2012). Annual visit by a THW youth group; participation in the Tunisian celebrations on 1 March (International Day for Disaster Reduction). Goal: Presentation of the capabilities of the THW’s youth sections. Costs shared between ONPC/THW. • Visit by a three-strong delegation to the THW in Germany (22-29 April 2012). Presentation of the functions and structure of the THW, elaboration of a rough concept for a project to introduce volunteering in the Tunisian ONPC. Costs shared between ONPC/THW.

• Trip by a THW staff member to Tunisia with a BMI delegation (13-16 May 2012). Preparations for further cooperation in the field of civil protection. Costs shared between ONPC/THW.

• Trip to the first meeting of the THW and ONPC’s ‘Joint Commission’ in Tunis (8-11 July 2012); drafting of a two-year plan of work. Costs shared between ONPC/THW.

• Visit by five ONPC officers to USAR Basic Training for Youngsters, a search-and-rescue course for young volunteers at Osnabrück (22-29 July 2012). Goal: Provision of information about work with volunteers in the THW. Costs shared between ONPC/THW.

• Trip by a four-strong THW delegation to Tunis (10-13 December 2012). Participation in the Tunisian International Volunteer Day celebrations. Discussion of progress made by projects and delivery of decommissioned THW vehicles for future deployment in Tunisian civil protection, generating considerable publicity. Costs shared between ONPC/THW.

• Organisation of three courses for 35 male Tunisian instructors and one female instructor in Germany (Sinzig, 17 February-2 March 2013; Dessau, 17-29 March 2013; Dresden/Dippoldiswalde, 6-20 April 2013). Costs met with project funds from the Federal Foreign Office.

• Meetings of the ten-strong binational project management team in Tunis (18-23 September 2012) and Oberwinter (16-19 December 2012). It is likely another meeting will be arranged in Germany in 2013 to draw up plans for the next project phase. Costs met with project funds from the Federal Foreign Office.

II. Police cooperation

Algeria

17-25 April 2012: Multinational BKA course on Operative Analysis at the Algerian-based African Centre for Studies and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT).

Tunisia

Within the framework of training assistance and equipment aid, the Federal Police is working on document protection and maritime security/maritime search and rescue in Tunisia. The activities focussed on border police operations are targeted at the Tunisian National Police, while the maritime activities are targeted at the Tunisian National Guard. • 19-21 November 2012: Trip by BMI/Federal Police Headquarters staff to coordinate the Federal Police’s planned engagement in Tunisia. Demand analysis for projects on document protection and maritime security/maritime search and rescue. Cost approx. €6,800.

• 10-14 December 2013: Fact-finding visit by a delegation of Tunisian border police to Frankfurt/Main Airport; theoretical/practical introduction to the first and second control lines, automated border checks, EASY-Pass and automated, biometrically supported border checks, technical equipment for checks; theoretical introduction to working methods, gathering/obtaining information and information sources at the airport; introduction to the Schengen Borders Code. Cost approx. €1,500.

• 25 February-1 March 2013: Fact-finding visit by Tunisian National Guard staff to the Federal Police District Office Sea at the Maritime Training Centre in Neustadt, Holstein; presentation of German standards in the field of maritime security. Cost approx. €11,000.

• 4-7 February 2013: Basic course/introduction to the fundamentals of document protection for Tunisian border police at Tunis Airport with two police officers from Federal Police Headquarters; characteristics of forged documents, security features of documents and authentication, manipulation techniques/forging methods. Cost approx. €2,500.

• 15-20 April 2013: Multiplier training on Document Security for Tunisian border police at Tunis Airport with two police officers from Federal Police Headquarters; assessment of forged documents in the first and second control lines, and initiation of requisite follow-up measures. Cost approx. €2,500.

• 23-24 October 2012: BKA workshop on the Liaison Officer System at the Tunis-Manouba Police College. Cost approx. €4,200.

• 29 October-2 November 2012: BKA course on Combatting Motor Vehicle Crime at the National Guard Headquarters in Tunis. Cost approx. €6,700.

• 5-9 November 2012: BKA course on Counterterrorism for the External Security Directorate (DSE). Cost approx. €3,700.

• 5 December 2012: BKA course on Recruiting Police Personnel. Cost approx. €4,500.

• 4-7 July 2011: Information trip for senior staff from the National Police and the Gendarmerie to the BKA’s State Security Division. Cost approx. €1,800.

• 16-18 November 2011: Information trip by senior staff from the National Police and the Gendarmerie to the BKA’s Forensic Science Institute. Cost approx. €270.

• 9-12 July 2012: Visit by Directorate General for National Security (DGSN) and Judicial Police staff to the BKA’s Serious and Organised Crime Division to learn about anti-corruption work. Cost approx. €4,700. Morocco

• 17-23 October 2011: Information trip to the BKA’s Central CID Services Division by Directorate General for National Security (DGSN) staff to learn about criminal identification services. Cost approx. €1,200.

• 10-18 July 2012: BKA course on Operative Analysis in Rabat for the National Gendarmerie. Cost approx. €3,000.

• 9-12 January 2012: Working visit to the BKA’s State Security Division by representatives of the Directorate-General for Territorial Surveillance (DGST). Cost approx. €660.

• 12-14 June 2012: Working visit to the BKA’s Central CID Services Division by DGSN representatives to learn about crime scene examination following bomb attacks. Cost approx. €3,700.

• 5-9 November 2012: Participation by two DGSN staff in an international explosives symposium at Berlin. Cost approx. €1,300.

• 22-26 October 2012: Working visit to the DGSN in Kenitra by Lower Saxony Police to discuss photofit generation (financed by BKA). Cost approx. €3,300.

• 18 January-30 June 2011: Participation of a DGSN staff member in the BKA Scholarship Programme (Basic Module). Cost approx. €15,000.

• 1-24 October 2011: Participation of a National Brigade of the Judicial Police (BNPJ) staff member in the Advanced Module of the BKA Scholarship Programme. Cost approx. €2,000.

• 18 January-30 June 2012: Participation of a Gendarmerie staff member in the BKA Scholarship Programme (Basic Module). Cost approx. €13,500.

• 19-24 November 2012: Fact-finding visit by a delegation from the Moroccan Police Academy to the Federal Police Academy at Lübeck; presentation of the Federal Police’s training and professional development concepts, presentation of Federal Police recruitment activities, presentation of training at the Federal Police Academy, introduction to the Scientific and Technical/Materials Management and Criminology Departments. Cost approx. €1,440.

Libya

• 20-27 May 2012: Visit by the head of Interpol Tripoli, the head of the Criminal Investigations Department and the official responsible for Germany at the Libyan Ministry of Interior to the BKA offices at Wiesbaden and Berlin. Talks were held in the International Coordination Division, Serious and Organised Crime Division, Forensic Science Institute and Central CID Services Division. Furthermore, talks were held at the BMI on international police cooperation. Cost approx. €7,800.

Egypt • 13-15 December 2011: Information trip by two Egyptian Forensic Medicine Authority staff members to the BKA’s Forensic Science Institute and Central CID Services Division. Cost approx. €1,800.

• 22-29 September 2012: Technical visit by BKA State Security Division staff to the Egyptian General Intelligence Service (GIS) and National Security Sector (NSS). Cost unknown.

• 5 November-14 December 2012: Professional development provision for two dog handlers delivered by the Saxony-Anhalt Police (financed by the BKA). Cost approx. €6,300.

In addition to this, smaller-scale training activities have been carried out for two countries’ immigration authorities (Algeria and Egypt) by the Federal Police document and visa advisers posted to North Africa as part of their regular duties.

Intelligence services

Question 3 cannot be answered openly because when intelligence services cooperate it is assumed that particulars of the types, instruments, forms and timing of joint operations will be treated confidentially. The confidentiality of such activities is the underlying basis for any cooperation among intelligence services. This is also true of specific, individual training assistance projects for other intelligence services. If details of a cooperative activity and the content delivered became known, there would be a danger that direct inferences could be drawn about the intelligence services’ modi operandi, methods and levels of knowledge, which would therefore have a direct impact on the intelligence services’ interests. This would cause significant disadvantages for the Federal Intelligence Service when it cooperated with other intelligence services and so be harmful to the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany. For these reasons, a file categorised as ‘classified material – confidential’ has been deposited with the Document Security Office of the German Bundestag and may be consulted in accordance with the Rules on Document Security.

4. What more recent details can the German Federal Government provide concerning the (planned) conclusion of a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ (MoU) between the EU and Libya (Bundestag Printed paper 17/11986)?

The EU’s Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Libya concerning cooperation on capacity building for the coordination of crisis response activities and public security is currently being finalised by the EU Delegation in Tripoli and the Libyan government. Most recently, Libya asked for the text of the MoU to be prefaced with a general statement that makes it clear the Memorandum is to be regarded as a framework agreement for the individual crisis prevention measures it makes provision for. The EEAS has complied with this request.

a) What other reports from the European External Action Service or the European Commission has the German Federal Government received in the last three months?

Due to the delay that has occurred in the signing of the MoU, there have been no further relevant reports on this issue. b) What is the substantive content of the ‘declaration of intent’ or any draft version of it that may have been drawn up with regard to ‘capacity building for crisis response coordination and public security’?

The MoU will promote the establishment of an early warning system, the building of capacities for a crisis response centre to be run by the Libyan government, the training of the Libyan police and their integration into international structures, the procurement of clearing equipment, and technical support for the secure storage of arms and munitions. The EU intends to support the communications infrastructure, and instruction on operative procedures and management, including instruction on early warnings, precautionary risk assessment and the coordination of crisis response operations, as well as the promotion of police reconnaissance capabilities in Libya.

5. What new progress has been made in the implementation of a civilian-military ‘crisis management operation in the field of border management in Libya’ since the Federal Government commented on this matter in Bundestag Printed paper 17/11986?

On 19 April 2013, the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) approved the Operational Plan for the Mission. The designated Finnish Head of Mission is currently on the ground together with a core team, preparing for the start of the Mission.

a) What meetings have taken place at the official level or in an ‘informal format’ since November 2012, and who has attended them?

In March 2013, an EEAS Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) travelled to Libya and conducted preparatory talks with the Libyan contacts. The German Federal Government has no information about informal meetings.

b) When is the project officially due to commence?

At present, there are plans for the Council for External Relations to adopt a decision on the deployment of the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) at the end of May 2013.

c) How much will this operation cost, and how will these costs be paid?

Initial estimates suggest it will cost approximately €30m a year. The comparatively high costs are explained by the expensive security arrangements required to protect the Mission.

d) What activities will be carried out by which actors?

The plan for the deployment of the Mission is currently being prepared by the EU. The competent Council working groups are deliberating regularly on these matters.

e) How does the German Federal Government view the fact that the ‘operation’ in question is supposed to be implemented in regions that were placed under emergency law as closed zones subject to military control in December 2012? The civilian CSDP border management mission EUBAM Libya is initially intended to work in Tripoli. Border guards will also be trained for deployment in the south of the country. An expansion of the Mission’s area of operation is possible and will be dependent on the security situation. The German Federal Government will adopt a position on how the deployment of the Mission to the southern regions of the country is to be viewed against the background of an up-to-date security assessment when this issue arises.

6. What more recent details does the German Federal Government possess concerning the structure of the ‘crisis response centre’, the training of the Libyan police and their integration into international structures?

A crisis response centre has been built up since 2011 at Mitiga Airport in Tripoli with financial support from Qatar. Interpol is supporting the passport controls at Tripoli Airport with EU finance under the Stability Instrument. From this location at Tripoli, it is also supporting controls on the national borders to Tunisia and Egypt, but not along Libya’s southern border. Furthermore, two Interpol staff are training employees of the Libyan Ministry of Interior in criminal investigation as part of the capacity building approach.

a) To what extent does the German Federal Government believe the ‘action to secure and store small arms and munitions’ mentioned in Bundestag Printed paper 17/11986 has been successful?

Since the end of 2011, the Federal Foreign Office has been supporting three projects on the control of conventional weapons and munitions in Libya. €750,000 of start-up finance was provided for the establishment of a Libyan Centre for Mine Action and Explosive Remnants of War (LMAC) in cooperation with the United States of America. The LMAC is now fully functional and a key point of contact for the United Nations, the EU, major donors, and actors that are coordinating projects on mine clearance and the implementation of small arms and munitions control in Libya.

In September 2012, the Federal Foreign Office commissioned the international non-governmental organisation Handicap International to carry out a two-year project to clear remnants of war from, and secure, a former bunker complex where arms and munitions were stored at Misrata. Several bunker complexes were destroyed during the fighting in Misrata. When this happened, large quantities of explosive ordnance – munitions of all calibres, rockets and mines – were scattered in and around the facilities. There was a danger of the local population looting the complexes and tampering with the munitions and ordnance to obtain scrap metal. Several accidents, some of them fatal, had occurred. Apart from this, the clearance of the bunkers is countering the possibility that terrorist forces could use the remaining explosives for attacks. This project financed by the Federal Foreign Office with €662,000 involves the deployment of two highly specialised clearance teams over a period of several months. As part of the project, Libyan personnel are also to be trained and the store reinstated. Between November 2012 and February 2013, five weapons bunkers and an area of 62,288 m2 of land were completely cleared of explosive remnants of war – at the current point in time, more than 5,500 individual items classified as explosive remnants of war, the equivalent of a net explosive quantity (NEQ) of 9.3 tonnes, have been destroyed.

With regard to the third capacity building project on the control of conventional weapons, reference is made to the answer to question 10.

b) In the view of the German Federal Government, what progress has been made in the ‘reintegration of Libyan militias following the fall of Muammar al-Gaddafi’?

The Libyan transitional government, which has been in office since November 2012, is moving only gradually to disband the revolutionary brigades. Where brigades have been disbanded, their members have been able to apply to join the army and police. According to estimates by the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), several hundred individuals have been integrated into the army so far. Of the remaining brigades, many are operating under orders from the army and police, which means they are officially responsible for the maintenance of security.

According to official information from the Libyan Ministry of Interior, the following measures for the reintegration of the militias had been carried out in the policing sector (including prisons) as of 12 March 2013:

• 34,500 former rebels had applied to join the police,

• 9,528 were still going through the selection procedure,

• 1,356 had failed the medical examination,

• 14,454 had passed and were waiting to begin their training,

• 6,425 were in training,

• 841 had completed their training at Tripoli in the second week of March, 550 at Benghazi,

• 1,143 had completed their training in the third week of March,

• it is hoped a total of 15,000 former fighters will complete the training in 2013.

7. To the knowledge of the German Federal Government or in its view, what techniques and methods should be applied when the national ‘crisis response centre and early warning system’ that is going to be established in Libya (Bundestag Printed paper 17/11986) is used in ‘operative procedures and data management’ for ‘predictive risk assessment and analysis’?

The national crisis response centre and the early warning system are in their initial start-up phase of operation. Passport controls are being used initially to introduce the operative procedures and data management technology. The elaboration of, and instruction in, a forward-looking risk assessment system is part of Interpol’s programme in Libya. This should serve to prevent threats such as human trafficking, organised crime and terrorism. a) What authorities and institutions from which countries are involved in this or making contributions?

Interpol is conducting the programme with support from the European Commission’s Stability Instrument.

b) What other ‘projects to improve the investigative capabilities of the Libyan police’ administered by other countries or the EU is the German Federal Government aware of, and how are they supposed to help ensure ‘national crime data’ is deployed ‘effectively to combat national and international criminal networks’ in future?

The central project, Rebuilding Libya’s Investigative Capacity (RELINC), is being conducted by Interpol and financed by the EU. The German Federal Government has no information of its own about projects conducted by other countries.

8. What more recent developments can the German Federal Government report concerning the mandate the EU’s FRONTEX agency has to take up negotiations for the conclusion of a working agreement with Libya?

The mandate continues to apply. The negotiations have not made any further progress as yet. The EU’s FRONTEX agency intends to present what it could do to support the Mission and the matters that would potentially be regulated by a working agreement to a delegation from Libya in the near future.

a) What other projects or measures did FRONTEX look at during the ‘fact-finding mission’ to Libya in November 2012?

Hitherto, no concrete projects or measures have been looked at.

b) What matters will the (intended) ‘working agreement’ regulate with regard to measures that could potentially be taken by FRONTEX?

Reference is made to the lack of progress made in the negotiations discussed above. With regard to the fundamental, substantive content of the working agreement as currently drafted, reference is made to the answer of the German Federal Government to the minor interpellation tabled by the Left Party parliamentary party in Bundestag Printed paper 17/9757 of 23 May 2012.

c) What other projects in which countries is FRONTEX collaborating on with the civilian-military European External Action Service as in the ‘fact-finding mission’, and has it been invited to participate in any joint trips with the EEAS?

The German Federal Government is not aware that the EU’s FRONTEX agency has taken part in any other comparable activities.

9. In the view of the German Federal Government, how has the Libyan government so far implemented the ‘orientation of [its] capabilities towards the combatting of organised crime and terrorism in line with rule-of-law norms and the protection of human rights’ demanded and welcomed by the EU, as well as the German Federal Government (Bundestag Printed paper 17/11986)?

Fundamentally, it can be stated that the Libyan security architecture that is in place is still at a merely rudimentary level. Both the government of Prime Minister Zeidan and the senior staff of the security authorities feel committed to international human rights standards and, as far as it is possible to tell, are advised and guided in this respect by the international actors on the ground.

a) To what extent does the German Federal Government see ‘comprehensive action to ensure the protection of personal data and respect for human rights’ being implemented in the above-mentioned projects?

Given the continuing political unrest, the German Federal Government believes it is too early yet to be able to conclusively assess the implementation of the points that have been mentioned.

b) What conclusions does the German Federal Government draw from the statement by an EU delegation of 13 March 2013 (Local EU Statement on Religious Freedom and Fundamental Rights), according to which grave human rights contraventions continue to be committed by state authorities in Libya, and what impact will this have on its own projects in the country?

From the point of view of the German Federal Government, respect for human rights remains a central policy concern as the new Libya is built. The German Federal Government will continue to work for this bilaterally in its dealings with the Libyan government and in concord with its multilateral partners. It welcomes the fact that the five foreign citizens of Christian faith detained since February 2013 were released following the statement referred to in the question.

10. What ‘bilateral capacity building project in the security sector’ does the German Federal Government wish to fund in Libya, and how is it intended to complement EU measures (Bundestag Printed paper 17/11986)?

In the course of the 2011 Libyan revolution, the Gaddafi regime lost control over large parts of its arsenal of weapons. As a consequence of this, the regime’s weapons stores were freely accessible to both the rebels and civilians, as well as the regime’s soldiers. Since the end of the fighting, central control has not been completely restored over the arsenal of weapons. According to information from the Libyan authorities, there is an acute need for improved, central control of weapons and munitions in Libya. The knowledge transfers, equipment and technical capabilities required if this is to be guaranteed effectively have been identified by the Libyan side. As a response to these challenges, the project aims to strengthen capacities in the field of conventional arms control in partnership with Libyan government authorities. This is intended to contribute to the attempts to contain the proliferation of weapons in Libya and neighbouring countries, and to cope with the security-relevant consequences of the Libyan civil war. a) What measures are planned for this purpose?

The implementation strategy drawn up following a review mission encompasses a programme of conventional arms control in Libya, which should consist of three components:

• building the capacities of the Libyan institutions that are working on mine clearance and arms control,

• support for Libyan initiatives concerned with the physical security and management of storage facilities,

• support for Libyan mine clearance, ordnance disposal and battlefield clearance activities.

The support will be provided in the form of knowledge transfers by long-term and short-term experts, the organisation and performance of specialised training courses, the provision of materials and equipment and, in certain cases, financial contributions to the implementation of measures made by government institutions and specialised non-governmental organisations. At present, this programme is in Phase 1, its start-up phase, which will ensure the activities are fully implementable by the beginning of Phase 2. Two other phases are provided for before the implementation of an exit strategy and handover to the Libyan partners in 2017.

There are no plans for further bilateral capacity building projects in the security sector.

b) How much will they cost, and how will these costs be met?

The bilateral project is financed from the Federal Foreign Office budget (chapter 0502, project title 687 77 – Disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation cooperation –) with €2.8m of funds being earmarked for the years 2013-2017.

The German project is also serving to put in place the preconditions for a planned multiannual EU project with a particular focus on secure storage.

11. What more recent information does the German Federal Government have on the efforts made by Tunisia, Libya, Algeria and Mauretania to establish their own border surveillance systems?

According to the information received by the German Federal Government, the current security situation is driving the governments of all the countries mentioned to seek to strengthen their existing border surveillance systems and intergovernmental cooperation. At the ‘5 + 5’ talks of interior and foreign ministers, the Maghreb states agreed to work together better and more effectively in the field of border controls. The interior ministers of the ‘5 + 5’ group (Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauretania plus France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Malta) met most recently in Algiers on 9 April 2013.

Algeria is interested in the installation of a border surveillance system.

In Mauretania, a project on the establishment and material equipment of border posts and mobile surveillance units has been cofinanced by the EU since 2010 using European funds allocated to the security strategy for the Western Sahel. Apart from the EU, Mauretania’s partners in this project include France and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). In 2012, 34 permanent police posts and 100 mobile units were set up by the Mauretanian security forces. The goal is professional action to secure national borders for the orderly management of cross-border traffic.

On account of its current vulnerabilities, Tunisia is seeking to establish a border surveillance system. No information is available about Libya in this respect.

a) What is the German Federal Government’s opinion of the work done by these countries in the Seahorse Mediterraneo Project?

b) What more recent information does the German Federal Government have with regard to the Tunisian participation in the Seahorse Mediterraneo Project and corresponding initiatives theEU would like to see?

Germany is not involved in the project group. The German Federal Government is therefore unable to judge the work done by the countries in question. Furthermore, reference is made to the answers of the German Federal Government of 20 December 2012 to questions 10-15 of the minor interpellation tabled by the Left Party parliamentary group in Bundestag Printed paper 17/11986.

12. In what ways are federal authorities working with the Tunisian government in the justice and home affairs sectors at present?

The basis for bilateral cooperation with the National Civil Defence Office (ONPC) is the joint declaration issued at state secretary level on 12 September 2012 and the declaration of intent on cooperation of 10 November 2012. The two-year plan of work adopted on 9 July 2012 is currently being implemented. As a matter of principle, none of the measures will be taken until detailed agreement has been reached in consensus on each issue.

In 2013, the Federal Criminal Police Office plans to initially carry out the following support activities:

• course on Crime Scene Work (three crime scene vehicles, forensic bags and photographic equipment for use in securing physical evidence will be handed over when the course is delivered),

• course on Handling/Defusing Unconventional Explosive and Incendiary Devices,

• course on Combatting Drugs Crime as a Particular Manifestation of Organised Crime,

• advanced training course on Motor Vehicle Crime for individuals who attended the basic training in 2012,

• information trip to learn about motor vehicle crime for selected individuals who attended the basic training in 2012,

• course on VIP Protection, • participation of an employee from the Tunisian security authorities in the Preparatory Module for the Scholarship Programme.

Further to this, reference is made to the answer to question 3.

a) What further details can the German Federal Government provide on the measures taken by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and the Federal Police in Tunisia, the content of which it has only sketched out with titles and subtitles to date (oral questions 3-6 put by Andrej Hunko, Member of the German Bundestag, during the German Bundestag question time on 20 March 2013, Minutes of Plenary Proceedings 17/230)?

The Intelligence Services in a Democratic Rule-of-Law State project is being facilitated by the Federal University of Applied Administrative Sciences as a Tunisian-German rule-of-law dialogue. It looks at the legitimation and oversight of the intelligence services in a rule-of-law state. It is centred on the legal regulation of the intelligence services’ activities on the basis of the Federal Intelligence Service Act (BNDG), the Act Regulating the Cooperation of the Federal Government and the Länder in Matters Relating to the Protection of the Constitution (BVerfSchG), the Act to Restrict the Privacy of Correspondence, Posts and Telecommunications (G10) and the Act Governing the Parliamentary Control of Intelligence Activities by the German Federation (PKGrG). The Federal Intelligence Service is involved, contributing its experience of practical legal issues to the project.

With regard to the measures taken by the Federal Criminal Police Office, reference is made to the answers to questions 3 and 21. In addition to this, the Federal Criminal Police Office’s commitment is restricted to the exchange of information about police investigations into criminal cases.

b) What authorities from which countries and which of their administrative units are taking part in the activities?

Reference is made to the answers to questions 3 and 12(a).

c) How much will the projects in question cost, and how will these costs be paid?

Individual measures will incur travel and accommodation costs that still cannot be quantified conclusively. The activities undertaken by the Federal Police will be paid for with funds from the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) and the Federal Foreign Office (AA) (transformation partnerships). The activities undertaken by the BKA will be financed from the budget of the BMI. It will not be possible to state the actual costs until after the measures have been conducted.

d) What content is being delivered by the ‘Intelligence Services in a Democratic Rule-of-Law State’ programme and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution’s ‘courses and workshops’ on ‘counterterrorism’ (please describe in as much detail as possible and attach presentations that have previously been given or are planned, where available)?

Reference is made to the answer to question 12(a). e) What content is being delivered in the activities undertaken by the BKA and the Federal Police, and to what extent do they also address technical options for criminal investigation, threat prevention or the prevention of undesired migration (please describe in as much detail as possible and attach presentations that have previously been given or are planned, where available)?

The Federal Police runs courses on document protection and maritime security/maritime search and rescue for the Tunisian authorities. This training assistance delivers the following content:

Document protection (‘train the trainer’ modular provision)

• Basic Training: Characteristics of forged documents, security features of documents and authentication, manipulation techniques/forging methods.

• Training for Multipliers: Assessment of forged documents in the first and second control lines, and performance of requisite follow-up measures.

• Professional Development for Multipliers 1: Evaluation of forged documents, conduct of requisite second-stage follow-up measures (above local level), conveying technical content relevant to this topic in decentralised professional development provision.

• Professional Development for Multipliers 2: Checking and verification methods, recent developments in these fields, base materials and printing technology, special security features, document issue and personalisation methods, creation of warning notices and information materials.

Maritime security/maritime search and rescue (‘train the trainer’ modular provision)

• Training for Multipliers: Creation of a basis for the independent provision of measures to improve qualification levels in the field of maritime training:

- Sea survival training

- Emergency training (victim rescue)

- Helo transfer

- Fire fighting

- Leak and spill control, etc.

• Professional Development for Multipliers/Instructor Training: Professional development for multipliers in the above fields.

In addition to this, the procurement of equipment aid has been initiated in the fields of maritime security/maritime search and rescue/victim rescue (lifejackets and life rafts, materials on self-rescue and victim rescue, fire extinguishers) and document protection (document verification technology for the first and second control lines, training equipment) in order to improve the border police’s performance of their functions. The intention is for this equipment to be handed over to the Tunisian authorities when the training courses are conducted.

The courses run by the Federal Criminal Police Office also address technical criminal investigation procedures (standard procedures). The Federal Criminal Police Office has only limited competence when it comes to threat prevention.

f) To what extent are the BND’s Intelligence Services in a Democratic Rule-of-Law State ‘cooperation project’ or the ‘courses and workshops’ held by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution on ‘counterterrorism’ also addressing the criticisms levelled at the German secret services on account of their role in the NSU scandal, partly because they made payments to some of the organisation’s members and failed to pass on information, so preventing its crimes from being solved?

The topics sketched out in the answer to question 12(a) are examined and communicated extensively in a sufficiently critical fashion in the rule-of-law dialogue facilitated by the Federal University of Applied Administrative Sciences. There are no plans for courses or workshops on counterterrorism activities for the protection of the constitution.

g) In which other countries have these authorities already carried out similar projects, and what further details of these activities can the German Federal Government provide?

The Intelligence Services in a Rule-of-Law State project is a new innovation.

13. For what reason were the activities that, according to information from the Federal Foreign Office, the Federal Intelligence Service has been undertaking since the spring of 2012 not mentioned in Bundestag Printed paper 17/10107, which was issued in the summer of 2012 (see oral question 36 put by Andrej Hunko, Member of the German Bundestag, during the German Bundestag question time on 20 March 2013, Minutes of Plenary Proceedings 17/230), even though an explicit question about this issue was put at that time (‘In what ways are federal authorities cooperating with the Tunisian government in the justice and home affairs sectors?’)?

The project in question, Intelligence Services in a Rule-of-Law State (the first joint workshop of which is planned to take place in May 2013), is a rule-of-law dialogue facilitated by the Federal University of Applied Administrative Sciences. As far as this is concerned, reference is made to the answer to question 12(a). In this case, there is no cooperation between justice authorities or authorities responsible for home affairs of the kind referred to in question 4 of the minor interpellation tabled by the Left Party parliamentary group on June 2012 in Bundestag Printed paper 17/9894.

14. To what extent has the German Federal Government’s attitude towards Tunisia’s request for equipment aid now altered (Bundestag Printed paper 17/7587) (please describe measures that may be taken in response to this request as well)? Police equipment aid complements police training assistance and, as a matter of principle, is provided with the aim of ensuring previously delivered training measures have sustainable impacts. Equipment aid for Tunisia is provided on an ad hoc basis within the framework of the current support measures. Furthermore, reference is made to the answer to question 12.

15. What other developments can the German Federal Government provide information on with regard to the intentions of the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI), which is holding talks with Tunisia about ‘bilateral projects’ that will be designed to assist the ‘stabilisation and democratisation of the country’ (Bundestag Printed paper 17/10107)?

a) What other developments have there been with regard to the ideas about examining other projects that would build on the ‘cooperation between the Tunisian disaster response- authority ONPC and the German Federal Agency for Technical Relief, which has been maintained for 20 years’ (Bundestag Printed paper 17/10107)?

These ideas have been put into practice in a concrete project on the introduction of volunteering in the ONPC. The pilot project is intended to show the Tunisian partner ONPC how it could strengthen its resources by setting up and integrating volunteer units. The project should not only contribute to improved civil protection in Tunisia, but also to the democratisation and strengthening of civil society by establishing civil protection units staffed with volunteers at three locations (Ben Arous, Jendouba and Sidi Bouzid).

b) What substantive grounds or relevant evidence can the German Federal Government supply for its answer that, ‘The necessity for support to be provided by the BMI during Tunisia’s transformation process can be discerned from the assessments mentioned in the answer to question 4e’ (Bundestag Printed paper 17/10107)?

The fields listed in the answer to question 4(e), migration, crime and terrorism, continue to represent challenges in the Tunisian transformation process. To this extent, the reasons mentioned for the cooperation with Tunisia continue to apply. Germany also continues to have an interest in the Tunisian security authorities developing in line with rule-of-law principles.

16. What specific activities is the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) working on to remedy ‘rule-of-law and democratic deficits’?

a) What content and specific projects are provided for in the Regional Programme on Good Governance – Maghreb?

The goal of the Regional Programme on Good Governance – Maghreb is to foster dialogue about good governance both within and between state institutions and civil society organisations. It is focussed on increasing the transparency with which public funds are spent. To this end, the Regional Programme is building up a regional network for exchange between the audit institutions of the Maghreb states. b) What state institutions and ‘civil society organisations’ from Algeria, Morocco, Mauretania and Tunisia are being targeted by this measure?

The state institutions involved are the audit bodies of the Maghreb states. The non-state civil society organisations are professional associations, (regional) non-governmental organisations and academic networks.

c) For what purpose did the German Federal Government approach the forum zenith association?

The forum zenith association’s Overcoming Dictatorship project, which was supported financially by the Federal Foreign Office and the Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations as part of the transformation partnerships programme set itself the task of examining the priority accorded to confronting the past during the post-revolutionary transition in Egypt and Tunisia.

17. What did the Tunisian President mean when he told Deutsche Welle (DW), ‘We are very glad Germany has accepted the conversion of some of Tunisia’s debts into development projects,’ and what measures does this refer to (DW, interview broadcast on 21 March 2013)?

What other details can the German Federal Government provide concerning the statement by Moncef Marzouki that both countries want, ‘to work together in key areas such as energy, for example’?

On 26 May 2011, Federal Chancellor Dr Angela Merkel announced under the auspices of the G8 Deauville Partnership that Egypt and Tunisia will be supported during the present phase of radical political change with additional financial aid in the form of financial cooperation debt swaps worth as much as €300m. Of this, up to €60m has been allocated to Tunisia.

It was possible for a debt swap agreement to be signed concerning the first tranche of this undertaking worth €30m in December 2012. The second agreement was signed on 2 May 2013. The Tunisian counterpart funds will be dedicated to employment-intensive investments in drinking water supplies and wastewater management in disadvantaged regions of Tunisia.

In the view of the German Federal Government, President Moncef Marzouki was referring to the energy partnership between Germany and Tunisia, which was signed in Tunis on 9 January 2012 by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr Guido Westerwelle, and the Tunisian Foreign Minister, Rafik Abdessalem. This cooperation is focussed on renewable energies, energy efficiency, general energy policy issues and security of supply, energy markets, energy research, energy technologies, and training and professional development. The energy partnership is being managed by a high-ranking steering body with government representatives from both sides, which met for the first time on 28 January 2013. The first planning workshop on the concrete organisation of the partnership was held in Tunis on 30 April 2013. The technical aspects of the energy partnership are being implemented by thematic working groups attended by government and industry representatives from both sides. 18. Is it true that the BKA is engaged in tracking down the assets of former members of the Tunisian and Egyptian governments (Handelsblatt, 29 October 2012, ‘Geldwäsche erreicht neuen Höchststand’), and what other authorities have been instructed to take what action for this purpose?

Egypt and Tunisia have directed requests for legal aid to Germany in which they have asked for the repatriation of assets that belong to individuals who are being prosecuted under criminal or civil law. Talks on action to deal with these requests have been conducted with representatives from Egypt and Tunisia. The requests for legal aid have been received through diplomatic channels via the Federal Foreign Office and submitted to the Federal Office of Justice, which has reported to the Federal Ministry of Justice. The Federal Criminal Police Office has conducted investigations to track down the assets of the individuals mentioned in the requests.

a) Who ordered these investigations?

The Federal Office of Justice forwarded requests for legal assistance in the seizure of assets that had been received from the Court of First Instance in Tunis to the Federal Criminal Police Office in January 2011. The 48 individuals specified in the requests are the same as the individuals whose assets are to be frozen listed in Council Regulation No 101/2011 of 4 February 2011. Furthermore, the Federal Office of Justice forwarded requests for legal assistance received from Egypt in February 2011. The Federal Criminal Police Office was asked to identify assets held in Germany in all cases.

b) What results have the investigations arrived at?

One request for legal assistance from Egypt has been withdrawn. It is continuing to be examined whether it will be possible to carry out the remaining requests for legal assistance. Conclusive results cannot be reported at present.

c) Is the German Federal Government now urging Saudi Arabia to extradite former President Ben Ali to Tunisia so that he can be put on trial there for, inter alia, the embezzlement of assets?

Reference is made to the answer of the German Federal Government to question 24 of the minor interpellation tabled by the Left Party parliamentary group in Bundestag Printed paper 17/9894 of 6 June 2012.

d) If the Federal Government is making no efforts to achieve this end, what were the reasons for this decision?

Reference is made to the answer of the German Federal Government to question 24 of the minor interpellation tabled by the Left Party parliamentary group in Bundestag Printed paper 17/9894 of 6 June 2012. 19. In what fields of criminality has the BKA liaison officer in Tunisia taken action over the last two years to both ‘initiate and support investigations’?

To what extent has his ‘information gathering and evaluation, and his other work relating to investigations’ also been concerned with covert investigations or politically motivated crime?

The main functions of the BKA liaison officer who has been based in Tunis since March 2012 have been the gathering and evaluation of information, and assistance for the restructuring of the Tunisian police. Hitherto, he has not been active in initiating investigations, but merely in supporting investigations by means of the exchange of information.

Information on politically motivated crime is exchanged with the Tunisian security authorities, although such exchanges have not hitherto extended to covert investigations.

The Federal Criminal Police Office liaison officer responsible for Tunisia has taken action to support investigations into religiously motivated terrorism as follows:

• Casework on the threats posed by Islamist terrorism.

• Reporting on incidents of politically motivated crime in Tunisia.

• Support during criminal investigations, general exchanges of information with the Tunisian authorities (e.g. gathering of border entry data). Support has not been provided for covert investigations.

20. What projects has the Federal Police’s border police liaison officer in Tunisia worked on over the last 12 months?

a) In how many cases has ‘information about the illegal migration situation’ been exchanged with the Tunisian security authorities in the last 12 months?

The border police liaison officer has reported regularly and on an ad hoc basis on ‘illegal migration’ from and via Tunisia. No German information about illegal migration has been passed on.

b) What ‘training assistance and equipment aid issues’ has the officer worked on over the last 12 months?

As a point of contact for the different actors, the border police liaison officer has arranged various training assistance and equipment aid activities with the Tunisian side, and has coordinated the preparation of training events on the ground. He is involved organisationally in the actual implementation of the activities.

21. What specific content was delivered by the BKA in the fourth quarter of 2012 during the Liaison Officer System, Motor Vehicle Crime, Recruitment of Police Personnel and Counterterrorism training courses conducted in Tunisia (Bundestag Printed paper 17/12469), and what techniques and procedures were presented in this context?

The Recruitment of Police Personnel course presented the procedure for the recruitment of trainees for the higher intermediate and higher police services. It looked in particular at the psychodiagnostic procedures deployed, and the appraisal and decision-making process when personnel are selected. The following content was delivered: Legal foundations for personnel recruitment (German Basic Law (GG), Federal Civil Service Act (BBG), Federal Ordinance on Careers and Promotion of Public Officials (BLV), Detective Careers Regulation (KrimLV), Federal Personnel Representation Act (BPersVG), Federal Act on Gender Equality (BGleiG), General Equal Treatment Act (AGG)), the structures and procedures involved in the recruitment processes for the higher intermediate and higher police services (preconditions, advertising of posts, selection procedure, appointment), structures and diagnostic instruments for the selection of personnel (aptitude test diagnostics, semi-structured interviews, assessment centres) for various target groups (higher intermediate and higher police services), as well as the foundations for quality assurance and evaluation.

The Motor Vehicle Crime training course conducted in Tunisia in the fourth quarter of 2012 delivered the following content: Overview of motor vehicle crime, legal analysis of motor vehicle crime, presentation of various modi operandi, vehicle identification taking into consideration the distinctive features typical of different manufacturers, security features of vehicle documents and the identification of forgeries, investigative options, organisation of a professional checkpoint and return of seized vehicles.

The Liaison Officer System course presented the BKA’s liaison officer system to the Tunisian course participants. It examined the following points: The selection of BKA liaison officers, planning of postings, preparation of BKA liaison officers, posting and functions of BKA liaison officers in other countries, cooperation with authorities in Germany and other countries, logistics and welfare.

The Counterterrorism course mentioned in the question included an account of the German police, the methodology of threat assessment and international aspects of counterterrorism work. In addition to this, the investigative procedures used by the Federal Criminal Police Office were presented.

22. What was the specific content of the courses conducted by the Hesse police in Tunisia for the BKA (Bundestag Printed paper 17/12760), Tactical Communication with Demonstrators, Measures at Football Matches, and Organisation and Establishment of a Command Post (please give a rough outline of the added value the Tunisian police were, in the view of the German Federal Government, expected to draw from the issues dealt with)?

The activities undertaken by the Hesse police did not involve the delivery of individual courses for the Federal Criminal Police Office. Rather, papers were given to a Tunisian delegation at the Frankfurt am Main Police Headquarters. The Land Hesse arranged a four-day working visit for a Tunisian delegation with financial support from the Federal Foreign Office. 23. What does the German Federal Government know about what are termed ‘counterterrorist crisis teams’, which are being established as part of the ‘security sector reform’ it is supporting (http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130327-tunisie-creation-cellules-crise-antiterroristes)?

a) What is the purpose of the unit, and who will lead or command it?

The German Federal Government is aware of the establishment of these ‘counterterrorist crisis teams’ from the press. Further to this, it has no information.

b) To what extent is the German Federal Government involved directly or indirectly in the establishment of the new unit (including any involvement in an advisory capacity)?

The German Federal Government has not been involved in the establishment of these units.

c) What other relationships, agreements or measures has the German Federal Government entered into or taken with the High Security Council, which is responsible for setting up the special unit?

The German Federal Government has not hitherto had any dealings with the High Security Council.

d) In view of its extensive support for the ‘security sector reform’ in Tunisia and the advice it has provided on its implementation, will this report prompt it to undertake its own investigations into the purported ‘counterterrorist crisis teams’?

The German Federal Government has regular contacts with the Tunisian transitional government, which allow it to discuss current developments in the country, including developments in security policy.

24. What knowledge or evidence does the German Federal Government have concerning the matters reported by the highly regarded opposition Internet portal Nawaat on 26 March 2013, according to which a ‘parallel police force’ is being built up in Tunisia, which is being trained in a police barracks at Tunis-Carthage Airport, and whose existence is justified by the Tunisian government as an ‘airport police force’ (http://tinyurl.com/clgggoe)?

In view of its extensive support for the ‘security sector reform’ in Tunisia and the advice it has provided on its implementation, will this report prompt it to undertake its own investigations into the matter?

The German Federal Government is aware of press reports about this issue. In April 2013, the new Minister of the Interior in the transitional government, Lotfi Ben Jeddou, ordered a series of personnel changes at Tunis-Carthage Airport. The German Federal Government is not aware of further details.

The German Federal Government has regular contacts with the Tunisian transitional government, which allow it to discuss current developments in the country, including developments in security policy. 25. What does the German Federal Government know about the claims that thousands of young Tunisians are in Syria supporting the fighting against the government (http://magharebia.com/fr/articles/awi/features/2013/03/27/feature-02), and what Tunisian and German authorities have been involved in any exchange of information?

In view of its support for the ‘security sector reform’ in Tunisia and the advice it has provided on its implementation, what is the German Federal Government’s attitude towards the news that criminal investigations have been instituted against individuals who have travelled to Syria?

According to information the German Federal Government has received from the intelligence services, there are currently Tunisians in Syria, at least some of whom are supporting the opposition to the government. No statements can be made concerning the total number of Tunisians who are in Syria and their age structure.

The German Federal Government assumes that the Tunisian criminal investigation authorities are taking action against individuals who have committed crimes on the basis of statutory provisions and in conformity with international legal provisions.

26. What does the German Federal Government know about the content of, and participants in, the workshop on ‘promoting constructive political participation of and with Salafi actors in North Africa’ organised in Tunis by the Czech government?

The German Federal Government has no information concerning the content of, and participants in, this event at Tunis.

27. What meetings of the ‘Tunisia Task Force’ have taken place in the last 12 months, what substantive issues have they dealt with, and who attended them?

a) What specific ‘international financial institutions’, what ‘private sector’ companies, what civil society organisations and what Members of the European Parliament are currently members of the ‘Task Force’ (Bundestag Printed paper 17/10107)?

b) In the view of the German Federal Government, what ‘important contribution to support for the Tunisian reform process’ is being made by the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and other international institutions (Bundestag Printed paper 17/10107)?

c) To the knowledge of the German Federal Government, for what purpose are the arms and security technology manufacturers Finmeccanica, INDRA and Siemens, and the energy groups Maire Tecnimont Group, British Gas Tunisia, ACCIONA, Prolea-Sofiproteol and Gas de France Suez represented on the ‘Tunisia Task Force’, and what initiatives have they put forward (where this is not apparent from the minutes, please provide as much information as can be remembered)? The Spanish diplomat Bernardino Leon, who was appointed EU Special Representative for the transformation countries in 2011, has a mandate to use what are known as ‘task forces’ to ensure the coherence of the EU’s activities. The only meeting of such a task force with Tunisia to date was held in Tunisia on 28/29 September 2011, and was chaired by the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Lady Catherine Ashton, and the then Tunisian prime minister, Béji Caid Essebsi. The co-chairs issued a joint statement about the Task Force’s conclusions. These task forces are not permanent structures, but high-profile meetings that have now been held with Jordan (February 2012) and Egypt (November 2012).

The mandates of the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) have been extended to the states in Europe’s southern neighbourhood so they can support the transition states. The aim is to use these institutions to put in place infrastructure and modernisation measures with corresponding effects on jobs and training, and to support economic reform measures.

The involvement of companies in fringe events held while a task force is meeting serves to promote inward investment to foreign investors, which is considered to be significant for the creation of jobs by the host governments.

28. What progress has been made by the ‘dialogue for migration, mobility and security’ between the EU and Tunisia that began in October 2011, and who is involved in the relevant initiatives?

a) For what purpose have the agencies FRONTEX, EASO and EUROPOL been involved, what proposals have they put forward, what cooperative activities that have resulted from the ‘dialogue’ are they participating in, and in what ways?

b) What progress has been made in the negotiations about a working agreement between FRONTEX and Tunisia?

The German Federal Government is not aware of any progress in the negotiations about a working agreement between FRONTEX and Tunisia. FRONTEX intends to invite a delegation from Tunisia in the near future in order to get the negotiations moving.

c) What Tunisian civil society organisations are taking part in the ‘dialogue’, of which the German Federal Government reported in the summer of 2012 that it was ‘planned to involve civil society institutions under the Mobility Partnership, for example representatives of diaspora organisations from the Member States and Tunisian non-governmental organisations committed to combatting human trafficking and corruption’ (Bundestag Printed paper 17/10107)?

After Tunisia had communicated its views on the proposal for a joint declaration about a Mobility Partnership in November 2012, the EU forwarded a revised text to Tunisia at the beginning of 2013. To date, there has been no response to this from the Tunisian side. Representatives from FRONTEX, EASO and Europol were present in an advisory capacity during the talks in Tunisia, acting within the scope of the mandates held by their respective agencies.

Talks are now being held regularly with Tunisian civil society organisations. For example, Anna Terrón, the special advisor to EU Commissioner Cecilia Malmström, met representatives of civil society and spoke with them about a future Mobility Partnership when she travelled to Tunisia from 25 to 27 February 2013. The people she met included representatives of the following organisations: IOM, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), Tunis Centre for Migration and Asylum (CETUMA), Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights (FTDES) and Arab Institute of Business Managers (IACE).

The EU Delegation in Tunis also participates regularly in events organised by civil society organisations at which the Mobility Partnership is discussed.

29. What information is the German Federal Government able to provide about the progress of the work on a European Union ‘Action Plan’ for Tunisia?

To what extent are the justice and home affairs sectors, above all police cooperation and migration control, touched upon by the ‘Action Plan’ (please discuss in greater detail than the outline given in Bundestag Printed paper 17/10107)?

When the Association Council met in Brussels on 19 November 2012, Tunisia and the European Union agreed politically on a new Action Plan for Privileged Partnership. The finalisation of the document has been delayed by the government crisis in Tunisia, but is expected in May 2013.

The Action Plan can be viewed on the Internet sites of the EU Delegation to Tunis and the European Commission (DEVCO), and also covers the justice and home affairs sectors.

The topic of migration will be dealt with under the Privileged Partnership by strengthening exchange in the fields of (vocational) education, labour market access, research, health, culture and youth exchanges. Furthermore, the dialogue for migration, mobility and security should create a framework for balanced cooperation on legal migration and migration management, the linkage of migration and development, protection for migrants’ rights, and efforts to combat irregular migration and organised crime. In this connection, reference is made to the shared goal of reaching agreement on a Mobility Partnership.

Specifically, the Action Plan deals in greater depth with cooperation on action to combat human trafficking, and the protection of asylum seekers and refugees. For example asylum seekers and refugees are to be protected by the provision of support for the establishment of a specialised administrative body to deal with asylum procedures in Tunisia.

30. What does the German Federal Government know about the founding of a ‘rule-of-law institute’ in Tunisia, which has come to the notice of the Members who are tabling this minor interpellation, a body that is supposed to work on, among other things, the ‘promotion of the rule of law’ and respect for human rights?

The intention is to establish the International Institute of Justice and the Rule of Law in Tunisia with its seat in Tunis. At present, work is being done to put in place the legal and organisational preconditions for this, and clarify the substantive issues its curriculums will cover.

a) To what extent and for what purpose should the Institute also deal with ‘extremism’?

Work is currently being done on the curriculums. Whether and to what extent the topic of ‘extremism’ will also play a role is therefore open at the present point in time.

b) What role is being played by the Global Counterterrorism Forum and its Countering Violent Extremism Working Group as far as this initiative is concerned?

The International Institute of Justice and the Rule of Law in Tunisia is to be established in the context of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) without being part of the GCTF. To date, there have been no contacts between the GCTF’s Countering Violent Extremism Working Group and the International Institute of Justice and the Rule of Law in Tunisia.

31. How has the German Federal Government worked since the summer of 2012 to ‘guarantee fundamental freedoms in Tunisia, including freedom of opinion, freedom of assembly and freedom of association’ (Bundestag Printed paper 17/10107)?

Is the German Federal Government aware of the extent to which freedom of opinion is now guaranteed by the Tunisian government, and how does it assess the implementation of the appropriate measures called for in Bundestag Printed paper 17/10107?

The German Federal Government has underlined the significance of fundamental freedoms in the Tunisian Transformation process in the German-Tunisian consultations at state secretary level, which will be held again on 12 September 2013 in Berlin, and articulated this position in the joint declaration issued by the state secretaries. In addition to this, steps to guarantee fundamental freedoms have been addressed under a project designed to support the process of drafting a Tunisian constitution and during the discussions on this matter. The German Federal Government is continuing to work for freedom of opinion, freedom of assembly and freedom of association to be guaranteed.

The new Tunisian transitional government led by Prime Minister Ali Laarayedh also professes its commitment to freedom of opinion. It continues to be enshrined in the transitional constitution, the ‘Little Constitution’ as it is known. However, the legal implementation of projects to expand and strengthen these freedoms at a purely legislative level, media freedom in particular, has been delayed in the last few months due to the government crisis.

32. Is it true that the Commission is deploying specialists in ‘information exchange and technical support’ to Tunisia to prepare for a ‘security sector reform’ (netzpolitik.org, 15 March 2013, ‘The revolution will be intercepted and databased: EU-Polizeiprojekte beglücken den Arabischen Frühling’), and what further details can the German Federal Government provide on this matter?

In mid-April 2013, the European Commission and the European External Action Service identified 12 experts to be deployed to Tunisia (none of whom are German citizens). The selection was forwarded to the Tunisian interior ministry.

a) What functions was or is the delegation entrusted with?

The goal of the expert mission is to carry out a ‘peer review’ of the Tunisian security sector, in particular the authorities that report to the Ministry of the Interior, and the functioning of the security authorities with a view to the rule of law, their finances, defence issues and democratic oversight. The peer review is intended to be the starting point for an appraisal of the reforms that will need to be undertaken.

b) What meetings or other activities are or have been provided for?

In order to prepare for the peer review, a meeting on the ‘terms of reference’ for the experts was held at Tunis in October 2012.

c) In what ways have federal authorities been involved in the discussion, performance or evaluation of this measure?

The German Federal Government was involved in the preparation of this measure when the Council working group met in Brussels.

d) What results are already available, and what is their substantive content?

The experts have not been deployed yet. There are therefore no results available.